Holding

The transfer order was within the State Government's competence and cannot be struck down as void; consequently, the appellant's admission to the M.D. Radiology course is upheld.

Summary

Dr. Ku. Nilofar Insaf and Dr. Devraj Jain competed for a single M.D. Radiology seat at Gandhi Medical College, Bhopal. Nilofar, who had transferred from a Bangalore medical college to Bhopal after paying a capitation fee, secured higher aggregate marks than Jain and was admitted. Jain challenged her admission, arguing that Nilofar's transfer was invalid under the state transfer rules, and that the merit list could be contested. The High Court quashed Nilofar's admission, but the Supreme Court held that the transfer order, though irregular, was within the State Government's competence and could not be declared void, and that Jain could not retrospectively challenge the merit list on equitable grounds. Consequently, Nilofar's admission to the M.D. course was upheld.

Issues considered

The validity of the State Government's order permitting the transfer of a student who paid a capitation fee from an out‑of‑state medical college.
Whether a third party can challenge such a transfer order retrospectively after the passage of time and subsequent events.
The applicability and statutory nature of the rules governing transfers and admissions to postgraduate medical courses.
The permissibility of challenging the merit list for M.D. admission after the lapse of the prescribed period and on equitable considerations.

Subjects

medical educationtransfer rulescapitation feemerit listpost‑graduate admissionequitable reliefMadhya Pradeshretrospective challenge

Judgment

DR. KU. NILOFAR INSAF
A
v.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ORS.

AUGUST 8, 1991

[S. RANGANATHAN, M. FATHIMA BEEVI AND B
N.D. OJHA, JJ.)

Medical College, admission to M.D. Course in Radiology--
Validity of-Rules for transfer of students from other medical colleges
to Madhya Pradesh Medical College-Validity of order of transfer and
its relevance/assailment.
c
The appellant and Dr. Jain, respondent No. 4, completed their
M.B.B.S. course in the years 1983-87. from Gandhi Medical College,
Bhopal. While Dr. Jain had been admitted into that course in the
Gandhi Medical College, Bhopal after he had passed the entrance test,
the appellant first sought admission to M.B.B.S. course in the M.S. D
Ramayya Medical College, Bangalore, after paying the capitation fee
and after completing the first year of the course in that College she got
herself transferred in 1984 to the Gandhi Medical College, Bhopal, with
the approval of the State Government and with no objection from the
Ramayya College, Bangalore. After passing M.B.B.S. both of them
cleared their internship of one year and also joined a house job in
Radiology in the same college and completed the same in August 1989.
Both of them then app!ied for a single seat in the Master's Degree
(M.D.) course in Radiology at Gandhi Medical College, Bhopal. The
appellant having secured higher marks got admission to this seat in
preference to Dr. Jain. Dr. Jain, thereupon, challenged the admission of
the appellant by means of a writ petition before the High Court on the F
ground inter alia that the transfer of the appellant from the Bangalore
Medical College to the Bhopal Medical College was itself invalid and
since the very admission of the appellant to the M.B.B.S. course degree
in the Bhopal College was invalid, she could not at all have been con-
sidered for admission to the M.D. course which was available only to
the institutional candidates. The High Court allowed the writ petition, G
quashed the admission of the appellant and directed that Dr. Jain, be
admitted to that seat. Hence this appeal by the appellant.

Allowing the appeal, this Court,

HELD: The validity of an order for transfer may be challenged H

429
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 3 S.C.R.

