Supreme Court of India
DR. DURYODHAN SAHU AND ORS.versusJITENDRA KUMAR MISHRA AND ORS.
- Citation
- 1998 INSC 318
- Decided
- 25 August 1998
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- S C AGRAWAL
Holding
The Administrative Tribunal cannot entertain a public interest litigation filed by a stranger and exceeded its jurisdiction by re‑examining the petitioner’s qualifications, so its order is set aside.
Summary
The Orissa Public Service Commission advertised a post of Junior Teacher (Lecturer) in Surgical Gastroenterology, requiring an M.S. degree with two years of special training in a Medical Council of India‑recognised institution. Dr. D. Sahu, a qualified surgeon who had acquired such training while assisting at SCB Medical College (a recognised institution), applied and was placed on a reserve list. The Government later created an additional post and, on the Commission's recommendation, appointed Dr. Sahu. Three public interest litigations were filed before the Central Administrative Tribunal seeking to quash the creation of the post and bar Dr. Sahu's appointment. The Tribunal held the applications maintainable and restrained the appointment, but refused to set aside the Government order creating the post. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 only "persons aggrieved" may approach the Tribunal; strangers cannot file public interest litigations. Moreover, the Tribunal erred by disregarding the expert opinion that Dr. Sahu satisfied the qualification requirement and by probing the technical qualification issue, thereby exceeding its jurisdiction. Consequently, the Tribunal's order was set aside and the appeals were allowed.
Issues considered
- The Administrative Tribunal under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, can entertain a public interest litigation filed by a stranger.
- Whether the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by examining the petitioner’s qualifications despite expert opinion confirming eligibility.
Legislation cited
- Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985s. 14, s. 15, s. 19, s. 20, s. 21, s. 3(q)
- Constitution of Indias. Article 226, s. Article 227, s. Article 32
Subjects
Administrative TribunalPublic Interest LitigationPerson aggrievedService mattersQualification requirementMedical Council of IndiaAppointmentJurisdictionTribunal jurisdiction
Judgment
DR. DURYODHAN SAHU AND ORS. A
v.
JITENDRA KUMAR MISHRA AND ORS.
AUGUST 25, 1998
[S.C. AGRAWAL, S. SAGHIR AHMAD AND B
M. SRINIVASAN, JJ.]
- Administrative T1ibunals Act, 1985-5.14, 15, 19 and 2(}-Power of Ad-
ministrative T1ib11nals to enteitain Public Interest Litigation (P.I.L. )-Held,
Administrative Tiibunals cannot ente1tain P.I.L.-Constitution of India, Ar-
tic/es 226/227 and 32-Public Interest Litigation.
C
Administrative Tribwzal-Jurisdiction-Technical Question-Held,
T1ibwzal should not ordinwily inte1fere with the opinion of the expeJts and
the concemed authOTities.
D
Words & Phrase~~'Person Aggrieved', 'Service M alters',
'Order'-Meaning of in the context of Administrative T1ib11nals Act, 1985.
The Orissa Public Service Commission issued an advertisement
inviting applications for the posts of Junior Teacher (Lecturer) in several
disciplines including surgical gastroenterology. The minimum educational E
qualification was prescribed as under :
"(a). A candidate must have obtained a post-Graduate Degree in the
concerned speciality/higher speciality or any other e!Juivalent degree or
!JUalification prescribed by the I.M.C/Dental Council of India as the case
may be for all the above posts. F
(b). For the post of surgical gastroenterology, candidates possessing
M.S. (general surgical) Degree with 2 years special training in surgical
gastroenterology from the institution recognised by the M.C.I. are eligible."
The petitioner was a !JUalified surgeon with M.S. Degree in General G
Surgery and had been working in the Department of Gastroenterology of
S.C.B. Medical College, Cuttack as an Assistant Surgeon from 17.9.1987
and was assisting the Professor and Head of the Department of Surgical
. Gastroenterology for about five years during which period he had acquired
the 'special training/experience' in the said subject. S.C.B. Medical College, H
77
78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP.1 S.C.R.
