Supreme Court of India
DR. (MRS.) MALATHI RAVI, M.D.versusDR. B.V. RAVI M.D.
- Citation
- 2014 INSC 426
- Decided
- 30 June 2014
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- S MUKHOPADHAYA
Holding
The Supreme Court upheld the decree of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty, finding desertion unproven but allowing the consideration of mental cruelty based on the overall facts and subsequent conduct.
Summary
The husband, Dr. B.V. Ravi, filed a petition for divorce under Section 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act alleging desertion, and also sought restitution of conjugal rights. The Family Court found no proof of desertion and granted restitution, but the wife, Dr. Malathi Ravi, later lodged FIRs against the husband, leading to his brief arrest. The High Court, considering these subsequent events, set aside the restitution decree and granted divorce on the ground of mental cruelty, even though mental cruelty was not pleaded. The Supreme Court held that desertion was not established, but the court could entertain the ground of mental cruelty based on the factual matrix and subsequent conduct, invoking its powers under Article 142. The Court affirmed the High Court's decree of divorce on mental cruelty and ordered maintenance of Rs.25,00,000 for the minor son.
Issues considered
- The existence of desertion under Section 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act.
- Whether a ground of mental cruelty not pleaded can be considered when the petition is for divorce on desertion.
- The admissibility of subsequent facts/events in determining mental cruelty.
- The propriety of upholding the High Court's decree of divorce on mental cruelty.
- The appropriate quantum of maintenance for the minor child.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 142
- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961
- Hindu Marriage Act, 1955s. 13(1)(ib), s. 9
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 34, s. 498A, s. 506
Subjects
Hindu Marriage ActDesertionMental crueltyDivorceSubsequent factsMaintenanceArticle 142Family law
Judgment
[2014] 6 S.C.R. 218
A DR. (MRS.) MALATHI RAVI, M.D.
Y.
DR. B.V. RAVI M.D.
(Civil Appeal No. 5862 of 2014)
JUNE 30, 2014
B
[SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPAOHAYA AND
DIPAK MISRA, JJ.]
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 - s. 13(1) - D/ssolutiori of
C marriage by way of divorce - Inference of mental cruelty- On
facts, petition for divorce by the husband on the ground of
desertion rejected by family court; however, the High Court
taking note of subsequent events, granted divorce on the
ground of mental cruelty, even though said ground was not
D prayed in the relief clause - Interference with - Held:
A/legation of desertion, as enshrined uls. 13(1 )(ib) not
established - However, incidents antecedent to the filing of
the petition reveal the attitude and the conduct of the wife
towards.her husband - Wife did not invite husband and his
E family members for naming ceremony of their son; wife
pursued higher studies without informing the husband; wife
alleged that the husband had kept her as unpaid servant;
husband at the time of delivery went to the hospital to bring.
the wife and child back to his house but wife along with the
F child went to her parental house - Wife did not join husband
immediat~ly pursuant to the order of the family court but
joined on the last days of expiration of period; and after two
months wife lodged an FIR against the husband and his family
members and as a result the husband suffered day's custody
G - It can be inferred that the husband was treated with mental
cruelty - Husband faced ignominy being an Associate
Professor in a Government Medical College - Wife showed.
anaemic emotional disposition to the husband - Thus, the
decree of divorce granted by High Court upheld singularly on
H 218
DR. (MRS.) MALATHI RAVI, M.D. v. DR. B.V. RAVI 219
M.D.
the ground of mental cruelty - However, in view of the social A
status and strata and the conct,Jt of effective availing of
Rs. 25, 00, 0001- to the wife, excluding the amount already paid
- Subsequent events. ·
Mental cruelty - Concept of - Effect of mental cruelty -
B
Held: Mental cruelty and its effect cannot be stated with
arithmetical exactitude - It varies from individual to individual,
from society to society and also depends on the status of the
persons - What would be a mental cruelty in the life of two
individuals belonging to particular strata of the society may C
not amount to mental cruelty in respect of another couple
belonging to a different stratum of society - Agonized feeling
or for that matter a sense of disappointment can take place
by certain acts causing a grievous dent at the mental level -
Inference has to be drawn from the attending circumstances.
D
Subsequent events - Reliance upon - Held: Subsequent
facts under certain circumstances can be taken into
consideration.
Administration of justice - Duty of the court - Dissolution
E
of marriage sought on the ground of desertion by the
husband, rejected by family court - However, High Court
taking into consideration subsequent events, granting divorce
on. the ground of mental cruelty, even though the said ground
was not prayed - Correctness of - Held: On facts, it is the
bounden duty of this Court to consider the issue of mental. F
cruelty for the sake of doing complete justice - Parties should
not be left to fight the battle afresh after expiry of thirteen years
of litigation - Dealing with the plea of mental cruelty would not
affect any substantive right of the wife rather would condone
a minor technical aspect - Administration of justice provokes ·· G
the judicial conscience that it is a fit case to invoke power
conferred on Supreme Court under Article 142 - Constitution
of India, 19,50 - Article 142.
The husband-respondent, an Associate Professor in 11,
220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A Medical College filed a petition seeking decree for judicial
separation, which was subsequently amended seeking
dissolution of marriage by way of divorce alleging that his
wife-appellant had deserted him. The appellant-wife in the
same petition filed an application under section 9 of the
B Hindu Marriage Act for restitution of conjugal rights. The
Family Court dismissed the petition for divorce since the
factum of desertion as requisite in law was not proved
and allowed the application for restitution of conjugal
rights. The wife did not join the husband immediately but
c only after the husband wrote letters to her as also sent
her notice. However, within two months the wife lodged
an FIR alleging dowry demand against the husband, his
family members. The husband was arrested and
remained in custody for one day and thereafter, was
enlarged on bail. The husband filed an appeal. The High
0
·court on considering certain facts and taking note of
subsequent events for which the wife was found
respons,ible, set aside the decree for restitution of
conjugal tights granted in favour of the wife and passed
dissolution of marriage by way of divorce on the ground
E of mental cruelty. Hence, the instant appeal.
Disposing of the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. The plea raised for grant of divorce was
F under Section 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
It provides for grant of divorce on the ground of desertion
for a continuous period of not less than two year
immediately preceding the presentation of the petition.
The Family Court, on the basis of material brought on
G record opined that there is no sufficient evidence to come
to a definite conclusion that the wife deserted him with
intention to bring the matrimonial relationship to an end
and further the period of two years was not completed.
The High Court reversed it by emphasizing on certain
aspects of conduct. Analysing the evidence, it is not
H
DR. (MRS.) MALATHI RAVI, M.D. v. DR. B.V. RAVI 221
M.D.
established that the appellant-wife had deserted the A
husband for a continuous period of not less than two
years immediately preceding the presentation of the
petition. The High Court, did not deal with this aspect in
an appropriate manner and opined that the wife had no
intention to lead a normal married life with the husband. B
Therefore, the allegation of desertion, as enshrined under
Section 13(1)(ib) were not established. The finding on that
score as recorded by the Principal Judge, Family Court
is upheld. [Para 15, 17) [237-F; 239-E-H; 240-A]
Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey: 2002 (1) SCR C
50: (2002) 2 sec 73 - referred to.
1.2. There is no cavil over the fact that the petition
was filed under Section 13(1 )(ib). t-towever, on a perusal
of the petition it transpires that there are assertions of ill- D
treatment, mental agony and torture suffered by the
husband. After the application of the wife was allowed
granting restitution of conjugal rights, the husband
communicated to her to join him, but she chose not to
join him immediately and thereafter, went to the E
matrimonial home along with a relative who is a police
officer. After she stayed for a brief period at the
matrimonial home, she left her husband and thereafter,
lodged FIR for the offences under Sections 498A and 506/
34 IPC and the provisions under Dowry Prohibition Act, F
1961 against the husband, his mother and the sister.
