Holding

The limitation period under Article 136 begins to run from the date the decree is passed, and the later engrossment on stamp paper relates back to that date; it does not suspend the limitation period.

Summary

In a partition suit, a final decree was passed on 7 August 1981 but was not engrossed on stamp paper until the respondents furnished the required stamp papers on 25 May 1982. The appellant filed an execution application on 21 March 1994, arguing that it was barred by the 12‑year limitation period under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The lower courts held that the limitation period began only when the decree was engrossed on stamp paper, allowing the execution. The Supreme Court held that a decree becomes enforceable at the moment it is passed, and the act of engrossing it on stamp paper merely relates back to that date; therefore the limitation period started on 7 August 1981 and the execution petition was time‑barred. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the lower courts' orders.

Issues considered

When does the limitation period for execution of a decree in a partition suit commence under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963?
Does the requirement of engrossing a decree on stamp paper under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 affect the enforceability of the decree for limitation purposes?

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 20 Rule 6A, s. Order 41 Rule 1
Indian Stamp Act, 1899s. Section 2(14), s. Section 2(15), s. Section 33, s. Section 35, s. Section 40(b), s. Section 42
Limitation Act, 1963s. Article 136

Subjects

LimitationDecree executionPartition suitIndian Stamp ActArticle 136EnforceabilityEngrossmentStamp duty

Judgment

DR. CHIRANJI LAL (D) BY LRS. A
v.
HARI DAS (D) BY LRS.

MAY 13, 2005

[R.C. LAHOTI, CJ., Y.K. SABHARWAL AND G.P. MATHUR, JJ.] B

Limitation Act, 1963-Artic/e 136-Decree passed in a partition suit-
Period of limitation for execution of such decree commences from the date of
the decree and not from the date of engrossment of the decree on the stamp ·C
paper-Engrossment of the decree on stamp paper would relate back to the
date of the decree-Indian Stamp Act, I 899--Section 35.

In a suit for partition filed against the predecessor-in-interest of the
appellants, final decree. was passed on 7th August, 1981 in favour of the
predecessor-in-interest of the respondents. There was no order of the Court D
directing the parties to furnish stamp papers for the purposes of engrossing
the decree. The stamp papers required for engrossing the decree were
furnished by respondents on 25th May, 1982 and the decree was engrossed
thereafte~. The execution application was filed on 21st March, 1994 in the
High Court. The appellant raised objection that the execution application E
was barred by limitation in view of Article 136 of the Act, but the execution
court rejected the objection. That order was upheld by the Division Bench
in appeal, which held that unless and until the decree is engrossed on the
stamp paper it is merely a judgment of the Court and there is no decree
available for execution and therefore, the starting point of limitation in
case of execution of a decre~ in partition suit is the date when the decree F
is engrossed on the requisite stamp papers as that would be the date when
decree becomes enforceable. Hence the present appeal.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: I.I. The In~ian Stamp Act, 1899 is a fiscal measure enacted G
with. an object to secure revenue for the State on certain classes of
instruments. Since a decree in a suit for partition creates rights ~nd
liabilities of the parties with respect to the immovable properties, it is
, considered as an instrument liable for the payment of stamp duty under
the Indian Stamp Act.·
~59
H
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. I S.C.R.

1.2. The Indian Stamp Act is not enacted to arm a litigant with a
weapon of technicality to meet the case of his opponent. The stringent
provisions of the Act are conceived in the interest of the revenue. Once
that object is secured according to law, the party staking his claim on the
instrument will not be defeated on the ground of initial defect in the
B instrument. [368-E-FJ

Hameed Joharan and Ors. v. Abdul Salam and Ors., [2001) 7 SCC 573;
Renu Devi v. Mahendra Singh and Ors., AIR (2003) SC 1608 and Hindustan
Steel Limitedv. Messrs Dilip Construction Company, [1969) 1SCC597, relied
on.
c Shankar Ba/want Lokhande v. Chandrakant Shankar Lokhande and Anr.,
[1995] 3 SCC 413 and WB. Essential Commodities Supply Corporation v.
Swadesh Agro Farming & Storage Pvt. Ltd. and Anr., [1999] 8 SCC 315,
referred to.

