Holding

The Court held that the constitutional validity and appropriate modality of domicile/residence‑based reservation for PG medical admissions require examination by a larger Bench and therefore referred the questions to such a Bench.

Summary

The Supreme Court considered appeals against a Punjab and Haryana High Court order that struck down a domicile/residence‑based reservation provision in the prospectus of Government Medical College, Chandigarh for PG medical courses. The petitioners sought to uphold the reservation for candidates with a ‘Chandigarh background’, while the respondents argued that such reservation violates Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. The Court examined the earlier jurisprudence on institutional preference and domicile‑based reservation, noting that the Constitution Bench in Saurabh Chaudri had not categorically overruled domicile‑based reservation but had stressed that any classification must be reasonable and not arbitrary. Given the divergent authorities and the special circumstance of Chandigarh having only one medical college, the Court declined to decide the merits and referred the matter to a larger bench for an authoritative pronouncement, while keeping the interim orders in force.

Issues considered

Whether providing for domicile/residence‑based reservation in admission to PG medical courses within the State/UT quota is constitutionally invalid and impermissible.
If such reservation is permissible, what should be the extent and manner of its implementation, especially where the State/UT has only one medical college.
If the reservation is impermissible, how should the remaining State quota seats (apart from permissible institutional preference) be filled.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 15, s. Article 16
Indian Medical Council Act, 1956s. Section 10D

Subjects

domicile reservationresidence reservationpost‑graduate medical admissioninstitutional preferenceArticle 14Article 15NEETstate quotalarger benchconstitutional validity

Judgment

[2019] 14 S.C.R. 781 781

DR. TANVI BEHL A
v.
SHREY GOEL & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 9289 of 2019)
DECEMBER 09, 2019 B
[A. M. KHANWILKAR AND DINESH MAHESHWARI, JJ.]
Education/Educational Institutions :
Admission – Post Graduate medical courses – Domicile/
residence based reservation – Validity and legality of – Medical C
College provided for domicile/residence based reservation for
Union Territory of Chandigarh Pool – Challenged – High Court
held such reservation invalid and directed cancellation of admission
made on the basis of such invalid reservation – Appeal to Supreme
Court – Held : The Constitution Benches of Supreme Court have
D
not completely overthrown/disapproved the concept of domicile/
residence based reservation – However, the manner of providing
such domicile/residence based reservation cannot be approved if
found irrational or arbitrary – Therefore, the question whether
domicile/residence based reservation, particularly in admission to
PG Medical Courses is constitutionally permissible and if E
permissible what would be mode and modalities of its
implementation need to be examined by Larger Bench of Supreme
Court for authoritative pronouncement.
Nikhil Himthani & Ors. v. State of Uttarakhand & Ors.
(2013) 10 SCC 237 : [2013] 14 SCR 23 ; Satyabrata F
Sahoo & Ors. v. State of Orissa (2012) 8 SCC 203 :
[2012] 10 SCR 204 ; Vishal Goyal & Ors. v. State of
Karnataka & Ors. (2014) 11 SCC 456 ; Dr. Kriti
Lakhina v. State of Karnataka (2018) SCC Online SC
324 – distinguished.
G
Dr. Pradeep Jain and Ors. v. Union of India and
Ors.(1984) 3 SCC 654 : [1984] 3 SCR 942 ; Jagdish
Saran v. Union of India (1980) 2 SCC 768 : [1980] 2
SCR 831 ; Magan Mehrotra v. UOI (2003) 11 SCC
186 – held inapplicable.
H
781
782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.

A Modern Dental College and Research Centre and Ors.
v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. (2016) 7 SCC
353 – needs reconsideration.
Saurabh Chaudri and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(2013) 11 SCC 146 ; Ashish Ranjan v. UOI & Ors.
B (2016) 11 SCC 225 ; Yatinkumar Jasubhai Patel and
Others v. State of Gujarat and Others [2019] 10 SCC
11 ; State of U.P. v. Pradip Tandon (1975) 1 SCC
267 : [1975] 2 SCR 761 ; D.P.Joshi v. State of M.P
AIR 1955 SC 334 : [1955] SCR 1215 ; Christian
Medical College, Vellore v. Union of India : (2014) 2
C SCC 305 : [2013] 7 SCR 908 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
(2013) 11 SCC 146 referred to Para 8.3
[1984] 3 SCR 942 held inapplicable Para 10.2
D
[1980] 2 SCR 831 held inapplicable Para 12
(2003) 11 SCC 186 held inapplicable Para 12
[2013] 14 SCR 23 distinguished Para 12
(2014) 11 SCC 456 distinguished Para 12
E
(2018) SCC online SC 324 distinguished Para 12
[2012] 10 SCR 204 distinguished Para 12
(2016) 11 SCC 225 referred to Para 14

F [2019] 10 SCC 11 referred to Para 14
[1975] 2 SCR 761 referred to Para 16.3
[1955] SCR 1215 referred to Para 16.4
[2013] 7 SCR 908 referred to Para 22
G (2016) 7 SCC 353 needs reconsideration Para 22
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 9289
of 2019.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.04.2019 of the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CWO No. 8234 of 2019
H (O&M)
DR. TANVI BEHL v. SHREY GOEL & ORS. 783

With A
Civil Appeal Nos. 9290. 9291, 9292-9293 of 2019.
P.S. Patwalia, Nidhesh Gupta, Sr. Advs., Chandra Prakash,
C.P. Rajwar, Vivek Singh, Dhrub Sheoran, Mohit Kumar Daroad,
Pankaj Jain, Harshika Verma, Rakesh Dahiya, Avijit Mani Tripathi,
B
Ms. Japneet Kaur, Ms. Vriti Gujral, Ms. Pallavi Singh, Sandeep
Chaudhary, Aditya Dahiya, Hemant Kushwaha, Gaurav Sharma,
Gauran Sharma, Dhawal Mohan, Prateek Bhatia, Prasana Mohan,
Kumar Dushyant Singh, Ms. Jaspreet Gogia, Rohit Sharma, Rounak
Nayak, Atul Agarwal, Anshul Chowdhary, Advs. for the appearing
parties. C

The Order of the Court was passed by
DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.
Preliminary
D
1. Leave granted.
2. These four appeals by special leave, directed against the
common judgment and order dated 23.04.2019, as passed by the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP No. 8234 of 2019
(O&M) and CWP No. 9565 of 2019 (O&M) and involving essentially E
the same questions relating to the legality and validity of domicile/
residence-based reservation for admission to the Post Graduate Medical
Courses (MD/MS Courses 2019)1 in Government Medical College and
Hospital, Chandigarh2, have been considered together and shall be
governed by this common order.3
F
1
Hereinafter also referred to as “the PG Medical Courses”
2
Hereinafter also referred to as “the Medical College”/ “the said Medical College”.
3
It may be noticed at the outset that the questioned reservation has been provided
for the ‘candidates with background of Chandigarh’. The candidates eligible under
this category are those (i) who have studied for 5 years in Chandigarh; or (ii) whose
parents have resided in Chandigarh for a period of 5 years; or (iii) who are children
of the persons who have held or are holding immovable property in Chandigarh or
G
who themselves have held or are holding such immovable property for a period of 5
years. Having regard to the submissions made and the questions involved,
notwithstanding the subtle distinction in the two concepts of domicile and residence
[as noted by this Court in the case of Yogesh Bhardwaj v. State of U.P. and Ors.:
(1990) 3 SCC 355], the reservation/preference in question is referred herein as
‘domicile/residence-based reservation’. H
784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.

A 3. By the impugned judgment and order dated 23.04.2019, the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh has held invalid the
provisions made by the said Medical College in its prospectus, so far
relating to the domicile/residence-based reservation as provided in UT 4
Chandigarh Pool; and has struck down the same while directing that
all the admissions made on the basis of such invalid reservation in the
B
said Medical College be cancelled and fresh admission process for
admission to the PG Medical Courses for the academic year 2019-20
be carried out on the basis of merit obtained by the candidates in
National Eligibility-Cum-Entrance Test.5 Aggrieved, the candidates
whose admission to the PG Medical Courses were to be cancelled as
C also the UT of Chandigarh and the said Medical College have preferred
these appeals.
The basic facts concerning the parties
4. Before dilating on the rival contentions and the issue involved,
appropriate it would be to make a brief reference to the factual aspects
D concerning the parties before us.
4.1. The appellant in the appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 12918
of 2019, completed her graduation in the year 2014; got herself registered
as a doctor with the Punjab Medical Council on 04.08.2016; appeared
for the NEET-PG 2019 for securing admission to a PG Medical Course;
E scored 410 marks and was placed at 51533 in All India Rank. The
appellant thereafter applied for admission under UT Pool Quota as she
was domiciled in Chandigarh since 2006. Pending adjudication of CWP
No. 8234 of 2019 (O&M) before the High Court, the appellant was
selected for admission to MD in Microbiology in the first round of
F counselling held on 05.04.2019; paid the course fees amounting to Rs.
33,420/-; and was waiting for her classes to begin from 01.05.2019.
With the impugned order dated 23.04.2019 her admission being in
jeopardy, she has preferred this appeal though she was not a party to
the said writ petition/s.

