ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIAversusTELEANGANA RASTRA SAMITHI & ANR.

                   [2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 468


A             ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA
                               v.
            TELEANGANA RASTRA SAMITHI & ANR.
               (Civil Appeal No. 10244 of 2010)
                       DECEMBER 03, 2010
B
           [ALTAMAS KABIR AND A.K. PATNAIK, JJ.]

         Representation of the People Act, 1951 - ss. 151A, 84,
    98, 101 and 150 - State Legislative Assembly- Resignation
C   by members - Vacancies notified in official gazette - Election
    Commission with-holding bye-elections to two constituencies
    due to pendency of election petitions - Challenged to -
    Direction by High Court to hold bye-elections in two casual
    vacancies in State Legislative Assembly - Held: Not
D   sustainable - Vacancy in order to be filled up in a bye-
    election, must be available for being filled up - Article 190
    provides that seat of the member becomes vacant on
    acceptance of his resignation by Speaker and would result in
    creation of casual vacancy- It does not introduce any element
E   of compulsion on Election Commission to hold a bye-election
    ignoring the provisions of s. 84 - Proceeding uls. 84 has to
    run its full course, particularly for the purposes of s. BA -
    Provisions of ss. 150 and 151 would be attracted which does
    not prescribing time limit for filling up such vacancy -
F   Introduction of s. 151A prescribing time limit for filling up
    vacancy, did not alter the position of s. 84 and ss. 98(c) and
    101 (b), since although casual vacancy in which election
    petitions were pending, may have occurred within the
    meaning of s. 150, cannot be held to have become available
G   for the purposes of being filled up within the time prescribed
    uls. 151A - Constitution of India, 1950 - Articles 354 and
     190(3)(b) - Election Laws - Interpretation of statutes.

        s. 151A - Interpretation of- Explained.

H                                468
ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA v. TELEANGANA 469
          RASTRA SAMITHI & ANR.

     ss. 150, 84 and 151A - Ratio in *D. Sanjeevayya's case         A
that when vacancy is caused by resignation of a member of
the House where election petition is pending, Election
Commission not bound u/s. 150 to hold bye-election
immediately after a vacancy arises but entitled to suspend
taking action u/s. 150 till decision in election petition uls. 84   B
was known - Subsequent insertion of s. 151A - Effect of s.
 151A on D. Sanjeevayya's case - Explained.

     Twelve members of the A. P. State Legislative
Assembly resigned from their membership to claim a
separate statehood. The vacancies were notified in the              C
official gazette. The appellant-Election Commission
issued notification to hold bye-elections to fill up 10 clear
vacancies. However, it did not issue notifications to hold
bye-elections to two constituencies due to pendency of
the election petitions. The respondent-Committee filed a            D
writ petition challenging the order of the Election
Commission not to hold bye-elections in the two
constituencies. The High Court directed the appellant to
hold bye-elections in the two casual vacancies in the
State Legislative Assembly. Therefore, the appellant filed          E
the instant appeal.

    Allowing the appeal, the Court

     HELD: 1.1. The key words in Article 190 of the
Constitution of India, 1950 relating to disqualification of         F
members of both the Houses of the Legislature of a State
and deals with vacation of seats, are that if a Member
resigns a seat and such resignation is accepted by the
Speaker or the Chairman, his seat shall thereupon
become vacant. In such event, it would result in the                G
creation of a casual vacancy within the meaning of Part
IX relating to bye-elections which contains Section 147
and Sections 149 to 151 A of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951. If such casual vacancy occurs in the
                                                                    H
    470   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A State Legislative Assemblies or the State Legislative
  Councils, the provisions of Sections 150 and 151 are
  attracted, which do not, however, prescribe any time limit
  for such vacancy to be filled up by the Election
  Commission. The provisions of Section 150 are relevant
s to the facts of the instant case since the case is with
  regard to the A.P. State Legislative Assembly. The
  provision of Section 150 gives rise to the apparent
  conflict regarding the duty of the Election Commission
  to fill up such vacancies in view of the provisions. of
c Section 84. According to the provisions of Section 84, in
  addition to claiming a declaration that the election of all
  or any of the returned candidates is void, an election
  petitioner can claim a further declaration that he himself
  or any other candidate has been duly elected. While
  Article 190(3)(b) provides that upon resignation of a seat
0
  by an elected member, if accepted, creates a vacancy,
  which, in turn, attracts the provisions of Part IX, a different
  note is struck by the latter part of Section 84 which
  cannot be lost sight of. If the election of the member who
  resigns is unchallenged, there is no difficulty in
E harmonizing the provisions of Section 151A with the rest
  of the Sections included in Part IX and Section SA of the
  1951 Act. It is only when an election petition is filed under
  Section 84 of the Act that the latter part of the Section
  comes into play. [Paras 24, 25 and 26] [486-F-H; 487-A-
F H; 488-A-D]

       1.2. In *O. Sanjeevayya's case while considering the
  effect of Article 190(3)(b) of the Constitution, it was held
  that the vacancy caused by the decision of the Speaker
G did not become a vacancy available for being filled up
  and/or capable of being filled up till a declaration was
  either made or refused under the latter part of Section 84.
  Notwithstanding the intervention of Section 151A by way
  of amendmerit with effect from 1st August, 1996, the
H
ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA v. TELEANGANA 471
          RASTRA SAMITHI & ANR.
position remains the same. The only effect on account of A
such declaration under Article 190(3)(b) is that a time limit
was fixed for holding bye-elections in respect of casual
vacancies. As regards the question whether a vacancy
caused on account of any of the contingencies
contemplated in Sections 147 and 149 to 151 can be said B
to be an available vacancy for the purposes of Section
151A of the 1951 Act, it is significant that in Section 151A
neither Section 84 nor Sections 98(c) and 101 (b) have
been mentioned. The casual vacancies referred to in
Sections 147 and 149 to 150 in the State Legislative c
Assembly and the State Legislative Council, are referred.
What was not indicated in the said provisions were
provided in Section 151A with the two exceptions carved
out in the proviso. Section 151A prescribed a time limit
   1