A
contemperaneously by a third party whose claim for admission or
transfer is superseded by such order but cannot be allowed to be
challenged by a third party because he finds,. in retrospect, at a
future point ef time, that it has affected his interests as a result of
subsequent events. [4371E]

B The order of the State of Madhya Pradesh permitting the transfer
of the appellant caunot be struck down aS void. There has been some
irregularity but, in the drcumstances in which it was passed, it was one
· within the competence of the State Government. [437F J

There is the need to avoid disturbing settled issues which affect
the life and career of an individual after a lapse of time or after the
c interposition of furthe1r events, as a result of which he has rightly
developed a sense of sec10rlty. [44 lB J

In the instant case, the merit list of 1989 is nothing but a rep-
roduction of the merit list of 1988 confined to a narrower group of
D students of the same b11tch. The latter did show the appellant to have
obtained more marks tl~an Dr. Jain and, in this sense, was adverse to
his interests. The omission of Dr. Jain to challenge the correctness of
the list then lulled the appellant into a sense of security that the merit
list was acceptable to all. Dr. Jain, should therefore be barred, on
equitable consideration from challenging the order of merit at the pre-
E sent stage. [441GJ

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3447
of 1990. ..
From the Judgment and Order dated 26.4.1990 of the Madhya
F Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition No. 4059 of 1989.

Rajinder Sachar, Vijay Gupta, Vivek Gambhir, S.K. Gambhir
and Surinder Kamail for the Appellant.

B.S. Banthia, S.S. Khanduja and S.K. Agnihotri for the 1
G Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

RANGANATHAN, J. Getting an admission into a professional
course has become so difficult and competitive of late that litigation
H instituted by disappointed candidates has become a regular feature.
NILOFAR v. STATE OF M.P. [RANGANATIIAN, J.) 431

This appeal, arising out of such a context, throws up for consideration
A
certain aspects which call for a difficult exercise in balancing equities.
We, therefore, proceed to discuss the facts and issues at some length.

The appellant Dr. Ku. Nilofar Insaf and respondent no. 4, Dr.
Devraj Jain, were competitors fm a single seat in the Master's Degree
(M.D.) course in Radiology at Gandhi Medical College, Bhopal. The B
appellant got admission to this seat in preference to Dr. Jain because
she had obtained average marks of 59.60 per cent in the examinations
of the M.B.B.S. course whereas Dr. Jain had obtained only 58.50 per
cent. Dr. Jain successfully challenged the admission granted to the
appellant in preference to himself in a writ petition in the Madhya
I'radesh High Court. Dr. lnsaf, who .has forfeited her admission in C
consequence of the judgment of the High Court, has filed the present
appeal.

In order to appreciate the circumstances in which the admission
granted to the appellant was quashed by the High Court, though she
had admittedly got a higher percentage of marks than Dr. Jain, .it is D
necessary to set out a few further facts. Dr. Jain and Dr. Insaf both
completed their M.B.B.S. course in the years 1983-87. However, while
Dr. Jain had been admitted into and completed that course in the
Gandhi Medical College, Bhopal, the appellant had initially joined her
M.B.B.S. course in the M.S. Ramayya Medical College, Bangalore,
wrote the first examination and completed the first year of :he E
M.B.B.S. course there. Thereafter, in August 1984, she made an
application for her transfer to the Gandhi Medical College, Bh~pal.
Her request was granted by the Gandhi Medical College with the
approval of the State of Madhya Pradesh and with "no objection" from
the Ramayya Medical College. Thereafter she sat in the second and
third examinations pertaining to the MBBS degree along with Dr. Jain F
and completed her MBBS course along with Dr. Jain in 1987 from the
Gandhi Medical College, Bhopal. Thereafter, both of them cleared
their internship of one year and also joined a house job in Radiology in
the same college and completed the same in August 1989. It was at this
stage that both of them applied for being admitted to the M.D. course
with the result already set out. G

As already mentioned, 1t 1s not in dispute that, if the total
number of marks obtained by the two contestants in all the examina-
tions of the M.B.B.S. degree are taken and reduced to an "effective"
percentage and a common maximum as per the rules, Dr. Nilofar
does get a higher percentage of marks than the respondent. In fact, we H
432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 3 S.C.R.