Because of the FIR the husband was arrested and
remained in custody for a day. The ladies availed the
benefit of anticipatory bail. The trial Magistrate recorded
a judgment of acquittal. Against the judgment of.acquittal, G
the appellant preferred an appeal before the High Court
after obtaining special leave which was ultimately
dismissed as withdrawn.[Para 18, 19) [240-C-G]
1.3. The High Court referred to certain grounds stated
in the memorandum of appeal and took note of certain H
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A subsequent facts. Though, the grounds stated in the
memorandum of appeal which were not established by
way of evidence could not have been pressed into service
or taken aid of, but the subsequent conduct of the wife
can be taken into consideration. It settled in law that
B subsequent facts under certain circumstances can be
taken into consideration. It is quite clear that subsequent
events which are established on the basis of non-
disputed material brought on record can be taken into
consideration. Having not accepted the ground of
c desertion, the two issues that remain for consideration
whether the issue of mental cruelty deserves to be
accepted in the obtaining factual matrix in the absence
of a prayer in the relief clause, and further whether the
situation has become such that it can be held that under
the existing factual scenario it would not be proper to
0
keep the marriage ties alive. The question is posed before
this Court that whether in a case of the instant nature, the
respondent-husband is required to amend the petition
and direct the Family Judge to consider the issue of
E mental cruelty or the fetter of technicality should be
ignored and consider the pleadings and evidence
brought on record as well as the subsequent facts which
are incontrovertible so that the lis is put to rest. The issue
of mental cruelty should be addressed to by this Court
for the sake of doing complete justice. It is the bounden
F duty of this Court to do so and not to leave the parties to
fight the battle afresh after expiry of thirteen years of
litigation. Dealing with the plea of mental cruelty which
is perceptible from the material on record would not
affect any substantive right of the appellant. It would be
G only condoning a minor technical aspect. Administration
of justice provokes the judicial conscience that it is a fit
case where the plentitude of power conferred on this
Court under Article 142 deserves to be invoked, more so,
when the ground ts statutorily permissible. By s.uch
H exercise, it would neither be supplanting the substantive
DR. (MRS.) MALATHI RAVI, M.D. v. DR. B.V. RAVI 223
M.D.
law nor would it be building a structure which does not A
exist. It would be logical to do so and illogical to refrain
from doing so.[Para 20, 23) [241-B-C; 242-E-H; 243-A-D]
A. Jayachandra v. Aneel.Kaur 2004 (6) Suppl. SCR
599:(2005) 2 SCC 22; Suman Kapur v. Sudhir Kapur 2008
B
(15) SCR 972:(2009) 1 SCC 422 - referred to.
1.4. The wife made allegations that the sister and
brother-in-law of the husband used to interfere in the
day-to-day affairs of the husband and. he W)lS caught in
conflict. The said aspect has really not been proven. It has C
been brought on· record that the sister and brother-in-law
are highly educated and nothing has been suggested to
the husband in the cross-examination that he was
pressurized by his sister in any manner whatsoever. It is
her allegation that the sister and brother-in-law of the D
husband were pressurizing him not to allow the wife to
prosecute higher studies and to keep her as an unpaid
servant in the house. On a st1,1died evaluation of the
evidence and the material b~ought on record it is
demonstrable that the wife herself admitted that the E
husband had given his consent for her higher education
and, in fact, assisted her. Thus, the said allegation has
not been proven. The allegation that the husband was
instigated to keep her at home as an unpaid servant is
quite a disturbing allegation when viewed from the F
spectrum of gender sensitivity and any sen$ltive person
would be hurt when his behavior has remotel-y not
reflected that attitude. The second aspect which has
surfaced from the evidence is that the wife had gone to
the parental home for delivery and therefrom she went to G
the hospital where she gave birth to a male child.
However, as the evidence would show, the husband
despite all his co-operation as a father, when had gone
to the hospital to bring the wife and child to his house,
she along with the child had gone to her parental house.
H
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A This aspect of the evidence has gone totally
unchallenged. Perceived from a social point of view, it
reflects the egocentric attitude of the wife and her non-
concern how such an act is likely to hurt the father of the
child. The next thing that has come in evidence is that the
B respondent was not invited at the time of naming
ceremony. He has categorically disputed the suggestion
that he and his family members were invited to the
ceremony. It is interesting to note that a suggestion has
been given that they did not attend the ceremony as in
c the invitation card the names of the parents of the.
husband had not been printed. It was asserted by the
husband that the said incident had caused him
tremendous mental pain. View from a different angle, it
tantamounts to totally ignoring the family of the husband.
D [Para 31] [248-C-H; 249-A-C]
1.5. The wife went to place 'G' to join her studies and
the husband was not aware of it and only come to know
when one professor told about it. Thereafter, he went to
place 'G' and stayed in a hotel and met the wife in the
E hostel on both the days. Despite his request to come to
ttie house she showed disinclination. When he enquired
about the child, he was told that the child was in her
mother's house. These are the incidents which are
antecedent to the filing of the petition.[Para 32] [249-D-E]
F
1.6. After the judgment and decree was passed by the
Family Judge, the husband sent a notice through his
counsel and intimated her to join him with the child. She
· did not join and the husband was compelled to send a
telegram. Thereafter, a reply was sent on her behalf that
G she would be joining but the exact date was not intimated.
Thereafter, a reply was sent to the legal notice sent by the
husband. The purpose of referring to these
communications is that despite obtaining decree for
restitution of conjugal rights the wife waited till the last day
H
DR. (MRS.) MALATHI RAVI, M.D. v. DR. B.V. RAVI 225
M.D.
of the expiration of the period as per the decree to join the A
husband. There may be no legal fallacy, but the attitude
gets reflected. The reply also states that there is
expectation of reasonable amount of care and cordiality.
This reflects both, a sense of doubt and a hidden threat.
As the facts unfurl, the wife stayed for two months and B
then left the matrimonial home and lodged the first
, information report against the husband and his mother
and sister for the offences punishable under Sections
498A, 506/34 IPC and under the provisions of Dowry
Prohibition Act. The husband suffered a day's custody and c
the mother and the sister availed anticipatory bail. The High
Court took note of all these aspects and held that the wife
had no intention to lead a normal marital life. That apart,
the High Court returned a finding that the marriage had
irretrievably been broken down. Of course, such an D
observation was made on the ground of conduct. [Para 33,
34, 35, 36] (249-F-G; 250-B-C, E-H; 251-A-B]
1.7. Mental cruelty and its effect cannot be stated with
arithmetical· exactitude. It varies from individual to
individual, from society to society and also depends on E
the status of the persons. What would be a mental cruelty
in the life of two individuals belonging to particular strata
of the society may not amount to mental cruelty in
. respect of another couple belonging to a different stratum
of society. The agonized feeling or for that matter a sense F
of disappointment can take place by certain acts causing
a grievous dent at the mental level. The inference has to
be drawn from the attending circumstances. The
incidents have been enumerated. This Court is disposed
to think that the husband had reasons to feel that he was G
humiliated, for allegations made against him which were
not correct; his relatives were dragged into the
matrimonial controversy, the assertions in the written
statement depict him as if he had tacitly conceded to have
harboured notions of gender insensitivity -or some kind H
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A of male chauvinism, his parents and he were ignored in
the naming ceremony of the son, and he learnt from
others that the wife had gone to place 'G' to prosecute
her studies. That apart, the communications, after the
decree for restitution of conjugal rights, indicated the
B attitude of the wife as if she was playing a game of Chess.