wit~in which a bye-election is to be held to fill up any
                                                               0
vacancy referred to in Sections 147 and 149 to 151 of the
1951 Act. Therefore, the Division Bench of the High Court
was clearly wrong in coming to a finding that the non-
obstante clause of Section 151A, which was not available,
when the decision in *D. Sanjeevayya's case was
rendered, altered the whole legal scenario and rendered E
the decision in *D.Sanjeevayya's case to be no longer
good law; and that in view of Section 151A, the provisions
of Section 84 or 98(c) or 101(b) became redundant upon
a seat being declared vacant by the Speaker of the House
under Article 190(3)(b) of the Constitution of India. It F
cannot be said that with the introduction of Section 151A
in the 1951 Act, it was the clear intention of the legislature
to wipe out the effects of *D.Sanjeevayya's case where the
decision had been rendered in the light of the provisions
of Section 150 where no time limit had been provided for G
filling up casual vacancies; and that section 151A
provides that when such casual vacancy arises, the
Election Commission has to fill up the vacancy by holding
bye-elections within six months from the date of
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    472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A occurrence of the vacancy. Any other interpretation of
  Section 151A would render the provisions of Sections S4,
  9S(c), 101(b) and SA of the 1951 Act otiose, which could
  not have been the intention of the Legislature, which
  would otherwise have clearly indicated as such in the
s proviso to Section 151A. [Paras 31 and 32] [491-F-H; 492-
  A-H; 493-A]

        *D. Sanjeevayya vs. Election Tribunal Andhra Pradesh
    and Ors. AIR 1967 SC 1211 - relied on.

C       1.3. A vacancy in order to be filled up in a bye-
  election, must be available for being filled up. In a
  situation contemplated by the latter half of Section S4 and
  its consequences as reflected in Sections 9S(c), 101(b)
  and SA of the 1951 Act, it cannot be said that a vacancy
D in such a situation would be a vacancy available for being
  filled up by a bye-election, particularly in a situation where
  allegations of corrupt practices have been made which,
  if proved, provides for disqualification under Section SA
  of the Act. Simply by submitting his resignation, a
E successful candidate against whom allegations of corrupt
  practices are made, cannot escape the consequences of
  Section SA of the Act, if the same are ultimately found to
  be proved. [Para 33] [493-B-D]

       1.4. The Representation of the People Act, 1951 is a
F complete Code for the conduct of elections by the
  Election Commission of India appointed under Article 324
  of the Constitution. Therefore, the provisions of Article
  190(3)(b) of the Constitution have to be read along with
  the provisions of the 1951 Act. Section S4 cannot be
G rendered otiose by holding that all vacancies on account
  of the said provision of the Constitution become
  immediately available for being filled up by way of a bye-
  election. The same reasoning applies in regard to Section
  151A and its impact on the latter part of Section S4
H
ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA v. TELEANGANA 473
          RASTRA SAMITHI & ANR.
thereof. A proceeding under Section 84 has to run its full A
course, particularly for the purposes of Section SA of the
Act. Therefore, the introduction of Section 151A did not
alter the position as far as the provisions of Section 84
and consequently 98(c) and 101(b) of the 1951 Act, since
although a casual vacancy may have occurred within the B
meaning of Section 150 of the 1951 Act, those vacancies
in which election petitions were filed and were pending
cannot be held to have become available for the
purposes of being filled up within the time. prescribed
under Section 151A of the 1951 Act. Article 190(3)(b) of c
the Constitution does not introduce any element of
compulsion on the Election Commission to hold a bye-
election ignoring the provisions of Section 84 of the Act.
In such cases, there is a little hesitation in holding that
such casual vacancies are not available for being filled 0
up and the Commission will have to wait for holding
elections in such Constituencies until a decision is
 rendered in regard to the latter part of Section 84 of the
 1951 Act, during the life of the House. The view expressed
by the High Court that a case has to be decided in
accordance with the laws as existing on the date of E
adjudication, while salutary in principle, are not attracted
to the facts of the instant case, in view of the provisions
of Section 84 of the 1951 Act. [Paras 34 and 35] [493-H;
494-A-H; 495-A]
                                                            F
    1.5. The judgment and order of the High Court is set
aside and the writ petition filed by the respondent No.1
for a direction to hold bye-elections for the 28-
Vemulawada Assembly Constituency and 29-Sircilla
Assembly Constituency is dismissed. [Para 36) [495-B-C]     G

     Sri Thomas Mates Gudinhjo vs. Election Commission of
India, New Delhi and Ors. AIR 2002 .Karnataka 232; Shri
Venkataramana Devaru vs. State of Mysore AIR 1958 SC
255; Reserve Bank of India vs. Peerless General Finance
                                                            H
    474    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A and Investment Co. Ltd. and Ors. (1987) 1 SCC 424; O.P.
  Sing/a and Anr. vs. Union of India and Ors. (1984) 4 SCC
  450; Krishan Kumar vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. (1991)
  4 SCC 258; Sultana Begum vs. Prem Chand Jain (1997) 1
  SCC 373; Central Bank of India vs. State of Kera/a and Ors.
B (2009) 4 SCC 94; Loknath Pradhan vs. Birendra Kumar Sahu
  AIR 1974 SC 505; Jyoti Basu vs. Debi Ghosa/ and Ors.
  (1982) 1 SCC 691; Consumer Education and Research
  Society vs. Union of India and Ors. (2009) 9 SCC 648;
  Baliram Waman Hiray vs. Justice B. Lentin and Ors. (1988)
c 4 SCC 419; La/ji Haridas vs. State of Maharashtra AIR
  1964 SC 1154; Indira Nehru Gandhi vs. Shri Raj Narain
  and Anr. 1975 Supp. SCC 1; Kanwar Lal vs. Amar Nath
  Chawla and Ors. (1975) 3 SCC 646 - referred to.
                        Case Law Reference:
D
          AIR 2002 Karnataka 232 Referred to.      Para 12
          AIR 1958 SC 255        Referred to.      Para 18
          (1987) 1 sec 424       Referred to.      Para 18
E         (1984) 4 sec 450       Referred to.      Para 18
          (1991) 4 sec 258       Referred to.      Para 18
          (1997) 1 sec 373       Referred to.      Para 18

F         (2009) 4 sec 94        Referred to.      Para 19
          AIR 1974 SC 505        Referred to.      Para 20
          (1982) 1 sec 691        Referred to.     Para 20
          (2009) 9 sec 648        Referred to.     Para 21
G
          (1988) 4 sec 419        Referred to.     Para 29
          AIR 1964 SC 1154        Referred to.     Para 29
          1975 Supp. sec 1        Referred to.     Para 29
H
ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA v. TELEANGANA 475
          RASTRA SAMITHI & ANR.
    (19~5) 3 SCC 646              Referred to.        Para 29        A
    AIR 1967 SC 1211              ReUed on.           Paras 31,
                                                      32, 33
    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
10244 of 2010.                                                       B

     From the Judgment & Order dated 30.6.2010 of the High
Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Writ
Petition No. 14443.

