Holding

The Supreme Court cannot direct Parliament to enact a law on custodial torture as it would breach the doctrine of separation of powers and constitute judicial legislation.

Summary

Dr. Ashwani Kumar, a former Law Minister, filed a miscellaneous application seeking a Supreme Court direction to Parliament to enact a comprehensive law against custodial torture, invoking the UN Convention against Torture and arguing that such torture violates Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court noted that the matter was already under consideration by the executive and the Law Commission, and that issuing a direction would amount to judicial participation in law‑making. It emphasized the doctrine of separation of powers and the constitutional limits on judicial intervention in legislative matters. Consequently, the Court held that it could not direct Parliament to enact the requested legislation. The application was therefore disposed of without any direction to the legislature.

Issues considered

Whether the Supreme Court can, under Articles 141 and 142, direct Parliament to enact a specific law on custodial torture when the matter is pending before the executive and legislature.
Whether such a direction would violate the doctrine of separation of powers and constitute impermissible judicial legislation.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 141, s. Article 142, s. Article 162, s. Article 21, s. Article 245, s. Article 246, s. Article 253, s. Article 32, s. Article 73
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. Section 330, s. Section 331

Subjects

custodial tortureseparation of powersjudicial legislationArticle 21UN Convention against Torturelegislative directionconstitutional lawjudicial restraint

Judgment

30 [2019]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 12 S.C.R. 30 [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A DR. ASHWANI KUMAR
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER
(Miscellaneous Application No. 2560 of 2018)
B In
(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 738 of 2016)
SEPTEMBER 05, 2019
[RANJAN GOGOI, CJI, DINESH MAHESHWARI AND
C SANJIV KHANNA, JJ.]
Custodial Torture: Writ petition filed under Art.32 of the
Constitution – Seeking effective and purposive legislative
framework/law based upon the ‘Convention against torture and
Other Cruel, inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’
D adopted by the United Nations General Assembly – Prayer of
applicant was that custodial torture being crime against humanity
which directly infracts and violates Art.21, this court should invoke
and exercise jurisdiction under Arts.141, 142 for protection and
advancement of human dignity, a core and non-negotiable
constitutional right – Held: It is true that in some extraordinary
E cases where notwithstanding the institutional reasons and the
division of power, this Court has laid down general rules/guidelines
when there has been a clear, substantive and gross human rights
violation, which significantly outweighed and dwarfed any
legitimising concerns based upon separation of powers, lack of
F expertise and uncertainty of the consequences – However, a mere
allegation of violation of human rights or a plea raising
environmental concerns cannot be the ‘bright-line’ to hold that self-
restraint must give way to judicial legislation – Where and when
directions should be issued by Court are questions and issues
involving constitutional dilemmas that mandate a larger debate and
G discussion – Such directions are to be issued with great care and
circumspection and certainly not when the matter is already pending
consideration and debate with the executive or Parliament – This is
not a case which requires Court’s intervention to give a suggestion
for need to frame a law as the matter is already pending active
H
30
DR. ASHWANI KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER 31

consideration – Any direction at this stage would be interpreted as A
judicial participation in the enactment of law – When the matter is
already pending consideration and is being examined for the
purpose of legislation, it would not be appropriate for this Court to
enforce its opinion, be it in the form of a direction or even a request,
for it would clearly undermine and conflict with the role assigned
B
to the judiciary under the Constitution – No directions can be given
to the executive to ratify the UN Convention for it would virtually
amount to issuing directions to enact laws in conformity with the
UN Convention – Constitution of India – Arts.21, 32, 141, 142.
Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Association v. Union
of India and Another (1989) 4 SCC 187 : [1989] 3 C
SCR 488; V.K. Naswa v. Home Secretary, Union of India
and Others (2012) 2 SCC 542 : [2012] 2 SCR 912;
State of Himachal Pradesh and Others v. Satpal Saini
(2017) 11 SCC 42 : [2017] 1 SCR 658 – relied on.
Union of India and Another v. Azadi Bachao Andolan D
and Another (2004) 10 SCC 1 : [2003] 4 Suppl. SCR
222; Rosiline George v. Union of India and Others
(1994) 2 SCC 80 : [1993] 3 Suppl. SCR 141; Sakshi v.
Union of India and Others (2004) 5 SCC 518 : [2004]
2 Suppl. SCR 723; P.B. Samant and Others v. Union of E
India and Others AIR 1994 Bom 323; Sheela Barse v.
State of Maharashtra (1983) 2 SCC 96 : [ 1983] 2 SCR
337; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shyamsunder Trivedi
and Others (1995) 4 SCC 262 : [1995] 1 Suppl. SCR
44; Nilabati Behera (Smt) alias Lalita Behera (Through
the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee) v. State of F
Orissa and Others (1993) 2 SCC 746 : [1993] 2 SCR
581; Prithipal Singh and Others v. State of Punjab
and Another (2012) 1 SCC 10 : [2012] 14 SCR 862; S.
Nambi Narayanan v. Siby Mathews and Others (2018)
10 SCC 804 : [2018] 12 SCR 51 – referred to. G
Regina (Countryside Alliance) and Others v. Attorney
General and Another (2008) 1 AC 719 – referred to.
Constitution of India: Separation of powers – India has a
written Constitution which is supreme and adumbrates as well as
H
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A divides powers, roles and functions of the three wings of the State -
the legislature, the executive and the judiciary – These divisions
are boundaries and limits fixed by the Constitution to check and
prevent transgression by any one of the three branches into the
powers, functions and tasks that fall within the domain of the other
wing – The three branches have to respect the constitutional division
B
and not disturb the allocation of roles and functions between the
triad – Adherence to the constitutional scheme dividing the powers
and functions is a guard and check against potential abuse of power
and the rule of law is secured when each branch observes the
constitutional limitations to their powers, functions and roles –
C Modern theory of separation of powers does not accept that the
three branches perform mutually isolated roles and functions and
accepts a need for coordinated institutional effort for good
governance, albeit emphasise on benefits of division of power and
labour by accepting the three wings do have separate and distinct
roles and functions that are defined by the Constitution – All the
D
institutions must act within their own jurisdictions and not trespass
into the jurisdiction of other – By segregating the powers and
functions of the institutions, the Constitution ensures a structure
where the institutions function as per their institutional strengths.
Constitution of India: Powers and functions of legislature –
E Held: The legislature as an elected and representative body enacts
laws to give effect to and fulfil democratic aspirations of the people
– Legislature functions as a deliberative and representative body –
It is directly accountable and answerable to the electorate and
citizens of this country – This representativeness and principle of
F accountability is what gives legitimacy to the legislations and laws
made by Parliament or the state legislatures.
Constitution of India: Arts.73 and 162 – Powers and functions
of executive – Held: The executive has the primary responsibility of
formulating government policies and proposing legislations which
G when passed by the legislature become laws – By virtue of Arts.73
and 162 of the Constitution, the powers and functions of the
executive are wide and expansive, as they cover matters in respect
of which Parliament/state legislature can make laws and vests with
the executive the authority and jurisdiction exercisable by the
Government of India or the State Government, as the case may be –
H
DR. ASHWANI KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER 33

As a delegate of the legislative bodies and subject to the terms of A
the legislation, the executive makes second stage laws known as
‘subordinate or delegated legislation’ – In fields where there is no
legislation, the executive has the power to frame policies, schemes,
etc., which is co-extensive with the power of Parliament or the state
legislature to make laws – At the same time, the political executive is
B
accountable to the legislature and holds office till they enjoy the
support and confidence of the legislature – Thus, there is
interdependence, interaction and even commonality of personnel/
members of the legislature and the executive – The executive,
therefore, performs multi-functional role and is not monolithic.
Constitution of India: Role of judiciary – Judges unlike C
members of the legislature represent no one, strictly speaking not
even the citizens – Judges are not accountable and answerable as
the political executive is to the legislature and the elected
representatives are to the electorate – This independence ensures
that the judges perform the constitutional function of safeguarding D
the supremacy of the Constitution while exercising the power of
judicial review in a fair and even-handed manner without pressure
and favours – As an interpreter, guardian and protector of the
Constitution, the judiciary checks and curbs violation of the
Constitution by the Government when they overstep their
constitutional limits, violate the basic structure of the Constitution, E
infringe fundamental rights or act contrary to law – Power of judicial
review has expanded taking within its ambit the concept of social
and economic justice – Yet, while exercising this power of judicial
review, the courts do not encroach upon the field marked by the
Constitution for the legislature and the executive, as the courts F
examine legality and validity of the legislation or the governmental
action, and not the wisdom behind the legislative measure or relative
merits or demerits of the governmental action – Neither does the
Constitution permit the courts to direct, advise or sermonise others
in the spheres reserved for them by the Constitution, provided the
legislature or the executive do not transgress their constitutional G
limits or statutory conditions.
Doctrines/Principles: Doctrine of separation of power – The
doctrine restrains the legislature from declaring the judgment of a
court to be void and of no effect, while the legislature still possesses
H
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A the legislative competence of enacting a validating law which
remedies the defect pointed out in the judgment – However, this
does not ordain and permit the legislature to declare a judgment as
invalid by enacting a law, but permits the legislature to take away
the basis of the judgment by fundamentally altering the basis on
which it was pronounced – Therefore, while exercising all important
B
checks and balances function, each wing should be conscious of
the enormous responsibility that rests on them to ensure that
institutional respect and comity is maintained – Constitution of India
– Judgment/Order – Legislation.
His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v.
C State of Kerala and Another (1973) 4 SCC 225 : [1973]
0 Suppl. SCR 1; State of Rajasthan and Others v. Union
of India and Others (1977) 3 SCC 592 : [1978] 1 SCR
1; I.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRs. v. State of Tamil Nadu
(2007) 2 SCC 1 : [2007] 1 SCR 706; State of Tamil
D Nadu v. State of Kerala (2014) 12 SCC 696 : [2014] 12
SCR 875 – followed
Binoy Viswam v. Union of India and Others (2017) 7
SCC 59 : [2017] 7 SCR 1; Kalpana Mehta and Others
v. Union of India and Others (2018) 7 SCC 1 : [2018]
E 4 SCR 1 – relied on
Doctrines/Principles: Doctrine of separation of power –
Distinction between interpretation and adjudication by the courts
on one hand and the power to enact legislation by the legislature
on the other – Adjudication results in what is often described as
F judge made law, but the interpretation of the statutes and the rights
in accordance with the provisions of Articles 14, 19 and 21 in the
course of adjudication is not an attempt or an act of legislation by
the judges – Legislature itself entrusts the judiciary to lay down
parameters in the form of precedents which is oft-spoken as judge
made law – Such law, even if made by the judiciary, would not
G
infringe the doctrine of separation of powers and is in conformity
with the constitutional functions – Thus, law-making within certain
limits is a legitimate element of a judge’s role, if not inevitable – A
judge has to adjudicate and decide on the basis of legal provisions,
which when indeterminate on a particular issue require elucidation
H and explanation – This requires a judge to interpret the provisions
DR. ASHWANI KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER 35