The launching of criminal prosecution can be perceived
from the spectrum of conduct. The Magistrate recorded
the judgment of acquit~al. The wife preferred an appeal
before the High Court after obtaining leave. After the
c State Government preferred an appeal in the Court of
Session, she choose to withdraw the appeal. But she
intended, as the pleadings would show, that the case
should reach the logical conclusion. This conduct
manifestly shows the widening of the rift between the
parties. It has only increased the bitterness. In such a
0
situation, the husband is likely to lament in every breath
and the vibrancy of life melts to give way to sad story of
life. [Para 37) [251-D-G; 252-A-D]
1.8. From the said attitude and treatment it can be
E inferred that the husband has been treated with mental
cruelty and definitely he has faced ignominy being an
Associate Professor in a Government Medical College.
When one enjoys social status working in a Government
hospital, this humiliation affects the reputation. That apart,
F it can be well imagined what he might be facing. In fact,
the chain of events might have compelled him to go
through the whole gamut of emotions. It certainly must
have hurt his self-respect and human sensibility. The
sanguine concept of marriag,e presumably became
G illusory and it would not be inapposite to say that the wife
showed anaemic emotional disposition to the husband.
The'refore, the decree of divorce granted by the High
Court deserves is upheld singul;uly on the ground of
mental cruelty. [Para 38] [252-E-G]
H
DR. (MRS.) MALATHI RAVI, M.D. v: DR. B.V. RAVI 227
M.D.
Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena@ Mota 1964 A
SCR 331:AIR 1964 SC 40; K. Narayanan v. K. Sreedevi AIR
1990 Ker 151; Mohinder Singh v. Harbens Kaur AIR 1992
P&H 8; Smt. Indira Gangele v. Shailendra Kumar Gangele
AIR 1993 MP 59 ; Vinit Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit 2006 (3)
SCR 116 :(2006) 3 SCC 778; Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh B
2007(4) SCR 428 :(2007) 4 SCC 511 ; Vishwanath Agrawal,
slo Sitaram Agrawal v. Sar/a Vishwanath Agrawal 2012 (7)
SCR 607 :(2012) 7 SCC 288; U. Sree v. U. Srinivas 2012
(11) SCR 256 :(2013) 2 SCC 114 ;K. Srinivas Rao v. D.A.
Deepa (2013) 5 SCC 226; G. V.N. Kameswara Rao v. G. C
Jabilli 2002 (1) SCR 153;(2002) 2 SCC 296; Parveen Mehta
v. lnderjit Mehta (2002) 5 SCC 706; Vijayakumar R. Bhate v.
Nee/a Vijayakumar Bhate 2003 (3) SCR 607:(2003) 6 SCC
334; Durga Prasanna Tripathy v. Arundh_ati Tripathy 2005 (2)
Suppl. SCR 833:(2005) 7 SCC 353; Naveen Kohli v. Neelu D
Kohli 2006 (3) SCR 53:(2006) 4 SCC 558;Samar Ghosh v.
Jaya Ghosh 2007(4) SCR 428:(2007) 4 SCC 511- referred
to.
2. As regards the grant of maintenance, both the
appellant and the respondent are doctors and have their E
respective jobs. The son is hardly sixteen years old and
definitely would require financial support for education
and other supportive things to lead a life befitting his
social status. The High Court, while granting a decree for
divorce should have adverted to it. However, it is not F
appropriate to keep anything alive in this regard between
the parties. The controversy is to be put to rest on this
score also. Considering the totality of circumstances, the
status the appellant enjoys and the strata to which the
parties belong, it becomes the bounden duty of the G
respondent to provide for maintenance and education for
the son who is sixteen years old. Though there has been
a settlement of Rs.3,00,000/- yet that was at a different
time and under different circumstances. The instant
appeal was pending. The duty of this Court is to see that H
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS· [2014) 6 S.C.R.
A the young son born in the wedlock must get acceptable
comfort as well as proper education. It is the duty of the
Court also to see that a minor son should not live in
discomfort or should be deprived of requisite modern
education. The appellant is earning but that does not
8 necessarily mean that the father should be absolved of
his liability. Regard being had to the social status and
strata and the concept of effective availing of education,
a sum of Rs.25,00,000/- (twenty five lacs) is fixed
excluding the amount already paid towards the
c maintenance and education of the son.[Para 39 and 40]
[252-H; 253-A-C, G-H; 254-A-B]
Case Law Reference:
1964 SCR 331 Referred to Para 13
D AIR 1990 Ker 151 Referred to Para 13
AIR 1992 P&H 8 Referred to Para 13
AIR 1993 MP 59. Referred to Para 13
E 2002 (1) SCR 50 Referred to Para 15
2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 599 Referred to Para 21
2008 (15) SCR 972 Referred to Para 22 -
2006 (3) SCR 116 Referred to Para 24
F
2007(4) SCR 428 Referred to Para 25
2012 (7) SCR 607 Referred to Para 27
2012 (11 ) SCR 256 Referred to Para 29
G
(2013) 5 sec 226 Referred to Para 30
2002 (1) SCR 153 Referred to Para 36
(2002) 5 sec 706 Referred to Para 36
H
DR. (MRS.) MALATHI RAVI, M.D. v. DR. B.V. RAVI 229
M.D.
2003 (3) SCR 607 Referred to Para 36 A
2005 (2) Suppl. SCR 833 Referred to Para 36
2006 (3) SCR 53 Referred to Para 36
2007(4) SCR 428 Referred to Para 36 B
CIVIL AP PELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.5862
of 2014.
From The Judgment and Order dated 11.09.2009 in MFA
No. 9164/2004 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore. c
Shanth Kumar V. Mohale, Harisha S.R., Amith J., Rajesh
Mahale for the Appellant.
Balaji Srinivasan, Mayank Kshirsagar, Vaishali Dixit,
Srishti Govil for the Respondent. o
The Judgn:ient of the Court was delivered by
DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. Marriage as a social institution is an affirmance of
civilized social order where two individuals, capable of entering E
into wedlock, have pledged themselves to the institutional norms
and values and promised to each other a cemented bond to
sustain and maintain the marital obligation. It stands as an
embodiment for continuance of the human race. Despite the
pledge and promises, on certain occasions, individual F
incompatibilities, attitudinal differences based upon egocentric
perception of situations, maladjustment phenomenon or
propensity for non-adjustment or refusal for adjustment gets
eminently projected that compels both the spouses to take
intolerable positions abandoning individual responsibility, G
proclivity of asserting superiority complex, betrayal of trust which
is the cornerstone of life, and sometimes a pervert sense of
revenge, a dreadful diet, or sheer sense of en'!f bring the cracks
in the relationship when either both the spouses or one of the
spouses crave for dissolution of marriage - freedom from the
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 6 S.C.R.
A institutional and individual bond. The case at hand initiated by
the husband for dissolution of marriage was viewed from a
different perspective by the learned Family Court Judge who·
declined to grant divorce as the factum of desertion as requisite
in law was not proved but the High Court, considering ~ertain
B facts and taking note of subsequent events for which the
appellant was found ~esponsible, gr~nted divorce. The High
Court perceived the acts of the appellant as a reflection of
attitude of revenge in marriage or for vengeance after the
reunion pursuant to the decree for restitution of marriage. The
c justifiabjlity of the said analysis within the parameters of
Section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (f9r brevity "the
Act") is the subject-matter of assail in this appeal, by special
leave, wherein the judgment and decree dated 11.09.2009
passed by the High Court of Karnataka in MFA No. 9164 of
2004 reversing the decree for restitution of conjugal rights
0
granted in favour of the wife and passing a decree for
dissolution of marriage by way of divorce ~!lowing the petition
preferred by the respondent-husband, is called in question.
