DINESHversusSTATE OF HARYANA
- Citation
- 2014 INSC 333
- Decided
- 25 April 2014
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- DIPAK MISRA
Holding
The Court held that "soon before" is a relative term determined by the facts, and a persistent course of dowry harassment constitutes "soon before" cruelty, so the presumption under Section 113‑B applies and the conviction under Section 304‑B IPC stands.
Summary
The appellant Dinesh was convicted for the death of his wife Manju Bala, who committed suicide by ingesting a pesticide within four years of marriage. The prosecution alleged that Dinesh and his brothers repeatedly harassed the deceased for additional dowry items such as a television and a gold chain, and barred her parents from meeting her, leading to her suicide. The trial court and High Court upheld convictions under Sections 498A and 304‑B IPC, relying on testimonies of the deceased's mother, father and mediators. On appeal, the appellant contended that the essential element of cruelty "soon before" death was not proved. The Supreme Court held that "soon before" is a relative term determined by the facts, and a persistent course of dowry harassment satisfies this requirement, thereby invoking the presumption under Section 113‑B of the Evidence Act. Consequently, the conviction under Section 304‑B IPC was affirmed.
Issues considered
- The prosecution must prove that the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment "soon before" her death under Section 304‑B IPC and Section 113‑B Evidence Act.
- The meaning and temporal scope of the term "soon before" in the context of dowry death statutes.
- Whether evidence of persistent dowry demands and harassment establishes the "soon before" requirement.
- Whether the conviction of the appellant under Section 304‑B IPC is sustainable on the evidence.
Legislation cited
- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961s. 2
- Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 113-B
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 304-B, s. 498A
Subjects
Judgment
[2014] 7 S.C.R. 321
DIN ESH A
v.
STATE OF HARYANA
(Criminal Appeal No. 578 of 2011)
APRIL 25, 2014
B
[DIPAK MISRA AND M.Y. EQBAL, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860 - s. 304-8 - Evidence Act, 1872 -
s. 113-8 - Suicide committed by married woman within 4
years of marriage - Death caused due to consumption of C
pesticide - Conviction of husband-appellant - Justification -
Held: Justified - Defence of appellant that death was caused
due to some complication at advanced stage of pregnancy,
without any basis - Evidence of the witnesses sufficiently
established that there was persistent demand for dowry from D
the side of the accused persons and for non-fulfilment of their
demand, the deceased was being subjected to cruelty and
harassment - Proximate connection between cruelty,
harassment and death of appellant's wife - Sufficient materials
showing that the accused persons started demanding E
television and gold chain etc. after marriage and that their
demand continued and the parents were not allowed to meet
their daughter unless their demands were fulfilled - Appellant
guilty of offence uls.304-8 /PC - Presumption contained in
s. 113-B of the Evidence Act fully applicable to the facts of the F
case.
Penal Code, 1860 - s.304-B - Evidence Act, 1872 -
s. 113-8 - Dowry death - Requirement of prosecution to prove
that soon before death, the victim was subjected to cruelty or
harassment - Expression "soon before" - Meaning of - Held: G
It is a relative term required to be considered under the
specific circumstances of each case and no straight jacket
formula can be laid down - Determination of the period which
can come within term "soon before" left to be determined by
321 H
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A courts depending upon the facts and circumstances of each
case - In case of dowry death, circumstances showing the
existence of cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not
restricted to a particular instances but normally refer to a
course of conduct - Such conduct may be spread over a
B period of time - If cruelty or harassment or demand of dowry
is shown to have persisted, it shall be deemed to be "soon
before death".
The appellant's wife committed suicide within four
years of marriage. The death was caused by
C consumption of organophosphorus compound. The It
was alleged that the deceased was compelled to commit
suicide as appellant-accused and his two brothers were
persistently harassing her for not bringing dowry to their'
satisfaction; and also did not permit the parents of the
D deceased to meet her for several months prior to the
incident.
The trial court convicted the appellant under Sections ·•
498A and 3048 IPC but acquitted his two brothers. In '
E appeal, the High Court affirmed the conviction of
appellant by placing reliance upon the evidences of PW.1
(mother of the deceased), PW2 (one of the mediators in
the marriage) and PW5 (deceased's father).
