DR. U. N. BORA, EX. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER & ORS.versusASSAM ROLLER FLOUR MILLS ASSOCIATION & ANR.

484                      [2021]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT   10 S.C.R. 484              [2021] 10 S.C.R.


A       DR. U.N. BORA, EX. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER & ORS.
                                        v.
         ASSAM ROLLER FLOUR MILLS ASSOCIATION & ANR.
                       (Criminal Appeal No. 1967 of 2009)
B                             OCTOBER 26, 2021
         [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND M. M. SUNDRESH, JJ.]
             Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Assam Agricultural Produce
      Market Act, 1972 – s.21 – Levy of cess on the agricultural produce
      bought or sold in the notified market area – Deeming fiction – Writ
C
      petitions filed by respondent no.1-Association – Rules struck down
      – s.21A inserted by 2006 amending Act – Challenged – Division
      Bench of High Court upheld s.21 and held that the deeming fiction
      would apply only where a trader fails to establish direct evidence
      of sale or purchase having been undertaken outside the notified
D     market area; Committee constituted – Contempt alleged – Appellants
      held guilty – On appeal, held: Civil contempt means willful
      disobedience of a decision of the Court – Willful disobedience is
      relevant – Merely because a subordinate official acted in disregard
      of an order passed by the Court, a liability cannot be fastened on a
      higher official in the absence of knowledge – Vicarious liability as
E
      a principle cannot be applied to a case of contempt – Further, High
      Court on the earlier occasion while dealing with the challenge made
      to s.21 made a categorical assertion that it did not wish to go into
      the disputed questions of fact – However, in the order under
      challenge it was done – A finding was given on the documents
F     produced by the respondent no.1 which could at best be pieces of
      evidence to be appreciated by the committee constituted – In cases
      where cess was levied, individual members of the respondent no.1
      could have made their challenge before the Committee – Order
      passed by the High Court in contempt case set aside.
G           Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Standard of proof – Held:
      Proof beyond reasonable doubt is required since the proceedings
      are quasi-criminal in nature.
            Contempt of Court – Disputed questions of facts – Held: While
      dealing with a contempt petition, the Court is not expected to conduct
H     a roving inquiry and go beyond the very judgment which was
                                       484
   DR. U.N. BORA, EX. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER v. ASSAM                  485
             ROLLER FLOUR MILLS ASSOCIATION

allegedly violated – Said principle has to be applied with more vigor   A
when disputed questions of facts are involved.
      Allowing the appeal, the Court
       HELD: 1.1 After the order under challenge before this
Court, the provision underwent further change having been
repealed by an ordinance followed by an appropriate                     B
enactment. The Court is dealing with a civil contempt. The
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 explains a civil contempt to mean
a willful disobedience of a decision of the Court. Therefore, what
is relevant is the “willful” disobedience. Knowledge acquires
substantial importance qua a contempt order. Merely because a           C
subordinate official acted in disregard of an order passed by the
Court, a liability cannot be fastened on a higher official in the
absence of knowledge. When two views are possible, the element
of willfulness vanishes as it involves a mental element. It is a
deliberate, conscious and intentional act. What is required is a
proof beyond reasonable doubt since the proceedings are quasi-          D
criminal in nature. Similarly, when a distinct mechanism is
provided and that too, in the same judgment alleged to have been
violated, a party has to exhaust the same before approaching the
court in exercise of its jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971. It is well open to the said party to contend that the        E
benefit of the order passed has not been actually given, through
separate proceedings while seeking appropriate relief but
certainly not by way of a contempt proceeding. While dealing with
a contempt petition, the Court is not expected to conduct a roving
inquiry and go beyond the very judgment which was allegedly
violated. The said principle has to be applied with more vigor          F
when disputed questions of facts are involved and they were raised
earlier but consciously not dealt with by creating a specific
forum to decide the original proceedings. [Paras 5, 8][490-G-H;
492-C-G]
      Hukum Chand Deswal v. Satish Raj Deswal, 2020 SCC                 G
      Online SC 438; Ram Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj, (2014) 16
      SCC 204 : [2014] 1 SCR 538 – relied on.
     1.2 The High Court on the earlier occasion while dealing
with the challenge made to Section 21 of the Act, made a
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486            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2021] 10 S.C.R.


