DR. SUNIL CLIFFORD DANIELversusSTATE OF PUNJAB

                      [2012] 7 S.C.R. 1100


A                DR. SUNIL CLIFFORD DANIEL
                                 V.
                       STATE OF PUNJAB
               (Criminal Appeal No. 2001 of 2010)

                     SEPTEMBER 14, 2012
B
        (DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND FAKKIR MOHAMED
                  IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, JJ)

        PENAL CODE, 1860:
c
        ss. 302 and 201 - Murder - Circumstantial evidence -
  Conviction and sentence of imprisonment for life awarded by
  courts below - Held: The statement of prosecution witnesses,
  the medical evidence, the serological report, the conduct of
D the accused remaining absconding, and the recoveries made
  pursuant to disclosure statement of the accused on his arrest,
  make the chain of circumstances complete leading to the guilt
  of the accused - There is no reason to interfere with the
  concurrent findings recorded by two courts below - Evidence
E - Circumstantial evidence - Code of Criminal Procedure,
  1973 - s. 313.

        CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973:

       s. 313 - Examination of accused - Held: It is obligatory
F on the part of the accused wHile being examined u/s 313, to
  furnish some explanation with respect to the incriminating
  circumstances associated with him, and the court must take
  note of such explanation even in a case of circumstantial
  evidence, to decide as to whether or not the chain of
G circumstances is complete - In the instant case, the accused
  could not furnish any explanation as to how the blood stained
  clothes were found in his room.

        ss. 162 (1) and 162 (2) - Statement made to police officer

H                               1100
     DR. SUNIL CLIFFORD DANIEL v. STATE OF                  1101
                    PUNJAB

- Held: There is a prohibition in peremptory terms and law           A
requires that a statement made before the Investigating Officer
should not be signed by the witness - However, in the event
that a police officer, ignorant of the statutory requirement asks
a witness to sign his statement, the same would not stand
vitiated - At the most, the court will inform the witness, that he   B
is not bound by the statement made before the police -
However, the prohibition contained in s. 162(1) is not
applicable to any statements made uls 27 of Evidence Act,
as explained by the provision uls 162(2) - Merely because
the recovery memo was not signed by the accused, will not            c
vitiate the recovery itself, as every case has to be decided on
its own facts - In the instant case, it cannot be said that the
recoveries are vitiated.

     CRIMINAL LAW:
                                                                     D
     Motive - Held: In a case of circumstantial evidence,
motive assumes great significance and importance, for the
reason that the absence of motive would put the court on its
guard and cause it to scrutinize each piece of evidence very
closely in order to ensure that suspicion, emotion or                E
conjecture do not take the place of proof.

     The appellant was prosecuted for committing the
murder of his wife and throwing her dead body at a
distant place. The case of the prosecution was that the
appellant and the deceased, both qualified doctors and
                                                                     F
working in the same hospital, were living in separate
hostels. On 9.3.1996, the appellant handed over a set of
blood stained clothes to the Medical Superintendent
(PW1) stating that when he reached his room, he found
the same therein. PW-1 informed the said fact to the                 G
police on the same day. PW-2, the mother of the
deceased, residing in a different city (Jagadhari) reached
the place of her daughter on 10.3.1996 and when she
found her missing, she lodged an FIR on the same day
                                                                     H
    1102   SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A at 9.40 p.m., expressing her apprehension that the
  appellant might have abducted her with the intention to
  kill her. PW-13, the ASI entrusted with the investigation
  went to the appellant's hostel, but found his room locked
  from outside and could not trace him anywhere. PW-1
s then handed over the blood stained clothes to the 1.0. On
  11.3.1996, the SHO (PW-14), on receiving a wireless
  message from a Police Chowki at about 20 kms away
  from the city, went alongwith PW-2 there and recovered
  the dead body of the deceased which was found lying
c in the bushes. The post-mortem report disclosed that the
  deceased died of strangulation and also had grievous
  injuries. The case u/s 364 IPC was converted to one u/
  ss 302 and 201 IPC. The trial court found the appellant
  guilty on both the counts and sentenced him to
0 imprisonment for life and 2 years' RI respectively. The
  High Court dismissed the appeal of the accused.

        Dismissing the appeal, the Court

        HELD:
E
       1.1 In Sha rad Birdhichand Sarda's case*, this court
  held that the onus is on the prosecution to prove that the
  chain is complete and that falsity or untenability of the
  defence set up by the accused cannot be made the basis
  for ignoring any serious infirmity or lacuna in the case of
F the prosecution. The Court further indicated the
  conditions which must be fully established before a
  conviction can be made on the basis of circumstantial
  evidence. [Para 17] [1121-C-D]

G       *Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra,
    1985 (1) SCR 88= AIR 1984 SC 1622 - relied on.

       1.2 In the instant case, a conjoint reading of the
    complete evidence and material on record, suggests that:
H
     DR. SUNIL CLIFFORD DANIEL v. STATE OF           1103
                    PUNJAB
     (i) The, deceased had informed her mother (PW-2)        A
residing in a different city, on 6.3.1996 that she would
reach there on 7.3.1996. However, she did not make it
there. Therefore, PW.2 came to the place of deceased to
search for her on 10.3.1996. [para 39] [1129-F-H]
                                                             B
     (ii)On 9.3.1996, the appellant handed over certain
blood stained clothes to PW.1, the Medical
Superintendent, stating that he had found the same in his
room, when he returned from the hospital. PW.1,
informed the police about the said incident, on the same     C
date. [para 39] [1130-A-B]

     (iii)On 10.3.1996, PW.2 filed a complaint about the
incident and an FIR was lodged. The Investigating Officer
went to the room of the appellant, as well as of the
deceased, in their respective hostels but the rooms were     D
found to be locked from the outside. He then made an
attempt to search for the appellant but was unable to
trace him. [Para 39] [1130-B-C]

    Admittedly, the appellant, after handing over the said   E
blood stained clothes to PW.1 on 9.3.1996, became
untraceable as a result of which, he could only be
arrested on 11.3.1996, at 6.00 p.m. This circumstance was
not taken into consideration by the courts below.
However, act of absconding, on the part of the accused,
alone does not necessarily lead to a final conclusion        F
regarding his guilt. [Para 18-19] [1122-D-F]

     Matru v. State of UP., 1971 (3) SCR 914 =AIR 1971 SC
1050; State thr. CBI v. Mahender Singh Dahiya, 2011 (1)
SCR 1104 = (2011) 3 SCC 109; and Sk. Yusuf v. State of G
West Bengal, 2011 (8) SCR 83 = AIR 2011 SC 2283 =
referred to.