find from the papers filed before us that another candidate, Dr. Km.
A
lndu Fotedar, had obtained a percentage of 59.04 which was also
higher than the percentage obtained by Dr. Jain. However, she is no
longer in the race for a seat in M.D. (Radiology) as she appears to
have joined the M.D. course in medicine that was offered to her. Thus
it was that the Radiology seat went to Dr. Insaf.
B
Dr. Jain's challenge to the admission granted to the appellant
cannot be a direct one as the latter had clearly secured higher
percentage of marks than himself in the M.B.B.S. examinations. He,
therefore, attacks her candidature for the M.D. course on other
grounds which may be described as collateral or indirect. According to
him. the transfer of the appellant from the Bangalore Medical College
c to the Bhopal Medical College was itself invalid and he urges that,
since the very admission of the appellant to the M.B.B.S. degree in the
Bhopal College was invalid, she could not at all have been considered
for admission to the M.D. course which was available only to the
institutional candidates. The grounds on which the transfer of the
D appellant from Bangalore to Bhopal is challenged by Dr. Jain are:-
-~
(a) The appellant had appeared in the pre-medical test for
admission to medical colleges in Madhya Pradesh. It is not
known whether she passed the test or did not get a sufficiently
high rank but the fact is that she did not get admission in any of
E the medical colleges in Madhya Pradesh. To overcome this diffi-
culty, she joined the Bangalore Medical College (the admission
to which did not perhaps require qualification in a pre-medical
examination) by paying a capitation fee. She has thus circum- .
vented the requirement of a pre-medical test by getting admitted
first at Bangalore and then getting a transfer to Bhopal;
F
(b) According to the rules, no transfer of a candidate to a medi-
cal college in Madhya Pradesh was permissible to students of
medical colleges outside the State who had secured admission in
a college after paying a capitation fee, development fee or dona-
tion in any form. As the appellant had obtained admission in the
G Bangalore college by paying a capitation fee, her applicaion for
transfer to the Bhopal Medical College could not and ought not
to have been entertained;

(c) The rules also require, where a person makes an application
for a transfer to a medical college in Madhya Pradesh, that the
H application should state the grounds on which he got admission
NILOFAR v. STATE OF M.P. [RANGANATIIAN, J.l 433
t
I
in a medical college of another State and whether he had ap-
A
peared for a pre-medical test or similar examination of. that
State. The appellant's application for transfer did not contain
any reference to this crucial aspect which was fundamental to a
valid transfer to the college in Madhya Pradesh;

(d) Even assuming that the transfer itself was not bad, a com- B
parison between the marks obtained by the appellant and those
obtained by the respondent was not a fair or proper one. The
appellant had appeared for one examination at Bangalore and
two examinations at Bhopal whereas Dr. Jain had appeared for
all the three examinations at Bhopal. At Bangalore, for the first
year, the appellant had three papers whereas in the Bhopal ~I- C
lege there were only two papers in the first year. Having regard
to the disparity in the syllabus, the subjects for the examination,
the standards of valuation and quality of teaching the compari-
son between himself and the appellant was not valid. If at iii! a
comparison had to be made, it should have been made by exclud-
ing the marks got by both in the first examination and taking into D
account 0 nly the marks obtained by them in the other two exami-
nations which were CO!Dmon to both.

The above contentions found favour with the High Court
quashed the admission of the appellant and directed Dr. Jain to be
admitted to that seat. Hence the present appeal. E

In our opinion, contentions (a) and (d) cannot stand by them-
selves and test, for their validity, on contentions (b) and (c). While it is
true that t.he appellant does not appear to have qualified in the pre-
medical test for admission to colleges in Madhya Pradesh, it cannot be
said that she has circumvented the rules by first getting admitted to the F
Bangalore college and then seeking a transfer to Bhopal; that course,
if permissible under the rules, was unobjectionable. So also, the last
contention by itself has no force. It is well-known that, in these
competitive days, students are not able to get admission, in the first
instance, in, an institution at their own place and have, very often, to
seek admission elsewhere initially and then try to get a transfer back. G
This is also envisaged by the rules which permit the transfer of a
student only after the first year course is completed. In such cases, if a
valid transfer is made, the position is as if the candidate has completed
the course in the second place and the rules (the validity of which are
not in .issue) permit a comparison of the average of marks obtained by
the candidates m all the ex,aminations after reducing them as a H
434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 3 S.C.R.