·n 2. The engrossment of the final decree in a suit for partition would
relate back to the date of the decree. The beginning of the period of
limitation for executing such a decree cannot be made to depend upon date
of the engrossment of such a decree on the stamp paper. The date of
furnishing of stamp paper is an uncertain act, within the domain,,.purview
E and control of a party. No date or period is fixed for furnishing stamp
papers. No rule has been shown requiring the court to call upon or give
any time for furnishing of stamp paper. A party by his own act of not
furnishing stamp paper cannot stop the running of period of limitation.
None can take advantage of his own wrong. Ttie' proposition that period
of limitation would remain suspended till stamp paper is furnished and
F · decree engrossed thereupon and only thereafter the period of twelve years
will b'egin to run would lead to absurdity. [369-E, GJ

Yeshwant Deorao Deshmukh v. Walchand Ramchand Kothari, [1950)
SCR 852, relied on.

G 3. Rules of limitation are meant to see that parties do not resort to
dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. There is no statutory
provision prescribing a time Jim it for furnishing of the stamp paper for
engrossing the decree or time limit for engrossment of the decree on stamp
paper and there is no statutory obligation on the Court passing the decree
H to direct the parties to furnish the stamp paper for engrossing the decree.
CHIRANJILAL(D)BYLRS. v.HARIDAS(D)BYLRS.[SABHARWAL, J.] 36]
In the present case the Court has not passed an order directing the parties A
to furnish the stamp papers for the purpose of engrossing the decree.
Merely because there is no direction by the Court to furnish the stamp
papers for engrossing of the decree or there is no time limit fixed by law,
does not mean that the party can furnish stamp papers at its sweet will
and claim that the period of limitation provided under Article 136 of the B
Act would start only thereafter as and when the decree is engrossed
thereupon. The starting of period of limitation for execution of a decree
cannot be made contingent upon the engrossment of the decree on stamp
paper. The engrossment of the decree on stamp paper would relate back
to the date of the decree, namely, 7th August, 1981, il1 the present case.
In this view, the execution application filed on 21st March, 1994 was time C
barred having been filed beyond the period of twelve years prescribed
under Article 136 of the Act. The High Court committed illegality in
coming to the conclusion that it was not barred by limitation. [370-B-EJ

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3745 of2002. D
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.11.2000 of the Delhi High
Court in Execution First Appeal (O.S.) No. l of 2000.

K.N. Bhat, R.N. Verma, M.K.Verma and R.S. Rana with him for the
Appellant.
E
Jaspal Singh, Ms. Jayashree Wad, Ashish Wad, Neeraj Kumar and Ms.
Surabhi Madan with him for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Y. K. SABHARWAL, J. Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for F
short 'the Act') prescribes a period of twelve years for the execution of any
decree (other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction) or order of any
civil court. It provides that the period would commence when the decree or
order becomes enforceable.

The question that arises for determination in this matter is when would
G
the period of limitation for execution of a decree passed in a suit for partition
commence. In other words, question is when such a decree becomes
enforceable - from the date when the decree is made or when the decree is
~

engrossed on the stamp paper. Which, out of these two, would be the starting
point of limitation? H

(
_,. .
-----'·
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A The facts are brief and undisputed. In a suit for partition filed against
the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants, final decree was passed on 7th
August, 1981 in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents. The
stamp papers required for engrossing the decree were furnished by respondents
on 25th May, 1982 and the decree was engrossed thereafter. There was no
B order of the Court directing the parties to furnish stamp papers for the purposes
of engrossing the decree. The execution application was filed on 21st March,
1994 in the High Court. The appellant raised objection that the execution
application was barred by limitation in view of Article 136 of the Act. The
execution court rejected the objection. The order was also upheld by the
Division Bench in the appeal. The Division Bench by the impugned judgment
C held that unless and until the decree is engrossed on the stamp paper it is
merely a judgment of the Court and there is no decree available for execution.
Therefore, it held that the starting point of limitation in case of execution of
a decree in partition suit is the date when the decree is engrossed on the
requisite stamp papers as that would be the date when decree becomes
D enforcea:6le.

A two-Judge Bench of this Court found that there was obvious conflict
among the three two-Judge Bench decisions i.e. (i) Shankar Ba/want Lokhande
v.Chandrakant Shankar Lokhande and Anr., [1995] 3 SCC 413 (ii)
W.B.Essential Commodities Supply Corporation v. Swadesh Agro Farming &
E Storage Pvt. Ltd. and Anr., [1999] 8 SCC 315 and (iii) Hameed Joharan and
Ors. v. Abdul Salam and Ors., [200 I] 7 SCC 573 and was of the view that
it would be appropriate that the case be placed before a three-Judge Bench
to resolve the conflict in these decisions.