    (iv) On 11.3.1996, PW.1 was informed that the
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    1104   SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A deceased had been missing from the hostel since
  9.3.1996. On the same day, PW.14, SHO, received a
  wireless message from the Police Chowki that the dead
  body of a female was lying in the bushes near an area of
  thoroughfare, closeby. He then rushed to the place
B alongwith PW.2, and recovered the dead body of the
  deceased. [para 39] [1130-0-F]

      (v) During the course of the investigation, PW.14, the
  SHO came to know that the appellant had borrowed the
  car of CW.2 which was parked in the same compound.
C It was taken into possession by the police, and a mat
  having blood stains on it, was recovered and sealed.
  [para 39] [1130-F-G]

       (vi) On 12.3.1996, experts were called and the room
D of the appellant was searched. Blood stains were found
  on the floor, which were scraped off and alongwith the
  same, a pair of chappals, also having blood stains on
  them, were recovered. The said articles were sealed.
  [para 39) [1130-H; 1131-A]
E
       (vii) The appellant was arrested on 11.3.1996 and he
  made a disclosure statement in the presence of police
  officials and also one 'RS', the panch witness, and the
  panchnama was prepared and in it, he stated that, he
  would help in the recovery of articles, used while
F committing the murder of the deceased. He led the
  police party and aided in making recoveries of a gunny
  bag, a dumb-bell and one tie, as the same had been
  hidden below garbage and bushes. The same were duly
  recovered and panchnama was prepared. All the
G materials so recovered were then sent for FSL/
  serological report, and the report received stated that all
  the said articles contained human blood etc. except for
  a few, wherein the blood had dis-integrated and as a
  result of which, no report could be submitted. [para 39]
H [1131-A-D]
     DR. SUNIL CLIFFORD DANIEL v. STATE OF             1105
                    PUNJAB

     {vii_i) On 11.3.1996, the dead body of the deceased,      A
was sent for post-mortem examination and various
articles of the deceased, including her bangles etc. were
taken into possession by the police. [para 39] [1131-D-E]

     {ix) In his statement, u/s 313 Cr.P.C., the appellant     8
changed his version from the one given to PW.1, stating
that the blood stained clothes handed over by him, were
found in the balcony, interconnecting various rooms, as
against his original statement wherein he had disclosed
that he had found them in his room. He could not furnish
any explanation with respect to how the blood stained
                                                               c
clothes were found in his room. [Para 39] [1131-F]

     It is obligatory on the part of the accused while being
examined u/s 313 Cr.P.C. to furnish some explanation
with respect to the incriminating circumstances                D
associated with him, and the court must take note of such
explanation even in a case of circumstantial evidence, to
decide as to whether or not, the chain of circumstances
is complete. [Para 37] [1129-B-C]
                                                               E
     Musheer Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 2
SCC 748 = 2010 (2) SCR 119 and The Transport
Commissioner, A.P., Hyderabad & Anr. v. S. Sardar Ali &
Ors., AIR 1983 SC 1225 = 1983 (3) SCR 729 - relied on.

    State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, (2000) 1 SCC 471 =         F
1999 (5) Suppl. SCR 215 - referred to.
     {x) PW.8, the taxi driver, deposed that, he had gone
to meet the appellant on 9.3.1996, who told him that he
wanted to go to Jagadhari. At that time, he was told to        G
come later, as the wife of the appellant had purportedly
gone to collect her salary. Admittedly, the appellant and
his wife, the deceased, were living separately and they
did not have a cordial relationship. In such a fact-
situation, the appellant would not have hired a taxi to go
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    1106    SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A to Jagadhari. More so, if the deceased was living
  separately, it was not possible for the appellant to say
  that his wife had gone to collect her salary. The evidence
  of CW.2, makes it clear that the appellant had in fact taken
  his car, used it for one and a half hours, and then brought
B the same back, and parked it in the hostel compound,
  after which he handed over the keys for the same to
  CW.2. [para 39] [1131-G-H; 1132-A-C]
       (xi) The nature of the injuries mentioned in the post-
  mortem report makes it crystal clear that the deceased
C died of strangulation i.e. asphyxia, and she also had
  several injuries on her head, which could have been
  caused by a dumb bell, which was one of the materials
  recovered and found to have blood stains on it. [para 39]
  [1132-D]
D
       (xii) As the appellant had a strained relationship with
  his wife, he no doubt wanted to get rid of her. Although
  he has claimed that the petitions for divorce by mutual
  consent were pending before the court, he has never
E submitted any documents with respect to this before the
  court. Thus, inference may be drawn that the appellant
  did in fact wish to get rid of his wife. [Para 39] [1132-E-F]
       In a case of circumstantial evidence, motive
  assumes greater significance and importance, for the
F reason that the absence of motive would put the court
  on its guard and cause it to scrutinize each piece of
  evidence very closely in order to ensure that suspicion,
  emotion or conjecture do not take th3 place of proof.
  Thus, in light of the settled legal proposition, the courts
G below rightly came to the conclusion on this aspect. [Para
  20, 23] [1122-H; 1123-A-B, F]
        Subedar Tewari v. State of UP. & Ors., AIR 1989 SC 733
    and Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar, 1994 (1) Suppl.
    SCR 483 =AIR 1994 SC 2420 - referred to.
H
    DR. SUNIL CLIFFORD DANIEL v. STATE OF              1107
                   PUNJAB

     (xiii) As the recoveries of the blood stained gunny       A
bag, dumb-bell, tie etc. were made on the basis of the
disclosure statement of the appellant himself, the chain
of circumstances is, therefore, complete. [Para 39] [1132-
F-G]
                                                               B
     Most of the articles recovered and sent for
preparation of FSL and serological reports contained
human blood. However, on the rubber mat recovered
from the car of CW.2 and one other item, there can be no
positive report in relation to the same as the blood on
such articles has dis-integrated. This Court has observed      C
that a failure by the serologist to detect the origin of the
blood due to dis-integration of the serum, does not mean
that the blood stuck on the object would not have been
human blood at all. Sometimes it is possible, either
because the stain is too insufficient, or due to               D
haematological changes and plasmatic coagulation, that
a serologist may fail to detect the origin of the blood.
However, in such a case, unless the doubt is of a
reasonable dimension, which a judicially conscientious
mind may entertain, with some objectivity, no benefit can      E
be claimed by the accused, in this regard. [Para 28-29]
[1125-E-F; 1126-A-C]

     Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2001 SC 330    =
2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 408; Prabhu Babaji Navie v. State of       F
Bombay, AIR 1956 SC 51 and Raghav Prapanna Tripathi v.
State of UP., AIR 1963 SC 74 = 1963 SCR 239 Jagroop
Singh vs. State of Punjab 2012 AIR 2600; John Pandian vs.
State represented by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu (2010)
14 SCC 129; State, Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Sunil & Anr.,      G
2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 144 = (2001) 1 SCC 652; Musheer
Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2010 (2) SCR 119 = (2010)
2 SCC 748 = and The Transport Commissioner, A.P.,
Hyderabad & Anr. v. S. Sardar Ali & Ors., 1983 (3) SCR 729
= AIR 1983 SC 1225 - relied on.
                                                               H
    1108   SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A      Sattatiya @ Satish Rajanna Kartalla Vs        State Of
    Maharashtra 2008 AIR 1184 - distinguished

       2.1 It is evident from s.162(1) CrPC that there is a
  prohibition in peremptory terms and law requires that a
  statement made before the Investigating Officer should
8
  not be signed by the witness. The same was found to be
  necessary for the reason that a witness will then be free
  to testify in court, unhampered by anything which the
  police may claim to have elicited from him. In the event
  that a police officer, ignorant of the statutory requirement,
C asks a witness to sign his statement, the same would not
  stand vitiated. At the most, the court will inform the
  witness that he is not bound by the statement made
  before the police. [Para 25] [1124-B-D]

D      2.2 However, the prohibition contained in s. 162(1)
  Cr.P.C. is not applicable to any statements made u/s 27
  of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, as explained by the
  provision u/s 162(2) Cr.P.C. Merely because the recovery
  memo was not signed by the accused, will not vitiate
E the recovery itself, as every case has to be decided on
  its own facts. In the event that the recoveries are made
  pursuant to the disclosure statement of the accused,
  then, despite the fact that the statement has not been
  signed by him, there is certainly some truth in what he
F said, for the reason that the recovery of the material
  objects was made on the basis of his statement.
  Therefore, it cannot be said that in the instant case, the
  recoveries are vitiated. [Para 25-27] [1124-D-E; G-H; 1125-
  A-D]

G       Golakonda Venkateswara Rao v. State of Andhra
    Pradesh, 2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 96 = AIR 2003 SC 2846 -
    relied on.