3. The respondent-husband, an Associate Professor in
E Ambedkar Medical ('.ollege, Kadugondanahalli, Bangalore, filed
a petition, M.S. No. 5 of 2001 under Section 13(1) the Act
seeking for a decree for judicial separation and dissolution of
marriage. However, in course of the proceeding the petition was
amended abandoning the prayer for judicial separation and
F converting the petition to one under Section 13(1 )(ib) of the Act
seeking dissolution of marriage by way of divorce.
4. In the petition filed before the Family court, it was
averred by the respondent-husband that the marriage between
G the parties was solemnized in accordance with Hindu Rites and
customs on 23.1 ~ .1994. After the marriage the husband and
wife stayed together for one and a half years in the house of
the father of the husband but from the very first day the appellant-
wife was non-cooperative, arrogant and her behaviour towards
the family members of the husband was unacceptable. Despite
H
DR. (MRS.) MALATHI RAVI, M.D. v. DR. B.V. RAVI 231
M.D. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
the misunderstanding, a male child was born in the wedlock and A
thereafter, the wife took the child and left the house and chose
not to come back to the husband or his family for a period of
three years. It was pleaded that there had been a marital
discord and total non-compatibility, and she had deserted him
severing all ties. It was also alleged that she had left the tender B
child in the custody of her parents and joined a post graduate
course in the Medical College of Gulbarga. All the efforts by
the husband to bring her back became an exercise in futility
inasmuch as the letters written by him were never replied.
Despite the non-responsive attitude of the wife, he, without c
abandoning the hope for reconciliation for leading a normal
married life, went to the house of his in-laws, but her parents ill
treated him by forcibly throwing him out of the house.
5. It was the assertion of the husband that after she
completed her course, she started staying with her parents D
along with the child at Bangalore and neither he nor his family
members were invited for the naming giving ceremony of the
child. As set forth, the conduct of the wife caused immense
mental hurt and trauma, and he suffered unbearable mental
agony when the family members of his wife abused and ill E
treated him while he had gone to pacify her and bring her back
to the matrimonial home. All his solicitations and beseechments
through letters to have normalcy went in vain which compelled
him to issue a notice through his couns"el but she chose not to
respond to the same. Under these circumstances, the petition F
was filed for judicial separation and thereafter, as has been
stated earlier, prayer was amended seeking dissolution of
marriage on the ground of desertion since she had deliberately
withdrall".'.n from his society.
G
6. The wife filed objections contending, inter alia, that when
she was residing in the matrimonial home, the sister and
brother-in-law of the husband, who stayed in the opposite
house, were frequent visitors and their interference affected the .
H
. 232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A normal stream of life of the couple. They influenced the husband
that he should not allow his wife to prosecute her studies and
be kept at home as an unpaid servant of the house. The
husband, as pleaded, was torn in conflict as he could not treat
the wife in the manner by his sister and brother-in-law had
B desired and also could not openly express disagreement. At
that juncture, as she was in the family way, as per the customs,
she came to her parental home and by the time the child was
born the sister and brother-in-law had been successful in
poisoning the mind of the husband as a result of which neither
C he nor his relatives, though properly invited, did not turn up for
the naming ceremony. All her attempts to come back to the
matrimonial home did not produce any result since the husband
was acting under the ill-advice of his sister and brother-in-law.
It was put forth that he had without any reasonable cause or
excuse refused to perform his marital obligations. The plea of
0
mental hurt and trauma was controverted on the assertion that
she had never treated him with cruelty nor was he summarily
thrown out of the house of her parents.
7. Be it stated, the wife in the same petition filed an
E application under Section 9 of the Act for restitution of conjugal
rights to which an objection was filed by the husband stating,
inter alia, that no case had been made out for restitution of
conjugal rights but, on the contrary, vexatious allegations had
been made. It was further averred that the wife had deserted
F him for more than five years and she had been harassing him
constantly and consistently.
8. In support of their respective pleas the husband and wife
filed evidence by way of affidavit and were cross-examined at
length by the other side. On behalf of the husband 12 documents
G were exhibited as Exts. P-1 to P-12 and the wife examined one
witness and exhibited four documents, Exts. R-1 to R-4.
9. The family court formulated the following points for
consideration: -
H
DR. (MRS.) MALATHI RAVI, M.D. v. DR. B.V. RAVI 233
M.D. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
"(1) Whether the petitioner proves that respondent A
assaulted him for a continuous period of not less
than 2 years immediately proceeding the
presentation of the petition?
(2) Whether the respondent proves that the petitioner B
without reasonable excuse withdrawn from the
society?
(3) Whether the petitioner is entitled for decree of
divorce as prayed for?
c
(4) Whether the respondent is entitled for decree of
restitution of conjugal right as prayed for?
· (5) What order?"
10. The learned Principal Judge of the family court, D
appreciating the oral and documentary evidence on record
came to hold that the material on record gave an impression
that there was no scuffle between the husband and the wife;
that even after the birth of the child the husband and his family
members used to visit the wife at her parental home to see the E
child; ttlat there was no material on record to show that when
he went to his in-laws house to see the child, he was ill-treated
in any manner; that after the child was born he had taken the
child along with her for vaccination and spent sometime; that
though the husband and his relatives were invited for naming F
ceremony of the child, they chose not to attend; that the husband
was able to recognize his son from the photograph in Ext. R-2;
that the plea of the husband that he was not allowed to see the
child did not deserve acceptation; that the circumstances did
not establish that wife had any intention to bring the conjugal G
relationship to an end but, on the contrary, she was residing in
her parents' house for delivery and then had to remain at
Gulbarga for prosecuting her higher studies; that while she was
studying at Gulbarga, as is evident from Ext. R-4, the husband
stayed there for two days, i.e., 27.5.1999 and 28.5.1999; that
H
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A from the letters vide Exts. P-3, P-7, P-9 and P-11 nothing was
discernible to the effect that the wife went to Gulbarga for her
studies without his permission and she had deserted him; that
the husband had not disclosed from what date he stopped
visiting the house of the wife's parents after the birth of the child;
B that the letters written by the husband did not reflect the non-
cooperative conduct of the wife; that there was no sufficient
evidence to come to a definite conclusion that the wife had
deserted the husband with an intention to bring the matrimonial
relationship to an end; that assuming ther,e was desertion yet
c the same was not for a continuous period of two years
immediately preceding the presentation of the petition; that the
husband only wrote letters after 15.9.1999 and nothing had
been brought on record to show what steps he had taken for
resumption of marital ties with the wife if she had deserted him;
D that the wife was not allowed to come back to the matrimonial
home because of intervention of his sister and brother-in-law;
that the explanation given by the wife to her non-response to
the letters was that when she was thinking to reply the petition
had already been filed was acceptable; that as the husband was
working at Ambedkar Medical College in the Department of
E Biochemistry and wife had joined in the Department of
Pathology which would show that she was willing to join the
husband to lead a normal marital life; and that it was the
husband who had withdrawn from the society of the wife without
any reasonable cause. Being of this view, the learned Family
F Judge dismissed the application for divorce and allowed the
application of the wife filed under Section 23(a) read with
Section 9 of the Act for restitution of conjugal rights.
