Holding

A State Police Chief cannot be transferred before completing the statutory tenure solely on the basis of the government’s subjective prima facie satisfaction; such transfer must be supported by objectively verifiable material, and in this case the transfer was arbitrary and the appellant must be reinstated.

Summary

Dr. T.P. Senkumar, the State Police Chief of Kerala, was transferred before completing the two‑year minimum tenure mandated by Section 97 of the Kerala Police Act, 2011 on the ground of "serious public dissatisfaction" with police efficiency following the Puttingal Temple tragedy and the Jisha murder case. The State Government argued that a prima facie satisfaction of the public mood was sufficient to justify the transfer. The Supreme Court held that a transfer of a senior officer holding a tenure post must be based on objectively verifiable material and cannot rely merely on the government’s subjective satisfaction. The Court found no material linking the appellant personally to the incidents and concluded that the transfer was arbitrary and unfair. Consequently, the Court ordered his reinstatement as State Police Chief. The appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

The validity of transferring a State Police Chief before the expiry of the statutory two‑year tenure under Section 97(2)(e) of the Kerala Police Act.
Whether a "prima facie satisfaction" of the State Government, based on public dissatisfaction, suffices as a ground for such transfer.
Whether the State Government’s subjective satisfaction is subject to judicial review.
The requirement of objective, verifiable material to justify removal of a tenure‑appointed officer.

Legislation cited

Kerala Police Act, 2011s. 18, s. 24, s. 25, s. 97(2)(e)

Subjects

Kerala Police ActSection 97tenure appointmenttransfer of police chiefjudicial reviewadministrative lawpublic dissatisfactionsubjective satisfactionobjective materialsecurity of tenurestate police

Judgment

[2017] 6 S.C.R. 881

DR. T. P. SENKUMAR IPS A

v.

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 5227of2017)
B
APRIL 24, 2017
[MADAN B. LOKUR AND DEEPAK GUPTA, JJ.)
Kera/a Police Act, 2011 - s. 97 - Transfer of State· Police Chief ,
appellant - Before completion of mandated ininimum ·tenure of two C
years for the State Police Chief - On ground that he caused "serious
public dissarisfaction about efficiency of police"- Whether such
transfer/displacement justified in law - State Government contended
that only a prima facie satisfaction of the Government was required
to transfer the appellant due to his conduct subsequent to an incident
of murder and a temple tragedy, which resulted in nuri1ber of deaths D
and injuries to many - It was alleged that appellant failed to take
action against the errant police officersfor the temple tragedy and
also failed to provide adequate response to the incident of murder
- Held: There is no material on record except the view that there .
was dissatisfaction among the general public on the efficiency of · E
the police - It is not enough to merely contend that the State
Government was subjeetively satisfied that the appellant ought to
.be transferred out as the State Police Chief - This make-believe
prima facie satisfaction by itself cannot take out judicial review of
administrative action in the garb of subjective satisfaction ° of the
State Government - The removal or displacement of any senior level F
officer from a tenure appointment must be for compelling reasons
and must be justified by the concerned authority, if called upon to
do so, on material that can be objectively tested - Significantly,
appellant was not found blameworthy in any manner whatsoever, it
was only the three errant police officers who were found at fault - G
No justification to conclude that the appellant alone deserved to be .
acted against only because he supported his subordinates - Appellant
has been unfairly and arbitrarily dealt with - He was displaced
from the post of the State Police Chief summarily and without
reasonable cause - State Government directed to reinstate him as
H
881
882 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 6 S.C.R.

A the State Police Chief - Service Law - Transfer - In case of tenure
appointment - Administrative Law - Judicial review.
Administrative Law - Statutory Authority - Order passed by
Chief Minister to replace the State Police Chief - On ground of
unsatisfactory leadership of appellant leading to serious
B dissatisfaction among general public ~ State Police Chief-appellant
challenged the order - State in a detailed counter affidavit further
alleged that appellant attempted to interfere in the investigation of
Temple tragedy - Held: Validity of an order passed in exercise of
statutory power on certain grounds. must be judged by the reasons
mentioned in the order - Those reasons cannot be supplemented by
c other reasons through affidavit or otherwise.
Constitution ofIndia -Art.32 rlw. Art. 142 -Power ofSupreme
Court to issue necessary directions to fill the vacuum till the
legislation steps in to cover the gap or the executive discharges its
role - Discussed.
D
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The facts and the record of the present case
indicate that the Temple tragedy and the murder of a dalit girl
were not the flash points necessitating the transfer of the
E appellant. The reason for his transfer was his conduct post the
Temple tragedy in not taking action against the errant police
officers (but supporting them) and in apportioning a part of the
blame on the district administration. The reference to the Jisha
murder case was an attempt at padding up the reason while the
reference to the alleged interference in the investigations by the
F CB-CID was a red herring or a ruse - the alleged interference
was not even in the contemplation of the Chief Minster. The
addition of the allegation of interference with the investigations
in the Temple tragedy is a further attempt in that direction - to
somehow or the other nail the appellant. (Para 87) (918-A-C)
G 2. Insofar as taking action against the errant police officers
for the Temple tragedy is concerned, the Chief Minister of the
State also took no action for more than a month after the Note
was put up by the Additional Chief Secretary (Home). The Chief
Minister did not take any action in spite of the Note pinpointing
the three errant police officers against whom action was required
H
DR. T.P. SENKUMAR IPS v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 883

to be taken. It is difficult to hazard a guess why no action was A
taken. But in any event, the fact of the matter is that a suo motu
writ petition concerning the incident and its aftermath was pending
in the Kerala High Court, a judicial commission chaired a former
Judge of the Kerala High Court was appointed by the State
Government and investigations had been referred to the CB-
B
CID in this regard. Surely appellant cannot alone be pre-judged
and blamed for this state of affairs. [Para 88) [918-D-E)
3. While it is true that a major part of the blame must rest
on the police force at the ground level, the district administration
perhaps cannot be completely absolved of its responsibility in
the enormous tragedy that took place, but this is ultimately an c
issue that may have to be decided by the High Court or by the
judicial commission or by the CB-CID. In any event, this can
hardly be any justification for coming to the conclusion that the
appellant alone deserved to be acted against only because he
supported his subordinates, while seeking to apportion a part of D
the blame on the district administration. [Para 89) [918-G-H)
4. Similarly, as far as the murder case is concerned, the
State Police Chief cannot alone be blamed for any lapse in
investigation or any delay in apprehending the accused. This is
more so considering the fact that a Special Investigating Team E
had been appointed consisting of 28 officers to investigate the
Jisha murder case. The appellant was not the investigating officer
in the matter. [Para 90) [919-A-B)
5. Oblique motives are attributed to the appellant for
recommending the posting of a member of the Special F
Investigating Team as Assistant Commissioner of Police, so that
he is under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Police, is a
little far-fetched. The appellant had nothing to fear in the
. investigations by the CB-CID since he was not involved in the
ground level arrangement in the Temple in question. It cannot
be said that the recommended officer was indispensable to the G
Special Investigating Team even if the Additional Director General
of Police (Crimes) may have objected to his transfer. It is being
assumed that even though the appellant was completely absolved
of any lapse in respect of the Puttingal Temple tragedy, he wanted
to interfere with the investigation for no apparent reason except H
884 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 6 S.C.R.

A perhaps to benefit the Commissioner of Police, for no apparent
reason. There is no evidence or material to arrive at any such
conclusive opinion. [Para 91] [919-D-G]
6. The State Government is right in submitting that it is
only a prima facie satisfaction that is to be arrived at by the State
B Government that the general public is dissatisfied with the
efficiency of the police so as to enable a .shifting out of the State
Police Chief. However, that prima facie satisfaction must be
based on some cogent and rational material. Nothing has been
placed in this regard except the view that there was dissatisfaction
among the general public on the efficiency of the police. Mere
C repetition of the provisions of Section 97(2)(e) of the Act is not
sufficient - there must be some material on reco.rd (other than a
newspaper report) but nothing has been pointed out during the
course of submissions. It is not enough to merely contend that
the State Government was subjectively satisfied that the appellant
0 ought to be transferred out as the State Police Chief. [Para 92]
[919-H; 920-A-B]
7. The subjective satisfaction of the State Government must.
be based on some credible material, which this Court might not
analyze but which can certainly be looked into. Having looked
into the record there is no material adverse to the interests of
E the appellant ex·cept an expression of opinion and views formed,
as far as he is concerned. This make-believe prima facie
satisfaction by itself cannot take out judicial revie~ of
administrative action in the garb of subjective satisfaction of the.
State Government. [Para 93] [920-C]
F 8. The appellant's displacement from the post of State Police
Chief in Kerala before the expiry of his tenure of two years was
not justified in law. The removal or displacement or transfer out
of an officer from a sensitive tenure post requires serious
consideration and good reasons that can be tested so that the
G officer is not dealt with as a pawn in a game. Unfortunately, the
somewhat exacting standards are absent in the present case and
the appellant was displaced from the post of State Police Chief
summarily and without reasonable cause.[Para 5][886-G-H;
887-A]
E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 4 SCC 3 :
H [1974] 2 SCR 348 - distinguished.
DR. T. P. SENKUMAR IPS v. UNION OF. INDIA & ORS: 885

Citizens for Justice & Peace v. State of Gujarat (2009) A
11 SCC 213 : [2009] 1SCR190 - held inapplicable.
M.A. Rasheed v. State of Kera/a (1974) 2 SCC 687:
[1975] 2 SCR 96 - relied on.
Prakash Singh & Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (2006)
8 SCC 1 : [2006] 6 Suppl. SCR 473; Vishaka v. State B
of Rajasthan (1997) 6 SCC 241: [1997] 3 Suppl. SCR
404; Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1998) 1 SCC 226 :
[1997] 6 Suppl. SCR 595; Commissioner of Police v.
Gordhandas Bhanji AIR 1952 SC 16: [1952] SCR 135;
Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner c
1978 (1) SCC 405 : [1978] 2 SCR 272 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2006) 6 Suppl. SCR 473 referred to Para6
[1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 404 referred to · Para9 D

[1997] 6 Suppl. SCR 595 referred to · Para-9
[1974] 2 SCR 348 distinguished Para 66
(2009] 1 SCR 190 held inapplicable Para 68
E
[1975] 2 SCR 96 relied on Para 79
(1952] SCR 135 referred to Para 85
[1978] 2 SCR 272 referred to Para 86
F
CNIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5227 .
of2017. ·
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.01.20 I 7 of the High Court
ofKerala at Emakulam in OP (CAT) No. 205 of2016.
Dushyant A. Dave, Sr. Adv, Prashant Bhushan, Haris Beeran, G
Mushtaq Salim, Usman Khan, Dev Praksah, Radha Shyam Jena, Advs.
for the Appellant. ·
Harish N. Salve, R. Venkataramani, Sr. Advs, G. Prakash,
Ms. Beena Prakash, Ms. Priyanka Prakash, Jishnu M. L, Manu Srinath,
K: L. Janjani, Jayant Mohan, B. Krishna Prasad, A1j? K. Joseph, H
886 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 6 S.C.R.

