DUNCANS INDUSTRIES LTD.versusA. J. AGROCHEM
- Citation
- 2019 INSC 1136
- Decided
- 4 October 2019
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- ARUN MISHRA
Holding
Section 16G(1)(c) of the Tea Act does not apply, and the IBC overrides the Tea Act, so the insolvency petition under Section 9 is maintainable without Central Government consent.
Summary
DUNCANS INDUSTRIES Ltd., a corporate debtor managing fourteen tea gardens, defaulted on payments to operational creditor A.J. Agrochem. The creditor filed an insolvency petition under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). The debtor argued that, because the Central Government had issued a notification under Section 16E of the Tea Act, 1953, Section 16G(1)(c) required prior government consent before any winding‑up or insolvency proceeding could be initiated. The Supreme Court examined whether Section 16G applied to the IBC process and whether the IBC, being a later statute, overrides the Tea Act. It held that the debtor remained in actual management of the tea gardens, so the conditions for Section 16G to trigger were not met, and that the IBC’s provisions have overriding effect, making the petition maintainable without Central Government consent. Consequently, the Court affirmed the NCLAT’s order and dismissed the appeal.
Issues considered
- Whether Section 16G(1)(c) of the Tea Act, 1953, requiring Central Government consent, applies to the initiation of corporate insolvency resolution proceedings under Section 9 of the IBC.
- Whether the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, has overriding effect over the Tea Act, 1953, thereby rendering the consent requirement inapplicable.
- Whether the management of the tea gardens had been taken over by the Central Government for the purposes of Section 16G.
- Whether insolvency proceedings under the IBC are distinct from winding‑up proceedings contemplated by Section 16G.
Legislation cited
- Companies Act, 1956
- Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016s. 238, s. 7, s. 9
- Tea Act, 1953s. 16D, s. 16E, s. 16G(1)(c), s. 16J, s. 16M
Subjects
Judgment
830 [2019]
SUPREME COURT 12 S.C.R. 830
REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.
A DUNCANS INDUSTRIES LTD.
v.
A. J. AGROCHEM
(Civil Appeal No. 5120 of 2019)
B OCTOBER 04, 2019
[ARUN MISHRA, M. R. SHAH AND B. R. GAVAI, JJ.]
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016:
ss. 7, 9 and 238 – Application for initiation of corporate
C insolvency resolution process by operational creditor – On facts,
appellant-operational debtor managing 14 tea gardens, out of
which, Central Government in exercise of power u/s. 16E of the
Tea Act, took control of 7 gardens – Appellant defaulted in making
payment to respondent–operational creditor against the pesticides
D supplied by the respondent – Initiation of insolvency proceedings
u/s. 9 by the respondent against the appellant – NCLT held that
the proceedings were not maintainable since prior consent of
Central Government as required u/s. 16 G not obtained – In appeal,
NCLAT held that application u/s. 9 was maintainable even without
consent of Central Government in terms with s. 16 G – On appeal,
E held: Section 16G(1)(c) shall not be applicable at all, as the
appellant-corporate debtor is continuing to be in management and
control of the tea gardens – Provisions of the IBC shall have an
over-riding effect over the Tea Act, 1953 – No prior consent of
the Central Government before initiation of the proceedings u/s. 7
F or s. 9 would be required and even without such consent of the
Central Government, the insolvency proceedings u/s. 7 or s. 9
initiated by the operational creditor shall be maintainable – Thus,
the order passed by NCLAT upheld – Tea Act, 1953 – s. 16G(1)(c).
Emphasis of – Held: Primary focus of the Code while
G enacting, is to ensure revival and continuation of the corporate
debtor by protecting the corporate debtor from its own management
and from a corporate debt by liquidation and such corporate
insolvency resolution process is to be completed in a time-bound
manner – As such the entire “corporate insolvency resolution
process” cannot be equated with “winding up proceedings”.
H
830
DUNCANS INDUSTRIES LTD. v. A. J. AGROCHEM 831
Dismissing the appeals, the Court A
HELD: 1.1 In effect, the appellant has been continued to
be in management and control of the tea estates, despite the
notification under Section 16E of the Tea Act. It is required to
be noted that notification under Section 16E was issued by the
Central Government and the Central Government authorised B
the Tea Board to take steps to take over the management and
control of the seven tea estates, having satisfied that the said
seven tea gardens were being managed by the appellant in a
manner highly detrimental to the tea industry and public interest.