A     categorical assertion that it did not wish to go into the disputed
      questions of fact. However, in the order under challenge it was
      done. A finding has been given on the documents produced by
      the respondent no.1 which could at best be pieces of evidence to
      be appreciated by the committee constituted already. It is the
      specific case of the appellants that they did not violate the
B
      directives of the court. There is no material to either establish
      their knowledge on the action of their subordinates, or that they
      acted in collusion with each other. Vicarious liability as a principle
      cannot be applied to a case of contempt. The question as to
      whether the drivers of two members of the respondent no.1
C     showed the order passed by the court and the documents
      produced are true and genuine being in the realm of adjudication,
      ought not to have been taken up by the High Court while
      exercising contempt jurisdiction. It is the respondent no.1 who
      not being satisfied with the order passed by the High Court, filed
      the special leave petition. Even in the communications sent apart
D
      from the Press Note, it is nowhere stated that the order passed
      by the court could be violated. The subsequent developments
      also shall enure to the benefit of the appellants. In cases where
      cess was levied, individual members of the respondent no.1 could
      have made their challenge before the committee. The entire
E     exercise of the High Court is not warranted and the aggrieved
      members of the respondent no.1 could have been well advised
      to seek the alternative remedy open to them including redressal
      through the committee. The order passed by the High Court on
      23.10.2009 in Contempt Case No.401 of 2008 is set aside. [Paras
      10,11][497-D-H; 498-A-B]
F
            Ashok Paper Kamgar Union vs. Godha and Ors., (2013)
            11 SCC 1; Kapildeo Prasad Sah and Ors. vs. State of
            Bihar, (1999) 7 SCC 569 : [1999] Suppl. SCR 725;
            Dinesh Kumar Gupta vs. United India Insurance
            Company Ltd. and Ors., (2010) 12 SCC 770 : [2010]
G           13 SCR 599; Anil Ratan Sarkar and Ors. vs. Hirak
            Ghosh and Ors., (2002) 4 SCC 21 : [2002] 2 SCR 346;
            India Airports Employees Union vs. Ranjan Chatterjee
            and Anr., (1999) 2 SCC 537 : [1999] 1 SCR 326;
            Director of Education, Uttaranchal vs. Ved Prakash
H
   DR. U.N. BORA, EX. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER v. ASSAM                      487
             ROLLER FLOUR MILLS ASSOCIATION

      Joshi and Ors., (2005) 6 SCC 98 : [2005] 1 Suppl. SCR                 A
      620; Union of India and Ors. vs. Subedar Devassy PV,
      (2006) 1 SCC 613 : [2006] 1 SCR 303; Mrityunjoy
      Das and Anr. vs. Sayed Hasibur Tahaman and Ors.,
      (2001) 3 SCC 739 : [2001] 2 SCR 471; Bal Kishan
      Giri vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 7 SCC 280:
                                                                            B
      [2014] 6 SCR 545 – referred to.
                        Case Law Reference
[1999] Suppl. SCR 725           referred to                Para 6
[2010] 13 SCR 599               referred to                Para 6
[2002] 2 SCR 346                referred to                Para 6           C

[1999] 1 SCR 326                referred to                Para 6
[2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 620         referred to               Para 6
[2006] 1 SCR 303                referred to                Para 6
[2001] 2 SCR 471                referred to                Para 6           D
[2014] 6 SCR 545                referred to                Para 6
[2014] 1 SCR 538                relied on                  Para 9
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No.1967 of 2009.                                                            E
      From the Judgment and Order dated 23.10.2009 of the High Court
of Gauhati in Contempt Case No.401 of 2008.
      Arunabh Chowdhury, Ms. Barnali Chowdhury, Dechen Wangdi
Lachungpa, Ms. Pallavi Langar, Rahul Pratap, M/s Coac, Advs. for the
Appellants.                                                                 F
        Hrishikesh Baruah, Ms. Radhika Gupta, Ms. Akangsha Manik,
Jagjit Singh Chhabra, Manish Goswami, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Advs.
for the Respondents.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                            G
      M. M. SUNDRESH, J.
      1. The present appeal has been filed against the order of the
Division Bench of the High Court finding the appellants guilty of willful
disobedience of the order passed in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 5491 of

                                                                            H
488              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2021] 10 S.C.R.