A Mrs. Shelna K, Yashraj, Advs. forthe Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MADAN B. LOKUR, J. I. The appellant - Dr. T.P. Sen.kumar
- is said to be an outstanding officer in the Indian Police Service and in
view of his meritorious record and service, he was appointed as the
B Director General of Police & Head of Police Force (the State Police
Chief) in terms of Section 18 of The Kera la Police Act, 2011 (for short
"the Act") on 22"d May, 2015.

2. Section 97 of the Act mandates that the State Government
C shall ensure a minimum tenure of two years for the State Police Chief..
However, the State Police Chief could be transferred out before
completion of the tenure if the State Government is primafacie satisfied
that it is necessary to do so, on certain grounds specified in sub-section •
(2) of Section 97 of the Act. We are concerned with clause ( e) thereof
relating to causing "serious dissatisfaction in the general public about
D efficiency of police in his jurisdiction."

3. Ordinarily therefore, the appellant's tenure as State Police Chief
should have continued till 21" May, 2017 and even thereafter till his
superannuation sometime in June, 2017. However, the tenure was cut
short and he was transferred out as Chairman and Managing Director
E of the Kerala Police Housing and Construction Corporation Ltd. on State
deputation basis by an order dated I" June, 2016.

4. The appellant challenged his displacement by fit ing a petition in
the Central Administrative Tribunal, which was dismissed. He then
preferred a writ petition in the Kerala High Court challenging the order
F
of the Central Administrative Tribunal. The Division Bench hearing the
writ petition dismissed it by the impugned judgment and order dated 25'"
January, 2017. It is under these circumstances that the appellant is now
before us.

G 5. The question for our consideration is whether the appellant's
displacement from the post of State Police Chief in Kerala before the
expiry of his tenure of two years was justified in law. In our opinion, the
answer is in the negative. The removal or displacement or transfer out
of an officer from a sensitive tenure post requires serious consideration
and good reasons that can be tested so that the officer is not dealt with
H
DR. T. P. SENKUMAR JPS v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. . 887
[MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

as a pawn in a game. Unfortunately, the somewhat exacting standards A
are absent in the present case and the appellant was displaced from the
post gf State Police Chief summarily and without reasonable cause.
Prakash Singh's case
6. Before detailing the controversy before us it is necessary to B
refer to the decision of this Court in Prakash Singh & Ors. v. Union of
India and Ors. 1 In that case, this Court dealt with the issue of police
reforms in the context of the far-reaching changes that had taken place
in the country after the enactment of the Indian.Police Act, 1861. It was
noted that no comprehensive review had been undertaken in this regard
at the national level and therefore, the Government oflndia appointed a C
National Police Commission on 1Slh November, 1977 which recommended
significant police reforms. It was also noted that subsequently, there
were other half a dozen reports on the same or similar subject but no
substantive reforms were brought about.
7. In the course of its judgment, this Court referred to a research D
paper titled "Political and Administrative Manipulation of the Police"
published in 1979 by the Bureau of Police Research and Development.
The research paper contained a caution to the effect that excessive
control by the political executive and its principal advisers over the police
had the inherent danger of making the police a tool for subverting the
process of law, promoting the growth of authoritarianism and shaking E
the very foundations of democracy. We may add that one of the findings
in the research paper is "The present predicament of Police is.that they
have been exposed to a two pronged pressure vertically from the ·--~

Administration and laterally from the politicians."2 With these two
pressures, the independent functioning of the police can and sometimes F
does get compromised at the hands of very important persons and those
claiming proximity to very important persons.
8. Keeping this and other material in mind, including the fact that
commitment, devotion and accountability of the police has to be only to
the rule of law, this Court issued certain directions in exercise of powers G
under Article 32 read with Article 142 of the Constitution for doing
complete justice in any cause or matter. This Court took the view that
the directions and guidelines ought to be observed in the absence of
1
(2006) s sec 1
'Research Studies on Police and Prison Issues (1970-2009) [Compendium] published
by the Bureau of Police Research and Training [page 81] H
888 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 6 S.C.R.

A legislation and implemented till the Legislatures pass appropriate
legislations.
9. Resort to Article 32 read with Article 142 of the-Constitution in
such situations was in continuation of similar views expressed in Vishaka
v. State of Rajasthan 3 wherein this Court held in paragraph 16 of the
a· Report that in the absence of enacted law,
" ...... to provide for the effective enforcement of the basic human
right of gender equality and guarantee against sexual harassment
and abuse, more particularly against sexual harassment at
workplaces, we lay down the guidelines and norms specified
c hereinafter for due observance at alt workplaces or other
· institutions, until a legislation is enacted for the purpose. This is
done in exercise of the power available under Article 32 of the
Constitution for enforcement of the fundamental rights and it is
further emphasised that this would be treated as the law declared
by this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution."
D
A similar view was taken by this Court in Vineet Narain v. Union
of Indifil wherein this Court held in paragraph 49 of the Report as
·follows:
"There are ample powers conferred by Article 32 read with Article
E _ 142 to make orders which have the effect of law by virtue of
Article 141 and there is mandate to all authorities to act in aid of
the orders of this Court as provided in Article 144 of the
Constitution. In a catena of decisions of this Court, this power has
been recognised and exercised, if need be, by issuing necessary
directions to fill the vacuum till such time the legislature steps in to
F cover the gap or the executive discharges its role ......... It is
essential and indeed the constitutional obligation of this Court under
the aforesaid provisions to issue the necessary directions in this
behalf. We now consider formulation of the needed directions in
the performance of this obligation. The directions issued herein
G for strict compliance are to operate till such time as they are
replaced by suitable legislation in this behalf."
10. One of the more significant directions given by this Court
pertains to the establishment of a State Security Commission. It was
directed that it should be ensured that the State Government does not
H 3
(1997)6SCC241
•<I 998) 1 sec 226
DR. T. P. SENKUMAR JPS v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 889
. [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

exercise unwarranted influence or pressure on the State Police and, A
therefore, a watchdog body called the State Security Commission should
be constituted with some official members as well as some non-official
members who should be chosen in such a manner that they are able to
function independent of government control. It was directed that the
recommendations of the State Security Commission shall be binding on
8
the State Government. Incidentally, on our asking we ~ere informed by
learned counsel for the State Government· that as of now, the State
Security Commission does not have any independent member.
11. Another significant direction given was that the State
Government shall select the Director General of Police of the State
from amongst the three senior-most empanelled officers keeping in mind
c
their length of service, very good record and range of experience for
heading the police force. It was directed that the Director General of
Police should have a minimum tenure of at least two years irrespective
of his date of superannuation. It was further directed that the Director
General of Police may be relieved of responsibilities by the State D
Government acting in consultation with the State Security Commission
on certain specified grounds. All these directions were given by this
Court so as to insulate the police from external pressures and maintain
the rule of law and not of persons.
The State legislation E
e

12. A few years after the decision in Prakash Singh, the Kerala
Legislature enacted the Kerala Police Act, 20 I I.
13. Section 18 of the Act provides for a State Police Chief vested
with the administration, supervision, direction and control of the police
throughout the State, subject to the control of the State Government. F
The State Police Chief should have tbe ability to lead the police force of
the State and should be selected taking this into account as well as the
overall history of service, professional knowledge and experience.
Section ·18 of the Act reads as follows:
"18. State Police Chief - (!)The administration, supervision, G
direction and control of the Police throughout the State shall, subject
to the control of the Go;vernment, be vested in an officer designated
as the State Police Chief.
(2) The State Police Chief shall be appointed by the Government
H
890 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 6 S.C.R.

