DURYODHAN ROUTversusSTATE OF ORLSSA

                     [2014] 9 S.C.R. 139


                    DURYODHAN ROUT                                 A
                              v.
                   STATE OF ORlSSA
        (Criminal Appeal Nos. 2277-2278 of 2009)
                       JULY 01, 2014
                                                                   B
       [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA AND
                DIPAK MISRA, JJ.]

     Penal Code, 1860: ss: 376(f), 302, 201. - Rape and
murder-.of 10 year old girl - Conviction based on C
circumstantial evidence. - PW1 and PW2 saw the appellant
carrying the deceased on a cycle near the jungle but returning
back alone after on hour - Confession of appellant that he
took the deceased near the jungle, undraped her and then
committed rape on her and when she cried, strangulated her D
to death - On statement of appellant, Investigating Officer
recovered the dead body and underwear of the deceased lying
nearby from the jungle - Appellant was last seen with the
deceased - There was nothing to indicate that within one hour,
there was any scope for anybody else, other than appellant E
to commit rape and murder of deceased - Chain of
circumstances led to hypothesis that appellant alone was
author of the crime - Trial court rightly convicted the appellant
u/ss. 376(f)/302!201 - All sentences to run concurrently.

      Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s. 31, proviso -           F
Sentences in case of conviction of several offences at one
trial - Held: Under proviso to sub- section (2) of s.31 in no
case a person can be sentenced to imprisonment for a period
longer than 14 years and the aggregate punishment shall not
exceed twice the amount of punishment which the Court is           G
competent to inflict for a single offence - In case a person is
sentenced of conviction of several offer;ices including one that
of life imprisonment, the proviso to s. 31 (2) shall come into

                              139
    140      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A play - In view of the· fact that life imprisonment means
  imprisonment for full and complete span of life, the question
  of consecutive sentences in case of conviction for several
  offences at one trial does not arise - Therefore, in case a
  person is sentenced of conviction of several offences,
B including one that of life imprisonment, the proviso to s.31 (2)
  shall come into play and no consecutive sentence can be
  -imposed - Sentence/Sentencing.

        Sentence/Sentencing: Life imprisonment - Held: Is not
   confined to 14 years of imprisonment~ s. 55 /PC & ss. 433
C and 433A indicate that only the appropriate government can
   commute the sentence for imprisonment of_ life for a term not
   exceeding 14 years or exceeds the release_ for such person
 . unless he has served at least 14 years of imprisonment - Life
   imprisonment means imprisonment for whole of the remaining
D period of convicted person's natural life - There is no
   provision either in /PC or Cr.P.C., whereby life imprisonment
   could be treated as either 14 years or 20 years without there
   being formal remission by the appropriate government -
   Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 55, 433, 433A.
E
         Evidence Act, 1872: Statement of accused made before
    the police officer which distinctly related to the facts of recovery
    - Held: Is admissible.

     General Clauses Act, 1897: s. 3(27) - Imprisonment -
F Meaning of
      The prosecution case was that on the fateful day, the
  appellant took the victfm-deceased aged 10 years on a
  bicycle on a pretext that the deceased would talk to her
G brother on phone. In the evening, the appellant returned
  alone to the village. The father of the deceased, PW-5
  asked the appellant about the deceased to which he
  informed that the deceased had gone with a woman to
  her house. When the deceased did not return the next
H day, PW-5 again questioned the appellant. The appellant
     DURYODHAN. ROUT v. STATE OF ORISSA                 141


confessed before PW-3, PW4, PW-5 and one more                  A
person that he killed the deceased by strangulating her.
The appellant was arrested and on the basis of his
statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, recovery
of the dead body of the deceased was madr.
                                                               B
      The trial court found the appellant guilty for offence
under sections 376(f)/302/201 IPC and convicted him and
sentenced h.im to death. The trial court also sentenced
him to undergo RI for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.
5000 for offence punishable under section 376(f) IPC and       C
RI for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000 for the
offence punishable under section 201, IPC. It was further
ordered that in default of payment of fine, the convict
would suffer imprisonment for one year for the offence
punishable under section 376 (f) IPC and three months
for the offence punishable under section 201 IPC and the       D
substantive sentences would run consecutively. On
reference, the High Court converted the capital sentence
to life imprisonment but ordered that rest of the sentence
remain unaltered.
                                                               E
    The questions which arose for consideration in the
instant appeal were w~ether the courts below were right
in convicting the appellant on the basis of circumstantial
evidence and whether the order that sentences under
sections 376 (f), ·302, 201 IPC are to ruh consecutively       F
was contrary tO the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section
31, Cr.P.C.

    Partly allowing the appeals, the Court

     HELD: 1. Admittedly, there was no eye-witness to the      G
occurrence, the order of conviction was based on thb
circumstantial evidence only. The evidence of PW-1 and
PW-2 showed that on the date occurrence at about 4 p.m.
while they were making chips by breaking boulders by
the side of road, they saw the accused carrying the            H
    142      SUPREME COURT REP.ORT§           [2014] 9 S.C.R.