     Meenakshi Arora, Poli Katakai for the Appellant                 c
   Indira Jaising, ASG, D. Ramakrishna Reddy, Sonam
Anand, J. Ramachander Rao, P. Venkat Reddy, 8.
Ramamurthy, Anil Kumar Tandale for the Respondents.
                                                                     D
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     ALTAMAS KABIR, J. 1. Leave granted.

      2. The Election Commission of India has filed this appeal
against the judgment and order dated 30th June, 2010, passed         E
by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ
Petition No.14443 of 2010 filed by the Respondent, Telangana
Rastra Samithi, challenging the decision of the Commission not
to hold bye-elections to 28-Vemulawada and 29-Sircilla
Assembly Constituencies in the State of Andhra Pradesh. The          F
writ petition involving the holding of bye-elections to casual
vacancies in the State Legislative Assembly, was allowed by
the High Court by its impugned judgment by applying the literal
rule of interpretation. It was held that the provisions of Section
151A of the Representation of the People Act, 1.951,                 G
hereinafter referred to as 'the 1951 Act', were mandatory and
that the pendency of election petitions and the uncertain
consequences that might follow would not in any manner dilute
the effect of Section 151 A, especially when the Speaker of the
Assembly had already notified the vacancies as contemplated          H
    476 SUPR~ME COURT REPORTS [2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A under Article 190(3)(b) of the Constitution read with Section 150
  of the aforesaid Act and had directed the Appellant herein to
  hold bye-elections for filling up the vacancies for the two
  aforesaid Assembly Constituencies along with bye-elections
  already notified for ten other Assembly Constituencies.
B
        3. Briefly stated, the facts indicate that in order to press
  for a separate Telangana State, a Joint Action Committee was
  formed with all political parties which took a decision that all
  the members of the Legislative Assembly of the respective
  political parties should resign. Consequently, 12 members
C submitted their resignations from the membership of the Andhra
  Pradesh State Legislative Assembly to the Speaker of the
  Assembly on 14th February, 2010. On receipt of the said
  resignations, the Speaker ordered that the resultant vacancies
  be notified. The said notification was duly published in the
D Andhra Pradesh Gazette (Part II Extraordinary) dated
  14.02.2010. The Election Commission of India issued a Press
  Note dated 21.06.2010 under Section 30 of the 1951 Act,
  notifying. its decision to hold bye-elections to fill. up 10 clear
  vacancies according to the programme indicated therein. The
E bye-elections to 28-Vemulawada and 29-Sircilla Assembly
  Constituencies were not notified on account of the fact that
  election petitions were pending in which the petitioners had
  sought to be declared elected. Accordingly, there being 1Oclear
  vacancies in the State Legislative Assembly of Andhra
F Pradesh, the Commission decided to hold bye-elections to fill
  up the 10 clear vacancies as per programme indicated. The
  decision of the Election Commission of India, hereinafter
  referred to as "the Commission", not to hold bye-elections in
  the two aforesaid constituencies was challenged in the writ
G petition, which was ultimately allowed.
        4. The question raised in the writ petition was whether
    Section 151A read with Sections 84, 98, 101 and 150 of the
    1951 Act, was mandatory or only directory. A question was also
H
ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA v. TELEANGANA 477
  RASTRA SAMITHI & ANR. [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]
raised as to whether Section 151A of the above Act is subject       A
to Article 324 of the Constitution. Since Section 151A of the
1951 Act is the focal point of the case made out by the writ
petitioners, the same is extracted hereinbelow :

    "151A. Time limit for filling vacancies referred to in          8
    sections 147, 149, 150 and 151.- Notwithstanding
    anything contained in section 147, section 149, section
    150 and section 151, a bye-election for filling any vacancy
    referred to in any of the said sections shall be held within
    a period of six months from the date of the occurrence of       C
    the vacancy:

          Provided that nothing contained in this section shall
    apply if-

     (a) the remainder of the term of a member in relation to a     o
     vacancy is less than one year; or

    (b) the Election Commission in consultation with the
    Central Government certifies that it is difficult to hold the
    bye election within the said period.
                                                                    E
     5. The High Court took the view that Sections 147, 148,
149, 150, 151 and 151A of the 1951 Act appear in Part IX
which deals with bye-elections. Part V of the aforesaid Act,
which deals with the conduct of general elections and Part Ill,
do not prescribe any time limit obliging the Commission to          F   I
conduct elections within a period of 6 months after expiry of the
term of the Assembly. Section 15 of the Act provides that
general elections shall be held for the purpose of constituting
a new legislative assembly on the expiration of the duration of
the existing Legislative Assembly or on its dissolution. The        G
proviso thereto prohibits a general election at any time before
six months prior to expiry of the term of the Assembly. Such
prohibition, however, does not apply to a case where the
Legislative Assembly is dissolved. Interpreting the provisions
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    478    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A   of Section 151A of the 1951 Act, the High Court observed that
    it is the only provision in the said Act which prescribes a time
    limit for filling casual vacancies both in the Rajya Sabha and
    the Lok Sabha and in the State Legislative Assemblies and
    State Legislative Councils by holding the bye-elections within
s   a period of 6 months from the date of the occurrence of the
    vacancies.

         6. Analysing the provisions of Sections 84, 98(c) and 101
    of the 1951 Act, the High Court held that the said sections are
C   enabling in nature, enabling an election petitioner to claim a
    declaration that the election of the returned candidate is void
    and for a further declaration that he or any other candidate had
    been duly elected. The High Court recorded the submission
    made on behalf of the Commission that if the bye-election to a
    constituency is not stayed and if a candidate who files an
D   election petition eventually gets such a declaration, and if a bye-
    election is held consequent upon a resignation of a Member,
    it could result in an impossible situation. On behalf of the
    Commission it was also submitted that the provisions of
    Sections 150 and 151 of the 1951 Act should be construed
E   harmoniously. The High Court, however, rejected the
    submissions made on behalf of the petitioner and took the stand
    that in view of the non-obstante clause in Section 151A, such
    harmonious construction was ruled out and that even otherwise,
    grant of additional relief of declaration that the election petitioner
F   had been elected was not the rule.