The contention urged on behalf of the appellants is that the date of
F engrossment of decree on stamp paper cannot be the starting point oflimitation
for the purposes of Article 136 of the Act.

Learned counsel for the appellants contends that there is no conflict in
the decisions. The submission is that the case of W.B. Essential Commodities
G Supply Corporation was that of a money decree and, therefore, any discussion
therein on the issue of enforcement of decree on stamp paper and starting
point of limitation on that basis would be merely obiter dicta. Likewise, the
point in issue, in fact, did arise in Lokhande 's case and only passing
observations have been made therein which are purely obiter. The said
observations were not necessary to decide the issue which was germane to
H the matter. Placing strong reliance on the decision in Hameed Joharan 's case
Cl-IIRANJI LAL (D) BY LRS. v.1-IARI DAS (D) BY LRS. [SABHARWAL, J.] 363
(supra), it is contended by learned counsel that the legal propositions correctly A
laid down therein squarely cover the issue arising in the present matter.

On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing' for the respondents
supporting the impugned judgment strongly relies on th.e decisions inLokhande
and W.B. Essential Commodities Supply Corporation cases in support of the
contention that a final decree of partition becomes enforceable only when it B
is engrossed on the stamp paper.

In Lokhande 's case, a preliminary decree was passed on 2nd August,
1955 in a suit for partition declaring the share of each of the parties to the
suit. The Court by its order dated 19th April 1958 directed preparation of C
final decree on the supply of the stamp papers. On 19th December, 1960 one
among the several parties to the suit whose shares had been declared in the
preliminary decree, supplied the stamp paper for engrossing the final decree
to the extent of his share declared in the preliminary decree and accordingly
on 11th January, 1961 a final decree was engrossed on the stamp paper to the
exte_nt of his share. Other parties to the suit whose shares were declared in D
the preliminary decree did not supply the stamp papers, hence no final decree
was made qua them. However, they filed application for execution of the
preliminary decree, which was dismissed as barred by limitation. The High
Court while dismissing the appeal held that in view of the fact that no final
decree was drawn on stamp paper there was no decree in existence for its E
execution. In this background it was found that no executable final decree
has been drawn working out the rights of the parties dividing the properties
in terms of the shares declared in the preliminary decree. Since the final
decree had not been drawn, the observatiOns regarding furnishing of stamp
paper and engrossment of the final decree thereupon were not germane to the
issue involyed in the said ca:;e. Thus, the-said observations are clearly obiter F
dicta.

Therefore, Lokhande 's case cannot be said to have laid down the
proposition that the period of limitation would commence only on engrossment
of final decree of partition on stamp paper.
G
In W.B. Essential Commodities Supply Corporation's case, the High
Court decreed the suit filed for recovery of money on 8th March, 1982.
However, the decree was actually drawn up and signed by the judge on 9th
August, 1983. Application for execution of decree was filed by the decree
holder on 5th June, 1995. The executing court ordered execution of the H
decree. But, on appeal, the Division Bench of the High Court set aside the
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A order and held that the execution petition was barred by limitation under
Article 136 of the Act. The question before this Court was whether the period
of limitation begins to run from the date the suit is decreed or from the date
when the decree is actually drawn up and signed by the judge.

The Court held that a decree is said to be enforceable when it is
B executable. For a decree to be executable, it must be in existence. A decree
would be deemed to come into existence immediately on the pronouncement
of the judgment and the decree becomes enforceable the moment thejudgment
is delivered and merely because there will be delay in drawing up of the
decree, it cannot be said that the decree is not enforceable till it is prepared
C because an enforceable decree in one form or the other is available to a
decree holder from the date of the judgment till the expiry of the period of
limitation under Article 136 of the Act.

In arriving at the abovenoted conclusion, the Court placed reliance on
Order 20 Rule 6A of Civil Procedure Code which provided that the last
D paragraph of the judgment should state in precise terms the relief which has .i

been granted by such judgment. It fixed the outer time limit of 15 days from
the date of the pronouncement of the judgment within which the decree must
be drawn up. In the event of the decree not so drawn up, clause (a) of sub-
rule (2) of Rule 6-A enabled a party to make an appeal under Rule 1 of Order
E 41 CPC without filing a copy of the decree appealed against and for that
purpose the last paragraph of the juqgment shall be treated as a decree. For
the purpose of execution also, provision is made in clause (b) of the said sub-
rule which says that so long as the decree is not drawn up, the last paragraph
of the judgment shall be deemed to be a decree. Clause {b) has thus enabled
the party interested in executing the decree before it is drawn up to apply for
F a copy of the last paragraph only, without being required to apply for a copy
of the whole of the judgment.

