Holding

The civil court lacked jurisdiction to pass an eviction decree under the Act because the conditions of the second proviso to section 10(1) were not met, rendering the decree a nullity.

Summary

The respondent sued the appellant for possession of a building on the ground of wilful default in paying rent of Rs.900 per month. The appellant denied being a tenant, claiming to be a co‑sharer, but the lower courts held it was a tenant and decreed eviction. While the suit was pending, clause (ii) of section 30 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, which excluded premises with rent above Rs.400, was struck down as violative of Article 14. The appellant argued that the declaration of invalidity made the civil‑court decree a nullity, whereas the respondent contended the decree was only eclipsed and could be executed once the statutory bar was removed. The Supreme Court held that section 10(1) of the Act bars civil‑court jurisdiction over eviction except when the tenant denies the landlord’s title or claims permanent tenancy and the Controller records a bona‑fide finding, which did not occur here; consequently the decree was passed by a court without jurisdiction and is a nullity. The appeal was allowed and the decree set aside.

Issues considered

Whether the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain an eviction suit under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 after clause 30(ii) was declared unconstitutional.
Whether a decree passed by a civil court lacking jurisdiction is a nullity or merely eclipsed pending removal of the statutory bar.
Whether the declaration of invalidity of section 30(ii) automatically brings the building within the ambit of the Act and affects the earlier decree.
Whether the conditions prescribed in the second proviso to section 10(1) of the Act were satisfied.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 9
Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Order, 1948s. 16, s. 9
Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960s. 10, s. 14, s. 15, s. 16, s. 30

Subjects

rent controlevictionjurisdictioncivil courtstatutory invalidityArticle 14coram non judicelandlord-tenantTamil Nadu Buildings Actlease

Judgment

EAST INDIA CORPORATION LTD.
A
V.
SHREE MEENAKSHI MILLS LTD.

APRIL 16, 1991 )
-
B [DR. T.K. THOMMEN AND R.M. SAHAI, JJ.]

Rent Control & Eviction: Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent
Control) Act, 1960---S. 10, 14 to 16--Eviction of tenant-Jurisdiction
of civil court.:_Scope of.

Constitution of India: Article 14--Declaration of constitutional -<,-
c invalidity ofstatutory provision-Effect of.

Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Order, 1948:
Ss. 9, 16. Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960:
s. 30(ii).
D Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: S. 9-Jurisdiction of Civil Court
under s. JO of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act,
1960-Extent of.
>--
..
Words & Phrases: Coram non judice.
E
The .respondent r.Jed a suit against the appellant fo~ recovery of
possession of a building on the ground of wilful default in payment of
rent which was Rs.900 per month. The appellant denied the relationship
of landlord and tenant, claiming himself as one of the "associates"
or "co-sharers" or "co-owners" of the building. The Mausif decreed --<
F the suit; and the decree was aftlrmed in appeal by the fll'St appellate
court as also by the High Court. Hence the present appeal.

During the pendency of the present appeal, cl. (ii) of s. 30 of Tamil
Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, which exempted
from application of the Act premises the monthly rent in respect of
G which exceeded Rs.400, and on the basis of which the suit giving rise to .._
>
the present appeal emanated, was struck down in a judgment by this
Court.**

The appellant contended that as a result of the declaration by this
H Court of the constitutional invalidity of clause (ii) of s. 30, of the Act,

310 -
EAST INDIA v. MEENAKSHI MILLS 311

which excluded from the purview of the Act any building or part thereof
let out on a monthly rent of Rs.400, the decree of the civil court. became A

- null and void and of no effect. On behalf of the respondent it was
" submitted that the decree passed by the civil court was not a nullity for
the Act did not bar the jurisdiction of the civil court but only prohibited
. execution of a decree for eviction otherwise than in accordance with the
relevant statutory provision; and that such a decree was not void, but B
was merely under an eclipse, and would become executable as and when
the bar is removed.