to decide the case and, in this process, he may take recourse and A
rely upon fundamental rights, including the right to life, but even
then he does not legislate a law while interpreting such provisions
– Such interpretation is called ‘judge made law’ but not legislation
– Constitution of India – Judge made law.
‘The Constitutional Separation of Powers’ by Aieleen B
Kavanagh – referred to.
Legislation: Power/Duty of legislature and judiciary –
Distinction between – Held: Legislating or law-making involves a
choice to prioritise certain political, moral and social values over
the others from a wide range of choices that exist before the C
legislature – It is a balancing and integrating exercise to give
expression/meaning to diverse and alternative values and blend it
in a manner that it is representative of several viewpoints so that it
garners support from other elected representatives to pass
institutional muster and acceptance – Legislation, in the form of an D
enactment or laws, lays down broad and general principles – It is
the source of law which the judges are called upon to apply – Judges,
when they apply the law, are constrained by the rules of language
and by well identified background presumptions as to the manner
in which the legislature intended the law to be read – Application of
law by the judges is not synonymous with the enactment of law by E
the legislature – Judges have the power to spell out how precisely
the statute would apply in a particular case – In this manner, they
complete the law formulated by the legislature by applying it – This
power of interpretation or the power of judicial review is exercised
post the enactment of law, which is then made subject matter of F
interpretation or challenge before the courts.
Interpretation of statutes: While exercising the interpretative
power, the courts can draw strength from the spirit and propelling
elements underlying the Constitution to realise the constitutional
values but must remain alive to the concept of judicial restraint G
which requires the judges to decide cases within defined limits of
power – Thus, the courts would not accept submissions and pass
orders purely on a matter of policy or formulate judicial legislation
which is for the executive or elected representatives of the people
to enact.
H
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) 1 SCC 416 :
[1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 284; Sunil Batra v. Delhi
Administration and Others (1978) 4 SCC 494 : 1979
(1) SCR 392; Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator,
Union Territory of Delhi and Others (1981) 1 SCC 608
B : 1981 (2) SCR 516; K.S. Puttaswamy and Another v.
Union of India and Others (2017) 10 SCC 1 : [2017]
10 SCR 569; Romila Thapar and Others v. Union of
India and Others (2018) 10 SCC 753 : [2018] 11 SCR
951; Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India and
C Others (2018) 9 SCC 501 : [2018] 9 SCR 291; Vishaka
and Others v. State of Rajasthan and Others (1997) 6
SCC 241 : [1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 404; Vineet Narain
and Others v. Union of India and Another (1998) 1
SCC 226 : [1997] 6 Suppl. SCR 595; Destruction of
Public and Private Properties, In RE v. State of Andhra
D
Pradesh and Others (2009) 5 SCC 212; Lakshmi Kant
Pandey v. Union of India (1984) 2 SCC 244; State of
West Bengal and Others v. Sampat Lal and Others
(1985) 1 SCC 317; K. Veeraswami v. Union of India
and Others (1991) 3 SCC 655:; Delhi Judicial Service
E Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi v. State of Gujarat
and Others (1991) 4 SCC 406; Mahender Chawla and
Others v. Union of India and Others (2018) SCC Online
2679; Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. and Another v.
Broach Borough Municipality and Others (1969) 2 SCC
F 283 : [1970] 1 SCR 388; Union of India v. V. Sriharan
alias Murugan and Others (2016) 7 SCC 1 : [2015] 14
SCR 613; P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka
(2002) 4 SCC 578; Bhim Singh v. Union of India (2010)
5 SCC 538 : [2010] 6 SCR 218; Manoj Narula v. Union
G of India (2014) 9 SCC 1: [2014] 9 SCR 965; Gainda
Ram and Others v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and
Others (2010) 10 SCC 715 : [2010] 12 SCR 996;
Common Cause: A Registered Society v. Union of India
(2017) 7 SCC 158 : [2017] 3 SCR 291 – referred to.
H
DR. ASHWANI KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER 37

Case Law Reference A
[1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 284 referred to Para 4
[1979] 1 SCR 392 referred to Para 4
[1981] 2 SCR 516 referred to Para 4
[2017] 10 SCR 569 referred to Para 4 B
[2018] 11 SCR 951 referred to Para 4
[2018] 9 SCR 291 referred to Para 4
[1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 404 referred to Para 4
[1997] 6 Suppl. SCR 595 referred to Para 4
C
(2009) 5 SCC 212 referred to Para 4
(1984) 2 SCC 244 referred to Para 4
(1985) 1 SCC 317 referred to Para 4
(1991) 3 SCC 655 referred to Para 4
D
(1991) 4 SCC 406 referred to Para 4
(2018) SCC Online 2679 referred to Para 4
[1973] 0 Suppl. SCR 1 followed Para 14
[1978] 1 SCR 1 followed Para 14
E
[2007] 1 SCR 706 followed Para 14
[2014] 12 SCR 875 followed Para 14
[1970] 1 SCR 388 referred to Para 14
[2017] 7 SCR 1 relied on Para 15
[2018] 4 SCR 1 relied on Para 16 F
[2015] 14 SCR 613 referred to Para 21
(2002) 4 SCC 578 referred to Para 22
[2010] 6 SCR 218 referred to Para 24
[1989] 3 SCR 488 relied on Para 28 G
[2012] 2 SCR 912 relied on Para 29
[2017] 1 SCR 658 relied on Para 30
[2014] 9 SCR 965 referred to Para 30
[2010] 12 SCR 996 referred to Para 30 H
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A [2017] 3 SCR 291 referred to Para 31
[2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 222 referred to Para 34
[1993] 3 Suppl. SCR 141 referred to Para 34
[2004] 2 Suppl. SCR 723 referred to Para 34
B AIR 1994 Bom 323 referred to Para 34
[1983] 2 SCR 337 referred to Para 35
[1993] 2 SCR 581 referred to Para 36
[1995] 1 Suppl. SCR 44 referred to Para 36
C
[2018] 12 SCR 51 referred to Para 39
[2012] 14 SCR 862 referred to Para 40
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Miscellaneous Application
No. 2560 of 2018. Writ Petition (Civil) No. 738 of 2016
D
Mr. Colin Gonsalves, Sr. Adv. (AC)
K. K. Venugopal, AG, Ms. Madhavi Divan, ASG, Ms. Divia Bang,
Ms. Raushan Tara Jaswal, Ms. Tanushree Nigam, R. Balasubramanian,
Ms. Shraddha Deshmukh, B. V. Balram Das, Siddhesh Kotwal,
E Ms. Bansuri Swaraj, Ms. Shreya Bhatnagar, Raghunatha Sethupathy,
Gagan Narang, Ms. Arshiya Ghose, Ms. Astha Sharma, Ms. Shobha
Gupta, Sourav Roy, Ms. Swarupama Chaturvedi, Anoop Kandari, Nishant
R. Katneshwarkar, V. N. Raghupathy, Sibo Sankar Mishra, Niranjan
Sahu, Leishangthem Roshmani Kh., Ms. Anupama Ngangom,
Ms. Maibam Babina, M. Yogesh Kanna, S. Partha Sarathi, S. Raja
F Rajeshwaran, Shuvodeep Roy, Kabir Shankar Bose, Rijuk Sarkar, K. V.
Jagdishvaran, Mrs. G. Indira, Suhaan Mukerji, Ms. Astha Sharma, Amit
Verma, Ms. Dimple Nagpal, (For M/s PLR Chambers & Co.), M. Shoeb
Alam, Ujjwal Singh, Gautam Prabhakar, Mojahid Karim Khan,
Mrs. K. Enatoli Sema, Amit Kumar Singh, Ms. Aruna Mathur, Avneesh
G Arputham, Ms. Anuradha Arputham, Ms. Geetanjali, G. Prakash, Jishnu
M. L., Mrs. Priyanka Prakash, Mrs. Beena Prakash, V. G. Pragasam,
S. Prabu Ramasubramanian, S. Manuraj, Advs. for the appearing parties.
Dr. Ashwini Kumar- Applicant-in-person.

