Holding

The Selection Committee lacked jurisdiction to award the three marital‑status marks, which must be fixed before the interview, rendering the appellant's appointment illegal.

Summary

Dipitimae Parida applied for the post of Anganwadi worker under the Integrated Child Development Scheme. At the deadline for applications she was unmarried, but she married later and was nevertheless awarded three marks for being a married woman during the viva‑voce. Respondent No.5 challenged the award of those marks, and the High Court set aside Parida's appointment, a decision later affirmed by the Division Bench. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that recruitment under the Scheme is governed by the State's circular issued under Article 162 of the Constitution, which fixes the criteria for marks and requires that marks for criteria (a) to (e) be notified before the interview. The Selection Committee was only empowered to conduct the viva‑voce (10 marks) and had no authority to grant the marital‑status marks, which must be considered as of the last date of application. Consequently, the appointment was illegal and the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the State's circular issued under Article 162 is a valid and binding guideline for Anganwadi worker recruitment.
Whether the Selection Committee had jurisdiction to award the three marital‑status marks after the application deadline.
Whether marital status, as an extra qualification, must be assessed as of the last date for filing applications.
Whether the appointment of the appellant should be set aside on these grounds.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 162

Subjects

Anganwadi workerrecruitmentmarital statusselection committeeArticle 162Integrated Child Development Schemeeligibility criteriamarks allocationadministrative law

Judgment

[2008] 14 S.C.R. 814

A DIPITIMAYEE PARIDA
v. :x~-
STATE OF ORISSA & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 6158 of 2008) .
......

OCTOBER 20, 2008
B
[S.8. SINHA AND CYRIAC JOSEPH, JJ]

Se/Vice Law
~ ~
Integrated Child Development Scheme - Clause 8(d) -
c Appointment of Angadwadi Worker- Eligibility criteria prescrib-
ing, inter alia, three marks for a married woman - Candidate
not married till last date for submitting application - Was
awarded marks by Selection Committee at ·the time of viva
voce on account of her being married - HELO: Not permis-
D sible - Ordinarily, qualifications for recruitment are to be con-
sidered on last date of filing of application - Selection Com-
mittee was merely authorized to award marks for viva voce - It
was not conferred with any power of relaxation - Stages for
---r--
grant of marks having been fixed, one Committee could not
E usurp jurisdiction of the other - State had jurisdiction under
Article 162 of the Constitution to issue the circular dated
7.10.1998 laying down criteria for the recruitment - Constitu-
tion of India, 1950 - Article 162 - Circular Letter dated
7. 10. 1998 issued by WECO Department of Government of
F Orissa.
Respondent no. 5 filed a writ petition before the High
Court challenging the recruitment of the appellant as an ~/ ',l
Anganwadi worker, on the ground that the latter was not
a married woman till the last date fixed for receipt of the
G application for the post and, therefore, 3 marks allotted to
her at the viva voce on account of her being married could
not have been 'illlotted to her and consequently she was
~-
not entitled to the appointment. The claim of respondent ~

no. 5 was that since she having secured more marks than
H 814
DIPITIMAYEE PARIDA v. STATE OF ORISSA 815
& ORS.

