Holding

The petition is not barred by limitation, the appellant remains disqualified as a leprosy patient, and the disqualification provisions are a reasonable classification that does not infringe Article 14.

Summary

The appellant, Dhirendra Pandua, was elected as a municipal councillor and chairperson in Orissa, but a fellow councillor filed an election petition under section 38 of the Orissa Municipality Act, 1950 alleging that Pandua was a leprosy patient and therefore disqualified under sections 16(1)(iv) and 17(1)(b). The petition was challenged on the ground that it was barred by the limitation period prescribed in section 19, and Pandua contended that he had been cured of leprosy at the time of election. The Supreme Court held that section 38 is a distinct remedial provision with no limitation period, so the petition was maintainable, and that the evidence showed Pandua was still a risk‑prone leprosy case and thus disqualified. The Court further examined the constitutional challenge under Article 14, concluding that the classification of leprosy patients as disqualified is a reasonable classification serving a legitimate public‑health objective and is not arbitrary. Consequently, the Court affirmed the findings of the District Judge and High Court, dismissing the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether an election petition filed under section 38 of the Orissa Municipality Act is barred by the limitation period prescribed in section 19.
Whether the appellant, being a leprosy patient, is disqualified from being elected or continuing as a municipal councillor under sections 16(1)(iv) and 17(1)(b).
Whether the disqualification provisions for leprosy patients violate Article 14 of the Constitution.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 136, s. Article 14

Subjects

election petitiondisqualificationleprosymunicipal councilArticle 14limitation periodpublic healthconstitutional law

Judgment

[2008] 13 S.C.R. 714

A DHIRENDRA PANDUA
V.
STATE OF ORISSA AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 5743 of 2008)
SEPTEMBER 19, 2008
B
[C.K. THAKKER AND D.K. JAIN, JJ.)

01issa Municipality Act, 1950:
s.38 - Election petition under - Limitation - Held: No
C period of limitation prescribed for presentation of petition un-
der s.38 to District Judge.
s.16{1)(iv) and s.17(1)(b) - Disqualification of leprosy
patient from contesting to post of Councillor in municipality or
continuing as such after election - Reasonableness of such
0
classification - Held: Said classification bear reasonable and
just relation with the object sought to be achieved by statute
and cannot be said to be unreasonable or arbitrary- S. 16(1 )(iv)
and 17(1)(b) not violative of Art.14 of Constitution - However,
E keeping in view present thinking ar.d researches carried on
leprosy as also on tuberculosis, and with professional input,
legislature may seriously consider necessity to retain such
provisions in the statutes - Constitution of India, 1950 - Ar-
ticle 14 - Class legislation.
F s.16(1)(iv) and s.17(1)(b)- Disqualification to hold office
as Councillor- Courts below held that at relevant time, elected
Council/or was not fully cured of leprosy - Justification of -
Held: ,Justified - Councillor's own showing on record that he
had doubts about the reactivation of the disease and had to
G approach District court for appropriate directions to concerned
authorities for providing adequate facilities for periodical
checks and issue of fitness certificate.
Public health: Leprosy - What is.

H 714
DHIRENDRA PANDUA v. STATE OF 715
-J
ORISSA AND ORS.

Constitution of India, 1950: Article 136 - Re-apprecia- A
tion of evidence - Scope of.
The appellant and the complainant-respondent no.3
were elected as Councillors of two different municipal
} wards. Subsequently, the appellant was also elected as
the Chairperson of the Municipal Council. The complain- B
ant filed an election petition under s.38 of the Orissa Mu-
nicipal Act, 1950 questioning the election of the appellant
as Councillor and Chairperson oh the ground that being
a leprosy patient, he had incurred disqualification under
s.16(1)(iv) and s.17(1)(b) of the Act and therefore could not c
continue as such.
Appellant contested the petition on the ground that
on the date of election, he was fully cured of the ailment,
....., and was thlis qualified to contest the election and that
D
the petition was barred by limitation. Election Tribunal held
that the petition was not barred by limitation and that on
the date of filing of his nomination and election to the of-
fice of Councillor, the appellant was a leprosy patient and
his status as a patient continued as there was no finality
of the medical opinion that he was fully cured of the dis- E
ease, thus appellant was disqualified under s.16(1 )(iv) and
s. 17(1 )(b) of the Act, to be elected and to continue as
Councillor of the Municipality. High Court affirmed the .
order of Tribunal. Hence the present appeal.
F
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. A conjoint reading of s.18 and s.38 of the
Orissa Municipality Act makes it clear that the two sec-
tions operate in two independent fields. The scope of s.18
is limited as compared to s.38. An election dispute under G
s.18 can be raised only by a candidate who was contest-
ing against the Councillor whose election had been chal-
lenged or by a minimum of 25 electors of the same ward,
within 15 days from the date of declaration of the result of
the election whereas under s.38, any elected Councillor H
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.