In the instant appeal, it was contended on behalf of
F the appellant that the High Court completely overlooked
the most essential ingredient i.e. soon before her death
the deceased must have been subjected to cruelty or
harassment in connection with demand for dowry; and
that by no stretch of imagination it could be held that
F soon before her death the deceased was subjected to
cruelty or harassment in connection with the demand for_
dowry.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
G
DINESH v. STATE OF HARYANA 323
HELD: 1. Section 304-8 IPC and Section 113-8 of the A
Evidence Act, 1872 were inserted by the Dowry
Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986 with a view to
combating the increasing menace of dowry death. The
legislative intent of enacting these provisions is to curb
the menace of dowry death. From a reading of the B
aforementioned two provisions i.e. Section 304-8, IPC
and Section 113-8 of the Evidence Act, it is evident that
the, prosecution must have brought on record /the
materials to show that soon before her death the victim
was subjected to cruelty or harassment. [Paras 10, 11, 12 c
and 13] [329-G; 330-D, F-G; 332-8]
1.2. The expression "soon before" is a relative term
as held by this Court, which is required to be considered
under the specific circumstances of each case and no
,straightjacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time D
of allotment. It can be said that the term "soon before" is
synonyms with the term "immediately before". The
determination of the period which can come within term
"soon before" is left to be determined by courts
depending upon the facts and circumstances of each E
case. [Para 15] [332-E-F] ·
1.3. In case of dowry death the circumstances
showing the existence of cnie'tty or harassment to the
deceased are not restricted to a particular instances but F
normally refer to a course of conduct. Such conduct may
be spread over a .period of time. If the cruelty or
harassment or demand of dowry is shown to have
persisted, it shall be deemed to be "soon before death".
Prima facie, this Court is of the view that neither definite G
period has been indicted in the aforementioned section
nor the expression "soon before" has been defined.
[Paras 16, 17] [332-G-H; 333-A
-
State of Punjab v. Iqbal Singh AIR (1991) SC 1532: 1991.
H
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A (2) SCR 790; Ramesh Panjiyar v. State of Bihar (2005) 2
SCC 388: 2005 (1) SCR 903; Kanas Raj v. State of Punjab
and Ors. (2000) 5 SCC 207: 2000 (3) SCR 662 and Dhian
Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab (2004) 7 SCC 759: 2004
(3) Suppl. SCR 442 - relied on.
B
2. In the present case, it has been sufficiently proved
that the death was caused due to consumption of
organophosphorus compound which is a pesticide.
Admittedly, the marriage was solemnised before four
C years from the date of occurrence. The defence of the
accused that the death was caused due to some
complication developed at the advanced stage of
pregnancy, is without any basis. The mother of the
deceased, who was examined as PW-1, deposed that at
the time of marriage dowry was paid as per their financial
D position. After the marriage the deceased visited her
paternal home and informed her parents that her husband
and his two brothers were ill-treating her for not bringing
television and gold chain in dowry. This was brought to
the notice of two p~rsons, who acted as mediators at the
E time of settlement of marriage proposal and requested the
accused persons not to harass the deceased but they did
not heed to it. PW-1 further deposed that the accused
person did not allow them to meet their daughter. The
evidence of PW- 1 was corroborated by PW-5, who also
F reiterated that the accused persons were demanding
television and a gold chain and the deceased was
subjected to cruelty for not bringing enough dowry. PW-
5 further deposed that when he went to the house of
accused persons at the time of marriage of his brother, he
G was again reminded that he should come to their house
only after giving television and gold chain. From the
evidence of other witnesses, it is sufficiently established
that there had been persistent demand for dowry from the
side of the accused persons and for non-fulfilment of their
H demand the deceased was being subjected to cruelty and
DINESH v. STATE OF HARYANA 325
harassment. Because of persistent demand for dowry and A
continuous torture, harassment and cruelty meted out on
the deceased, she died by consuming pesticide. [Para 18]
(333-F-H; 334-A-F]
3. Considering the evidence and the conduct of the 8
accused persons, there cannot be any difficulty in
holding that the deceased died because of cruelty,
harassment and demand for dowry. There is a proximate
connection between cruelty, harassment and death of the
deceased. There are sufficient materials showing that the C
accused persons started demanding television and gold
chain etc. after the marriage and that their demand
continued and the parents were not allowed to meet their
daughter unless their demands were fulfilled. [Para 19]
(334-G-H; 335-A-B]
D
4. In the facts and circumstances of the case, both
the Sessions Court and the High Court have come to the
correct finding that the accused is guilty of offence under
Section 304-B of the IPC and that the presumption
contained in Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is fully E
applicable to the facts of the case. [Para 20] (335-B-C]
Case Law Reference :
1991 (2) SCR 790 relied on Para 12
F
2005 (1) SCR 903 relied on Para 14
2000 (3) SCR 662 relied on Para 16
2004 (3) Suppl. SCR 442 relied on Para 17
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal G
No. 578 of 2011.