After holding that decree becomes enforceable the moment the judgment
is delivered, which ultimately decided the question that arose for consideration
G in the case, the Court went further and observed that there may, however, be
situations in which a decree may not be enforceable on the date it is passed.
The Court gave three situations by way of illustrations to demonstrate when
a decree may not be enforceable on the date it is passed. The third illustration
is more pertinent to the present discussion, which is as follows:

H "Thirdly, in a suit for partition of immovable properties after passing
CHIRANJI LAL (D) BY LRS. v. HARi DAS (D) BY LRS. [SABHARWAL, J.] 365
of preliminary decree when, in final decree proceedings, an order is A
passed by the court declaring the rights of the parties in the suit
properties, it is not executable till final decree is engrossed on non-
judicial stamp p~per supplied by the parties within the time specified
by the court and the same is signed by the Judge and sealed. It is in
this context that the observations of this Gourt in Shan/car Ba/want
Lokhande v. Chandrakant Shan/car Lokhande, [1995] 3 sec 413 B
have to be understood. These observations do not apply to a money
decree and, therefore, the appellant can derive no benefit from them."

This illustration according to the Court was necessitated because of the
observations in Lokhande 's case. Since these observations have already been C
held to be obiter, this illustration is not of much significance in deciding the
present matter and it cannot be said to be exposition of Jaw. In addition to
this, the decree involved in the case was a decree passed in a suit for recovery
of money and not a decree passed in a suit for partition, hence the question
of engrossing of the decree on stamp paper does not arise.
D
In Hameed Joharan 's case, a preliminary decree for partrtion was passed
on 8th June, 1969 and a final decree was passed on 20th November, 1970.
On 28th February, 1972, the Court issued notice to the parties to furnish
stamp papers and granted time till 17th March, 1972 for the same. The decree
· holder did not furnish any stamp paper, hence no decree was finalized. An
execution application was presented on 21st May, 1984. The execution petition E
was dismissed as barred by limitation as the same was filed beyond twelve
years stipulated in Article. 136 of the Act. Subsequently, a revision petition
was filed against the said order and the High Court set aside the order and
directed the executing court to consider the question of limitation afresh. The
executing court after fresh consideration of the matt~r held that the execution F
petition is not barred by limitation. As against this, a revision petition was
filed before the High Court and the Learned Single Judge of the High Court
allowed the revision petition and set aside the order of the executing court.
Consequently, the execution petition also stood dismissed. The question before
the Court was whether the limitation period begins to run from the date when
the decree is made or from the date on which the stamp paper for engrossing G
the decree is to be furnished as per the direction of the court and the decree
is engrossed on such stamp papers.

This Court in its detailed and elaborate judgment held that the direction
given by the Court for furnishing of stamp papers within a specified date by H
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A itself will not take the decree out of the purview of Article 136 of the Act
as regards the enforceability of the decree. It was held that furnishing of
stamp paper was an act entirely within the domain and control of the party
required to furnish and any delay in the matter of furnishing of the same
cannot possibly be said to be putting a stop to the period of limitation being
B run. The Court observed "that:-

"Needless to record that engrossment of ·stamped paper would
undoubtedly render the decree executable but that does not mean and
imply, however, that the enforceability of the decree would remain
suspended until furnishing of the stamped paper - this is opposed to
C the fundamental principle on which the statutes of limitation are
founded".
•
. The Court has further observed that:-

"Be it noted that the legislature cannot be subservient to any personal
whim or caprice. In any event, furnishing of engrossed stamp paper
D for the drawing up of the decree cannot but· be ascribed to be a
ministerial act, which cannot possibly put under suspension a
legislative mandate. Since no conditions are attached to the decree
and the same has been passed declaring the shares of the parties
finally, the Court is not required to deal with the matter any further
E - what has to be done - has been done. The test thus should be - has
the Court left out something for bei!"lg adjudicated at a later point of
time or is the decree contingent upon the happening of an event - i.e.
to say the Court by its- own order postpon~.s the enforceability of the
order - in the event of there being no postponement by a specific
order of the Court, there being a suspension of the decree being
F unenforceable would not arise".