      Jackaran Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1995 SC 2345
H and State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram 1999 (2) SCR 29 =AIR
    DR. SUNIL CLIFFORD DANIEL v. STATE OF          1109
                   PUNJAB

1999 SC 1776; State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, 1999 (5)     A
Suppl. SCR 215 = (2000) 1 SCC 471 - referred to.

    3. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there
is no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings
recorded by the courts below. [Para 40] [1132-G-H]         8
                   Case Law Reference:
    1985 (1) SCR 88          relied on          Para 17
    1971 (3) SCR 914         referred to        Para 19
                                                           c
    2011 (1) SCR 1104        referred to        Para 19
     2011 (8) SCR 83         referred to        Para 19
    AIR 1989 SC 733          referred to        Para 21
    1994 (1) Suppl. SCR 483 referred to         Para 22    D

    AIR 1995 SC 2345         referred to        Para 24
    1999 (2) SCR 29          referred to        Para 25
    2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 96 relied on            Para 26    E
    2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 408 relied on          Para 29
    AIR 1956 SC 51           relied on          Para 29
    1963 SCR 239             relied on          Para 29
                                                           F
    AIR 2008 SC 1184         distinguished      Para 30
    c2010) 14 sec 129        relied on          Para 32
    2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 144 relied on           Para 34
                                                           G
    2010 (2) SCR 119         relied on          Para 37
    1983 (3) SCR 729         relied on          Para 37
    1999 (5) Suppl. SCR 215 referred to         para 38
                                                           H
    1110    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
    No. 2001 of 2010.

      From the Judgment & Order dated 01.04.2009 of the High
  Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal
B No. 399-DB of 2000.

        Kanchan Kaur Dhodi for the Appellant.

        Jayant K. Sud, AAG, Vishal Dabas, Priya Shahdeo, Kuldip
    Singh, Mohit Mudgil for the Respondent.
c       The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This appeal has been
  preferred against the impugned judgment and order dated
  1.4.2009, passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
D Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. 399-DB of 2000, by which
  it has affirmed the judgment and order dated 21.8.2000 passed
  by the Sessions Judge, Ludhiana in Sessions Case No. 28 of
  1996, convicting the appellant under Sections 302 and 201 of
  the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the
E 'IPC'), and awarded him a sentence to undergo RI for life and
  to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- and in default of this, to undergo
  further RI for a period of 3 months. The appellant has further
  been sentenced to undergo RI for two years and to pay a fine
  of Rs.1,000/- and in default of this, to undergo further RI for a
F period of 2 months under Section 201 IPC. It has further been
  directed that the sentences would run concurrently.

         2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal
    are as under:

G       A. The appellant got married to Dr. Loyalla Shagoufta,
  deceased, on 29.10.1993. Both of them being qualified
  doctors, were working in the Christian Medical College
  (hereinafter referred to as 'CMC'), Hospital Ludhiana. The
  relationship between the husband and wife became strained
H and they have been living separately since June 1994.
     DR. SUNIL CLIFFORD DANIEL v. STATE OF                 1111
          PUNJAB [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.)

    B. As per the appellant, a petition for divorce by mutual      A
consent was filed on 20.2.1996, under Section 28 of the
Special Marriage Act, 1954 in the Court of the District Judge,
Ludhiana, and both parties therein, appeared before the District
Judge, Ludhiana on the first motion of the case. However, they
were asked to wait for the second motion.                          B

     C. On 9.3.1996, the appellant handed over a set of blood
stained clothes to Dr. B. Pawar, the Medical Superintendent,
(PW.1 ), stating that when he came to his room that day, the
same were found therein. Dr. B. Pawar (PW.1 ), informed the        C
police about the said incident on the same date.

      D. Dr. Loyalla Shagoufta, wife of the appellant, had
informed her mother Smt. Victoria Rani (PW.2), who was living
in Jagadhari, District Yamunanagar, by way of a telephone call
on 6.3.1996, that she would visit her on 8.3.1996. However, she    D
did not reach Jagadhari on 8.3.1996. Victoria Rani (PW.2), then
came to Ludhiana 011 10.3.1996, and found that her daughter
was missing. Smt. Victoria Rani (PW.2) then lodged FIR No.
16 of 1996 on 10.3.1996, at 9.40 p.m. wherein being the
complainant, she expressed her apprehension that the               E
appellant herein, had abducted her daughter with the intention
of killing her.

     E. In the meanwhile, Dr. Namrata Saran, one of the
residents of the hostel in which the deceased resided, also
informed Dr. B. Pawar (PW.1), Medical Superintendent that the      F
deceased had in fact been missing from the hostel since
9.3.1996. After an enquiry it came to light that the deceased
was on leave from 9.3.1996 to 16.3.1996.

     F. Piara Singh, ASI (PW.13), took up the investigation of     G
the case and went to the appellant's hostel, however, his room
No.2010, was found to be locked. A police party searched for
the appellant, among several other places, in the house of Mr.
Rana, one of his relatives, but he could not be traced/found
                                                                   H
    1112    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A   anywhere. Dr. B. Pawar (PW.1) handed over the blood stained
    clothes given to him by the appellant, to the 1.0.

         G. On 11.3.1996, Vir Rajinder Pal (PW.14), SHO, Police
    Station, Ludhiana received a wireless message at 9.00 a.m.,
    from the Police Chowki at Lalton Kalan, which is about 20 k.m.
8
    away from the main city, informing him that the dead body of a
    female had been found, lying in the bushes, near the main road.
    The Investigating Officer took Victoria Rani (PW.2) with him,
    while accompanied by other police personnel, and recovered
    the body of the deceased from the said place.
c
         H. Immediately after the recovery of the dead body, Vir
    Rajinder Pal (PW.14 ), visited the room of the appellant in the
    hostel and conducted a thorough search of the same, in the
    presence of Dr. B. Pawar (PW.1 ), Medical Superintendent.
D
          I. The post-mortem of the deceased was conducted by a
    Medical Board consisting of three doctors, including Dr. U.S.
    Sooch (PW.11 ), on 11.3.1996. He opined that the deceased
    had died by way of strangulation and a corresponding ligature
E   mark was found on her neck. She also had several grievous
    injuries to her head.