·A deceased on a cycle- and at about 5 p·.m. they saw him
   returning alone. PW-5 and PW-6, the father and the
   mother of the deceased respectively, stated that the
   accused took the deceased on a cyc'.e on the pretext that
   the later would talk to her brother, working at Bargarh,
 B over phone. While the accused was in Police custody, he
   confessed his guilt which was recorded under Ext.7. The
   Ext.7 reflected that on 11th September, 2004 afternoon he
   took the deceased n_ear the jungle, undraped her and
   then committed rape on her. When she cried, he
 c strangulated her to death and left the dead body covering
   it with branches of trees. On the basis of statement of the
   accused, the 1.0 recovere~ the dead body and the Chadi
   (underwear) of the deceased lying nearby, from the
   jungle. The statement of the accused made before the
 0 Police Officer which distinctly related to the facts of
   recovery is admissible under the law. [Para 6) [148-F-H;
   149-A-B]

         2. According to the doctor PW-9, who conducted
    autopsy on the dead body of the victim-deceased, the
 E cause of death was due 'to throttling and probably
    homicidal in nature. He further stated that the accused
    might have attempted three to four times to introduce his
    penis into the vaginal orifice of the deceased. From his
    evidence, it further transpired that on 13th September,
 F 2004, he examined the accused 'and found seminal fluid
    marks on his pant. He also found one linear abrasion of
    size Y4 on the postero-lateral aspect of the left elbow and
  · another linear abrasjon of the same size on the medial
    aspect of his right knees. According to him, those injuries
 G might have been caused 12 hours prior to the alleged
    incident. Therefore, it was not safe to hold that in course
    of rape and murder of deceased, the accused sustained
    those injuries. PW-9, however, could not notice any sign
    of recent sexual intercourse on the private part of the
 H accused. [Para 7) (151-F-H; 152-A]
      DURYODHAN ROUT v. STATE OF ORISSA                    143


     3. The trial court convicted the appellant on the basis       A
of the chain of circumstantial evidence available against
1he accused. It was found that the accused carried the
deceased in his cycle at about 4 p.m. but returned alone
at 5 p.m. He confessed to have murdered the deceased
before PW-5. On the basis of the statement of the                  B
accused recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act,
the L.O. discovered the dead body; the opinion of the
Doctor was that the deceased was raped and murdered.
The Doctor examined the accused and found seminal
fluid marks on his pant. The accused gave false statement          c
that the deceased went with a woman. PW-1 and PW-2
saw the accused carried the deceased on. a cycle at
about 4 p.m. and returned alone one hour thereafter.
Thus, the accused was last seen with the deceased.
There was nothing to indicate that within one hour, there          0
was any scope for anybody else, other than the accused
to commit rape and murder of the deceased. The chain
 of circumstances of the case thereby would lead to the
 hypothesis that the accused and the accused alone was
 the author of the crime, and therefore, the trial court rightly
                                                                   E
 convicted the accused under Sections 376(f)/302/201 IPC.
 [Para 9] [151-D-H]         ·

    4. Section 31 of the Cr.P.C. relates to sentences in
cases of conviction of several offences at o'ne trial. Under
provis9 to Sub Section (2) of Section 31 of Cr.P.C. in no F
      a
case perSO.{l can be sentenced to imprisonment for/a'
period long~r th.an fourteen years and the aggregate
pun,ishment shall/not exceed twice the amou~ of
punishment which the, Cbµ~ is .competent to inflic~ for a
single offen~e. Section 45. of .the Indian Penal' Code G
defints life as ... The, word-;..~life!: denotes the/iife of a ·
human being, unless the contrciry appear)> from tne
context". The word "imprisonment" has hot'been .~efined
either in the Code of Cfimirial Procedure or in the Indian
Penal Code. As per the, G~neral Clauses Act, 1897 under H
                         ',             '..,
    144     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A Section 3(27) - "imprisonment" shall mean imprisonment
  of either description as defined iri the Indian Penal Code.
  The definition of imprisonment under the General Clauses
  Act would, therefore, in case of Jife imprisonment mean
  imprisonment, for life/imprisonment for the remainder of
B the convict's life. It is not correct to say that imprisonment
  for life has not been included in the definition of term
  'imprisonment' under Section 3(27) of the General
  Clauses Act, 1897. [Paras 15 & 16] [152-G-H; 153-H; 154-
  A-C]
c       5. Imprisonment for life is not confined to 14 years
   of imprisonment. A reading of Sectio~ ~tf'-C ~r:i~,ction
   433 and 433A Cr.P.C. would inc~,ic~tE; thaf.o,nly--ttl~
   appropriate Government can com'O'n/tel: the sente~ce for
   imprisonment of life for a_ tern;i m>t;ex~ding fou~n,
0 .years or exceeds the ~J~seforcl.fu:H person,unless he
   has served at least fourfeenyears of impri.sonment.
   Section 57 of the Indian Penal Code merely relate$ tc)
   calculating fractions of terms of punishment by pro:v'idjng
   a numerical' value of 20 years to life imprisqnrnent.
E Section .53 of the Indian Penal Code ~ists the
   punishments to which offenders are liable under the
   Code. A person sentenced to life imprisonment is bound
   to serve the 1~emainder of his life in prison unless the
   sentence is commuted by the appropriate Government in
f terms of the Section 55, 433 and 433A of the Code of
   Criminal Proc~dure. [Para 17] [154-D-F; 155-B]
       Gopal Vinayak Godse vs. The S.tate of Maharashtra &
  Ors., AIR 1961 S~ 600: 1961 SCR 440; State of Madhya
G Pradesh vs. Ratan Singh & Ors. (1976) 3 SCC 470:1976 (0)
  Suppl. SCR 552; Naib Singh vs. State of Punbaj & Ors.
  (1983) 2 SCC 454: 1983 (2) SCfR 770; Ashok Kumar vs.
  Union of India & Ors. (1991) 3 SCC 498:1991 (2) SCR SSS; ,
  Gopa/ Vinayak Godse in Satpal vs. State of Haryana & Anr.
H (1992) 4 SCC 172: 1992 (3) SCR 898; Subash Chander vs.
       DURYODHAN ROUT v. STATE OF ORISSA                145