the appellant, was entitled to the appointment. The Single A
Judge of the High court allowed the writ petition and the
Division Bench dismissed the intra-court appeal filed by
the appellant.
In the instant appeal it was contended for the appel-
lant that the question whether a woman was married or 8
not although not wholly irrelevant, but being not an es-
sential qualification for appointment as an Anganwadi
worker, the High Court committed a serious error in set-
ting aside her appointment.
c
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The matter relating to recruitment of
Anganwadi Workers is not governed by any statute. Re-
cruitments are made pursuant to the Integrated Child
Development Scheme framed by the Central Government. D
The State, therefore, while making recruitments in such
projects, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 162 of
the Constitution of India, may issue such guidelines and/
or circulars as it may seem fit and proper, and the same
would be binding on all the functionaries working in terms E
of the 'Scheme' including the Selection Committees con-
stituted for recruitment of Anganwadi Worker. Validity of
the Circular Letter dated 7.10.1998 laying down the crite-
ria for recruitment of Anganwadi Worker is not in ques-
tion. The manner in which the marks are to be distributed F
has been laid down in Clause 8 of the said circular letter.
Sub-Clause (d) of Clause 8, inter alia, prescribed three
marks to be granted if the candidate was a married
woman. [para 8 and 9] [820-C-G]
1.2 The marks which have to be awarded in terms of G
Clause 8 (a) to (e) were to be notified prior to holding of
interview. It was for the competent Comm.ittee to award
marks in terms of clause 8(a) to (e) ·of the Circular Letter
dated 7.10.1998. The Selection Committee could not have
done so as it was merely authorized to hold the viva-voce H
816 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A test wherefor only 10 marks were specified. [para 9] [821-
A; 821-D] j(-
1.3 When marks are fixed specifying the criteria in
the rule, the same should be strictly followed. The Selec-
tion Committee was not conferred with any power to grant
8 relaxation. Stages for grant of marks having bee.n fixed,
one Committee could not usurp the jurisdiction of the
other. If the marks allotted because of appellant's marita.I
status are allowed to stand, then for all intent and purport )L •
the mark.s awarded by the Interviewing Committe~ to the
C appellant would be 12outof10, which was impermissible.
Even otherwise, ordinarily the qualification or extra-quali-
fication laid down for the recruitment should be consid-
ered as on the last ·date for filing of the application. Th~re
is no infirmity in the impugned judgment. [para 10, 12 and
D 14] [821-F-H; 882-C; 823-G]
Pramod Kumar v. UP Secondary Education Services
Commission & Ors. 2008 (4) SCALE 580; Rekha Chaturvedi
=
v. University of Rajasthan & Ors. 1993 (1) SCR 186 1993 ·--,-.
Supp. (3) SCC 168; Ashok Kumar Sharma & Ors. v. Chander
E =
Shekhar & Anr. 1997 (2) SCR 896 1997 (4) SCC 18;_Ashok
Kumar Sankar v. Union of India & Ors. 2007 (3) SCR 95 =
(2007) 4 SCC 54; and Rajasthan Public Service Commis-
sion v. Kaila Kumar Paliwal and Anr. 2007 (5) SCR 1131 =
(2007) 1o sec 260 - relied on.
F
CASE LAW REFERENCE
2008 (4) SCALE 580 relied on para 11
1993 (1) SCR 186 relied on para 12

G 1997 (2) SCR 896 relied on para 13
2007 (3) SCR 95 relied on para 13
2001 (5) SCR 1131 relied on para 13
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6158
H of 2008
DIPITIMAYEE PARIDA v. STATE OF ORISSA 817
& ORS.

From the final Judgment and Order dated 10.4.2006 of A
··~·
the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in Writ Appeal No. 31 of
2005
Anukul Chandra Pradhan and Shiv Sagar Tiwari for the
Appellant.
B
Shibashish Misra, Manoj Kumar Das and Sibo Sankar
Mishra for the Respondents.
~
j;
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
5.8. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted. c
2. Appellant is before us aggrieved by and dissatisfied
with the judgment and order dated 10.4.2006 passed by a Divi-
sion bench of the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack dismissing
an appeal against the judgment and order dated 30.3.2005
passed by a learned single judge of the said Court in Writ Peti- D
tion (C) No. 1952 of 2003 allowing the writ application filed by
respondent No. 5 herein.
3. The State of Orissa in terms of the Integrated Child De-
velopment Scheme of the Central Government issued an ad-
E
vertisement for appointment of Anganwadi Workers. A check
list laying down guidelines for selection of Anganwadi Workers
was also issued. The Constitution of the Committee as also the
marks to be allotted on different items were specified therein. A
Circular Letter dated 7 .10.1998 was furthermore issued by the
W.E.C.D. Department of Government of Orissa for selection of F
Anganwadi Workers laying down minimum educational qualifi-
..,..
cations and as also other criteria therefor; the relevant clause
whereof reads as under:
"8) Candidates who have been included in the panel G
mentioned above, will be called for an interview and marks
will be awarded to them in the following manner:
--..! 1"'
a) Percentage of marks obtained in that Matriculation
examination or percentage of marks obtained in the
written test for non-matriculates as may be relevant. H
818 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A b) 3 marks if the candidate is intermediate or equivalent
or has higher qualification. /(
c) 5 marks if the candidate belongs to S.C. and S.T.
category.

B d) 3 marks if she is married and additional 3 marks if
she is a widow or a divorcee (i.e. where marriage
has been dissolved by a court degree) provided she
resides in that village. 'f,__ •

e) Marks to be awarded for experience out of a
c maximum of 5. The experience relevant for this
purpose will be experiences in any area of the duties
of Anganwadi worker acquired in Government
employment or in employment in a programme under
a registered voluntary organization funded by the
D St~te/Central Govt. for this purpose.