A     2001 etc. dated 12.09.2008 in respect to the levy made while upholding
      Section 21 of the Assam Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1972.
            2. Pending the appeal, the first appellant died on 27.02.2017.
      Taking note of the aforesaid fact, the proceedings as against him were
      declared as abated by the order of this court dated 07.10.2021.
B           3. We have heard the arguments of the counsels at the Bar and
      perused the documents filed along with the written arguments.
            FACTS:
            4. While leapfrogging unnecessary facts, a brief sketch is furnished
      hereunder:
C
            a)     On 03.09.1974, the Assam Agricultural Produce Market
                   Act, 1972 came into the statute book. Section 21 of the Act
                   conferred power on the marketing committees or the Assam
                   State Agricultural Marketing Board (hereinafter referred
                   to as “the Board”) to levy cess on the agricultural produce
D                  bought or sold in the notified market area, at the prescribed
                   rate. Explanation-I appended to the said provision brought
                   in a deeming fiction. Rules were enacted in exercise of the
                   power conferred under Section 49 of the Act.
            b)     Writ petitions were filed by the respondent no.1-Association
E                  among others before the High Court on the premise that its
                   members purchased the agricultural produce outside the
                   State and thus, no cess is leviable. Rules were struck down
                   leading to the introduction of the Amendment Act, 2000,
                   amending Section 21 of the Act while inserting Section 21A.
                   A challenge made by the Board to the decision of the Full
F                  Bench dated 04.04.2001 before this Court resulted in the
                   order dated 08.12.2005, inter alia holding that in view of the
                   subsequent developments, there is no need to go into the
                   issues.
            c)     Section 21A was inserted by the amending Act, 2006
G                  facilitating the Board to levy and collect cess for the
                   marketing committees in the notified market areas in addition
                   to their existing power. This amendment was put into
                   challenge in the batch of writ petitions before the Division
                   Bench of the High Court. While upholding the constitutional
H                  validity vide judgment dated 12.09.2008, it has been held
 DR. U.N. BORA, EX. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER v. ASSAM                       489
ROLLER FLOUR MILLS ASSOCIATION [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]

        that the deeming fiction would apply only to such of those         A
        cases where a trader fails to establish that there is direct
        evidence of sale or purchase having been undertaken outside
        the notified market area. It was further held that disputed
        questions including that of refund cannot be gone into in a
        writ petition invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
                                                                           B
        and such disputes can be dealt with by the committee
        constituted.
  d)    Alleging that the orders passed by the Division Bench with
        respect to the direct evidence produced by the members of
        the respondent no.1 were not looked into and scrutinized
        on purpose while levying cess, a contempt petition was filed       C
        in Contempt Case (Civil) No.401 of 2008. Incidentally, the
        respondent no. 1 also filed a Special Leave Petition (Civil)
        No. 11317 of 2009 challenging the order of the Division
        Bench dated 12.09.2008, which was converted into Civil
        Appeal No. 9655 of 2013, wherein, leave was granted by             D
        this court vide order dated 25.10.2013.
  e)    In the aforesaid contempt petition, the Division Bench vide
        the impugned order dated 23.10.2009 took note of certain
        documents produced by two members of the respondent
        no.1, such as sale invoices, lorry challans, tax challans,         E
        insurance receipts etc. It went into the factual assertions
        made, notwithstanding the committee constituted by it earlier
        for the aforesaid purpose and accordingly, hauled all the
        appellants for committing willful disobedience.
  f)    Against the aforesaid order punishing the appellants for           F
        having committed a contumacious act, a Special Leave
        Petition (Civil) No.10538 of 2010 was filed by the Board
        and on grant of leave the same was registered as Civil
        Appeal No. 9656 of 2013. This Court has passed the
        following order on 30.03.2010 while issuing notice in the
        aforesaid appeal filed by the Board when the matter was            G
        pending as a special leave petition:
           “Permission to file SLP is granted.
           Issue notice on the application for condonation of delay
           as well as on the special leave petitions.
                                                                           H
490              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2021] 10 S.C.R.