       7. On the basis of its aforesaid findings the High Court,
  despite the decision of this Court in D. Sanjeevayya Vs.
  Election Tribunal Andhra Pradesh and others [AIR 1967 SC
  1211    =1967 (2) SCR 489], held that the submissions made
G on behalf of the Election Commission that the provisions of
  Section 151 A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,
  should be interpreted so as not to render Sections 84, 98 and
  101 otiose, was unsustainable. It was also held that a Court
  should decide a case as per the law as on the existing date of
H
ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA v. TELEANGANA 479
  RASTRA SAMITHI & ANR. [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]
adjudication. The High Court, therefore, allowed the writ petition    A
and directed elections be held in the two constituencies
referred to hereinabove, since in its view ignoring the provisions
of Section 151A of the 1951 Act would amount to violation of
Article 327 and valid law made by Parliament.
                                                                      B
     8. Appearing for the Election Commission, learned
Advocate, Ms. Meenakshi Arora submitted that the approach
of the High Court in the impugned judgment and the final
conclusion reached in this case was completely contrary to the
views expressed by this Court in 0. Sanjeevayya's case                C
(Supra). Ms. Arora submitted that the said decision fully
covered the question raised in the present Election Petition and
the High Court had erred in trying to distinguish the same on
the sole ground that the said decision had been rendered at a
point of time when Section 151 A had not been introduced into
the 1951 Act.                                                         D

     9. Ms. Arora submitted that the issue to be resolved in this
case is the apparent conflict between jhe provisions of
Sections 84, 98(c) and 101(b) of the 1951 Act and Section
151A thereof in the light of Article 190 (3)(b) of the Constitution   E
of India. It was further submitted that the question to be
answered in this case is whether the directions contained in
Section 151 A of the 1951 Act indicating that notwithstanding
anything contained in Sections 147, 149, 150 and 151 thereof,
a bye-election for filling any vacancy referred to in any of the      F
said sections shall be held within a period of six months from
the date of the occurrence of the vacancy, barring the two
exceptions indicated in the proviso, are directory in nature or
mandatory. The same has to be considered along with the
provisions of Sections 84, 98(c) and 101(b) of the 1951 Act           G
and Article 190(3)(b) of the Constitution, which provides that
once a Member of a House resigns from the House of the
Legislature of a State and the same is accepted by the
Speaker, the seat shall become vacant.

     10. Ms. Arora submitted that all these questions had fallen      H
    480    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A for consideration in 0. Sanjeevayya's case (supra) and had
  been duly answered, though not in the context of Section 151A
  of the 1951 Act. The learned counsel urged that the introduction
  of Section 151A in the 1951 Act with effect from 1st August,
  1996, did not alter the situation to any great extent since even
B after the introduction of Section 151A, the question still remains
  as to what would happen in the event a declaration prayed for
  under the latter part of Section 84, was made by the Election
  Commission, in terms of Section 98(c) and 101 (b) of the said
  Act.
c      11. Ms. Arora submitted that the decision in 0.
  Sanjeevayya's case (Supra) was rendered in relation to the
  provisions of Section 150 of the 1951 Act in the context of both
  Article 190(3)(b) of the Constitution and the apparent
  contradiction in Sections 84, 98(c) and 101(b) of the 1951 Act
D and would be equally applicable to the instant case, since the
  same question is involved regarding the relief contemplated in
  the latter part of Section 84 of the 1951 Act.

        12. Ms. Arora urged that the provisions of Section 151A,
E by their very nature made it clear that the same were directory
  and not mandatory in nature. It was urged that apart from the
  two exceptions carved out in the proviso, there was no mention
  of Sections 84, 98(c) or even 101 (b) in the amended
  provisions, which the Legislature, if it had so intended, could
F have also included in the proviso. In this connection, Ms. Arora
  referred to a Division Bench decision of the Karnataka High
  Court in Sri Thomas Mates Gudinhjo vs. Election Commission
  of India, New Delhi and Ors. [AIR 2002 Karnataka 232),
  wherein R.V.Raveendran, J. (as His Lordship then was) while
G delivering the judgment for the Bench, took note of the decision
  of this Court in D. Sanjeevayya's case (supra) and held as
  follows:

          "Section 151 A no doubt seeks to ensure that no
          Constituency remains unrepresented for more than six
H
ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA v. TELEANGANA 481
  RASTRA SAMITHI & ANR. [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]
    months. But it is not unconditional. It is subject to two        A
    exceptions i.e. where the remainder of the term of a
    member in relation to a vacancy is less than one year or
    where the Election Commission in consultation with the
    Central Government certifies that it is difficult to hold the
    bye-election within the said period. Further the Non             B
    obstante clause is limited in its application to Sections 147,
    149, 150 and 151. The non obstante clause does not refer
    to Section 84 or 98 (c ) or 101. It therefore follows that
    Section 151A will have no application if an Election
    Petition is pending where the prayer is not merely a             c
    challenge to the election of the elected candidate, but also
    seeks a declaration that the petitioner or some one else
    should be declared as having been elected under Sections
    84 read with Section 101 of the Act."
     13. Ms. Arora submitted that the judgment and order of the      D
Andhra Pradesh High Court was not sustainable and was liable
to be set aside.
     14. Learned Additional Solicitor General (ASG), Ms. Indira
Jaisingh, while reiterating Ms. Arora's submissions on the           E
relevant provisions of the 1951 Act and the Constitution of India,
contended that as would be evident from Sections 112 and 116
of the 1951 Act, election petitions are filed and adjudicated not
merely in the private interest of the contesting candidates, but
also in public interest to ensure that corrupt practices are         F
eliminated and the constituency is represented by the candidate
lawfully elected. The learned ASG submitted that it is for such
reason that elections were not notified in two of the twelve
vacancies caused by the resignation of twelve legislators, as
election petitions under Section 84 of the 1951 Act were
pending in respect thereof. The learned ASG further submitted        G
that the Court was required to consider whether the Election
Commission was under any compulsion to hold bye-elections
in the constituencies in respect whereof election petitions had
been filed and were pending, having regard to the provisions
of Section 151A of the 1951 Act.                                     H
    482   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A       15. It was then reiterated that according to the rules of
  interpretation, an attempt should be made to harmonize
  apparently conflicting provisions within the same enactment
  instead of declaring one of the contradicting provisions to be
  ultra vires. The learned ASG urged that although there appears
B to be an apparent conflict between Article 190(3)(b) of the
  Constitution and Section 151A of the 1951 Act on the one hand
  and Sections 84, 98(c) and 101 (b) of the said Act on the other,
  the said provisions were capable of being harmonized in a
  manner so that such apparent conflict stood resolved.
c     -16. It was further contended that Sections 8A, BOA, 84, 98,
  99 and 101 of the 1951 Act are intended to serve a public
  purpose, namely, the eradication of corrupt practice and to
  ensure that the candidate declared elected had indeed been
  lawfully elected and that is why an election petition does not
D abate on the death of the sole petitioner. The learned ASG
  urged that both the above-mentioned provisions of the 1951 Act
  and the provisions of Section 151A thereof are intended to
  serve the public interest. While a time limit has been introduced
  in Section 151A for conducting bye-elections to maintain a duly
E elected Legislative Assembly, the public interest is also served
  by ensuring the purity of the election process. It was also urged
  that the various provisions would have to be harmonized so as
  to apply the provisions of Section 151A to all bye-elections,
  except to those in respect of which exceptions had been carved
F out in the proviso and also in relation to constituencies where
  election petitions were pending.