G 4.2. The appellants of SLP(C) No. 11441 of 2019, upon
completing their graduation, had appeared in the same NEET-PG 2019
conducted on 06.01.2019 and had secured 639 and 454 marks, thereby
standing at 10910 and 40780 ranks respectively. The appellant No. 1
4
‘Union Territory’ is abbreviated as ‘UT’
5
H Hereinafter also referred to as “NEET” / “NEET- PG 2019”
DR. TANVI BEHL v. SHREY GOEL & ORS. 785
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

herein belongs to General Category while the appellant No. 2 belongs A
to Schedule Caste Category. These appellants had applied for admission
in the said Medical College; participated in the counselling sessions;
were offered seats under the UT Chandigarh Pool being higher in merit;
were allotted their respective subjects; and had paid the requisite fees.
These appellants were respondent Nos. 11 and 5 respectively in CWP
B
No. 8234 of 2019 (O&M) before the High Court and have preferred
the appeal for their admission being in jeopardy in view of the impugned
order dated 23.04.2019.
4.3. The appellant of SLP(C) No. 12919-20 of 2019 completed
her MBBS in 2016 and had been registered as a doctor with the Punjab
Medical Board. She too appeared in NEET-PG 2019 conducted on C
06.01.2019 and stood at rank 2164 with a score of 770 marks. She
participated in the counselling sessions conducted thereafter; and was
selected for the course of M.S. in General Surgery under the All India
Quota. Though the appellant had taken admission in the said course
but was listed at serial No. 8 in the UT Chandigarh Pool Quota list D
and as such, was hopeful of getting allotted another course in that
Quota.
4.3.1. It is the case of the appellant that despite being selected
in the first round wherein she was allotted M.S. in General Surgery
and while waiting for the second round of counselling, the Medical
College mandated that she ought to surrender her seat of M.S. in E
General Surgery before appearing in the second round of counselling
under the UT Chandigarh Pool Quota though such surrendering of the
seat was not mandated in relation to the other candidates. Nevertheless,
the appellant secured a seat in M.S. in Obstetrics and Gynaecology in
UT Chandigarh Pool Quota and duly paid her fees on 05.04.2019. F
Subsequently, with passing of the order impugned, the admission of this
appellant was also in jeopardy and hence she, though not a party to
the said writ petition/s, has preferred this appeal.
4.4. The appellants of the appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.
11477 of 2019 are the Union Territory of Chandigarh and the said
Government Medical College and Hospital, Chandigarh, whose G
proposition for domicile/residence-based reservation in UT Chandigarh
Pool has been pronounced against by the High Court.
4.5. Therefore, all the appellants herein are aggrieved of the
impugned order dated 23.04.2019 and have questioned the same on more
or less similar grounds. H
786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.

A 5. On the other hand, the contesting respondents of these appeals
had been the writ petitioners before the High Court questioning the
domicile/residence-based reservation. They have supported the
impugned order on identical submissions.
6. It may be noticed that the Medical Council of India was not
B a party to this litigation before the High Court but was ordered to be
impleaded in these proceedings by the order dated 06.05.2019. Further,
on 09.05.2019, this Court allowed the appellants to implead the already
admitted students (academic session 2019-20) as parties; and granted
ad-interim stay over the impugned order of the High Court while
C making it clear that the admission process which was completed on
the basis of the stated provisions governing domicile/residence-based
reservation shall be subject to the outcome of these matters.
The question involved and the background aspects

D 7. The principal question calling for determination in these matters
is as to whether providing for domicile/residence-based reservation in
admission to PG Medical Courses is constitutionally invalid and is
impermissible? If answer to this question is in the negative and it is
held that such reservation is not impermissible, the corollary questions
E would be as to the mode and modalities for providing such reservation
in the respective States/ Union Territories; and more particularly, in
relation to the State or Union Territory having only one medical college.
The background in which these questions have arisen could be noticed
as infra.

F Academic year 2018-19 – decision in Dr. Chahat Bhatia’s case
8. For the academic year 2018-19, the Government Medical
College and Hospital, Chandigarh had issued a prospectus for its PG
Medical Courses while stating that 125 seats were available with the
institution in the said PG Medical Courses of which, 50% i.e., 63 seats
G were allocated to All India Quota whereas the remaining 62 seats were
meant for the students who had passed MBBS examination from the
medical institutions of UT Chandigarh. 6 This prescription of
6
Out of these, 15% seats remain reserved for the Scheduled Caste candidates. The
seats remaining after such reservation are referred as open seats and the discussion
H herein essentially relates to such open seats.
DR. TANVI BEHL v. SHREY GOEL & ORS. 787
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

‘institutional preference’ was challenged by way of a writ petition A
before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, being CWP No. 8962
of 2018: Dr. Chahat Bhatia v. Government Medical College and
Hospital, Sector 32, Chandigarh and Ors. The High Court, by way
of its interim order dated 07.05.2018, stayed the application of the Clause
relating to ‘institutional preference’. Assailing the said stay order, SLP B
(C) No. 12593 of 2018 was filed by the Medical College wherein this
Court, by the order dated 10.05.2018, directed the High Court to dispose
of the matter on priority and also directed that the candidates who had
secured admissions shall not be displaced, subject to the final decision
in the matter. Subsequently, the High Court, by its order dated
C
15.05.2018, held that while calculating institutional preference, the seats
reserved under All India Quota ought to be excluded. The question of
reservation on the basis of ‘domicile’ was never challenged and,
therefore, the High Court did not deal with the said issue.
8.1.The High Court, in its order dated 15.05.2018 noted that there D
was only one medical institution located within the territory of
Chandigarh leading to the position that all the seats, after deducting the
reserved ones, would be filled up from the candidates passing their
MBBS examination from the said Medical College, thereby depriving
all other candidates from the region of an opportunity of admission to
E
the PG Medical Courses at Chandigarh. It was contended that the
proposition of the Medical College amounted to 100% reservation on
institutional preference which was impermissible in terms of the settled
decisions of this Court. In view of the contentions urged, the Court
noted the two issues calling for determination as under:-
F
“i) Whether in the wake of the condition imposed in the
prospectus coupled with the fact of a singular institute in the
territorial boundary of UT Chandigarh preference
contemplated in the prospectus would tantamount to 100%
reservation in favour of the incumbents having completed G
their MBBS course from Government Medical College and
Hospital, Sector 32, Chandigarh or not.
ii) Whether the candidates who have done their schooling
in Chandigarh or are connected to the City of Chandigarh
would need to be treated preferentially or not.” H
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.

A 8.2. After having thus noted the issues involved, the High Court
put aside the second issue with the following observations:-
“In so far as the second issue is concerned, it need not
engage our attention for a longer period considering it has
been settled by the various pronouncements of the Hon’ble
B Supreme Court deprecating preference or weightage on the
basis of residence alone. So, the surviving issue is the one
that we have set out at (i) above.”
8.3. After the aforesaid observations, the High Court noted that
the concept of institutional preference was standing on firm pedestal
C with various pronouncements of this Court; and, particularly with
reference to the Constitution Bench decision in Saurabh Chaudri and
Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.: 2013 (11) SCC 146, observed that
it was not difficult to conclude that the institutional preference would
be a valid criterion but then, its extent could be irksome and bad in law.
D The High Court also referred to the provisions made in regulation 9(IV)
and 9A of the Post-Graduate Medical Education Regulations, 2000
prescribed by the Medical Council of India as also the institutional
preference provided by different States like the State of Punjab and
the State of Haryana. Thereafter, the High Court expressed its
disapproval of the allocation of seats as provided by the UT Chandigarh
E and the Medical College while observing as under:-
“To our mind, if we see the break-up of seats, 63 out of 125
seats, being 50% would be consumed in the All India Quota
leaving the residue of 62, which, if the prescribed criteria
of the prospectus is applied, would leave no seat for any
F other aspirant.
The learned Senior Standing Counsel for UT, Chandigarh
would be quick to respond to refer to clauses PG-8 and PG-
8.1 to contend that there is a procedure prescribed to fill the
left over seats where the candidates who have studied in
G Chandigarh for a period of 5 years or the children of
persons who have resided in Union Territory of Chandigarh
for a period of at least 5 years or the children of persons
who have held immovable property in UT Chandigarh for a
period of 5 years at any time prior to the last date of the
H submission of the application, would be considered.
DR. TANVI BEHL v. SHREY GOEL & ORS. 789
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

This in itself would make no significant impact to the primary A
question that we are dealing with i.e. there being 100%
institutional preference. In fact, the mischief seems to have
been done not in prescribing the conditions of preference
but by placing an interpretation on the calculation for
institutional preference by taking into account the seats. The
B
prospectus states that 50% of total number of seats have
been reserved for institutional preference for students of
medical institution of UT Chandigarh. “Total number of
seats” taken for this determination of institutional preference
seats is 125, which according to us, would be erroneous for
the simple reason that out of 125 seats allocated to the UT C
pool 50% i.e. 63 seats would be propelled out of orbit of
the UT Chandigarh pool the moment they are consumed in
the All India Quota leaving only 62 seats for the College to
be filled up. Therefore, total number of seats for the
institutional preference are the residual ones that fall to the
D
institution after All India Quota is consumed. Thus the
interpretation placed by the Chandigarh Administration
would virtually discard from the process of consideration
other aspirants who may, being from the region be higher
up in merit but would stand excluded.
To avoid merit being a casuality it would be in the fairness E
of things that 50% institutional preference be restricted to
62 seats falling to the share of the institution after the
remaining 50% have been consumed in the All India quota.”
8.4. Interestingly, the High Court, even though made a cursory
observation in the earlier part of the order that the second issue as F
regards preferential treatment to the candidate having connectivity with
the city of Chandigarh need not be dilated, for this Court having not
approved the preference or weightage on the basis of residence alone
but then, proceeded to observe in the later part of the order that the
linkage of the candidate to Chandigarh was not questioned and hence, G
would not invite any comment from the Court. With these observations,
the High Court concluded and held as follows:-
“Nobody has raised any question to Clauses PG-8 or PG-
8.1 where the candidates having linkage to Chandigarh
either through education or placement of their parents or H
790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.