A of the Municipality, irrespective of his constituency or the
Chairperson, at the request of the Municipality can
present a petition to the District Judge of the District to
determine the question whether or not the person com-
plained against has incurred disqualification on any of
B the grounds enumerated in ss.16 or 17 of the Act. S.38 is
wider in scope inasmuch as the issue of disqui;ilification
of a Councillor can be raised not only on the grounds
mentioned in s.17 i.e. on the grounds which come into
existence after the person is elected as a Councillor, but
C also on the grounds mentioned in s.16, i.e. on the grounds
which had made him ineligible for election while he was a
candidate i.e. before he came to be elected as a Council-
lor. It is, therefore, manifest that when a question with re-
gard to the validity of election of a Councillor arises, it
D has to be dealt with in accordance with the procedure
prescribed under s.19 of the Act. However, when the ques-
tion raised is as to whether or not the Councillor has in-
curred any disqualification and thereby ceased to hold
the office, it has to be referred and determined as per the
procedure laid down in s.38 of the Act. It is axiomatic that
E the question of disqualification to hold an office would
arise at the stage posterior to the election i.e. after a per-
son is elected as a Councillor. The provision appears to
have been made to ensure that no Councillor, who has
incurred disqualification on any of the grounds, mentioned
F in ss. 16 and 17 of the Act, either prior to the election or
after the election at any time during the tenure for which
he is elected, should be allowed to hold the office. Unlike
in s.19, no period of limitation has been prescrihed for
presentation of a petition under s.38 of the Act to the Dis-
G trict Judge. [Para 10] [725-E-H; 726-A-E]
1.2. The Election Petition was filed by a Councillor
elected from a different ward, for a declaration that the
appellant has incurred disqualification un<.ler ss. 16 as well
as 17 of the Act, on the ground that he was and is a lep-
H
DHIRENDRA PANDUA v. STATE OF 717
ORISSA AND ORS.

rosy patient. The petition clearly fell within the ambit of s. A
38 of the Act and in the light of the legal position, it was
maintainable as such. The complainant's petition was not
barred by limitation. [Para 11] [726-F~G]
2.1 The appellant did suffer from .leprosy. Therefore,
the question for adjudication before the Election Tribu- 8
nal-cum-District Judge 'was whether th~ appellant is still
a leprosy patient and is, thus, disqualified to hold the of-
fice as a Councillor. [Para 12] [726-H; 727-A]
2.2 Leprosy is a chronic infectious disease affecting c
mainly the skin and the nerves and _was among the first
infection to be associated with a specific causative .or~
ganism - Mycobacterium leprae. Leprosy has been a
major health problem for man sincetim~ immemorial. Till
recently it was considered to be an incurable disease.
0
Moreover, it not only leaves behind a terrifying image of
disfigurement, the patient and his family is. ostracized from.
the society. [Paras 13, 14] [727 -B-E]
Sloane-Dorland Annotated Medical-Legal Dictionary -
referred to. E
2.3. It appears that the appellant was suffering from
Multibacillary disease ('MB'}. According to the bulletin is-
sued by the Indian Council of Medical Research ('ICMR'),
in February, 2002 MB patients when treated with Multi-
drug therapy (MDT} - a three drug combination, till smear . F
negativity or for two years, the results have generally been
very satisfactory. The MB patients treated and with regu-
lar follow up for over two to five years have responded
well with very few relapses. It is finally opined that it is
essential that the patients be kept under follow up for vary- G
ing periods as they were not sure of the long term effects
of the multi drug therapy. Thus, it appears from the news
report that despite various measures, at the relevant time,
relapse/reactivation of leprosy was not completely ruled
out and it depended on various factors. It is, however, H
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 13 S.C.R.