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.02.2010 of the
High.Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl. Appeal
No. 1006-SB of 1998. H
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A Rishi Malhotra for the Appellant.
Ramesh Kumar, Kamal Mohan Gupta for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B M.Y. EQBAL, J. 1. This appeal by special leave is directed
against the judgment and order dated 17th F_ebruary, 2010 of
the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Criminal Appeal No.
1006-SB of 1998 whereby learned Judge of the High Court
dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant challenging the
C judgment of conviction/sentence passed by the trial court.
2. The prosecution version in a nutshell is that marriage of
Manju Bala was solemnized with Dinesh, appellant-accused
about four years before her death. Dowry in accordance with
D their financial capacity was given by her parents at the time of
marriage. However, appellant and his two brothers, namely
Vinod Kumar and Rakesh, were not satisfied with the dowry
and started harassing her for not bringing dowry to their
satisfaction. Although, mediators also requested accused
persons not to harass the deceased Manju Bala, their requests
E fell flat. It has also been alleged that the accused persons,
apf',ellant and his two brothers, did not permit the parents of
Manju Bala to meet her for the past several months prior to the
death.
F 3. Manju Bala was carrying a pregnancy of about eight
months when accused Vinod went to the house of her parents·
on the fateful day i.e. on 7.6.1994 and informed them that Manju
Bala was seriously ill. When Manju Bala's father Ram Naresh
and brother Raman were going to the house of accused
G persons for seeing her, they noticed accused Dinesh and his
mother carrying Manju Bala in a tractor to Civil Hospital
Fatehabad. Driver of the tractor ignored their signal to stop,
tractor. On arriving at Civil Hospital, they learnt that Manju Bala·
had died before reaching the Hospital. Munni Bai - mother of
H the deceased suspected that her daughter was murdered by
DINESH v. STATE OF HARYANA 327
[M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
her husband Dinesh and his brothers, namely Vinod and A
Rakesh, for not satisfying their demand for dowry. On her
statement, FIR No.441 dated 8.6.1994 under section 498-A
. and 304-B, Indian Penal Code (in short 'IPC') was registered
in the Police Station, Fatehabad and all the.three accused \'."ere
arrested. On finding a prima facie case under aforesaid B
sections, the accused persons were charge sheeted.
4. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined nine
witnesses and closed the evidence. Factum of marriage
between Manju Bala and Dinesh was admitted when the
accused persons were examined under Section 313, Cr.P.C. C
However, it was denied that Manju Bala was ever harassed for·
bringing dowry. Accused controverted the allegations and
claimed that they had good relations with Manju, who at the time
of first delivery developed complication and child died.
Thereafter, when she was about to deliver child, she again D
·developed complication and resultantly she died. During trial,
the accused examined three witnesses in their defence.
5. The Trial Court after concluding the trial found the charge
under Sections 498-A and 304-B, IPC framed against accused E
Dinesh proved. The Trial Court opined that the prosecution
failed to prove the charges under aforesaid sections against
the other two accused Vinod and Rakesh and accordingly
acquitted them of the charge. The Additional Sessions Judge
convicted Dinesh and sentenced him to undergo RI for one year F
under Section 498-A and to pay a fine of Rs.500/-. In default of
payment of fine, the accused-appellant was further directed to
undergo RI for six months. He was further sentenced to undergo
RI for ten years under Section 304-B, IPC. Both the sentences
•
were ordered to run concurrently.