A Cuttack was also one of the institutions recognised by the Medical Council
of. India (M.C.I.). In response to the aforesaid advertisement, the .,
petitioner applied for the post of Junior Teacher (Lecturer) in the dis-
cipline of Surgical Gastroenterology. The case of the petitioner and
another candidate was referred to the Director of Medical Education &
B Training by the Public Service Commission for his opinion on their
eligibility for selection. The Director vide letter No. 1387 M.E.T. dated
20.7.1992 expressed his opinion that the petitioner was c1ualified to he
considered as per M.C.I. rules along with other eligible candidates. The
Commission recommended the name of Dr. M to Govt. alongwith the
advice that it had maintained a reserve list of suitable candidates for a
C period of one year from the date of recommendation. The reserve list
included the name of the petitioner. The Govt. found that the Department
of Surgical Gastroenterology was understaffed and it was not in accord-
ance with MCI Pattern. Hence, the Govt. created one more post of Lecturer
on 25.8.1993 and on the same day, rec1uested the Public Service Commis-
D sion to recommend the name of a suitable candidate from the reserve list.
On 30.8.1993, the Commission recommended the name of the petitioner
for appointment.
At that stage, three applications were filed before the Central Ad-
ministrative Tribunal. The prayers and the averments in all the three
E applications were almost identical. The prayers were for (i) quashing the
order of the Govt. dated 25.8.1993 creating one more post of Junior
Teacher, (ii) debarring the petitioner from being appointed as Junior
Teacher and (iii) preventing the Govt. from appointing any candidate as
Lecturer without requisite qualification and training in the super
F speciality. The substance of the allegations was that the petitioner did not
possess the qualifications prescribed for the post of Lecturer and the Govt.
in order to accommodate him created another post which was not adver-
tised. It was alleged that the appointment was not nnly malafide and illegal
but it was also against public interest and that the petitioner had exerted
inlluence over the concerned authorities and managed to secure the ap-
G pointment. The applications were opposed by the Govt. and the petitioner
on merits as well as on the ground of maintainability. The Tribunal held
that the applications were maintainable at the instance of the applicants
and restrained the appointment of the petitioner as lecturer. The Tribunal
refused to c1uash the G0\1. order dated 25.8.1993 creating one more post
H of Junior Teacher. The Tribunal further directed the Health and Family
DR. D. SAHU v. J.K. MISHRA 79
Welfare Department to take appropriate steps for filling up the post after A
complying with the relevant statutory provisions and issuing a fresh
advertisement through the Public Service Commission.
Against the aforesaid order of the Central Administrative Tribunal,
the petitioner and the State Govt. have appealed to this court. It was
contended that the Administrative Tribunal constituted under the Ad· B
ministrative Tribunals Act, 1985 cannot entertain a public interest litiga·
tion and that the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction in passing the
impugned order by considering a technical question after brushing aside
• the opinion of the experts and the concerned authorities. The contention
of the respondent was that the petitioner did not have two years special C
training in Surgical Gastroenterology from an institution recognised by
MCI for the purpose of giving special training in the said subject.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD : l. The question as to maintainability of a public interest D
litigation before the Tribunal depends for its answer on the provisions of
the Act. The Tribunal having been created by the Act, the scope and extent
of its jurisdiction have to be determined by interpreting the provisions
thereof. It bas .been declared in Chandra Kumar v. U.O.l., that tJie
Tribunals have to perform only, a 'supplemental' as opposed to a substitu-
tional-role' in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 E
of the Constitution. [86-F; 87-A]
L. Chandra Kumar v. U.O.l., [1997] 3 SCC 261 followed and S.P.
Sampath Kumar v. State of A.P., [1987] 1 SCC 124, referred to.
2.1. A perusal of Sections 19 & 20 shows that the Tribunal can be F
approached only by 'persons aggrieved' by an order as defined. The crucial
- expression 'person aggrieved' has to be construed in the context of the Act
and the facts of the case. [88-E] ·
17iammanna v. K Veera Reddy & Ors., [1980] 4 SCC 62; Jasbhai G
Matibhai Desai v. Roshan KumarHaji Bashir Ahmad & Ors., [1976] 1 SCC
671, referred to.
2.2. The basic idea as evident from the various provisions of the
Administrative Tribunal Act is that the Tribunal should c1uickly redress the
grievances in relation to service matters. The definition of 'service matters' H
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. l S.C.R.