H
DR. ASHWANI KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER 39

The Order of the Court was passed by A
SANJIV KHANNA, J.
1. This order would dispose of Miscellaneous Application No.
2560 of 2018 filed by Dr. Ashwani Kumar, applicant in-person, who is a
senior advocate and a former Law Minister and Member of Parliament,
praying for the following relief: B
“In the aforesaid premises, it is therefore respectfully prayed that
since no action has been taken by the Government pursuant to
the statement of the Hon’ble Attorney General, the stand taken
by the National Human Rights Commission and the Law
Commission of India in its report of October 2017 and because C
the merit of the prayer is virtually admitted and conceded before
this Hon’ble Court, the National Human Rights Commission, the
Law Commission of India and by Select Committee of Parliament,
as an integral constituent of the right to life with dignity under
Article 21, this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to direct the Central
Government to enact a suitable stand-alone, comprehensive D
legislation against custodial torture as it has directed in the case
of mob violence/lynching vide its judgment 17th July 2018.”
2. The applicant had filed the above-captioned Writ Petition (Civil)
No. 738 of 2016 under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for an
effective and purposive legislative framework/law based upon the E
‘Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment’ (“UN Convention”, for short) adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly and opened for signature, ratification
and accession on 10 th December 1984. India had signed the UN
Convention on 14th October 1997. However, India has not ratified the
F
UN Convention.
3. Writ Petition (Civil) No. 738 of 2016 was disposed of vide
order dated 27th November 2017, which reads as under:
“Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned Attorney General for India submitted
that the prayer made in the writ petition has been the subject G
matter of discussion in the Law Commission and the Law
Commission has already made certain recommendations. He
would further submit that the report is being seriously considered
by the Government. In view of the aforesaid statement, we do

H
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A not intend to keep this writ petition pending and it is accordingly
disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.”
4. The applicant predicating his case on the right to life and liberty
and judgments of this Court had argued that custodial torture being crime
against humanity which directly infracts and violates Article 21 of the
B Constitution, this Court should invoke and exercise jurisdiction under
Articles 141 and 142 of the Constitution for the protection and
advancement of human dignity, a core and non-negotiable constitutional
right. In D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal1 custodial torture and violence
was described as a wound inflicted on the soul, so painful and paralysing
that it engenders fear, rage, hatred and despair, and denigrates the
C individual. In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration and Others2, this
Court had observed that the prisoners have enforceable liberties, though
devalued but never demonetised and, therefore, it is within the jurisdictional
reach and range of this Court’s writ to deal with prison and police caprice
and cruelty. Similarly, in Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator,
D Union Territory of Delhi and Others3, this Court had observed that
torture in any form is inhuman, degrading and offensive to human dignity
and constitutes an inroad into the right to life and is prohibited by Article
21 of the Constitution, for no law authorises and no procedure permits
torture or cruelty, inhuman or degrading treatment. Reference was made
to Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 7
E of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which prohibits
torture in all forms in absolute terms. Recently, in K.S. Puttaswamy
and Another v. Union of India and Others4 this Court had once again
emphased on the right to human dignity which, first and foremost, means
the dignity of each human being ‘as a human being’. When human dignity
F in a person’s life is infringed and physical or mental welfare is negated
and harmed, the Court would intervene to protect and safeguard
constitutional values. Reference was also made to the decision in Romila
Thapar and Others v. Union of India and Others5 claiming that despite
existing law and repeated judicial decisions, custodial torture still remains
rampant and widespread in India. Our attention was drawn to the report
G of Asian Centre for Human Rights which was based, inter alia, on the
1
(1997) 1 SCC 416
2
(1978) 4 SCC 494
3
(1981) 1 SCC 608
4
(2017) 10 SCC 1
5
H (2018) 10 SCC 753
DR. ASHWANI KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER 41
[SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

information and data furnished by the Government of India in Parliament, A
acknowledging 1674 custodial deaths, including 1530 deaths in judicial
custody and 144 deaths in police custody during the period 1st April 2017
to 28 th February 2018. India has consistently and unequivocally
condemned and deprecated custodial torture at international forums and
has signed the UN Convention but the Government’s reluctance to ratify
B
the UN Convention, which envisages a comprehensive and standalone
legislation, it was argued, is baffling and unintelligible. Indian statutory
law at present is not in harmony and falls short on several accounts, both
procedurally and substantively, with the UN Convention and, thus, there
is an urgent and immediate need for an all-embracing standalone
enactment based on the UN Convention. Articles 51(c) and 253 of the C
Constitution underscore the ‘constitutional imperative’ of aligning domestic
laws with international law and obligations. The legislation as prayed, it
was submitted, would fulfil the constitutional obligations of the Government
of India and the constitutional goals which the Government ought to
achieve. Accordingly, the directions as prayed for would not entrench
D
upon Parliament’s domain to enact laws as they directly relate to the
protection and preservation of human rights. The directions are justified
and necessary in view of the delay and inaction in enacting the law,
notwithstanding the recommendations made by the National Human
Rights Commission, report of the Law Commission of India in October
2017, and report of the Select Committee of Parliament dated 2th E
December 2010 and repeated commitments made by the Indian
Government. Reference was made to Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union
of India and Others6 wherein this Court had highlighted the need for
enactment of a suitable legislation to deal with mob violence/lynching in
the country. Reliance was placed on judgments of this Court in Vishaka
F
and Others v. State of Rajasthan and Others7, Vineet Narain and
Others v. Union of India and Another8, Destruction of Public and
Private Properties, In RE v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others9,
Lakshmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India10, State of West Bengal and
Others v. Sampat Lal and Others11, K. Veeraswami v. Union of India
G
6
(2018) 9 SCC 501
7
(1997) 6 SCC 241
8
(1998) 1 SCC 226
9
(2009) 5 SCC 212
10
(1984) 2 SCC 244
11
(1985) 1 SCC 317
H
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A and Others12 and Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari
Court, Delhi v. State of Gujarat and Others13. While referring to
Mahender Chawla and Others v. Union of India and Others14, and
other decisions including Tehseen S. Poonawalla (supra), it was argued
that this Court has not flinched from suggesting, recommending, advising,
guiding and directing the Government of India with respect to statutory
B
enactments. It was submitted that the delay and inaction in implementing
the constitutional obligation relates back to the year 1997 when India
had signed the UN Convention, but the Government has failed to enact
a comprehensive legislation despite commitments and recommendations
made and noticed above. This, it was submitted, reflects unreasonable
C and unacceptable conduct of the Government in shielding infringement
of Article 21 and violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Thus,
the Court may issue directions to the Union of India to enact a law
dealing with custodial torture in terms of the U.N. Convention.
5. It may be noted here that the applicant was the Chairperson of
D the Select Committee of the Rajya Sabha that had submitted the report
on custodial torture depicting the need for a comprehensive standalone
legislation.
6. Respondent No.1 – Union of India, in its response, has stated
that the draft legislation prepared on the basis of the Law Commission’s
E report is under active consideration and was referred to stakeholders,
that is, the States and Union Territories for their inputs and suggestions.
It was highlighted that the ‘Criminal Laws’ and the ‘Criminal Procedure’
fall in the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of
India and, therefore, comments and views of the State Governments/
Union Territories were solicited on the recommendations made by the
F Law Commission of India. There may have been some delay as some
States did not furnish their response, albeit the Union of India took steps
by sending reminders on 27th June 2018, 27th November 2018 and 20th
December 2018. Subsequent affidavit dated 12th February 2019 discloses
that all States and Union Territories have filed their inputs/suggestions
G and that the question of enacting a legislation is under consideration. A
legislation of this nature given the nuances, niceties and spectrum of
divergent views and choices is a complex and challenging task. Laws
12
(1991) 3 SCC 655
13
(1991) 4 SCC 406
14
H (2018) SCC Online 2679
DR. ASHWANI KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER 43
[SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

are legislated after due debate, deliberation and once the required A
consensus is formed. Any direction by this Court requiring the Parliament
to frame a law or modify an enactment in a particular manner would
violate doctrine of separation of powers, a basic feature of the
Constitution. Parliament as an elected body representing the citizenry is
bestowed with constitutional power to enact laws, which create rights,
B
obligations and duties with attendant penalties. Existing municipal laws
governing the field as interpreted by the Courts apply in matters of
custodial torture.
7. We have in addition to Dr. Ashwani Kumar and Mr. K.K.
Venugopal, learned Attorney General of India, heard Mr. Colin Gonsalves,
senior advocate and amicus curiae, and Ms. Shobha Gupta, counsel for C
the National Human Rights Commission, the second respondent before
us.
8. At the outset, we must clarify that by the present order, we
would be deciding a very limited controversy, viz. the prayer of the
applicant that this Court should direct Parliament to enact a standalone D
and comprehensive legislation against custodial torture based on the UN
Convention. The prayer made requires the Court to examine and answer
the question that whether within the constitutional scheme, this Court
can and should issue any direction to the Parliament to enact a new law
based on the UN Convention. E
9. Classical or pure theory of rigid separation of powers as
advocated by Montesquieu which forms the bedrock of the American
Constitution is clearly inapplicable to parliamentary form of democracy
as it exists in India and Britain, for the executive and legislative wings in
terms of the powers and functions they exercise are linked and overlap F
and the personnel they equip are to an extent common. However, unlike
Britain, India has a written Constitution, which is supreme and adumbrates
as well as divides powers, roles and functions of the three wings of the
State – the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. These divisions
are boundaries and limits fixed by the Constitution to check and prevent
transgression by any one of the three branches into the powers, functions G
and tasks that fall within the domain of the other wing. The three branches
have to respect the constitutional division and not disturb the allocation
of roles and functions between the triad. Adherence to the constitutional
scheme dividing the powers and functions is a guard and check against
potential abuse of power and the rule of law is secured when each H
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A branch observes the constitutional limitations to their powers, functions
and roles.
10. Modern theory of separation of powers does not accept that
the three branches perform mutually isolated roles and functions and
accepts a need for coordinated institutional effort for good governance,
B albeit emphasises on benefits of division of power and labour by accepting
the three wings do have separate and distinct roles and functions that
are defined by the Constitution. All the institutions must act within their
own jurisdiction and not trespass into the jurisdiction of the other. Beyond
this, each branch must support each other in the general interest of good
governance. This separation ensures the rule of law in at least two ways.
C It gives constitutional and institutional legitimacy to the decisions by each
branch, that is, enactments passed by the legislature, orders and policy
decisions taken by the executive and adjudication and judgments
pronounced by the judiciary in exercise of the power of judicial review
on validity of legislation and governmental action. By segregating the
D powers and functions of the institutions, the Constitution ensures a
structure where the institutions function as per their institutional strengths.
Secondly, and somewhat paradoxically, it creates a system of checks
and balances as the Constitution provides a degree of latitude for
interference by each branch into the functions and tasks performed by
the other branch. It checks concentration of power in a particular branch
E or an institution.
11. The legislature as an elected and representative body enacts
laws to give effect to and fulfil democratic aspirations of the people.
The procedures applied are designed to give careful thought and
consideration to wide and divergent interests, voices and all shades of
F opinion from different social and political groups. Legislature functions
as a deliberative and representative body. It is directly accountable and
answerable to the electorate and citizens of this country. This
representativeness and principle of accountability is what gives legitimacy
to the legislations and laws made by Parliament or the state legislatures.
G Article 245 of the Constitution empowers Parliament and the state
legislatures to enact laws for the whole or a part of the territory of India,
and for the whole or a part of the State respectively, after due debate
and discussion in Parliament/ the state assembly.
12. The executive has the primary responsibility of formulating
H government policies and proposing legislations which when passed by
DR. ASHWANI KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER 45
[SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