Allowing the appeal, this Court,

HELD: 1.1 Section 10 of Tamil Nadn Bnildl"W' (Lease and Rent C
Control) Act, 1960 prohibits jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of
eviction of a tenant whether in execntion of a decree or otherwise except
in accordance with the provisions of that sedlon and ss. 14 to 16. The
sole circumstance and the condition precedent to the exercise of jnris-
diction by a civil conrt as stated in second 'proviso to s. 10( 1) is that the
tenant should have denied the title of the landlord or claimed right of D
permanent tenancy and the Controller, on sncb denial or claim by the
tenant, reaches a decision and duly records a finding that sncb denial or
claim was bona fide and only when these conditions are satisfied jnris-
diction of the civil court can be invoked to pass a decree for eviction on
any of the grounds mentioned in s. 10 or ss. 14 to 16. Except to this
limited extent the jnrisdictlon of the civil court is completely barred and E
the same is vested in the tribunals set up under the Act. Any suit
instituted by a landlord for eviction of a tenant from a building falling
within the ambit of the Act, otherwise than as stipulated by the section
is, therefore, incompetent for lack of jurisdiction of the court and
any decree of the court in such a suit is null and void and of no
effect. [317D-E, G-H; 318A-D, G-H] f
Sushi/ Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra, [1990] 1 SCC page
193, referred to.
1.2 The decision of the Controller is concerned solely with the
bona fides, and not the~orn:i:tness or validity,_Ofthe_denial or claim, for
these difficult questions of title are by the statute reserved for decision G
by the appropriate civil court which is the more competent forum in
such matters. [318D-E]

Magiti Sasamal v. Pandab Bissoi, [1962] 3 SCR 673, referred to.

1.3 H the decision of the Controller is that tenant's denlal or H
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 2 S.C.R.

A claim is not bona fide, the jurisdiction of the civil court cannot he
invoked by the landlord and the Controller will then be the competent
authority to order eviction, after affording the parties a reasonable
opportunity of being heard, on any one of the grounds specified under the >
statnte, including the ground that the tenant has, without bona fide
denied landlord's title or claimed right of permanent tenancy. [318E-F]
B
1.4 Although the Act contains no express bar of jurisdiction of
the civil court, its provisions explicitly show that, subject to the extra-
ordinary powers of the High Court and this Court, such jurisdiction is
impliedly barred, except to the limited extent specially provided by the .J,:--
statute for eviction of tenants "in execution or otherwise". The provi-
C sfons of the Act are clear and complete in regard to the rmality of the
orders passed by the special tribunals set up under it, and their compe-
tence to administer the same remedy as the civil courts render in civil
suits. Such tribunals having been so constituted as to act in conformity
with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, the clear and
explicit intendment of the legislature is that all questions relating to the
D specia! rights and liabilities created by the statute should be decided by
the tribunals constituted nnder it. (317A-CI ,_.

Dhulabhai & Ors. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.,
(1968] 3 SCR 662; Secretary of State v. Mask & Co., (1939-40] IA 222
(PC), Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. v. Governor General in Council,
E (1946] 47 IA 50 (PC) and Barraclough v. Brown & Ors., (1897] AC 615
(HL), referred to.

In the instant case, the procedure stipulated in the second provbo
to s. 10 had not been complied with. At the time of institntion of the
F suit, the building in question did not come within the ambit of the Act,
owing to the exclusionary provision contained in cl. (ii) of s. 30, but
after leave to appeal was granted, the applicability of the Act was
extended to the building by reason of the decision of this Court (**)
declaring the invalidity of cl. (ii) of s. 30 on account of its inconsistency
with Article 14 of the Constitution. Whatever he the consequences of
G that declaration-whether it has rendered the stautory provision null
and void and of no effect, or, merely inoperative, unenforceable and
dormant to he revitalised on subsequent removal of the constitutional
ban-in either event, the civil court acting without the aid of the
exclusionary provision in cl. (ii) ofs. 30, during the period of invalidity,
had become coram non judice and its proceedings resulting in the
H decree a nullity. [319A-D]
EAST INDIA v. MEENAKSHI MILLS [THOMMEN, J.) 313

**Rattan Arya & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., [1986] 3 A
sec 385, referred to.
"" ;.: Kiran Singh & Ors. v. Chaman Paswan & Ors., [1955] 1 SCR
117, relied on.

B. V. Patankar & Ors. v. C. G. Sastry, [1961] 1 SCR 591, held B
inapplicable.

Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. State of Bombay, [1955] 1 SCR
613; Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P. and Ors., [1955] 1 SCR 707;
Bhikaji Narain Dhakras & Ors. v. The State of M.P. & Anr., [1955] 2
SCR 589 and M.P. V. Sundararamier & Co. v. The State of A.P. & C
Anr., (1958] SCR 1422, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLAIB JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4032
of 1984.

From the Judgment and Order dated 13.12.1983 of the Madras D
·' High Court in Second Appeal No. 166 and CMP. No. 1714 of 1983.