A found in Section 3(q) shows that in relation to a person the expression
means all service matters relating to the conditions of his service. The
significance of the word 'his' cannot be ignored. Section 3(b) defines the ·
word 'application' as an application made under section 19. The latter
section refers to 'person aggrieved'. In order to bring a matter before the
Tribunal, an application has to be made and the same can be made only by
B a person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the juris-
diction of the Tribunal. The word 'order' has been defined in the explana-
tion to sub-section (1) of section 19 so that all matters referred to in Section
3(q) as service matters could be brought before the Tribunal. If in that
context, Sections 14 and 15 are read, there is no doubt that a total stranger
C to the concerned service cannot make an application before the Tribunal.
If public interest litigations at the instance of strangers are allowed to be
entertained by the Tribunal the very object of speedy disposal of service
matters would get defeated. The Administrative Tribunal constituted under
the Act cannot entertain a public interest litigation at the instance of a total
stranger. [89-C-F; 90-B]
D
Smt. Amitarani Khuntia v. State of 01issa, (1996) 1 OLR CSR-2, ap-
proved.
S.P. Gupta & Ors. v. U.O.l. & Ors., [1982) 2 SCR 365 and Univ. of
Mysore & Anr. v. C.D. Govinda Rao & Another, [1964) 4 SCR 575, distin-
E guished.
3. The list of recognised Medical Colleges in India published by the
M.C.I. contains the name of S.C.B. Medical College, Cuttack at SI. No. 80.
Thus the said college is a recognised institution. The interpretation that the
F institution should be recognised for giving special training in Surgical
Gastroenterology is erroneous. There is no such rec1uirement in the rule.
[91-D]
4. The Tribunal overlooked that the experience acquired by the
petitioner was recognised to be sufficient to satisfy the rec1uisite qualifica-
G tion of two years special training by the Director of Medical Education and
Training when a reference was made to him by the Orissa Public Service
Commission. It was only after getting the matter clarified, the Service
Commission called the petitioner for viva voce. Once the concerned
authorities are satisfied with the eligibility qualifications of the person
concerned it is not for the Court or the Tribunal to embark upon an
H investigation of its own to ascertain the c1ualilications of the said person.
..
DR. D. SAHU v. J.K. MISHRA [SRINIVASAN, J.] 81
Hence the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by considering a technical A
<1uestiou after brushing aside the opinion of the experts and the concerned
authorities. [91-E-F; 92-C]
State of Bihar v. Ramesh Challdra & Allr., [1997) 4 SCC 43, relied on.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 4215-17 B
and 4212-4214 of 1998.
From the Judgment and Order dated 6.9.94 of the Orissa Ad-
ministrative Tribunal, Bhubaneshwar in O.A. Nos. 1630, 1439/93 and
1614(C) of 1994.
Jayant Das, A.K. Pantle, Raj Kumar Mehta, R.P. Wadhwani, Vinoo
c
Bhagat, Santosh Kumar and (K.C. Sudarshan) for M/s. K.L. Mehta & Co.
for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D
SRINIVASAN, J. Leave granted.
2. Two questions have arisen for decision (1) whether an Administra-
tive Tribunal constituted under Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') can entertain a public interest litiga-
tion and (ii) whether on the facts of this case the Tribunal has exceeded
E
its jurisdiction in passing the impugned order?
3. The facts are as follows:
The petitioner.in S.L.P. 10472- 10474/95 hereinafter referred to as
the petitioner, a qualified snrgeon with M.S. Degree in General Surgery
had been working in the Department of Gastroenterology of S.C.B. Medi-
F
cal Collage, Cuttack as an Assistant Surgeon from 17 .09 .1987. Earlier he
worked as lecturer in General Surgery from ll.06.84 to 17.09.86. From
17.09.87, he was assisting the professor and Head of the Department of
Surgical Gastroente.rology for about five years durine which period he had
acquired 'Special training/experience' in the said subject. G
4. The Orissa Public Service Commission caused advertisement No.
27 of 1991/92 inviting applications for the post of Junior Teacher (Lec-
turer) in several disciplines including Surgical Gastroenterology. The last
date for receipt of applications was 15.05.92. The minimum educational
qualification was prescribed as under : H
82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A (a) A candidate must have obtained a post Graduate Degree
in the concerned speciality/higher speciality or any other
equivalent degree or qualification prescribed by the I.M.C./Dental
Council of India as the case may be for all the above posts.