A from among those officers of the State Cadre of the Indian Police
Service who have already been promoted to the rank of Director
General of Police, taking into account the ability to lead the Police
Force of the State, the overall history of service, professional
knowledge and experience:
B Provided that where in a case or disciplinary proceedings, for and
on behalf of the State a charge has been given or is pending against
. an officer before any Court or Tribunal or departmental agency,
that officer shall not be appointed as the State Police Chief.
(3) Any person who performs any functions of the police in the
C State ofKerala in exercise of the powers under this Act shall be
officers subordinate to the State Police Chief.
(4) Such number of officers of different ranks as may be decided
by the Government from time to time shall assist the State Pol ice
Chief.
D
(5) No officer senior to the State Police Chief shall be appointed
in the Kerala Police."
14. Section 24 of the Act provides for the constitution of the State
Security Commission for discharging certain functions as mentioned in
E Section 25 of the Act. The State Security Commission consists of the
Minister in-charge of Home Department who shall be the Chairperson;
the Minister in-charge of Law; the Leader of Opposition; a retired Judge
of the High Court nominated by the Chief Justice of the High Court of
Kera la; the Chief Secretary; the Secretary to State Government in the
Home Department and the State Police Chief as ex-officio members
F and three non-official members of eminence nominated by the Governor
of the State, one of the non-official members being a woman. In other
words, the State Security Commission is expected to be a relatively
independent body, but is not truly so in view of other provisions in the
Act.
G 15. The functions of the State Security Commission as given in
Section 25 of the Act read as follows:
"25. Functions of the Commission. -(I) The Commission shall
have the following functions, namely:-

H
DR. T. P. SENKUMAR IPS v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 891
[MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

(a) to frame general policy guidelines for the functioning of the A
Police in the State;
(b) to issue directions for the implementation of crime prevention
tasks and service oriented activities of the Police;
(c) to evaluate, from time to time, the performance of the Police
in the State in general; B

(d) to prepare an annual report of the activities of the Commission
and submit it to the Government; and
(e) to prepare the guidelines for the changes to be carried out,
from time to time, in the State Police; and c
(t) to discharge such other functions as may be assigned to it by
the Government.
(2) The report submitted by the Commission under clause (d) of
sub-section (1) shall, on receipt, be placed before the Legislative
Assembly. D
(3) No Act or Proceedings of the Commission shall be deemed
to be invalid merely by reason of any vacancy in the Commission
at the time any such Act or Proceedings was done or issued.
(4) Notwithstanding any guidelines or directions issued by the
Commission, the Government may lawfully issue such directions
E
as it deems necessary on any matter, if the situation so warrants,
to meet any emergency.
(5) The directions of the Commission shall be binding on the
Police Department:
F
Provided that the Government may, for reasons to be recorded in
writing, fully or partially, reject or modify any recommendation or
direction of the Commission."
16. With regard to the minimum tenure of police officers including
the State Police Chief, Section 97 of the Act provides as follows: G
"97. Minimum tenure of police officers.- (1) The Government
shall ensure a minimum tenure of two years for police officers
posted as State Police Chief, Inspectors General in charge of
Ranges, Superintendents of Police or Commissioners in charge
of Police Districts and State House Officers:
H
892 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 6 S.C.R.

A Provided that this tenure shall not be applicable in cases of
superannuation, promotion, reversion, suspension, leave, etc.
(2) The Government or the appointing authority may, without
prejudice to the right to initiate any legal or departmental action
transfer any police officer before completing the normal tenure
B of two years, on being satisfied prime facie that it is necessary to
do so on any of the following grounds stated in (a) to (t) namely:-
( a) the officer is subjected to disciplinary action;
(b) it is found prima facie on investigation that the officer is involved
in a corrupt practice or in a criminal offence involving proclivity
c for violence or moral turpitude;
(c) the officer is physically or mentally incapable of discharging
his duties;
( d) a superior officer evaluating the work of an officer, reports, in
writing, that the officer is not carrying out his duties efficiently;
D
(e) cause serious dissatisfaction in the general public about
efficiency of police in his jurisdiction;
(t) the officer requests, in writing, for a transfer from the place
where he is working."
E 17. It will be seen from the above that some of the directions
given by this Court were not accepted by the Kerala Legislature in
enacting the Act. Among these was the direction regarding the binding
nature of the recommendations of the State Security Commission and
the direction relating to the Director General of Police or the State Police
F Chief being relieved of responsibilities by the State Government acting
in consultation with the State Security Commission. Consequently, in the
selection or removal of the Director General of Police or the State Police
Chief, the State Security Commission has no role to play under the Act.
In a sense therefore, an important element in the spirit of the judgment
of this Court was not accepted by the Kerala Legislature, namely that of
G making the State Police Chief accountable only to the rule of law nor did
the Kerala Legislature accept the warning of the Bureau of Police
Research and Development against excessive control over the police by
the political executive and its principal advisers.

H
DR. T. P. SENKUMAR IPS v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 893
[MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

18. In this background, what falls for our consideration is whether A
the State Police Chief,can be removed from his tenure posting on a
primafacie opinion that he or she caused "serious dissatisfaction in the
general public about efficiency of police in his jurisdiction" and what are
the restrictions and constraints in arriving at such a prima facie
conclusion.
B
Puttingal Temple Tragedy and the Note of 13•• April, 2016
19. The appellant was given a tenure appointment as the State
Police Chief on 22"d May, 2015 in accordance with Section 18 and Section
97 of the Act. It appears that his tenure did not involve any controversy
until the night of91• April, 2016. c
20. Very briefly, on 9•• April, 2016 a festival called 'Meena Bharani
Utsavam' was celebrated in district Kollam. As a part of the celebrations,
the Temple Administration Committee sought permission to have a
fireworks display in the form of a competition at the Puttingal Devi
Temple. Permission to hold such a competition was declined by the D
District Administration. An application was then made by the Temple
Administration Committee to hold a fireworks display (non-competitive)
but even this was declined by the District Administration. However, the
Temple Administration Committee nevertheless went ahead with a
fireworks display. Late into the night (early morning of 10 1• April) an
extremely unfortunate tragedy occurred resulting in the stock of fireworks E
catching a spark. This resulted in an explosion and the death of more
than 100 persons and injuries to m·ore than 400 persons.
21. The facts leading up to the tragedy are summarized in a Note
dated 13•• April, 2016 by the Additional Chief Secretary (Home) with
regard to what is now known as the Puttingal Temple tragedy. The F
Note of the Additional Chief Secretary (Home) is comprehensive and is
based on reports received from:
(I) State Police Chiefand Director General of Pol-ice (appellant)
(2) Commandant General Fire Police
G
(3) Director, State Intelligence
(4) Additional Director General ofPolice, Crimes
(5) District Collector and District Magistrate, Kollam

H
894 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 6 S.C.R.

A (6) Commissioner of Police, Kollam City
In other words, the Note is based on inputs received from all
relevant sources and is also based on contemporaneous information.
22. The Note records that the Temple Administration Committee
sought permission for a display of fireworks but this was declined by an
B order dated 8'h April, 2016 by the Additional District Magistrate, Kollam.
The officer declined to grant any permission either for display of fireworks
or competitive fireworks. While declining to grant permission, the
Additional District Magistrate, Kollam specifically instructed the
Commissioner of Police, Kollam City to ensure that no violation of the
c order takes place.
23. The Circle Inspector of Police, Paravur was present at the
site of display of fireworks and the tragic incident. It was reported that
the officer "repeatedly asked the temple authorities to stop the display
of fireworks" but obviously to no effect. It appears that before the
D fireworks display started, the temple authorities informed the Circle
Inspector of Police that a sanction order from the Additional District
Magistrate was on the way but he failed to verify this from the District
Magistrate.
24. From the report of the Director, State Intelligence Bureau, it
E appears that the District Police Chief (perhaps the Commissioner of
Police) Kollam City was alerted on 31'' March, 2016 for taking steps
concerning issues relating to the temple festival.
25. On 9th April, 2016 at about 12.30 p.m. a meeting was held in
the chambers of the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Koll am City where
F the temple authorities of Puttingal Devi temple and police officers
participated. The Deputy Commissioner of Police gave instructions that
the fireworks display could be conducted only after getting a proper
license or permission from the Additional District Magistrate. The temple
authorities apparently assured that the fireworks display would be
conducted only in accordance with law.
G
26. The Note records several conclusions, some of the more
important ones as far as we are concerned are as follows:
(a) Despite the "'.arning given as early as on 31" March, 2016
there was no pro-active planning [by the police] to avert the
tragedy. The Additional District Magistrate had passed an order
H
DR. T. P. SENKUMAR IPS v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 895
[MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

on 81h April, 2016 prohibiting the display of fireworks and the A
Commissioner of Police had received this order. The Deputy
Commissioner of Police held a meeting in his chamber on 91h April,
2016 wherein he is said to have told the temple authorities to get
an order from the Additional District Magistrate for permitting
the fireworks display after ensuring that there would be no B
competition. It was concluded that apparently the Deputy
Commissioner of Police was appeasing the temple authorities
rather than trying to implement the order of the Additional District
Magistrate.
(b) The Circle Inspector of Police did not inform any officer senior
to him in the chain of command when the situation was going out C
of control. As far as the Commissioner of Police is concerned, he
admitted that he got information of the tragedy only when it had
struck (and not when the fireworks display started).
(c) The fireworks display started at about 11.30 p.m. on 9 1h April,
2016 but the Circle Inspector of Police and other officers remained D
mute witnesses to a violation of the order of the Additional District
Magistrate.
It was then concluded:
"The conclusion is therefore inescapable that the field officers E
have failed in implementing the order of the District Magistrate;
in following up the field situation on a minute to minute basis so
that this tragedy could have been averted.
There is absolute dereliction of duty and abdication of responsibility
on the part of the ACP, Chathanur and DCP, Kollam City in not
F
effectively monitoring the situation in the temple in the night of9'h
April, 2016, resulting in a tragedy claiming more than 110 human
lives.
In the circumstances, it is not desirable to keep the three officers
- Commissioner of Police, Kollam City, Assistant Commissioner G
of Police, Chathanur and Circle Inspector of Police, Paravur - in
their present postings any longer. They should be kept out of their
field postings pending disciplinary proceedings for major penalty.
Their suspension is warranted in public interest."

H
896 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 6 S.C.R.