A property, and therefore, it need not invite any comment from
us. Suffice it to say that the interpretation of institutional
preference with its applicability of total number of seats
which are 125 has resulted in a situation that reeks of
arbitrariness and a resultant violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. We would thus hold the stand of the
B
UT Chandigarh erroneous in this regard. While upholding
the principal of institutional preference we would direct that
it would relate to 50% of the seats available to the institution
after 50% of All India Quota has been consumed and upon
such calculation throw open the seats to other deserving
C aspirants.
Issues have been raised about individual candidates and
their eligibility, but we are of the opinion that these are
matters to be left to the Committee in-charge of Counselling
to examine.
D In view of the above, we direct the Government Medical
College and Hospital, Sector 32, Chandigarh to conduct the
counselling afresh by keeping in view the above.”
8.5. Aggrieved by the order aforesaid, a petition for Special
Leave to Appeal, being SLP (C) No. 13562 of 2018, was filed in this
E Court but the same was dismissed in limine on 24.05.2018.
Academic year 2019-20
9. The Medical College, following the aforesaid decision in the
case of Dr. Chahat Bhatia (supra), issued the prospectus on 16.03.2019
F for admissions to the PG Medical Courses for the academic year 2019-
20 stating that the total number of seats were 128, which were equally
divided into All India Quota and State Quota, as set out in Clause 1
and Clause 2 of the prospectus. More specific to the case at hand,
Clause 2 explained that the State Quota was further divided in Clause
2A (Institutional Preference Pool) and Clause 2B (UT Chandigarh Pool).
G This Clause 2B is the bone of contention herein. For ready reference,
the entire Clause 2 pertaining to the State Quota seats may be
reproduced as under:-
“2. State Quota: 64 seats. In compliance of the decision of
Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court, distribution of
H 50% State Quota seats are as below:-
DR. TANVI BEHL v. SHREY GOEL & ORS. 791
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

Category Total No. of Reserved (SC) General A
seats 15%
1. Institutional 32 5 27
Preference Pool (IP)
2. UT, Chandigarh Pool 32 5 27
Total 64 10 54

A. Institutional Preference Pool (IP): Candidates who have B
passed their MBBS examination from Govt. Medical College
& Hospital Chandigarh
B. UT Chandigarh Pool: Candidate who fulfil eligibility
criteria as below: This category will include candidates with
C
background of Chandigarh. To be eligible for this category
candidate should fulfil any of the following criteria:-
i. Studied for a period of 5 years in the Union Territory
of Chandigarh at any time prior to the last date of the
submission of the application. D
ii. Candidates whose parents have resided in Union
Territory of Chandigarh for a period of at least 5 years
at any time prior to the last date of the submission of
the application either in pursuit of a profession or
holding a job. E
iii. Children of persons who have held/hold immovable
property in Union Territory of Chandigarh for a
period of five years at any time prior to the last date
of the submission of the application. The property
should be in the name of the parents or the candidate F
himself/herself.
Important Note:
a) To be eligible for UT Chandigarh Pool under B(i), the
candidate must submit a certificate to the effect from G
Principal of School/College located within the territory
of UT Chandigarh.
b) To be eligible under B (ii), the candidate should submit
a certificate issued by the D.C of UT Chandigarh to
the effect that the candidate or his parents have been H
792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.

A residing/have resided in Chandigarh at least for 5
years.

c) To be eligible under B (iii), the candidate must submit
a certificate issued by D.C-cum-Estate Officer/Tehsildar
stating that the candidate/parents of the candidate
B
have held/are holding immovable property in UT
Chandigarh for at least for 5 years prior to the
submission of application.”

Challenge before the High Court–the impugned order dated 23.04.2019
C
10. The private respondents (writ petitioners) challenged the
legality and validity of the aforesaid Clause 2B of the prospectus in
CWP No. 8234 of 2019 (O & M): Shrey Goel and Ors v. Union
Territory of Chandigarh and Anr. before the High Court of Punjab
and Haryana. Pending disposal of this petition, another writ petition,
D
being CWP No. 9565 of 2019 (O & M): Shweta Sandhu and Ors
v. Union Territory of Chandigarh and Anr. was filed on 05.04.2019
by other candidates with similar challenge to the said Clause 2B of the
prospectus. Besides this, similarly aggrieved candidates filed various
impleading applications in the said petitions. By way of its order dated
E 12.04.2019, the High Court allowed such applications and the applicants
were impleaded as respondent Nos. 13 to 22 to the said petitions.

10.1. The said writ petitions were tagged together and the High
Court, by its common order dated 23.04.2019, struck down the impugned
F Clauses of the prospectus issued by the Medical College. The High
Court took note of the issue involved in the matter as follows:-

“The short question that has been posed before us is whether
the above extracted clause of the prospectus inasmuch as it
gives primacy and emphasis to a person’s residence and
G association with a city to grant a concession in merit, is in
direct conflict with the various decisions of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court such as Dr. Pradeep Jain etc. etc. vs. Union
of India and others reported as 1984 AIR (SC) 1420 and
Saurabh Chaudri and others v. Union of India and others
H reported as (2003) 11 SCC 146 , or not?”
DR. TANVI BEHL v. SHREY GOEL & ORS. 793
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

10.2. The High Court reproduced some of the observations made A
by this Court in the referred decisions including those in Dr. Pradeep
Jain and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.: (1984) 3 SCC 654 and
those occurring in paragraphs 29 to 32 of the Constitution Bench decision
in Saurabh Chaudri (supra) as also the fact that only the question of
institutional preference was decided in Dr. Chahat Bhatia (supra) and B
the question of domicile/residence-based reservation was not gone into.
The High Court, thereafter, proceeded to consider the three stipulations
occurring in the impugned Clause 2B of the prospectus (as noticed
above) and disapproved the same while observing as under:-
“To test the rationale, we would pick up all the three C
stipulations one by one.
If we look at stipulation (a) that a person ought to have
studied for 5 years in UT, Chandigarh at any point of time
prior to the last date of submission of the application then
it is capable of following two interpretations: D
(i) That if a preference in this category is given it will increase
the reservation for institutional preference. One has to be
mindful of the fact that we are dealing with admission to Post
Graduate courses and if there is a student who has studied
5 years in UT, Chandigarh at any time prior to the last date E
of submission of the application, it will certainly lean in
favour of those who have studied for their MBBS degree in
UT, Chandigarh. Since there is only one college in
Chandigarh, the benefit flowing from such a clause would
merge with that of the institutional preference, thereby F
upsetting the balance provided by a 50% cap intended for
Institutional Preference. This clause is, therefore, fraught
with inherent dangers.
Second situation would be that a candidate might have
studied for 5 years in UT, Chandigarh at any time prior to G
the last date of the submission of the application which would
also mean studying from Kindergarden to Class V or for any
other period for that purpose. This would hardly provide any
rationale to the logic of claiming a seat for a post graduate
course under the UT, Chandigarh pool. H
794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.

A Similarly, clause (b) reads an entitlement for those whose
parents have resided in UT, Chandigarh for a period of 5
years at any point of time prior to the last date of submission
of the application either in pursuit of a profession or in
holding a job. This too does not offer any rationale to
B convert it into a preference for the simple reason that a
person may have settled down in Chandigarh briefly for a
period of 5 years and then departed. The absurdity of this
stands out if we visualize a situation, of a person having come
to Chandigarh possibly at the time when it was coming up
in the 1950s and departed after spending 5 years only to
C
return after a lapse of more than 60 years and claim a
preference since he had spent 5 years in Chandigarh at some
time and fulfills the condition of being a resident of this town
“at any time prior to the last date of submission of the
application.”
D
Likewise, clause (c ) also offers a similarly absurd situation
of there being a case where a person has invested in
property, may be at any point of time but choosing to give it
up, and yet fulfilling the clause of owning a property for a
period of 5 years at any time prior to the last of submission
E
of the application.”