Despite the same, very surprisingly, by an interim arrangement,
the Division Bench of the High Court has handed over the C
management and control of the seven tea gardens to the
appellant, because of whose mis–management, it has
deteriorated the condition of the tea gardens run by the
appellant. Be that as it may, the fact remains that, pursuant to
the interim arrangement/order passed by the Division Bench of D
the High Court dated 29.09.2016, the appellant–corporate debtor
is continued to be in management and control of the seven tea
gardens and they are running the tea gardens. Therefore, in the
facts and circumstances of the case, and more particularly when,
despite the notification under Section 16E of the Tea Act, the
appellant–corporate debtor is continued to be in management E
and control of the tea gardens/units and are running the tea
gardens as if the notification dated under Section 16E has not
been issued, Section 16G of the Tea Act, more particularly
Section 16G(1)(c), shall not be applicable at all. On a fair reading
of Section 16G, Section 16G shall be applicable only in a case F
where the actual management of a tea undertaking or tea unit
owned by a company has been taken over by any person or body
of persons authorised by the Central Government under the Tea
Act. Therefore, taking over the actual management and control
by the Central Government or by any person or body of persons
authorised by the Central Government is sine qua non before G
Section 16G of the Tea Act is made applicable. Therefore, in the
facts and circumstances of the case, Section 16G(1)(c) shall not
be applicable at all, as the appellant–corporate debtor is
continued to be in management and control of the tea units/
gardens. [Para 7.1] [841-F-H; 842-A-E] H
832 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.
A 1.2 Section 16G(1)(c) refers to the proceeding for winding
up of such company or for the appointment of receiver in respect
thereof. Therefore, as such, the proceedings under Section 9
of the IBC shall not be limited and/or restricted to winding up
and/or appointment of receiver only. The winding up/liquidation
of the company shall be the last resort and only on an eventuality
B
when the corporate insolvency resolution process fails. The
primary focus of the legislation while enacting the IBC is to
ensure revival and continuation of the corporate debtor by
protecting the corporate debtor from its own management and
from a corporate debt by liquidation and such corporate
C insolvency resolution process is to be completed in a time–bound
manner. Therefore, the entire “corporate insolvency resolution
process” as such cannot be equated with “winding up
proceedings”. Therefore, considering Section 238 of the IBC,
which is a subsequent Act to the Tea Act, 1953, shall be
applicable and the provisions of the IBC shall have an over–
D
riding effect over the Tea Act, 1953. Any other view would
frustrate the object and purpose of the IBC. If the submission
on behalf of the appellant that before initiation of proceedings
under Section 9 of the IBC, the consent of the Central
Government as provided under Section 16G(1)(c) of the Tea Act
E is to be obtained, in that case, the main object and purpose of
the IBC, namely, to complete the “corporate insolvency
resolution process” in a time–bound manner, shall be frustrated.
The sum and substance would be that the provisions of the IBC
would have an over–riding effect over the Tea Act, 1953 and that
no prior consent of the Central Government before initiation of
F
the proceedings under Section 7 or Section 9 of the IBC would
be required and even without such consent of the Central
Government, the insolvency proceedings under Section 7 or
Section 9 of the IBC initiated by the operational creditor shall
be maintainable. Thus, the order passed by the NCLAT holding
G that insolvency petition under Section 9 of the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code, 2016 initiated by the respondent–operation
creditor shall be maintainable, is upheld. [Para 7.4, 8] [846-E-
H; 847-A-D]
Macquarie Bank Ltd. v. Shilpi Cable Technologies Ltd.
H (2018) 2 SCC 674 : [ 2017] 13 SCR 751 ; K. Kishan
DUNCANS INDUSTRIES LTD. v. A. J. AGROCHEM 833
v. M/s. Vijay Nirman Company Pvt. Ltd. (2018) 17 SCC A
662 : [2018] 10 SCR 959 ; Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v.
Union of India [AIR 2019 SC 739 : (2019) 4 SCC 17:
[2019] 3 SCR 535 ; Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI
Bank [AIR 2017 SC 4084 : (2018) 1 SCC 407 :
[2017] 8 SCR 33 ; PCIT v. Monnet Ispat and Energy
B
Ltd. (2018) 18 SCC 786 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2017] 13 SCR 751 referred to Para 4.7
[2018] 10 SCR 959 referred to Para 4.7
C
[2019] 3 SCR 535 referred to Para 5.2
[2017] 8 SCR 33 referred to Para 5.4
[2019] 3 SCR 535 referred to Para 5.4
(2018) 18 SCC 786 referred to Para 5.4 D
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 5120
of 2019.
From the Judgment and Order 20.06.2019 of the National
Company Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in Company Appeal
(AT)(Insolvency) No. 710 of 2018. E
Shyam Divan, Sr. Adv., Atul Kumar, R. Banarjee, Udayaditya
B., Amit Gupta, Ms. Deepali, Tarun Gupta, Advs. for the Appellant.