A percentage of a uniform maximum. There can, therefore, be no doubt
that such transfers and comparisons can be valid and permissible. The
real question, therefore, is whether there has been a valid transfer op
the facts of the present case.

An annexure has been filed before us-it was also before the High
B Court-which purports to set out the "rules for transfer of the students
from other medical col,leges to Madhya Pradesh State medical col-
leges". Though the High Court and the parties before it proceeded on
the basis that these were "rules" governing transfer, there has been
some controversy before us on this to which we shall advert later. The
following rules are relevant for our present purpose: +-·
c I. The applications from students for transfer from Medi-
cal Colleges outside the State and studying in !st M.B.B.S.
(Pre-Clinical block) will not be considered.

2. Applications of those candidates who have cleared the
D !st M.B.B.S. examination of the university in Anatomy &
Physiology (including Biochemistry) and are studying in
higher classes will be considered provided the College in
which he was studying was a Medical Council of India
approved College.

E 3. Applications of only those will be considered who
satisfy the following conditions in accordance with the pre-
medical examination rules of Madhya Pradesh-
..
(a) possessed minimum qualification for appearing in the
pre-medical examination at the time of admission.
F
(b) is a bona fide resident of Madhya Pradesh as per rules
of Pre-medical Examination of M.P.

(c) was within the prescribed age limit as per rules of Pre-
medical Examination of Madhya Pradesh at the time of
G admission.

Government would consider relaxation of rules in respect
of those candidates who are married to a Government
Servant employed in the Madhya Pradesh State.

H 4. Applications of those candidates for transfer from
NILOFAR v. STATE OF M.P. [RANGANATIIAN, J.l 435

Medical Colleges outside the State will not be considered -A
who have secured admission in a College after paying capi-
tation, development fee or donation in any form. Applica-
tion should also state the grounds on which he got admis-
sion in a Medical College of another State and whether he
had appeared for pre-medical test or similar examination of
that State. ·B

9. The appellant will submit a 'No Objection' Certificate
of the concerned Medical College and the University where
he was studying before his transfer.

13. The applicant will submit his applications with all the
required information first to the Dean, Medical College
c
where he wants to be transferred and the application will
then be routed through the Chairman, Pre-Medical Exami-
nation Board to Government for final orders.

On the basis of these rules, the objections to the transfer raised D
on behalf of Dr. Jain may now be considered:

(a) A submission was made that the Bangalore college is not an
approved medical college (vide rule 2 above) but this is not sub-
stantiated. The document relied upon in support of this conten-
tion is only a list of medical colleges in India published by the E
Health Ministry of the Central Government. There is no mention
in it that only these colleges and none else have been approved
by the All India Medical Council. Also, the list does not be~r a
date. It appears to be an old one and does not refer to any college
recognised after 1979. There is nothing to show that the Banga-
lore medical college was established before that. That apart, it F
appears that the Bangalore college is affiliated to the Bangalore
University. and there is no reason to believe that it was not an
approved medical college.

(b) The objection that the transfer is bad because the appellant
had not qualified in a pre-medical test, conducted either in G
Madhya Pradesh or in Bangalore, does not appear to be well-
founded. While the rules no doubt contain a reference to pre-
medical tests. rules 3, 5 and 13 make it clear that the passing of a
pre-medical test is not a pre-requisite for a transfer. No doubt
rule 4 requires that the application for transfer should say
whether the appelicant had appeared for a pre-medical or similar H
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 3 S.C.R.

test in the State from which a transfer is sought. The omission of
A
the appellant in the present case to mention this in her applica-
tion may be a defect but, in the absence of any clear rule to the
effect that a pass in a pre-medical test is an essential condition for
transfer, it cannot be treated as a vital defect vitiating the
transfer.
B
(c) There is, however, force in the contention that the transfer in
the ptesent case was violative of the first part of rule 4. This
clearly precludes the consideration of an application for transfer
from a person who had gained admission to a medical college on
payment of a capitation fee, development fee or donation. +-
Neither the appellant nor the State contradicted Dr. Jain's aver-
c . ment in the writ petition that the appellant had secured admis-
sion in the Bangalore colllege only on the basis of such payment.
There is, therefore, an infringement of rule 4-atleast in part-
and we shall proceed to consider the effect of the same. But
before we proceed to do so, we should like to digress a little to
D make some general observations.