(b) For the post of surgical gastroenterology, candidates pos-
B sessing M.S. (general surgical) Degree with 2 years special training
in surgical gastroenterology from the institution recognised by the
M.C.I. are eligible.
5. Even before the issue of advertisement the Health and Family
C Welfare Department of the Government of Orissa sought clarification
regarding qualification for appointment to the post of lecturer in the
Department of Gastroenterology vide letter no. 43633/Hd 26.12.90. The
Medical Council of India (for short M.C.I.) in Letter No. MCl-12(1)/91-
Med/21954 dated 27.12.91 replied that the matter was considered by the
Post Graduate Medical Education Committee of the Council at its meeting
D and it was decided as under :-
"The Postgraduate Committee agreed for the appointment of
teachers as Lecturers in the department of Gastroenterology pos-
sessing M.S. (General Surgery) with 2 years special training in
Surgical Gastroenterology which should be in a recognized institu-
E
tion as prescribed by the MCI in recommendations on Teachers'
eligibility qualifications for other similar departments. This arran-
gement is agreeable for five years till sufficient people are available
with the postgraduate qualification in Surgical Gastroenterology."
F It was only on that basis the minimum of two years special training in a
recognized institution was prescribed as part of the minimum qualification
for the post of Lecturer in the case of candidates possessing M.S. (General
Surgery) degree.
G 6. The institution in which the petitioner was working, namely S.C.B.
Medical College is also one of the institutions recognized by the M.C.I. In
response to the aforesaid advertisement, the petitioner applied for the post
of.Junior Teacher (Lecturer) in the discipline of Surgical Gastroenterology.
' Six other persons had also applied for the same post. The case of the
petitioner and that of Dr. P.K. Dehata were referred to the Director of
H Medical Education & Training by the Public Service Commission for his
DR. D. SAHU v. J.K. MISHRA [SRINIVASAN, J.] 83
opinion on their eligibility for selection. The Director expressed his opinion A
in his letter no. 1387 MET. dated 20.7.92 that the petitioner was qualified
to be considered as per MCI rulers along with other eligible candidates.
The petitioner and Dr. M.K. Mahapatra were called for the viva voce test.
The name of Dr. Mahapatra was recommended to Government along with
the advice that the Commission had maintained a reserve list of suitable
candidates for a period of one year from the date of recommendation. Dr.
B
Mahapatra was appointed as Junior Teacher.
7. The Government found that the department of Surgical
Gastroenterology was understaffed as it had only one Professor and one
Lecturer and it was not in accordance with MCI pattern. Hence the C
Government created one more post of Lecturer on 25.08.93. On the same
day, the Government requested the Public Service Commission to recom-
mend the name of a suitable candidate from the reserve list. On 30.08.93, the
Commission recommended the name of the petitioner for appointment.
D
8. At that stage one Chandi Charan Routray in his capacity as
General Secretary, Cuttack Surakhya Committee filed 0.A. 1439/93 before
the Principal Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal at Bhubanes-
war. Another application 0.A. 1630/93 was filed by the Cuttack Surakhya
Committee through Jitendra Kumar Mishra before the same Bench. A
third application was filed before the Cuttack Bench in 0.A. No. 1614 E
(c)/94 by one Ni bas Chandra Mishra. The prayers in all the three applica-
tions are identical. They are for (i) quashing the order of the Government
dated 25.08.93 creating one more post of Junior Teacher, (ii) debarring the
petitioner from being appointed as Junior Teacher and (iii) preventing the
Government from appointing any candidate as Lecturer without requisite F
qualification and training in the super speciality. The averment in all the
three applications were almost identical. The substance of the allegations
was that the petitioner did not possess the qualifications prescribed for the
post of Lecturer and the Government in order to accommodate him
created another post which was not advertised. It was alleged that the
petitioner had exerted influence over the concerned authorities and G
managed to secure the appointment. According to the applicants the
appointment was not only malafide and illegal but it was also against public
interest.