U.R. Lalit and S. Srinivasan for the Appellant.

Dr. Y.S. Chitale, Darshan Singh, Praveen Kumar and Sumit Sen
for the Respondent. E

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

THOMMEN, J. The appellant, the East India Corporation
Limited, is the defendant in O.S. No. 623 of 1980, which is a suit
instituted by the respondent, Shree Meenakshi Mills Limited, for F
recovery of possession of a building on the ground of arrears of rent,
etc. The respondent-plaintiff alleged that the appellant-defendant was
the tenant of the building in question and that it has not paid the
agreed rent of Rs.900 per month for a long period, despite persistent
demands, and has thus been in "wilful default" of payment of the
· agreed rent. The appellant denied these allegations. It specifically G
denied any relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties,
and contended that its occupation of the building was not as a tenant of
the respondent, but aS one of its "associates" or ''co-sharers" or
"co-owners". The suit was decreed. The decree of the learned Munsif
was affirmed in appeal by the .First Appellate Court as well as by the
- High Court. All the three courts, rejecting the appellant's contentions H
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 2 S.C.R.

A to th~ contrary, found that it was a tenant of the respondent; it
questioned without bona fide the respondent's title as landlord; it was
m ?e~ault of p~yment of rents, and, it was liable to be evicted from the
bmldmg. Ag~mst these concurrent findings, the present appeal was
brought to this Court by means of a special leave petition. Leave was
granted by order of this Court dated 24.9.84.
B
. At the time of the institution of the suit, or the grant of leave by
this Court, the building in question did not come within the purview of
the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 ('the
Act') for the agreed rent, as alleged by the plaintiff-respondent and as
found by all the courts, was Rs. 900 per month, and as such was outside
·C the limit prescribed under section 30(ii) of the Act for a residential
building to fall within the statutory ambit. Section 30, as it stood at the
relevant time, stated:

"30. Exemption in the case of certain buildings.-Nothing
contained in this Act shall apply to-
D
(i) any building for a period of five years from the date on
which the construction is completed and notified to the ,._.
local authority concerned; or

(ii) any residential building or part thereof occupied by
E any one tenant if the monthly rent paid by him in respect of
that building or part exceeds four hundred rupees.
"

Clause {ii) of section 30 was, however, struck down by this Court
in Rattan Arya & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., [1986] 3 SCC
F 385. This Court stated:

" .... Section 30(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease
and Rent Control) Act, 1960 has to be struck down as viola-
tive of Article 14 of the Constitution. A writ will issue
declaring Section 30(ii) as unconstitutional".
G
As a result of this declaration of the constitutional invalidity of section
30(ii), the Act in question, according to the appellant, has to be read
as if clause (ii) of section 30 was never brought into force, and conse-
quently all residential buildings, which are older than five years (see
clause (i) of section 30) and let out for whatever rent, came within the
H
ambit of the Act. Accordingly, although the suit was properly
EAST INDIA v. MEENAKSHI MILLS [THOMMEN, J.) 315

instituted in the civil court without regard to the special provisions of
A
the Act, it is now contended that as a result of the declaration by this
Court of the consitutional invalidity of clause (ii) of section 30, which
; excluded from the purview of the Act any building or part thereof let
out on a monthly rent of Rs.400 the decree of the civil court, whatever
be the merits of the findings on the respective contentions of the
parties, has become null and void and of no effect whatever. This B
contention of the appellant is based on the principle that any decree
passed by an incompetent court is a nullity. The appellant's counsel

- -~
relies on the principle reiterated by this Court in Sushi! Kumar Mehta
v. Gobind Ram Bohra, [1990] 1 SCC 193 and the earlier decisions
referred to therein on the point. In Kiran Singh &. Ors. v. Chaman
Paswan & Ors., [1955] 1 SCR 117 at 121, Venkatarama Ayyar, J.
pointed out: c
" .... It is a fundamental principle well established that a
decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity'
and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and where-
ever it is sought to be enforced or relied upori, even at the D
stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A
defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial,
or whether it is in respect of the subject matter of the
action, strikes at the very authority of the court to pass any
decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent
of parties. If the question now under consideration fell to E
be determined only on the application of general principles
governing the matter, there can be no doubt that the Dis-
trict Court of Monghyr was coram non judice, and that its
judgment and decree would be nullities."