the legislature become laws. By virtue of Articles 73 and 162 of the A
Constitution, the powers and functions of the executive are wide and
expansive, as they cover matters in respect of which Parliament/state
legislature can make laws and vests with the executive the authority and
jurisdiction exercisable by the Government of India or the State
Government, as the case may be. As a delegate of the legislative bodies
B
and subject to the terms of the legislation, the executive makes second
stage laws known as ‘subordinate or delegated legislation’. In fields
where there is no legislation, the executive has the power to frame
policies, schemes, etc., which is co-extensive with the power of Parliament
or the state legislature to make laws. At the same time, the political
executive is accountable to the legislature and holds office till they enjoy C
the support and confidence of the legislature. Thus, there is
interdependence, interaction and even commonality of personnel/
members of the legislature and the executive. The executive, therefore,
performs multi-functional role and is not monolithic. Notwithstanding
this multifunctional and pervasive role, the constitutional scheme ensures
D
that within this interdependence, there is a degree of separation that
acts as a mechanism to check interference and protect the non-political
executive. Part XIV of the Constitution relates to “Services under the
Union and the States”, i.e., recruitment, tenure, terms and conditions of
service, etc., of persons serving the Union or a State and accords them
a substantial degree of protection. “Office of profit” bar, as applicable to E
legislators and prescribed vide Articles 102 and 191, is to ensure separation
and independence between the legislature and the executive.
13. The most significant impact of the doctrine of separation of
powers is seen and felt in terms of the institutional independence of the
judiciary from other organs of the State. Judiciary, in terms of personnel, F
the Judges, is independent. Judges unlike members of the legislature
represent no one, strictly speaking not even the citizens. Judges are not
accountable and answerable as the political executive is to the legislature
and the elected representatives are to the electorate. This independence
ensures that the judges perform the constitutional function of safeguarding
the supremacy of the Constitution while exercising the power of judicial G
review in a fair and even-handed manner without pressure and favours.
As an interpreter, guardian and protector of the Constitution, the judiciary
checks and curbs violation of the Constitution by the Government when
they overstep their constitutional limits, violate the basic structure of the
Constitution, infringe fundamental rights or act contrary to law. Power H
46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A of judicial review has expanded taking within its ambit the concept of
social and economic justice. Yet, while exercising this power of judicial
review, the courts do not encroach upon the field marked by the
Constitution for the legislature and the executive, as the courts examine
legality and validity of the legislation or the governmental action, and not
the wisdom behind the legislative measure or relative merits or demerits
B
of the governmental action. Neither does the Constitution permit the
courts to direct, advise or sermonise others in the spheres reserved for
them by the Constitution, provided the legislature or the executive do not
transgress their constitutional limits or statutory conditions. Referring to
the phrase “all power is of an encroaching nature”, which the judiciary
C checks while exercising the power of judicial review, it has been
observed15 that the judiciary must be on guard against encroaching beyond
its bounds since the only restraint upon it is the self-imposed discipline of
self-restraint. Independence and adherence to constitutional
accountability and limits while exercising the power of judicial review
gives constitutional legitimacy to the court decisions. This is essence of
D
the power and function of judicial review that strengthens and promotes
the rule of law.
14. Constitutional Bench judgments in His Holiness Kesavananda
Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala and Another16 , State of
Rajasthan and Others v. Union of India and Others17, I.R. Coelho
E (Dead) by LRs. v. State of Tamil Nadu18 and State of Tamil Nadu v.

15
Asif Hameed & Others v. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Others, 1989 Supp. (2) SCC
364 quoting with approval dissenting opinion of Frankfurter J. in Trop v. Dulles.
Frankfurter J. had observed:
“Rigorous observance of the difference between limits of power and wise
F exercise of power — between questions of authority and questions of prudence
— requires the most alert appreciation of this decisive but subtle relationship
of two concepts that too easily coalesce. No less does it require a disciplined
will to adhere to the difference. It is not easy to stand aloof and allow want of
wisdom to prevail to disregard one’s own strongly held view of what is wise in
the conduct of affairs. But it is not the business of this Court to pronounce
policy. It must observe a fastidious regard for limitations on its own power,
G and this precludes the court’s giving effect to its own notions of what is wise or
politic. That self-restraint is of the essence in the observance of the judicial
oath, for the Constitution has not authorized the judges to sit in judgment on
the wisdom of what Congress and the executive branch do.”
16
(1973) 4 SCC 225
17
(1977) 3 SCC 592
18
H (2007) 2 SCC 1
DR. ASHWANI KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER 47
[SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

State of Kerala19 have uniformly ruled that the doctrine of separation of A
powers, though not specifically engrafted, is constitutionally entrenched
and forms part of the basic structure as its sweep, operation and visibility
are apparent. Constitution has made demarcation, without drawing formal
lines, amongst the three organs with the duty of the judiciary to scrutinise
the limits and whether or not the limits have been transgressed. These
B
judgments refer to the constitutional scheme incorporating checks and
balances. As a sequitur, the doctrine restrains the legislature from
declaring the judgment of a court to be void and of no effect, while the
legislature still possesses the legislative competence of enacting a
validating law which remedies the defect pointed out in the judgment.20
However, this does not ordain and permit the legislature to declare a C
judgment as invalid by enacting a law, but permits the legislature to take
away the basis of the judgment by fundamentally altering the basis on
which it was pronounced. Therefore, while exercising all important checks
and balances function, each wing should be conscious of the enormous
responsibility that rests on them to ensure that institutional respect and
D
comity is maintained.
15. In Binoy Viswam v. Union of India and Others21, this Court
referring to the Constitution had observed that the powers to be exercised
by the three wings of the State have an avowed purpose and each branch
is constitutionally mandated to act within its sphere and to have mutual
institutional respect to realise the constitutional goal and to ensure that E
there is no constitutional transgression. It is the Constitution which has
created the three wings of the State and, thus, each branch must oblige
the other by not stepping beyond its territory.
16. In Kalpana Mehta and Others v. Union of India and
Others22, Mr. Justice Dipak Misra, the then Chief Justice of India, under F
the headings ‘Supremacy of the Constitution’, ‘Power of judicial
review’ and ‘Doctrine of separation of powers’, has held that the
Constitution is a supreme fundamental law which requires that all laws,
actions and decisions of the three organs should be in consonance and in
accord with the constitutional limits, for the legislature, the executive G
and the judiciary derive their authority and jurisdiction from the
19
(2014) 12 SCC 696
20
Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. and Another v. Broach Borough Municipality and
Others, (1969) 2 SCC 283
21
(2017) 7 SCC 59
22
(2018) 7 SCC 1 H
48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A Constitution. Legislature stands vested with an exclusive authority to
make laws thereby giving it a supremacy in the field of legislation and
law-making, yet this power is distinct from and not at par with the
supremacy of the Constitution, as:
“41. This Court has the constitutional power and the authority to
B interpret the constitutional provisions as well as the statutory
provisions. The conferment of the power of judicial review has a
great sanctity as the constitutional court has the power to declare
any law as unconstitutional if there is lack of competence of the
legislature keeping in view the field of legislation as provided in
the Constitution or if a provision contravenes or runs counter to
C any of the fundamental rights or any constitutional provision or if
a provision is manifestly arbitrary.”
17. Having said so, Dipak Misra, CJ went on to observe:
“42. When we speak about judicial review, it is also necessary to
D be alive to the concept of judicial restraint. The duty of judicial
review which the Constitution has bestowed upon the judiciary is
not unfettered; it comes within the conception of judicial restraint.
The principle of judicial restraint requires that Judges ought to
decide cases while being within their defined limits of power.
Judges are expected to interpret any law or any provision of the
E Constitution as per the limits laid down by the Constitution.”
Earlier, Dipak Misra, CJ had observed:
“39. From the above authorities, it is quite vivid that the concept
of constitutional limitation is a facet of the doctrine of separation
F of powers. At this stage, we may clearly state that there can
really be no straitjacket approach in the sphere of separation of
powers when issues involve democracy, the essential morality
that flows from the Constitution, interest of the citizens in certain
spheres like environment, sustenance of social interest, etc. and
empowering the populace with the right to information or right to
G know in matters relating to candidates contesting election. There
can be many an example where this Court has issued directions
to the executive and also formulated guidelines for facilitation and
in furtherance of fundamental rights and sometimes for the
actualisation and fructification of statutory rights.”
H
DR. ASHWANI KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER 49
[SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