Krishan Lal & Ors. (2001) 4 SCC 458: 2001 (2) SCR              A
864 ;Shri Bhagwan vs. State of Rajasthan (2001) 6 SCC.296:
2001 (3) SCR 656 ; Mohd. Munna vs. Union of India & Ors.
(2005) 7 SCC 417: 2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 233; Swamy
Shraddananda vs. State of Karnataka (2008) 13 SCC
767: 2008 (11) SCR 93; Sangeet & Anr. vs. State of Haryana,    B
(2013) 2 sec 452: 2012 (13) SCR 85 - relied on.

     6. In view of the fact· that life imprisonment means
imprisonment for full and complete span of life, the
question of consecutive sentences in case of conviction        C
for several offences at one trial does not arise. Therefore,
in case a person is sentenced of conviction of several
offences, including one that of life imprisonment, the
proviso to Section 31(2) shan-come into play and no
consecutive sentence can be imposed. [Para 27] [158-G-
H]                                                             D
    Kamalanantha and Ors. vs. State of T.N, (2005) 5 SCC
194:·2005 (3) SCR 182; Chatar Singh vs. State of M.P.
(2006) 12 SCC 37: 2006 (9) Suppl. SCR 369; Ramesh
Chilwal alias Bambayya vs. State of Uttarakhand (2012) 11      E
sec 629: 2612 (6 ) SCR 558 - relied on.
     7. The trial court was not just)fied in imposing the
 sentence under Section 376(f)/302/201 IPC to run
-consecutively. The High court failed to address the said
                                                               F
 issue. While the order of conviction and the sentence are
 not interfered considering the fact that the accused has
 been awarded life imprisonment for the offence under
 Section 302, all the sentences imposed under Indian
 Penal Code are to run concurrently. The judgment
 passed by the Session Judge as affirmed by the High           G
 Court stood modified to that extent. [Para 32] [161-C-D]
                                                          '
                    Case Law Reference:
     1961 SCR 440                Relied on      Para 18
                                                               H
    146       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2014} 9 S.C.R.


A     1976 (0) Suppl. SCR 552          Relied on         Para 19
      1983 (2) SCR 770                 Relied on         Para 20
      1991 (2) SCR 858                 Relied on         Para 21
      1992 (3) SCR 898                 Relied on-        Para 22
B
      2001 (2) SCR 864                 Relied on         Para 23
      2001 (3) SCR 656                 Relied on         Para 23
      2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 233          Relied on         Para 24

c     2008 (11) SCR 93                 Relied on         Para 25
      2012 (13) SCR 85                 Relied on         Para 25
      2005 (3) SCR 182                 Relied on         Para 28
      2006 (9) Suppl. SCR 369          Relied on         Para 29
D     2012 (6 ) SCR 558 ·              Relied on         Para 30
        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
    Nos. 2277-2278 of 2009

        From the Judgment and Order dated 08.01.2008 of the
E   High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in DSREF No. 2 of 2007 and
    JCRLA No. 12 of 2007.

          T.N.Singh, V.K. Singh for the Appellant.

F         Shibashish Misra for the Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. 1. These
  appeals are directed against the common judgment dated 8th
G January, 2008 passed by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack
  in Death Reference Case No.2 of 2007 and J. Crl. A.No.12 of
  2007. By the impugned judgment,, the High Court "upheld the
  conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section 376,
  302 and 201 IPC. However, taking into consideration the facts
H and circumstances of the case, the age of the appellant, his
      DURYODHAN ROUT v. STf.TE OF ORISSA                      147
       [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
  family background and the fact that the appellant had no            A
  criminal antecedent, the capital sentence for the offence under
  Section 302 IPC has been commuted to life imprisonment; and
. rest of sentence remain unaltered.

