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Supreme Court of India

DR. UMRAO SINGH CHOUDHARYversusSTATE OF M.P. AND ANR.

Citation
1994 INSC 184
Decided
2 May 1994

Holding

The State Government’s satisfaction under s.52(1) justified the notification, and the provisions of s.52 expressly exclude the application of natural‑justice principles, so the court will not overturn the decision.

Summary

Dr. Umrao Singh Choudhary was appointed Vice‑Chancellor of Devi Ahilya Vishwavidyalaya under section 13 of the Madhya Pradesh Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1973. On 21 January 1994 the Governor, exercising power under section 52(1) of the same Act, issued a notification that the Vice‑Chancellor should vacate office, causing the petitioner to lose his position. The petitioner challenged the notification before the Madhya Pradesh High Court, alleging mala‑fide, arbitrariness and violation of natural‑justice principles, but the writ petition was dismissed. He then filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court. The Court held that the State Government’s satisfaction that the university’s administration could not be carried out under the Act justified the use of section 52(1); the power is statutory, subject to judicial review, but the court will not overturn the Government’s satisfaction. The Court further held that section 52, by necessary implication, excludes the application of natural‑justice rules, so no notice or hearing was required. Consequently, the Special Leave Petition was dismissed.

Issues considered

  • Whether the Governor’s notification under s.52(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1973, was within the statutory authority.
  • Whether the exercise of power under s.52(1) is amenable to judicial review under Articles 136 and 226 of the Constitution.
  • Whether the principles of natural justice apply to the removal of the Vice‑Chancellor under s.52(1).
  • Whether the High Court erred in dismissing the writ petition challenging the notification.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Vice‑Chancellor removalStatutory powerNatural justiceJudicial reviewAdministrative lawUniversity governanceArticle 136Article 226

Judgment

A                      DR. UMRAO SINGH CHOUDHARY
                                            v.
                            STATE OF M.P. AND ANR.

                                     MAY 2, 1994

B             [K. RAMASWAMY AND N. VENKATACHALA, JJ.]

           Constitution of India : Articles 136, 22!r--Notiftcation under s.52 of
    Madhya Pradesh Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1973-Vice- Chancellor to va-
    cate office-Heid, when State Government was satisfied as contemplated by
C   s.52 court would not be justified in inteifering in exercise ofpower under Article
    136 or Article 226.

            Madhya Pradesh Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1973 : Sections 13, 14,
    52-Vice-Chance/loi-Notiftcation under s.52 providing that Vice-Chancellor
    ceased to be operative with ifnmediate effect-Held, State Govemnzent was
D   justified in issuing notification as it was satisfied that a situation had a1isen
    in which administration of University could not be carried on in accordance
    with prnvi.\·ions of Adhiniyan1,

          Administrative Law : Judicial reviev.-Notification under s.52 of M.P.
E Act No. 22 of 197J-Vice-Chancellor to vacate office-Held, action under s.52
    statutory and subject to judicial review as envisaged by Articles 136 or 226 of
    the Constitution-However, Court would not sit in appeal over opinion of
    State Government.

          Natural Justice : Vice-Chancel/oi-Notiftcation under s.52 of M.P. Act
F 22 of 197J-Held, s.52 by necessary implication excludes application of
    principles of natural justice.

           The petitioner was appointed as Vice-Chancellor under s.13 of Mad-
    hya Pradesh Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1973 on 5.9.1992. The Governor,
    issued a notification under s.51 of the Adhiniyam whereby the petitioner
G   ceased to be the Vice-Chancellor w.e.f. 21.1.1994. The petitioner filed a writ
    petition before the High Court contending that the notification besides
    being ma/a fide, illegal and arbitrary, was violative of principles of natural
    justice as the action of the Governor was administrative and the petitioner
    was not afforded any opportunity. The High tourt dismissed the writ
H   petition. The petitioner filed the special leave petition.
                                           842
                  DR. UMRAO SINGH v. STATE OF M.P.                       843

      Dismissing the special leave petition, this Court                         A
      HELD : 1. The State Government was justified in issuing the
notification under s.52(1) of Madhya Pradesh Vishwavidyalaya Ad-
hiniyam, 1973. [847-C]

      2.1. The condition precedent to exercise the power under s.52(1) is       B
the satisfaction as contemplated thereby of the State Guvennnent, i.e. the
Governor with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, and record-
ing of the reasons as mentioned therein. In the instant case, the State
Government was satisfied that a situation had arisen in which the ad-
ministration of the University could not be carried on in accordance with
the provisions of the Adhiniyam and for better administration and to
                                                                                c
prevent detriment to the interest of the University, it issued the Notifica-
tion 'for the reasons mentioned therein' and directed that ss.13 and 14 of
the Adhiniyam would not apply. [pp. 846-F-H; 847-A]