f) Marks obtained in the interview which will be out of
a maximum of 10 marks.
-+--
. Note:- Marks awarded to candidate in accordance with
E clause (a) to (e) shall be notified prior to holding of
interview."
Rule 10 provides for composition of Selection Commit-
tee. Different Selection Committees were constituted for rural
and urban areas separately.
F
4. Appellant filed an application for recruitment as an
Anganwadi Worker, the last date wherefor was 20.9.2000. Ad- ·1r
mittedly, at that time, she was not married. She was married in
2001. She secured 43% in HSC Examination+ 3 marks in In-
G te.rmediate and 9 marks in viva voce, totaling 55 marks. How-
ever, she was awarded 3 more marks on the ground that she
got married although as noticed hereinbefore she on the last
--1'"
· specified date for filing of the application was not married. ~

Respondent No. 5 also filed an application for her recruit-
H ment asAnganwadi Worker. She secured 49.8% marks in HSC
DIPITIMAYEE PARIDA v. STATE OF ORISSA 819
& ORS.
-x
examination,+ 3 marks in Intermediate,+ 3 marks for marriage, A

..
+ 2 marks for viva-voce examination, thus, totaling 57.8% marks .
5. Contending that the Selection Committee had no juris--
diction to award 3 marks to appellant, respondent filed a writ
petition before the High Court of Orissa. The said writ petition
B
was allowed by a learned single judge of the said Court by a
• / judgment and order dated 30.3.2005, opining:
"A candidate who .acquired the prescribed qualifications
or extra qualification subsequent to such prescribed date
cannot be considered at all. Admittedly on the date of c
publication of the Notification and the date fixed for
submission of application the petitioner was not married
though she got married subsequently. The authorities
awarded three marks in her favour. In view of the ratio of
the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Ashok Kumar
D
Sharma (supra), the petitioner is not entitled to the said
three marks and only the eligibility and the qualifications
possessed by the opposite party no. 5 on the date
prescribed in the notification is to be taken into
consideration. In view of the clear position of law, I find that
the authorities acted illegally and with material irregularity E
in awarding extra three marks to the opposite party no. 5.
If the aforesaid three marks were deducted from 58%
then the opposite party no. 5 would secure 55% marks
whereas the petitioner would secure 57.8% marks. This
aspect was not kept in mind by the Collector. Therefore, F
I have no hesitation to set aside the order pass8d hy the
Collector and direct that the petitioner be engaged as an
Anganwadi Worker in the centre in question, if there is no
other impediment."
~ .. G
.... As indicated hereinbefore, on an intra court appeal pre-
ferred thereagainst by the appellant, the Division Bench passed
the impugned judgment dismissing the same.

6. Mr. Anukul Chandra Pradhan, learned counsel appear-
ing on behalf of appellant would submit that the question as to H
820 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A whether a woman is married or not although not wholly relevant,
but being not an essential qualification for appointment as an
Angaflwadi Worker, the learned single judge as also the Divi-
sion Bench of the High Court committed a serious error in pass-
ing the impugned judgments.
B 7. Mr. Shibashish Misra, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the contesting respondent, on the other hand, would
support the impugned judgment contending that the Selection
Committee could not have granted three marks in favour of the
appellant on the premise that she was married.
c
8. The matter relating to recruitment of Anganwadi Work-
ers is not governed by any statute. Recruitments are made pur-
suant to a Scheme framed by the Central Government. The
State, therefore, while making recruitments in such projects in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 162 of the Constitution
0
of India, may issue such guidelines and/or circulars as it may
seem fit and proper. ....,_
The said guidelines are ordinarily binding on all the func-
tionaries working in terms of the 'scheme' including the Selec-
E tion Committees constituted for recruitment of Anganwadi
worker.
9. We have noticed hereinbefore that a Circular Letter had
been issued by the State Government on 7.10.1998; the valid-
ity whereof is not in question. The manner in which the marks
F are to be distributed has been laid down in clause 8 of the said
circular letter.
Sub-Clause (d) of Clause 8 of the said Circular postulates
that three marks are to be granted if the candidate is a married
G woman and additional three marks are to be granted if she is a
widow or a divorcee.
As,the Scheme deals with the welfare of the children, it is
expected that a married woman would be able to deal with them
more efficiently; widows and divorcees are granted additional
H marks in order to give incentive to them to work with the children.
DIPITIMAYEE PARIDA v. STATE OF ORISSA 821
....:~
& ORS .