       2. The case of the prosecution is that on 11th September,
                                                                      8
 2004, at about 3 p.m. accused Duryodhan Rout, on the pretext
 that the deceased, Subhasini, a minor girl aged about 10 years
 would talk over phone with his brother, Bamodev Bhoi took her
 on a bicycle. When the evening set in, the, accused alone
 returned to the village and on enquiry about Subhasini, by Mulia     C
 Bhoi (P'<V-5), father of th.e deceased, he told that she had gone
 with a wbman of Ranibandha to her house. On the next day,
 as she did not return Mulia Soi (PW-5) again questioned the
 accused regarding the where about of the deceased. The
 accused confessed in presence of Rabi Biswal (PW-3),
 Dasarathi Bhoi (PW-4) and Subashini Bhoi that he killed the          D
 deceased by pressing her neck. With the help of these three
 witnesses, Mulia Bhoi (PW-5) took the accused to Thakurgarh
 P.S. got the FIR scribed by one Laxman Senapti and lodged it
 before Udit Narayan Pany, Officer-in-charge of the said Police
 Station. A P.S. Case No.51 dated 12th September, 2004 under          E
 Section 302/201 IPC was instituted. The accused was
 arrested, his statement was recorded under Section·27 of the
 Indian Evidence Act on the basis of which he went to the spot
 made recovery of the dead body of the deceased, held inquest
 over it, seized the Chadi (underwear) of the victim lying near       F
 the spot, prepared seizure list in respect thereof and sent the
 dead body to Adhamalik Hospital for autopsy. He also seized
 the wearing apparels of the accused, forwarded to the Court
  on 13th December, 2004 and handed over charge of
  investigation of the case to the C.I. of Police. After completion   G
  of investigation,. Investigating Officer (1.0.) submitted charge
  sheet against the accused under Sections 376/302/201 IPC.

      3. Learned Session Judge secured the presence of the

                                                                      H
    148      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014) 9 S.C.R.


A   accused, framed charges u/s 376/302/201 l.P.C. The accused
    pleaded not guiJty and claimed to be tried.

         4. In order to establish its case, the prosecution examined
    8 witnesses. The accused examined himself as DW-1 besides
    examined DW-2, his father to prove his. stand. After assessing .
B   the evidence on record, the Trial Court found the accused guilty
    for the offence under Sections 376(f)/302/201 IPC convicted
    him thereunder and sentenced him to death for the offence
    punishable under Section 302 IPC. The Session J.udge also
    sentenced him to undergo RI for 10 years and to pay a fine of
C   Rs.5,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 376(f)IPC
    and RI for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- for the
    offence punishable under Section 201 IPC. It was further
    ordered that in default of payment of fine, the convict would
    suffer imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable
D   under Section 376(f) IPC and three months for the offence
    punishable under Section 201 IPC and the substantive
    sentences would run consecutively.

        5. The High Court, as noticed above in Reference,
E   converted the capital sentenced to life imprisonment but
    ordered that rest of the sentence remain unaltered.

       6. Admittedly, there was no eye-witness to the occurrence,
  the order of convictton was based on the circumstantial
  evidence only. From the evidence of Paramla Nahak (PW-1)
F and Pechi @ Silas Bhoi (PW-2), it transpires that on the date
  occurrence at about 4 p.m. while they were making chips by
  braking boulders by the side of road, they saw the accused
  carrying the deceased on a cycle and at about 5 p.m. they saw
  him returning alone. Mulia Bhoi (PW-5) and Kalpana Bhoi (PW-
G 6), the father and the mother of the deceased respectively,
  stated that the accused took the deceased on a cycle on the
  pretext that the later would talk to her brother, working at
  Bargarh, over phone from the house of Bijaya Bhoi of village
  Anandpur. While the accused was in Police custody, he
H confessed his guilt which was recorded under Ext.7. The Ext.7
      DURYODHAN ROUT v. STATE OF ORISSA                      149
      [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
reflects that on 11th September, 2004 afternoon he took the A
deceased near Arakhkuda Salabani Jungle, undraped her and·
then committed rape on per. When she cried. He strangulated
her to death and left the dead body covering it with branches
of trees. On the basis of statement of the accused the 1.0
recovered the dead body and the Chadi (underwear) of the B
deceased lying nearby, from Arakhkuda Salabani Jungle. The
statement of the accused made before the Police Officer which
distinctly relates to the facts of recovery is admissible under the
law.                                                      .

    7. Dr. Narayan Udgata (PW-9) stated that on 12th                 C
September, 2004 he was attached to Sub-Divisional Hospital,
Athamallik as a Specialist in 0 and G. On that date at 5 p.m.
on Police requisition, he conducted autopsy over the dead
body of the deceased-Subhasini Bhoi aged about 10 years and
found as follows:           ~                                        D

      "(i)    Bleeding from nostrils and mouth and both the
              ears with small clotting of blood.

       (ii)   Eyes were half opened.                                 E
      (iii)   Bloody froth present in the nostrils and mouth.

      (iv)    Stool had been discharged from anus.

      (v)     Thumb marks were present on the front of the           F
              neck.