11. After the said judgment and decree was passed by the
G learned Family Judge, the respondent did not prefer an appeal
immediately. He waited for the wife to join and for the said
purpose he wrote letters to her and as there was no response,
he sent a notice through his counsel. The wife, eventually, ioined
oa 22.8.2004 at the matrimonial house being accompanied by
H her relative who was working in the Police Department. As the
DR. (MRS.) MALATHI RAVI, M.D. v. DR. B.V. RAVI 235
M.D. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
turn of events would uncurtain, the wife lodged an FIR No. 401/ A
2004 dated 17.10.2004 at Basaveshwaranagar alleging
demand of dowry against the husband, mother and sister as a
consequence of which the husband was arrested being an
accused for the offences under Section 498A and 506 read
with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and also under the B
provisions of Dowry Prohibition Act. He remained in custody
for a day until he was enlarged on bail. His parents were
compelled to hide themselves and moved an application under
Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, ultimately,
availed the benefit of said provision. After all these events took c
place, the husband preferred an appeal along with application
for condonation of delay before the High Court which formed
the subject-matter of M.F.A. No. 9164/04 (FC). The High Court
condoned the delay, took note of the grounds urged in the
memorandum of appeal, appreciated the subsequent events D
that reflected the conduct of the wife and opined that the attitude
of the wife confirmed that she never had the intention of leading
a normal married life with the husband and, in fact, she wanted
, to stay separately with the husband and dictate terms which had
hurt his feelings. The High Court further came to the conclusion E
that the husband had made efforts to go to Gulbarga on many
an occasion, tried to convince the wife to come back to the
matrimonial home, but all his diligent efforts met with miserable
failure. As the impugned judgment would reflect, the behaviour
of the wife established that she deliberately stayed away from
the marital home and intentionally caused mental agony by F
putting the husband and his family to go through a criminal
litigation. That apart, the High Court took the long separation
into account and, accordingly, set aside the judgment and
decree for restitution of conjugal rights and passed a decree
for dissolution of marriage between the parties. G
12. We have heard Mr. Shanth Kumar V. Mohale, learned
counsel for the appellant and Mr. Balaji Srinivasan, learned
counsel for the respondent.
H
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A 13. Assailing the legal sustainability of the judgment of the
High Court, Mr. Shanth Kumar, learned counsel appearing for
the appellant, submitted that when the petition for divorce was
founded solely on the ground of desertion and a finding was
returned by the family court that the ingredients stipulated under
B Section 13(1)(ib) pf the Act were not satisfied making out a
case of desertion on the part of the wife, the High Court should
have concurred with the same and not proceeded to make out
a case for the respondent-husband on the foundation of mental
cruelty. It is urged by him that the High Court has taken note of
c subsequent events into consideration without affording an
opportunity to the appellant to controvert the said material and
that alone makes the decision vulnerable in law. Learned
counsel would submit that the High Court has erroneously ·
determined the period of communication of letters and the
silence maintained by the wife which is factually incorrect and,
0
in fact, the concept of desertion, as is understood in law, has
not been proven by way of adequate evidence but, on the
contrary, the analysis of evidence on record by the Family Court
goes a long way to show that there was, in fact, no desertion
on the part of the wife to make out a case for divorce. It is his
E further submission that the High Court has opined that the
marriage between the parties had irretrievably been broken.
and, therefore, it was requisite to grant a decree for dissolution
of marriage by divorce which cannot be a ground for grant of·
divorce. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions
F in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena @ Mota 1, K.
Narayanan v. K. Sreedevi2, Mohinder Singh v. Harbens Kaur3
and Smt. Indira Gangele v. Shailendra Kumar Gange/e 4 •
14. Mr. Balaji Srinivasan, learned counsel for the
G respondent-husband, has urged that if the petition filed by the
husband is read in entirety, it would be clear that the husband
had clearly pleaded about the mental hurt and trauma that he
had suffered because of the treatment meted out to him by his
wife and her family members. He has drawn our attention to
H the evidence to show that for a long seven and a half years
STATE OF GUJARAT v. KISHANBHAI 237
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
despite the best efforts he could not get marital cooperation A
from his wife and as the High Court has accepted the same,
the impugned judgment is flawless. He has highlighted about
the non-responsive proclivity of the wife when she chose not to
reply to the letters of the husband beseeching her to join his
company while she was staying at Gulbarga. He has also B
drawn our attention to the cross-examination of the husband
where he has deposed that after the delivery of the son on
12.1.1998 when she was discharged, he and his mother had
gone to bring the wife and the child to their home but she went
to her parental home and further neither he nor his family c
members were invited for the naming ceremony which was
performed in October, 1998. Learned counsel has drawn our
attention to the subsequent events which have been brought on
record by way of affidavit as well as the rejoinder filed by the
appellant-wife to the counter affidavit to highlight the D
subsequent conduct for the purpose of demonstrating the cruel
treatment of the wife. It is canvassed by him that the subsequent
events can be taken note of for the purpose of mental cruelty
by this Court and the decree of divorce granted by the High
Court should not be disturbed.
.... E
. 15. To appreciate the rivalised submissions raised at the
Bar, we have carefully perused the petition and the evidence
adduced by the parties and the judgment of the Family Court
and that of the High Court. The plea that was raised for grant
of divorce was under Section 13(1)(ib) of the Act. It provides F
for grant of divorce on the ground of desertion for a continuous
period of not less than two year immediately preceding the
presentation of the petition. The aforesaid provision stipulates
that a husband or wife would be entitled to a dissolution of
marriage by decree of divorce if the other party has deserted G
the party seeking the divorce for a continuous period of not less
1. AIR 1964 SC 40.
2. AIR1990Kcr151.
3. AIR 1992 P&11 8.
4. AIR 1993 MP 59 H
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A thal\ two years immediately preceding the presentation of the
petition. Desertion, as a ground for divorce, was inserted to
Secti~n 13 by Act 68/1976. Prior to the amendment it was only
a ground for judicial separation. Dealing with the concept of
desertion, this Court in Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra
B Pandey5 has ruled thus:-
"Desertion", for the purpose of seeking divorce under the
Act, means the intentional permanent forsaking and
abandonment of one spouse by the other without that
other's consent and without reasonable cause. In other
c words it is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage.
Desertion is not the. withdrawal from a place but from a
state of things. Desertion, therefore, means withdrawing
from the matrimonial obligations i.e. not permitting or
allowing and facilitating the cohabitation between the
D parties. The proof of desertion has to be considered by
taking into consideration the concept of marriage which in
law legalises the sexual relationship between man and
woman in the society for the perpetuation of race,
permitting lawful indulgence in passion to prevent
E licentiousness and for procreation of children. Desertion
is not a single act complete in itself, it is a continuous
course of conduct to be determined under the facts and
circumstances of each case. After referring to a host of
authorities and the views of various authors, this Court in
F Bipinchandra Jaisinghbai Shah v. Prabhavafi1 held that
if a spouse abandons the other in a state of temporary
passion, for example, anger or disgust without intending
permanently to cease cohao1tation, it will not amount to
desertion.
G
16. In the said case, reference was also made to Lachman
Utamchand Kirpalani's case wherein it has been held that
desertion in its essence means the intentional permanent
forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without
H 5. (2002) 2 sec 73.
DR. (MRS.) MALATHI RAVI, M.D. v. DR. B.V. RAVI 239
. M.D. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
that other's consent, and without reasonable cause. For i:he A
offence of desertion so far as the deserting spouse is
concerned, two essential conditions must be there (1) the
factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation
permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Similarly two
elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is B
concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of
conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the
matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid. For
holding desertion as proved the inference may be drawn from
certain facts which may not in another case be capable pf c
leading to the same inference; that is to say the facts have to
be viewed as to the purpose which is revealed by those acts
or by conduct and expression of intent,ion, both anterior and
subsequent to the actual acts of separation.
17. In the case at hand, the Family Court, on the basis of D
the evidence brought on record, has recorded a finding that
there was no desertion for a continuous period of two years.