A heartening to note that in a news bulletin issued by the
World Health Organisation some time in the year 2006, it
is claimed that India, which at one point of time had a preva-
lence rate of leprosy as high as 57 per ten thousand popu-
lation, through its determined implementation of the Na-
B tional Leprosy Eradication Programmes, has. achieved its
set goal of Elimination of Leprosy as Health Problem; per-
haps short of Eradication. [Para 15] [727-F-H; 728-A-C]
2.4 It is trite that under Article 136 of the Constitution
this Court does not ordinarily re-appraise evidence for it-
C self nor determine whether or not the High court has come
to a correct conclusion on facts. It is only where the High
Court has completely missed the real point requiring ad-
judication or has missed or ignored the relevant material,
this Court would be justified in going into the evidence
D for satisfying itself that grave injustice has not resulted in
the matter, which is not the case here. It is perceptible that
on appellant's own showing that he was having some
doubts about at least the reactivation of the disease and
had to approach this Court for appropriate directions to
E the concerned authorities for providing adequate facili-
ties for periodical check ups including bacteriological
tests and issue of fitness certificate. Thus, the District
Judge as also the High Court was justified in coming to
the conclusion that on facts obtaining at the relevant time,
F the appellant had not been fully cured of leprosy. The
stand of the appellant that his affidavit filed in this Court,
detailing the past and present status of his health, was
only meant for a limited purpose of securing a job cannot
be accepted. Such a plea deserves to be deprecated.
G [Para 19] [731-B-E]
3 1 It is well settled that Article 14 forbids class legis-
lation; it does not forbid reasonable classification for tha
purpose of legislation. Nonetheless, that clas.;ification
should not be arbitrary but must rest upon som';l real and
H substantial distinction bearing reasonable and just rela-
DHIRENDRA PANDUA v. STATE OF 719
ORISSA AND ORS.

tion to the things in respect of which the classification is A·
made. To satisfy the Constitutional test of permissible clas-
sification, two conditions must be satisfied, namely: (i) that
the classification must be founded on an intelligible dif-
ferentia which distinguishes persons or things that are
grouped together from others left out of the group; and 8
(ii) that such differentia must have a rational relation to
the object sought to be achieved by the statute in ques-
tion. [Para 20] [731-H; 732-A-B]
Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendo/kar
& Ors. (1959)1 S.C.R. 279; Path um ma & Ors. v. State of Kera/a C
& Ors. (1978) 2 SCC 1; Javed & Ors. v. State of Haryana &
Ors. (2003) 8 sec 369 - relied on.
3.2 In the instant case, the impugned classification
is that those persons who have been or have become of
0
unsound mind or leprosy or tuberculosis patients are dis-
qualified from either contesting for the post of a Council-
lor in the Municipality or continuing as such after elec-
tion. The obvious object and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the said restriction appears to be that being a E
contagious disease, it can be transmitted via droplets from
the nose and mouth during close and frequent contacts
with untreated infected persons, therefore, the other elected
Councillors or the members of the public with whom they
are required to have day-to-day close contact as Munici-
pal Councillors, may also get affected by the disease. It is F
true that now with aggressive medication a patient may be
fully cured of the disease, yet the Legislature in its wisdom
has thought it fit to retain such provisions in the statute in
order to eliminate the danger of its being transmitted to
other people from the person affected by the disease. Hav- G
ing regard to these circumstances, the said classification
does bear a reasonable and just relation with the object
sought to be achieved by the statute in question and can-
not be said to be unreasonable or arbitrary. Accordingly,
ss.16(1 )(iv) and 17(1 )(b) of the Act are not violative of Ar- H
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.

A ticle 14 of the Constitution. [Para 21] (732-D-H]
4. Having regard to the changed concept and knowl-
edge gained about the disease of leprosy, on the recom-
mendation of the Working Group on Eradication of Lep-
rosy, appointed by the Government of India, many State
8 Governments and Union Territories have repealed the An-
tiquated Lepers Act, 1898 and subsequent similar State
Acts, providing for the segregation and medical treatment
of pauper lepers suffering from infectious type of disease.
Therefore, keeping in view the present thinking and re-
c searches carried on leprosy as also on tuberculosis, and
with professional input, the Legislature may seriously
consider whether it is still necessary to retain such provi-
sions in the statutes. [Para 22] (733-A-C]
Case Law Reference
D
(1959) 1 S.C.R. 279 relied on Para 20
(1978) 2 sec 1 relied on Para 20
(2003) 8 sec 369 relied on Para 20
E CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5743
of 2008
From the final Judgment and Order dated 7 .10.2005 of
the High Court of Orissa at Chttack in Writ Petition (Civil) 12860
of 2004
F
Kedar Nath Tripathy, H.P. Sahu and Abhisth Kumar for the
Appellant.
K. Sarda Devi, Aparna Bhat and Kirti Renu Mishra for the
Respondents.
G
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

D.K. JAIN, J.: 1. Leave granted. )'

2. This appeal, by special leave, is directed against the
i-1 judgment and order dated 7th October, 2005 rendered by the
DHIRENDRA PANDUA v. STATE OF 721
ORISSA AND ORS. [D.K. JAIN, J.]