      (vi)    Two linear abrasions of size 3" x 4" on the front of
              the neck due to scratching by some sharp weapon
              like human nail.
                                                                     G
      (vii)   Finger marks were present on both sides of the neck
              and back of the neck.

      (viii) Extravasation of blood in to the sub-cutaneous
             tissues under the thumb and finger marks and
             adjacent muscles of the neck.                           H



                  .\
    150          SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A         (ix)    Muscles of neck corresponding to the thumb and
                  finger marks were mildly lacerated.

          (x)     Multiple abrasions (linear) of size varying from 2"
                  and 3" on both sides of scapular region. Most
                  probably caused by weapon like human nails.
B
          (xi)    Multiple abrasions on the back of both buttocks
                  due to friction on a rough surface, like rough
                  ground and the abrasions were associated with
                  very mild bleeding. The size of multiple abrasions
c                 varies from Yz" x Yz" to %" x Yz".

          (xii) Laceration of the vagina with bleeding with clots,
                most probably because of attempt to introduce the
                penis-forcibly. The penis most probably was large
D               in size and the vaginal orifice of the deceased girl,
                aged about 10 years was very narrow. The
                laceration appears to have been caused by
                several attempts to introduce the penis into the
                vagine.
E         (xiii) All the injuries were ante mortem in nature. The
                 throttling was also ante mortem in nature. There
                 was no evidence of seminal fluid in or around
                 vagina or on any part of the body of anywhere in
                 the clothings of the victim.
F
       According to Dr. Narayan Udgata (PW-9), the cause of
  death was due to throttling and probably homicidal in nature.
  He further stated that the accused might have attempted three
  to four times to introduce his penis into the vaginal orifice of
G the deceased. From his evidence, it further transpires that on
  13th September, 2004, he examined the accused and found
  seminal fluid marks on his pant. He also found one linear
  abrasion of size Y4 on the postero-lat~ral aspect of the left elbow
  and another linear abrasion of the same size on the medial
H aspect of his right knees. According to him, those injuries might
        DURYODHAN ROUT v. STATE OF ORISSA                       151
        [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
 have been caused 12 hours earlier to the alleged incident.             A
 Therefore, it is not safe to hold that in course of rape and murder
 of deceased, the accused sustained those injuries. Dr. Narayan
 Udgata (PW-9),however, could not notice any sign of recent
 sexual intercourse on the private part of the accused.
                                                              B
      8. Mulia Bhoi (PW-5), stated that the accused confessed
 before him and Rabindra Biswal (PW-3) and Dasarathi Bhoi
 (PW-4) that he killed the deceased. Rabindra Biswal (PW-3)
 and Dasarathi Bhoi (PW-4) turned hostile and did not support
 the prosecution. However, Kalpana Bhoi (PW-6) corroborated~ C
 this part of evidence of Mulia Bhoi (PW-5). When asked by
 Mulia Bhoi (PW-5) regarding the whereabout of the deceased,
 accused told that she went with a woman of Ranibandha, which
 was found to be incorrect.

       9. The Trial Court convicted the appellant on the basis of       D
  the chain of circumstantial evidence available against the
  accused. It was found that the accused carried on the deceased
  in his cycle at about 4 p.m. but returned alone at 5 p.m. He
  confessed to have murdered the deceased before Mulia Bhoi
  (PW-5). On the basis of the statement of the accused recorded         E
  under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the 1.0. discovered the
  dead body; the opion of the Doctor was that the deceased was
  raped and murdered. The Doctor examined the accused and
  found seminal fluid marks on his pant. The accused gave false
  statement that the deceased went with a woman of                      F
  Ranibandha. Paramla Nahak (PW-1) and Pechi@ Bilas Bhoi
  (PW-2)saw the accused carried the deceased on a cycle at
  about 4 p.m. and returned alone one hour thereafter. Thus, the
/accused was last seen with the deceased. There is nothing to
  indicate that within one hour, there was any scope for anybody        G
  else, other than the accused to commit rape and murder of the
  deceased. The chain of circumstances of the case thereby
  leads to the hypothesis that the accused and the accused alone
  was the author of the crime, and therefore, the Trial Court rightly
  convicted the accused under Sections 376(f)/302/201 IPC.
                                                                        H
     152      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A         10. During the arguments, learned counsel for the appellant
     mainly argued on the question of consecutive sentence as
     passed by the Trial Court and upheld by the High Court. It was
     contended that Trial Court and the High Court wrongly held that
     the sentences under Sections 376(f)/302/201 IPC to run
.B   consecutively.

       11. The question arises whether the judgment passed by
  the Trial Court as affirmed by the High Court, that the sentences
  under Sections 376(f)/302/201 IPC are to run consecutively is
  contrary to the proviso to sub Section (2) of Section 31 ofthe
C Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as
  "Cr.P.C.").

       12. According to the learned Counsel for the respondent- ..
  State of Orissa proviso to Sub Section (2) of Section 31 of the ·
D Cr.P.C. cannot be made applicable to a conviction for life
  imprisonment under Section 302 IPC.