18. D.Y. Chandrachud, J., in his separate and concurring judgment A
for himself and A.K. Sikri, J. in Kalpana Mehta (supra) had referred to
the nuanced ‘doctrine of functional separation’ that finds articulation in
the articles/books by Peter A. Gerangelos in his work titled ‘The
Separation of Powers and Legislative Interference in Judicial
Process, Constitutional Principles and Limitations’23, M.J.C. Vile’s
B
book titled ‘Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers’24, Aileen
Kavanagh in her work ‘The Constitutional Separation of Powers’25
and Eoin Carolan in his book titled ‘The New Separation of Powers –
A Theory for the Modern State’26. These authors in the context of
modern administrative State have reconstructed the doctrine as consisting
of two components: ‘division of labour’ and ‘checks and balances’, instead C
of isolated compartmentalisation, by highlighting the need of interaction
and interdependence amongst the three organs in a way that each branch
is in cooperative engagement but at the same time acts, when necessary,
to check on the other and that no single group of people are able to
control the machinery of the State. Independent judiciary acts as a
D
restraining influence on the arbitrary exercise of power.
19. Referring to the functional doctrine, D.Y. Chandrachud, J.,
had cited the following judgements:
“249. In State of U.P. v. Jeet S. Bisht, the Court held that the
doctrine of separation of powers limits the “active jurisdiction” of E
each branch of Government. However, even when the active
jurisdiction of an organ of the State is not challenged, the doctrine
allows for methods to be used to prod and communicate to an
institution either its shortfalls or excesses in discharging its duty.
The Court recognised that fundamentally, the purpose of the
doctrine is to act as a scheme of checks and balances over the F
activities of other organs. The Court noted that the modern concept
of separation of powers subscribes to the understanding that it
should not only demarcate the area of functioning of various organs
of the State, but should also, to some extent, define the minimum
content in that delineated area of functioning. S.B. Sinha, J.
G
addressed the need for the doctrine to evolve, as administrative
23
Hart Publishing, 2009
24
Oxford University Press, 1967
25
David Dyzenhaus and Malcolm Thorburn (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of
Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016)
26
Oxford University Press, 2009 H
50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A bodies are involved in the dispensation of socio-economic
entitlements: (SCC p. 619, para 83)
“83. If we notice the evolution of separation of powers doctrine,
traditionally the checks and balances dimension was only
associated with governmental excesses and violations. But in
B today’s world of positive rights and justifiable social and economic
entitlements, hybrid administrative bodies, private functionaries
discharging public functions, we have to perform the oversight
function with more urgency and enlarge the field of checks and
balances to include governmental inaction. Otherwise we envisage
the country getting transformed into a state of repose. Social
C engineering as well as institutional engineering therefore forms
part of this obligation.”
(emphasis in original)
xx xx xx
D 251. In Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union
of India, Madan B. Lokur, J. observed that separation of powers
does not envisage that each of the three organs of the State —
the legislature, executive and judiciary — work in a silo. The
learned Judge held: (SCC p. 583, para 678)

E “678. There is quite clearly an entire host of parliamentary
and legislative checks placed on the judiciary whereby its
administrative functioning can be and is controlled, but these
do not necessarily violate the theory of separation of powers
or infringe the independence of the judiciary as far as decision-
making is concerned. As has been repeatedly held, the theory
F of separation of powers is not rigidly implemented in our
Constitution, but if there is an overlap in the form of a check
with reference to an essential or a basic function or element of
one organ of State as against another, a constitutional issue
does arise. It is in this context that the 99th Constitution
Amendment Act has to be viewed—whether it impacts on a
G basic or an essential element of the independence of the
judiciary, namely, its decisional independence.”
20. Thereafter, D.Y. Chandrachud, J. had observed:
“254. While assessing the impact of the separation of powers
upon the present controversy, certain precepts must be
H
DR. ASHWANI KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER 51
[SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

formulated. Separation of powers between the legislature, the A
executive and the judiciary is a basic feature of the Constitution.
As a foundational principle which is comprised within the basic
structure, it lies beyond the reach of the constituent power to
amend. It cannot be substituted or abrogated. While recognising
this position, decided cases indicate that the Indian Constitution
does not adopt a separation of powers in the strict sense. B
Textbook examples of exceptions to the doctrine include the
power of the executive to frame subordinate legislation, the
power of the legislature to punish for contempt of its privileges
and the authority entrusted to the Supreme Court and the High
Courts to regulate their own procedures by framing rules. In C
making subordinate legislation, the executive is entrusted by
the legislature to make delegated legislation, subject to its control.
The rule-making power of the higher judiciary has trappings of
a legislative character. The power of the legislature to punish
for contempt of its privileges has a judicial character. These
exceptions indicate that the separation doctrine has not been D
adopted in the strict form in our Constitution. But the importance
of the doctrine lies in its postulate that the essential functions
entrusted to one organ of the State cannot be exercised by the
other. By standing against the usurpation of constitutional
powers entrusted to other organs, separation of powers supports
E
the rule of law and guards against authoritarian excesses.
255. Parliament and the State Legislatures legislate. The
executive frames policies and administers the law. The judiciary
decides and adjudicates upon disputes in the course of which
facts are proved and the law is applied. The distinction between
the legislative function and judicial functions is enhanced by F
the basic structure doctrine. The legislature is constitutionally
entrusted with the power to legislate. Courts are not entrusted
with the power to enact law. Yet, in a constitutional democracy
which is founded on the supremacy of the Constitution, it is an
accepted principle of jurisprudence that the judiciary has the G
authority to test the validity of legislation. Legislation can be
invalidated where the enacting legislature lacks legislative
competence or where there is a violation of fundamental rights.
A law which is constitutionally ultra vires can be declared to
be so in the exercise of the power of judicial review. Judicial
review is indeed also a part of the basic features of the H
52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A Constitution. Entrustment to the judiciary of the power to test
the validity of law is an established constitutional principle which
co-exists with the separation of powers. Where a law is held
to be ultra vires there is no breach of parliamentary privileges
for the simple reason that all institutions created by the
Constitution are subject to constitutional limitations. The
B legislature, it is well settled, cannot simply declare that the
judgment of a court is invalid or that it stands nullified. If the
legislature were permitted to do so, it would travel beyond the
boundaries of constitutional entrustment. While the separation
of powers prevents the legislature from issuing a mere
C declaration that a judgment is erroneous or invalid, the law-
making body is entitled to enact a law which remedies the
defects which have been pointed out by the court. Enactment
of a law which takes away the basis of the judgment (as
opposed to merely invalidating it) is permissible and does not
constitute a violation of the separation doctrine. That indeed is
D the basis on which validating legislation is permitted.
256. This discussion leads to the conclusion that while the
separation of powers, as a principle, constitutes the cornerstone
of our democratic Constitution, its application in the actual
governance of the polity is nuanced. The nuances of the doctrine
E recognise that while the essential functions of one organ of the
State cannot be taken over by the other and that a sense of
institutional comity must guide the work of the legislature,
executive and judiciary, the practical problems which arise in
the unfolding of democracy can be resolved through robust
constitutional cultures and mechanisms. The separation doctrine
F
cannot be reduced to its descriptive content, bereft of its
normative features. Evidently, it has both normative and
descriptive features. In applying it to the Indian Constitution,
the significant precept to be borne in mind is that no institution
of governance lies above the Constitution. No entrustment of
G power is absolute.”
21. Having elucidated the doctrinal basis of separation of powers
and mutual interaction between the three organs of the State in the
democratic set-up, it would be important to draw clear distinction between
interpretation and adjudication by the courts on one hand and the power
H to enact legislation by the legislature on the other. Adjudication results in
DR. ASHWANI KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER 53
[SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

what is often described as judge made law, but the interpretation of the A
statutes and the rights in accordance with the provisions of Articles 14,
19 and 21 in the course of adjudication is not an attempt or an act of
legislation by the judges. Reference in this regard can be made to the
opinion expressed by F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, J. in Union of India v. V.
Sriharan alias Murugan and Others27 who had, in the context of capital
B
punishment for offences under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
(“IPC”, for short), held that the lawmakers have entrusted the task of
weighing and measuring the gravity of the offence with the institution of
judiciary by reposing a very high amount of confidence and trust. It
requires a judge to apply his judicial mind after weighing the pros and
cons of the crime committed in the golden scales to ensure that the C
justice is delivered. In a way, therefore, the legislature itself entrusts the
judiciary to lay down parameters in the form of precedents which is oft-
spoken as judge made law. This is true of many a legislations. Such
law, even if made by the judiciary, would not infringe the doctrine of
separation of powers and is in conformity with the constitutional functions.
D
This distinction between the two has been aptly expressed by Aileen
Kavanagh in the following words:
“In general, the ability and power of the courts to make new law
is generally more limited than that of the legislators, since courts
typically make law by filling in gaps in existing legal frameworks,
extending existing doctrines incrementally on a case-by-case basis, E
adjusting them to changing circumstances, etc. Judicial lawmaking
powers tend to be piecemeal and incremental and the courts must
reason according to law, even when developing it. By contrast,
legislators have the power to make radical, broad-ranging changes
in the law, which are not based on existing legal norms....” F
22. Seven Judges of this Court in P. Ramachandra Rao v. State
of Karnataka28 had, while interpreting Articles 21, 32, 141 and 142 of
the Constitution, held that prescribing period at which criminal trial would
terminate resulting in acquittal or discharge of the accused, or making
such directions applicable to all cases in present or in future, would amount G
to judicial law-making and cannot be done by judicial directives. It was
observed that the courts can declare the law, interpret the law, remove
obvious lacuna and fill up the gaps, but they cannot entrench upon the
27
(2016) 7 SCC 1
28
(2002) 4 SCC 578 H
54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A field of legislation. The courts can issue appropriate and binding directions
for enforcing the laws, lay down time limits or chalk out a calendar for
the proceeding to follow to redeem the injustice and for taking care of
the rights violated in the given case or set of cases depending on the
facts brought to the notice of the court, but cannot lay down and enact
the provisions akin to or on the lines of Chapter XXXVI of the Code of
B
Criminal Procedure, 1973. Drawing distinction between legislation as
the source of law which consists of declaration of legal rules by a
competent authority and judicial decisions pronounced by the judges laying
down principles of general application, reference was made to Salmond
on Principles of Jurisprudence (12th Edition) which says:
C “we must distinguish law-making by legislators from law-making
by the courts. Legislators can lay down rules purely for the future
and without reference to any actual dispute; the courts, insofar as
they create law, can do so only in application to the cases before
them and only insofar as is necessary for their solution. Judicial
D law-making is incidental to the solving of legal disputes; legislative
law-making is the central function of the legislator.”
Reference was also made to Professor S. P Sathe’s work on
“Judicial Activism in India % Transgressing Borders and Enforcing
Limits,” evaluating the legitimacy of judicial activism, wherein it was
E observed:
“Directions are either issued to fill in the gaps in the legislation or
to provide for matters that have not been provided by any
legislation. The Court has taken over the legislative function not
in the traditional interstitial sense but in an overt manner and has
F justified it as being an essential component of its role as a
constitutional court.” (p.242)
“In a strict sense these are instances of judicial excessivism that
fly in the face of the doctrine of separation of powers. The doctrine
of separation of powers envisages that the legislature should make
G law, the executive should execute it, and the judiciary should settle
disputes in accordance with the existing law. In reality such
watertight separation exists nowhere and is impracticable. Broadly,
it means that one organ of the State should not perform a function
that essentially belongs to another organ. While law-making
through interpretation and expansion of the meanings of open-
H
DR. ASHWANI KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER 55
[SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