9. The applications were opposed by the Government and the H
84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A petitioner on merits as well as on grounds of maintainability. The Tribunal
held that the applications were maintainable at the instance of the ap-
plicants. As regards the qualification of the petitioner the Tribunal ob-
served as follows:-
"The most important question to be decided is whether Dr.
B
Sahoo possesses the requisite qualification and eligibility for the
post of Lecturer in Surgical Gastroenterology. A perusal of the
clarificatory letter issued by the IMC to the Secretary, Health &
F.W. Deptt. (Annexure-I) would indicate that the prescribed
qualification is Master's degree in Surgical Gastroenterology. On
c account of non-availability of candidates possessing that qualifica-
tion, a temporary relaxation was allowed for a short period of 5
years till doctors with M.S. in Surgical Gastroenterology are avail-
able. In lieu of M.S. in Gastroenterology, M.S. in general Surgery
with two years special training in the discipline, was allowed. For
D interpreting the expression "special training in a recognized institu-
tion as prescribed by IMC'', we would have very much valued the
views of IMC itself. But the views of the IMC who are also parties
to the litigation, unfortunately are not available as no counter or
submission has been filed on their behalf. But it stands to common
sense that special training in a super speciality which is to be
E substituted for a Master's degree in that discipline should be in an
apex-medical institution like the AIIMS, specially notified by the
IMC for the purpose. There is no indication to show that SCB
medical college has been recognized as an institution for imparting
special training in Surgical Gastroenterology. The Government
F counter also does not say so. On the other hand, certain averments
in the government counter that the said department in SCB Medi-
cal College is under-staffed and that it was manned only by a
Professor till Dr. Mahapatra joined as Lecturer, points to the
conclusion that it was not equipped with. adequate facilities for
imparting special training. No doubt Dr. Sahoo has acquired
G sufficient practical experience by assisting the Head of Deptt. for
a long period of six years and the list of publications he has to his
credit, as given in his counter, would support such a view. But it
cannot be said that he has acquired the special training indicated
by the IMC in their letter since the SCB Medical College has not
H been notified by the IMC as a recognized institution for imparting
DR. D. SAHU v. J.K. MISHRA [SRINNASAN, J.] 85
such training in that super speciality. A
10. On the above reasoning the Tribunal granted the second prayer
of the applicants and restrainetl the appointment of the petitioner as
lecturer. The Tribunal refused to quash the Government order creating the
post and rejected the first prayer. The Tribunal directed the Health and
Family Welfare Department to take appropriate steps for filling up the post B
after complying with tlie relevant statutory provisions and issuing a fresh
advertisement through the Public Service Commission. The petitioner has
challenged the said order in S.L.P. Nos. 10472-10474/95. The State Govern-
ment has filed S.L.P. Nos. 18714-18716/95 against the same order. It is in
such circumstances the two questions set out in the beginning arise for C
consideration.
11. These S.L.Ps. came up for hearing on 15.02.96 before a Bench of
two Judges. The Bench passed the following order:-
"Whether a public interest litigation can be entertained by the D
Administrative Tribunal under Section 19 of the Administrative
Tribunals Act, 1985 is the question raised by the appellant- State
of Orissa & Ors? Section 19, inter alia, provides that a person
aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the juris-
diction of a Tribunal may make an application to the Tribunal for
redressal of his grievance. P1ima facie, it appears that a public
E
interest litigant is not a person aggrieved in that sense. The State-
appellant relies on certain obsei:vations made by K. Ramaswamy,
J. in R.K. Jain v. Union of India, (1993] 4 S.CC 119 which are to
the following effect:
F
"Shri Harish Chander, admittedly was the Senior Vice-
President at the relevant time. The contention of Shri Thakur
of the need to evaluate the comparative merits of Mr. Harish
Chander and Mr. Kalyansundaram a seniormost member for
appointment as President would not be gone into in a public
interest litigation. Only in a proceedings initiated by an ag- G
grieved person it may be open to be considered. This writ
petition is also not a writ of quo wmrnnto. In service
jurisprudence it is settled law that it is for the aggrieved
person i.e. non-appointee to assail the legality of the offend-
ing action. Third party has no locus standi to canvass the H
86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A legality or correctness of the action. Only public law declara-
tion would be made at the behest of the petitioner, a public-
spirited person."