Amar Dave, Ms. Sonal Shah, Kushagra Shah, Ms. Shrvti
Agarwal, T. Mahipal, Ms. Sonal Agarwal, Ms. Swati Agarwal, Advs. F
for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
M. R. SHAH, J.
1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
G
and order dated 20.06.2019 passed by the National Company Law
Appellate Tribunal (for short “NCLAT”) by which the learned Appellate
Tribunal has allowed the said appeal preferred by the respondent herein
and has quashed and set aside the order dated 05.10.2018 passed by
the National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata (for short “NCLT”),
holding that the respondent’s application under Section 9 of the H
834 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.
A Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (for short “IBC”) would be
maintainable, the original respondent has preferred the present appeal.
2. The facts of the case in nutshell are as under:
2.1 That the appellant is a Corporate Debtor. It is a company
which owns and manages 14 tea gardens. Out of 14 tea gardens, the
B Central Government vide notification dated 28.01.2016, in exercise of
its power under Section 16E of the Tea Act, 1953 has taken over the
control of 7 tea gardens.
2.2 That the respondent is an operational creditor of the appellant.
It used to supply pesticides, insecticides, herbicides etc. to the appellant.
C According to the respondent-operational creditor, a sum of Rs.41,55,500/
- was due and payable by the appellant-corporate debtor to the
respondent-operational creditor. That the respondent initiated the
proceedings against the appellant-corporate debtor before the NCLT
under Section 9 of the IBC. Initiation of the proceedings under the IBC
by the respondent-operation creditor was opposed by the appellant-
D
corporate debtor mainly and solely on the ground that, as provided under
Section 16G(1)(c) of the Tea Act, once the management of tea unit
has been taken over by the Central Government, then the proceedings
for winding up or appointment of receiver cannot be initiated without
the consent of the Central Government. It was the case on behalf of
E the appellant-corporate debtor that, in the present case, as the prior
approval of the Central Government has not been taken, as required
under Section 16G of the Tea Act, the insolvency proceeding under
Section 9 of the IBC would not be maintainable. That, by an order
dated 05.10.2018, learned NCLT held that in view of the statutory
provisions under Section 16G of the Tea Act and as the prior consent
F of the Central Government has not been obtained, the proceedings under
Section 9 of the IBC shall not be maintainable. In an appeal before
the NCLAT by the respondent-operational creditor, by the impugned
judgment and order, the NCLAT has reversed the order passed by the
NCLT, Kolkata and has held that the respondent’s application under
Section 9 of the IBC would be maintainable even without the consent
G
of the Central Government in terms of Section 16G of the Tea Act.
Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order
dated 20.06.2019 passed by the learned NCLAT, allowing the
respondent’s appeal thereby holding that the insolvency petition filed
under Section 9 of the IBC would be maintainable, the original
H respondent-corporate debtor has preferred the present statutory appeal.
DUNCANS INDUSTRIES LTD. v. A. J. AGROCHEM 835
[M. R. SHAH, J.]
3. Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Advocate has appeared on A
behalf of the appellant-corporate debtor and Shri Amar Dave, learned
Advocate has appeared on behalf of the respondent-operational creditor.
4. Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Advocate appearing on
behalf of the appellant-corporate debtor has taken us through the relevant
provisions of the Tea Act, 1953, more particularly Section 16. He has B
also taken us through the objects and the purpose of the Tea Act.
4.1 It is submitted by Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Advocate
appearing on behalf of the appellant that the Tea Act is a special Act
for the purpose of providing control by the Union of India of the Tea
Industry. It is submitted that Section 16D(1) of the Tea Act, 1953 C
provides for taking over the tea unit and the tea undertaking inter alia
if the Central Government is of the opinion that the tea unit is being
managed in a manner highly detrimental to the tea industry or to public
interest. It is submitted that Section 16D(4) provides that the Central
Government shall take such steps as may be necessary for the purpose
of efficiently managing the business of the undertaking. It is submitted D
that any notification under Section 16D is to have effect for a period
not exceeding five years which can only be extended if the Central
Government is of the opinion that it is expedient to do so in public interest,
for such period not exceeding one year at a time, and for total period
not exceeding six years. It is submitted that Section 16E refers to the
E
power of the Central Government to restart the tea undertaking if it is
found necessary in the interest of the general public. It is submitted
that Section 16G specifically deals with a situation such as in the present
application. It is submitted that an insolvency process is also meant to
culminate in liquidation, if there is no revival. It is submitted that since
the Tea Act permits for the Central Government to take over the F
management of a tea estate which is not run properly, the prior
permission under Section 16G is applicable to such an estate, the
management of which has been taken over by the Government.
4.2 It is further submitted by Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior
Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant that the “winding up” G
process under the Companies Act, 1956 includes the insolvency
proceedings under the IBC. It is submitted that, therefore, initiation of
any proceedings for winding up or liquidation by way of insolvency
proceedings under the IBC shall be maintainable only after the consent
of the Central Government is obtained, as required under Section 16G
of the Tea Act which, in the present case, is lacking. H
836 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.