High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in W.P. (C) No.12860 of 2004. A
By the impugned order, the High Court has dismissed the writ
petition, preferred by the appellant assailing the decision of the
Election Tribunal-cum-District Judge, Balasore, passed under
Section 38 of the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950 (for short 'the Act').
3. The appellant as well as respondent No.3 in this appeal, B
hereinafter referred to as the complainant, were elected as
Councillors of two different municipal wards in the election held
on 19th September, 2003 for the Notified Area Council.
Subsequently, on 30th September, 2003, the appellant was also
elected as the Chairperson of the Municipal Council. On 15th C
October, 2003, the complainant filed an Election Petition under
Section 38 of the Act questioning the election of the appellant
as Councillor and Chairperson, on the ground that being a
leprosy patient, he had incurred disqualification under Sections
16(1)(iv) and 17(1)(b) of the Act and, therefore, could not continue D
as such. It was alleged that the fact of his being a leprosy patient
even at the time of filing of nomination was also suppressed by
the appellant.
4. The appellant contested the petition. Denying the said
allegations, it was stated that as on the date of election as E
Councillor as also the Chairperson, he was fully cured of the
ailment and was, thus, qualified to contest the election. It was
also pleaded that the Election Petition was barred by limitation.
The Election Tribunal framed as many as five issues. The two
main issues, with which we are concerned, were: (i) whether the F .
petition was barred by limitation and (ii) whether the appellant is
a leprosy patient and as such disqualified to contest and hold the
posts of a Councillor and Chairperson of the Municipality. Taking
into consideration the evidence led by both the sides and upon
elaborate discussion on the provisions of the Act, the Tribunal G
came to the conclusion that the petition was not barred by
limitation and hence maintainable and that on the date of filing of
his nomination and election to the office of Councillor, the appellant
was a leprosy patient and his status as a patient still continues as
there is no finality of the medical opinion that he has been fully H
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.

A cured of the disease. Thus. the appellant was declared to be
disqualified under Sections 16(1 )(iv) and 17(1) (b) of the Act, to
be elected and to continue as Councillor of the Municipality.
5. Aggrieved, the appellant unsuccessfully challenged the
said decision in the High Court. The High Court, affirmed the
B order of the Election Tribunal-cum-District Judge on both the
counts, namely, (i) Section 19 of the Act, prescribing the period
of limitation for presentation of the Election Petition was not
applicable and (ii) that the appellant was still suffering from risk
prone leprosy. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant has preferred
C this appeal.
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
7. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
contended that the High Court has committed manifest error of
D law in affirming the finding of the Election Tribunal that the
appellant was still suffering from leprosy. It was urged that the
said finding is patently perverse inasmuch as the Tribunal
ignored the evidence adduced by the appellant, in particular
the medical certificates issued by the doctors, certifying that
E the appellant was not suffering from leprosy on the date of filing
of the nomination. It was urged that the High Court as well as
the Election Tribunal have laid too much emphasis on the
proceedings pending in this Court, which have no relevance to
the controversy at issue. It was also asserted that the Election
F Petition was barred by limitation.
8. Before examining the stand of the appellant, it would be
necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. Chapter
Ill of the Act deals with election of the Councillors to the
Municipalities and the Election Petitions. Sections 16, 17, 18,
G 19 and 38 are material for our purpose and, therefore, for ready
reference, the relevant parts thereof are extracted below:
"16. Disqualification of Candidates for election-(1) No
person shall be qualified for election as a Councillor of a
Municipality if such person-
H
OHIRENDRA PANDUA v. STATE OF 723
ORISSAAND ORS. [D.K. JAIN, J.]