       17. Yet another facet of the learned ASG's submissions
  was in regard to the powers vested in the High Courts under
G Section 80A of the 1951 Act. It was submitted that such power
  could not be taken away by implication and the election petition
  would have to be allowed to reach its logical conclusion. The
  learned ASG relied primarily on the decision in 0.
  Sanjeevayya's case (supra) and the decision of the Karnataka
H High Court in Sri Thomas Mates Gudinhjo's case (supra),
 ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA v. TELEANG.A.NA 483
   RASTRA SAMITHI & ANR. [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.J
 which had been rendered after the introduction of Section 151 A,      A
 following the ratio in D. Sanjeevayya's case.

       18. On the question of harmonious construction, the
  learned ASG also relied on the decisions of this Court in (i) Shri
  Venkataramana Devaru vs. State of Mysore [AIR 1958 SC
                                                                       8
  255]; (ii) Reserve Bank of India vs. Peerless General Finance
  and Investment Co. Ltd. & Ors. [(1987) 1 SCC 424]; (iii) O.P.
  Sing/a & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors. [(1984) 4 SCC 450];
  (iv) Krishan Kumar vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. [(1991) 4
  SCC 258]; (v) Sultana Begum vs. Prem Chand Jain [(1997)
. 1 sec 373]; etc., where it has been uniformly stated thatwhere       c
  there appears to be an inconsistency between two provisions
  in the same statute, the enactment has to be read as a whole
  and the conflicting provisions have to be so construed so as
  to avoid a clash as far as possible. The said principle has been
  very lucidly explained in Sultana Begum's case (supra),              D
  paragraph 10 whereof is extracted hereinbelow :

      "10. The rule of interpretation r~quires that while
      interpreting two inconsistent, or, obviously repugnant
      provisions of an Act, the Courts should make an effort to        E
      so interpret the provisions as to harmonize them so that
      the purpose of the Act may be given effect to and both the
      provisions may be allowed to operate without rendering
      either of them otiose."

     19. With regard to the non-obstante clause in Section             F
151A of the 1951 Act, the learned ASG placing reliance on the
decision of this Court in Central Bank of India vs. State of
Kera/a & Ors. [(2009) 4 SCC 94], submitted that since Section
151A does not refer to Sections 84, 98, 99 and 101, its
provisions could not override the provisions of the said Sections      G
which would have to be given their full flow. The learned ASG
submitted that it was for the Court to maintain the balance
between two public interests by restricting the application of
Section 151 A to only those vacancies which were available
                                                                       H
    484   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A   for being filled up, including such vacancies where no election
    petition was pending.

         20. Mr. D. Ramakrishna Reddy, learned Senior Advocate
    appearing for the Respondent No.1, on the other hand
    contended with reference to the decision in D. Sanjeevayya's
8
    case (supra), that when a vacancy is declared in the Legislative
    Assembly by the Speaker under Article 190(3)(b) of the
    Constitution, the election petition could not and did not survive
    as the Speaker's decision was final. Learned counsel
    submitted that the aforesaid decision had been rendered in the
C   context of Section 150 of the 1951 Act where no time limit had
    been fixed and where Section 151A was yet to find a place in
    the statute book and could not be relied on for the purpose of
    this case as had been held by the High Court in its impugned
    judgment. Mr. Reddy, while referring to the decision of this Court
D   in Loknath Pradhan vs. Birendra Kumar Sahu [AIR 1974 SC
    505], laid particular emphasis on another decision of this Court
    in Jyoti Basu & Ors. vs. Debi Ghosa/ & Ors. [(1982) 1 SCC
    691], wherein it was held that though the right to elect was
    fundamental to democracy it was a statutory right which wciuld
E   have to be construed strictly according to the statute. Mr. Reddy
    submitted that with the introduction of Section 151A in the 1951
    Act with effect from 1st August, 1996, it was the clear intention
    of the legislature to wipe out the effects of D. Sanjeevayya's
    case where the decision had been rendered in the light of the
F   provisions of Section 150 of the said Act where no time limit
    had been provided for filling up casual vacancies.