Dr Y.S. Chitale, appearing for the respondent, however, sub- · F
mits that the decree passed by the civil court in the present case is not a
nullity for the Act has not barred the jurisdiction of the civil court, but
only prohibits execution of a decree for eviction otherwise than in
accordance with the relevant statutory provisions. Such a decee, he
says, is not void, but is merely under an eclipse, and will become
-< executable as and when the bar is removed. He refers to section 10 of G
the Act which reads:

"S. 10.-Eviction of tenants.-(!) A tenant shall not be
evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise
except in accordance with the provisions of this section or
sections 14 to 16: H
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 2 S.C.R.

....................................................
A Rdying on certain observations of this Court in B. V Patankar &
Ors. v. C.G. Sastry, [1961] 1 SCR 591 in the context of the Mysore
House Rent and Accommodation Control Order, 1948, Dr. Chitale
submits that, like in that case, what is prohibited by section 10 in the
present case is execution of the decree and the validity of the decree as
B such is not affected. Wedo not agree.

Section 9 of the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Con-
trol Order, 1948 reads:

"S. 9(1) A tenant in possession of a house shall not be
evicted therefrom whether in execution of a decree or
c otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this
clause.
"
Section 16 of that Order reads:

D "S. 16.-Nothing in this Order shall prevent a landlord
from filing a suit for eviction of a tenant before a compe-
tent civil court, provided that no decree for eviction of a
tenant, passed by a civil court shall be executed unless a
certificate to that effect is obtained from the Controller."

E Section 16 of the Mysore Order, 1948, thus specifically allows the
institution of a civil suit for eviction of a tenant, although a decree
passed by such a court for eviction cannot be executed without a
certificate to that effect from the Controller. Jurisdiction of the civil
court is thus not only not barred but specifically preserved, except for
the restriction imposed on the execution of decrees in matters of evic-
F tion. On the other hand, such a provision is significantly absent in the
enactment in question. The provisions of the Mysore Order considered
bythiscourtinB.V. Patankar& Ors. v. C.G. Sastry, [1961] !SCR591
and those of the Act in question here are not in pari materia: The
observations of this Court relied on by Dr. Chitale are not, therefore,
helpful in understanding the provisions in question in the instant case.
G
Section 10 of the Act, as seen above, prohibits eviction of a
tenant whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accor-
dance with the provisions of that section or sections 14 to 16. These
provisions as well as the other provisions of the Act are a self con-
tained code, regulating the relationship of parties, creating special
H rights and liabilities, and, providing for determination of such rights
EAST INDIA v. MEENAKSHI MILLS·(THOMMEN, J.( 317

and liabilities by tribunals constituted under the statute and whose
A
orders are endowed with finality. The remedies provided by the
....., statute in such matters are adequate and complete. Although the sta-
> lute contains no express bar of jurisdiction of the civil court, except for
eviction of tenants "in execution or otherwise", the provisions of the
statute are clear and complete in regard to the finality of the orders
passed by the special tribunals set up under it, and their competence to B
administer the same remedy as the civil courts render in civil suits.
Such tribunals having been so constituted as to act in conformity with
the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, the clear and explicit
~
intendment of the legislature is that all questions relating to the special
-· rights and liabilities created by the statute should be decided by the
tribunals constituted under it. Although the jurisdiction of the civil
court is not expressly barred the provisions of the statute explicitly c
show that, subject to the extra-ordinary powers of the High Court and
this Court, such jurisdiction is impliedly barred, except to the limited
extent specially provided by the statute. See in this connection the
.,
..
principle stated by this Court in Dhu/abhai & Ors. v. The State of
Madhya Pradesh & Anr., [1968] 3 SCR 662. See also Secretary of State D
v. Mask & Co., [1939-40] lA 222 (PC): Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. v.
...... Governor General in Council, [1946-47] IA 50 (PC) and Barraclough
v.Brown&Ors., [1897]AC615(HL).
~

;j
Judged by this test, the jurisdiction of the civil court"in respect of
eviction of tenants is barred except to the extent and subject to the E
conditions prescribed under section 10. The second proviso to section
10( 1) reads:

"Provided further that where the tenant denies the
title of the landlord or claims right of permanent tenancy,
the Controller shall decide whether the denial or claim is F
bona fide and if he records a finding to that effect, the
landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in
a civil ·court and the Court may pass a decree for eviction
on any of the grounds mentioned in the said sections,
notwithstanding that the Court finds that such denial does
-;
not involve forfeiture of the lease or that the claim is G
unfounded".