Thus, even if there is direction by the Court, for furnishing of stamp
papers by a particular date for the purposes of engrossing of the decree, the
period of limitation begins to run from the date when the decree is passed
G and not from the date when the decree is engrossed on the stamy papers
supplied by the parties. '

The Court also held that the period of limitation prescribed in Article
136 of the Act cannot be obliterated by an enactment wholly unconnected
therewith, like the Indian Stamp Act. Legislative mandate as sanctioned under
H Article 136 of the Act cannot be kept in abeyance unless the selfsame
CHIRANJJ LAL (D) BY LRS. v. HARI DAS (D) BY LRS. [SABHARWAL, J.] 367
legislation makes a provision therefor. The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 has been A·
engrafted in the statute book to consolidate and amend the law relating to
stamps. Its applicability thus stands restricted to the scheme of the Indian
Stamp Act.

As regards the bar under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, it was
held in Hameed Joharan 'a case that the prescribed period shall not be allowed B
to remain suspended until the stamp paper is furnished and the partition
decree is drawn thereon and subsequently signed by the judge. Enforceability
of the decree cannot be the subject-matter of Section 35, neither can the
limitation be said to be under suspension. The Court differentiated between
"executability" ·and "enforceability" of the decree. The phrase 'execution' C
was held to mean the process for enforcing or giving effect to the judgment
of the court and it is completed when the decree holder gets the money or
other thing awarded to him by the judgment. It was held that though the
decree may not be received in evidence or be acted upon but the period of
limitation cannot be said to remain under suspension at the volition and D
mercy of the litigant. The period of limitation starts by reason of the statutory
provisions as prescribed in the statute. Time does not stop running at the
instance of any individual unless, of course, the same has a statutory sanction
being conditional.

The reference order mentions that the decision of a two Judge Bench E
of this Court in Renu Devi v. Mahendra Singh and Ors., AIR (2003) SC 1608
would have some bearing. In that case in a suit for partition a compromise
decree was made on 13th February, 1978 declaring the share of the parties
in the suit property. The final decree was engrossed on the stamp paper on
24th May, 1979. Two parties to the decree gifted the property that fell into F
their share by a gift deed. Title to these gifted properties was challenged in
the title suit. The Trial Court dismissed the suit. On appeal, the First Appellate
Court allowed the appeal. On further appeal, the High Court while allowing
the appeal held that donors acquired their separate title in the joint property
only after the final decree was engrossed on the stamp paper i.e. on 24th
May, 1979 and, therefore, they were legally incompetent to gift their property G
so as to transfer the title to the donees inasmuch as before the decree was
engrossed on the stamp paper they did., not have any title in the property .
.·\'<
--·
This Court while allowing the appeal against the decision of the High
Court held that the compromise decree dated 13th February, 1978 being a H
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. l S.C.R.

A decree effecting partition by metes and bounds ought to have been engrossed
on requisite stamp papers. The deficiency stood supplied by the same beir.g
engrossed on stamp papers on 24th May, 1978. The engrossing of the decree
on stamp paper validated the compromise decree dated 13th February, 1978
and it became effective and binding w,ith effect from 13th February, 1978
B itself. Thus, the Court has categorically held that even ifthe decree is engrossed
on the stamp paper on a subsequent date, the decree would be legally effective
from the date when the decree is actually passed.

Learned counsel for the respondents contends that Section 35 of the
Indian Stamp Act, 1899 provides that an instrument not duly stamped cannot
J
C be 'acted upon'. Therefore, a decree passed in a suit for partition cannot be
acted upon which means it cannot be enforced until engrossed on stamp
paper. It is further contended that Article 136 of the Act presupposes two
I
conditions for the execution of the decree. Firstly, the judgment has to be )
converted into a decree and secondly, the decree should be enforceable. It is
D further submitted that a decree becomes enforceable only when the decree is
engrossed on the stamp paper. Therefore, the period of limitation begins to
run from the date when the decree becomes enforceable i.e. when the decree
is engrossed on the stamp paper.