A 27. The Note dated i3'h April, 2016 appears to have been placed
before the Chief Minister of the State on 14'h April, 2016 but he did not
pass any order thereon and the file was returned only after the elections
to the Legislative Assembly were over in May 2016. However, what is
of significance, as far as the present appeal is concerned, is that the
appellant was not found blameworthy in any manner whatsoever - it is
B
only the three police officers at the field level in Kollam City, Chathanur
and Paravur who were found to be at fault and their suspension and
transfer was recommended.
28. At this stage, it may be mentioned that the results of the elections
to the Kerala Legislative Assembly were declared on 19'h May, 2016
C and the political party of the incumbent Chief Minister did not secure a
majority. Consequently, the present government with a different Chief
Minister assumed office on 2S'h May, 2016. It seems that the concerned
file was returned only around this time.
Suo motu proceedings in the High Court
D
29. In the meanwhile, soon after the Puttingal Temple tragedy,
the Kerala High Court took notice of the tragedy and registered a suo
motu writ petition being W.P. (C) No.14978of2016. In this writ petition,
an affidavit was filed by the Chief Secretary of the State on 13'h Apri I,
· 2016. The affidavit gives the sequence of events which is more or less
E the same as in the Note dated 1J'h April, 2016. With regard to the role of
the police, he stated in paragraph 6 of the affidavit as follows:
"Subsequently on 09.04.2016, the police made all bandobust
arrangements for the conduct of the festival and there was a
scheme prepared by the police for crowd management as well to
F prevent commission of offences. In the night of 09.04.2016
thousands of people gathered at the temple to watch the fire works
display. The police officials as well as the Tahsildar, Kollam were
present at the temple premises. The Circle Inspector of Police,
Paravoor who was on duty in the temple compound, noticing the
G preparation made by the organizers for the fire works display
after the lowering of the festival flag from the flag mast at 9.30
p.m. asked the office bearers of the Temple Committee to show
the order granting permission of the same. They said that sanction
had been obtained from the Additional District Magistrate and
somebody would be bringing it to the spot. In the meanwhile it
H
DR. T. P. SENKUMAR IPS v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 897
[MADAN B. LOKUR, J.)

was announced through the public address system that the A
committee had permission to conduct display of fire works
(Vedikkettu) from the Additional District Magistrate and there
would be a display of fire words. The Circle Inspector of Police
asked to wait until the permit was actually shown to him. Instead,
the temple authorities violating the law, def),ing the lawful direction
B
of the authorities started to ignite the fire works abruptly. When
the fire works (Vedikkettu) started huge crowd rushed forward
to view it. All officials including the Circle Inspector of Police
immediately went to the ground for managing the crowd, since
there was surge of people. It is submitted that around 03.00 a.m.
on I 0.04.2016 some spark from the fire works fell inside the fire C
works shed (Kambappura) and resulting in explosion causing heavy
casualties."
30. In his affidavit, the Chief Secretary also mentioned that a
judicial commission has been set up, headed by a former Judge of the
Kerala High Court, to look into all aspects of the Puttingal Temple tragedy. D
It was noted that investigation into the crime, which resulted in the tragedy
was handed over to the CB-CID and a team headed by the Additional
Director General of Police (Crime) was constituted. We were told that
the investigation was transferred to the CB-CID on 11th April, 2016. It
appears that the writ petition is still pending disposal and the judicial
commission has not yet given its report. E

31. Significantly, even the Chief Secretary did not make any adverse
comment against the appellant.
Jisha Murder case
32. On 281hApril, 2016 another terrible incident occurred, namely, F
the brutal murder of a young Dalit girl Jisha within the jurisdiction of the
Kuruppumpady police station. On 3'd May, 2016 the appellant sent a
communication to the Additional Chief Secretary (N/C) giving the details
of the crime and the initial investigation. The communication reads as
follows:
G
"Crime No. 909/16 u/s 449, 302 !PC of Kuruppumpady Police
Station was registered at 9.30 p.m. on 28.04.2016 on the basis of
the statement given by one Anas, Panchayat Member there. This
was related to the murder of Jisha, aged 30/2016 years who was
found murdered in her house on the bank of a canal. Within a
H
898 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 6 S.C.R.

A short time, District Police Chief, Emakulam Rural also reached
the spot and the entire team started investigation. The deceased
was staying with her mother Smt. Rajeswari. It is known that,
Jisha's father belongs to SC community and Smt. Rajeswari
belongs to OBC community. All scientific investigation procedures
are adopted in this case. IGP Ernakulam Range, who had
B
experience of working in CBI for 7 years is personally supervising
the investigation from 29.04.2016 onwards. They have formed a
· good investigation team with DySP, Perumbavoor as Investigating
Officer. Efforts are taken to identify the accused through scientific
methods.
c The post-mortem report of the deceased has revealed that the
deceased had been attacked with more than one weapon. Brutality
of the attack is also noticed. The time of the death is estimated to
be between 4.30 p.m. and 5.00 p.m. on 28.04.2016. The
investigation is in full swing by one of the best team available in
D the state. It is expected that the accused can be clearly found out
within a short time."
A Special Investigation Team consisting of 28 officers has since
been constituted to investigate and prosecute the crime. For the present,
it is not advisable to say anything more on this subject.
E Notes of 26'h May, 2016 and the appellant's transfer
33. Other than the terrible murder ofJisha nothing of significance
seems to have transpired between J3Lh April, 2016 and 26'" May, 2016
or at least the official files do not reveal anything of significance.
However, elections to the Legislative Assembly had intervened in the
meantime and another Government assumed office.
F
34. On 26'" May, 2016 the Additional Chief Secretary (Home) put
up two Notes to the (recently elected) Chief Minister. The first Note
suggests (by way of an example) that it was prompted by a report in the
New Indian Express of 18'" April, 2016 wherein the appellant expressed
the view that the police alone cannot be blamed for the Puttingal Temple
G tragedy. The newspaper report reads:
Don't Blame the Police Alone: DGP 5
By Pradeep Pillai I Published: 18th April 2016 03 :58 AM I
Last Updated: 18th April 2016 03:58 AM I A+A A- I
'http://epaper.newindianexpress.com/78 I 74 7 /The-New-Indian-Express-Koch i/
H 18042016#page/l/2 and http://epaper.newindianexpress.com/c/9748784
DR. T. P. SENKUMAR JPS v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 899
[MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

KOCH!: DGP T P Sertkumar has hit right back. "Where was A
the ADM and Tahasildar when tragedy struck Puttingal Devi
Temple at Paravur? Why there is no action against Revenue
and other officials concerned," asked Senkumar, in response
to a report submitted by Additional Chief Secretary Nalini Netto
in which she recommended suspension of three police officers.
B
In a report submitted to the Chief Minister, the DGP pointed
out that it was not fair to blame the police alone for the tragedy.

Officials of the district administration, Pollution Control Board,
Directorate of Explosives, Environmental Engineering, Fire and
Rescue services should also be held accountable. Action, if C
any, should be taken against all," he argued.

Senkumar also pleaded not to take disciplinary action till the
Crime Branch probe is over. "I am not saying that there is no
failure on the part of the police. When fault finding is being
done it has to be done impartially and everyone responsible D
should be made accountable," he told Express.

"How did Thrissur Pooram go on? There was societal pressure.
An all party meet was called, High Court had intervened and a
collective decision was taken to take precaution and ensure
E
smooth conduct. When we take a deviant move from previous
years it should be done sufficiently early and publicity given.

"Once you had decided to ban the fireworks the district
administration should have calied a meeting of officials
concerned from all departments. What was the plan of action? F
Considering the large gathering during the fireworks display, a
law and order situation should have been anticipated and suitable
directions also should have been given. Revenue officers should
have been present to help the police take action," he noted.

"The Tahasildar was supposed to be there. Instead of merely G
complaining to the police, he could also have called the District
Collector and informed the possibility of a violation. It is reported
that he went home after midnight and returned only in the
morning. If the CI on the field is to be blamed, the Tahasildar

H
900 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 6 S.C.R.

A should also be equally responsible. It is not correct to start
looking for scapegoats once something goes wrong," he said.
Further stressing his point, Senkumar said: "The ADM vanished
from the scene. Did he seek permission of the Chief Electoral
Officer before leaving the district for his home in Ernakulam?
B It is too much to say that the police alone is responsible after
things went out of hand. It is wrong, partial," the DGP said.
35. In the first Note dated 26' 11 May, 2016 the Additional Chief
Secretary (Home) explained that the earlier Note dated 13'11 April, 2016
dealt mainly with the report of the State Police Chief dated 13 1h April,
c 2016. She had then confined herself to examining the critical issues only
and did not elaborate on the "peripherals". Therefore, she submitted the
Note dated 26 1h May, 2016.
36. On a reading of the first Note, it appears to be in the nature of
a counter affidavit to certain observations, comments and conclusions
D recorded more than a month earlier by Senkumar in his report dated 13'11
April, 2016. In any event, the Additional Chief Secretary (Home)
concluded the Note by expressing the opinion that:
" ..... Even if all other departments are ticked off for contributory
failure, it will in no way mitigate or absolve the District Police
E from its responsibility, as it is the police which has to publicise the
ban order and implement it effectively. The primary responsibility
for the said tragedy therefore rests fairly and squarely on the
District Police and there is no hiding from this fact. The DGP as
head of the police fon;e is expected to evaluate without fear or
favour the performance of his force and take to task those found
F remiss in the line of duty. Here, instead of providing proper
leadership, the DGP has gone overboard to protect erring police
officials, sending a very wrong and dangerous message, not just
to the force, but also to the public, which could have far reaching
disastrous consequences.
G In addition to all these, the action of the DGP in trying to interfere
in an undesirable manner the functioning of the investigating team
of the Crime Branch which is probing the Puttingal temple tragedy.
can be seen from the devious means adopted by him. In his letter
dated nil, the DGP gave a panel of names for replacing ACP,
H Chathannur on the request of the ADGP (Crimes). But strangely
DR. T. P. SENKUMAR !PS v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 901
[MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