10.3. Thereafter, the High Court, with reference to the aforesaid
decisions in Saurabh Chaudri’s case and Dr. Pradeep Jain’s case,
observed that there existed no nexus of the impugned stipulations with
F the object sought to be achieved i.e., making reservations on the basis
of residence; and such a reservation has to be objected to, for admission
to the PG Medical Courses should be only on the basis of merit. The
High Court held and concluded as under:-
“We would, therefore, conclude that in the matters of
G admission to Post Graduate courses such a reservation/
preference which has its foundations in a long discarded
principle i.e. domicile would be unsustainable. Besides, all
the clauses that have been introduced in the brochure and
discussed to describe a candidate with background of
H Chandigarh would be unsustainable in law as they have no
DR. TANVI BEHL v. SHREY GOEL & ORS. 795
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

rationale to the objects sought to be achieved even if we A
have to assume that such a preference was permissible in law.
We, therefore, strike down clause 2 (a), (b) and (c) of UT,
Chandigarh Pool as being invalid and unsustainable in law.
All admissions made by placing reliance on the above would
as a logical corollary be also unsustainable. The only course B
available to the college is to fill up the seats through merit
position obtained by candidates in NEET examinations.”
The submissions:
11. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants have made C
more or less similar nature submissions in support of their challenge to
the order impugned that have been countered by the learned counsel
appearing for the contesting respondents. The learned counsel appearing
for the Medical Council of India has also made elaborate submissions
as regards the scheme of examination and the admissions in question
D
as also in response to various queries of this Court. We may briefly
take note of the varying submissions and contentions so urged.
11.1. The substance of submissions on behalf of the private
appellants, the candidates who had secured admission in the respective
branches of PG Medical Courses in the said Medical College, has been E
that the High Court has erroneously held the domicile/residence-based
reservation to be impermissible for admission to the PG Medical
Courses. The learned counsel appearing for the respective appellants
have argued that even when a three-Judge Bench of this Court in the
case of Dr. Pradeep Jain (supra) expressed its disapproval of domicile/
F
residence-based reservation for admission to PG Medical Courses, the
Constitution Bench of this Court in Saurabh Chaudri (supra) has not
disapproved such domicile/residence-based reservation. The learned
counsel have particularly referred to paragraphs 29 to 32 of the decision
in Saurabh Chaudri (supra) in support of their contentions and have
also urged that in paragraphs 38 to 70 in Saurabh Chaudri’s case, G
the Constitution Bench has only considered the constitutional validity
of institutional preference and in that context, the law laid down in Dr.
Pradeep Jain was upheld but the said decision in Saurabh Chaudri
cannot be relied upon for disapproval of domicile/residence-based
preference for admission to the PG Medical Courses; and there is no H
796 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.

A constitutional bar over providing such a preference. It has further been
contended that the criteria as laid down by UT Chandigarh and its
Medical College cannot be said to be offending the principle of equality;
and the High Court has seriously erred in treating the same to be
arbitrary and unlawful. It has also been contended on behalf of these
B appellants that in any case, the High Court could not have set aside
the admissions that had been made for the academic year 2019-20,
particularly when counselling of the candidates had been completed and
in fact, there was no specific prayer for setting aside the admissions
already given. In the alternative part of submissions, it has also been
contended in the appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 1141 of 2019
C
that this aspect of reservation on the basis of domicile/residence for
admission to PG Medical Courses is required to be reconsidered and
decided by a Larger Bench of this Court.
11.2. On behalf of the other appellants-UT Chandigarh and the
D Medical College, the learned senior counsel has also extensively referred
to various decisions of this Court as also the decision of the High Court
in Dr. Chahat Bhatia (supra) and has submitted that until the academic
year 2018-2019, these appellants were filling up the total number of
Post-graduate seats available in the UT by dividing them in two parts:
50% of the total number of seats for All India Quota and remaining
E 50% by way of institutional preference from amongst the students who
had passed out from the appellant-Medical College. However, this
process was challenged and the High Court, in its decision in Dr.
Chahat Bhatia (supra) ruled that institutional preference would remain
restricted to 50% of the State Quota seats7. According to the learned
F counsel, in the wake of the decision in Dr. Chahat Bhatia and the fact
that UT Chandigarh has only one medical college, the position obtainable
had been that the UT Administration could have kept only 32 seats (50%
of 64 number of State Quota seats) reserved to be filled up by way of
institutional preference. In this scenario, according to the learned counsel,
G provision was required to be made for the remaining 50% of State Quota
seats allotted to UT Chandigarh and for this purpose, the UT had to
identify such students by providing some criteria. Thus, according to
the learned counsel, such criteria for filling up the remaining State Quota
7
This would effectively mean 25% of total open seats being allowed for institution
H preference – being 50% of the 50% State Quota seats.
DR. TANVI BEHL v. SHREY GOEL & ORS. 797
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

seats came to be reflected in Clause 2B of the prospectus; and the A
criteria so provided by the appellants are neither invalid nor suffer from
any illegality, so as to be struck down.
11.2.1. The learned senior counsel has further referred to the
fact that in the scheme of examination and admission to the PG Medical
Courses, the State Quota seats are to be filled up by the respective B
States by following their respective qualifying criteria and guidelines;
and has referred to Clauses 13.2 and 14.9 of the Information Bulletin
issued by the National Board of Examination that conducts the National
Eligibility-Cum-Entrance Test.8 Thus, according to the learned counsel,
domicile/residence-based preference for State Quota seats is recognised C
by the National Board of Examination too. The learned counsel has
reiterated the submission that in Saurabh Chaudri’s case, the
Constitution Bench has not ruled against the domicile/residence-based
reservation for admission to the PG Medical Courses.
11.2.2. The learned counsel has also referred to the provisions D
made by various other States and Union Territories for the purpose of
filling up the State Quota seats; and has pointed out that not only the
UT Chandigarh but several other States and Union Territories have

8
The said clauses read as under:- E
13.2 For States/Union Territories – 50% State Quota Seats and Private Medical
Colleges/Institutes/Universities/Deemed Universities:
a) Reservation policy and guidelines applicable in different States/Union
Territories of India will be followed for the respective State/Union territory
quota seats.
b) NBE shall be providing only the data of candidates and the marks scored
by them in NEET-PG to the State Governments/Counselling Authority without F
applying the reservation prevalent in the concerned States/Private Medical
Colleges/Institutes/Universities. The merit list and category wise merit list
for the concerned State shall be generated by the State themselves as per the
applicable Regulations, qualifying criteria, applicable guidelines and reservation
policies.
Clause 14.9: RESULT FOR STATE QUOTA SEAT:
e) Candidates must verify from the respective State Government/UTs if at all
G
they will be considered for admission to State Quota Post Graduate seats/
Institute Pool based on applicable Regulation and/or domicile criteria,
State/Institute of Graduation, reservation policy etc. Merely appearing/
passing in NEET-PG 2019 does not make a candidate qualified and/or eligible
for State Quota Seats/admission to Private Universities & Institutes.
{emphasis supplied) H
798 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.

A made similar provisions on domicile/residence-based preference for
filling up such 50% State Quota seats in PG Medical Courses. 9
9
The summary of procedure followed for PG Admissions in different States/UTs, as
placed before us by the counsel for the appellants makes out that in all such
admissions, 50% seats are provided for All India Quota but as regards 50% of State
Quota seats, different provisions have been made by different States/Union Territories.
B These aspects are duly corroborated in the summary of such admission processes in
different States/UTs, as placed before us by the learned counsel for the Medical Council
of India. The provisions in relation to some of the States/UTs are stated as under:-
State Reservations
HARYANA 2019 -STATE 50% Quota
20% -Institutional preference.
5% of annual sanctioned intake CAPACITY –Persons with Disabilities.
Open Merit* (left over seats)
C Eligibility Criteria:
-Passed MBBS/BDS from any recognised Medical Institution in Haryana as a
resident of Haryana.
- Passed MBBS/BDS from any recognised Medical Institution in India who’s
Parents produce a Haryana Resident Certificate.
PUNJAB 2018 STATE 50% Quota through Baba Farid University Of Health Science (BFUHS)
50% -Institutional Preference
ANDHRA PRADESH -STATE 50% Quota
2019-2020 85% seats in favour of Local Candidates in relation to local areas.
D 15% seats for residents of 10 yrs/parents employed in Govt. jobs in State/
if spouses of candidates are in Govt. jobs in the state/employed in quasi-
public institutions.
-50% of seats in Private Institutions are under competent authority.
MAHARASHTRA -STATE 50% QUOTA
2019 - Domicile candidates of State who have got admission to MBBS through 15% AIQ
can apply for admission state quota seats.
-50% of seats in Private Institutions are under State CET cell quota/rest 50% are
through institutional preference.
E BIHAR 2018 -STATE 50% Quota
- Domicile candidates of State who have got admission to MBBS through exam
conducted by AIQ/ Govt. of Bihar before bifurcation of state can apply for
admission in state quota seats.
- Candidate who is not a permanent resident of Bihar but has passed MBBS from
any Medical college in Bihar.
- Reservation of 50% of total seats for SC/ST/EBC/BC/RCG/DQ permanent
residents of Bihar
KARNATAKA 2019 -STATE 50% Quota
Eligibility Criteria:
F -Cleared MBBS/BDS from an Institution in State of Karnataka
-Cleared MBBS/BDS from an Institution in India and studied for minimum 10
academic years in Karnataka and must have completed his/her Higher Secondary
from Karnataka.
RAJASTHAN 2019 -STATE 50% Quota
-25% Reserved for Institutional Preference
-25% Reserved for candidates who have cleared MBBS from medical institutes of
Rajasthan
UTTAR PRADESH, -STATE 50% Quota
G 2019 -Seats Reserved for candidates who have cleared MBBS from medical institutes of
UP.
-Domicile candidates of State who have got admission to MBBS colleges outside
UP through AIQ can apply for admission in state quota seats.
.
PUDUCHERRY, 2019- -STATE 50% Quota
2020 -All Govt. Quota Seats reserved for residents of Puducherry.
DELHI, 2019 -STATE 50% Quota
50% seats allotted to Faculty of Medical Science, Delhi University.
H 50% seats allotted to Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University.
DR. TANVI BEHL v. SHREY GOEL & ORS. 799
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