A 4.3 It is further submitted by Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior
Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in the present case,
in the proceedings challenging the Central Government notification dated
28.01.2016 authorising the Tea Board to take over the management and
to take control of the 7 tea estates of the appellant-corporate debtor,
the High Court of Calcutta though has not stayed the notification, but
B only made an interim arrangement for the management of 7 tea estates
and the High Court has directed/permitted the appellant to run the
gardens in a prudent business-like manner and to pay both the current
and arrear dues of the workers. It is submitted that the interim order
has been passed for improving the conditions of the workers as also
C that of the tea estates.
4.4 It is further submitted by Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior
Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant that the provisions of
the Tea Act, 1953 apply to tea units, the management of which have
been taken over for the purpose of stimulating the production and
D manufacturing of tea. It is submitted that the control by the Tea Board
of the manufacturing of tea from the tea units is in public interest. It is
also a welfare legislation. The Tea Act is a Central Act and applies
only to companies which are having tea gardens or tea units. It is
submitted that if the provisions of the Tea Act are applicable, then on
a conjoint reading of Section 16G, Section 16J and Section 16M of the
E Tea Act, an application under Section 7 or Section 9 of the IBC would
not be maintainable and cannot be proceeded with without the consent
of the Central Government.
4.5 It is further submitted by Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior
Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in the present case,
F by passing the impugned judgment and order, the learned NCLAT has
erroneously relied upon Section 238 of the IBC to hold that the IBC
will have an overriding effect over the Tea Act. It is submitted that
Section 238 of the IBC will be applicable if there is any conflict between
the two legislations. It is submitted that, in the present case, there is no
such conflict between the Tea Act and the IBC. It is submitted that
G
even the learned NCLAT in the impugned order recognizes and/or
records that the provisions of the IBC and the Tea Act are not
inconsistent with each other. It is submitted that the IBC process can
be started if the permission is obtained from the Central Government
by a financial creditor or an operational creditor. It is submitted that
H the provisions of Section 7 or Section 9 may not require the consent of
DUNCANS INDUSTRIES LTD. v. A. J. AGROCHEM 837
[M. R. SHAH, J.]
the Central Government to initiate such proceedings, but when the A
management of the tea gardens have been taken over by the Central
Government under the Tea Act, one will have to consider the provisions
of the Tea Act which requires the consent of the Central Government.
It is submitted that, therefore, the process of insolvency resolution under
the IBC has not been stopped, but what it requires is an additional
B
permission under the Tea Act for the purpose of initiation of such
insolvency proceeding. It is submitted that this should be logical as the
management of the tea gardens is already under the Central
Government under the Tea Act for public interest and for the interest
of workers of the tea gardens.
C
4.6 It is further submitted by Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior
Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant that both IBC and the
Tea Act are welfare legislations. IBC is a general Act for corporate
resolution process for all corporates, but the Tea Act protects corporates
which have tea gardens. The Tea Act is a special legislation enacted
by the Parliament for protecting the Tea Industries and Tea Gardens D
and provides for taking over the management by the Tea Board or the
Central Government or any person authorized by the Central
Government for running the tea gardens or protection of the workers.
It is submitted that, therefore, its provisions can be harmoniously
construed along with the IBC.
E
4.7 Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Advocate appearing on
behalf of the appellant has heavily relied upon the decision of this Court
in the case of Macquarie Bank Ltd. v. Shilpi Cable Technologies
Ltd. (2018) 2 SCC 674 as well as the recent decision of this Court
dated 14.08.2019 in the case of K. Kishan v. M/s. Vijay Nirman
Company Pvt. Ltd. (2018) 17 SCC 662, on non-applicability of Section F
238 of the IBC. Making the above submissions and relying upon the
above decisions of this Court, it is submitted by Shri Shyam Divan,
learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant-corporate
debtor that since there is no inconsistency between the Tea Act and
the IBC, there is no occasion to apply Section 238 of the IBC to give G
overriding effect.
4.8 Making the above submissions and relying upon the above
decisions of this Court, it is prayed to allow the present appeal and
quash and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the
learned NCLAT and restore the order passed by the NCLT, Kolkata H
838 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.
A by holding that in absence of the consent of the Central Government
as provided under Section 16G of the Tea Act, the insolvency
proceedings initiated by the respondent-operational creditor under
Section 9 of the IBC shall not be maintainable.
5. The present appeal is vehemently opposed by Shri Amar Dave,
B learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent-operational
creditor.