A                     Assam State Agricultural Marketing Board is permitted
                      to collect tax in accordance with the Judgment passed
                      by the Division Bench of High Court dated 12.9.2008,
                      uninfluenced by the order passed in the contempt
                      proceedings dated 23.10.2009.
B                     Post along with SLP(C) No. 11317 of 2009.”
            g)     The special leave petitions filed by the respondent no.1
                   challenging the original order of the Division Bench was
                   taken up as Civil Appeal Nos. 9655 of 2013, 9657-9665 of
                   2013 and 9666 of 2013 and accordingly the order dated
C                  29.09.2021 was passed, which is appositely referred
                   hereunder:
                      “Learned Counsel for the Appellants state that the
                      impugned Act has been repealed by an Ordinance issued
                      on 13.07.2020 and subsequently Act has been brought
D                     in place.
                      In view of the aforesaid, the issue sought to be debated
                      in the present appeals have become academic and thus
                      it is not disputed that the appeals really do not survive
                      for consideration.
E                     Civil appeals are disposed of accordingly. Pending
                      applications also stand disposed of.”
            h)     After the order dated 12.09.2008 passed by the Division
                   Bench upholding Section 21 of the Act, there were exchange
                   of communications between the appellants and the
F                  respondents. While the respondent no.1 alleged violation of
                   the order passed, the appellants contended that the action
                   was only taken in tune with the mandate of the Board under
                   Section 21 of the Act and the remedy, if any, to the members
                   of the respondent no.1 would be before the Committee
                   constituted in pursuance of the said decision.
G
            5. Thus, much water has flown under the bridge after the order
      under challenge before us. The provision underwent further change
      having been repealed by an ordinance followed by an appropriate
      enactment. In light of the aforesaid factual scenario, we shall proceed
      with the case.
H
   DR. U.N. BORA, EX. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER v. ASSAM                        491
  ROLLER FLOUR MILLS ASSOCIATION [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]

      SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANTS:                                          A
        6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that
the second appellant was transferred on 23.07.2008 and the appellant
no. 1 was in-charge only till 21.01.2009. The first appellant died on
27.02.2017. There is no willful and deliberate violation of the order
involved. The High Court has erred in going into the facts in appreciating    B
evidence. It exceeded its jurisdiction which it declined to exercise even
while invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It could have
relegated the members of the respondent no.1 to go before the committee
constituted. There is absolutely no material to implicate the appellants
with the alleged action of their subordinates. The concept of vicarious
liability is alien to a contempt jurisdiction. Unconditional apologies were   C
also rendered before the High Court. The respondent no.1 is the one
who simultaneously assailed the order dated 12.09.2008 passed by the
Division Bench, before this Court, while approaching the High Court
under its contempt jurisdiction. Even otherwise, in light of the subsequent
developments, the appeal deserves to be allowed. On the aforesaid             D
submissions, the appellants placed reliance upon various decisions of
this Court in the case of:
      •      Ashok Paper Kamgar Union vs. Godha and Ors., (2013)
             11 SCC 1
      •      Kapildeo Prasad Sah and Ors. vs. State of Bihar, (1999)          E
             7 SCC 569
      •      Dinesh Kumar Gupta vs. United India Insurance
             Company Ltd. and Ors., (2010) 12 SCC 770
      •      Anil Ratan Sarkar and Ors. vs. Hirak Ghosh and Ors.,
             (2002) 4 SCC 21                                                  F
      •      India Airports Employees Union vs. Ranjan
             Chatterjee and Anr., (1999) 2 SCC 537
      •      Director of Education, Uttaranchal vs. Ved Prakash
             Joshi and Ors., (2005) 6 SCC 98
      •      Union of India and Ors. vs. Subedar Devassy PV, (2006)           G
             1 SCC 613
      •      Mrityunjoy Das and Anr. vs. Sayed Hasibur Tahaman
             and Ors., (2001) 3 SCC 739
      •      Bal Kishan Giri vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 7
             SCC 280                                                          H
492            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2021] 10 S.C.R.