12. Per contra, learned senior counsel for private respondents A
(the writ petitioners) has extensively referred to the aforesaid decision
of this Court in Dr. Pradeep Jain and Saurabh Chaudri and has
further relied upon the decisions in Jagdish Saran v. Union of India:
(1980) 2 SCC 768; Magan Mehrotra v. UOI :(2003) 11 SCC 186;
Nikhil Himthani & Ors. v. State of Uttarakhand & Ors.: (2013)
B
10 SCC 237; Vishal Goyal & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors.:
(2014) 11 SCC 456; Dr. Kriti Lakhina v. State of Karnataka: 2018
SCC online SC 324; and Satyabrata Sahoo & Ors. v. State of Orissa
:(2012) 8 SCC 203. The learned counsel would submit that in accord
with the said decisions, these respondents, having passed their M.B.B.S.
course and having applied under ‘institutional quota’, are entitled for C
admission to the PG Medical Courses under the said quota of
institutional preference but are deprived of the same because of the
impugned domicile/residence-based reservation provided by the Medical
College. He has also contended that the issue involved in the present
matters is no more res integra as the reservation in PG Medical Courses
D
on the basis of place of birth and/or residence/domicile has been
GOA, 2019 -STATE 50% Quota (only one university)(Press Note)
KERALA, 2019 -STATE 50% Quota
383 seats in P.G. Degree courses
79 seats in PG Diploma Courses in the Government Medical
Colleges
8 Seats for PG Degree at RCC, Trivandrum E
-Eligibility:
Academic : Applicants must have MBBS degree recognized by
MCI
Nativity: Applicants should have satisfied any of the following
conditions:
- Indian Citizens of Kerala origin.
- Candidates who are sons/daughters of Non-Keralite parents,
who have obtained MBBS Degree from any of the Medical
Colleges in the State of Kerala. F
TELENGANA, 2019 -STATE 50% Quota
85% seats in favour of Local Candidates in relation to local areas.
(as provided in the Andhra Pradesh Educational Institution Order,
1974 as amended from time to time)
The Non local candidates do not have any reservations. The
Nonlocal candidates are eligible for 15% unreserved seats only.
The local candidates are also eligible for 15% unreserved seats.
WEST BENGAL, -STATE 50% Quota or Open Category candidates G
2019 Passed MBBS/BDS from WB.
Permanent Resident of WB
JHARKHAND 2019 -STATE 50% Quota
- Domicile candidates of State who have got admission to MBBS through
exam conducted by AIQ/ Govt. of Bihar before bifurcation of state in 2000
can apply for admission in state quota seats.
- Candidate who have passed MBBS from any Medical college/University
in Jharkhand.
H
800 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.

A disapproved, being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India;
and that admission to specialised courses should be on the basis of merit
alone. The learned senior counsel has further submitted that in the order
impugned, the High Court has rightly observed that there is no nexus
of the classification prescribed with the objective sought to be achieved
i.e., allotting 50% of State Quota seats. The learned counsel would
B
submit that in relation to the issue concerning ‘admission on the basis
of domicile’, the High Court has observed in Dr. Chahat Bhatia that
the practice has been repeatedly disapproved; and the said decision has
attained finality. Thus, according to the learned counsel, domicile/
residence-based reservation has rightly been disapproved in the order
C impugned.
13. The learned counsel for the Medical Council of India has also
made extensive reference to the aforesaid decisions, including those in
Dr. Pradeep Jain and Saurabh Chaudri and has submitted that, for
the law settled by this Court in Saurabh Chaudri, 50% seats of the
D total seats in the PG Medical Courses are All India Quota Seats and
are to be filled up from the All India Merit List. For these All India
Seats, counselling is carried out by Directorate General of Health
Services and the balance 50% goes to the respective States for which,
counselling is carried out by the concerned State. According to the
E learned counsel, these 50% State Quota seats cannot be filled up by
the State by imposing domicile/residential requirement, though the State
may prescribe institutional preference as the criteria for filling up these
50% State Quota seats. Learned counsel has submitted that the
impugned Clause 2B of the prospectus is violative of the principle of
equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution and is also
F contrary to the various judicial pronouncements of this Court and is,
therefore, liable to be quashed.
13.1. The learned counsel has also placed on record a chart
showing the policy of 21 States in applying institutional preference/
reservation along with relevant portion of brochures/Information Bulletin
G published by the respective States. The learned counsel has also
submitted that as per the time schedule framed by the Council with
the prior approval of the Central Government as well as approved by
this Court in Ashish Ranjan v. UOI & Ors.: (2016) 11 SCC 225,
the date for commencement of academic year had been 01.05.2019
H and the last date for completion of admission process for PG Medical
DR. TANVI BEHL v. SHREY GOEL & ORS. 801
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

Courses had been 31.05.2019; and all admissions to PG Medical A
Courses had already been completed for the current academic year
2019-20, which may not be disturbed at this belated stage.
13.2. The learned counsel for Medical Council in the last
submitted that if at all the admissions are to be cancelled, manual
counselling may be ordered only in relation to those students who have B
not joined and taken admission in any other college because any other
proposition may upset the entire process of studies in the respective
PG Medical Courses.
14. At this juncture, relevant it would also be to notice that during
the course of hearing of these matters, it was pointed out by the learned C
counsel for parties that the question as regards institutional preference
had been referred to a Larger Bench of this Court in the case of
Yatinkumar Jasubhai Patel and others v. State of Gujarat and
others: SLP(C) No. 7003 of 2017. It has, however, been brought to
our notice that while decision remained pending in these matters, the
said referred case and connected matters were decided by a three- D
Judge Bench of this Court on 04.10.2019 upholding the institutional
preference for admission to the PG Medical Courses. Having regard
to the question involved we would refer to the said decision at the
appropriate stage hereafter later.
Whether domicile/residence-based reservation is entirely E
impermissible?
15. As noticed, the core question calling for determination herein
is as to whether providing for domicile/residence-based reservation for
admission to PG Medical Courses is constitutionally invalid and is
impermissible. Several decisions of this Court have been referred by F
the learned counsel for the respondents in support of the impugned order
of the High Court and in support of the contention that such a
prescription is constitutionally invalid. In our view, the submissions on
invalidity of the domicile/residence based reservation in relation to the
State Quota seats and the assumption that such a proposition is long
back discarded (as per the expression employed by the High Court) G
needs to be examined by a Larger Bench of this Court in view of the
significance of the issue, which is of recurrence in every academic year
for one reason or another; and particularly when varying views have
been expressed by different Benches, which need to be reconciled with
the observations made by the Constitution Bench of this Court in H
802 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.

A Saurabh Chaudri’s case. We may, therefore, refer to the decision in
Saurabh Chaudri in requisite details.
16. It could be profitably noticed that before the pronouncement
in Saurabh Chaudri by the Constitution Bench, this Court had
expressed desirability of merit-based admissions to the Medical Courses;
B and multiple vistas of such admission process were dealt with by this
Court in several decisions like those in Jagdish Saran, Dr. Pradeep
Jain as also in Magan Mehrotra (supra). In fact, reference to the
Constitution Bench in Saurabh Chaudri’s case had been in sequel to
Magan Mehrotra’s case inasmuch as a three-Judge Bench of this
Court in Magan Mehrotra had held that apart from institutional
C preference, no other preference including reservation on the basis of
residence was envisaged in view of the decision in Dr. Pradeep Jain.
However, the notification consequently issued by Delhi University for
institutional preference for admission to PG Medical Courses was
questioned by the appellants claiming themselves to be the residents of
D Delhi. In this challenge; a Division Bench of this Court referred the
matter to a three-Judge Bench having regard to the decision in Magan
Mehrotra; and the three-Judge Bench directed the matter to be placed
before a Bench of five Judges considering its importance. In this
backdrop, the Constitution Bench, dealing with the reference in Saurabh
Chaudri, indicated the two questions being determined by it in the
E following:-
“2. The core question involved in these writ petitions and
appeal centres around the constitutional validity of
reservation whether based on domicile or institution in the
matter of admission into postgraduate courses in
F government-run medical colleges.
*** *** ***
10. The question which was initially raised in the writ petition
was as to whether reservation made by way of institutional
preference is ultra vires Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution
G of India; but during hearing a larger issue viz. as to whether
any reservation, be it on residence or institutional preference,
is constitutionally permissible, was raised at the Bar.”
16.1. The first question, as to whether reservation on the basis
of domicile is impermissible, was answered and disposed of by the
H Constitution Bench in the following passages:-
DR. TANVI BEHL v. SHREY GOEL & ORS. 803
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

“29. The first question that arises for consideration is, A
whether the reservation on the basis of domicile is
impermissible in terms of clause (1) of Article 15 of the
Constitution of India. The term “place of birth” occurs in clause
(1) of Article 15 but not “domicile”. If a comparison is made
between Article 15(1) and Article 16(2) of the Constitution of
India, it would appear that whereas the former refers to “place B
of birth” alone, the latter refers to both “domicile” and
“residence” apart from place of birth. A distinction, therefore,
has been made by the makers of the Constitution themselves to
the effect that the expression “place of birth” is not synonymous
to the expression “domicile” and they reflect two different
C
concepts. It may be true, as has been pointed out by Shri Salve
and pursued by Mr Nariman, that both the expressions appeared
to be synonymous to some of the members of the Constituent
Assembly but the same, in our opinion, cannot be a guiding factor.
In D.P. Joshi case a Constitution Bench held so in no uncertain
terms. D
30. This Bench is bound by the said decision.
31. In State of U.P. v. Pradip Tandon this Court observed:
(SCC p. 277, para 29)
“29. The reservation for rural areas cannot be sustained
on the ground that the rural areas represent socially and E
educationally backward classes of citizens. This
reservation appears to be made for the majority
population of the State. Eighty per cent of the population
of the State cannot be a homogeneous class. Poverty in
rural areas cannot be the basis of classification to support
reservation for rural areas. Poverty is found in all parts F
of India. In the instructions for reservation of seats it is
provided that in the application form a candidate for
reserved seats from rural areas must submit a certificate
of the District Magistrate of the district to which he
belonged that he was born in rural area and had a G
permanent home there, and is residing there or that he was
born in India and his parents and guardians are still living
there and earn their livelihood there. The incident of birth
in rural areas is made the basic qualification. No
reservation can be made on the basis of place of birth,
as this would offend Article 15.” H
804 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.