5.1 It is vehemently submitted by Shri Amar Dave, learned
Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent-operational creditor
that the IBC is a complete Code in itself. It is submitted that the IBC
C is a consolidating and amending law relating to re-organization and
insolvency resolution and for matters connected therewith or incidental
thereto. It is submitted that the Code, which was promulgated in 2016,
has not provided for the pre-requisite of obtaining consent from the
Central Government for initiating corporate insolvency resolution process
like the Tea Act, which is an earlier Act enacted in 1953. It is submitted
D that, thus, such a pre-requisite of obtaining consent cannot be imported
and/or read into the Code when the self-contained Code itself does not
provide for it.
5.2 It is further submitted that importing the requirement of
obtaining consent of the Central Government prior to initiating the
E corporate insolvency resolution process would be completely contrary
to the over-riding nature of the Code, and of the clear legislative intent
of keeping the arms of the Government away from the resolution
process and of not delaying the process of resolution. It is further
submitted that an examination of Chapter IIIA of the Tea Act reveals
F that the object of restarting/revival of the tea company is a writ large
in the scheme of the Tea Act. It is submitted that the said object of
restarting/revival is borne out from Section 16B(2), Section 16E(1)(b),
Section 16I(1) and Section 16K of the Tea Act. It is submitted that
restarting/revival of the company is also the object of the IBC, as is
clear from the Preamble of the IBC and also as observed by this Court
G in the case of Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India [AIR 2019
SC 739 : (2019) 4 SCC 17]. It is submitted that therefore in the event
of any conflict between the two legislations, the provisions of the IBC
would prevail by virtue of Section 238 of the IBC.
5.3 It is submitted by Shri Dave, learned Advocate appearing on
H behalf of the respondent-operational creditor that the present case is
DUNCANS INDUSTRIES LTD. v. A. J. AGROCHEM 839
[M. R. SHAH, J.]
not one where Section 16G of the Tea Act applies at all, as the A
management has not been “taken over” by the Central Government or
the Tea Board. It is submitted that the notification dated 28.01.2016
was issued under Section 16E(1) of the Tea Act. It is submitted that,
according to the sub-section (2) thereof, the provisions of Section 16G
shall apply to a notified order made under Section 16E(1). It is submitted
B
that Section 16G(1) shall be applicable when the management of a tea
undertaking or tea unit owned by a company has been taken over by
the Tea Board. It is submitted that thus Section 16G(1) of the Tea
Act does not automatically get triggered with the issuance of a
notification under Section 16E(1) of the Tea Act, but becomes applicable
once the management of a tea undertaking or tea unit owned by a C
company has been taken over by the Tea Board. It is submitted that,
in the present case, pursuant to the interim order passed by the Division
Bench of the High Court of Calcutta in which the notification dated
28.01.2016 is challenged by the corporate debtor, the appellant-corporate
debtor continues to be in management and control of the tea units/
D
gardens. It is submitted that therefore application of Section 16E(1) is
no longer prevalent and consequently Section 16G of the Tea Act shall
not be applicable at all.
5.4 It is further submitted by Shri Dave, learned Advocate
appearing on behalf of the respondent-operational creditor that Section E
16G(1)(c) of the Tea Act is applicable to a proceeding for “winding
up” and not to proceeding for initiation of “corporate insolvency
resolution process”, as the both are not one and the same proceedings.
It is submitted that winding up of a company is provided for, and
governed by, the Companies Act. It is submitted that, on the other hand,
F
initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process is provided for, and
governed by, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. It is submitted
that both these processes are distinct from one another and not
synonymous with one another. It is submitted that the power of the
Parliament to make any law relating to winding up can be traced to
Entry nos. 33 and 34 of the Union List of the Seventh Schedule of the G
Constitution. It is submitted that, on the other hand, the power of the
Parliament to make any law relating to insolvency can be traced to Entry
no. 9 of the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.
It is submitted that, thus, winding up and insolvency proceedings are
not one and the same as they have been mentioned under two separate H
840 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.
A entries in two separate lists in the Seventh Schedule. It is submitted
that, as such, Section 16G(1)(c) of the Tea Act, which mandates that
no winding up proceeding can lie in any court against a company which
has been taken over by the Tea Board without consent of the Central
Government, does not and cannot be interpreted to mean that the said
B section applies to any proceeding for initiation of corporate insolvency
resolution process against a company which has been taken over by
the Tea Board. It is submitted that the learned NCLAT has rightly held
that Section 16G(1)(c) relates to winding up and, on the other hand,
Section 9 of the IBC is not a proceeding for winding up, but for initiation
of “corporate insolvency resolution process” to ensure revival and
C
continuation of the corporate debtor by protecting the corporate debtor
from its own management and from corporate debt by liquidation. In
support of his above submissions, Shri Dave, learned Advocate
appearing on behalf of the respondent-operational creditor, has heavily
replied upon the decisions of this Court in Innoventive Industries Ltd.