What is stated in the second proviso to section 10(1) is the sole
circumstance in which the civil court is invested with jurisdiction in
matters of eviction. But this jurisdiction cannot be invoked otherwise
than as stipulated in the second proviso. This means that the condition H
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 2 S.C.R.

A precedent to· the exercise of jurisdiction by a civil court is that the
tenant should have denied the title of the landlord or claimed right of
permanent tenancy and the Controller should, on such denial or claim
by the tenant, reach a decisiog whether such deni!ll or claim is bona ~ ...
fide. Upon such decision, the Controller must record a finding to that
effect. In that event, the landlord is entitled to sue for eviction of the
B tenant in a .civil court. Where these conditions are satisfied, the civil
court will have jurisdiction to pass a decree for eviction on any of the
grounds mentioned in section 10 or sections 14 to 16, notwithstanding
that the Court has found that the tenant's denial of the landlord's title
,,.
does not involve forfeiture of the lease, or, his claim of right of per- ~

manent tenancy is unfounded. Except to this limited extent, the juris- ~-

diction of the civil court in matters of eviction of a tenant is completely
c barred and the jurisdiction in such matters is vested in the tribunals set
up under the statute.

Significantly, the jurisdiction of the civil court can be invoked
only where the Controller comes to a decision, and records a finding,
D that the denial or claim by the tenant, as aforesaid, is bona fide. If the
Controller were to come to the opposite conclusion, no question of
invoking the jurisdiction of the civil court would arise. But the decision
of the Controller is concerned solely with the bona fides and not the
correctness or validity, of the denial or claim, for these difficult ques-
-
tions of title are by the statute reserved for decision by the appropriate
E civil court which is the more competent forum in such matters. (See
the principle discussed in Magiti Sasamal v. Pandab Bissoi, [1962] 3
SCR 673. In such an event, the civil court will become competent to
pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in section -<"
10 or sections 14 to 16. On the other hand, if the decision of the
Controller is that the tenant's denial or claim is not bona fide the
F jurisdiction of the civil court cannot be invoked by the landlord and
the Controller will then be the competent authority to order eviction,
after affording the parties a reasonable opportunity of being heard, on
any one of the grounds specified under the statute, including the
ground that the tenant has, without bona fide, denied the landlord's
title or claimed right of permanent tenancy. What is significant is that
G the decision of the Controller, duly recorded by him, as regards the •·
bona fide denial or claim by the tenant is the condition precedent to
the invocation of power of the civil court. Any suit instituted by the
landlord for eviction of a tenant from a building falling within the
ambit of the Act, otherwise than as stipulated by the section, is, there-
fore, incompetent for lack of jurisdiction of the Court and any decree
H of the Court in such a suit is null and void and of no effect.
EAST INDIA v. MEENAKSHI MILLS [THOMMEN, J.] 319

In the present case, the procedure stipulated in the second pro- A
viso to section 10 has not been complied with. At the time of the
institution of the suit, the building in question did not come within the
• ).. ambit of the Act, owing to the exclusionary provision contained in
clause (ii) of section 30, but after leave to appeal was granted by this
Court, the applicability of the Act was extended to the building by
B
reason of the decision of this Court in Rattan Arya & Ors. v. State of
Tamil Nadu & Anr., [1986] 3 SCC 385 declaring the invalidity of clause
(ii) of section 30 on account of its inconsistency with Article 14 of the
Constitution. Whatever be the consequence of that declaration-
~·
whether it has rendered the statutory provision null and void and of
--, no effect. See Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. The State of Bombay,
[1955] 1SCR613 and Saghir Ahmad v. The State of U.P. and Others, c
[ 1955] 1 SCR 707 or merely inoperative, unenforceable and dormant
to be revitalised on subsequent removal of the constitutional ban. See
Bhikaji Narain Dhakras and Others v. The State of Madhya Pradesh
and Another, [1955] 2 SCR 589 and M.P. V. Sundararamier & Co. v.
The State of Andhra Pradesh & Another, [1958] SCR 1422 in either
D
event, the Civil Court acting without the aid of.the exclusionary provi-
sion in clause (ii) of section 30, during the period of invalidity, has
-,( become coram non judice and its proceedings resulting in the decree a
nullity. See Kiran Singh & Others v. Chaman Paswan & Others, [1955]
1SCR117 at 121.
E
In the circumstances, we set aside the decrees of the courts below.
The appeal is allowed and the appellant is entitled to costs throughout.

~
R.P. Appeal allowed.

'