A 32. Answer to the said question must, therefore, be rendered
in the negative.”
(underlining supplied)
16.2. Thus, the answer by Constitution Bench to the question as
to whether domicile/residence-based reservation is impermissible had
B been in a crisp and terse negative. In other words, the answer was in
the affirmative on permissibility. For comprehension of the basis of such
answer by the Constitution Bench, appropriate it would be to closely
look at the two decisions referred to in the aforesaid paragraphs 29
and 31 in Saurabh Chaudri.
C 16.3. In the case of State of U.P. v. Pradip Tandon10 (referred
to in the above-quoted paragraph 31 of Saurabh Chaudri), the question
that arose for consideration before the three-Judge Bench of this Court
had been as to whether the instructions framed by the State of Uttar
Pradesh in making reservation in favour of the candidates from rural
areas, hill areas and Uttarakhand for admission to Medical Colleges
D were constitutionally valid. This Court did not approve of the reservation
for rural areas for the same had been made only on the basis of the
place of birth and hence, was offending Article 15 of the Constitution.
However, in the said decision, the reservation made in favour of the
people in hill areas and Uttarakhand area was upheld, for the same
E having been made for the benefit of socially and educationally backward
classes of citizens, particularly when this Court found that the State
had established that the people in those areas were of socially and
educationally backward classes.
16.4. As noticed, in Saurabh Chaudri, after a short reference
to the decision in D.P.Joshi v. State of M.P.11 this Court reiterated that
F the concept of “domicile” was not equivalent to the concept of “place
of birth”; and the prohibition contained in Article 15(1) of the Constitution
of India relates to any discrimination only on the basis of the “place of
birth”. The said decision in D.P.Joshi was rendered by a Constitution
Bench of this Court in a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution
G of India that was filed while questioning the stipulation regarding
capitation fees, as made by Mahatma Gandhi Medical College at Indore,
run by the State of Madhya Bharat. The petitioner, who was a resident
of Delhi and had been admitted as a student in the said Medical College

10
(1975) 1 SCC 267
H 11
AIR 1955 SC 334
DR. TANVI BEHL v. SHREY GOEL & ORS. 805
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

at Indore, was called upon to pay a sum of Rs. 1500/- per annum as A
capitation fee in addition to the tuition fee and other charges payable
by the students of said college in general. The petitioner’s grievance
had been that such rules relating to the matter of fees, as in force in
the college concerned, were of discrimination between the students who
were residents of Madhya Bharat and those who were not, inasmuch
as the residents of other States were required to pay such capitation B
fee in addition to the tuition fee and charges payable by all the students;
and such a stipulation was offending Articles 14 and 15 of the
Constitution of India. The Constitution Bench, by 4:1 majority, rejected
such contentions while pointing out the significant distinction in the
concepts of “domicile/residence” and “place of birth” and after finding C
nothing of discrimination in providing capitation fees on a particular class
of students and not others. The rule in question was taken note of as
under:
“4. ….”For all students who are ‘bona fide residents’ of
Madhya Bharat no capitation fee should be charged. But for
D
other non- Madhya Bharat students the capitation fee should
be retained as at present at Rs. 1,300 for nominees and at
Rs. 1,500 for others”.
…..
‘Bona fide resident’ for the purpose of this rule was defined E
as :
“one who is -
(a) a citizen of Indian whose original domicile is in
Madhya Bharat, provided he has not acquired a
domicile elsewhere, or F
(b) a citizen of India, whose original domicile is not in
Madhya Bharat but who has acquired a domicile in
Madhya Bharat and has resided there for not less than
5 years at the date, on which he applies for admission,
or G
(c) a person who migrated from Pakistan before
September 30, 1948 and intends to reside in Madhya
Bharat permanently, or
(d) a person or class of persons or citizens of an area or
territory adjacent to Madhya Bharat or to India in H
806 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.

A respect of whom or which a Declaration of Eligibility
has been made by the Madhya Bharat Government”.
16.4.1. After extracting Article 15(1) of the Constitution of India12,
the Constitution Bench expounded on the difference in the concepts of
“domicile/residence” and “place of birth” in the following:-
B “5….Residence and place of birth are two distinct
conceptions with different connotations both in law and in
fact, and when article 15(1) prohibits discrimination based
on the place of birth, it cannot be read as prohibiting
discrimination based on residence.”

C The Court again said:
“6… whether the expression used is “domicile of origin” or
“domicile of birth”, the concept involved in it is something
different from what the words “place of birth” signify. And
if “domicile of birth” and “place of birth” cannot be taken
as synonymous, then the prohibition enacted in article 15(1)
D against discrimination based on place of birth cannot apply
to a discrimination based on domicile.”
(underlining supplied)
16.4.2. The Court further rejected the contention that there could
not be a domicile of Madhya Bharat and also found force in the
E contention that the expression “domicile” in the concerned clauses was
essentially referable to “residence”. The Court said:
“10. Under the Constitution, the power to legislate on
succession, marriage and minority has been conferred under
Entry 5 in the Concurrent List on both the Union and the
F State Legislatures, and it is therefore quite conceivable that
until the center intervenes and enacts a uniform code for the
whole of India, each state might have its own laws on those
subjects, and thus there could be different domiciles for
different States. We do not, therefore, see any force in the
contention that there cannot be a domicile of Madhya Bharat
G under the Constitution.
11. It was also urged on behalf of the respondent that the
word “domicile” in the rule might be construed not in its
12
Article 15 (1) of the Constitution of India reads under:-
“The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion,
H race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them”.
DR. TANVI BEHL v. SHREY GOEL & ORS. 807
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

technical legal sense, but in a popular sense as meaning A
“residence”, and the following passage in Wharton’s Law
Lexicon, 14th Edition, page 344 was quoted supporting such
a construction :
“By the term ‘domicile’, in its ordinary acceptation, is mean
the place where a person lives or has his home. In this sense B
the place where a person has his actual residence,
inhabitancy, or commorancy, is sometimes called his
domicile”.
In Mcmullen v. Wadsworth: [1889] 14 A.C. 631, it was
observed by the Judicial Committee that “the word domicile
in Article 63 (of the Civil Code of Lower Canada) was used C
in the sense of residence, and did not refer to international
domicile”. What has to be considered is whether in the
present context “domicile” was used in the sense of
residence. The rule requiring the payment of a capitation fee
and providing for exemption there from refers only to bona D
fide residents within the State. There is no reference to
domicile in the rule itself, but in the Explanation which
follows, clauses (a) and (b) refer to domicile, and they occur
as part of the definition of “bona fide resident”.
In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 28, page 5, it is stated :
E
“The term ‘bona fide residence’ means the residence with
domiciliary intent”.
There is therefore considerable force in the contention of the
respondent that when the rule-making authorities referred to
domicile in clauses (a) and (b) they were thinking really of
F
residence. In this view also, the contention that the rule is
repugnant to article 15(1) must fail.”
16.4.3. The Court also rejected the contention that the Rule
imposing capitation fee was in contravention of Article 14 in the
following:
G
“14. It is next contended for the petitioner that the imposition
of capitation fee on some of the students and not on others
is discriminatory, and is in contravention of Article 14 of the
Constitution, and therefore void. The impugned rule divides,
as already stated, self-nominees into two groups, those who
are bona fide residents of Madhya Bharat and those who H
808 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.