xx xx xx xx A
.(iv) has been adjudged by a competent Court to be of
unsound mind or is a leprosy or a tuberculosis patient; or

xx xx xx xx
17. Disqualification of Councillor:-(1) Subject to the 8
provisions of Section 38, a Councillor shall cease to hold
his office, if he-

xx xx xx xx
(b) becomes of unsound mind, a leprosy or a tuberculosis C
patient; or
xx xx xx xx
18. Power to question election by petition:-(1) The
election of any person as a Councillor may be questioned D
by election petition on the ground.
(a) xx xx xx xx
(b) xx xx )()( xx
(c) that such person though enrolled as elector was E
disqualified for election under the provisions of Sections
15, 16 and 29.
(2) xx xx xx xx
19. Form and presentation of petition:-(1) The petition F
shall be presented before the District Judge, together with
a deposit of two hundred rupees as security for cost within
fifteen days, after the day on which the result of the election
was announced and shall specify the ground or grounds
on which the election of the opposite party is questioned G
and shall contain a summary of the circumstances alleged
to justify the election being questioned on such grounds.
(2) The petition may be presented by any candidate in
whose favour votes have been recorded and who claims
H
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.

A to be declared elected in place of the person whose
election is questioned, or by twenty five or more electors
of the Ward.
(3) xx xx xx xx
B 38. District Judge to decide question of disqualification of
Councillors:-(1 )Whenever it is alleged that any person,
who has been elected as Councillor is disqualified under
Section 16 or 17 and such person does not admit the
allegation or whenever any Councillor himself is in doubt,
c whether or not he has become qualified for office under
Section 16 or 17, such Councillor or any other Councillor
may, and the Chairperson at request of the Municipality
shall apply to District Judge of the district in which the
Municipal area is situated.
D (2) The said Judge after making such inquiry as he deems
necessary shall determine whether or not such person is
disqualified under Section 16or17 and his decision shall
be final
(3) Pending such decision, the Councillor shall be entitled
E to act as if he were not disqualified."
9. Section 16 of the Act provides for disqualification of
candidates for election as a Councillor of a Municipality. It
enumerates the grounds on which a person shall be regarded
F as disqualified for election. Clause (iv) of Sub-section (1) of
Section 16 of the Act envisages that no person shall be qualified
for election as a Councillor of a Municipality if he has been
adjudged by a Competent Court to be of unsound mind or is a
leprosy or a tuberculosis patient. Similarly, like Section 16,
G Section 17 enumerates certain grounds on which a Councillor
would become disqualified to hold office but the said provision
has been made subject to the provisions of Section 38 of the
Act. Section 17(1 )(b) lays down that a Councillor shall cease to
hold his office if he becomes of unsound mind, a leprosy or a
H tuberculosis patient. Section 18 stipulates that the validity of
i DHIRENDRA PANDUA v. STATE OF 725
ORISSA AND ORS. [D.K. JAIN, J.]

election of any person as a Councillor may be questioned by a A
petition on the ground enumerated therein, one of them being
that he was disqualified for election under the provisions of
Sections 15, 16 and 29. Section 19 lays down the procedure
for presentation of the Election Petition before the District Judge.
The Election Petition is required to be filed within 15 days after B
the date on which the result of the elections was announced. It
can be presented either by a rival candidate in the same ward,
who claims to be declared elected in place of the person whose
election is questioned or by a group of 25 or more electors of
the ward, which means that unless a candidate w,as a contestant c
against the person whose election as a Councillor had been
challenged, he cannot present the petition singularly. Section
38 of the Act, which is the pivotal provision, vests jurisdiction in
the District Judge to decide the question whether the Councillor
has incurred disqualification on any of the grounds mentioned D
in Sections 16 or 17 of the Act. But under Section 38, issue
regarding disqualification of a Councillor can be raised only by
a Councillor and by no other person.
10. A conjoint reading of the aforenoted provisions of the
Act makes it clear that Sections 18 and 38 operate in two E
independent fields. The scope of Section 18 is limited as
compared to Section 38. An election dispute under Section 18
of the Act can be raised only by a candidate who was contesting
against the Councillor whose election had been challenged or
by a minimum of 25 electors of the same ward, within 15 days F
from the date of declaration of the result of the election whereas
under Section 38 any elected Councillor of the Municipality,
irrespective of his constituency or the Chairperson, at the
request of the Municipality can present a petition to the District
Judge of the District to determine the question whether or not G
the person complained against has incurred disqualification on
any of the grounds enumerated in Sections 16 or 17 of the Act.
From a bare reading of Section 38, it is clear that the Section is
wider in scope inasmuch as the issue of disqualification of a
Councillor can be raised not only on the grounds mentioned in
H
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R ,.
A Section 17 1.e. on the grounds which come into existence after
the person is elected as a Councillor, but also on the grounds
mentioned in Section 16, i.e. on the grounds which had made
him ineligible for election while he was a candidate i.e. before