D v. ICICI Bank [AIR 2017 SC 4084 at paras 16, 51 and 56 : (2018) 1
SCC 407], Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. [AIR 2019 SC 739 at paras 10 to
12 : (2019) 4 SCC 17] and a decision in PCIT v. Monnet Ispat and
Energy Ltd. (2018) 18 SCC 786. Making the above submissions and
relying upon the above decisions of this Court, it is prayed to dismiss
E the present appeal and to confirm the impugned judgment and order
passed by the learned NCLAT.
6. The short question which is posed for consideration of this
Court is whether before initiation of the proceedings under Section 9
of the IBC, a consent of the Central Government as provided under
F Section 16G(1)(c) of the Tea Act, 1953 is required and/or whether in
absence of any such consent of the Central Government the
proceedings initiated by the respondent-operational creditor under
Section 9 of the IBC would be maintainable or not?
7. Sections 16G of the Tea Act reads as under:
G
“16G. Application of Act 1 of 1956.—(1) Where the
management of a tea undertaking or tea unit owned by a company
has been taken over by any person or body of persons authorised
by the Central Government under this Act, then, notwithstanding
anything contained in the said Act or in the memorandum or
H articles of association of such company,—
DUNCANS INDUSTRIES LTD. v. A. J. AGROCHEM 841
[M. R. SHAH, J.]
(a) it shall not be lawful for the shareholders of such company A
or any other person to nominate or appoint any person to
be a director of the company;
(b) no resolution passed in a meeting of the shareholders of such
company shall be given effect to unless approved by the
Central Government; B
(c) no proceeding for the winding up of such company or for
the appointment of receiver in respect thereof shall lie in
any court except with the consent of the Central
Government.
(2) Subject to the provisions contained in sub-section (1), and to C
the other provisions contained in this Act, and subject to such
other exceptions, restrictions and limitations, if any, as the Central
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette specify
in this behalf, the Companies Act, 1956, shall continue to apply
to such company in the same manner as it applied thereto before D
the issue of the notified order.”
7.1 In the present case, it is true that by notification dated
28.01.2016 issued under Section 16E of the Tea Act, the Central
Government authorised the Tea Board to take over the management
or the control of the seven tea estates mentioned in the said notification. E
However, the appellant challenged the said notification before the High
Court of Calcutta and the learned Single Judge of the High Court
dismissed the said petition. However, in an appeal, the Division Bench
of the High Court of Calcutta vide the interim order dated 20.09.2016
has permitted the appellant-corporate debtor to continue with the
management of the said tea estates. Therefore, in effect, the appellant F
herein has been continued to be in management and control of the tea
estates, despite the notification under Section 16E dated 28.01.2016.
At this stage, it is required to be noted that notification under Section
16E of the Tea Act was issued by the Central Government and the
Central Government authorised the Tea Board to take steps to take
G
over the management and control of the seven tea estates, having
satisfied that the said seven tea gardens were being managed by the
appellant in a manner highly detrimental to the tea industry and public
interest. Despite the same, very surprisingly, by an interim arrangement,
the Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta has handed over the
management and control of the seven tea gardens to the appellant, H
842 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.
A because of whose mis-management, it has deteriorated the condition
of the tea gardens run by the appellant. Be that as it may, the fact
remains that, pursuant to the interim arrangement/order passed by the
Division Bench of the High Court dated 29.09.2016, the appellant-
corporate debtor is continued to be in management and control of the
seven tea gardens and they are running the tea gardens. Therefore, in
B
the facts and circumstances of the case, and more particularly when,
despite the notification under Section 16E of the Tea Act, the appellant-
corporate debtor is continued to be in management and control of the
tea gardens/units and are running the tea gardens as if the notification
dated under Section 16E has not been issued, Section 16G of the Tea
C Act, more particularly Section 16G(1)(c), shall not be applicable at all.
On a fair reading of Section 16G of the Tea Act, we are of the opinion
that Section 16G of the Tea Act shall be applicable only in a case where
the actual management of a tea undertaking or tea unit owned by a
company has been taken over by any person or body of persons
authorised by the Central Government under the Tea Act. Therefore,
D
taking over the actual management and control by the Central
Government or by any person or body of persons authorised by the
Central Government is sine qua non before Section 16G of the Tea
Act is made applicable. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of
the case, Section 16G(1)(c) shall not be applicable at all, as the
E appellant-corporate debtor is continued to be in management and control
of the tea units/gardens.