       21. Mr. Reddy lastly referred to and relied on the decision
  rendered by this Court in Consumer Education and Research
  Society vs. Union of India & Ors. [(2009) 9 SCC 648]. He drew
G our attention to paragraph 61 of the judgment in which in the
  context of Sections 147 and 149 of the 1951 Act it was
  observed that the said provisions dealt with casual vacancies
  in the House of the People on account of the seat of a Member
  becoming vacant or being declared vacant or his election being
H
ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA v. TELEANGANA 485
  RASTRA SAMITHI & ANR. [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]
declared void. In such context it was further observed that           A
Section 151A provides that when such casual vacancy arises,
the Election Commission has to fill up the vacancy by holding
bye-elections within six months from the date of occurrence of
the vacancy.
                                                                    B
      22. The rival contentions on the issue under consideration
have been occasioned by·the introduction of Section 151A in
Part IX of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, with
effect from 1st August, 1996. Part IX of the said Act which deals
exclusively with Bye-elections contains Section 147 and C
Sections 149 to 151 which deal with casual vacancies in the
Council of States (Rajya Sabha), the House of the People (Lok
Sabha), the State Legislative Assemblies and the State
Legislative Councils. Prior to the introduction of Section 151A
in the 1951 Act, no time limit had been set for filling up the
casual vacancies contemplated in the different elected bodies, D
either under Section 147 or Section 149 to 151. Section 151A
was introduced in the 1951 Act to address the lacuna and to
make provisions for holding of bye-elections for filling any
vacancy referred to in Sections 147 and 149 to 151 within a
period of six months from the date of occurrence of the vacancy, E
barring the two exceptions carved out in the proviso to Section
151A itself. What is of vital importance in this case is the choice
of the words "a bye-election for filling any vacancy referred to
in any of the said sections shall be held within a period of six
months from the date of occurrence of the vacancy". The F
question is when does such vacancy occur. Is it on the date on
which the resignation is made to the Speaker of the House or
is it from the date when the vacancy becomes available for
being filled up? This is the same question which fell for decision
in D. Sanjeevayya's case (supra), though Section 151A of the G
1951 Act was not available at that time and the decision was
rendered in the context of Article 190(3)(b), Sections 84, 98(c),
101(b) and Section 150 of the 1951 Act.

     23. Article 190 of the Constitution falls under the provisions
                                                                      H
    486     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A   relating to disqualification of members of both the Houses of
    the Legislature of a State and deals with vacation of seats. We
    are concerned with the provisions of Section 190(3)(b) of the
    Constitution, which read as under :-

          "190. Vacation of seats - (3) If a member of a House of
B
          the Legislature of a State -

          (a) ........... .-.................... .

          (b) resigns his seat by writing under his hand addressed
c         to the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be, and
          his resignation is accepted by the Speaker or the
          Chairman, as the case may be,

          his seat shall thereupon become vacant:

D         Provided that in the case of any resignation ref~rred to in
          sub clause (b), if from information received or otherwise
          and after making such inquiry as he thinks fit, the Spealcer
          or the Chairman, as the case may be, is satisfied that such
          resignation is not voluntary or genuine, he shall not accept
E         such resignation."

        24. The key words in the above provision are that if a
  Member resigns a seat and such resignation is accepted by
  the Speaker or the Chairman, his seat shall thereupon
F become v9cant (Emphasis supplied). In such event, it would
  result in the creation of a casual vacancy within the meaning of
  Part IX relating to bye-elections which contains Section 147 and
  Sections 149 to 151A. If such casual vacancy occurs in the
  State Legislative Assemblies or the State Legislative Councils,
G the provisions of Sections 150 and 151 are attracted, which do
  not, however, prescribe any time limit for such vacancy to be
  filled up by the Election Commission. Since in the instant case
  we are concerned with the A.P. State Legislative Assembly, the
  provisions of Section 150 are relevant to the facts of the case
  and are extracted hereinbelow :-
H
ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA v. TELEANGANA 487
  RASTRA SAMITHI & ANR. [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]
    "150. Casual vacancies in the State Legislative                    A
    Assemblies. - (1) When the seat of a member elected to
    the Legislative Assembly of a State becomes vacant or
    is declared vacant or his election to the Legislative
    Assembly is declared void, the Election Commission shall,
    subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), by a notification    B
    in the Official Gazette, call upon the Assembly constituency
    concerned to elect a person for the purpose of filling the
    vacancy so caused before such date as may be specified
    in the notification, and the provisions of this Act and of the
    rules and orders made thereunder shall apply, as far as            c
    may be, in relation to the election of a member to fill such
    vacancy.

         (2) If the vacancy so caused be a vacancy in a seat
    reserved in any such constituency for the Scheduled
    Castes or for any Scheduled Tribes, the notification issued        D
    under sub-section (1) shall specify that the person to fill that
    seat shall belong to the Scheduled Castes or to such
    Scheduled Tribes, as the case may be."

     25. It is the aforesaid provision of Section 150 which gives      E
rise to the apparent conflict regarding the duty of the Election
Commission to fill up such vacancies in view of the provisions
of Section 84 which provides as follows :-

     "84. Relief that may be claimed by the petitioner - A
     petitioner may, in addition to claiming a declaration that        F
     the election of all or any of the returned candidates is void,
     claim a further dP.claration that he himself or any other
     candidate has been duly elected."

     26. According to the provisions of Section 84, in addition        G
to claiming a declaration that the election of all or any of the
returned candidates is void, an election petitioner can claim a
further declaration that he himself or any other candidate has
been duly elected. It is this question which fell for consideration
in 0. Sanjeevayya's case (supra) giving rise to an apparent            H
    488    SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A   conflict between the provisions of Article 190(3)(b) of the
    Constitution and Section 84 of the 1951 Act. While Article
    190(3)(b) provides that upon resignation of a seat by an elected
    member, if accepted, creates a vacancy, which, in turn, attracts
    the provisions of Part IX, a different note is struck by the latter
s   part of Section 84 which cannot be lost sight of. In
    D. Sanjeevayya's case (supra) although the provisions of
    Section 151A were not available, this Court felt that there was
    no finality in the vacancy caused by the resignation of a member
    of the House where an election petition was pending. If the
c   election of the member who resigns is unchallenged, there is
    no difficulty in harmonizing the provisions of Section 151A with
    the rest of the Sections included in Part IX and Section 8A of
    the 1951 Act. It is only when an election petition is filed under
    Section 84 of the Acr that the latter part of the Section comes
    into play and is, thereafter, reflected in Sections 98(c) and
0
    101 (b) of the said Act.