From the facts stated earlier, it is not clear how, in the face of the
specific provisions contained in the rules, the appellant's transfer was
considered and sanctioned, particularly when the application had to be
scrutinised by a number of authorities: the Bhopal medical college, the
E Chairman of the Pre-medical Board referred to in rule 13, the Uni-
versity of Bhopal and the State Government. It is difficult to believe
that they were not conscious that the limitations imposed by the rules
operated in this case. The application of the appellant (a copy of which
has been placed before us) contained a bare and simple request for
transfer and nothing more and the authorities did not even care to call
F for the details required under the rules before taking a decision, The
respondent has alleged that this was done by reason of the influence
exerted by the appellant's father but this is not substantiated. All that
has been brought out is that the appellant is a resident of Bhopal and
her father is a doctor practising at Bhopal. In the circumstances we
think that the authorities must have acted bona fide on considerations
G of sympathy towards, and the hardship of, the appellant in pursuing
her course of study for a number of years at distant Bangalore. They
must have thought that their decision would only help the appellant
and harm no one. But the facts of the present case show how even
well-meant decisions, whiCh seem innocuous at the time they are
taken, can rebound in the long run and affect the interests of others in
01 manner that could not have been even conceived of earlier. It is,
NILOFAR v. STATE OF M.P. (RANGANATIIAN, J.l 437

therefore, necessary to emphasise that, in matters of this type, the
A
. authorities should carefully and strictly apply the relevant rules.

Now reverting to the question as to the impact of this infringe-
ment of the rules on the situation in the present case, Sri Sachar,
appearing for the appellant, puts forward two aspects for considera-
tion. In the first place, he submits that the rules relied upon for the B
respondent are merely internal guidelines or instructions not having
the force of law and that a deviation therefrom here or there would not
affect the validity of the order accepting the application for transfer.
Sri Sachar may be right in saying this but unfortunately, both parties
and the High Court have proceeded on the basis that there were
"rules" i.e. some instruments having statutory force. No material has C
been placed before us either to support or repel this assumption and so
we will not be justified in treating them to be otherwise. However, we
think that, even if they are viewed as "rules" they should not be
treated as rigid, inflexible and mandatory, having in mind the context
and purpose in whicn they are made. These are rules setting out
circumstances in which the application for transfer will be granted and D
deal with a matter primarily concerning the applicant and the
authorities.

The validity of an order for transfer may be challenged contem-
poraneously by a third party whose claim for admission or transfer is
superseded by such order but cannot be allowed to be challengoo by a E
third party because he finds, in retrospect, at a future point of time,
that it has affected his interests as a result of subsequent events. We
-i would, therefore, hold that the order of the State of Madhya Pradesh
..,. permitting the transfer of the appellant cannot be struck down as void.
There has been some irregularity but, in the circumstances in which it
was passed, it was one within the competence of the State Government. F

The second answer, furnished on behalf of the appellant to Dr.
Jain's challenge is that Dr. Jain was aware, even as early as 1987, that
in the order of merit of M.B.B.S. candidates the appellant ranked
higher than the respondent. Apart from the fact that this was just a
matter of arithmetic, an "order of merit" had indeed been published G
by the University at the time the medical graduates of 1987 were being
considered for house-jobs. Reference is made in this context to a chart
entitled "Merit list for the selection of House Officers, Gandhi Medi-
cal College, Bhopal, for the year 1988" placed at p. 68 of the paper
book before us. This list is incomplete but it contains the names, in
order of merit, of 58 students who had completed M.B.B.S. in 1987 H
438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 3 S.C.R ..