7.2 Now, so far as the main issue, namely, whether before
initiation of the proceedings under Section 9 of the IBC, a prior consent
of the Central Government as provided under Section 16G(1)(c) of the
F Tea Act is required or not and/or in absence of any such consent of
the Central Government, the proceedings under Section 9 of the IBC
shall be maintainable or not, is concerned, at the outset, it is required
to be noted that the IBC is a complete Code in itself. In a recent
decision of this Court in the case of Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. (supra),
this Court had an occasion to consider the Statement of Objects and
G
Reasons of the IBC and also the Preamble of the IBC, which when
noted by this Court in its earlier decision in Innoventive Industries Ltd.
(supra), in paragraphs 25 and 26 in the case of Swiss Ribbons Pvt.
Ltd. (supra), this Court has referred to the Statement of Objects and
Reasons of the IBC and the Preamble of the IBC. Paragraphs 25 and
H 26 are as under:
DUNCANS INDUSTRIES LTD. v. A. J. AGROCHEM 843
[M. R. SHAH, J.]
25. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for the Code have A
been referred to in Innoventive Industries [Innoventive
Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank, (2018) 1 SCC 407 : (2018) 1 SCC
(Civ) 356] which states: (SCC pp. 421-22, para 12)
“12. … The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Code
reads as under: B
‘Statement of Objects and Reasons.—There is no single law
in India that deals with insolvency and bankruptcy. Provisions
relating to insolvency and bankruptcy for companies can be
found in the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions)
Act, 1985, the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial C
Institutions Act, 1993, the Securitisation and Reconstruction
of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act,
2002 and the Companies Act, 2013. These statutes provide
for creation of multiple fora such as Board of Industrial and
Financial Reconstruction (BIFR), Debts Recovery Tribunal
(DRT) and National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and their D
respective Appellate Tribunals. Liquidation of companies is
handled by the High Courts. Individual bankruptcy and
insolvency is dealt with under the Presidency Towns
Insolvency Act, 1909, and the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920
and is dealt with by the courts. The existing framework for E
insolvency and bankruptcy is inadequate, ineffective and
results in undue delays in resolution, therefore, the proposed
legislation.
2.The objective of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code,
2015 is to consolidate and amend the laws relating to F
reorganisation and insolvency resolution of corporate persons,
partnership firms and individuals in a time-bound manner for
maximisation of value of assets of such persons, to promote
entrepreneurship, availability of credit and balance the interests
of all the stakeholders including alteration in the priority of
payment of government dues and to establish an Insolvency G
and Bankruptcy Fund, and matters connected therewith or
incidental thereto. An effective legal framework for
timely resolution of insolvency and bankruptcy would
support development of credit markets and encourage
entrepreneurship. It would also improve Ease of Doing H
844 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.
A Business, and facilitate more investments leading to higher
economic growth and development.
3. The Code seeks to provide for designating NCLT and DRT
as the adjudicating authorities for corporate persons and firms
and individuals, respectively, for resolution of insolvency,
B liquidation and bankruptcy. The Code separates commercial
aspects of insolvency and bankruptcy proceedings from judicial
aspects. The Code also seeks to provide for establishment of
the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Board) for
regulation of insolvency professionals, insolvency professional
agencies and information utilities. Till the Board is established,
C
the Central Government shall exercise all powers of the Board
or designate any financial sector regulator to exercise the
powers and functions of the Board. Insolvency professionals
will assist in completion of insolvency resolution, liquidation
and bankruptcy proceedings envisaged in the Code.
D Information Utilities would collect, collate, authenticate and
disseminate financial information to facilitate such
proceedings. The Code also proposes to establish a fund to
be called the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Fund of India for
the purposes specified in the Code.
E 4. The Code seeks to provide for amendments in the Indian
Partnership Act, 1932, the Central Excise Act, 1944, Customs
Act, 1962, the Income Tax Act, 1961, the Recovery of Debts
Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, the Finance
Act, 1994, the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial
Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, the
F
Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Repeal Act,
2003, the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007, the
Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008, and the Companies
Act, 2013.
5. The Code seeks to achieve the above objectives.’”
G
26. The Preamble of the Code states as follows:
“An Act to consolidate and amend the laws relating to
reorganisation and insolvency resolution of corporate persons,
partnership firms and individuals in a time-bound manner for
H maximisation of value of assets of such persons, to promote
DUNCANS INDUSTRIES LTD. v. A. J. AGROCHEM 845
[M. R. SHAH, J.]
entrepreneurship, availability of credit and balance the interests A
of all the stakeholders including alteration in the order of
priority of payment of government dues and to establish an
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India, and for matters
connected therewith or incidental thereto.”