       2.2. The action under s.52 is only statutory action, but subject to      D
judicial review. However, the court would not sit in appeal over the opinion
of the State Government. When, in the facts of the case, the State Govern-
ment was satisfied of the situation contemplated by s.52(1), though the
court may differ from the formation of that satisfaction, if questioned in an
appeal, and may come to a different conclnsion, it would not be justified to
differ from the conclusion in exercise of the power of judicial review under    E
Article 136 or under Article 226 of the Constitution. [p. 846-F; 847-A-B)

      S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, [1994) 3 S.C.C. 1, followed.

       3. The principle of natural justice does not supplant the law, but
supplement the law. Its application may be excluded, either expressly or F
by necessary implication. Section 52, in juxta-position to s.14, by necessary
implication, excludes the application of the principles of natural justice.
In view of this statutory animation it cannot be said that the petitioner is
entitled to the notice and an opportunity before taking action under
s.52(1). [846-B-C)                                                            G
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (C)
No. 6800 of 1994.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 21.2.94 of the Madhay Pradesh
High Court in M.P. No. 125 of 1994.                                  H
    844                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [1994] 3 S.C.R.

A          A.K. Goel and Mrs. Sheela Goel for the Petitioner.

          Satish K. Agnihotri for the Respondent.

          The following Order of the Court was delivered :

B          The prititioner was appointed as Vice Chancellor of Devi Ahilya
    Vishwavidalaya {University) on September 5, 1992 under s.13 of Madhya
    Pradesh Vishwavidayala Adhiniyam, 1973, for short 'Adhiniyam' for a
    period of four years and he had joined on September 17, 1992. The
    Governor exercising the power under s.52(1) of the Adhiniyam issued a
C   notification on January 21, 1994 and by operation thereof the petitioner
    had ceased to be the Vice-Chancellor with effect from the said date. On
    January 22, 1994 the petitioner had moved a writ petition in the High Court
    of Madhya Pradesh to declare the action as ma/a fide, illegal, arbitrary,
    impinging his right to continue in office till September 17, 1996 and was
    violative of principles of natural justice. The division bench, by its order
D   dated February 21, 1994, in Misc. Petition No. 125 of 1994 dismissed the
    petition. Thus this special leave.

        Two contentions were raised in the High Court as well as before us
  that the action of the Governor is administrative and omission to give
E opportunity to the petitioner is violative of principle of natural justice,
  apart from being a ma/a fide exercise of powers by the State Government.
  Since the Misc. Petition was taken up for hearing at the admission stage,
  records had been called for by the High Court and were made available
  by the Government. As stated in the judgment, the High Court felt it
  expedient to dispose of the case at the hearing stage itself. In those
F circumstances no counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the State Govern-
  ment. With a view to satisfy the tenability of the contentions raised vis-a-vis
  the material made available by the Govt. in support of the impugned order
  and to satisfy ourselves independently, we sent for the records and the
  counsel today placed the records before us. We have carefully gone
G through the record and also the note said to have been submitted to the
  Governor for consideration before issuing the notification. We have heard
  the counsel on both sides.

           Undoubtedly the petitioner was appointed under s.13 of the Ad-
     hiniyam and s.14 thereof provides an elaborate enquiry and reasonable
H    opportunity for removal of the Vice Chancellor (Kulapati) from office




                                                                                    I
                  DR.UMRAOSINGH v.STATEOFM.P.                             845

before, expiry of the term, obviously as a measure of punishment. Section A
52(1) of the Adhiniyam equally empowers the State Govt. in a modified
form, to satisfy that "if the State Govt. on receipt of a report or otherwise,
satisfied that situation has arisen in which the administration of the univer-
sity cannot be carried out it accordance with the provisions of the Act,
without deteriment to the interest of the University, and it is expedient in
                                                                               B
the interest or the University so to do, it may by notification, for reasons
to be mentioned therein, direct that the provision of ss. 13, 14, 20 to 25,
40, 47, 54 and 68 shall, as from the date specified in the notification, apply
to the university, subject to the modification specified in the schedule". On
issuance thereof the Vice Chancellor shall cease to hold office by operation
of sub- s.(4) of s.52, Clause II thus :                                           c
         "The Kulpati, holding office immediately before the appointed
         date, shall notwithstanding that his term of office has not expired,
         vacate his office."
                                                                                  D
By operation thereof the applicability of ss.13 and 14 stood modified and
the need to conduct a regular enquiry against the petitioner was obviated.
On issuance of the notification under s.52(1) and on and with effect from
the said date the Vice Chancellor, by operation of S.52(4) shall, not-
withstanding his term of office had not been expired, is required to vacate
his office. In other words, he ceased to hold the office. It is found as a fact   E
that the petitioner ceased to hold office with effect from January 21, 1994
and the new incumbent had assumed office.