        13. It was submitted that imprisonment can be rigorous or
  simple (S,ection 60 of the Indian Penal Code). As far as life
E imprisonment is concerned, there is no such classification. The
  first classification was attempted by the Law Commission of
  India through its 39th report to qualify it as rigorous but the same
  was never translated into legislation. But such submission is
  not based on any reasoning.

F        14. In order to fully appreciate the question involved in the
     present case it is desirable to notice the relevant provisions of
     Criminal Procedure Code and Indian Penal Code.

       15. Section 31 of the Cr.P.C. relates to sentences in cases
G of conviction of several offences at one trial. Under proviso to Sub
  Section (2) of Section 31 of Cr.P.C. in no case a person can be
  sentenced to imprisonment for a period longer than fourteen years
  and the aggregate punishment shall not exceed twice the amount
  of punishment which the Court is competent to inflict for a single
  offence. Section 31 of Cr.P.C. reads as follows:
H
     DURYODHAN ROUT v. STATE OF ORISSA                   153
      [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
    "31. Sentences in cases of conviction of several offences    A
    at one trial.

    ( 1) When a person is convicted at one trial of two or more
    offences, the Court may, subject to the provisions of
    section 71 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860 ), 8
    sentence him for such offences, to the several
    punishments prescribed therefor which such Court is
    competent to inflict; such punishments when consisting
    of imprisonment to commence the one after the
    expiration of the other in such order as the Court may C
    direct, unless the Court directs that such punishments
    shall run concurrently.

    (2) In the case of consecutive sentences, it shall not be
    necessary for the Court by reason only of the aggregate--
    punishment for the several offences being in excess of D
    the punishment which it is competent to inflict on
    conviction of a single offence, to send the offender for trial
    before a higher Court:

    Provided that-                                               E
           (a) in no case shall such person be sentenced to
           imprisonment for longer period than fourteen years;

           (b) the aggregate punishment shall not exceed
           twice the amount of punishment which the Court is - F
           competent to inflict for a single offence.

    (3) For the purpose of appeal by a convicted person, the
    aggregate- of the consecutive sentences passed against
    him under this section shall be deemed to be a single        G
    sentence."

     16. Section 45 of the Indian Penal Code defines life as
"The word "life" denotes the life of a human being, unless the
contrary appears from the context".
                                                                 H
    154          SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014) 9 S.C.R.


A       The word "imprisonment" has not be9fl defined either in
    the Code of Criminal Procedure or in the Indian Penal Code.

         As per the General Clauses Act, 1897 under Secfion 3(27)
    - "imprisonment" shall mean imprisonment 'of either description
    as defined in the Indian Penal Code. The definition of
8
    imprisonment under the General Clauses Act would, therefore,
    in case of life imprisonment mean imprisonment for life/
    imprisonment for the remainder of the convict's life.

       We are not in agreement with submission made on behalf
C of the State that imprisonment for life has not been included in
  the definition of term 'imprisonment' under Section 3(27) of the
  General Clauses Act, 1897.

        17. Imprisonment for life is not confined to 14 years of
D imprisonment. A reading of Section 55 IPC and Section 433
  and 433A Cr.P.C. would indicate that only the appropriate
  Government can commute the sentence for imprisonment of life
  for a term not exceeding fourteen years or exceeds the release
  for such person unless he has served at least fourteen years
E of imprisonment.

         Section 57 of the l(Ldian Penal Code merely relates to
    calculating fractions of terms of punishment by providing a
    numerical value of 20 years to life imprisonment.

F        Section 53 of the Indian Penal Code lists the punishments
    to which offenders are liable under the Code which reads as
    follows:

          "First-Death;

G          Secondly- Imprisonment for life;

           Fourthly- Imprisonment, which is of two Descriptions,
                 hamely:-

           (1)    Rigorous, that is, with hard labour;
H
      DURYODHAN ROUT v. STATE OF ORISSA                     155
       [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
      (2)   Simple                                                  A
    Fifty-Forfeiture of property;

    Sixthly-Fine."
     Therefore, a person sentenced to life imprisonment is          B
bound to serve the remainder of his life in prison unless the
sentence is commuted by the appropriate Government in terms
of the Section 55, 433 and 433A of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.

     ~ 8. In Gopal Vinayak Godse vs. The State of Maharashtra       C
& Ors., AIR 1961 SC 600, the Constitution Bench of this Court
while dealing with the question as to whether there is any
provision of law whereunder a sentence for life imprisonment,
without any formal remission by the appropriate Government
can be automatically treated as one for a definite period. In the   D
said case this Court held:
    "5. If so, the next question is whether there is any
    provision of law where under a sentence for life
    imprisonment, without any formal remission by                   E
    appropriate Government, can be automatically treated as
    one for a definite period. No such provision is founcj in
    the Indian Penal Code, Code of Criminal Procedure or
    the Prisons Act. Though the Government of India stated
    before the Judicial Committee in the case cited supra
                                                                    F
    that, having regard to Section 57 of the Indian Penal
    Code, 20 years' imprisonment was equivalent to a
    sentence of transportation for life, the Judicial Committee
    did not express its final opinion on that question. The
    Judicial Committee observed in that case thus at p. 10:
                                                                    G
     "Assuming that the sentence is to be regarded as one
     of twenty years, and subject to remission for good
     conduct, he had not earned remission sufficient to entitle
     him to discharge at the time of his application, and it was
     therefore rightly dismissed, but in saying this, Their         H
    156       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A         Lordships are not to be taken as meaning that a life
          sentence must in all cases be treated as one of not more
          than twenty years, or that the-convict is necessarily entitled
          to remission."