A           SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS:
             7. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that
      the press release followed by the failure on the part of officials working
      under the appellants would clearly show the intention to circumvent the
      orders passed by the Court. Materials were accordingly produced. It is
B     a case of deliberate attempt to overcome the judgment of the Court,
      notwithstanding the adequate knowledge. As the High Court has
      considered the relevant materials, there is no need to interfere with the
      reasoned order passed.
            DISCUSSION:
C            8. We are dealing with a civil contempt. The Contempt of Courts
      Act, 1971 explains a civil contempt to mean a willful disobedience of a
      decision of the Court. Therefore, what is relevant is the “willful”
      disobedience. Knowledge acquires substantial importance qua a contempt
      order. Merely because a subordinate official acted in disregard of an
D     order passed by the Court, a liability cannot be fastened on a higher
      official in the absence of knowledge. When two views are possible, the
      element of willfulness vanishes as it involves a mental element. It is a
      deliberate, conscious and intentional act. What is required is a proof
      beyond reasonable doubt since the proceedings are quasi-criminal in
      nature. Similarly, when a distinct mechanism is provided and that too, in
E     the same judgment alleged to have been violated, a party has to exhaust
      the same before approaching the court in exercise of its jurisdiction under
      the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It is well open to the said party to
      contend that the benefit of the order passed has not been actually given,
      through separate proceedings while seeking appropriate relief but
F     certainly not by way of a contempt proceeding. While dealing with a
      contempt petition, the Court is not expected to conduct a roving inquiry
      and go beyond the very judgment which was allegedly violated. The said
      principle has to be applied with more vigor when disputed questions of
      facts are involved and they were raised earlier but consciously not dealt
      with by creating a specific forum to decide the original proceedings.
G
             9. We do not wish to reiterate the aforesaid settled principle of
      law except by quoting the reasoned decision of this Court in Hukum
      Chand Deswal v. Satish Raj Deswal, 2020 SCC Online SC 438 wherein
      the celebrated judgment in Ram Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj, (2014) 16 SCC
      204, has been quoted. The following paragraphs would govern the
H     aforesaid principle:
 DR. U.N. BORA, EX. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER v. ASSAM                      493
ROLLER FLOUR MILLS ASSOCIATION [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]

  “18. At the outset, we must advert to the contours delineated by        A
  this court for initiating civil contempt action in Ram Kishan vs.
  Tarun Bajaj & Ors. In paragraphs 11, 12 and 15 of the reported
  decision, this Court noted thus:
     “11. The contempt jurisdiction conferred on to the law courts
     power to punish an offender for his wilful disobedience/             B
     contumacious conduct or obstruction to the majesty of law, for
     the reason that respect and authority commanded by the courts
     of law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen that his
     rights shall be protected and the entire democratic fabric of
     the society 5 (2014) 16 SCC 204 18 will crumble down if the
     respect of the judiciary is undermined. Undoubtedly, the             C
     contempt jurisdiction is a powerful weapon in the hands of the
     courts of law but that by itself operates as a string of caution
     and unless, thus, otherwise satisfied beyond reasonable doubt,
     it would neither be fair nor reasonable for the law courts to
     exercise jurisdiction under the Act. The proceedings are quasi       D
     criminal in nature, and therefore, standard of proof required in
     these proceedings is beyond all reasonable doubt. It would
     rather be hazardous to impose sentence for contempt on the
     authorities in exercise of the contempt jurisdiction on mere
     probabilities. (Vide V.G. Nigam v. Kedar Nath Gupta, (1992)
     4 SCC 697, Chhotu Ram v. Urvashi Gulati, (2001) 7 SCC                E
     530, Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh, (2002) 4 SCC 21,
     Bank of Baroda v. Sadruddin Hasan Daya, (2004) 1 SCC
     360, Sahdeo v. State of U.P., (2010) 3 SCC 705 and National
     Fertilizers Ltd. v. Tuncay Alankus, (2013) 9 SCC 600.
     12. Thus, in order to punish a contemnor, it has to be established   F
     that disobedience of the order is “wilful”. The word “wilful”
     introduces a mental element and hence, requires looking into
     the mind of a person/contemnor by gauging his actions, which
     is an indication of one’s state of mind. “Wilful” means knowingly
     intentional, conscious, calculated and deliberate with full          G
     knowledge of consequences flowing therefrom. It excludes
     casual, accidental, bona fide or unintentional acts or genuine
     inability. Wilful acts does not encompass involuntarily or
     negligent actions. The act has to be done with a “bad purpose
     or without justifiable excuse or stubbornly, obstinately or
     perversely”. Wilful act is to be distinguished from an act done      H
494     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 10 S.C.R.