The High Court has reversed it by emphasizing on certain
aspects of conduct. Analysing the evidence, we are of the
considered opinion that it is not established that the appellant- E
wife had deserted the husband for a continuous period of not
less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of
the petition. It is because the petition· was presented in the year
2001 and during the cross-examination of the husband it has
been admitted by him that he had gone to Gulbarga in May, F
1999 for two days. The Family Court, on the basis of material
brought on record, has opined that there i$ no sufficient
evidence to come to a definite conclusion that th~ wife deserted
him with intention fo bring the matrimonial relatiohship to an end
and further the period of two years was not completed. The High G
Court, as it seems to us, has not dealt with this aspect in an
appropriate manner and opined that the wife had no intention
to lead a normal married life with the husband. Therefore, the
allegation of desertion, as enshrined under Section 13(1 )(ib)
has not been established. The finding on that score as H
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 6 S.C.R.
A recorded by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court,
deserves to be affirmed and we so do. ·
18. Presently to the factual matrix in entirety and the
subsequent events. We are absolutely conscious that the relief
of dissolution of marriage was sought on the ground of
8
desertion. The submission of the learned counsel for the
appellant is that neither subsequent events nor the plea of
cruelty could have been considered. There is no cavil over the
fact that the petition was filed under Section 13(1)(ib). However,
on a perusal of the petition it transpires that there are
C assertions of ill-treatment, mental agony and torture suffered by·
the husband.
19. First we intend to state the subsequent events. As has
been narrated earlier, after the application of the wife was
D allowed granting restitution of conjugal rights, the husband
communicated to her to join him, but she chose not to join him
immediately and thereafter went to the matrimonial home along
with a relative who is a police officer. After she stayed for a
brief period at the matrimonial home, she left her husband and
E thereafter lodged FIR No. 401/2004 on 17.10.2004 for the
offences under Sections 498A and 506/34 of the Indian Penal
Code and the provisions under Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961
against the husband, his mother and the sister. Because of the
FIR the husband was arrested and remained in custody for a
F day. The ladies availed the benefit of anticipatory bail. The
learned trial Magistrate, as we find, recorded a judgment of
acquittal. Against the judgment of acquittal, the appellant
preferred an appeal before the High Coyrt after obtaining
special leave which was ultimately dismissed as withdrawn
G since in the meantime the State had preferred an appeal before
the Court of Session. At this juncture, we make it absolutely
clear that we will not advert to the legal tenability of the judgment
of acquittal as the appeal, as we have been apprised, is sub-
judice. However, we take note of certain aspects which have
been taken note of'by the High Court and also brought on record
H
D'R. (MRS.) MALATHI RAVI, M.D. v. DR. B.V. RAVI 241
M.D. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
for a different purpose. A
20. The seminal question that has to be addressed is
whether under these circumstances the decree for divorce
granted by the High Court should be interfered with. We must
immediately state that the High Court has referred to certain 8
grounds stated in the memorandum of appeal and taken note
of certain subsequent facts. We accept the submission of the
learned counsel for the appellant that the grounds stated in the
memorandum of appeal which were not established by way of
evidence could not have been pressed into service or taken C
aid of. But, it needs no special emphasis to state that the
subsequent conduct of the wife can be taken into consideration.
It settled in law that subsequent facts under certain
circumstances can be taken into consideration.
21. In A. Jayachandra v. Anee/ Kau~ it has been held D
thus: -
"If acts subsequent to the filing of the divorce petition can
be looked into to infer condonation of the aberrations, acts
subsequent to the filing of the petition can be taken note E
of to show a pattern in the behaviour and conduct."
22. In Suman Kapur v. Sudhir Kapur7 this Court had
accepted what the High Court had taken note of despite the
fact that it was a subsequent event. It is necessary to reproduce
the necessary paragraphs from the said decision to perceive F
the approach of this Court: -
"46. The High Court further noted that the appellant wife
sent a notice through her advticate to the respondent
husband during the pendency of mediation proceedings c
in the High Court wherein she alleged that the respondent
was having another wife in USA whose identity was
6. (2005) 2 sec 22
7. (2009) 1 sec 422
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 6 S.C.R.
A concealed. This was based on the fact that in his income
tax return, the husband mentioned the social security
number of his wife as 476-15-6010, a number which did
not belong to the appellant wife, but to some American lady
(Sarah Awegtalewis). ·
B
47. The High Court, however, recorded a finding of fact
accepting the explanation of the husband that there was
merely a typographical error in giving social security
number allotted to the appellant which was 476-15-6030.
According to the High Court, taking undue advantage of
c the error in social security number, the appellant wife had
gone to the extent of making serious allegation that the
respondent had married an American woman whose
social security number was wrongly typed in the income
tax return of the respondent husband."
D
23. From the acceptance of the reasons of the High Court
by this Court, it is quite clear that subsequent events which are
established on the basis of Ron-disputed material brought on
record can be taken into consideration. Having held that, the
E question would be ·whether a decree for divorce on the ground
of mental cruelty can be granteo. We have already opined that
the ground of desertion has not been proved. Having not
accepted the .ground of desertion, the two issues that remain
for consideration whether the issue of mental cruelty deserves
F to be accepted in the obtaining factual matrix in the absence
of a prayer in the relief clause, and further whether the situation
has become such that it can be held that under the existing
factual scenario i}would not be proper to keep the marriage
ties alive. Learned counsel for the appellant has urged with
G vehemence that when dissolution of marriage was sought on
the ground of desertion alone, the issue of mental cruelty can
neither be raised nor can be addressed to. Regard being had
to the said submission, we are constrained to pose the
question whether in a case of the present nature we should
require the respondent-husband to amend the petition and
H
DR. (MRS.) MALATHI RAVI, M.D. v. DR. B.V. RAVI 243
M.D. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
direct the learned Family Judge to consider the issue of mental A
cruelty or we should ignore the fetter of technicality and consider
the pleadings and evidence brought on record as well as the
subsequent facts which are incontrovertible so that the lis is put
to rest. In our considered opinion the issue of mental cruelty
should be addressed to by this Court for the sake of doing B
complete justice. We think, it is the bounden duty of this Court
to do so and not to leave the parties to fight the battle afresh
after expiry of thirteen years of litigation. Dealing with the plea
of mental cruelty which is perceptible from the material on
record would not affect any substantive right of the appellant. It c
would· be only condoning a minor technical aspect.
Administration of justice provokes our judicial conscience that
it is a fit case where the plentitude of power conferred on this
Court under Article 142 deserves to be invoked, more so, when
the ground is statutorily permissible. By such exercise we are D
certain that it would neither be supplanting the substantive law
nor would it be building a structure which does not exist. It would
be logical to do so and illogical to refrain from doing so.
24. Before we proceed to deal with the issue of mental
cruelty, it is appropriate to state how the said concept has been E
viewed by this Court. In Vinit Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit8, while
dealing with the issue of mental cruelty, the Court held as
follows: - -
. -- - -
"31. It is settled by a catena of decisions that mental cruelty F
can cause even more serious injury than the physical harm
and create in the mind of the injured appellant such
apprehension as is contemplated in the section. It is to be
determined on whole facts of the case and the matrimonial
relations between the spouses. To amount to cruelty, there G
must be such wilful treatment of the party which caused
suffering in body or mind either as an actual fact or by way
of apprehension in such a manner as to render the
continued living together of spouses harmful or injurious
8. (2006) 3 sec 778. H
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A having regard to the circumstances of the case.
xxxxxxxxx
35. Each case depends on its own facts and must be
judged on these facts. The concept of cruelty has varied
B from time to time, from place to place and from individual
to individual in its application according to social status of
the persons involved and their economic conditions and
other matters. The question whether the act complained
of was a cruel act is to be determined from the whole facts
c and the matrimonial relations between the parties. In this
connection, the culture, temperament and status in life and
many other things are the factors which have to be
considered."
D 25. In Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh 9, this Court has given
certain illustrative examples wherefrom inference of mental
cruelty can be drawn. The Court itself has observed that they
are illustrative and not exhaustive. We think it appropriate to
reproduce some of the illustrations: -
E "(i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the
parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as would
not make possible for the parties to live with each other
could come within the broad parameters of mental cruelty.