Such an interpretation i~ not permissible having regard to the object
E and scheme of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. The Stamp Act is a fiscal measure
enacted with an object to secure revenue for the State on certain classes of
instruments. It is not enacted to arm a litigant with a weapon of technicality
to meet the case of his opponent. The stringent provisions of the Act are
conceived in the interest of the revenue. Once that object is secured according
F to law, the party staking his claim on the instrument will not be defeated on
the ground of initial defect. in the instrument {Hindustan Steel Limited v.
Messrs. Dilip Construction Company, [1969] 1 SCC 597}. Section 2(14) of
the Indian Stamp Act defines an 'instrument' as including every document by
which any right or liability is, or purported to be created, transferred, limited,
extended, extinguished or recorded. Section 2( 15) defines 'instrument of
G partition' as any instrument whereby co-owners of any property divide or
agree to divide such property in severalty, and includes also a final order for
effecting a partition passed by any revenue authority or any Civil Court and
an award by an arbitrator directin,g partition. Section 3 provides a list of
instruments which shall be chargeable with duty of the amount indicated in
H Schedule I of the Indian Stamp Act. Article 45 of Schedule I prescribes the
CHIRANJI LAL (D) BY LRS. v. HARIDAS (D) BY LRS. [SABHARWAL, J] 369
proper stamp duty payable in case of an instrument of partition. Section 33 A
provides for the impounding of the instrument not duly stamped and for
examination of the instrument for ascertaining whether the instrument is duly
stamped or not. Section 35 provides that no instrument chargeable with duty
shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having by law
or consent of parties, authority to receive evidence, or shall be acted upon, B
registered or authenticated by any such person or by any p~blic officer,
unless such instrument is duly stamped. Section 40 (b) provide~ for payment
of the proper duty, ifthe instrument impou.nded is not duly stamped. Section
42 (I) provides for certifying that proper duty has been paid on the impounded
instrument. Sub-section (2) provides that after such certification the instrument
shall be admissible in evidence, and may be registered, acted upon and C
authenticated as if it had been duly stamped. .

A decree in a suit for partition declares the rights of the parties in the
immovable properties and divides the shares by metes and bounds. Since a
decree in a suit for partition creates rights and liabilities of the parties with
respect to the immovable properties, it is considered as an instrument liable . D
for the payment of stamp duty under the Indian Stamp Act. The object of the
Stamp Act being securing the revenue for the State, the scheme of the Stamp
Act provides that a decree of partition not duly stamped can be impounded
and once the requisite stamp duty along with penalty, if any, is paid the
~ . decree can be acted upon. E
The engrossment of the final decree in a suit for partition would relate
back to the date of the decree. The beginning of the period of limitation for
executing such a decree cannot be made to depend upon date of the
engrossment of such a decree on the stamp paper. The date of furnishing of
stamp paper is an uncertain act, within the domain, purview and control of p
a party. No date or period is fixed for furnishing stamp papers. No rule has
been shown to us requiring the court to call upon or give any time for
furnishing of stamp paper. A party by his own act of not furnishing stamp
paper cannot stop the running of period of limitation. None can take advantage
of his own wrong. The proposition that period of limitation would remain
suspended till stamp paper is furnished and decree engrossed thereupon and G
only thereafter the period of twelve years will begin to run would lead to
'· absurdity. In YeshwantDeorao Deshmukh v. Walchand Ramchand Kothari,
(1950] SCR 852 it waf said that the .payment of court fee on the amount
found due was entirely in the power of the decree holder and there was
nothing to prevent him from paying it then and there; it was a decree capable H
'

370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A of execution from the very date it was passed.
Rules of limitation are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory
tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. As above noted, there is no statutory .~
provision prescribing a time limit for furnishing of the stamp paper for
engrossing the decree or time limit for engrossment of the decree on stamp
B paper and there is no statutory obligation on the Court passing the decree to
direct the parties to furnish the stamp paper for engrossing the decree. In the
present case the Court has not passed an order directing the parties to furnish
the stamp papers for the purpose of engrossing the decree. Merely because
there is no direction by the Court to furnish the stamp papers for engrossing
C of the decree or there is no time limit fixed by law, does not mean that the
party can furnish stamp papers at its sweet will and claim that the period of
limitation provided under Article 136 of the Act would start only thereafter
as and when the decree is engrossed thereupon. The starting of period of
limitation for execution of a partition decree cannot be made contingent upon
the engrossment of the decree on the stamp paper. The engrossment of the
~-
D decree on stamp paper would relate back to the date of the decree, namely,
7th August, 1981, in the present case. In this view the execution application
filed on 21st March, 1994 was ti[lle barred ~aving been filed beyond the
period of twelve years prescribed under Article 136 of the Act. The High
Court committed illegality in coming to the conclusion that it was not barred
E by. limitation.

In view of the above, the impugned judgment is set aside and the
appeal is allowed. Parties shall bear their own costs.

B.B.B. Appeal allowed.
j-

t