       J. On 11.3.1996, the Investigating Officer came to know,
  in the course of interrogation that, the appellant had used the
  car of one Dr. Pauli (CW.2), and that a blood stained mat was
F lying in the dicky of the said car. The police hence took
  possession of the said car and mat, and sent the mat for
  preparation of an FSL report.

       K. The appellant was arrested on 11.3.1996, and his room
G in the hostel was searched yet again, by one Ashok Kumar,
  Head Constable from the Forensic Department, who scraped
  some blood stained earth from the floor of the room. He also
  found a pair of blood stained white V-shaped, Hawaii
  chappals. Photographs of the said room were also taken. During
H
    DR. SUNIL CLIFFORD DANIEL v. STATE OF                   1113
         PUNJAB [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

interrogation, the appellant made a disclosure statement on         A
13.3.1996 to the effect that he would be able to help in the
recovery of some relevant material from a place where he had
hidden it. The appellant then led the police party to a place
behind Old Jail, Ludhiana. From there, after removing some
garbage etc., one blood stained gunny bag, a blood stained          B
dumb-bell and one blood stained tie, were recovered.

    L. The said recovered articles alongwith the clothes etc.,
found en the body of the deceased at the time of the post-
mortem, and the blood stained clothes given by the appellant        C
to Dr. B. Pawar (PW.1 ), which were subsequently handed over
to the Investigating Officer, were sent for FSL report.

      M. The FSL and serological report was then received, and
it revealed that, all the articles recovered by the police during
investigation, including the blood stained floor of his room, a     D
part of the Hawaii chappals, and the recovered tie, contained
human blood, with the sole exception of the mats found in the
dicky of the car. The blood stains herein, had dis-integrated
and it was therefore not possible to ascertain whether the same
also contained human blood.                                         E

     N. The police completed the investigation of the case and
submitted a charge sheet against the appellant. The case was
converted from one under Section 364, to one under Sections
302 and ~01 IPC. The appellant was thus charged, but as he
                                                                    F
pleaded not guilty, he claimed trial. The prosecution examined
15 witnesses and two court witnesses were also examined
under Section 31 ~ of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
(hereinafter called as 'Cr.P.C.').

     0. After the conclusion of the trial and appreciation of the   G
evidence in full, the learned Sessions Judge, vide judgment and
order dated 21.8.2000 found the appellant guilty on both counts
and hence awarded him the aforementioned punishments.

     P. Aggrieved, the appellant preferred Criminal Appeal          H
    1114    SUF'REME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A   No.399-DB of 2000 before the High Court, which was
    dismissed by the impugned judgment and order dated
    1.4.2009.

        Hence, this appeal.
B      3. Mrs. Kanchan Kaur Dhodi, learned counsel appearing
  for the appellant, submitted that the investigation was not
  conducted fairly. She stated that the appellant herein, had no
  motive whatsoever to commit the murder of his wife, and that
  they were going to separate very soon, as both parties had filed
C an application seeking divorce, by mutual consent. Further, no
  recovery was made from the room of the appellant in the hostel,
  rather the objects recovered had been planted. The appellant
  did not make any disclosure statement. Thus, even the recovery
  made from the place in close vicinity of the Old Jail, was not
D made in accordance with law, as there was no independent
  witness with respect to the said recoveries, and the recovery
  memo also, was never signed by the appellant. It is therefore,
  a case of circumstantial evidence. The courts below failed to
  appreciate that the chain of circumstances is not complete.
E Hence, the appeal deserves to be allowed.

        4. Per contra, Shri Jayant K. Sud, AAG, appearing for the
  State of Punjab, has opposed the appeal, contending that the
  circumstances in the present case, point towards the guilt of
F the appellant without any exception. The deceased was surely
  killed in the room of the appellant. Recoveries were clearly
  made in view of the disclosure statement made by the
  appellant. Law does not require the recovery memo to be
  signed by the accused. He also stated that the appellant
  disappeared after the said incident and could only be arrested
G after a period of two days. It is the appellant alone who could
  explain the circumstances surrounding the purpose for which
  he had borrowed the car of Dr. Pauli (CW.2), and why he had
  wanted to hire a taxi to go to Jagadhari, as admittedly, his
  relations with his wife had been very strained. The appeal
H clearly lacks merit and is therefore liable to be dismissed.
    DR. SUNIL CLIFFORD DANIEL v. STATE OF                  1115
         PUNJAB [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

     5. We have considered the rival submissions made by           A
learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.

     6. Dr. U.S. Sooch (PW.11), was among the members of
the Board of Doctors, who conducted the post-mortem of the
body of the deceased on 11.3.1996, at 5.00 p.m. and found          B
the following injuries on her person:

    "1. Well defined ligature mark 9" x 3.4" placed horizontally
    on the front of neck and both lateral sides of the neck, in
    the middle of neck and on the right side of the nee~
    reaching below the lobule of the right ear. On exploration     C
    of the ligature the subcutaneous tissue was ecchymosed
    with laceration of underneath muscles and the hyoid bone
    was fractured. The larynx and trachea were congested.

    2. An abrasion Yi " x Yi" on the tip of the chin.              D
    3. Abrasion %" x Yi" and 1" below the angle, of left
    mandible.

    4. Lacerated wound 2, Yi" x 1" x bone deep obliquely
    placed on the right fronto parietal region and 1" inside the   E
    hair line near the midline.

    5. Lacerated wound with badly crushed margins 2, Yi'' x
    Yi" bone deep on the right occipital region.
    6. Defused swelling 3" x 2" on the right occipital region      F
    across the midline.

    Therefore, it is evident from the aforementioned injuries,
    as also from the medical report, that the deceased Loyalla
    Shagoufta was, without a doubt, a victim of homicide.          G
     7. Dr. B. Pawar (PW.1 ), Medical Superintendent, deposed
to the extent that the deceased was supposed to be on leave
from 9.3.1996 to 16.3.1996, and that on the date of the said
incident, she was not present in her hostel. Further, the
                                                                   H
    1116    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2012] 7 S.C.R.


A   appellant had reported to him, that when he came back to his
    room, he had found some blood stained clothes therein. The
    clothes were thereafter collected in a bag, and were kept in the
    office of Dr. B. Pawar (PW.1 ), and the possession of the same,
    was subsequently taken, by the police.
B
       8. Smt. Victoria Rani (PW.2), mother of the deceased
  supported the case of the prosecution. She deposed that her
  daughter's marriage with the appellant had been quite strained,
  since no child could be born out of the wedlock and hence, they
C had started living separately. Her daughter had informed her
  by way of a telephone call, that she would visit Jagadhari on
  7.3.1996, but she never came. Therefore, the complainant,
  Victoria Rani (PW.2), came to Ludhiana to search for her
  daughter, but she was found to be missing. Thus, she submitted
  a complaint to the police, on the basis of which, an FIR was
D lodged, wherein, she expressed her doubts with regard to the
  intention of the appellant, as in her opinion, he had been
  wanting to get rid of her daughter, and therefore, he could have
  kidnapped her for the purpose of killing her and fulfilling his
  purpose, once and for all.
E
       9. Some of the witnesses, particularly Sarabjit Singh
  (PW.7), Security Guard of the hospital, Anil Kumar (PW.9), a
  Cook, working in the canteen of the Junior Doctor's Hostel and
  Joginder Singh (PW.12), did not support the case of the
F prosecution and turned hostile. However, the evidence of Kirpal
  Dev Singh (PW.8), is highly relevant. He deposed in court that
  he was providing services of a taxi and would park the same
  in the premises of CMC Hospital, Ludhiana. On 8.3.1996, the
  Canteen Contractor Joshi, had asked him to talk to Dr. Sunil
G of CMC, who wished to hire his taxi to go to Jagadhari.
  Accordingly, he went to speak to the appellant and became
  aware of the fact that the appellant wished to travel to Jagadhari
  on 9.3.1996. He then went to the appellant's hostel with his taxi
  on 9.3.1996, but was told by him that his wife had presently
  gone to collect her salary from Lalton Kalan and therefore,
H asked him to come again at 10.00 a.m. Thus, the said witness
     DR. SUNIL CLIFFORD DANIEL v. STATE OF                   1117
          PUNJAB [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.)