F (ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire matrimonial
life of the parties, it becomes abundantly clear that situation
is such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be
asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with
other party.
G xxx xxxxxx
(iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deep
H e. (2007) 4 sec s11.
._.
DR. (MRS.) MALATHI RAVI, M.D. v. DR. B.V. RAVI 245
M.D. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused A
by the conduct of other for a long time may lead to mental
cruelty.
)()()()()()()()()(
(vii) Sustained reprehensible conduct, studied neg_lect, B
indifference or total departure from the normal standard of
conjugal kindness causing injury to mental health or
deriving sadistic pleasure can also amount to mental
cruelty.
c
)()()()()()()()()(
(x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a
few isolated instances over a pe'riod of years will not
amount to cruelty. The ill conduct must be persistent for a D
fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has
deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and
behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds it extremely
difficult to live with the other party any longer, may amount
to mental cruelty.
E
xxxxxxxxx
(xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous
separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond
is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction though F
supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law
in such cases, does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the
contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions
of the parties. In such like situations, it may lead to mental
cruelty."
G
26. In the said case the Court has also observed thus: -
"99 .... The human mind is extremely complex and human
behaviour is equally complicated. Similarly human ingenuity
has no bound, therefore, to assimilate the entire human H
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A behaviour in one definition is almost impossible. What is
cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in the other
case. The concept of cruelty differs from person to person
depending upon his upbringing, level of sensitivity,
educational, family and cultural background, financial
B position, social status, customs, traditions, religious beliefs,
human values and their value system.
100. Apart from this, the concept of mental cruelty cannot
remain static; it is bound to change with the passage of
time, impact of modern culture through print and electronic
c media and value system, etc. etc. What may be mental
cruelty now may not remain a mental cruelty after a
passage of time or vice versa. There can never be any
strpitjacket formula or fixed parameters for determining .,
mental cruelty in matrimonial matters. The prudent and
D appropriate way to adjudicate the case would be to
evaluate it on its peculiar facts and circumstances .... "
27. In Vishwanath Agrawal, s/o Sitaram Agrawal v. Sar/a
Vishwanath Agrawa/1°, while dealing with mental cruelty, it has
E been opined thus: -
"22. The expression "cruelty" has an inseparable nexus with
human conduct or human behaviour. It is always dependent
upon the social strata or the milieu to which the parties
belong, their.ways of life, relationship, temperaments and
F emotions that have been conditioned by their social status."
28. In the said case, analyzing the subsequent events and
the conduct of the wife, who was responsible for publication in
a newspaper certain humiliating aspects about the husband,
G the Court held as follows: -
"In our considered opinion, a normal reasonable man is
bound to feel the sting and the pungency. The conduct and
H 10. c2012i 7 sec 288.
DR. (MRS.) MALATHI RAVI, M.D. v. DR. B.V. RAVI 247
M.D. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
circumstances make it graphically clear that the respondent A
wife had really humiliated him and caused mental cruelty.
Her conduct clearly exposits. that it has resulted in causing
agony and anguish in the mind of the husband. She had
publicised in the newspapers that he was a womaniser
and a drunkard. She had made wild allegations about his B
character. She had made an effort to prosecute him in
criminal litigations which she had failed to prove. The
feeling of deep anguish, disappointment, agony and
frustration of the husband is obvious."
29. In U. Sree v. U. Srinivas 11 , the Court, taking note of C
the deposition of the husband that the wife had consistently ill
treated him inasmuch as she had shown her immense dislike
towards his "sadhna" in music and had exhibited total
indifference to him, observed as follows: -
D
"It has graphically been demonstrated that she had not
shown the slightest concern for the public image of her
husband on many an occasion by putting him in a situation
of embarrassment leading to humiliation. She has made
wild allegations about the conspiracy in the family of her E
husband to get him remarried for the greed of dowry and
there is no iota of evidence on record to substantiate the
same. This, in fact, is an aspersion not only on the
character of the husband but also a maladroit effort to
malign the reputation of the family." F
30. In K. Srinivas Rao v. D.A. Deepa 12 , while dealing with
the instances of mental cruelty, the court opined that to the
illustrations given in the case of Samar Ghosh certain other
illustrations could be added. We think it seemly to reproduce
the observations: - G
"Making unfounded indecent defamatory allegations
11. (2013) 3 sec 114.
12. (2013) 5 SSC 226 H
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A against the spouse or his or her relatives in the pleadings,
filing of complaints or issuing notices or news items which
may have adverse impact on the business prospect or the
job of the spouse and filing repeated false complaints and
cases in the court against the spouse would, in the facts
B of a case, amount to causing mental cruelty to the other
spouse."
31. Presently, we shall advert to the material on record. It
is luminous from it that the wife has made allegations that the
C sister and brother-in-law of the husband used to interfere in the
day-to-day affairs of the husband and he was caught in conflict.
The said aspect has really not been proven. It has been brought
on record that the sister and brother-in-law are highly educated
and nothing has been suggested to the husband in the cross-
examination that he was pressurized by his sister in any manner
D whatsoever. It is her allegation that the sister and brother-in-law
of the husband were pressurizing him not to allow the wife to
prosecute higher studies and to keep her as an unpaid servant
in the house. On a studied evaluation of the evidence and the
material brought on record it is demonstrable that the wife
E herself has admitted that the .husband had given his consent
for her higher education and, in fact, assisted her. Thus, the
aforesaid allegation has not been proven. The allegation that.
the husband was instigated to keep her at home as an unpaid
servant is quite a disturbing allegation when viewed from the
F spectrum of gender sensitivity and any sensitive person would
be hurt when his behavior has remotely not reflected that
attitude. The second aspect which has surfaced from the
. evidence is that the wife had gone to the parental home for 1
delivery and therefrom she went to the hospital where she gave
G birth to a male child. However, as the evidence would show,
the husband despite all his co-operation as a father, when had
gone to the hospital to bring the wife and child to his house,
she along with the child had gone to her parental house. This
aspect of the evidence has gone totally unchallenged.
H
DR. (MRS.) MALATHI RAVI, M.D. v. DR. B.V. RAVI 249
M.D. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
Perceived from a social point of view, it reflects the egocentric A
attitude of the wife and her non-concern how such an act is likely
to hurt the father of the child. The next thing that has come in
evidence is that the respondent was not invited at the time of
naming ceremony. He has categorically disputed the
suggestion that he and his family members were invited to the B
ceremony. It is interesting to note that a suggestion has been
given that they did not attend the ceremony as in the invitation
card the names of the parents of the husband had not been
printed. It has been asserted by the husband that the said
incident had caused him tremendous mental pain. View from c
a different angle, it tantamounts to totally ignoring the family of
the husband.
32. Another incident deserves to be noted. The wife went
to Gulbarga to join her studies and the husband was not aware
of it and only come to know when one professor told about it. D
Thereafter he went to Gulbarga and stayed in a hotel and met
the wife in the hostel on both the days. Despite his request to
come to the house she showed disinclination. When he
enquired about the child, he was told that the child was in her
mother's house. These are the incidents which are antecedent E
to the filing of the petition.
33. We have already stated the legal position that
subsequent events can be taken note of. After the judgment and
decree was passed by the learned Family Judge, the husband F
sent a notice through his counsel dated 14.7.2004 and intimated
her as follows: -
"According to the operative portion of the order, my client
has to welcome you to join him with the child within three
months which please note. G
My client's address is Dr. B.V. Ravi, M.D., residing in No.
428. 2nd Across, 6th Main, 3rd Stage, 3rd Block,
Basaveshwaranagar, Bangalore-79 and his Telephone No.