textured expressions such as ‘due process of law’, ‘equal protection A
of law’, or ‘freedom of speech and expression’ is a legitimate
judicial function, the making of an entirely new law ... through
directions ... is not a legitimate judicial function.” (p.250)
23. From the above, it is apparent that law-making within certain
limits is a legitimate element of a judge’s role, if not inevitable.29 A judge B
has to adjudicate and decide on the basis of legal provisions, which when
indeterminate on a particular issue require elucidation and explanation.30
This requires a judge to interpret the provisions to decide the case and,
in this process, he may take recourse and rely upon fundamental rights,
including the right to life, but even then he does not legislate a law while
interpreting such provisions. Such interpretation is called ‘judge made C
law’ but not legislation. Aileen Kavanagh, in explaining the aforesaid
position, had observed:
“...If there has not been a case in point and the judge has to
decide on the basis of legal provisions which may be indeterminate
on the issue, then the judge cannot decide the case without making D
new law...This is because Parliament has formulated the Act in
broad terms, which inevitably require elaboration by the courts in
order to apply it to the circumstances of each new case. Second,
even in cases where judges apply existing law, they cannot avoid
facing the question of whether to change and improve it.... E
Interpretation has an applicative and creative aspect.”
Legislating or law-making involves a choice to prioritise certain
political, moral and social values over the others from a wide range of
choices that exist before the legislature. It is a balancing and integrating
exercise to give expression/meaning to diverse and alternative values F
and blend it in a manner that it is representative of several viewpoints so
that it garners support from other elected representatives to pass
institutional muster and acceptance. Legislation, in the form of an
enactment or laws, lays down broad and general principles. It is the
source of law which the judges are called upon to apply. Judges, when
they apply the law, are constrained by the rules of language and by well G
identified background presumptions as to the manner in which the
29
Lord Irvine: ‘Activism and Restraint: Human Rights and Interpretative Process’,
(1999) 4 EHRLR 350
30
Aileen Kavanagh: ‘The Elusive Divide between Interpretation and Legislation under
the Human Rights Act 1998’ (2004) 24 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 259–285 H
56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A legislature intended the law to be read. Application of law by the judges
is not synonymous with the enactment of law by the legislature. Judges
have the power to spell out how precisely the statute would apply in a
particular case. In this manner, they complete the law formulated by the
legislature by applying it. This power of interpretation or the power of
judicial review is exercised post the enactment of law, which is then
B
made subject matter of interpretation or challenge before the courts.
24. Legislature, as an institution and a wing of the Government, is
a microcosm of the bigger social community possessing qualities of a
democratic institution in terms of composition, diversity and accountability.
Legislature uses in-built procedures carefully designed and adopted to
C bring a plenitude of representations and resources as they have access
to information, skills, expertise and knowledge of the people working
within the institution and outside in the form of executive.31 Process and
method of legislation and judicial adjudication are entirely distinct. Judicial
adjudication involves applying rules of interpretation and law of precedents
D and notwithstanding deep understanding, knowledge and wisdom of an
individual judge or the bench, it cannot be equated with law making in a
democratic society by legislators given their wider and broader diverse
polity. The Constitution states that legislature is supreme and has a final
say in matters of legislation when it reflects on alternatives and choices
with inputs from different quarters, with a check in the form of democratic
E accountability and a further check by the courts which exercise the
power of judicial review. It is not for the judges to seek to develop new
all-embracing principles of law in a way that reflects the stance and
opinion of the individual judges when the society/legislators as a whole
are unclear and substantially divided on the relevant issues32. In Bhim
F Singh v. Union of India33, while observing that the Constitution does
not strictly prohibit overlapping of functions as this is inevitable in the
modern parliamentary democracy, the Constitution prohibits exercise of
functions of another branch which results in wresting away of the regime
of constitutional accountability. Only when accountability is preserved,
there will be no violation of principle of separation of powers. Constitution
G not only requires and mandates that there should be right decisions that
govern us, but equal care has to be taken that the right decisions are
31
D. Kyritsis, Constitutional Review in a Representative Democracy (2012) 32 Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies
32
Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] AC 789 (p. 879-880)
33
H (2010) 5 SCC 538
DR. ASHWANI KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER 57
[SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

made by the right body and the institution. This is what gives legitimacy, A
be it a legislation, a policy decision or a court adjudication.
25. It is sometimes contended with force that unpopular and difficult
decisions are more easily grasped and taken by the judges rather than
by the other two wings. Indeed, such suggestions were indirectly made.
This reasoning is predicated on the belief that the judges are not directly B
accountable to the electorate and, therefore, enjoy the relative freedom
from questions of the moment, which enables them to take a detached,
fair and just view.34 The position that judges are not elected and
accountable is correct, but this would not justify an order by a court in
the nature of judicial legislation for it will run afoul of the constitutional
supremacy and invalidate and subvert the democratic process by which C
legislations are enacted. For the reasons stated above, this reasoning is
constitutionally unacceptable and untenable.
26. Dipak Misra, CJ in Kalpana Mehta’s case, under the heading
‘Power of judicial review’ had examined several judgments of this
Court to reflect upon the impressive expanse of judicial power in the D
superior courts that requires and demands exercise of tremendous
responsibility by the courts. Thus, while exercising the interpretative
power, the courts can draw strength from the spirit and propelling
elements underlying the Constitution to realise the constitutional values
but must remain alive to the concept of judicial restraint which requires E
the judges to decide cases within defined limits of power. Thus, the
courts would not accept submissions and pass orders purely on a matter
of policy or formulate judicial legislation which is for the executive or
elected representatives of the people to enact. Reference was made to
some judgments of this Court in the following words:
F
“43. In S.C. Chandra v. State of Jharkhand, it has been ruled
that the judiciary should exercise restraint and ordinarily should
not encroach into the legislative domain. In this regard, a reference
to a three-Judge Bench decision in Suresh Seth v. Indore
Municipal Corpn. is quite instructive. In the said case, a prayer
was made before this Court to issue directions for appropriate G
amendment in the M.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. Repelling
the submission, the Court held that it is purely a matter of policy
which is for the elected representatives of the people to decide
34
See observations of Lord Neuberger in Regina (Nicklinson) and Another v. Ministry
of Justice and Others [2014] UKSC 38 H
58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A and no directions can be issued by the Court in this regard. The
Court further observed that this Court cannot issue directions to
the legislature to make any particular kind of enactment. In this
context, the Court held that under our constitutional scheme,
Parliament and Legislative Assemblies exercise sovereign power
to enact law and no outside power or authority can issue a direction
B
to enact a particular kind of legislation. While so holding, the Court
referred to the decision in Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare
Assn. v. Union of India wherein it was held that no court can
direct a legislature to enact a particular law and similarly when an
executive authority exercises a legislative power by way of a
C subordinate legislation pursuant to the delegated authority of a
legislature, such executive authority cannot be asked to enact a
law which it has been empowered to do under the delegated
authority.”
27. It can be argued that there have been occasions when this
D Court has ‘legislated’ beyond what can be strictly construed as pure
interpretation or judicial review but this has been in cases where the
constitutional courts, on the legitimate path of interpreting fundamental
rights, have acted benevolently with an object to infuse and ardently
guard the rights of individuals so that no person or citizen is wronged, as
has been observed in paragraph 46 of the judgment of Dipak Misra, CJ
E in Kalpana Mehta’s case. Secondly, these directions were given subject
to the legislature enacting the law and merely to fill the vacuum until the
legislative takes upon it to legislate. These judgments were based upon
gross violations of fundamental rights which were noticed and in view of
the vacuum or absence of law/guidelines. The directions were interim in
F nature and had to be applied till Parliament or the state legislature would
enact and were a mere stop-gap arrangement. These guidelines and
directions in some cases as in the case of Vishaka (supra) had continued
for long till the enactment of ‘The Sexual Harassment of Women at
Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013’
because the legislature (it would also include the executive) impliedly
G and tacitly had accepted the need for the said legislation even if made by
the judiciary without enacting the law. Such law when enacted by
Parliament or the state legislature, even if assumably contrary to the
directions or guidelines issued by the Court, cannot be struck down by
reason of the directions/guidelines; it can be struck down only if it violates
H the fundamental rights or the right to equality under Article 14 of the
DR. ASHWANI KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER 59
[SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