          Section 57 of the Indian Penal Code has no real bearing
8         on the question raised before us. For calculating fractions
          of terms of punishment the section provides that
          transportation for life shall be regarded as equivalent to
          imprisonment for twenty years. It does not say that
          transportation for life shall be deemed to be
c         transportation for twenty years for all purposes; nor does
          the amended section which substitutes the words
          "imprisonment for life" for "transportation for life" enable
          the drawing of any such all embracing fiction. A sentence
          of transportation for life or imprisonment for life must
D         prima facie be treated as transportation or imprisonment
          for the whole of the remaining period of the convicted
          person's natural life."

       19. In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Ratan Singh & Ors.,
E (1976) 3 SCC 470, this Court held that sentence of
  imprisonment for life does not automatically expire at the end
  of 20 years. This Court held:

          "9. From a review of the authorities and the statutory
          provisions of the Code of Crimina'1 Procedure the
F         following propositions emerge:

          "(1) that a sentence of imprisonment for life does not
          automatically expire at the end of 20 years including the
          remissions, because the administrative rules framed
G         under the various Jail Manuals or under the Prisons Act
          cannot supersede the statutory provisions of the Indian
          Penal Code. A sentence of imprisonment for life means
          a sentence for the entire life of the prisoner unless the
          appropriate Government chooses to exercise its
          discretion to remit either the whole or a part of the
H
       DURYODHAN ROUT v. STATE OF ORISSA                    157
       [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
      sentence under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal           A
      Procedure;"

      20. This Court in Naib Singh vs. State of Punbaj & Ors.,
 (1983) 2 SCC 454, relying upon the judgment made by the Privy
 Council in 'Kishor Lal' and Constitution Bench decision of this   B
 Court in 'Gopal Vinayak Godse' held that the appellant in the
 said case was liable to serve the sentence until the remainder
 of his life in prison.

      21. In Ashok Kumar vs. Union of India & Ors., (1991) 3
 SCC 498, this Court held that the expression "life imprisonment" C
 must be read in the context of Section 45 of the Indian Penal
 Code which would mean imprisonment for the full or complete
 span of life. This Court further held that the provisions in Section
 57 that imprisonment for life shall be reckoned as equivalent
 to imprisonment for 20 years is for the purpose of working out · D
 the fraction of the terms of punishment.

       22. This Court endorsed the view taken by this Court in
  the case of Niab Singh, the Privy Council judgment in Kishori
: Lal and the judgment in the case of Gopal Vinayak Godse in       E
· Satpal vs. State of Haryana & Anr., (1992) 4 SCC 172.

      23. In Subash Chander vs. Krishan Lal & Ors., (2001) 4
 SCC 458, this Court held that life imprisonment means
 imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the
 convicted person's natural life unless the appropriate            F
 Government chooses to exercise its discretion to remit either
 the whole or a part of the sentence under Section 401 Cr.P.C.

      Similar was the view taken by this Court in Shri Bhagwan
 vs. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 6 SCC 296.                         G

     24. This Court reiterated that life imprisonment was not
 equivalent to imprisonment for 14 years or 20 years in Mohd.
 Munna vs. Union of India & Ors., (2005) 7 SCC ·411. The
 Court held that the life imprisonment means imprisonment for
 whole of the remaining period of the convicted person's natural   H
    158       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A life. There is no provision either in the Indian Penal Code or in
  the Criminal Procedure Code, whereby life imprisonment could
  be treated as either 14 years or 20 years without there being
  of formal remission by the appropriate Government.

         25. In Swamy Shraddananda vs.State of Karnataka,
8
    (2008) 13 SCC 767, this Court while substituting the sentence
    of death to life imprisonment held that the prisoner shall not be
    released from prison till the rest of his life.

         Similar view was taken by this Court in Sangeet & Anr.
C vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 sec 452. In the said case this
  Court held that a prisoner serving a life sentence has no
  indefeasible right to release on completion of either 14 years
  or 20 years imprisonment. A convict undergoing life
  imprisonment is expected to remain in custody till the end of
D liis life subject to any remission granted by the appropriate
  Government under Section 432 Cr.P.C.

        26. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court,
  it is clear that a sentence of imprisonment for life means a
E sentence for entire life of the prisoner unless the appropriate
  Government chooses to exercise its discretion to remit ei~her
  the whole or a part of the sentence under the provisions of the
  Criminal Procedure Code.