A        carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It does
         not include any act done negligently or involuntarily. The
         deliberate conduct of a person means that he knows what he
         is doing and intends to do the same. Therefore, there has to be
         a calculated action with evil motive on his part. Even if there is
         a disobedience of an order, but such disobedience is the result
B
         of some compelling circumstances under which it was not
         possible for the contemnor to comply with the order, the
         contemnor cannot be punished. “Committal or sequestration
         will not be ordered unless contempt involves a degree of default
         or misconduct.” (Vide S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R.
C        Attabiraman, (1985) 1 SCC 591, Rakapalli Raja Ram Gopala
         Rao v. Naragani Govinda Sehararao, (1989) 4 SCC 255,
         Niaz Mohammad v. State of 19 Haryana, (1994) 6 SCC 332,
         Chordia Automobiles v. S. Moosa, (2000) 3 SCC 282, Ashok
         Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha, (2003) 11 SCC 1,
         State of Orissa v. Mohd. Illiyas, (2006) 1 SCC 275 and
D
         Uniworth Textiles Ltd. v. CCE, (2013) 9 SCC 753.
            xxx                  xxx                   xxx
         15. It is well settled principle of law that if two interpretations
         are possible, and if the action is not contumacious, a contempt
E        proceeding would not be maintainable. The effect and purport
         of the order is to be taken into consideration and the same
         must be read in its entirety. Therefore, the element of
         willingness is an indispensable requirement to bring home the
         charge within the meaning of the Act. [See Sushila Raje
         Holkar v. Anil Kak, (2008) 14 SCC 392 and Three Cheers
F        Entertainment (P) Ltd. v. CESC Ltd., (2008) 16 SCC 592.”
      Similarly, in R.N. Dey & Ors. vs. Bhagyabati Pramanik & Ors.,
      this Court expounded in paragraph 7 as follows:
         “7. We may reiterate that the weapon of contempt is not to be
G        used in abundance or misused. Normally, it cannot be used for
         execution of the decree or implementation of an order for which
         alternative remedy in law is provided for. Discretion given to
         the court is to be exercised for maintenance of the court’s
         dignity and majesty of law. Further, an aggrieved party has no
         right to insist that the court should exercise such jurisdiction as
H
 DR. U.N. BORA, EX. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER v. ASSAM                     495
ROLLER FLOUR MILLS ASSOCIATION [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]

     contempt is between a contemner and the court. It is true that      A
     in the present case, the High Court has kept the matter pending
     and has ordered that it should be heard along with the first
     appeal. But, at the same time, it is to be noticed that under the
     coercion of contempt proceeding, appellants cannot be directed
     to pay the compensation amount which they are disputing by
                                                                         B
     asserting that claimants were not the owners of the property
     in question and that decree was obtained by suppressing the
     material fact and by fraud. Even presuming that the claimants
     are entitled to recover the amount of compensation as awarded
     by the trial court as no stay order is granted by the High Court,
     at the most they are entitled to recover the same by executing      C
     the 6 (2000) 4 SCC 400 20 said award wherein the State can
     or may contend that the award is a nullity. In such a situation,
     as there was no wilful or deliberate disobedience of the order,
     the initiation of contempt proceedings was wholly unjustified.”
     xxx xxx xxx                                                         D
  22. Pertinently, the special leave petitions were filed by the
  respondent against the order dated 28.1.2019, which as aforesaid,
  did not deal with the question regarding the monthly rent payable
  by the respondent but explicitly left the parties to pursue the same
  before the executing Court. The plaintiff/petitioner having            E
  acquiesced of that observation of the High Court, cannot be allowed
  to contend to the contrary. This Court in Jhareswar Prasad Paul
  & Anr. vs. Tarak Nath Ganguly & Ors., in paragraph 11, opined
  thus:
     “11. … The court exercising contempt jurisdiction is not entitled   F
     to enter into questions which have not been dealt with and
     decided in the judgment or order, violation of which is alleged
     by the applicant. The court has to consider the direction issued
     in the judgment or order and not to consider the question as to
     what the judgment or order should have contained. At the cost
     of repetition, 7 (2002) 5 SCC 352 23 be it stated here that the     G
     court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned
     with the question of contumacious conduct of the party, which
     is alleged to have committed deliberate default in complying
     with the directions in the judgment or order. If the judgment or
     order does not contain any specific direction regarding a matter    H
496      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 10 S.C.R.