G
6. Aggrieved by the judgment and order of the Trial Court,
appellant approached the High Court preferring Criminal
Appeal ~o. 1006 of 1998. After hearing learned counsel for the
parties and going through the essential ingredients of Section
304-B, IPC, learned Judge of the High Court dismissed the H
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A appeal observing that there is evidence with regard to the
factum of persisting demand of dowry and on account of failure
to meet the demand for dowry, Manju Bala was compelled to
commit suicide within a period of four years of marriage, though
the precise date of her marriage is not in evidence but both
8 sides admitted that marriage was solemnized about four years
prior to her death.
7. We have gone through the judgment passed by Trial
Court and also by the Appellate Court. Both the Courts on
appreciation of entire evidence came to the conclusion that the
C prosecution has proved the charges against the appellant. The
High Court while affirming the judgment of the Trial Court has
considered the provision of Section 304-B, l.P.C. and Section
113-B of the Indian Evidence Act. The High Court relied upon
the evidences of PWs.1, 2 and 5 to come to the conclusion
D that there had been persistent demand for dowry and also the
complainant was not allowed to meet the deceased and further
the death was caused by the consumption of
oreganophosphorus compound, which conclusively establishes
the appellant guilty under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal
E Code. The High Court further recorded the findings that the
totality of evidence reveal persisting demand for dowry and on
the failure of the complainant to meet the demand, the
deceased was compelled to commit the suicide within the
period of four years of marriage.
F
8. Assailing the impugned judgment of conviction, Mr.
Rishi Malhotra, learned counsel appearing for the appellant,
firstly contended that in absence of evidence that the deceased
soon before her death was subjected to cruelty, the conviction
of the appellant under Section 304-B, IPC cannot at all be
G sustained. Learned counsel also submits that Munni Bai,
mother of the deceased, who was examined as PW-1 deposed
that she was not aware about the reason of the death of the
deceased. The witness was declared hostile by the prosecution
and during her cross-examination she categorically admitted
H
DINESH v. STATE OF HARYANA 329
[M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
that the police did not record her statement according to her A
narration. Learned counsel has further drawn our attention to
the evidence of these witnesses on cross examination where
she was confronted with the fact of alleged demand for dowry
where the witness admitted that she had not stated before the
police that accused were demanding T.V. and a golden chain. 8
Learned counsel contended that PW-2 Rak.esh Kumar, who
was one of the mediators in the said marriage, wrongly stated
that the alleged demand for dowry by the accused persons were
made approximately four years before the date of occurrence.
On the basis of these evidence, learned counsel contended c
that the courts below without looking into the various material
contradictions have passed the impugned order of conviction.
Learned counsel submitted that the High Court completely
overlooked the most essential ingredient i.e. soon before her
death the deceased must have subjected to crualty or
0
harassment in connection with demand for dowry. Lastly, it was
contended that even admitting the evidence on record the
demand, if any, was made about four years before the death
of the deceased even then by no stretch of imagination it can
be held that soon before her death the deceased was
subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with the E
demand for dowry.
9. Per contra, Mr. Ramesh Kumar, learned counsel
appearing for the prosecution, has supported the impugned
judgment by drawing our attention to the material evidence F
brought on record by the prosecution.
10. Before we discuss the facts in evidence brought on
record, we wish to discuss the relevant provisions which are
involved in this case. As noticed, the appellant is convicted G
under Section 304-8of1.P.C. The said section reads as under:-
"304-8- Where the death of a woman is caused by any
burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under
normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage
and it is shown that soon before her death she was H
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any
relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any
demand for dowry, such death shall be called" dowry
death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to
have caused her death. Explanation.- For the purposes of
B this sub- section," dowry" shall have the sallle meaning as
in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of
1961 ).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven
c years but which may extend to imprisonment for life."
11. Another relevant provision which needs to be
discussed is Section 113-8 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
The said provision is quoted hereinbelow:-
D
"113-8. Presumption as to dowry death.- When the
question is whether a person has committed the dowry
death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her
death such woman had been subjected by such person to
cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any
E
demand for dowry, the cqurt shall presume that such
person had caused the dowry death. Explanation.- For
the purposes of this section," dowry death" shall have the
same meaning as in section 3048 of the Indian Penal
Code."