Ten marks had been fixed for viva-voce test. The marks A
which have to be awarded in terms of clause 8 (a) to (e) were to
be notified prior to holding of interview.
The reason behind the same appears to be invoking the
principle of transparency in the Selection Process. Thus, as in
B
terms of clause 8(a) to (e), appellant got 55% marks; the Selec-
j. ~ tion Committee could not have awarded her three additional
marks on the premise that she was married. Even before the
interview such marks could not have been awarded as the au-
thorities were not expected to be aware that she was married
after filing of the application for recruitment. It may or may not c
be for appellant to bring the said subsequent event to the notice
of the competent authority so as to enable them to consider that
although on the last date for filing of the application she was not
married but was married subsequently. We say so because in
terms of the rules it was for the competent Committee to award D
_.,., marks in terms of clause 8(a) to (e) of the said Circular Letter
dated 7.10.1998. The Selection Committee could not have done
so as it was merely authorized to hold the viva-voce test where-
for only 10 marks were specified.
E
10. We had adverted to this aspect of the matter so as to
enable us to consider the submissions made by Mr. Pradhan
that the criterion of one's marital status was not relevant. It is
one thing to say that the criteria fixed by the State for the pur-
pose of recruitment of Anganwadi Workers are illegal or ultra
vi res but it is another thing to say that although they are valid, in F
their application some relaxation could be granted. When marks
are fixed specifying the criteria in the rule, the same should be
strictly followed. The Selection Committee was not conferred
with any power to grant relaxation. Stages for grant of marks
~ having been fixed; one Committee could not usurp the jurisdic- G
"' tion of the other. If the contention of respondents is correct, then,
for all intent and purport, the marks awarded by the Interviewing
Committee to the appellant would be 12 out of 10, which was
impermissible.
H
L
'

'-

822 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 14 S.C.R.
-,:·
...--
A 11. This Court in Pramod Kumar v. UP Secondary Edu-
cation Services Commission & ors. (2008 (4) SCALE 580]
held:
" ... Appellant, however, has filed a writ application for
issuance of or in the nature of a writ of mandamus. He,
B therefore, must establish existence of a legal right in himself
...,
and a corresponding legal duty in the State. If he did not
possess the requisite qualification to hold a post, he could
not have any legal right to continue. It was, therefore,.
"
immaterial as to why and when the said proceeding had
c been initiated against him."
12. Even otherwise, ordinarily the qualification or extra-
qualification laid down for the recruitment should be considered
as on the last date for filing of the application. This has been so
D held in Rekha Chaturvedi v. University of Rajasthan & ors. rr-
[1993 Supp. (3) SCC 168], stating:
~-
"The contention that the required qualifications of the
candidates should b~ examined with reference to the date ~

of selection and not with reference to the last date for
E making applications has only to be stated to be rejected.
The date of selection is invariably uncertain. In the absence
of knowledge of such date the candidates who apply for
the posts would be unable to state whether they are
qualified for the posts in question or not, if they are yet
F acquire the qualifications. Unless the advertisement
~
mentions a fixed date with reference to which the
qualifications are to be judged, whether the said date is
of selection or otherwise, it would not be possible for the ~

. candidates who do not possess the requisite qualifications
in praesenti even to make applications for the posts. The
G ,----f
uncertainty of the date may also lead to a contrary
consequence, viz., even those candidates who do not have ""
the qualifications in praesenti and are likely to acquire
them at an uncertain future date, may apply for the posts
thus swelling the number of applications. But a still worse
H
DIPITIMAYEE PARIDA v. STATE OF ORISSA 823
& ORS.

-)\-' consequence may follow, in that it may leave open a scope A
for malpractices. The date of selection may be so fixed or
manipulated as to entertain some applicants and reject
others, arbitrarily. Hence, in the absence of a fixed date
indicated in the advertisement/notification inviting
applications should be judged, the only certain date for B
the scrutiny of the qualifications will be the last date for
making the applications. We have, therefore, no hesitation
-· _x
in holding that when the Selection Committee in the present
case, as argued by Shri Manoj Swarup, took into
consideration the requisite qualifications as on the date c
of selection rather than on the last date of preferring
applications, it acted with patent illegality, and on this
ground itself the selections in question arc liable to be
quashed."
13. Yet again, in Ashok Kumar Sharma & Ors. v. Chander D
Shekhar & Anr. [1997 (4) SCC 18], this Court held:
...,._ "One reason behind this proposition is that if it were known
that persons who obtained the qualifications after the
prescribed date but before the date of interview would be
E
allowed to appear for the interview, other similarly placed
persons could also have applied. Just because some of
the person had applied notwithstanding that they had not
acquired the prescribed qualifications by the prescribed
date, they could not have been treated on a preferential
basis." F
i {See also Ashok Kumar Sankar v. Union of India & ors.
[(2007) 4 SCC 54 Para 20], Rajasthan Public Service Com-
mission v. Kaila Kumar Paliwal and Anr.[(2007) 10 SCC 260
Para 20 and 21]}
G
14. In this view of the matter, we do not find any legal infir-

- i-- mity in the impugned judgment. The appeal is dismissed ac-
cordingly. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

R.P. Appeal dismissed.
H