       27. Section 31 of Cr.P.C. relates to sentence in cases of
F conviction of several offences at one trial. Proviso to Sub
  Section (2) to Section 31 lays down the embargo whether the
  aggregate punishment of prisoner is for a period of longer than
  14 years. In view of the fact that life imprisonment means
  imprisonment for full and complete span of life, the question of
G consecutiye sentences in case of conviction for several
  offences at one trial does not arise. Therefore, in case a person
  is sentenced of conviction of several offences, including one
  that of life imprisonment, the proviso to Section 31 (2) shall
  come into play and no consecutive sentence can be imposed.
H
     DURYODHAN ROUT v. STATE OF ORISSA                     159
     [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
     28. In the case ofKamalanantha and others vs. State of       A
T.N., (2005) 5 SCC 194, this Court held:

    '75. Regarding the sentence, the trial court resorted to
    Section 31 CrPC and ordered the sentence to run
    consecutively, subject to proviso (a) of the said section.
                                                                  8
     76. The contention of Mr Jethma/ani that the term
     "imprisonment" enjoined in Section 31 CrPC does not
     include imprisonment for life is unacceptable. The term
     "imprisonment" is not defined under the Code of
     Criminal Procedure. Section 31 of the Code falls under       C
     Chapter /JI of the Code which deals with power of courts.
     Section 28 of the Code empowers the High Court to pass
     any sentence authorised by law. Similarly, the Sessions
     Judge and Additional Sessions Judge may pass any
     sentence authorised by Jaw, except the sentence of death     o
     which shall be subject to confirmation by the High Court.
     In our opinion the term "imprisonment" would include the
  .. §entence of imprisonment for life."

      29. The aforesaid judgment was relied upon by this Court    E
in Chatar Singh vs. State of M.P., (2006) 12 sec 37, and
held:

    "9. Although, the power of the court to impose consecutive
    sentence under Section 31 of the Criminal Procedure
    Code was a/so noticed by a Constitution Bench of this. F
    Court in K. Prabhakaran v. P. Jayarajan2, but, therein the
    question of construing proviso appended thereto did not
    and could not have fallen for consideration.

    10. The question, however,....J;ame up for consideration in   G
    Zulfiwar Ali v. State of U.P.3 wherein it was held: (All LJ
    p. 1181, para 25)

           "25. The opening words 'In the case of consecutive
           sentences' in sub-section (2) of Section 31 make
           it clear that this sub-section refers to a case in     H
    160       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2014] 9 S.C.R.


A               which 'consecutive sentences' are ordered. After
                providing that in such a case If an aggregate of
                punishment for several offences is found to be in
                excess of punishment which the court is competent
                to inflict on.a conviction of single offence, it shall not
B               be necessary for the court to send the offender for
                trial before a higher court. After making such a
                provision, proviso (a) is added to this sub-section
                to limit the aggregate of sentences which such a
                court pass while making the sentences
                consecutive. That is this proviso has provided that
c               in no case the aggregate of consecutive sentences
                passed against an accused shall exceed 14 years.
                In the instant case the aggregate of the two
                sentences passed against the appellant being 28
                years clearly infringes the above proviso. It is
D               accordingly not liable to be sustained."

                11. In view of the proviso appended to Section 31
                of the Criminal Procedure Code, we are of the
                opinion that the High Court committed a manifest
E               error in sentencing the appellant for 20 years'
                rigorous imprisonment. The maximum sentence
                imposable being 14 years and having regard to
                the fact that the appellant is in custody for more
                than 12 years. Now, we are of the opinion that
F               interest of justice would be subserved if the
                appellant is directed to be sentenced to the period
                already undergone. "

       30. In the recent judgment in Ramesh Chilwal alias
    Bambayya vs. ·State of Uttarakhand, (2012) 11 SCC 629, this
G Court held:

          "4. Since this Court issued notice only to clarify the
          sentence awarded by the trial Judge, there is no need to
          go into all the factual details. We are not inclined to
H         modify the sentence. However, considering the fact that
       DURYODHAN ROUT v. STATE OF ORISSA                         161
        [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
      the trial Judge has awarded life sentence for an offence           A
      under Section 302, in view of Section 31 of the Code of
      Criminal Procedure, 1973, we make it clear that all the
      sentences imposed under /PC, the Gangsters Act and
      the Arms 6f;t are to run concurrently."
                                                                         B
       31. In view of the aforesaid discussions and decisions
 rendered by this Court, we hold that the Trial Court was not
 justified in imposing the sentence under Section 376(f)/302/201
  IPC to run consecutively. The High court failed to address the
 said issue.
                                                                         c
        32. Fort.he reasons stated above, while we are not inclined
  to interfere with the order of conviction and the sentence,
  considering the fact that the accused has been awarded life
  imprisonment for the offence under Section 302, we direct that
  all the sentences imposed under Indian Penal Code are to run           D
· concurrently. The judgment passed by the Session Judge as
  affirmed by the High Court stands mQdified to the extent above.
  The appeals are allowed in part with the aforesa1d observations.

 Devika Gujral                                 Appreal partly allowed.