A who had, apparently, applied for house jobs in the college. It sets out
their aggregate marks in the M.B.B.S. examinations with certain
adjustments and also the effective percentage thereof. The appellant's
precentage is shown as 59.60 and his rank as 37; Dr. Indu Fotedar is at
44 with a percentage of 59.04; and Dr. Jain is no. 49 with a percentage
B of 58.50 Sri Sachar invites our attention to the "Rules for Post-
graduation (M.D./M.S. course) in clinical, para clinical and non-
clinical discipl:ines, in medical colleges in Madhya Pradesh". These
rules provide a scheme whereby (a) the marks obtained by candidates
in the M.B.B.S. examinations (sometimes at different collelges and
universities which have different maxima for the examinations) are to
be standardised to a common maximum; (b) adjusted by giving certain
c penalty marks (for example, where a candidate has made extra
attempts in any examination) and bonus marks (where he has some
special distinctions in academics or extra curricular activities: for
example, distinction in a subject or National Cadet Corps certificates);
and (c) determining the "effective marks" and their percentage. The
process of selection of merit candidates for the post graduate course is
0 outlined in rules 8.1to8.3. They read thus:

"8. l Merit candidates in clinical subjects shall be selected ).. 4

from out of those who are completing their house jobs
within that calender year.
E
8.2 Candidates under 8.1 shall be selected by the Dean of
the Medical College, strictly on the basis of merit from
amongst the students passing from that college, on the
recommendation of the college and Hospital Council or the
P.G. Committee of the college.
F
8.3 The merit list of candidates under 8.1and8.2 would be
prepared by each Dean of the College every year and
notified on the College Notice Board. Any objection or
representation received within 10 days of notification
would be considered by the Dean of the College who shall
make modifications, if necessary, after placing the objec-
G tion or representation before the College and Hospital
Council or P.G. Committee."

On the strength of these rules, Sri Sachar contends that the respondent,
not having preferred objections to the ljlerit list referred to earlier, is
H now estopped from challenging the merit list. ·
NILOFAR v. STAIB OF M.P. [RANGANATHAN, J.I 439

We find that there is a good deal of confusion about the relevant
A
facts in this regard. In the High Court, the respondent's case was that
he had duly filed his objections to the merit list of 1989 in July 1989
and well within time. The list that is relied upon by him is a list
published by the Dean which bears the heading "Particulars of the
candidates who have applied for registration in M.D. Radiology for
the year 1989" placed at page 49 of the paper book. It contains 9 B
names (including Drs. Insaf, Jain and Fotedar) and the details of their
period of study and internship. The last two columns are headed
"Effective Marks" and "Effective Percentage". They are not, how-
ever, arranged in order of merit but are arranged on a different basis.
-+ The first four names are of candidates who had applied for the M.D.
course in Radiology, whereas the others had applied also for admis-
sion to M.D. courses in other subjects. It is on the basis of this list c
apparently, that the selections were made and, in his petition for
special leave before us, the appellant also admitted this position. Sri
Sachar, however, contends, that the earlier list produced by him
(p. 68) is the merit list referred to in the rules and not this one which
does not even purport to be a "merit list".