went to the doctor's place again, at 10.00 a.m. but he was yet        A
again asked to come later, this time at 11.30 a.m. It was then,
that tne said witness told the doctor that he was no longer willing
to go to Jagadhari and he may engage another taxi, for this
purpose.
                                                                      B
      10. Piara Singh, ASI (PW.13), deposed that he came to
know about the said incident and henceforth went to CMC
Hospital, Ludhiana, on 10.3.1996, after receiving the complaint
made by Victoria Rani (PW.2). However, he found room No.
2010 of the said hostel occupied by the appellant to be locked        C
from the outside. He then went alongwith a police party, to the
room of the deceased but found that, this too had been locked
from the outside. The witness then attempted to search for the
appellant, and for this purpose, he also went to the house of
Mr. Rana, who was a relative of the appellant and was living in
close proximity to the hospital in Ludhiana itself, but the           D
appellant could not be found either here. He continued his
search at various other places, including hotels but was unable
to find the accused.

     On 11.3.1996, he stated that he had accompanied Vir              E
Rajinder Pal (PW.14), and had therefore participated in the
recovery of the dead body of deceased Dr. Loyalla Shagoufta
from Lalton Kalan. He further deposed that on 13.3.1996, one
gunny bag, one iron dumb bell and one tie were recovered in
the presence of panch witness, Randhir Singh. A disclosure            F
statement was also made by the appellant, in his presence to
the effect that, these articles were related to the murder of the
deceased and he had offered to help recover the same.

     11. After recording the evidence led by the prosecution,
the statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313         G
Cr.P.C. The appellant denied all the allegations made by the
prosecution and pleaded innocence. He stated that the blood
stained clothes had been left in the balcony of his room, when
he was not present therein and that he had produced the said
                                                                      H
    1118    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A   clothes before Dr. B. Pawar (PW.1 ), Medical Superintendent,
    prior to the lodging of the FIR.

        12. Vir Rajinder Pal (PW.14), supported the case of the
  prosecution in full, giving complete details from the very
8 beginning of the incident, as he was posted as the SHO, Police
  Station, Ludhiana on 10.3.1996. He deposed regarding the
  recoveries made from the room of the accused, after the
  checking of the room and the preparation of seizure memos.
  The keys of the car parked in the premises of CMC hospital,
  one blood stained mat, duly attested by the panch witnesses,
C and a photocopy of the registration certificate of the said car,
  were taken into possession, as also the recovery of the blood
  stained clothes, which were handed over to him by Dr. B.
  Pawar (PW.1 ). He further deposed with regard to how the
  appellant was arrested as also about the items that were
D recovered from his body, the recovery of the blood stained floor
  from the appellant's room and the V-shaped pair of Hawaii
  chappals. The articles were all sealed and sent for FSL. He
  finally deposed regarding the manner in which the body was
  recovered, how the panchnama of recovery was prepared, and
E also about the manner in which, the post-mortem was
  conducted.

       13. Dr. Pauli (CW.2), deposed that on 9.3.1996, he was
  contacted by the appellant at 6.00 p.m. and was told by him
F that his wife was missing, as a result of which, the appellant
  was in need of his car. Dr. Pauli (CW.2), therefore, gave his
  car to the appellant, bearing registration No. CH01-5653. The
  appellant returned after a duration of 1% hours, parked the car
  outside the hostel, and handed over the key to the said witness.
G The possession of the said car was taken by the police on
  11.3.1996, and the blood stained rubber mat was then
  recovered from the dicky of the car. The said mat was sealed
  and taken away by the Investigating Officer (PW.14).

     14. The trial court after appreciating the evidence on record
H came to the following conclusions:
DR. SUNIL CLIFFORD DANIEL v. STATE OF                1119
     PUNJAB [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
"However, various pieces of circumstantial evidence           A
discussed above i.e. blood scratching lifted from the
hostel room in occupation of accused production of
various blood stained clothes by the accused before the
Medical Superintendent of the Hospital and the recovery
of blood stained neck tie and dumb-be/I on the basis of       B
a disclosure statement suffered by the accused and the
blood stained car mat recovered in the case leave no
manner of doubt that Dr. Mrs. Loyal/a Shagoufta was first
done to death in the hostel room no. 2010 in occupation
of the accused by strangulating her as well as causing        c
various injuries to her and thereafter the accused
appeared to Dr. Pauli CW. 2 to remove the traces of
evidence appearing against him and was liable for the
murder of Dr Mrs. Loyal/a Shagoufta deceased as well
as for causing dis-appearance of the evidence.
                                                              D
       Dr. Loyal/a Shagoufta in fact appeared to have
been murdered in the hostel room in occupation of the
accused. Various blood stains recovered from that room
are a clear pointer to the fact that she was murdered in
that room. None else could commit the crime in that room      E
except with the knowledge and consent of the accused
when the accused alone was in occupation of that room
and was responsible for the crime committed in that room.
Production of various blood stained clothes by the
accused before the Medical Superintendent of the              F
Hospital also goes to show that he was fully involved in
the crime. On the fateful evening he also borrowed car
from Dr. Pauli CW2, which was used by him in removal
of the dead body from the place of crime and the recovery
of a blood stained mat from that car a/so goes to show        G
that he in fact removed the dead body in that car. All this
shows that he in fact murdered his wife Dr. Mrs. Loyal/a
Shagoufta and later on removed her dead body to cause
dis-appearance as we// as for causing dis-appearance of
the evidence against him."                                    H
    1120    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A       So far as the motive is concerned, the court came to the
  conclusion that there was sufficient motive to kill the deceased,
  as the appellant wanted to now get rid of the deceased. More
  so, the appellant could not explain how the deceased happened
  to meet her death in his room. The court noted that though there
B were minor discrepancies in the story, the same were not fatal
  to the case of the prosecution and added that the case of the
  prosecution was fully supported by the FSL report and therefore,
  on such grounds, convicted the appellant.