A are not, and while it imposes a capitation fee on the latter, it
exempts the former from the payment thereof. It thus proceeds
on a classification based on residence within the State, and
the only point for decision is whether the ground of
classification has a fair and substantial relation to the
purpose of the law, or whether it is purely arbitrary and
B fanciful.
15. The object of the classification underlying the impugned
rule was clearly to help to some extent students who are
residents of Madhya Bharat in the prosecution of their
studies, and it cannot be disputed that it is quite a legitimate
C and laudable objective for a State to encourage education
within its borders. Education is a State subject, and one of
the directive principles declared in Part IV of the Constitution
is that the State should make effective provisions for
education within the limits of its economy. (Vide article 41).
The State has to contribute for the upkeep and the running
D of its educational institutions. We are in this petition
concerned with a Medical College, and it is well-known that
it requires considerable finance to maintain such an
institution. If the State has to spend money on it, is it
unreasonable that it should so order the educational system
E that the advantage of it would to some extent at least enure
for the benefit of the State? A concession given to the
residents of the State in the matter of fees is obviously
calculated to serve that end, as presumably some of them
might, after passing out of the College, settle down as
doctors and serve the needs of the locality. The classification
F is thus based on a ground which has a reasonable relation
to the subject-matter of the legislation, and is in consequence
not open to attack. It has been held in The State of Punjab
v. Ajaib Singh and another: 1953 S.C.R. 254 that a
classification might validly be made on a geographical
basis. Such a classification would be eminently just and
G
reasonable, where it relates to education which is the
concern primarily of the State. The contention, therefore, that
the rule imposing capitation fee is in contravention of article
14 must be rejected.”
17. From the aforesaid, it is but clear that in Saurabh Chaudri,
H the Constitution Bench found that the other Constitution Bench in
DR. TANVI BEHL v. SHREY GOEL & ORS. 809
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

D.P.Joshi had rejected the contention that no provision could be made A
on the basis of domicile/residence in relation to students taken in the
medical colleges. In other words, in Saurabh Chaudri, this Court relied
upon the decision in D.P.Joshi while holding that domicile/residence-
based reservation was not impermissible. Standing this exposition by
the Constitution Bench of this Court, it is difficult to conclude that
domicile/residence-based reservation/preference is a concept totally B
overthrown and jettisoned.
18. In the impugned order, it was noticed by the High Court that
the aforementioned paragraphs 29 to 32 in Saurabh Chaudri (supra)
were sought to be relied upon by the contesting respondents (some of
them being the appellants herein) to contend that preference on the basis C
of domicile is permissible and does not offend the constitutional scheme
of things. However, after noticing such contention, the High Court
switched over to the proposition of institutional preference and
extensively reproduced the passages from its decision in Dr. Chahat
Bhatia (supra). The High Court thereafter referred to the stipulations D
in the questioned Clause 2B of the prospectus and found basic flaws
and shortcomings in the same. Having said so, the High Court proceeded
to observe that even if such a reservation (i.e., domicile/residence-based
reservation) was possible, it would have no hesitation in saying that the
questioned Clause in the prospectus was unsustainable. Thereafter, the
High Court observed that this Court in Saurabh Chaudri and Dr. E
Pradeep Jain has clearly laid down that preference on the basis of
residence is to be deprecated in the matters of admission in PG Medical
Courses; and reproduced paragraph 46 as also paragraph 1 in Saurabh
Chaudri while observing that the conclusion in Saurabh Chaudri was
the same as the one accorded in Dr. Pradeep Jain13. In the process F

13
The other referred passages in the decision of the High Court relate to the issue
concerning institutional preference; and the conclusion of the Constitution Bench
indicative of its accord with the law laid down in Dr. Pradeep Jain had only been in
regard to the institutional preference where the Constitution Bench finally noticed
and observed as under: G
“67. This Court may therefore notice the following:
(i) The State runs the universities.
(ii) It has to spend a lot of money in imparting medical education to the
students of the State.
(iii) Those who get admission in postgraduate courses are also required to
be paid stipends. Reservation of some seats to a reasonable extent, thus,
would not violate the equality clause. H
810 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.

A of such discussion and reasoning, the High Court has not even touched
the contention that in view of the aforesaid answer by the Constitution
Bench, preference on the basis of domicile was not entirely
impermissible; and seems to have clearly missed out the import of the
other answer by the Constitution Bench in Saurabh Chaudri, as
occurring in the above-quoted paragraphs 29 to 32.
B
19. It appears that for the Constitution Bench in Saurabh
Chaudri having largely approved the observation in Dr. Pradeep Jain’s
case in relation to the question of institutional preference, the High Court
has assumed that all the observations in Dr. Pradeep Jain stood ipso
facto approved. True it is that in Dr. Pradeep Jain, a three-Judge
C Bench of this Court stated its total disapproval of domicile/residence-
based reservation in PG Medical Courses14 but such observations in
(iv) The criterion for institutional preference has now come to stay. It has
worked out satisfactorily in most of the States for the last about two
decades.
(v) Even those States which defied the decision of this Court in Dr Pradeep
D
Jain case had realized the need for institutional preference.
(vi) No sufficient material has been brought on record for departing from
this well-established admission criterion.
(vii) It goes beyond any cavil of doubt that institutional preference is based
on a reasonable and identifiable classification. It may be that while
working out the percentage of reservation invariably some local students
E will have preference having regard to the fact that domicile/residence
was one of the criteria for admission in MBBS course. But together with
the local students, 15% students who had competed in all-India entrance
examination would also be getting the same benefit. The percentage of
students who were to get the benefit of reservation by way of institutional
preference would further go down if the decision of this Court in Dr
Pradeep Jain case is scrupulously followed.
F (viii) Giving of such a preference is a matter of State policy which can be
invalidated only in the event of being violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India.
(ix) The students who would get the benefit of institutional preference being
on identifiable ground, there is hardly any scope for manipulation.”
14
In Dr. Pradeep Jain, total disapproval of domicile/residence-based reservation in
PG Medical Courses was stated in the following:-
G “22…..We are therefore of the view that so far as admissions to post-graduate
courses, such as MS, MD and the like are concerned, it would be eminently
desirable not to provide for any reservation based on residence requirement within
the State or on institutional preference. But, having regard to broader
considerations of equality of opportunity and institutional continuity in education
which has its own importance and value, we would direct that though residence
requirement within the State shall not be a ground for reservation in admissions
H
DR. TANVI BEHL v. SHREY GOEL & ORS. 811
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

Dr. Pradeep Jain, when read with reference to aforesaid paragraphs A
29 to 32 of the decision in Saurabh Chaudri, the inevitable result is
that domicile/residence-based reservation has not been taken as an
anathema altogether to these admission processes.
20. At this juncture, we may also briefly take note of the other
decisions cited and relied upon in these matters. B
20.1. The other decisions relied upon by the respondents
proceeded on their own facts and the particular prescription of
reservation was found invalid for its own shortcomings. So far the
decisions in Jagdish Saran, Dr. Pradeep Jain and Magan Mehrotra
are concerned, as noticed, they were rendered before the decision by C
the Constitution Bench in Saurabh Chaudri.
20.2. In Nikhil Himthani (supra) the State of Uttarakhand had
provided that only such MBBS pass-outs from Government Colleges
of Uttarakhand who were admitted to the MBBS Course through
Uttarakhand State PMT would be eligible, implying that the candidates D
applying through All India PMT would not be eligible. Further, it was
also provided that MBBS pass-outs from the colleges outside State would
be eligible only if they were domicile of State of Uttarakhand and
selected through MBBS in other States through All India PMT or
through Uttarakhand State PMT. In that context, this Court said that
no preference could be given to the candidates on the basis of domicile E
to compete for institutional quota of the State.
20.3. In Vishal Goyal as also in Dr. Kriti Lakhina (supra) only
‘a candidate of Karnataka origin’ was provided to be eligible to appear

to post-graduate courses, a certain percentage of seats may in the present F
circumstances, be reserved on the basis of institutional preference in the sense
that a student who has passed MBBS course from a medical college or university,
may be given preference for admission to the post-graduate course in the same
medical college or university but such reservation on the basis of institutional
preference should not in any event exceed 50 per cent of the total number of open
seats available for admission to the post-graduate course. This outer limit which
we are fixing will also be subject to revision on the lower side by the Indian Medical
G
Council in the same manner as directed by us in the case of admissions to the
MBBS course. But, even in regard to admissions to the post-graduate course, we
would direct that so far as super specialities such as neuro-surgery and cardiology
are concerned, there should be no reservation at all even on the basis of institutional
preference and admissions should be granted purely on merit on all-India basis.”
(underlining supplied) H
812 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.

A for entrance test; and the expression had been defined in such a manner
so as to exclude a candidate who had otherwise completed MBBS or
BDS in an institution in the State of Karnataka. Such a stipulation was
not approved for being in conflict with the decision in Pradeep Jain’s
case. In Vishal Goyal’s case, this Court observed as under:
B “11. Mr Mariarputham is right that in Saurabh Chaudri v.
Union of India this Court has held that institutional preference
can be given by a State, but in the aforesaid decision of
Saurabh Chaudri, it has also been held that decision of the
State to give institutional preference can be invalidated by
the court in the event it is shown that the decision of the State
C
is ultra vires the right to equality under Article 14 of the
Constitution. When we examine sub-clause (a) of Clause 2.1
of the two Information Bulletins, we find that the expression
“A candidate of Karnataka origin” who only is eligible to
appear for entrance test has been so defined as to exclude
D a candidate who has studied MBBS or BDS in an institution
in the State of Karnataka but who does not satisfy the other
requirements of sub-clause (a) of Clause 2.1 of the
Information Bulletin for PGET-2014. Thus, the institutional
preference sought to be given by sub-clause (a) of Clause
E 2.1 of the Information Bulletin for PGET-2014 is clearly
contrary to the judgment of this Court in Pradeep Jain case.”
20.4. In Satyabrata Sahoo (supra), there were two categories
of candidates- direct and in-service. In direct category, students were
to be selected strictly on the basis of inter-se academic merit, as
F determined by a competitive test whereas in-service was a restricted
category of candidates who had put in at least three years’ service in
remote and difficult areas. 87 seats were available for in-service
candidates and 86 for direct category. The seats in direct category were
also reserved for members of SC/ST communities and also for those
SC/ST candidates who had migrated from their State of origin subject
G to certain conditions. Under the category of direct candidates, there
was an additional weightage for candidates who were in employment
of Government of Odisha/Government of Odisha undertaking/
Government of India/Public Undertaking located in Odisha and had
worked in rural/tribal/backward areas. Additional weightage of 10% of
H the marks, up to maximum of 30% of the marks obtained, for each
DR. TANVI BEHL v. SHREY GOEL & ORS. 813
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