enough, both the names given are those of officers who have A
been part of the investigating team of the Crime Branch. Even
when the ADG Crimes requested that the investigating team should
not be changed, no action was taken by the DGP. Finally a fresh
panel had to be called for by the Government. Even if it is argued
that the names were given inadvertently, not taking action on the
B
request of the ADGP (Crimes) to retain his investigating team, is
reason enough for presuming an undesirable motive.
All these point to an inefficient and ineffective leadership, which
is highly detrimental to a huge uniformed force like the State Police,
entrusted with the dual responsibilities of maintaining law and order
and prevention and detection of crime, in a transparent manner C
and to the satisfaction of the public at large."
37. On the same day, that is on 26'h May, 2016 the Additional
Chief Secretary (Home) put up a second Note to the Chief Minister and
this was on the Jisha murder case. In the second Note, there is a reference
to a report made by the Director General of Police (Senkumar) on the D
Jisha murder case. The only allegation maae in the second Note is that
the report of the Director General of Police is silent on the issue why no
action was taken against certain officers who had delayed the recording
of the First Information Report in the Jisha murder or the delay in
forwarding the First Information Report to the concerned Magistrate. It E
is also alleged that the report of the Director General of Police is
completely silent on the callous handling of the scene of crime and the
initial investigation steps. The second Note then goes on to highlight
certain contradictions between the report of the Director General of
Police, the First lnfonnation Report and the First Information Statement.
We make no comment on this at all since this is a matter that mighr F
come up during the trial.
38. In the second Note, the Additional Chief Secretary (Home)
concludes from the above, that the control and discipline in the police
force is lacking, pointing to poor leadership and direction of the Director
General of Police and that there is a lack of integrity, transparency and G
efficiency of the police force in general in handling the Jisha murder
case that seems to have seriously eroded the confidence of the public,
especially women in particular, reflecting poorly on the leadership of the
force.
H
902 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 6 S.C.R.

A The order cutting short the tenure
39. Acting on the above N0tes, the Chiefr\ 1·n ister took a decision
on 27'h May, 2016 to replace the appellant. This decision is under challenge
and it reads as follovys:
"It has b..:L·n decided to replace the present Director General of
B Police and State Police Chief in the wake of the fact that his
leadership has not been satisfactory leading to serious
dissatisfaction among the general public about the efficiency and
transparency of the Police Force in the State, especially in regard
to the Puttingal Temple Incident and the Jisha Murder case. The
c Committee Constituted for the selection of the DGP may meet at
the earliest and examine the profiles of the officers in the zone of
consideration and place the facts before the Government for
consideration to enable a decision to be taken."
The decision was ratified by the Cabinet on 1st June, 2016 and
D given effect to on the same day.
40. It will be apparent from a reading of the decision that what
weighed with the Chief Minister was only one ground, namely, the
appellant's unsatisfactory leadership leading to serious dissatisfaction
among the general public about the efficiency and transparency of the
E police force in the State, especially in regard to the Puttingal Temple
tragedy and the Jisha murder case.
Proceedings in the Central Administrative Tribunal
41. Feeling aggrieved by his transfer and consequent removal as
the State Police Chief, the appellant challenged the order dated 1st June,
F 2016 in the Central Administrative Tribunal through O.A. No. 446 of
2016.
42. In response to the averments and allegations made by
Senkumar, a reply affidavit was filed by the Joint Secretary to the
Government of Kerala, General Administration Special (A&C)
G Department on or about 24'h June, 2016. In the affidavit there is a
reference to lapses by the appellant in dealing with the Puttingal Temple
tragedy. It is stated that he hesitated to suspend or initiate action against
the delinquent police officers and instead adopted an attitude of
safeguarding them. This created widespread dissatisfaction among the
general public and in the media which the government was constrained
H
DR. T. P. SENKUMAR IPS v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 903
[MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

to take seriously. He tried to white wash the police at the expense of A
other departments. As the head of the police force in the State, he was
expected to evaluate, without fear or favour, the performance of the
force and take to task those found remiss in the line of duty. Instead of
protecting the interests of the State and acting as the protector of the
people, the appellant had gone overboard in protecting erring polic~
B
officers. This sent a very wrong and dangerous message, not just to the
. force but also to the people. Such an attitude would have far reaching
and disastrous consequences which could not be tolerated in the larger
public interest.
43. In the reply affidavit, there is an allegation that after the
Puttingal Temple tragedy, the appellant attempted to interfere with the C
Crime Branch investigation team probing the tragedy and that this raised
serious concerns for the State.
44. It was alleged as follows:
"In his letter dated nil, the Director General of Police gave a panel D
of names for replacing ACP, Chattannur on the request of the
ADGP (Crimes). But strangely enough, both the names given
are those of officers who have been part of the investigating team
of the Crime Branch. Even when the ADG Crimes requested
that the investigating team should not be changed, no action was
taken by the Director General of Police. Finally, a fresh panel E
had to be called for by the Government. Even if it is argued that
the names were given inadvertently, not taking action on the request
of the ADGP (Crimes) to retain his investigating team, is reason
enough for presuming an undesirable motive. In fact, the co-
ordination between the higher level police officers was also in F
question."
45. With regard to the Jisha murder case it was stated that there
were several serious lapses on the part of the police officers which the
appellant tried to white wash, ignore or justify. It was stated as follows:-
"The murder shocked the conscience of the nation and especially G
the people of Kerala. The manner in which the police officer
proceeded with the investigation of this crime is an everlasting
shame to the state police. No measures were taken to safeguard
the available evidence. The police took hasty steps to cremate
the body. In the night of29.04.2016 though the incident came to H
904 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 6 S.C.R.

A the notice of the people throughout the State, it took 5 days for the
State Police Chief to report the matter to Government, that too,
only after the news was widely flashed in the media. This caused
wide spread criticism in the media and among the public about the
police apathy. The report submitted by the State Police Chief
even after 5 days of the incident did not indicate the time of
B
registration of FIR. The report was an attempt to focus on the
skill ofthe investigation team rather than informing the Government
of the matters regarding the brutal murder. The Government
received a second report on 04.05.2016, which was totally
insensitive to the gravity of the situation. On 12.05.2016,
c Government received a third report highlighting the socio-economic
scenario of the victim. It is also indicated that there are such
vulnerable families and such crimes are bound to happen. In fact.
there were many willful lapses on the part of the State Police
Chief. He failed to act as the SPC. He was enthusiastic in
protecting the delinquent officers. As a result, the image of the
D
State Government before the public and sense of security to the
public, were adversely affected. This has resulted in an
unfortunate situation. There was not only failure in prevention
but also failure in detection. The level of callousness and
insensitivity with which the matter was handled by the SPC is
E appalling. The entire issue was taken over by the media and civil
society. On the whole, Government had no option bµt to replace
the State Police Chief with an efficient and capable officer to
deal with such a situation."
46. The Central Administrative Tribunal in its order dated 21"
F July, 2016 took the view that the replacement or transfer of the appellant
as the State Police Chief was not ma/a fide or with any oblique motive
or for extraneous or political considerations but on the ground that the
Government was satisfied, prima facie, that the appellant's shift was
necessary as it caused serious dissatisfaction in the general public about
the efficiency of the police force satisfying the conditions mentioned in
G Section 97(2)(e) of the Act.
(>
Proceedings in the High Court
4 7. Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Central Administrative
Tribunal, the appellant preferred a writ petition in the Kerala High Court
H being O.P. (CAT) No. 205 of2016. This writ petition was heard and
DR. T. P. SENKUMAR IPS v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 905
[MADAN B. LOKUR, J.)

decided by a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court and by the A
impugned judgment and order dated 25'h January; 2017 it was dismissed.
Unfortunately the counter affidavit filed by the State (if any counter
affidavit was at all filed) is not on our record.
48. It was held by the High Court, inter alia, that the Government
was primafacie satisfied that action was required to be taken under the B
provisions of Section 97(2) (e) of the Act and that there were no ma/a
fides in the transfer of the appellant particularly due to the change of
government. It was held that the displacement of the appellant was
based on the subjective satisfaction of the government and that the action
or inaction on the part of the appellant was correct or sustainable was
not a matter of scrutiny before the Court. It was further held that the
c
Central Administrative Tribunal had approached the issue in the correct
perspective and the finding and reasoning given for declining interference
did not warrant any exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court to set
aside its order.
49. It is important to note that the High Court made no reference D
to the alleged interference by the appellant in the CB-CID investigations
into the Puttingal Temple tragedy.
50. It is against this decision of the High Court that the present
appeal has been instituted.
E
Proceedings in this Court
51. The appeal directed against the decision of the High Court
was initially listedfor preliminary hearing on 6'h March, 2017 when notice
was issued to the respondents. In response to the notice, the Chief
Secretary of the State filed a counter affidavit on 2J'd March, 2017
F
virtually reiterating the contents of the earlier affidavits. It is stated in
the affidavit that Section 97(2)(e) of the Act which was invoked in the
case, contemplates a prima facie satisfaction of the government that
there is serious dissatisfaction in the general public about the efficiency
of the police in the jurisdiction of a police officer. The prima facie
satisfaction is the subjective satisfaction of the government and is not G
open to judicial scrutiny in the sense of propriety of the satisfaction on
an objective appraisal of facts.
52. Significantly, it is reiterated that the primary responsibility for
the Puttingal Temple tragedy rests fairly and squarely on the district
H
906 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 6 S.C.R.