H
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A 23229865. In obedience to the Hon'ble Court order, you
called upon to join Dr. B.V. Ravi to the above said address
any day after 18th of July, 2004, as this period upto 17th
is inauspicious because of "Ashada" ."
B 34. As it appears, she did not join and the husband was
compelled to send a telegram. Thereafter, on 13.8.2004 a reply
was sent on her behalf that she would be joining after 15.8.2004
but the exact date was not intimated. Thereafter, on 14.8.2004
a reply was sent to the legal notice dated 14.7.2004 sent by
c the husband. It is appropriate to reproduce the relevant two
paragraphs: -
"In this context, we hereby inform you that our client will be
comiflg to join your client in the above said address along
with the child on Sunday the 22nd August 2004 as the
D auspicious NIJASHRAVANA MONTH commences from
16th August 2004.
Further our client expects reasonable amount of care and
cordiality from your client's side. Please ensure the same."
E
35. The purpose of referring to these communications is
that despite obtaining decree for restitution of conjugal rights
the wife waited till the iast day of the expiration of the period
as per the decree to join the husband. There may be no legal
fallacy, but the attitude gets reflected. The reply also states that
F there is expectation of reasonable amount of care and cordiality.
This reflects both, a sense of doubt and a hidden threat. As the
facts unfurl, the wife stays for two months and then leaves the
matrimonial home and lodges the first information report
against the husband and his mother and sister for the offences
G punishable under Sections 498A, 506/34 of the Indian Penal
Code and under the provisions of Dowry Prohibition Act. The
husband suffers a day's custody and the mother and the sister
availed anticipatory bail.
H
DR. (MRS.) MALATHI RAVI, M.D. v. DR. B.V. RAVI 251
M.D. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
36. The High Court has taken note of all these aspects and A
held that the wife has no intention to lead a normal marital life.
That apart, the High Court has returned a finding that the
marriage has irretrievably been broken down. Of course, such
an observation has been made on the ground of conduct. This
Court in certain cases, namely, G. V.N. Kameswara Rao v. G. B
Jabilli 13, Parveen Mehta v. lnderjit Mehta 14, Vijayakumar R.
Bhate v. Nee/a Vijayakumar Bhate 15 , Durga Prasanna
Tripathy v. Arundhati Tripathy16, Naveen Kohli v. Nee/u Kohli1 7
and Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (supra), has invoked the
principle of irretrievably breaking down of marriage. c
37. For the present, we shall restrict our delineation to the
issue whether the aforesaid acts would constitute mental
cruelty. We have already referred to few authorities to indicate
what the concept of mental cruelty means. Mental cruelty and
its effect cannot be stated with arithmetical exactitude. It varies D
from individual to individual, from society to society and also
depends on the status of the persons. What would be a mental
cruelty in the life of two individuals belonging to particular strata
of the society may not amount to mental cruelty in respect of
another couple belonging to a different stratum of society. The E
agonized feeling or for that matter a sense of disappointment
can take place by certain acts causing a grievous dent at the
mental level. The inference has to be drawn from the attending
circumstances. As we have enumerated the incidents, we are
disposed to think that the husband has reasons to feel that he F
has been humiliated, for allegations have been made against
him which are not correct; his relatives have been dragged into
the matrimonial controversy, the assertions in the written
statement depict him as if he had tacitly conceded to have
harboured notions of gender insensitivity or some kind of male G
13. (2002) 2 sec 296.
14. (2002) 5 sec 706.
~5. (2003) 6 sec 334
16. (2005) 7 sec 353
17. (2006) 4 sec 558
H
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A chauvinism, his parents and he are ignored in the naming
ceremony of the son, and he comes to learn from others that
the wife had gone to Gulbarga to prosecute her studies. That
apart, the communications, after the decree for restitution of
conjugal rights, indicate the attitude of the wife as if she is
B playing a game of Chess. The launching of criminal prosecution
can be perceived from the spectrum of conduct. The learned
Magistrate has recorded the judgment of acquittal. The wife had
preferred an appeal before the High Court after obtaining
leave. After the State Government prefers an appeal in the
c Court of Session, she chooses to withdraw the appeal. But she
intends, as the pleadings would show, that the case should
reach the logical conclusion. This conduct manifestly shows the
widening of the rift between the parties. It has only increased
the bitterness. In such a situation, the husband is likely to lament
in every breath and the vibrancy of life melts to give way to sad
0
story of life.
38. From this kind of attitude and treatment it can be ·
inferred that the husband has been treated with mental cruelty
and definitely he has faced ignominy being an Associate
E Professor in a Government Medical College. When one enjoys
social status working in a Government hospital, this humiliation
affects the reputation. That apart, it can be well imagined the
slight he might be facing. In fact, the chain of events might have
compelled him to go through the whole gamut of emotions. It
F certainly must have hurt his self-respect and human sensibility.
The sanguine concept of marriage presumably has become
illusory and it would not be inapposite to say that the wife has
shown anaemic emotional disposition to the husband.
Therefore, the decree of divorce granted by the High Court
G deserves to be affirmed singularly on the ground of mental
cruelty.
39. Presently, we shall proceed to deal with grant of
maintenance. Both the appellant and the respondent are
doctors and have their respective jobs. The son is hardly
H
DR. (MRS.) MALATHI RAVI, M.D. v. DR. B.V. RAVI 253
M.D. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
sixteen years old and definitely would require financial support A
for education and other supportive things to lead a life befitting
his social status. The High Court, while granting a decree for
divorce should have adverted to it. However, we do not think it
appropriate to keep anything alive in this regard between the
parties. The controversy is to be put to rest on this score also. B
Considering the totality of circumstances, the status the
appellant enjoys and the strata to which the parties belong, it
becomes the bounden duty of the respondent to provide for
maintenance and education for the son who is sixteen years
old. At this juncture, we may note that a proceeding was C
initiated before the learned Principal Judge, Family Court,
Bangalore and in the said proceeding the learned Principal
Judge passed the following order: -
"Matter is settled before the mediation centre where in D
parties have entered into a memorandum of settlement.
Contents of the Memorandum of Settlement are admitted
by the Parties. Court is satisfied that the same is voluntary.
As per the terms of settlement para 5 clause (i) petitioner E
has deposited Rs.3,00,000/- in the name of minor child in
Karnataka Bank, copy of fixed deposit receipt and R.D.
Account pass book are filed along with memo. Hence
petition is allowed in terms of settlement.
Memorandum of settlement shall be a part of the decree." F
40. Learned counsel for the respond_!3nt would submit that
the amount has been settled. Though there has been a
settlement of Rs.3,00,000/- yet that was at a different time and
under different circumstances. The present appeal was G
pending. The duty of this Court is to see that the young son born
in the wedlock must get acceptable comfort as well as proper
education. It is the duty of the Court also to see that a minor
son should not live in discomfort or should be deprived of
requisite modern education. We are conscious, the appellant H
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A is earning but that does not necessarily mean that the father
should be aQsolved of his liability. Regard being had to the
social status and strata and the concept of effective availing of
education we fix a sum of Rs.25,00,000/- (twenty five lacs)
excluding the amount already paid towards the maintenance
B and education of the son. The said amount shall be deposited
by the respondent within -a period of six months before the
learned Principal Judge, Family Court at Bangalore and the
amount shall be kept in a fixed deposit in a nationalized bank
in the joint account of the appellant and the minor son so that
c she can draw quarterly interest and expend on her son. After
the son attains majority the joint account shall continue and they
would be at liberty to draw the amount for the education or any
urgent need of the son.
41. With the aforesaid directions, we affirm the decree for
D divorce passed by the High Court. The appeal stands disposed
of accordingly but without any order as to costs.
Nidhi Jain Appeal disposed of.
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