       27. In 0. Sanjeevayya's case (supra), this Court while
  considering the apparent conflict between Article 190(3)(b) of
  the Constitution and Sections 150, 84 and 98 of the 1951 Act,
E came to the conclusion that it was not permissible to interpret
  Section 150 of the Act in isolation without reference to Part Ill
  of the Act which prescribes the machinery for calling in question
  the election of a returned candidate. Their Lordships further
  observed that a returned candidate could not get rid of an
F election petition filed against him merely by resigning his seat
  from the legislature, whatever be the reason for his resignation.
  Although not stated in the judgment, the ramifications of an
  order under Section 84 are felt in Section BA dealing with
  disqualification on the grounds of corrupt practices. Such an
G eventuality cannot be avoided by the returned member simply
  by resigning his seat in the Legislative Assembly and. the
  provisions of Section 150 would, therefore, have to be read in
  conjunction with Section 84. Their Lordships, therefore,
  ultimately held that in such cases the Election Commission was
H not bound under Section 150 of the Act to hold a bye-election
ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA v. TELEANGANA 489
  RASTRA SAMITHI & ANR. [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]
forthwith, but it was entitled to suspend taking action under the   A
said section till the decision in the election petition under
Section 84 was known.

     28. In its impugned judgment the High Court dealt with the
decision of this Court in 0. Sanjeevayya's case (supra) in the      8
following terms :

            "Sanjeevayya ratio is of no help to ignore the
     enacted provision nor ECI can call back on exercising
     power under Article 324 of Constitution. Therefore,
     pendency of election petition and the uncertainty of           C
     consequences there from are neither a reason nor
     rationale to ignore Section 151A and classify casual
     vacancies into 'clear vacancies' and 'not clear vacancies'.
     Article 190(3)(b) of the Constitution does not admit such
     differentiation. Insofar as bye-elections are concerned,       0
     when once a declaration is made under Section 150 of RP
     Act by the Speaker - a vacancy that arises as
     contemplated under Constitution and/or the relevant
     statute; Section 151A comes into play and the bye-
     elections to the casual vacancies that arises under            E
     Sections 147, 149, 150 and 151 shall have to be
     conducted by ECI within the period mandated by the
     Parliament.

            Sanjeevayya was a case where a member's
                                                                    F
     election was impeached before the Election Tribunal.
     During its pendency, the successful candidate submitted
     resignation and invoked public law remedy before this
     Court. He unsuccessfully sought mandamus to ECI to hold
     election as per Section 150 of RP Act. The pendency of
     election petition and Sections 86, 98(C) and 150 of RP         G
     Act (without any time limit for conduct of bye-election)
     became all important statutory facts for construction of the
     provisions. The Supreme Court considered that, "no time
     limit is fixed in the Section for the Election Commission
     to call upon Assembly Constituency concerned to elect          H
    490     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A         a person for filling the vacancy", that, Section does not
          say that "the Election Commission shall hold a bye-
          election "forthwith" or "immediately"' and that in the facts
          of that case, Election Commission is not bound under
          Section 150 of RP Act to hold bye-election forthwith (see
B         paras 5 and 6 of AIR). Needless to mention that the case
          involved construction of Section 150 in the context of
          Sections 84 and 98(C) of RP Act at the time when Section
          151A was not in RP Act.

          There was some debate before us that Act 21 of 1996
c         which inserted Section 151 A not being a piece of
          legislative invalidation (or validation), Sanjeevayya covers
          the /is. We are afraid we cannot accept the submission. It
          is well settled that the construction qf provision by the Court
          before such provision is amended or substituted is an
D         exercise of interpretation of the law as existed and does
          not and should not be treated as covering the situation after
          express enactment amending the provisions of Law so
          construed earlier."

E       29. In order to justify its departure from the decision of this
  Court in D. Sanjeevayya's case (supra), the Division Bench of
  the High Court instead relied on the decision of this Court in
  Baliram Waman Hiray vs. Justice B. Lentin & Ors. [(1988) 4
  SCC 419), wherein, the decision in Lalji Haridas vs. State of
F Maharashtra [AIR 1964 SC 1154], which was a decision in
  relation to the proceedings taken by the Income Tax Officer
  under Section 37(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, was relied
  upon. The question involved therein was that the said
  proceedings before the Income Tax Officer were judicial
G proceedings within the meaning of Section 193 of the Indian
  Penal Code. For the purposes of Section 195(1)(b) of the
  Code, reliance was also placed on the decision of this Court
  in Indira Nehru Gandhi vs. Shri Raj Narain & Anr. [1975 Supp.
  SCC 1] and Kanwar Lal vs. Amar Nath Chawla & Ors. [(1975)
  3 sec 646], regarding the changes in the law effected by the
H
    ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA v. TELEANGANA 491
      RASTRA SAMITHI & ANR. [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]
    amendments which were held to repel the submissions made              A
    therein on behalf of the Respondent that the expenses incurred
    by a political party could be identified with the election of a
    candidate and that such expenditure was to be added to the
    election expenses of a candidate as being authorized by him.
    This Court instead held that expenses incurred or authorized          B
    in connection with the election of a candidate by a political party
1
    would not be deemed to be and would not ever be deemed to
    have been expenditure in connection with the election incurred
    or authorized by the candidate. The High court observed that
    legislative changes were relevant in considering the binding          c
    nature of the precedent of the Courton record and that such a
    precedent may cease to be an authority in view of the
    subsequent changes made by competent legislature. On the
    basis of such conclusions, the High Court held that even if the
    statement of objects and reasons of the amending Act did not
                                                                          0
    specifically refer to Sanjeevayya, the new legal regime alone
    must be looked into by the Court.

         30. In its impugned judgment the Division Bench of the
    High Court also held that the submission made on behalf of the
    counsel for the Election Commission that Sections 150 and             E
    151 of the 1951 Act should be harmoniously construed, was
    ruled out in view of the non-obnstante clause in Section 151 A.

         31. We are afraid that we are unable to agree with the
    reasoning of the Division Bench of the High Court in its attempt      F
    to distinguish the decision of this Court in 0. Sanjeevayya's
    case (supra) on the basis that the subsequent inclusion of
    Section 151A in the 1951 Act nullified the ratio of the decision
    in D.Sanjeevayya's case (supra) and that in view of Section
    151A, the provisions of Section 84 or 98(c) or 101(b) became          G
    redundant upon a seat being declared vacant by the Speaker
    of the House under Article 190(3)(b) of the Constitution of India.

         32. The decision in Sanjeevayya's case (supra) involved
    the causation of a casual vacancy on account of resignation by
    the elected candidate while an election petition under Section        H
        492   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R..