C        15. The High Court concurred with the finding of the trial
    court observing as under:

        "Non-production of copy of Divorce Petition shows that
        the appellant-accused had the motive to eliminate the
        deceased. Admission of the appellant-accused before
D       Dr. B. Pawar that blood stained clothes were found lying
        in his room and later on change of stand when examined
        under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that the bfood stained clothes
        were lying in the balcony of the Junior Doctor's Hospital
        show that the prosecution story inspires confidence.
E       Firstly, Dr. Shagoufta was murdered. Blood stained
        clothes were recovered from the room and by arranging
        car of Dr. Pauli dead body was thrown in the area of
        village La/ton Kalan. Dead body lying near the road is
        suggesting that the appellant-accused was in hurry to
F       dispose of the dead body, that is why, after 1~hours key
        of the car was returned to Dr. Pauli. Tie, dumb-be/I and
        gunny bag were recovered as per disclosure statement
        and the recovered articles were found to be stained with
        blood. On 9.3.1996, Dr. Yogesh through Sarabjit Singh,
        Security Guard summoned the appellant-accused to
G
        Operation Theatre, but nothing on the file that the
        appellant-accused had attended the Operation Theatre
        to assist Dr. Yogesh. PW 7 Sarabjit Singh had gone to
        the room of the appellant-accused with the request that
        services of the appellant-accused are needed in the
H
     DR. SUNIL CLIFFORD DANIEL v. STATE OF                 1121
          PUNJAB [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
    Operation Threatre. Sarabjit Singh is not related to the        A
    deceased. So, there was no idea to disbelieve him.

     As per post-mortem examination, death was due to
strangulation as well as by causing various injuries. Neck tie
recovered as per disclosure statement suffered by the               8
appellant-accused was found to be stained with blood."

     16. The instant case is a case of blind murder and is based
entirely on circumstantial evidence, as there is no eye-witness
to the said incident.
                                                                    c
      17. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra,
AIR 1984 SC 1622, it was held by this court that, the onus is
on the prosecution to prove, that the chain is complete and that
falsity or untenability of the defence set up by the accused,
cannot be made the basis for ignoring any serious infirmity or      o
lacuna in the case of the prosecution. The Court then proceeded
to indicate the conditions which must be fully established before
a conviction can be made on the basis of circumstantial
evidence. These are:

    (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt        E
    is to be drawn should be fully established. The
    circumstances concerm~d 'must' or 'should' and not 'may
    be' established;

    (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with     F
    the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say,
    they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis
    except that the accused is guilty;

    (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature          G
    and tendency;

    (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except
    the one to be proved; and
    (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not        H
    1122    SUl=>REME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A       to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion
        consistent with the innocence of the accused and must
        show that in all human probabifity the act must have
        been done by the accused".

       Thus, in a case of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution
8
  must establish each instance of incriminating circumstance, by
  way of reliable and clinching evidence, and the circumstances
  so proved must form a complete chain of events, on the basis
  of which, no conclusion other than one of guilt of the accused
  can be reached. Undoubtedly, suspicion, however grave it may
C be, can never be treated as a substitute for proof. While dealing
  with a case of circumstantial evidence, the court must take
  utmost precaution whilst finding an accused guilty, solely on the
  basis of the circumstances proved before it.

0      18. Admittedly, the appellant, after handing over the said
  blood stained clothes to Dr. B. Pawar (PW.1 ), on 9.3.1996,
  became untraceable as a result of which, he could only be
  arrested on 11.3.1996, at 6.00 p.m. Though this circumstance
  was not taken into consideration by the courts below, the
E learned standing counsel appearing for the State has relied
  upon it very strongly indeed before us.

        19. This Court has considered this issue time and again
  and held that the mere act of absconding, on the part of the
  accused, alone does not necessarily lead to a final conclusion
F regarding the guilt of the accused, as even an innocent person
  may become panic stricken and try to evade arrest, when
  suspected wrongly of committing a grave crime; such is the
  instinct of self-preservation. (See: Matru v. State of UP., AIR
  1971 SC 1050; State thr. CBI v. Mahender Singh Dahiya,
G (2011) 3 SCC 109; and Sk. Yusuf v. State of West Bengal,
  AIR 2011 SC 2283).
        In view of the above, we do not find any force in the
    submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the State.

H       20. In a case of circumstantial evidence, motive assumes
     DR. SUNIL CLIFFORD DANIEL v. STATE OF                 1123
          PUNJAB [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

great significance and importance, for the reason that the          A
absence of motive would put the court on its guard and cause
it to scrutinize each piece of evidence very closely in order to
ensure that suspicion, emotion or conjecture do not take the
place of proof.
    21. In Subedar Tewari v. State of UP. & Ors., AIR 1989          B
SC 733, this Court observed as under:
    "The evidence regarding existence of motive which
    operates in the mind of an assassin is very often than
    (sic) not within the reach of others. The motive may not        C
    even be known to the victim of the crime. The motive
    may be known to the assassin and no one else may know
    what gave birth to the evil thought in the mind of the
    assassin."
    22. Similarly, in Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar,       0
AIR 1994 SC 2420, this court held as under:
    "In a case of circumstantial evidence, the evidence
    bearing on the guilt of the accused nevertheless
    becomes untrustworthy and unreliable because most
    often it is only the perpetrator of the crime alone who         E
    knows as to what circumstances prompted him to adopt
    a certain course of action leading to the commission of
    the crime. Therefore, if the evidence on record suggest
    sufficient/necessary motive to commit a crime it may be
    conceived that the accused had committed it. "                  F
     23. Thus, if the issue is examined in light of the aforesaid
settled legal proposition, we may concur with the courts below
on the said aspect.
    24. In Jackaran Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1995 SC
2345, this Court held that:                                         G
    "The absence of the signatures or the thumb impression
    of an accused on the disclosure statement recorded
    under Section 27 of the Evidence Act detracts materially
    from the authenticity and the reliability of the disclosure     H
    statement. "
    1124     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A         25. However, in State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram, AIR 1999
    SC 1776, this Court examined the said issue at length and
    considered the provisions of Section 162(1) Cr.P .C., Section
    162(1) reads, a statement made by any person to a police
    officer in the course of an investigation done, if reduced to
s   writing, be not signed by the person making it. Therefore, it is
    evident from the aforesaid provision, that there is a prohibition
    in peremptory terms and law requires that a statement made
    before the Investigating Officer should not be signed by the
    witness. The same was found to be necessary for the reason
c   that, a witness will then be free to testify in court, unhampered
    by anything which the police may claim to have elicited from
    him. In the event that, a police officer, ignorant of the statutory
    requirement asks a witness to sign his statement, the same
    would not stand vitiated. At the most, the court will inform the
    witness, that he is not bound by the statement made before the
0
    police. However, the prohibition contained in Section 162(1)
    Cr.P.C. is not applicable to any statements made under Section
    27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter called
    'Evidence Act'), as explained by the provision under Section
    162(2) Cr.P.C. The Court concluded as under:
E
       "The resultant position is that the Investigating Officer is
  not obliged to obtain the signature of an accused in any
  statement attributed to him while preparing seizure memo for
  the recovery of any article covered by Section 27 of the
F Evidence Act. But if any signature has been obtained by an
  Investigating Officer, there is nothing wrong or illegal about
  it."
        26. In Golakonda Venkateswara Rao v. State of Andhra
  Pradesh, AIR 2003 SC 2846, this court once again
G reconsidered the entire issue, and held that merely because
  the recovery memo was not signed by the accused, will not
  vitiate the recovery itself, as every case has to be decided on
  its own facts. In the event that the recoveries are made pursuant
  to the dis9losure statement of the accused, then, despite the
H fact that the statement has not been signed by him, there is
     DR. SUNIL CLIFFORD DANIEL v. STATE OF                   1125
          PUNJAB [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

certainly some truth in what he said, for the reason that, the       A
recovery of the material objects was made on the basis of his
statement. The Court further explained this aspect by way of
its earlier judgment in Jackaran Singh (supra) as, in this case,
there was a dispute regarding the ownership of a revolver and
the cartridge recovered therein. The prosecution was unable          B
to lead any evidence to show that the crime weapon belonged
to the said appellant and observations were made by this Court
in the said context. The court held as under:

     "The fact that the recovery is in consequence of the
     information given is fortified and confirmed by the             C
     discovery of wearing apparel and skeletal remains of the
     deceased which leads to believe that the information and
     the statement cannot be false. "

    27. In view of the above, the instant case is squarely           o
covered by the ratio of the aforesaid judgments, and the
submissi5rn advanced in this regard is therefore, not
acceptab(e.

      28. Most of the articles recovered and sent for preparation
of FSL and serological reports contained human blood.                E
However, on the rubber mat recovered from the car of Dr. Pauli
(CW.2) and one other item, there can be no positive report in
relation to the same as the blood on such articles has dis-
integrated. All other material objects, including the shirt of the
accused, two T-shirts, two towels, a track suit, one pant, the       F
brassier of the deceased, bangles of the deceased, the under-
garments of the deceased, two tops, dumb bell, gunny bag, tie
etc. were found to have dis-integrated.

     29. A similar issue arose for consideration by this Court       G
in Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2001 SC 330,
wherein the Court, relying upon earlier judgments of this Court,
particularly in Prabhu Babaji Navie v. State of Bombay, AIR
1956 SC 51; Raghav Prapanna Tripathi v. State of UP., AIR
1963 SC 74; and Teja Ram (supra) observed that a failure by
                                                                     H
    1126    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A the serologist to detect the origin of the blood due to dis-
   integration of the serum, does not mean that the blood stuck
 · on the axe would not have been human blood at all. Sometimes
   it is possible, either because the stain is too insufficient, or due
   to haematological changes and plasmatic coagulation, that a
8 serologist may fail to detect the origin of the blood. However,
   in such a case, unless the doubt is of a reasonable dimension,
   which a judicially conscientious mind may entertain, with some
   objectivity, no benefit can be claimed by the accused, in this
   regdrd.
c       30. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed very
    heavy reliance on the judgment of this Court in Sattatiya @
  Satish Rajanna Karla/la v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2008 SC
  1184, wherein it was held that in case the Forensic Science
  Laboratory Report/Serologist Report is unable to make out a
D case, that the blood found on the weapons/clothes recovered,
  is of the same blood group as that of the deceased, the same
  should be treated as a serious lacuna in the case of the
  prosecution.

E        The appellant cannot be allowed to take the benefit of such
    an observation in the said judgment, for the reason that in the
    aforementioned case, the recovery itself was doubted and, in
    addition thereto, the non- matching of blood groups was treated
    to be a lacunae and not an independent factor, deciding the
F   case.

       · 31. A similar view has been reiterated in a recent judgment
  of this court in Criminal Appeal No. 67 of 2008, Jagroop Singh
  v. State of Punjab, decided on 20.7.2012, wherein it was held
  that, once the recovery is made in pursuance of a disclosure
G statement made by the accused, the matching or non-matching
  of blood group (s) loses significance.

         32. In John Pandian v. State represented by Inspector of
    Police, Tamil Nadu, (2010) 14 SCC 129, this Court held:
H
    DR. SUNIL CLIFFORD DANIEL v. STATE OF                  1127
         PUNJAB [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

    " .... The discovery appears to be credible. It has been       A
    accepted by both the courts below and we find no reason
    to discard it. This is apart from the fact that this weapon
    was sent to the forensic science laboratory (FSL) and it
    has been found stained with human blood. Though the
    blood group could not be ascertained, as the results were      8
    inconclusive, the accused had to give some explanation
    as to how the human blood came on this weapon. He
    gave none. This discovery would very positively further
    the prosecution case."

                                            (Emphasis added)       C

      33. In view of the above, the Court finds it impossible to
accept the submission that, in the absence of the report
regarding the origin of the blood, the accused cannot be
convicted, upon an observation that it is only because of lapse    o
of time that the classification of the blood cannot be
determined. Therefore, no advantage can be conferred upon
the accused, to enable him to claim any benefit, and the report
of dis-integration of blood etc. cannot be termed as a missing
link, on the basis of which, the chain of circumstances may be     E
presumed to be broken.

     34. When the appellant herein made a disclosure
statement, a panchnama was prepared and recovery
panchnamas were also made. The evidence on record
revealed that the same were duly signed by two police officials,   F
and one independent panch witness, namely, Randhir Singh
Jat, who was admittedly, not examined. Therefore, a question
arose regarding the effect of non-examination of the said panch
witness, and also the sanctity of the evidence, in respect of
recovery made only by two police officials.                        G

     35. The issue was considered at length by this Court in
State, Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Sunil & Anr., (2001) 1 SCC
652, wherein this Court held as under:
                                                                   H
    1128    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012) 7 S.C.R.


A       " .... But if no witness was present or if no person had
        agreed to affix his signature on the document, it is difficult
        to Jay down, as a proposition of law, that the document
        so prepared by the police officer must be treated as
        tainted and the recovery evidence unreliable. The court
B       has to consider the evidence of the investigating officer
        who deposed to the fact of recovery based on the
        statement elicited from the accused on its own worth.

         We feel that it is an archaic notion that actions of the
    police officer should be approached with initial
C   distrust ......... At any rate, the court cannot start with the
    presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a
    proposition of Jaw the presumption should be the other way
    around. That official acts of the police have been regularly
    performed is a wise principle of presumption and recognised
D   even by the legislature. Hence when a police officer gives
    evidence in court that a certain article was recovered by him
    on the strength of the statement made by the accused it is
    open to the court to believe the version to be correct if it is
    not otherwise shown to be unreliable. It is for the accused,
E   through ct"oss-examination of witnesses or through any other
    materials, to show that the evidence of the police officer is
    either unreliable or at least unsafe to be acted upon in a
    particular case. If the court has any good reason to suspect
    the truthfulness of such records of the police the court could
F   certainly take into account the fact that no other independent
    person was present at the time of recovery. But it is n.ot a
    legally approvable procedure to presume the police action as
    unreliable to start with, nor to jettison such action merely for
    the reason that police did not collect signatures of
G   independent persons in the documents made
    contemporaneous with such actions. "

        36. One Randhir Singh Jat had been the Panch witness
  for the disclosure Panchnama and Recovery Panchnama. He
  has not been examined by the prosecution. No question was
H put to the Investigating Officer (PW .14). in his cross-
     DR. SUNIL CLIFFORD DANIEL v. STATE OF                  1129
          PUNJAB [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

examination, as to why the prosecution had withheld the said        A
witness. The 1.0. was the only competent person to answer the
query. It is quite possible that the witness was not alive or
traceable.