Constitution. These are extraordinary cases where notwithstanding the A
institutional reasons and the division of power, this Court has laid down
general rules/guidelines when there has been a clear, substantive and
gross human rights violation, which significantly outweighed and dwarfed
any legitimising concerns based upon separation of powers, lack of
expertise and uncertainty of the consequences.35 Same is the position in
B
cases of gross environmental degradation and pollution. However, a mere
allegation of violation of human rights or a plea raising environmental
concerns cannot be the ‘bright-line’ to hold that self-restraint must give
way to judicial legislation. Where and when court directions should be
issued are questions and issues involving constitutional dilemmas that
mandate a larger debate and discussion (see observations of Frankfurter C
J. as quoted in Asif Hameed & Others v. State of Jammu & Kashmir
& Others in foot note 15 supra).
28. Such directions must be issued with great care and
circumspection and certainly not when the matter is already pending
consideration and debate with the executive or Parliament. This is not a D
case which requires Court’s intervention to give a suggestion for need to
frame a law as the matter is already pending active consideration. Any
direction at this stage would be interpreted as judicial participation in the
enactment of law. This Court in Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare
Association v. Union of India and Another36 had directed that no court
E
can direct the legislature to enact a particular law. Similarly, when an
executive authority exercises the legislative power by way of subordinate
legislation pursuant to delegatory authority of the legislature, such
executive authority cannot be asked to enact a law which it has been
empowered to do under delegated authority. Again, we would quote
from Dipak Misra, CJ in Kalpana Mehta’s case, in which it was F
observed:
“44. Recently, in Census Commr. v. R. Krishnamurthy, the Court,
after referring to Premium Granites v. State of T.N., M.P. Oil
Extraction v. State of M.P., State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao
Andolan and State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga, held: (R. G
Krishnamurthy case, SCC p. 809, para 33)

35
See Aileen Kavanagh, Judicial Restraint in the Pursuit of Justice (2009) University of
Oxford Legal Research Paper Series
36
(1989) 4 SCC 187 H
60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A “33. From the aforesaid pronouncement of law, it is clear as
noonday that it is not within the domain of the courts to embark
upon an enquiry as to whether a particular public policy is wise
and acceptable or whether a better policy could be evolved. The
court can only interfere if the policy framed is absolutely capricious
or not informed by reasons or totally arbitrary and founded ipse
B
dixit offending the basic requirement of Article 14 of the
Constitution. In certain matters, as often said, there can be opinions
and opinions (sic) but the court is not expected to sit as an appellate
authority on an opinion.”
29. In V.K. Naswa v. Home Secretary, Union of India and
C Others37, this Court in clear and categoric terms had observed that we
do not issue directions to the legislature directly or indirectly and any
such directions if issued would be improper. It is outside the power of
judicial review to issue directions to the legislature to enact a law in a
particular manner, for the Constitution does not permit the courts to direct
D and advice the executive in matters of policy. Parliament, as the legislature,
exercises this power to enact a law and no outside authority can issue a
particular piece of legislation. It is only in exceptional cases where there
is a vacuum and non-existing position that the judiciary, in exercise of its
constitutional power, steps in and provides a solution till the legislature
comes forward to perform its role.
E
30. In State of Himachal Pradesh and Others v. Satpal Saini38,
this Court had overturned the directions given by the High Court to amend
provisions of the state enactment after what was described as the plight
of large population of non-agriculturist himachalis. Reference was made
to Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Association (supra) that no
F writ of mandamus can be issued to the legislature to enact a particular
legislation nor can such direction be issued to the executive which
exercises the powers to make rules in the nature of subordinate legislation.
Reference was also made to V.K. Naswa (supra) wherein several earlier
judgments were considered and it was held that the courts have a very
G limited role and, in its exercise, it is not open to make judicial legislation.
Further, the courts do not have competence to issue directions to the
legislature to enact a law in a particular manner. Reference was also
made to the constitutional bench judgment in Manoj Narula v. Union
37
(2012) 2 SCC 542
38
H (2017) 11 SCC 42
DR. ASHWANI KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER 61
[SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

of India39 in which a discordant note struck by two judges in Gainda A
Ram and Others v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Others40
was held to be contrary to the Constitution by observing that the decision
whether or not Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951
should be amended is solely within the domain of Parliament and,
therefore, no directions can be issued by this Court. It was observed:
B
“6. The grievance, in our view, has a sound constitutional
foundation. The High Court has while issuing the above directions
acted in a manner contrary to settled limitations on the power of
judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. A direction,
it is well settled, cannot be issued to the legislature to enact a law.
The power to enact legislation is a plenary constitutional power C
which is vested in Parliament and the State Legislatures under
Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution. The legislature as the
repository of the sovereign legislative power is vested with the
authority to determine whether a law should be enacted. The
doctrine of separation of powers entrusts to the court the D
constitutional function of deciding upon the validity of a law enacted
by the legislature, where a challenge is brought before the High
Court under Article 226 (or this Court under Article 32) on the
ground that the law lacks in legislative competence or has been
enacted in violation of a constitutional provision. But judicial review
cannot encroach upon the basic constitutional function which is E
entrusted to the legislature to determine whether a law should be
enacted. Whether a provision of law as enacted subserves the
object of the law or should be amended is a matter of legislative
policy. The court cannot direct the legislature either to enact a
law or to amend a law which it has enacted for the simple reason F
that this constitutional function lies in the exclusive domain of the
legislature. For the Court to mandate an amendment of a law —
as did the Himachal Pradesh High Court — is a plain usurpation
of a power entrusted to another arm of the State. There can be
no manner of doubt that the High Court has transgressed the
limitations imposed upon the power of judicial review under Article G
226 by issuing the above directions to the State Legislature to
amend the law. The Government owes a collective responsibility
to the State Legislature. The State Legislature is comprised of
39
(2014) 9 SCC 1
40
(2010) 10 SCC 715 H
62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A elected representatives. The law enacting body is entrusted with
the power to enact such legislation as it considers necessary to
deal with the problems faced by society and to resolve issues of
concern. The courts do not sit in judgment over legislative
expediency or upon legislative policy. This position is well settled.
Since the High Court has failed to notice it, we will briefly
B
recapitulate the principles which emerge from the precedent on
the subject.
7. In Mallikarjuna Rao v. State of A.P. and in V.K. Sood v.
Deptt. of Civil Aviation this Court held that the court under Article
226 has no power to direct the executive to exercise its law-
C making power.
8. In State of H.P. v. Parent of a Student of Medical College
this Court deprecated the practice of issuing directions to the
legislature to enact a law: (SCC p. 174, para 4)

D “4. … The direction given by the Division Bench was really
nothing short of an indirect attempt to compel the State
Government to initiate legislation with a view to curbing the
evil of ragging….”
The same principle was followed in Asif Hameed v. State of J&K
E where this Court observed that: (SCC p. 374, para 19)
“19. … The Constitution does not permit the court to direct or
advise the executive in matter of policy or to sermonise qua
any matter which under the Constitution lies within the sphere
of the legislature or executive….”
F In Union of India v. Assn. for Democratic Reforms this Court
observed that: (SCC p. 309, para 19)
“19. … it is not possible for this Court to give any directions
for amending the Act or the statutory Rules. It is for Parliament
to amend the Act and the Rules.”
G xx xx xx
12. The judiciary is one amongst the three branches of the State;
the other two being the executive and the legislature. Each of the
three branches is co-equal. Each has specified and enumerated
constitutional powers. The judiciary is assigned with the function
H
DR. ASHWANI KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER 63
[SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

of ensuring that executive actions accord with the law and that A
laws and executive decisions accord with the Constitution. The
courts do not frame policy or mandate that a particular policy
should be followed. The duty to formulate policies is entrusted to
the executive whose accountability is to the legislature and, through
it, to the people. The peril of adopting an incorrect policy lies in
B
democratic accountability to the people. This is the basis and
rationale for holding that the court does not have the power or
function to direct the executive to adopt a particular policy or the
legislature to convert it into enacted law. It is wise to remind us of
these limits and wiser still to enforce them without exception.”
31. Even more direct on the facts of the present case would be C
judgement by one of us, (Mr. Justice Ranjan Gogoi, the Chief Justice), in
Common Cause: A Registered Society v. Union of India41 to the
following effect:
“18. There can be no manner of doubt that the parliamentary
wisdom of seeking changes in an existing law by means of an D
amendment lies within the exclusive domain of the legislature and
it is not the province of the Court to express any opinion on the
exercise of the legislative prerogative in this regard. The framing
of the Amendment Bill; reference of the same to the Parliamentary
Standing Committee; the consideration thereof by the said E
Committee; the report prepared along with further steps that are
required to be taken and the time-frame thereof are essential
legislative functions which should not be ordinarily subjected to
interference or intervention of the Court. The constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers and the demarcation of the
respective jurisdiction of the Executive, the Legislature and the F
Judiciary under the constitutional framework would lead the Court
to the conclusion that the exercise of the amendment of the Act,
which is presently underway, must be allowed to be completed
without any intervention of the Court. Any other view and any
interference, at this juncture, would negate the basic constitutional G
principle that the legislature is supreme in the sphere of law-making.
Reading down a statute to make it workable in a situation where
an exercise of amendment of the law is pending, will not be justified
either. A perception, however strong, of the imminent need of the
41
(2017) 7 SCC 158 H
64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A law engrafted in the Act and its beneficial effects on the citizenry
of a democratic country, by itself, will not permit the Court to
overstep its jurisdiction. Judicial discipline must caution the Court
against such an approach.”
32. When the matter is already pending consideration and is being
B examined for the purpose of legislation, it would not be appropriate for
this Court to enforce its opinion, be it in the form of a direction or even a
request, for it would clearly undermine and conflict with the role assigned
to the judiciary under the Constitution. In this connection, we may refer
to the observation of Lord Bingham in Regina (Countryside Alliance)
and Others v. Attorney General and Another42, though made in a
C different context, to the following effect:
“...The democratic process is liable to be subverted if, on a question
of moral and political judgment, opponents of the Act achieve
through the courts what they could not achieve in Parliament.”