B
he came to be elected as a Councillor. It is, therefore, manifest
that when a question with regard to the validity of election of a
•
Councillor arises, it has to be dealt with in accordance with the
procedure prescribed under Section 19 of the Act. However,
when the question raised is as to whether or not the Councillor
has incurred any disqualification and thereby ceased to hold
c the office, it has to be referred and determined as per the
procedure laid down in Section 38 of the Act. It is axiomatic that
the question of disqualification to hold an office would arise at
the stage posterior to the election i.e. after a person is elected
as a Councillor. The provision appears to have been made to
ensure that no Councillor, who has incurred disqualification on )"
D
any of the grounds, mentioned in Sections 16 and 17 of the Act,
either prior to the election or after the election at any time during
the tenure for which he is elected should be allowed to hold the
office. Precisely for this reason, unlike in Section 19, no period
of limitation has been prescribed for presentation of a petition
E under Section 38 of the Act to the District Judge.

11. Having noted the scheme of Chapter Ill of the Act, we
may now advert to the facts at hand. As noticed above, the
Election Petition was filed by a Councillor elected from a different
F ward, for a declaration that the appellant has incurred
disqualification under Sections 16 as well as 17 of the Act, on
the ground that he was and is a leprosy patient. In our judgment,
the petition clearly fell within the ambit of Section 38 of the Act
and in the light of the legal position enunciated above, it was
maintainable as such. We are, therefore, in complete agreement
G
with the Courts below that the complainant's petition was not
barred by limitation. )r

12. Now, coming to the merits of the Election Petition, it
appears from the material on record that, unfortunately, the
H appellant did suffer from leprosy. Therefore, the question for
,
I
DHIRENDRA PANDUA v. STATE OF 727
ORISSA AND ORS. [D.K. JAIN, J.)

adjudication before the Election Tribunal-cum-District Judge A
was whether the appellant is still a leprosy patient and is, thus,
disqualified to hold the office as a Councillor?
13. Leprosy is a chronic infectious disease affecting mainly
the skin and the nerves and was among the first infection to be
associated with a specific causative organism - Mycobacterium 8
leprae. In Sloane-Dorland Annotated Medical-Legal Dictionary,
published some time in the year 1987, the disease of leprosy
has been explained thus:

"Leprosy, which is also known as Hansen's disease, is a c
mildly infectious degenerative disease caused by the
micro-organism Mycobacterium leprae. The disease
produces lesions in the skin, the mucous membranes,
and the peripheral nervous system. ln its more advanced
stage, it affects internal organs and renders its sufferers
0
vulnerable to other diseases such as diabetes and cancer."
14. Leprosy has been a major health problem for man since
time immemorial. Till recently it was considered to be an
incurable disease. Moreover, it not only leaves behind a terrifying
image of disfigurement, the patient and his family is ostracized E
from the society.

15. It appears that the appellant was suffering from
Multibacillary disease (for short 'MB'). According to the bulletin
issued by the Indian Council of Medical Research (for short
'ICMR'), in February, 2002 MB patients when treated with Multi- F
drug therapy (MDT) - a three drug combination, till smear
negativity or for two years. the results have generally been very
satisfactory. The MB patients treated and with regular follow up
for over two to five years have responded well with very few
relapses. It is noted that the length of multi drug therapy required G
or to be administered depends upon the aim, resources,
motivation of the individual and his availability for the fol!ow up.
Nevertheless, the bulletin says that a few studies have &hown
that despite two years of regular therapy; almost 10% patients
continue to harbour viable persisters. It is finally opined that it is H
\
--
~
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 13 S.C.R.
-~

A essential that the patients be kept under follow up for varying
periods as they were not sure of the long term effects of the
multi drug therapy. Thus, it appears from the news report that
despite various measures, at the relevant time, relapse/
reactivation of leprosy was not completely ruled out and it ~