year of service rendered in remote or difficult areas was provided to A
the candidates applying in direct category. While dealing with such
stipulations, it was pointed out that weightage was available only for
in-service category, to which 50% seats for PG admission had already
been earmarked. The Court was of the view that on the strength of
that weightage, the encroachment or inroad or appropriation of seats
B
earmarked for open category candidates (direct admission category)
would affect the candidates who compete strictly on the basis of the
merit; and there could be no encroachment from one category to
another. Hence, the candidates of in-service category could not encroach
upon the open category and vice-versa.
20.5. The aforesaid decisions proceed on their own facts but it C
is difficult to cull out that domicile/residence-based reservation is
altogether disapproved. However, the manner of providing such domicile/
residence-based reservation would always remain subject to the
requirements of rationality and reasonableness; and cannot be approved
if found irrational or arbitrary, as had been the matters in Vishal Goyal D
and Dr. Kriti Lakhina (supra).
21. As regards the decision in Yatinkumar’s case (supra), suffice
it to notice that therein, a three-Judge Bench of this Court referred to
several decisions including that in Saurabh Chaudri and reiterated that
institutional preference has been consistently approved and permitted E
in the PG Medical Courses. However, one of the contentions urged
before the Court had been that with introduction of NEET, the purpose
for which institution preference was held permissible by this Court was
no longer existing. This Court took note of the scheme of these
admissions and found that admissions to the PG Medical Courses, even
in case of institutional preference/reservation, were to be given only F
on the basis of merit and the marks obtained in NEET. This decision in
Yatinkumar’s case does not relate to the core issue involved in the
present matters pertaining to domicile/residence-based reservation but
the significant aspect noticeable from this decision is that this Court
has indubitably reiterated the position that the admissions to the PG G
Medical Courses on any quota or preference are to be made only on
the basis of merits and marks obtained in NEET.
22. At this juncture and for the observations occurring in
Yatinkumar’s case (supra) as regards NEET, we may also take note
of the fact that the provisions for uniform entrance examination to all H
814 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.

A Medical Educational Institutions at the undergraduate level and post-
graduate level came to be inserted in the Indian Medical Council Act,
1956 (‘the Act of 1956’) in the form of Section 10D15 therein by way
of Ordinance No. 4 of 2016 dated 24.05.2016 which was later on
replaced by the Indian Medical Council (Amendment) Act, 2016. The
background in which the said provision came to be inserted had been
B
that the Medical Council of India and the Dental Council of India issued
notification dated 21.12.2010 amending the existing statutory regulations
to provide for a single National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test (NEET)
for admission to the MBBS/BDS courses. The said notifications were
struck down in the case of Christian Medical College, Vellore v.
C Union of India: (2014) 2 SCC 305. However, the said decision was
recalled by the order dated 11.04.2016 in Review Petition (C) Nos.
2159-2268 of 2013. Several features related to the professional unaided
minority and non-minority educational institutions as also the medical
and dental education and healthcare systems came to be examined and
pronounced upon by a Constitution Bench of this Court on 02.05.2016
D
in the case of Modern Dental College and Research Centre and
Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors.: (2016) 7 SCC 353.
That had been the background in which Section 10D came to be
introduced to the Act of 1956 w.e.f. 24.05.2016. The observations in
the said decision in Modern Dental College as also the effect of the
E fact that the admissions to PG Medical Courses are only based on the
merit obtained in NEET also require consideration vis-a-vis domicile/
residence-based reservation.
23. On the other side of spectrum, we may also observe that the
generalised and blanket prohibition on domicile/residence-based
F reservation may not be workable in relation to the State Quota seats

15
Section 10D as inserted to the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 reads as under:
“10D. There shall be conducted a uniform entrance examination to all medical
educational institutions at the undergraduate level and post-graduate level through
such designated authority in Hindi, English and such other languages and in such
manner as may be prescribed and the designated authority shall ensure the conduct
G of uniform entrance examination in the aforesaid manner:
Provided that notwithstanding any judgment or order of any court, the provisions
of this section shall not apply, in relation to the uniform entrance examination at
the undergraduate level for the academic year 2016-17 conducted in accordance
with any regulations made under this Act, in respect of the State Government
seats (whether in Government Medical College or in a private Medical College)
H where such State has not opted for such examination.”
DR. TANVI BEHL v. SHREY GOEL & ORS. 815
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

of PG Medical Courses. As noticed, the fundamental fact remains that A
all the admissions to the Medical Courses, be it All India Quota or be
it the State Quota, are made on the basis of ranks obtained in NEET
and not otherwise16. 50% of the seats are assigned to the States/Union
Territories as being the State Quota seats. As noticed, different States
and Union Territories have made different provisions for filling up these
B
State Quota seats. The institutional preference, that has also been held
permissible in the decisions of this Court, obviously comes into play in
relation to such State Quota seats. However, even when institutional
preference carries a major or prominent role in relation to such State
Quota seats, varying provisions have also been made by different States/
UTs with reference to domicile/residence, seemingly for the purpose C
of ensuring that the candidates belonging to a particular State/UT would
be available for rendering service in that State/UT after post-
graduation.
23.1. The peculiar feature in relation to the State Quota seats is
that if some provision as regards domicile/residence-based reservation D
is not made, the only other method of filling up these State Quota seats
would be by way of institutional preference. This would effectively result
in entire of the State Quota seats going to institutional preference alone.
Now, if the entire State Quota seats are provided for institutional
preference alone, the consequence would be that only the candidates
E
of the medical institutions in the State/UT would be filling up the State
Quota seats; and such a consequence may not be permissible at all.
23.2. Moreover, the unique situation in relation to UT Chandigarh
is that it has only one Medical College. Thus, the dispensation in
question, as provided by UT Chandigarh and its Medical College and
F
as construed by High Court, if given effect to, would inevitably result
in cornering all the State Quota PG seats by the students of that solitary
Medical College alone. In the alternative, if only 50% of State Quota
seats are to be given to that Medical College, the remaining 50% of
State Quota seats would again fall in the pool of All India Quota because
there is no other mode of filling up these seats. We find it difficult if G
either of such consequences could be countenanced.
23.3. It is also noteworthy that even as per the instructions issued
by the examining body, the State Quota seats could be filled up by the
16
Subject to the provisions for reservations in relation to specified class of persons. H
816 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R.

A States, inter alia, with reference to the domicile. In the given scenario,
it is again difficult to accept that domicile/residence-based reservation,
as provided for filling up of the State Quota open seats, be held invalid
altogether.
24. Before summing up and making reference, we may observe
B in the passing that in regard to the case at hand, the High Court has
indicated several reasons for its disapproval of the stipulations made in
impugned Clause 2B of the prospectus in question. Prima facie, it
appears that even if domicile/residence-based reservation in admission
to PG Medical Courses is held permissible, the mode and modalities
for its application would still require further examination because it
C remains questionable if such reservation could be applied by way of
such stipulations, as made in the impugned Clause 2B of the prospectus
in question. Having said so and for the order proposed to be passed in
these matters, we do not find it necessary to enter into microscopic
analysis of the sub-clauses pertaining to domicile/residence-based
D reservation as occurring in the impugned Clause 2B of the prospectus
in question and would leave such questions open to be determined on
the basis of answers to the root questions by the Larger Bench.
Summation and Reference
25. For what has been discussed hereinabove, in our view, the
E question as to whether providing for domicile/residence-based
reservation, particularly in admission to PG Medical Courses, is
constitutionally permissible as also its corollaries, including the mode and
modalities of its implementation (if permissible), more particularly in
relation to the State/UT having only one Medical College, need to be
F examined by a Larger Bench of this Court for authoritative
pronouncement.
26. Accordingly we would propose the following questions to
be examined by a Larger Bench of this Court :
1. As to whether providing for domicile/residence-based
G reservation in admission to “PG Medical Courses” within
the State Quota is constitutionally invalid and is
impermissible?
2. (a) If answer to the first question is in the negative and
if domicile/residence-based reservation in admission to
H “PG Medical Courses” is permissible, what should be
DR. TANVI BEHL v. SHREY GOEL & ORS. 817
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

the extent and manner of providing such domicile/ A
residence-based reservation for admission to “PG
Medical Courses” within the State Quota seats?
(b) Again, if domicile/residence-based reservation in
admission to “PG Medical Courses” is permissible,
considering that all the admissions are to be based on B
the merit and rank obtained in NEET, what should be
the modality of providing such domicile/residence-
based reservation in relation to the State/UT having
only one Medical College?
3. If answer to the first question is in the affirmative and if C
domicile/residence-based reservation in admission to “PG
Medical Courses” is impermissible, as to how the State
Quota seats, other than the permissible institutional
preference seats, are to be filled up?
27. The matters be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of D
India for constitution of appropriate Larger Bench. The interim orders
passed in these matters shall continue until further orders.

Kalpana K. Tripathy Matters referred to Larger Bench.
E

F

G

H