D 33. Confronted with the present situation, Mr. Colin Gonsalves,
learned amicus curiae, had submitted that directions can be given to the
executive to ratify the UN Convention. We do not think that any such
direction can be issued for it would virtually amount to issuing directions
to enact laws in conformity with the UN Convention, a power which we
do not ‘possess’, while exercising power of judicial review.
E
34. Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned Attorney General, in his
submissions has rightly urged that Article 253 of the Constitution which
deals with the legislation for giving effect to international agreements,
confers power on Parliament to make laws for the whole or any part of
the territory of India for implementing any treaty, agreement or convention,
F notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of Chapter
XI of the Constitution. Thus, notwithstanding Articles 245 and 246 of the
Constitution, Parliament has the supreme power to make laws for
implementing any treaty or convention which may even encroach upon
the exclusive legislative competence of the States. The executive action
G under Article 73 of signing and ratifying the convention can be
implemented without any violation of the State’s right when the legislation
is passed by the Parliament under Article 253. ‘Police’ and ‘Prisons’ are
State subjects. Ratification of the UN Convention would require enactment
of laws under Article 253 of the Constitution, for mere ratification would
42
H (2008) 1 AC 719
DR. ASHWANI KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER 65
[SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

not affect and undo the existing laws or result in the enactment of new A
laws. Ratification, as is well recognised, is a political act and would
require consultation with the State Governments/Union Territories and
subsequent deliberation of their comments by the Union of India. Union
of India has pointed out that they have a reservation on Article 20 of the
UN Convention. Reference is also made to the Vienna Convention on
B
the Law of Treaties, 1969, to which India is not a party but which
provisions are reflected in the Standard Operating Procedure issued by
the Ministry of External Affairs in respect of Memorandum of
Understanding/Agreement with foreign countries. The Standard
Operating Procedure, clause (iv) under Heading D – Treaty Making
Formalities which relates to ratification, states that where a treaty does C
not provide for its entry into force only upon its signature and makes it
subject to ratification, the treaty requires ratification. In order to ensure
that India is in a position to efficiently discharge all obligations emanating
from treaties/ agreements, such ratification should be undertaken only
after relevant domestic clauses have been amended and the enabling
D
legislations enacted when there is absence of domestic law on the subject.
On the issue that the treaty making power is a political act, reference
has been made to the following decisions: Union of India and Another
v. Azadi Bachao Andolan and Another43; Rosiline George v. Union
of India and Others44; Sakshi v. Union of India and Others45; and
P.B. Samant and Others v. Union of India and Others46. E
35. However, this is not to state that the courts would not step in,
when required, to protect fundamental rights. It is indisputable that the
right to life and the right to liberty are of foremost importance in a
democratic state and, therefore, any form of torture would violate the
right to life and is prohibited by Article 21 of the Constitution. Such F
action would be unconstitutional under Article 21 and would fail the test
of non-arbitrariness under Article 14 of the Constitution. Indeed, the
courts have been at the forefront in protecting and safeguarding individual
rights. In 1982, on the basis of a letter written by a journalist complaining
of custodial violence suffered by women prisoners in police lock-ups in
the city of Bombay, this Court in Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra47 G

43
(2004) 10 SCC 1
44
(1994) 2 SCC 80
45
(2004) 5 SCC 518
46
AIR 1994 Bom 323
47
(1983) 2 SCC 96 H
66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A had issued the guidelines to safeguard the rights of arrested persons
including female prisoners to afford them protection in police lock-ups
from possible torture or ill-treatment. A person detained in a prison is
entitled to live with human dignity and his detention in prison should be
regulated by a procedure established by law which must be reasonable,
fair and just. This can be done by applying, elucidating and even creatively
B
expanding existing laws and principles on case to case basis. Judiciary
while exercising its jurisdiction in this manner is not enacting or legislating
but applying the Constitution and protecting fundamental rights under
Article 21 of the Constitution.
36. This human right aspect was again highlighted in Nilabati
C Behera (Smt) alias Lalita Behera (Through the Supreme Court Legal
Aid Committee) v. State of Orissa and Others48 to state that the
convicts, prisoners or under-trials must not be denuded of their
fundamental rights under Article 21 and only such restrictions as are
permitted by law can be imposed. It is the responsibility of the prison
D authority and the police to ensure that the person in custody is not deprived
of his right to life, even if his liberty is circumscribed by the fact that the
person is in confinement. Even limited liberty is precious and it is the
duty of the State to ensure that even a person in custody is dealt with in
accordance with the procedure established by law. In the State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Shyamsunder Trivedi and Others49 this Court
E had highlighted that a sensitive and realistic rather than a narrow technical
approach is required while dealing with cases of custodial crime. The
court must act within its powers and as far as possible try that the guilty
should not escape to ensure that the rule of law prevails.
37. We would take note of the judgment of this Court in D.K.
F Basu (supra) wherein the following directions/ guidelines with respect
to rights/custodial torture were issued:
“(1) The police personnel carrying out the arrest and handling
the interrogation of the arrestee should bear accurate, visible
and clear identification and name tags with their designations.
G The particulars of all such police personnel who handle
interrogation of the arrestee must be recorded in a register.
(2) That the police officer carrying out the arrest of the arrestee
shall prepare a memo of arrest at the time of arrest and
48
(1993) 2 SCC 746
49
H (1995) 4 SCC 262
DR. ASHWANI KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER 67
[SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

such memo shall be attested by atleast one witness, who A
may be either a member of the family of the arrestee or a
respectable person of the locality from where the arrest is
made. It shall also be counter signed by the arrestee and
shall contain the time and date of arrest.
(3) A person who has been arrested or detained and is being B
held in custody in a police station or interrogation center or
other lock-up, shall be entitled to have one friend or relative
or other person known to him or having interest in his welfare
being informed, as soon as practicable, that he has been
arrested and is being detained at the particular place, unless
the attesting witness of the memo of arrest is himself such C
a friend or a relative of the arrestee.
(4) The time, place of arrest and venue of custody of an arrestee
must be notified by the police where the next friend or
relative of the arrestee lives outside the district or town
through the Legal Aid Organisation in the District and the D
police station of the area concerned telegraphically within
a period of 8 to 12 hours after the arrest.
(5) The person arrested must be made aware of this right to
have someone informed of his arrest or detention as soon
as he is put under arrest or is detained. E

(6) An entry must be made in the diary at the place of detention
regarding the arrest of the person which shall also disclose
the name of the next friend of the person who has been
informed of the arrest and the names and particulars of the
police officials in whose custody the arrestee is. F
(7) The arrestee should, where he so requests, be also examined
at the time of his arrest and major and minor injuries, if any
present on his/her body, must be recorded at that time. The
“Inspection Memo” must be signed both by the arrestee
and the police officer effecting the arrest and its copy G
provided to the arrestee.
(8) The arrestee should be subjected to medical examination
by a trained doctor every 48 hours during his detention in
custody by a doctor on the panel of approved doctors
appointed by Director, Health Services of the concerned H
68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A State or Union Territory. Director, Health Services should
prepare such a penal for all Tehsils and Districts as well.
(9) Copies of all the documents including the memo of arrest,
referred to above, should be sent to the illaqa Magistrate
for his record.
B (10) The arrestee may be permitted to meet his lawyer during
interrogation, though not throughout the interrogation.
(11) A police control room should be provided at all district and
state headquarters, where information regarding the arrest
and the place of custody of the arrestee shall be
C communicated by the officer causing the arrest, within 12
hours of effecting the arrest and at the police control room
it should be displayed on a conspicuous notice board.”
38. The law in this regard is also laid down in Sections 330 and
331 of the IPC which relate to ‘voluntarily causing hurt to extort
D confession or to compel restoration of property’ and ‘voluntarily causing
grievous hurt to extort confession or to compel restoration of property’
respectively.
39. In terms of the aforesaid edicts, legal jurisprudence has
developed for providing compensation for the unconstitutional deprivation
E of fundamental right to life and liberty as a public remedy in addition to
claims in private law for damages by tortuous acts of public servants. In
D.K. Basu (supra) the public law remedy for award of compensation
was elucidated as arising from indefeasible rights guaranteed under Article
21 and justified on the ground that the purpose of public law is not only to
F civilise public power but also to ensure that the citizens live under a legal
system where their rights and interests are protected and preserved.
For the grant of compensation, therefore, proceedings under Article 32
or 226 of the Constitution are entertained when violation of the
fundamental rights granted under Article 21 is established. In such cases,
claims of a citizen are tried on the principle of strict liability where defence
G of sovereignty may not be available. In S. Nambi Narayanan v. Siby
Mathews and Others50 where criminal proceedings were initiated against
Nambi Narayanan but it was found that the prosecution story was a
sham, compensation of Rs. 50 lakhs was awarded for the anxiety suffered
and maltreatment meted out to him.
50
H (2018) 10 SCC 804
DR. ASHWANI KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER 69
[SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

40. We have no hesitation in observing that notwithstanding the A
aforesaid directions in D.K. Basu (supra) and the principles of law laid
down in Prithipal Singh and Others v. State of Punjab and Another51
and S. Nambi Narayanan (supra), this Court can, in an appropriate
matter and on the basis of pleadings and factual matrix before it, issue
appropriate guidelines/directions to elucidate, add and improve upon the
B
directions issued in D.K. Basu (supra) and other cases when conditions
stated in paragraph 27 supra are satisfied. However, this is not what is
urged and prayed by the applicant. The contention of the applicant is
that this Court must direct the legislature, that is, Parliament, to enact a
suitable standalone comprehensive legislation based on the UN Convention
and this direction, if issued, would be in consonance with the Constitution C
of India. This prayer must be rejected in light of the aforesaid discussion.
41. Notwithstanding rejection of the prayer made by the applicant,
we would in terms of the above discussion clarify that this would not in
any way affect the jurisdiction of the courts to deal with individual cases
of alleged custodial torture and pass appropriate orders and directions in D
accordance with law.

Devika Gujral M.A. disposed of.

E

F

G

51
(2012) 1 SCC 10 H