These observations were not specifically concurred to by the
other two Members of the Bench (one of us being one such
B member). The Administrative Service Tribunals have been
recognised by this Court to be substitutes of the High Court
and other Courts having had jurisdiction in the matter. The
High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution has power
to issue a writ of quo warranto and that can undeniably be
c sought by any person; not necessarily a person aggrieved.
Would it be otherwise and locus standi being determined
purely on the axis of Section 19, the purpose of creating the
Service Tribunal would seemingly be frustrated. It may there-
fore crop up that the above observations of K. Ramaswamy,
J may attract an exception. In any case, the matter is impor-
D tant in order to define jurisdiction of the tribunal and there-
fore in the fitness of things, should be placed before a three
Member Bench. We therefore direct these special leave peti-
tions to be heard by a three-Member Bench."
E 12. We have heard counsel on both sides at length. Several rulings
have been relied on by them though in none of them, the question arose
directly for co!lsideration. The question as to maintainability of a public
interest litigation before the Tribunal depends for its answer on the
provisions of the Act. The Tribunal having been created by the Act, the
f scope and extent of its jurisdiction have to be determined by interpreting
the provisions thereof. In S.P. Sampath Kumar v. State of A.P. (1987) 1
S.C.C. 124 it was held that the Tribunals constituted under the Act were
effective substitutes to the High Courts in the scheme of administration of
justice and they were entitled to exercise powers thereof. It was observed
G that they were real substitutes not only in form and dejure but in content
and de facto. On that premise the Court held that th$: power of judicial
review exercised by High Courts in service matters under Articles 226 and
227 was completely excluded. It may be noticed that the order of reference
dated 15.2.96 extracted in the earlier paragraph makes a specific mention
of this aspect of the matter. If that view had continued to prevail, the
H approach to the question might have been different.
DR. D. SAHU v. J.K. MISHRA [SRINIVASAN, J.] 87
13. But the law has now been declared differently in Chandra Kumar A
v. Union of India, [1997] 3 S.C.C. 261 that the Tribunals have to perform
only, a 'supplemental - as opposed to a substitutional - role' in discharging
the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. This
Court has held that the powers of the High Courts under Articles 226/227
are not taken away by the Act. It is only against such a backdrop the
B
jurisdiction of the Tribunal under the Act to entertain a public interest
litigation has to be decided. No doubt, it is contended by learned
counsel for the appellants tliat even from the inception of the Act public
interest litigations could be entertained only by the High Courts in
exercise of their extraordinary jurisdiction and plenary powers and as
such powers were not available to the Tribunals, the latter could never c
have entertained such litigations. It is not necessary for us to consider
that contention. As the status of the Tribunals has now been settled in
Chandra Kumar (supra), we will discuss the question in the light of the
said pronouncement.
D
14. Section 14 of the Act provides that the Central Administrative
Tribunal shall exercise all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable
by all courts except the Supreme Court immediately before the appointed
day in relation to matters set out in the section. Similarly, section 15
provides for the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the State Administra- E
tive Tribunals in relation to matters set out therein. Sections 19 to 27 of
the Act deal with the procedure. Section 19 strikes the key-note. Sub-sec-
tions (1) and (4) of section 19 are in the following terms:
S.19 (1) Subject to other provisions of this Act, a person
F
aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the juris-
diction of a Tribunal may make an application to the Tribunal for
the redressal of his grievance.
Explanation: For the pwposes of this sub-section, "order" means
an order made : G
(a) by the Government or a local or other authority within the
territory of India or under the control of the Govt. of India or by
any corporation (or society) owned or controlled by the Govern-
ment; or H
88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A {b) by an officer, committee or other body or agency of the
Government or a local or other authority or corporation (or
society) referred to in clause (a)
*******************
13 *******************
S.19 (4) Where an application h\ls been admitted by a Tribunal
under sub-section (3), every proceeding under the relevant service
rules as to redressal of grievances in relation to the subject matter
C of such application pending immediately before such admission
shall abate and save as otherwise directed by the Tribunal, no
appeal or representation in relation to such matter shall thereafter
be entertained under such rules.