B depended on various factors, noticed above. It is, however,
heartening to note that in a news bulletin issued by the World
Health Organisation some time in the year 2006, it is claimed
that India, which at one point of time had a prevalence rate of
leprosy as high as 57 per ten thousand population, through its
c determined implementation of the National Leprosy Eradication
Programmes, has achieved its set goal of Elimination of
Leprosy as Health Problem; perhaps short of Eradication.
16. Bearing in mind the aforenoted facets of the leprosy
disease and the advances made in its treatment therapies, we
D now proceed to examine, whether the findings of the District
Judge, affirmed by the High Court, to the effect that the appellant
has not been fully cured of leprosy and is still affected by the
said disease, suffers from any apparent infirmity warranting
interference. For the determination of this primarily factual issue,
E it would be necessary to delve a little deeply into the factual
aspects of the matter which have weighed with the District Judge
as well as the High Court in deciding the issue against the
appellant.
17.As noted above, the stand of the complainant was that
F the appellant was a leprosy patient and his status as such has
been continuing even prior to the date of election, which is
evidently borne out from the fact that he had himself approached
this Court, soliciting directions to the State Health Authorities to
conduct requisite medical investigations and tests on him and
G "to issue him a certificate on finding him cured and fit so as to
obviate his disability arising out of the disease" and that the
..,,
said matter is still pending. In the reply affidavit before the District
Judge. the initial stand of the appellant was that he was never a
leprosy patient. Accordingly, the District Judge framed issues
H and permitted the parties to lead evidence in support of their
DHIRENDRA PANDUA v. STATE OF 729
ORISSA AND ORS. [D.K. JAIN, J.}

respective stands. On an elaborate analysis of the evidence, A
so led by both the sides, the District Judge came to the
conclusion that the appellant was still suffering from risk prone
leprosy. In arriving at the said finding, the District Judge, has
relied on the following material/circumstances:
~
(i) Once· upon a time, the appellant was working as a B
para legal worker under the Government of West
Bengal and being a leprosy patient he received
treatment whereafter he remained bacteriologically
negative for three consecutive examinations and
declared fit to resume his duties in Government c
service with a further advice to appear for further
periodical check up at intervals of three months for
one year and for further check up at intervals of six
months for five years. However, since further
periodical check ups were not conducted, the D
appellant moved this Court for directions to the State
Health Authorities to conduct periodical investigations
and tests of leprosy patients including the appellant.
(ii) In his testimony, the appellant has stated that he has
privately undergone tests under Dr. P.C. Rath, Cuttack E
and has also been examined by some doctors at
Bhadrak who found no leprosy in him. A certificate
(Ext.A) dated 20th August, 2003 was also produced
by him. In his cross-examination, he conceded that
he had filed petitions in this Court on behalf of a F
leprosy organisation, wherein he had filed an affidavit
admitting to be a leper but only with a view to secure
a job.
(iii) Exhibit 11 is a letter dated 23rd May, 2003 issued by
G
the Joint Director of Health Services (Leprosy/TB},
Orissa to the Chief District Medical Officer, Balasore
:,.
with a list of 46 leprosy patients for their
bacteriological investigations and to submit progress
report for onward transmission to this Court. This
H
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.

A letter along with list of patients was produced by the
Chief District Medical Officer, Balasore by order of
this Court on the petition of the appellant. The list of
patients accompanying the said letter includes the
name of the appellant at serial No.3.
B {iv) On 7th April, 2003 the appellant had himself written
to the Chief District Medical Officer for
implementation of order dated 20th February, 2003
passed by this Court, inter alia, stating on affidavit
that he had made a specific prayer before this Court
c for four time bacteriological investigations with
subsequent follow up actions and that despite
direction of this Court, no investigations had been
conducted. In the affidavit accompanying the said
petition, the appellant had stated that he had been
D identified as "risk prone leprosy case with reversal
reaction for nerve damage". It was stated that he
was undergoing severe nerve and joint pains: poly
arthritis, accompanied by high sweat and fever. In
the ·affidavit, the appellant had complained that the
E medical authorities have neither undertaken the
required nerv~ function assessment nor adopted
specific Flow Chart and even life saving drugs were
not being supplied to him to prevent occurrence of
any leprosy disability and unnatural death.
F 18. Accordingly, the District Judge held that the averments
in the affidavit go to show that the appellant was still suffering
from leprosy and that the order of this Court directing
bacteriological and other tests etc. had not been conducted on
the appellant. The District Judge, accordingly, concluded that
G at least by 20 1t1 March, 2004, on which date the State
Government had filed an affidavit before this Court, complete
investigations, tests and treatments in respect of the leprosy
patients. including the appellant, had not been conducted and,
therefore, the patients included in the list filed before this Court,
H including the appellant, were not fully cured of leprosy.
., DHIRENDRA PANDUA v. STATE OF
ORISSA AND ORS. [D.K. JAIN, J.]
731