7.3 After noticing and considering the Statement of Objects and B
Reasons for the IBC and the Preamble to the Code, thereafter this
Court has observed and held in paragraphs 27 and 28 as under:
“27. As is discernible, the Preamble gives an insight into what
is sought to be achieved by the Code. The Code is first and
foremost, a Code for reorganisation and insolvency resolution of C
corporate debtors. Unless such reorganisation is effected in a
time-bound manner, the value of the assets of such persons will
deplete. Therefore, maximisation of value of the assets of such
persons so that they are efficiently run as going concerns is
another very important objective of the Code. This, in turn, will
promote entrepreneurship as the persons in management of the D
corporate debtor are removed and replaced by entrepreneurs.
When, therefore, a resolution plan takes off and the corporate
debtor is brought back into the economic mainstream, it is able
to repay its debts, which, in turn, enhances the viability of credit
in the hands of banks and financial institutions. Above all, E
ultimately, the interests of all stakeholders are looked after as
the corporate debtor itself becomes a beneficiary of the resolution
scheme—workers are paid, the creditors in the long run will be
repaid in full, and shareholders/investors are able to maximise
their investment. Timely resolution of a corporate debtor who is
in the red, by an effective legal framework, would go a long way F
to support the development of credit markets. Since more
investment can be made with funds that have come back into
the economy, business then eases up, which leads, overall, to
higher economic growth and development of the Indian economy.
What is interesting to note is that the Preamble does not, in any G
manner, refer to liquidation, which is only availed of as a last
resort if there is either no resolution plan or the resolution plans
submitted are not up to the mark. Even in liquidation, the liquidator
can sell the business of the corporate debtor as a going concern.
(See ArcelorMittal [ArcelorMittal (India) (P) Ltd. v. Satish
Kumar Gupta, (2019) 2 SCC 1] at para 83, fn 3). H
846 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.
A 28. It can thus be seen that the primary focus of the legislation
is to ensure revival and continuation of the corporate debtor by
protecting the corporate debtor from its own management and
from a corporate death by liquidation. The Code is thus a
beneficial legislation which puts the corporate debtor back on its
feet, not being a mere recovery legislation for creditors. The
B
interests of the corporate debtor have, therefore, been bifurcated
and separated from that of its promoters/those who are in
management. Thus, the resolution process is not adversarial to
the corporate debtor but, in fact, protective of its interests. The
moratorium imposed by Section 14 is in the interest of the
C corporate debtor itself, thereby preserving the assets of the
corporate debtor during the resolution process. The timelines
within which the resolution process is to take place again protects
the corporate debtor’s assets from further dilution, and also
protects all its creditors and workers by seeing that the resolution
process goes through as fast as possible so that another
D
management can, through its entrepreneurial skills, resuscitate the
corporate debtor to achieve all these ends.
7.4 Section 16G(1)(c) refers to the proceeding for winding up
of such company or for the appointment of receiver in respect thereof.
Therefore, as such, the proceedings under Section 9 of the IBC shall
E not be limited and/or restricted to winding up and/or appointment of
receiver only. The winding up/liquidation of the company shall be the
last resort and only on an eventuality when the corporate insolvency
resolution process fails. As observed by this Court in Swiss Ribbons
Pvt. Ltd. (supra), referred to hereinabove, the primary focus of the
F legislation while enacting the IBC is to ensure revival and continuation
of the corporate debtor by protecting the corporate debtor from its own
management and from a corporate debt by liquidation and such
corporate insolvency resolution process is to be completed in a time-
bound manner. Therefore, the entire “corporate insolvency resolution
process” as such cannot be equated with “winding up proceedings”.
G Therefore, considering Section 238 of the IBC, which is a subsequent
Act to the Tea Act, 1953, shall be applicable and the provisions of the
IBC shall have an over-riding effect over the Tea Act, 1953. Any other
view would frustrate the object and purpose of the IBC. If the
submission on behalf of the appellant that before initiation of proceedings
H under Section 9 of the IBC, the consent of the Central Government as
DUNCANS INDUSTRIES LTD. v. A. J. AGROCHEM 847
[M. R. SHAH, J.]
provided under Section 16G(1)(c) of the Tea Act is to be obtained, in A
that case, the main object and purpose of the IBC, namely, to complete
the “corporate insolvency resolution process” in a time-bound manner,
shall be frustrated. The sum and substance of the above discussion
would be that the provisions of the IBC would have an over-riding effect
over the Tea Act, 1953 and that no prior consent of the Central
B
Government before initiation of the proceedings under Section 7 or
Section 9 of the IBC would be required and even without such consent
of the Central Government, the insolvency proceedings under Section
7 or Section 9 of the IBC initiated by the operational creditor shall be
maintainable.
8. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the C
present appeal fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and is
accordingly dismissed. The impugned judgment and order dated
20.06.2019 passed by the learned NCLAT holding that insolvency
petition under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
initiated by the respondent-operation creditor shall be maintainable, is D
hereby confirmed. No costs.
Nidhi Jain Appeal dismissed.
E
F
G
H
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