A        or if there is any ambiguity in the directions issued therein then
         it will be better to direct the parties to approach the court which
         disposed of the matter for clarification of the order instead of
         the court exercising contempt jurisdiction taking upon itself the
         power to decide the original proceeding in a manner not dealt
         with by the court passing the judgment or order. If this limitation
B
         is borne in mind then criticisms which are sometimes levelled
         against the courts exercising contempt of court jurisdiction “that
         it has exceeded its powers in granting substantive relief and
         issuing a direction regarding the same without proper
         adjudication of the dispute” in its entirety can be avoided. This
C        will also avoid multiplicity of proceedings because the party
         which is prejudicially affected by the judgment or order passed
         in the contempt proceeding and granting relief and issuing fresh
         directions is likely to challenge that order and that may give
         rise to another round of litigation arising from a proceeding
         which is intended to maintain the majesty and image of courts.”
D
             xxx                  xxx                 xxx
      23. Thus understood, we find force in the explanation offered by
      the respondent that as per its bona fide understanding, there was
      no outstanding dues payable to the petitioner. Moreover, as
E     observed by the High Court, these aspects could be answered by
      the executing Court if the parties pursue their claim(s) before it in
      that regard. Suffice it to observe that it is not a case of intentional
      violation or wilful disobedience of the order passed by this Court
      to initiate contempt action against the respondent. Instead, we
      hold that it would be open to the parties to pursue their claim(s) in
F     execution proceedings or any other proceedings, as may be
      permissible in law in respect of the issue(s) under consideration.
      In such proceedings, all aspects can be considered by the
      concerned forum/Court on merits in accordance with law. We
      say no more.
G     24. Reverting to the allegation about damage caused to the suit
      property by the respondent at the time of vacating the same, in
      our opinion, the respondent has made out a formidable case that it
      did not cause any damage, much less permanent damage to the
      structure in the suit property. Whereas, the petitioner was relying
H     on photographs concerning the debris on the site left behind at the
   DR. U.N. BORA, EX. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER v. ASSAM                          497
  ROLLER FLOUR MILLS ASSOCIATION [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]

      time of vacating the suit property. The debris cannot cause damage        A
      and it is certainly not a case of defacement of the suit property.
      That position is reinforced from the fact that the water park in the
      suit premises was started and became fully functional within 2-3
      months. Viewed thus, it is rightly urged that it can be safely
      assumed that no damage was caused by the respondent to the
                                                                                B
      structure in question. Minor repairs required to be carried out by
      the petitioner for making the water park functional cannot be painted
      as intentional disobedience of the order of this Court. In any case,
      that being a complex question of fact, need not be adjudicated in
      the contempt proceedings. We leave it open to the petitioner to
      pursue even that claim in execution proceedings or such other             C
      proceedings as may be permissible in law. We may not be
      understood to have expressed any final opinion in respect of
      condition of the suit premises, whilst handing over possession to
      the petitioner. We hold that even this issue under consideration
      does not warrant initiation of contempt action against the
                                                                                D
      respondent.”
       10. On facts, we find that the High Court on the earlier occasion
while dealing with the challenge made to Section 21 of the Act, made a
categorical assertion that it did not wish to go into the disputed questions
of fact. However, in the order under challenge it was done. A finding
has been given on the documents produced by the respondent no.1 which           E
could at best be pieces of evidence to be appreciated by the committee
constituted already. It is the specific case of the appellants that they did
not violate the directives of the court. There is no material to either
establish their knowledge on the action of their subordinates, or that they
acted in collusion with each other. Vicarious liability as a principle cannot   F
be applied to a case of contempt. The question as to whether the drivers
of two members of the respondent no.1 showed the order passed by the
court and the documents produced are true and genuine being in the
realm of adjudication, ought not to have been taken up by the High Court
while exercising contempt jurisdiction. We may note that it is the
respondent no.1 who not being satisfied with the order passed by the            G
High Court, filed the special leave petition. Even in the communications
sent apart from the Press Note, it is nowhere stated that the order passed
by the court could be violated. We find that the subsequent developments
also shall enure to the benefit of the appellants. In cases where cess
was levied, individual members of the respondent no.1 could have made           H
498             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2021] 10 S.C.R.


A     their challenge before the committee. In our considered view, the entire
      exercise of the High Court is not warranted and the aggrieved members
      of the respondent no.1 could have been well advised to seek the alternative
      remedy open to them including redressal through the committee.
            11. In light of the aforesaid discussion, we accordingly set aside
B     the order passed by the High Court on 23.10.2009 in Contempt Case
      No.401 of 2008. Consequently, the appeal filed by the appellant nos. 2 to
      4 stands allowed. No costs.


      Divya Pandey                                                 Appeal allowed.
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