     37. It is obligatory on the part of the accused while being    8
examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. to furnish some
explanation with respect to the incriminating circumstances
associated with him, and the Court must take note of such
explanation even in a case of circumstantial evidence, to
decide as to whether or not, the chain of circumstances is          C
complete. The aforesaid judgment has been approved and
followed in Musheer Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010)
2 SCC 748. (See also: The Transport Commissioner, A.P.,
Hyderabad & Anr. v. S. Sardar Ali & Ors., AIR 1983 SC 1225).

      38. This Court in State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, (2000)      D
1 sec 471, held that, when the attention of the accused is
drawn to such circumstances that inculpate him in relation to
the commission of the crime, and he fails to offer an appropriate
explanation or gives a false answer with respect to the same,
the said act may be counted as providing a missing link for         E
completing the chain of circumstances. We may hasten to add
that we have referred to the said decision, only to highlight the
fact that the accused has not given any explanation whatsoever,
as regards the incriminating circumstances put to him under
Section 313 Cr.P.C.                                                 F

    39. In view of the above, a conjoint reading of the complete
evidence and material on record, suggests as under:

    (i) The deceased Loyalla Shagoufta had informed her
mother residing in Jagadhari, on 6.3.1996 that she would reach      G
there on 7.3.1996. However, she did not make it there.
Therefore, Victoria Rani (PW.2), that is, mother of the
deceased, came to Ludhiana to search for her daughter on
10.3.1996.
                                                                    H
    1130    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2012] 7 S.C.R.


A        (ii) On 9.3.1996, the appellant handed over certain blood
    stained clothes to Dr. B. Pawar (PW.1 ), Medical
    Superintendent, stating that he had found the same, in his room,
    when he returned from the hospital. Dr. B. Pa war (PW .1),
    informed the police about the said incident, on the same date.
B
       (iii) On 10.3.1996, Victoria Rani (PW.2), filed a complaint
  about the incident and an FIR was lodged. The Investigating
  Officer went to the room of the appellant, as well as of the
  deceased, in their respective hostels but the rooms were found
  to be locked from the outside. He then made an attempt to
C search for the appellant at the residence of his relative Mr.
  Rana, and also in other dhabas and hotels, but was unable to
  trace him, despite his efforts to do so.

      (iv) On 11.3.1996, Dr. Namrata Saran, informed Dr. B.
D Pawar (PW.1) that the deceased had been missing from the
  hostel since 9.3.1996.

       On the same day, Vir Rajinder Pal (PW.14), SHO,
  received a wireless message from the Police Chowki at Lalton
E Kalan, that the dead body of a female was lying in the bushes
  near an area of thoroughfare, closeby. He then rushed to the
  place alongwith Victoria Rani (PW.2), and recovered the dead
  body of the deceased and went on to prepare the panchanama
  etc. The room of the appellant was searched, but no recovery
  was made from the room.
F
       (v) During the course of the investigation, Vir Rajinder Pal
  (PW.14), SHO, realised that the appellant had borrowed the car
  of Dr. Pauli (CW.2). Thus, the said car which was parked in
  the same compound, was taken into possession by the police,
G and a mat having blood stains on it, was recovered and sealed.

      (vi) On 12.3.1996, experts were called and the room of the
  appellant was searched. Blood stains were found on the floor,
  which were scraped off and alongwith the same, a pair of V-
H shaped Hawaii chappals, also having blood stains on them,
    DR. SUNIL CLIFFORD DANIEL v. STATE OF                   1131
         PUNJAB [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

were recovered. The said articles were sealed.                      A
     (vii) The appellant was arrested on 11.3.1996, as he was
produced by Joginder Singh (PW.12), and made a disclosure
statement in the presence of police officials and also one
Randhir Singh, the panch witness, and the panchnama was
prepared and in it, he stated that, he would help in the recovery   B
of articles, used while committing the murder of the deceased.
On the basis of the said disclosure statement, he led the police
party to the Old Ludhiana Jail and aided in making recoveries
of a gunny bag, a dumb bell and one tie, as the same had been
hidden below garbage and bushes. The same were duly                 C
recovered and panchnama was prepared. All the materials so
recovered were then sent for FSUserological report, and the
report received stated that all the said articles contained human
blood etc. except for a few, wherein the blood had dis-
integrated and as a result of this, no report could be submitted.   D

     (viii) On 11.3.1996, the dead body of the deceased, was
ser.t for post-mortem examination by a Board of doctors
including Dr. U.S. Sooch (PW.11 ), and various articles of the
deceased, ir.cluding her bangles etc. were taken into
possession by the police.                                           E

     (ix) In his statement, under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the
appellant changed the version of his story, from the one given
to Dr. B. Pawar (PW.1 ), stating that blood stained clothes
handed over by him, were found in the balcony, interconnecting      F
various rooms, as against his original statement wherein he had
disclosed that he had found them in his room. He could not
furnish any explanation with respect to how the blood stained
clothes were found in his room.
     (x) Kirpal Dev Singh (PW.8), a taxi driver, though did not     G
identify the appellant in court, yet was not declared hostile by
the prosecution, deposed that, on being asked by the canteen
contractor Joshi, he had gone to meet the appellant on
9.3.1996, who told him that he wanted to go to Jagadhari. At
                                                                    H
    1132    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A that time, he was told to come later, as the wife of the appellant
  had purportedly gone to collect her salary from Lalton Kalan.
  Admittedly, the appellant and his wife, the deceased were living
  separately and they did not have a cordial relationship. In such
  a fact-situation, the appellant would not have hired a taxi to go
8 to Jagadhari. More so, if the deceased was living separately,
  it was not possible for the appellant to say that his wife had
  gone to Lalton Kalan, to collect her salary. The evidence of Dr.
  Pauli (CW.2), makes it clear that the appellant had in fact taken
  his car, used it for one and a half hours, and then brought the
C same back, and parked it in the hostel compound, after which
  he handed over the keys for the same to Dr. Pauli (CW.2).
       (xi) The nature of the injuries mentioned in the post-mortem
  report makes it crystal clear that the deceased died of
  strangulation i.e. asphyxia, and she also had several injuries
D to her head, which could have been caused by a dumb bell,
  which was one of the materials recovered and found to have
  blood stains on it.

       (xii) As the appellant had a strained relationship with his
  wife, he no doubt wanted to get rid of her. Although he has
E claimed that the petitions for divorce by mutual consent were
  pending before the court, he has never submitted any
  documents with respect to this before the court. Thus, inference
  may be drawn that the appellant did in fact wish to get rid of
  his wife.
F
       (xiii) As the recoveries of the blood stained gunny bag,
  dumb bell, tie etc. were made on the basis of the disclosure
  statement of the appellant himself, the chain of circumstances
  is therefore, complete.
G        40. In view of the above, we do not find any reason to
    interfere with the concurrent findings recorded by the courts
    below. The appeal lacks merit and is therefore, dismissed
    accordingly.

H R.P.                                          Appeal dismissed.