A police and there is no hiding from this fact. The appellant as head of the
police force was expected to evaluate without fear or favour the
performance of his force and take to task those found remiss in the line
of duty. Instead of providing proper leadership, he went overboard in
protecting erring police officials, sending a very wrong and dangerous
message, not just to the force, but also to the public, which could have
B
far reaching disastrous consequences. It is further stated that all this
. points to an inefficient and ineffective leadership which is highly
detrimental to a huge uniformed force like the State Police, en_trusted
with dual responsibilities of maintaining law and order and prevention
and detection of crime in a transparent manner and to the satisfaction of
c the public at large. It is stated that a responsible government is accountable
to the general public and a responsible police officer acting in a manner
not suitable to the occasion cannot be permitted to continue in the post
when the issues involved are sensitive and have far-reaching
consequences. The Council of Ministers in the State was seized of the
issues and it was in pursuance of the decision of the Council of Ministers
D
that the appellant was transferred.
53. In this affidavit, a reference is made to the report dated lJ•h
April, 2016 forwarded by the appellant to the Additional Chief Secretary
and which has been referred to above. It is stated that in the report, the
appellant's attempt and attitude was more to insinuate the lapses resulting
E . in the tragedy on the district administration while seeking to assert that
the entire blame cannot be put on the police. The course of events
clearly revealed that adequate action was not taken against the delinquent
police officers or such action was not recommended by the appellant at
the appropriate time. This contributed to the dissatisfaction on the
F efficiency of the police in the minds of the general public. In the counter
affidavit there is no reference to the Jisha murder case or to the alleged
interference in the CB-CID investigations in the Puttingal Temple tragedy.
54. A further detailed counter affidavit was filed by the Chief
Secretary on 10'11 April, 2017. In the detailed counter affidavit the facts
G and views relating to the Puttingal Temple tragedy are reiterated and it
is not necessary to go over them again.
55. However, in the detailed counter affidavit it was alleged that
the appellant was trying to interfere in the functioning of the CB-CID
investigating team into the Puttingal Temple tragedy.
H
DR. T. P. SENKUMAR IPS v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ·907
[MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

56. It was stated that while the appellant has asked for the transfer A
of one Deputy Superintendent of Poli_ce, Tirur on 28'h April, 2016 a
communication was received from the Chief Electoral Officer on 5•h
May, 2016 mentioning the transf~rof the Deputy Superintendent of Police;
Tirur, as well as the transfer of' the Assistant Commissioner of Police,
Chathanur.
B
57. As a replacement, the appellant suggested Gopakumaran Nair
and Radhakrishnan, but the Additional Director General of Police
(Crimes) (investigating the Puttingal Temple tragedy) wrote to the
appellant with a copy of the letter to the Home Secretary requesting that
Gopakumaran Nair should not be transferred since he was part of the
team investigating into the tragedy. Similarly and for the same reason,
c
the Additional Director General of Police (Crimes) objected to
Radhakrishnan being appointed as the Assistant Commissioner of Police,
Chathanur. Eventually, Velayudhan Nair was posted as the Assistant
Commissioner of Police, Chathanur. The conclusion drawn by the Home
Secretary was that 'Placing Gopakumaran Nair (or Radhakrishnan) as D
the Additional Commissioner of Police, Chathanur would put him under
the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Police, Kollam City, whose role
was under investigation and therefore "these circumstances were
reasonable enough for presuming an undesirable motive" of the appellant.
58. There is also a reference to a letter dated I o•h May, 2016 sent E
by the Home Secretary to the Director General, Election Commission of
India wherein it is mentioned that the Government was not aware of the
proposal for the transfer of the Assistant Commissioner of Police,
Chathanur until it received the communica~ion dated 4•h May, 2016. It is
not clear why such a reference is made in the detailed counter affidavit
- is it sought to be suggested that the appellant had influenced the Director F
General, Election Commission of India to transfer the Assistant
Commissioner of Police, Chathanur. If that is the suggestion it is extremely
unfortunate.
59. Adverting to the Jisha murder case, it was alleged that since
details were not made available to the government with regard to the G
murder which had raised a serious public outcry, the Home Secretary
sent a detailed questionnaire on 4'h May, 2016 to the Inspector General
of Police with a copy to the appellant asking for full details as to the
steps taken.
H
908 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 6 S.C.R.

A 60. In response, the Inspector General of Police replied to the
questionnaire but the appellant did not do so but only enclosed an order
establishing a Special Investigating Team of 28 officers to investigate
I
the murder.
61. On a subsequent occasion, the appellant submitted another
B report to the Home Secretary on 12'" May, 2016 wherein he failed to
address the crucial issue of the cremation of the victim soon after the
post mortem even when forensic investigation was under way as to a
possible sexual assault. The appellant also did not address any of the
controversies in the public domain such as protest marches by various
organizations.
c
The correct perspective
62. However, what is important about the detailed counter affidavit
is that it places the entire case in the proper perspective in the following
words:
D "The question was not about his involvement directly in any of the
incidents, the question was how he, as a Chief of the State Police,
dealt with the situation where there was great public concern
about these incidents. The first related to the firework tragedy in
a temple complex and the second related to lapses in the
E investigation into the murder of a young law student.
The Police Chiefis not personally responsible either for supervising
the conduct of events or adherence to safety measures in relation
to large public gatherings nor is the Police Chief directly incharge
of the investigations. However, where the conduct of the police
appears to fall short of the standards demanded by the law, the
F
Police Chief is expected to conduct himself in a manner that
restores public faith and confidence in the police and in the
Government and not to take a partisan view to protect his officers.
A Police Chief who conduct himself in a manner that creates
dissatisfaction in the general public about the efficiency of the
G police can be for that reason transferred by the executive
government under the statute."
The issue therefore is not really about the details of the Puttingal Temple
tragedy or the Jisha murder case - the issue is really of the appellant's
conduct post these two events, the expectations of the general public
H
DR. T. P. SENKUMAR IPS v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 909
[MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

(as learned counsel for the State put it) and the "serious public A
dissatisfaction".
Discussion on the legal issues
63. On the legal issues, it was submitted by learned counsel for
the State Government that only a prima facie satisfaction of the
government was required to transfer the State Police Chief due to events B
subsequent to the Puttingal Temple tragedy and the Jisha murder.
64. It was submitted that the State Government was primafacie
satisfied that the conduct of the appellant post the two incidents did not
inspire any confidence in his leadership and that translated into serious
public dissatisfaction on the efficiency and the role of the police. This, it C
was submitted, was more than enough to enable the government to
conclude that the appellant deserved to be transferred out as the State
Police Chief.
65. We are of opinion that the Puttingal Temple tragedy and the
Jisha murder, both extremely tragic events, were not and were admittedly D
not the basis for the transfer of the appellant. The correct perspective
was placed by learned counsel for the State of Kerala and that is the
subsequent conduct of the appellant in failing to take action against the
errant police officers for the Puttingal Temple tragedy and that he failed
to provide an adequate response to the Jisha murder. It was argued E
that cumulatively, this indicated that the appellant was not suited to be in
charge of the State Police and therefore deserved to be replaced.
66. Our attention was drawn to E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil
Nadu 6 and particularly the following passage in paragraphs 87 and 88
of the Report: ·
F
"Now, two important considerations must weigh with us in
determining our approach to these questions. First, the post of
Chief Secretary is a highly sensitive post. It is a post of great
confidence - a lynchpin in the administration - and smooth
functioning of the administration requires that there should be G
complete rapport and understanding between the Chief Secretary
and the Chief Minister. The Chief Minister as the head of the
Government is in ultimate charge of the administration and it is he
who is politically answerable to the people for the achievements
'(1974) 4 sec 3
H
910 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 6 S.C.R.

A and failures 9fthe Government. If, therefore,for any valid reason
the Chief Secretary forfeits the confidence of the Chief Minister,
the Chief Minister may legitimately, in the larger interests of
administration, shift the Chief Secretary to another post, provided
of course that does not involve violation of any of his legal
or constitutional rights. There can be no question in such a
B
case as to who is right and who is wrong. The displacement of
the Chief Secretary from his post in such a case would not be
arbitrary and it would not attract the inhibition of Articles 14 and
16. It may, however, be pointed out that such an action would not,
we think, ordinarily be taken except for the most compelling
c reasons, because, if resorted to without proper justification, it would
tend to affect the political neutrality of the public service and lead
to demoralisation and frustration amongst the public servants.
Secondly ... So long as the transfer is made on account of the
exigencies of administration and is not from a higher post to a
D lower post with discriminatory preference ofajunior for the higher
post, it would be valid and not open to attack under Articles 14
and 16."
67. In Royappa the concern of this Court was in relation to the
post of the Chief Secretary of the State but which was not a tenure post.
E This Court observed that the post ofChiefSecretary is a highly sensitive
post and the person holding that post is the lynch pin in the administration.
The ChiefMinister of the State must, therefore, have complete confidence
in him or her and there must be complete rapport and understanding
between the Chief Secretary and the Chief Minister of the State. Since
the Chief Minister is in ultimate charge of the administration of the State
·p
and is answerable to the people for the achievements and failures of the
government, ifthe Chief Secretary forfeits the confidence of the Chief
Minister, he or she may be shifted to another post in the larger interest of
administration provided there is no violation of any legal or constitutional
right.
G 68. Our attention was also drawn to an observation in Citizens
for Justice & Peace v. State of Gujarat7 to the effect that "the
appointment of a government servant is the prerogative of the particular
Government, particularly, when it is a sensitive appointment ofthe Director

H '(2009) 11sec213
DR. T. P. SENKUMAR IPS v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 911
[MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

General of Police." It was then observed thatthis Court would not extend A
its hands to upset such an appointment under the judicial doctrine review.
69. The broad principle laid down in Royappa is obviously
applicable to the present case, but with two distinctions, one of them
being that it did not deal with a tenure post or an appointment and
replacement under a statute. Of course and undoubtedly the post of B
Chief Secretary of a State and the Director General of Police or the
State Police Chief are both sensitive posts. But the sensitivity attached
to the post of a Chief Secretary has a different dimension from the
sensitivity attached to the post of the State Police Chief. which is of a
different genre. Unlike the Chief Secretary of the State, the State Police
Chief as the head of the police force is concerned with the investigation C
of crimes, law and order and public order and not general executive
administration. Prakash Singh makes it very clear that the police must
be permitted to function without any regard to the status and position of
any person while investigating a crime or taking preventive measures. ·
In other words, the rule of law should not become a casualty to the D
whims and fancies of the political executive. In that event, the State
·Police Chief might be pressurized laterally by the political executive and
vertically by the Administration. It is to ensure (and that is the rationale
for the decision of this Court) that no such pressure is exerted Ofl "the
State Police Chief and if so exerted, then the State Police Chief does not
succumb to such pressure, that Prakash Singft provided for security of E
tenure and insulating the police from the Executive.
70. As far as Citizens for Justice & Peace·is concerned, that is
clearly inapplicable. We are not concerned with the appointment of the
State Police Chief but with his removal from a tenure post. That apart, it
would be tragic if this Court were to come to a conclusion that the F
removal of a person from a sensitive but tenure appointment based on a
stature is the "prerogative" of the government and judicial review is not
available merely because the post concerned is a sensitive one. If such
a view were to hold the field, Article 14 of the Constitution, the citizen's
struggle against executive arbitrariness would become irrelevant and G
this Court would be surrendering its constitutional obligation.
71. We may also recall that the Bureau of Police Research and
Development, in a publication referred to by this Court in Prakash Singh
warned that excessive control by the political executive and its principal
H
912 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 6 S.C.R.