15. Section 20 provides that the Tribunal shall not ordinarily admit
D an application unless it is satisfied that the applicant had availed of all the
re~edies available to him under the relevant rules. Section 21 provides for
a pe.riod of limitation for approaching the Tribunal. A perusal of the above
provisions shows that the Tribunal can be approached only by 'persons
aggrieved' by an order as defined. The crucial expression ' persons
E aggrieved' has to be construed in the context of the Act and the facts of
the case.
16. In Thammanna v. K. Veera Reddy and Other, [1980] 4 S.C.C. 62
it was held that although the meaning of the expression 'person aggrieved'
may vary according to the context of the statute and the facts of the case,
F nevertheless normally, a person aggrieved must be a man who has suffered
a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced
which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him
something or wrongfully affected his title to something.
G 17. In Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar Haji Bashir Ahmed
and Others, [1976] 1 S.C.C. 671 the Court held that the expression 'ag-
grieved person' denotes an elastic, and to an extent, an elusive concept.
The Court observed:
".. .It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact, and
H comprehensive definition. At best, its features can be described in
'
DR. D. SAHU v. J.K. MISHRA [SRINIVASAN, J.] 89
a broad tentative manner. Its scope and meaning depends on A
diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the
statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances
of the case, the nature and extent of the petitioner's interest, and
the nature and extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by him'.
18. The constitution of Administrative Tribunal was necessitated
B
because of large pendency of cases relating to service matters in various
courts in the country. It was expected that the setting up of Administrative
Tribunals to deal exclusively in service matters would go a long way in not
only reducing the burden of the Courts but also provide to the persons
covered by the Tribunals speedy relief in respect of their grievances. The c
basic idea as evident from the various provisions of the Act is that the
Tribunal should quickly redress the grievances in relation to service mat-
ters. The definition of 'service matters' found in Section 3 ( q) shows that
in relation to a person the expression means all service matters relating to
the conditions of his service. The significance of the word 'his' cannot be D
ignored. Section 3 (b) defines the word 'application' as an application made
under Section 19. The latter Section refers to 'person aggrieved'. In order
to bring a matter before the Tribunal, an application has to be made and
the same can be made only by a person aggrieved by any order pertaining
to any matter within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. We have already seen E
that the word 'order' has been defined in the explanation to sub-s. (l) of
Section 19 so that aU matters referred to in Section 3 ( q) as service matters
could be brought before the Tribunal. If in that context, Sections 14 and
15 are read, there is no doubt that a total stranger to the concer:ied service
cannot make an application before the Tribunal. If public interest litiga-
tions at the instance of strangers are allowed to be entertained by the
F
Tribunal the very object of speedy disposal of service matters would get
defeated.
19. Our attention has been drawn to a judgment of the Orissa
Administrative Tribunal in Smt. Amitarani Khuntia v. State of Orissa, ( 1996) G
1 OLR (CSR)-2. The Tribunal after considering the provisions of the
Act held that a private citizen or a stranger having no existing right to
any post and not intrinsically concerned with any service matter is not
entitled to approach the Tribunal. The foUowing passage in the judg-
ment is relevant: H
90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. I S.C.R.
A ".... A reading of the aforesaid provisions would mean that an
application for redressal of grievances could be filed only by a
'person aggrieved' within the meaning of the Act.
Tribunals are constituted under Article 323 A of the Constitu-
tion of India. The above Article empowers the Parliament to enact
B law providing for adjudication or trial by Administrative Tribunals
of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and condi-
tions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts
in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or any
local or other authority within the territory of India or under the
control of the Government of India or of any Corporation owned
c is controlled by the Government and such law shall specify the
jurisdiction, powers and authority which may be exercised by each
of the said Tribunals. Thus, it follows that Administrative Tribunals
are constituted for adjudication or trial of the disputes and com-
plaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of
D persons appointed to public services and posts. Its jurisdiction and
powers have been well-defined in the Act. It does not enjoy any
plenary power."
We agree with the above reasoning.