F
12. These two provisions in Indian Penal Code and Indian
Evidence Act have been inserted by the Dowry Prohibition
(Amendment) Act, 1986 with a view to combating the increasing
menace of dowry death. The legislative intent of enacting these
G provisions is to curb the menace of dowry death. This Court
while considering the legislative intent in the case of State of
· Punjab vs. Iqbal Singh, AIR (1991) SC 1532 observed as
under:-
"8. The legislative intent is clear to curb the menace of
H
DINESH v. STATE OF HARYANA 331
[M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
dowry deaths, etc., with a firm hand. We must keep in mind A
this legislative intent. It must be remembered .that since
crimes are generally committed in the privacy of residential
homes and in secrecy, independent and direct evidence
is not easy to get. That is why the legislature has by
introducing Sections 113-A and 113-B in the Evidence Act B
tried to strengthen the prosecution hands by permitting a
·presumption to be raised if certain foundational facts are
. established and the unfortunate event has taken place
within seven years of marriage. This period of seven.years
is considered to be the turbulent one after which the c
legislature assumes that the couple would have settled
down in life. If a married women is subjected to cruelty or
harassment by her husband or his family members Section
498-A, IPC would be attracted. If such cruelty or
harassment was inflicted by the husband or his relative for,
0
or in connection with, any demand for dowry immediately
preceding death by burns and bodily injury or in abnormal
circumstances within seven years of marriage, such
husband or relative is deemed to have caused her death
and is liable to be punished under Section 304-B, IPC.
When the question at issue is whether a person is guilty
E
of dowry death of a woman and the evidence discloses
that immediately before her death she was subjected by
such person to cruelty and/or harassment for, or in
connection with, any demand for .dowry, Section 113-B,
· Evidence Act provides that the court shall presume that F
such person had caused the dowry death. Of course if
there is proof of the person having intentionally caused her
death that would attract Section 302, IPC. Then we have
a situation where the husband or his relative by his wilful
conduct creates a situation which he knows will drive the G
woman to commit suicide and she actually does so, the
case would squarely fall within the ambit of Section 306,
IPC. In such a case the conduct of.the person would
tantamount to inciting or provoking or virtually pushing the
woman into a desperate situation of no return which would H
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A compel her to put an end to her miseries by committing
suicide."
13. If we read the aforementioned two provisions i.e.
Section 304-B, IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, it
is evident that the prosecution must oave brought on record the
8
materials to show that soon before her death the victim was
subjected to cruelty or harassment.
14. In the case of Ramesh Panjiyar vs. State of Bihar,
(2005) 2 SCC 388, this Court held that the prosecution has to
C rule out the possibility of a natural or incidental death so as to
bring it within the purview of "Death occurring otherwise than
in the normal circumstances". The expression "soon before" is
very relevant where Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and
Section 304-B, IPC are pressed into service. Hence, the
D prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence
there was cruelty or harassment only attracting the provision of
Section 113-B.
15. The expression "soon before" is a relative term as held
E by this Court, which is required to be considered under the
specific circumstances of each case and no straight jacket
formula can be laid down by fixing any time of allotment. It can
be said that the term "soon before" is synonyms with the term
"immediately before". The determination of the period which
1
can come within term "soon before" is le1' to be determined by
F courts depending upon the facts and circumstances of each
case.
16. In the case of Kanas Raj vs. State of Punjab & Ors.,
(2000) 5 sec 207, it was held that in case of dowry death the
G circumstances showing the existence of cruelty or harassment
to the deceased are not restricted to a particular instances but
normally refer to a course of conduct. Such conduct may be
spread over a period of time. If the cruelty or harassment or
demand of dowry is shown to have persisted, it shall be
H deemed to be "soon before death".
DINESH v. STATE OF HARYANA 333
[M.Y. EQ8AL, J.]