A advisors over the police has the inherent danger of making the police a
tool for subverting the process of law. That view too would have to be
thrown out of the window if arbitrary removal from a tenure post based
on a statute is taken out of the purview ofjudicial review merely because
the person holds a sensitive post.
B 72. We also cannot overlook the fact that in the event of any law
and order or public order situation, it is the policeman that is the first
responder and not an officer of the administration. If the authority of the
first responder were to get compromised, the citizen would not have
anyone to turn to for assistance resulting in the crumbling of the rule of
law. This certainly cannot be permitted. This is not to say that the police
c must be treated with kid gloves - all that is sought to be conveyed is that
a certain degree of freedom is required to be given to the police by
insulating it from possible attempts·to control its independent functioning,
and there is a good explanation for this.
73. The decision in Prakash Singh and the fashioning of the Act
D respect the necessity of the tenure appointment of the State Police Chief.
Prakash Singh made sure that the removal of the State Police Chief is
not a routine sort of affair. However, the Act diluted this to some extent
but retained the broad contours of the law laid down by this Court in its
decisions.
E 74. In Royappa this Court cautioned (in the passage quoted above)
against the easy and mechanical displacement of the Chief Secretary of
the State. In our opinion the caution is equally, ifnot more, applicable in
the case of the Director General of Police or the State Police Chief.
This Court observed that the displacement of the Chief Secretary must
F be for the most compelling reasons and should not be arbitrary, otherwise
it "would tend to affect political neutrality" and lead to demoralization
and frustration among public servants.
75. It is for this reason that as far as the police is concerned,
commission after commission recommended insulating the police from
G the Executive and providing the force a degree of freedom, without
political or executive interference so that it could impartially investigate
crimes and take preventive measures in law and order or public order
situations. It is this that persuaded this Court in Prakash Singh to
direct the setting up of a State Security Commission so that the State
Government does not exercise unwarranted influence or pressure on
H
DR. T. P. SENKUMAR IPS v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 913
[MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

the State police. It is this that persuaded this Court to direct that three A
persons independent of the government should be members of the State
Security Commission (provided they are appointed by the State
Government!) and that the recommendations of the Commission shall
be binding on the State Government. Furthermore, to provide security
of tenure this Court directed that the Director General of Police should
B
have a minimum tenure ·of at least two years irrespective of the date of
superannuation. To maintain the independence of the police from
government control in matters relating to investigations or criines,
preventive measures concerning law and order and public order, the
Director General of Police may be relieved of responsibilities only in
consultation with the State Security Commission and that too for limited c
reasons.
76. While the Kerala Legislature did not fully adopt the directions
given by this Court while enacting the Act, the Legislature partially and
only partially accepted the spirit of the directions issued by this Court in
maintaining the requirement that the State Police Chief should have a D
minimum tenure of two years and the reasons for shifting the State
Police Chief from his or her post were limited and provided for in Section
97 of the Act. The Kera la Legislature was, perhaps, quite right in adding
clause (e) to Section 97(2) of the Act to the effect that if there is serious
public dissatisfaction about the efficiency of the police, a police officer
E
may be transferred even if he or she has not completed the normal
tenure of two years. While this transfer could be affected by the
government on beingprimafacie satisfied of public dissatisfaction, the
assessment would necessarily have to be made in an objective and not a
subjective manner otherwise the entre purpose of a secure tenure
appointment woulq be nullified. This is where there is a difference in the F
role of the Chief Secretary as the chief executive of the State and the
Director General of Police of a State - their roles cannot be equated.
While the Chief Secretary can be removed if he or she does not enjoy
the confidence of the Chief Minister or does not have a "complete rapport
and understanding" with the Chief Minister, the removal cannot be
questioned, unless there is a violation of some statutory or constitutional G
provision. But that is not so with the State Police Chief. The reason is
not far to seek-the Cabinet colleagues of the Chief Minister or Senior
bureaucrats (including the Chief Secretary) might need to be investigated
in an appropriate case. Can the Chief Minister then remove the State
H
914 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 6 S.C.R.

A Police Chief on the ground that in such an event he or she does not enjoy
the confidence of the Chief Minister or that there is no "complete rapport
and understanding" between the State Police Chief and the Chief Minister?
The answer is quite obvious.
77. Indeed for this reason, considered in the background of the
B security of tenure, each of the various clauses in Section 97(2) of the
Act clearly and unmistakably point to action being permitted against a
police officer only on the basis of verifiable material, such as disciplinary
action, involvement in a corrupt practice or a criminal offence, physical
or mental incapacity, assessment on the basis' of evaluation of the work
of an officer by a superior etc. and not on the subjective whims and
cfancies of those in a position of power. There is nothing to suggest that
as compared to the other clauses in Section 97(2) of the Act "serious
dissatisfaction in the general public about efficiency of police in his
jurisdiction" must be given a different treatment or interpretation. The
opinion of serious dissatisfaction must be based on verifiable material
D and not a perception that the Chief Minister or other senior functionary
might have or the "public expectation" (as learned counsel for the State
put it) that the Chief Minister might imagine. Quite often public opinion
can be misleading or motivated. It is true that where an assessment of
this nature is required to be made, there would be an element of
subjectivity, but that subjective view must haye some basis- not a mere
E perception.

78. Section 97(2)( e) of the Act must, therefore, be read and
· understood in the context of the other clauses of that Section which
relate to verifiable facts and events. Clause ( e) is not a blanket clause
that permits the State Government to take any decision on the basis of
F what it believes to be public dissatisfaction. Otherwise, the State
Government can misuse.it and justify an adverse action on the ground of
primafacie satisfaction outside the ambit of judicial review.
79. In this context the following passages from M.A. Rasheed v.
State of Kerala 8 are quite telling on the issue of 'satisfaction' of an
G executive authority:
"Where powers are conferred on public authorities to exercise
the same when "they are satisfied" or when "it appears to them",
or when "in their opinion" a certain state of affairs exists; or when

H '(1974) 2 sec 687 paragraphs s to 10
DR. T. P. SENKUMAR !PS v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 915
[MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

powers enable public authorities to take "such action as they think A
fit" in relation to a subject matter, the courts will not readily defer
to the conclusiveness of an executive authority's opinion as to the
existence of a matter of law or fact upon which the val id ity of the
exercise of the power is predicated.
Where reasonable conduct is expected the criterion of B
reasonableness is not subjective, but objective. Lord Atkin in
Liversidge v. Anderson9 said:
"If there are reasonable grounds, the Judge has no further
duty of deciding whether he would have formed the same belief
any more than, ifthere is reasonable evidence to go to a jury, c
the Judge is concerned with whether he would have come to
the same verdict." ·
The onus of establishing unreasonableness, however, rests upon
the person challenging the validity of the acts.
Administrative decisions in exercise of powers even if conferred D
in subjective terms are to be made in good faith on relevant
consideration. The courts inquire whether a reasonable man could
have come to the decision in question without misdirecting himself
on the law or the facts in a material respect. The standard. of
reasonableness to which the administrative body is required to E
conform may range from the courts' own opinion of what is
reasonable to the criterion of what a reasonable body might have
decided. The courts will find out whether conditions precedent to
the formation of the opinion have a factual basis."
80. We are therefore clearly of opinion that the removal or F
displacement of any senior level officer from a tenure appointment must
be for compelling reasons and must be justified by the concerned
authority, if called upon to du so, on material that can be objectively
tested. This is what the rule of law expects and this is what Section 97
of the Act expects - the law must be faithfully implemented in a purposive
manner. G
Discussion on facts
81. We have referred to the various affidavits as well as the Notes
of the Additional Chief Secretary for two reasons: Firstly, no guilt or
'1942 AC 206, 228-229 H
916 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 6 S.C.R.