E 20. Learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the decision of
this Court in S.P. Gupta a11d Others Etc. v. U11ion of India & 01:~. Etc., (1982)
2 S.C.R. 365 and read out several passages from the judgment dealing with
the question of 'standing'. In that case the Court was not concerned with
a Tribunal constituted under a Statute. It was discussing the question of
F 'standing' in a proceeding before the High Court or this Court. That ruling
cannot help the respondents in the present case. Our attention is also
drawn to a judgment in U11iversity of Mysore and A11other v. C.D. Govinda
Rao and Another, [1964) 4 S.C.R. 575, wherein the scope of a writ of quo
warranto has been discussed. That decision will not apply in the present
G case as there was no application for issue of a writ of quo warranto before
-
the Tribunal. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the
proceedings before the Tribunal is in the nature of quo warranto and it
could be filed by any member of the public as he is an aggrieved person
in the sense public interest is affected. We have already pointed out that
the applications in the present case have been filed before the appointment
H of the petitioner as a Lecturer and the relevant prayers are to quash the
DR. D. SAHU v. J.K. MISHRA [SRINIVASAN, J.] 91
creation of the post itself and preventing authorities from appointing the A
petitioner as lecturer. Hence, the applications filed by the respondents
cannot be considered to be quo warranto.
21. In the result, we answer the first question in the negative and hold
that the Administrative Tribunal constituted under the Act cannot enter-
tain a public interest litigation at the instance of a total stranger. B
22.Turning to the second question, even the facts set out by us earlier
would show that the petitioner satisfied the requisite qualifications
prescribed for the post of lecturer. The only contention urged is that the
petitioner did not have two years special training in Surgical Gastroenterol-
ogy from an institution recognised by MCI for giving special training. There c
is no merit in the contention. The list of recognised Medical Colleges in
India published by the MCI contains the name of S.C.B. Medical College,
Cuttack in SI. No. 80. Thus the said college is a recognised institution. The
interpretation that the institution should be recognised for giving special
training is erroneous. There is no such requirement in the rule. D
23. Even the Tribunal has found that the petitioner had acquired
sufficient practical experience by assisting the Head of the Department of
Surgical Gastroenterology in the said college for a long period of six years
and had several publications to his credit. The Tribunal overlooked that
the said experience acquired by the petitioner was recognised to be suffi- E
cient to satisfy the requisite qualification of two years special training by
the Director of Medical Education and Training when a reference was
made to him by. the Orissa Public Service Commission. It was only after
getting the matter clarified, the Service Commission called the petitioner
for viva voce. Once the concerned authorities are satisfied with the
eligibility qualifications of the person concerned it is not for the Court or F
the Tribunal to embark upon an investigation of its own to ascertain the
qualifications of the said person. ·
24. In State of Bihar v. Ramesh Chandra and Another, [1997] 4 S.C.C.
43 a Division Bench to which one of us (S.C. Agrawal, J.) was party had
occasion to consider a similar regulation prescribing qualifications for
G
appointment of Professor/Associate Professor. The rule used the expres-
sion 'two years special training'. The High Court held that the appointee
did not have the requisite special training and failed to establish that he
possessed the same qualification. This Court reversed that conclusion and
pointed out that the said person had received more than two years training H
92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A in the concerned speciality after obtaining the degree of M.S. It was held
that the training received as resident surgical officer by the concerned
person between 1976 and 1980 could be regarded as special training though
. the concerned Unit was not an independent unit but it was having all the
requisite facilities. This Court also referred to the Certificate issued by the
Head of the Unit and other materials on record and held that the condition
B of special training for two years was fulfilled.
25. In the present case we have already referred to the opinion of
the Director of Medical Education in the matter of qualifications of the
petitioner. There was no justification for the Tribunal to ignore the same.
Hence the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by considering a technical
C question after brushing aside the opinion of the experts and the concerned
authorities. There is no material whatever to accept the contention of the
respondents that the petitioner wielded influence over the concerned
authorities or that the action of the authorities was vitiated by mala fides.
D 26. In the view we have expressed above, it is unnecessary for us to
consider the contention of the appellants that the applications before the
Tribunal were not bona fide and the applicants therein had ulterior motives
in filing the same.
27. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The judgment and order
E of the Orissa Administrative Tribunal, Bhubneshwar in 0.A. nos. 1439 and
1630 of 1992 and 1614 of 1994 is set aside. There will however be no order
as to costs.
A.KT. Appeals allowed.
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