~~ The merit list of 1988 (p. 68) was clearly one prepared in the
context of selection for house jobs in 1988. The rules regulatirig admis-
sions for that purpo_se have not been placed before us. We can only
guess from the contents and columns in the list that they apparently
run on the same lines as the rules for admission for M.D. If this be E
treated as the merit list referred to in rule 8.3, of the relevant rules.
Dr. Jain is clearly precluded from challenging it after one year. But
"' rule 8.3 refers to merit list for selection of candidates for the diploma
-'( course being published every year. None of the parties including the
coll©g!;! authorities have been able to clarify whether (apart from the
list at p. 49 of the paper book) any "merit list" for the year 1989 in F
respect of admission to M.D. courses, on the pattern of the list at
p. 68, had at all been published by the Dean of the college. In this
context, we should'point out that the list earlier published (p. 68)
contained all the relevant details for preparation of such a merit list.
There is nothing before us to show that the procedure for adjustment,
standardisation arid averaging were not the same for preparing a merit G
list for selection of house officers as for the selection of candidates to
the M.D. courses outlined in rule 8.5 (and this appears to be so from
the .adjustment columns in the list at p. 68). The only difference is that
this 1ist is restricted only to the nine candidates seeking admission to
the M.D. course in radiology. Apparently, having regard to the small
number of applicants for the course in question, the authorities merely,.,; 1-1
440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 3 S.C.R.

prepared a short list containing the relevant extracts regarding effec-
A
tive marks and percentage from the earlier list-without calling it a
merit list-and made the selectiions. In the circumstances, we think
that there can be no practical or legal difficulty in treating the list at J.. •
p. 49 as the relevant merit list for the present purpose. Learned
counsel for Dr. Jain is, therefore, correct in saying that, in this view,
B he could and did lodge his objections within the time specified in rule
8.3 and he cannot be precluded! from contesting the correctness or
validity of th.e list on the grounds of delay. On strictly legal considera-
tions, therefore, the respondent cannot be shut out from raising his
objections at this stage.

But, it seems to us, questions of this nature cannot be decided on
c considerations of pure law. Granting that it is open to Dr. Jain to
challenge the merit list, one has to examine whether there are any
limits to the scope of such challenge on grounds, if not of law, of
justice and equity. Of course, he can challenge the correctness of the
order of merit, he can challenge any errors in the marks taken into
D account or the adjustments made thereto, and he can even challenge
the eligibility of any of the candidates for consideration. But there are
abvious limitations to such challenge. For example, it would seem
difficult to say that one can challenge the correctness of the marks that
one of the other candidates has obtained in the examinations and call
for the revaluation of some or all of his papers or to permit a conten-
E tion that one of the candidates has not been properly awarded the
M.B.B.S. degree and that, therefore, his application should be
ignored. Their having obtained th1e marks noted in the list or a degree
of a university or secured a transfer are actual events that have hap-
pened. There may have been some irregularity at some earlier stage
but it does not go to the root of the matter so as to render the qualifica-
F tion void ab initio capable of being ignored, without anything more, at
any time for any purpose. The position may be different where a
person is claiming under a bogus degree. The appellarit has obtained
the deigree after a regular course; the only grievance is that she should
not have b.een permitted to do part of it in a particular college. The
legality or validity of such qualifications must be directly challenged
G and got set aside in independent proceedings. To permit a collateral
attack on them in other proceedings, as here, will be beset with prob-
lems and complications of a far-reaching magnitude. For obvious
reasons, limitations have to be imposed on the grounds available for
such challenge. The need for suich circumspection will be better
appreciated if another situation of a similar nature is considered. Sup-
H pose the competition between the two present contestants had arisen,
NILOFAR v. STATE OF M.P. (RANGANATHAN, J.] 441