A lapse has been directly attributed to the appellant either for the Puttingal
Temple tragedy or the Jisha murder case. On the contrary, as far as the
Puttingal Temple tragedy is concerned, the Additional Chief Secretary
recommended action against three specific police officers and placed
the file before the Chief Minister. The appellant has been accused of
failure to take action against these errant police officers (rather supporting
B
them) and unjustifiably apportioning a part of the blame on the district
administration. However, it must be noted that for more than one and a
half months the Chief Minister took absolutely no action on the Note
dated l 3'h April, 2016 but just seems to have kept it in his office. Under
these circumstances, it is not clear what action could be taken by the
c appellant or any officer of the government including the Chief Secretary
and the Additional Chief Secretary against the errant police officers
while the matter was pending with the Chief Minister. Could they or
should they have by-passed the Chief Minister? In any event, nothing
has been shown to us to suggest that the Chief Minister was reminded
D that some action needed to be taken by him or that he should give some
specific direction on the file placed before him. In our view therefore, if
the appellant failed to take any action against the errant police officers,
the entire official machinery starting from the Chief Minister down to
the Chief Secretary and the Additional Chief Secretary are equally to
blame. What is more important in this context is that the recommendation
E to take action against the errant police officers was made to the Chief
Minister and not to the appellant.
82. As far as the Jisha murder case is concerned, the allegation
against the appellant is of a general nature highlighting certain
contradictions between his report, the First Information Report and the
F First Information Statement. We ought not to comment on these alleged
contradictions. The generalization made leads to the conclusion that the
leadership of the appellant was poor and that he lacked control and
discipline over the police force which eroded public confidence,
notwithstanding the responsibility of the large investigating team ..
G 83. The second and more serious reason for the transfer (though
it is not mentioned by the Chief Minister) is to be found in the first Note
dated 26'h May, 2016 of the Additional Chief Secretary (Home). Perhaps
for this reason, it finds only a fleeting mention in the reply affidavit filed
in the Central Administrative Tribunal and in this Court, but the detailed
counter affidavit elaborates this reason. The allegation has been detailed
H
DR. T. P. SENKUMAR IPS v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 917
[MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

above and it is not necessary to repeat it, except to say that according to A
the Home Secretary, the appellant attempted to interfere in the
investigations relating to the Puttingal Temple tragedy.
84. The law has been well-settled for many years now that when
an order is passed in exercise of a statutory power on certain grounds,
its validity must be judged by the reasons mentioned in the order. Those B
reasons cannot be supplemented by other reasons through an affidavit
or otherwise. Were this not so, an order otherwise bad in law at the very
outset may get validated through additional grounds later brought out in
the form of an affidavit.
85. In this context it is worth referring to Commissioner ofPolice c
v. Gordhandas Bhanji 10 in which it was said:
"Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority
cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given
by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was
in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by o
public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended
to affect the acting and conduct of those to whom they are
addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to
the language used in the order itself."
This view was affirmed by the Constitution Bench of this Court in E
Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner. 11
86. Apart from the fact that it is not permissible for the State
Government to provide reasons in the detailed counter affidavit for the
transfer.of the appellant, additional reasons that are not mentioned by
the Chief Minister, we find the reference to interference in. the
F
investigation in the Puttingal Temple tragedy as somewhat incongruous.
There is nothing to suggest what advantage could be gained by the
appellant in scuttling the investigations in the Puttingal Temple tragedy,
particularly since in an earlier part of the detailed counter affidavit it is
admitted that the State Police Chief is not personally responsible for
supervising the conduct of events or adherence to safety measures in G
relation to large public gatherings. Therefore, why would the appellant
want to interfere in the investigations?

IOAJR 1952SC 16
11 191s (I) sec 405

H
918 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 6 S.C.R.

A 87. The facts and the record of the present case indicate that the
Puttingal Temple tragedy and the Jisha murder were not the flash points
necessitating the transfer of the appellant. The reason for his transfer
was his conduct post the Puttingal Temple tragedy in not taking action
against the errant police officers (but supporting them) and in apportioning
a part of the blame on the district administration. The reference to the
B
Jisha murder case was an attempt at padding up the reason while the
reference to the alleged interference in the investigation-s by 'the CB-
. CID was a red herring or a ruse - the alleged interference was not even
in the contemplation of the ChiefMinster. The addition of the allegation
of interference with the investigations in the Puttingal Temple tragedy is
c a further attempt in that direction - to .somehow ·or the other nail the
appellant.
88. As already indicate.d above, as far as taking action against the
errant police officers for the Puttingal Temple tragedy is concerned, the
Chief Minister of the State also took no action for more than a month
D after the Note dated 13•h April, 2016 was put up by the Additional Chief
Secretary (Home). The Chief Minister did not take any action in spite
of the Note pinpointing the three errant police officers against whom
action was required to be taken. It is difficult to hazard a guess why no
action was taken. But in any event, the fact of the matter is that a suo
motu writ petition concerning the incident and its aftermath was pending
E in the Kerala High Court, a judicial commission chaired a former Judge
of the Kerala High Court was appointed by the State Govermnent and
investigations had been referred to the CB-CID in this regard. Surely
Senkumar cannot alone be pre-judged and blamed for this state of affairs.
89. As far as apportioning a part of the blame on the district
F administration is concerned, it cannot be anybody's case and indeed no
such submission was made before us that the district administration had
absolutely no rQle to play in the Puttingal Temple tragedy. While it is
true that a major part of the blame must rest on the police force at the
ground level, the district administration perhaps cannot be completely
G absolved ofits responsibility in the enormous tragedy that took place, but
this is ultimately an issue that may have to be decided by the Kerala
High Court or by the judicial commission or by the CB-CID. In any
event, this can hardly be any justification for coming to the conclusion
that the appellant alone deserved to be acted against only because he
supported his subordinates, while seeking to apportion a part of the blame
H on the district administration.
DR. T. P. SENKUMAR JPS v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 919
[MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

90. Similarly, as far as the Jisha murder case is concerned some A
of the conclusions arrived at on the file placed before us are a little
unfortunate and appear to be prejudging the investigation. What impact
this might have on the trial is again anybody's guess but surely the State
Police Chief cannot alone be blamed for any lapse in investigation or
any delay in apprehending the accused. This is more so considering the B
fact that a Special Investigating Team had been appointed consisting of
28 officers to investigate the Jisha murder case. The appellant was not
the investigating officer in the matter. .
91. Perhaps, what might be a very serious infraction by the
appellant is the allegation that he tried to interfere with the investigatio!ls
in the Puttingal Temple tragedy. We have, therefore, very carefully c
considered this allegation. Unfortunately; the file placed before us does
not indicate the circumstances in which the Assistant Commissioner of
Police, Chathanur was transferred out by the Election Commission but
we are entitled to assume that the decision of the Election Commission
in this regard was completely bona fide. However, to attribute oblique D
motives to the appellant for recommending the posting of a member of
the Special Investigating Team as Assistant Commissioner of Police,
Chathanur so that he is under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of
Police, Kollam City is a little far-fetched. The appellant had nothing to
fear in the investigations by the CB-CID since he was not involved in
the ground level arrangement in the Puttingal Temple. It cannot be said E
that the recommended officer was indispensable to the Special
Investigating Team even if the Additional Director General of Police
(Crimes) may have objected to his transfer. It appears to us that too
much is being read into this and a hypothesi_s that was not even accepted
by the Chief Minister or the State Government is being advanced as a F
definite conclusion. It is being assumed thateven though the appellant
was completely absolved of any lapse in respect of the Puttingal Temple
tragedy, he wanted to interfere with the investigation for no apparent.
reason except perhaps to benefit the Commissioner of Police, Kollam
City for no apparent reason. There is no evidence or material to arrive
at any such conclusive opinion. G

92. Learned counsel for the State Government is right in submitting
that· it is only a prima facie satisfaction that is to be arrived at by the
State Government that the general public is dissatisfied with the efficiency
of the police so as to enable a shifting out of the State Police Chief.
However, that prima facie satisfaction must be based on some cogent H
920 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 6 S.C.R.

A and rational material. Nothing has been placed.before us in this regard
except the view that there was dissatisfaction among the general public
on the efficiency of the police. Mere repetition of the provisions of
Section 97(2)(e) of the Act is not suff1cient- there must be some material
on record (other than a newspaper report) but unfortunately nothing has
B been pointed out to us during the course of submissions. It is not enough
to merely contend that the State Government was subjectively satisfied
that the appellant ought to be transferre<t out as the State Police Chief.
93. The subjective satisfaction of the State Government must be
based on sqme credible material, which this Court might not analyze but
which can certainly be looked into. Having looked into the record placed
c before us we find that there is no material adverse to the interests of the
'appeltlnt except an ei>pression of opinion and views formed, as far as
he is concerned, as late as on 261h May, 2016. This make-believe prima
facie satisfaction by itself cannot take out judicial review of administrative
action in. the garb of subjective satisfaction of the State Government.
D 94. We are a little disturbed by the resurrection of the Puttingal
Temple tragedy and the Jisha murder case on 26'" May, 2016 as soon as
the present government in Kerala asaumed office. The so-called public
dissatisfaction with regard to the role of the police in the Puttingal Temple
tragedy lay dormant for more than one month and similarly, the role of
E the police in the investigations in the Jisha murder case. also remained
dormant for almost a month. Suddenly, these issues resurfaced as soon
as the present government assumed office. This might perhaps be a
coincidence but it might also be. politically motivated, as suggested by
learned counsel for the appellant. It is not necessary for us to delve into
this controversy nor is it necessary for us to consider the submission of
F learned counsel for the State Government that there was no politics
involved in the transfer of the appellant since the first Note was put up
before the Chief Minister by the Additional Chief Secretary (Home) as
far back as on l3 1h April, 2016. While this is so, it must not be forgotten
that the Note dated 13 1h April, 2016 did not cast any aspersion on the
G appellant. In any event, if we are asked to choose between leaning in
favour of the State or the citizen, we would certainly lean in favour of
the citizen and give him or her benefit of the doubt.
95. We are also a little disturbed with the view expressed in the
detailed counter affidavit and elsewhere that the appointment of the
H appellant was irregular if not illegal. Ifthat is so and the State Government
DR. T. P. SENKUMAR IPS v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 921
[MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

ofKerala is bent upon making irregular or illegal appointments to sensitive A
posts, then no one can help God's own country.
Conclusion
96. On an overall consideration of the material on record and
considering the case in its proper perspective, that is the events post the
Puttingal Temple tragedy and the Jisha murder and not the two tragedies B
themselves, we have no hesitation in concluding that the appellant has
been unfairly and arbitrarily dealt with. Under the circumstances, we
are compelled to set aside the judgment and order of the Central
Administrative Tribunal, the impugned judgment and order of the High
Court as well as the order dated I" June, 2016 and direct the State of c
Kerala to reinstate the appellant Dr. T.P. Senkumar as the State Police
Chief.
97. The appeal is allowed.

Ankit Gyan Appeal allowed.