17. Prima facie we are of the view that neither definite A
period has been indicted in the aforementioned section nor the
expression "soon before" has been defined. In the case of
Dhian Singh & Anr. vs. State of Punjab, (2004) 7 SCC 759,
this Court held that:- ·
8
"The contention of the appellant's counsel is that even if it
is proved that there was cruelty on account of demand of
dowry, such cruelty shall be soon before the death and
there must be proximate connection between the alleged
cruelty and the death of the deceased. It is true that the C
prosecution has to establish that there must be nexus
between the cruelty and the suicide and the cruelty meted
out must have induced the victim to commit suicide. The
appellant has no case that there was any other reason for
her to commit suicide. The evidence shows that the first
appellant had demanded dowry and he had sent her away D
from his house and only after mediation she was taken
back to the appellant's house and death happened within
a period of two months thereafter. These facts clearly show
that the suicide was the result of the harassment or cruelty
meted out to the deceased. The presumption under E
Section 113-8 of the Indian Evidence Act could be invoked
against the appellant and the Sessions Court rightly found
the appellant guilty of the offence punishable under Section
304-8 IPC and Section 201 IPC."
F
18. Coming to the facts of the present case, it has been
sufficiently proved that the death was caused due to
consumption of oreganophosphorus compound which is a
pesticide. Dr. S.P. Mimani and Dr. S.P. Dadich (PW-9)
conducted postmortem examination on the dead body of the G
deceased. They collected viscera including parts of stomach,
intestine, lung, kidney and blood. On examination of the viscera
it was found containing oreganophosphorus compound which
is a poisonous substance. In the opinion of Dr. S.P. Mimani
(PW-9) the death was caused by the aforementioned H
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A compound. Admittedly, the marriage was solemnised before
four years from the date of occurrence. The defence of the
accused that the death was caused due to some complication
developed at the advanced stage of pregnancy, is without any
basis. The mother of the deceased, who was examined as PW-
B 1, deposed that at the time of marriage dowry was paid as per
their financial position. After the marriage the deceased Manju
Bala visited her paternal home and informed her parents that
her husband Dinesh and his brothers Vinod Kumar and Rakesh
were ill-treating her for not bringing television and gold chain in ·
c dowry. This was brought to the notice of Suresh and Rakesh,
who acted as mediators at the time of settlement of marriage
proposal and requested the accused persons not to harass the
deceased but they did not heed to it. PW-1 further deposed that
the accused person did not allow them to meet their daughter.
The evidence of PW- 1 was corroborated by Ram Naresh (PW-
0
5), who also reiterated that the accused persons were
demanding television and a gold chain and the deceased was
subjected to cruelty for not bringing enough dowry. PW-5 further'
deposed that when he went to the house of accused persons
at the time of marriage of his brother Vinod, he was again
E reminded that he should come to their house only after giving
television and gold chain. From the evidence of other witnesses,
it is sufficiently established that there had been persistent
demand for dowry from the side of the accused persons and
for non-fulfilment of their demand the deceased Manju Bala was
F being subjected to cruelty and harassment. Because of
persistent demand for dowry and continuous torture,
harassment and cruelty meted out on the deceased Manju Bala,
she died by consuming pesticide.
-G 19. Considering the evidence referred to hereinbefore and
the conduct of the accused persons, there cannot be any
difficulty in holding that the deceased died because of cruelty,
harassment and demand for dowry. We are also of the
considered opinion that there is a proximate connection
H between cruelty, harassment and death of the deceased as
DINESH v. STATE OF HARYANA 335
[M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
discussed above. There are sufficient materials showing that A
the accused persons started demanding television and gold
·. chain etc. after the marriage and that their demand continued
and the parents were not allowed to meet their daughter unless
their demands were fulfilled.
B
20. In the facts and circumstances of the case, both the
Sessions Court and the High Court have come to the correct
' finding that the accused is guilty of offence under Section 304-
B of the IPC and that the presumption contained in Section 113-
B of the Evidence Act is fully applicable to the facts of the case. C
21. In our considered opinion, therefore, the judgment of
conviction passed by the courts below needs no interference
by this. Court. Hence, there is no merit in this appeal and is
accordingly dismissed. The appellant shall be taken into
custody forthwith to serve the remaining sentence. D
Bibhuti Bhushan Bose Appeal dismissed .
. ':
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