       Though the contention of mala fides has been repeated by the
learned senior counsel, when we pointed out, that the petitioner had not F
made any specific allegation against any specified officer or holder of the
office, nor impleaded any officer or holder of the office as a party respon-
dent, in fairness, the learned Senior counsel did not pursue the line of
argument. Nonetheless it was contended that the petitioner was entitled to
be afforded an opportunity of being heard before passing the impugned
notification and the order passed in violation thereof offends the principle G
of natural justice. We find no force in the contention. Section. 14 engrafts
an elaborate procedure to conduct an enquiry against the vice Chancellor
and after giving reasonable opportunity, to take action thereon for his
removal from the office. Section 52 engrafts an exception thereto. The
condition precedent, however, is that the State Govt. should be satisfied, H
    846                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    (1994J 3 S.C.R.

A   obviously on objective consideration of the material relevant to the issue,
    as on record, that the administration of the lJniversity cannot be carried
    out in accordance with the provisions of the Act, without deteriment to the
    interest of the University, and that it is expedient in the interest of the
    University and for proper administration thereof, lo apply in a modified
    form, excluding the application of ss.13 and 14, etc. and to issue the
B
    notification under s.52(1). By necessary implication, the application of the
    principle of natural justice has been excluded. In view of this statutory
    animation the contention that the petitioner is entitled to the notice and
    an opportunity before taking action under s.52(1) would be self-defeating.         '
    The principle of natural justice does not supplant the law, but supplement
c   the law. Its application may be excluded, either expressly or by necessary
    implication. Section 52 in juxtaposition to s.14, when considered, the ob-
    vious inference would be that the principle of natural jt.stice stands ex-
    cluded.


D          Obviously for this reason, to satisfy ourselves whether the notification
    is founderi upon any record and whether the reasons given in support
    thereof, are relevant to the issue, the record. was summoned, and has been
    made available to us. The note placed before the Governor also was placed.
    It is an elaborate note, pregnant with material details touching the malad-
    ministration of the University. From the record we have seen that the Govt.
E   considered the above material and the Governor after due satisfaction had
    exercised the power under s.52(1): Though the High Court held that the
    action under s.52 is legislative action, it is obviously illegal in the light of
    the decision of this court in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, Civil Appeal
    No. 3645 of 1989, etc. decided on March 11, 1994 wherein this court
F   considered the presidential proclamation under Art. 356 and held that the
    action is not beyond the kan of judicial review. The action under s.52 is
    only statutory action, but subject to judicial review. However, the court
    would not sit in appeal over the opinion of the State Govt. The statute gives
    power to the State Government. The Government exercised his power with
    the <iid and advice of the Council of Ministers in issuing the notification
G   under s.52. Therefore, though it was a statutory notification, the condition
    precedent is that the satisfaction of the State Govt., i.e. the Governor, with
    the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers is of the situation mentioned
    in s.52(1) and for reasons to be recorded therein, for better administration
    so the University, the State Govt. was satisfied that a situation had arisen
                                                                                           '
H in \Vhich the administration of the University could not be carried on in
                      DR.UMRAOSINGH v.STATEOFM.P.                               847

    accordance \Vith the provisions of the Adhiniyam and for better administra-        A
    tion \vhercof and to prevent the detrin1ent to the interest of the University,
    the State Govt. issued the notification 11 for the reasons mentioned therein"
    and directed that the provisions mentioned therein under ss.13 and 14 shall
    not apply. When those facts are present and the State Govt. were satisfied
    of the situation contemplated under s.52(1), though the court may differ
    from that formation of satisfaction when the court is called upon in an            B
    appeal against the said satisfaction and may come to a different conclusion,
    we would not be justified to differ from the conclusion in our judicial
    review under Art. 136 or of the I-ligh Court under Art. 226 of the Constitu-
    tion. Though the Academic Council etc, had been dissolved, the correct-
    ness thereof is not the subject matter of this special leave petition. We are      c
    not called upon to enter into that question. Therefore, from the records
    we are satisfied that the State Govt. were justified in issuing the notification
    under s.52( 1) of the Adhiniyam.

         The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed, but in the cir-
    cumstances without costs.                                                 D
    R.P.                                                        Petition dismissed.




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