    A   84 of the Act was pending. The effect of Article 190(3)(b) of
        the Constitution was considered in the facts of the said case
        and it was held that the vacancy caused by the decision of the
        Speaker did not become a vacancy available for being filled
        up and/or capable of being filled up (Emphasis supplied) till
    B   a declaration was either made or refused under the latter part
        of Section 84. Notwithstanding the intervention of Section 151A
        by way of amendment with effect from 1st August, 1996, the
        position remains the same. The only effect on account of such
        declaration under Article 190(3)(b}is that a time limit was fixed
    c   for holding bye-elections in respect of casual vacancies. The
        all important question is whether a vacancy caused on account
        of any of the contingencies contemplated in Secti16ns 147 and
        149 to 151 can be said to be an available vacancy for the
        purposes of Section 151A of the 1951 Act. It is significant that
        in Section 151A neither Section 84 nor Sections 98(c) and
    D   101(b) have been mentioned. Instead, what is referred to are
        the casual vacancies referred to in Sections 147 and 149 to
        150 in the State Legislative Assembly and the State Legislative
        Council. What had not been indicated in the said provisions
        were provided in Section 151 A with the two exceptions carved
    E   out in the proviso. Section 151A prescribed a time limit within
        which a bye-election is to be held to fill up any vacancy referred
        to in Sections 147 and 149 to 151 of the 1951 Act. The Division
        Bench of the High Court was, therefore, clearly wrong in coming
        to a finding that the non-obstante clause of Section 151 A,
    F   which was not available, when the decision in D. Sanjeevayya's
        case (supra) was rendered, altered the whole legal scenario
        and rendered the decision in D.Sanjeevayya's case (supra) to
        be no longer good law as declared by this Court. Although, an
        attempt has been made to differentiate between the facts of
    G   D.Sanjeevayya's case (supra) and this case, we are unable
        to accept the interpretation of Section 151A in support of such
        contention. Any other interpretation of Section 151A would
        render the provisions of Sections 84, 98(c), 101(b) and BA of
        the 1951 Act otiose, which could not have been the intention
    H

/
ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA v. TELEANGANA 493
  RASTRA SAMITHI & ANR. [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]
of the Legislature, which would otherwise have clearly indicated       A
as such in the proviso to Section 151A.

     33. At this stage, it would be apposite to consider another
aspect of the matter regarding the meaning of the expression
"vacancy" for the purpose of ParUX of the aforesaid Act. In this       8
behalf we are inclined to agree with the decision rendered in
D.Sanjeevayya's (supra) case and the submissions of the
learned Additional Solicitor General that in order to be filled up
in a bye-election, a vacancy must be available for being filled
up. In a situation such as that contemplated by the latter half of     C
Section B4 and its consequences as reflected in Sections
9B(c), 101(b) and BA of the 1951 Act, it cannot be said that a
vacancy in such a situation would be a vacancy available for
being filled up by a bye-election, particularly in a situation where
allegations of corrupt practices have been made which, if
proved, provides for disqualification under Section BA of he           D
said Act. Simply by submitting his resignation, a successful
candidate against whom allegations of corrupt practices are
made, cannot escape the consequences of Section BA of the
Act, if the same are ultimately found to be proved.
                                                                       E
     34. The various decisions cited do not appear to have any
relevance as far as the facts of this case are concerned. The
object with which the 1951 Act was enacted is reflected in the
Preamble which reads as follows :-
                                                                       F
    "The Act to provide for the conduct of elections of the
    Houses of Parliament and to the House or Houses of the
    legislature of each State, the qualifications and
    disqualifications, the membership of those Houses, the
    corrupt practices and other offences at or in connection
    with such elections and the decision of doubts and                 G
    disputes arising out of or in connection with such elections."

     The Act is a complete Code for the conduct of elections
by the Election Commission of India appointed under Article
324 of the Constitution which provides for superintendence,            H
    494    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 14 {ADDL.) S.C.R.


A direction, control and conduct of elections to Parliament and
  to the legislature of every State and also of elections to the
  offices of President and Vice-President held under the
  Constitution. The provisions of Article 190{3)(b} of the
  Constitution have, therefore, to be read along with the
B provisions of the 1951 Act. Section 84 of the said Act cannot
  be rendered otiose by holding that all vacancies on account of
  the aforesaid provision of the Constitution become immediately
  available for being filled up by way of a bye-election. The same
  reasoning applies in regard to Section 151A of the 1951 Act
c and its impact on the latter part of Section 84 thereof. As has
  been mentioned hereinbefore, a proceeding under Section 84
  has to run its full course, particularly forithe purposes of Section
  BA of the said Act. The views expressed by the Division Bench
  of the High Court on this point cannot, therefore, be sustained.
D        35. We are, therefore, of the firm view that the introduction
    of Section 151A in the Act did not alter the position as far as
    the provisions of Section 84 and consequently 98{c) and 101{b)
    of the 1951 Act are concerned, since although a casual
    vacancy may have occurred within the meaning of Section 150
E   of the 1951 Act, those vacancies in which election petitions had
    been filed and were pending cannot be held to have become
    available for the purposes of being filled up within the time
    prescribe'd under Section 151A of the 1951 Act. Article
    190(3)(b) of the Constitution merely indicates that if a Member
F   of a House of a Legislature of State resigns his seat by writing
    to the Speaker and such resignation is accepted, his seat shall
    become vacant. It does not introduce any element of
    compulsion on the Election Commission to hold a bye-election
    ignoring the provisions of Section 84 of the Act. In such cases,
G   we have little hesitation in holding that such casual vacancies
    are not available for being filled up and the Commission will
    have to wait for holding elections in such Constituencies until
    a decision is rendered in regard to the latter part of Section
    84 of the 1951 Act during the life of the House. The view
H   expressed by the High Court that a case has to be decided in
ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA v. TELEANGANA 495
  RASTRA SAMITHI & ANR. [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.)
accordance with the laws as existing on the date of                   A
adjudication, while salutary in principle, are not attracted to the
facts of this case in view of the provisions of Section 84 of the
1951 Act.

      36. The Appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment and
                                                                      8
order of the High Court is, accordingly, set aside and the writ
petition filed by the Respondent No.1 herein for a direction tc
hold bye-elections for the 28-Vemulawada Assembly
Constituency and 29-Sircilla Assembly Constituency is
dismissed. Having regard to the facts involved, the parties will      C
bear their own costs.

N.J.                                            Appeal allowed.