not, as it has, just two years after the M.B.B.S. degree, but, say,
A
fifteen years later, when they both apply for a post in a hospital or
Government open to M.B.B.S. graduates. If, in that situation, it
' • .A should be contended for Dr. Jain that the appellant cannot be con-
sidered for the post because her transfer to the Bhopal medical college
was bad and, consequently, that the M.B.B.S degree obtained by her
was not valid, we think the answer to the contention must patently be B
in the negative. The need to avoid disturbing settled issues which
affect the life and career of an individual after a lapse of time or after
the interposition of further events, as a result of which he has rightly
developed a sense of security, has been emphasised by this Court in
.+ Mudgal v. Singh, !1984} 4 S.C.C. 531relying on the earlier decisions in
Makashi v. Menon, (1982} 2 SCR 69 and Malcolm Lawrence Cecil
D'Souza v. Union, [1975} Supp SCR 409. What should be a reasonable
c
period beyond which, or the intervening developments because of
which, such challenge cannot be permitted must depend on the facts
and circumstances of each case.
In the present case, there are valid considerations why Dre Jain
D
should not be allowed to challenge the merit list at this poiiit of time.
We have referred earlier to the plea of Dr. Jain that he has challenged
the merit-list of 1989 within the period of time mentioned in the rules.
Technically, he is right, as we have already held. But if we look at the
position more closely, we find that the precedence of the appellant
over Dr. Jain crystallised as soon as the M.B.B.S. results were
E
published. We do not know whether any merit list of the results of the
examination were published or not at that time but it cannot be that
Dr. Jain was not aware that the appellant had got higher percentage of
-~ marks than himself. At any rate, this became clear when the merit list
was published for the house jobs in August 1988. It is true that the
place accorded to the appellant in that list did not prejudice Dr. Jain in
F
his selection for the house job. Still, the rules of the university make it
clear that the aggregate and average marks in the M.B.B .S. course
would also be material for admission to the M.D. course. The merit list
of 1989 is nothing but a reproduction of the merit list of 1988 confined
to a narrower group of students of the same batch. The latter did show
the appellant to have obtained more marks than Dr. Jain and, in this G
sense, was adverse to his interests. The omission of Dr. Jain to
challenge the correctness of the list then lulled the appellant into a
sense of security that the merit list was acceptable to all. We, there-
fore, think that Dr. Jain should be barred, on equitable considera-
tions, from challenging the order of merit at the present stage.
Another important consideration which prevents us from giving H.
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 3 S.C.R.

any relief to Dr. Jain-even if we accept all his contentions-is this. The
A
M.D. course, admission to which is the bone of controversy, started in
August 1989 and is coming to a close shortly. Though the appellant lost
in the High Court, she was permitted by this Court-though, obvi- A•
ously, subject to the result of this appeal-to continue attending the
classes for M.D. in Radiology. Now she has almost completed her
B course and, \to deprive her of her seat at this stage, apart from
irretrievably harming her, will not benefit Dr. Jain who cannot now be
admitted against the M.D. seat of 1989. This again is a development
which militates against the grant of any relief to Dr. Jairi.
Before we conclude, we should like to touch upon one more +.
aspect. The course of events narrated above will show that Dr. Jain has
c been the victim, partly, of a lapse on the part of the medical college
authorities in properly applying the rules governing transfer and,
partly, of courts' delay in disposing of his writ petition and the present
appeal. In the course of the hearing, therefore, we were tempted to
consider whether we should give some relief to Dr. Jain by directing
the authorities to consider his case for admission to the M.D. course
D atleast this year. On careful thought, however, we find it difficult to
make any specific directions or recommendations for a number of
reasons. In the first place, we are told that Dr. Jain has, in the
meantime, undergone and completed a diploma course in Radiology
and, in terms of a rule recently promulgated, is not eligible to apply for
the M.D. course for another three years, even if he is interested to do
E so. Secondly, as noted already, the rules permit admission in M.D. in
any year only to candidates who have finished their house jobs in that
year and, Dr. Jain having completed his house job in 1989, may not be
eligible to be considered for admission this year. Thirdly, if any direc-
tion of the above nature is given by us, it will operate to the prejudice
of some other candidate who is eligible for admission to that course in
F the normal course. Fourthly, it would not also have been possible for
us-even if we had come to the conclusion that Dr. Jain and not the
appellant should have been admitted in 1989-to direct the University
to carry forward that vacancy and grant him admission to it now. We
therefore refrain from giving any directions to the authorities in the
matter as had been mooted in the course of the hearing.
G
For the reasons above mentioned, we have come to the c.ondu-
sion that the appeal should be allowed and the appellant's admission to
the M.D. Radiology course 1989-91 should be upheld. We direct
accordingly. No costs.

Y.L. Appeal allowed.