19. Having bestowed our anxious consideration to the A
matter, we are of fl'ie opinion that none of the aforenoted
circumstances takt"n ·into consideration by the District Judge,
'
;
can be said to be either irrelevant or not germane to the issue
for determination so as to warrant interference of this Court. It is
~
trite that under Article 136 of the Constitution this Court does B
not ordinarily re-appraise evidence for itself nor determine
whether or not the High court has come to a correct conclusion
on facts. It is only where the High Court has completely missed
the real point requiring adjudication or has missed or ignored
the relevant material this Court would be justified in going into
the evidence for the purpose of satisfying itself that grave
c
injustice has not resulted in the matter, which is not the case
here. It is perceptible that on appellant's own showing that he
was having some doubts about at least the reactivation of the
disease and had to approach this Court for appropriate
D

~
'
" directions to the concerned authorities for providing adequate
facilities for periodical check ups including bacteriological tests
and issue of fitness certificate. Thus, the District Judge as also
the High Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that on
facts obtaining at the relevant time, the appellant had not been
fully cured of leprosy. We are unable to accept the stand of the E
appellant that his affidavit filed in this Court, detailing the past
and present status of his health, was only meant for a limited
purpose of securing a job. Such a plea deserves to be
)(
deprecated. We are, thus, of the opinion that the High Court
I
was correct in law and on facts in affirming the decision of the F
District Judge.
20. Before closing the case, we may mention that in this
appeal, a new ground has been urged, namely, that the
provisions of Section 16 and 17 of the Act are discriminatory
G
and, thus, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. During the
course of hear1ng, without much elaboration, learned counsel
forthe appellant faintly referred to the said ground. In our opinion,
this contention is also untenable. It is well settled that Article 14
forbids class legislation; it does not forbid reasonable
H
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.

A classification for the purpose of legislation. Nonetheless, that
..
classification should not be arbitrary but must rest upon some
real and substantial distinction bearing reasonable and just
relation to the things in respect of which the classification is made.
To satisfy the Constitutional test of permissible classification, two
B conditions must be satisfied, namely: (i) that the classification
must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes
persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of
the group; and (ii) that such differentia must have a rational relation
to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.
c (See: Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia Vs. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar
& Ors. 1, Pathumma & Ors. Vs. State of Kera/a & Ors. 2 , Javed &
Ors. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors. 3 )
21. In the instant case, the impugned classification is that
those persons who have been or have become of unsound mind
D or leprosy or tuberculosis patients are disqualified from either
contesting for the post of a Councillor in the Municipality or
continuing as such after election. The obvious object and the
r
purpose sought to be achieved by the said restriction appears ....·-
to be that being a contagious disease, it can be transmitted via
E droplets from the nose and mouth during close and frequent
contacts with untreated infected persons, therefore, the other
elected Councillors or the members of the public with whom
they are required to have day-to-day close contact as Municipal
Councillors, may also get affected by the disease. It is true that
F now with aggressive medication a patient may be fully cured of
the disease, yet the Legislature in its wisdom has thought it fit
to retain such provisions in the statute in order to eliminate the
danger of its being transmitted to other people from the person
affected by the disease. Having regard to these circumstances,
G we are convinced that the said classification does bear a
reasonable and just relation with the object sought to be
achieved by the statute in question and cannot be said to be
unreasonable or arbitrary. Accordingly, we hold that Sections
16(1 )(iv) and 17(1 )(b) of the Act are not violative of Article 14 of
the Constitution.
H
~ DHIRENDRA PANDUA v. STATE OF 733
ORISSAAND ORS. [D.K. JAIN, J.]
,.
22. Before parting with this case, we deem it appropriate A
to point out that having regard to the changed concept and
knowledge gained about the disease of leprosy, on the
recommendation of the Working Group on Eradication of
~ Leprosy, appointed by the Government of India, many State
Governments and Union Territories have repealed the antiquated B
Lepers Act, 1898 and subsequent similar State Acts, providing
for the segregation and medical treatment of pauper lepers
suffering from infectious ,type of disease. Therefore, keeping in
view the present thinking and researches carried on leprosy as
also on tuberculosis, and with professional input, the Legislature c
may seriously consider whether it is still necessary to retain such
provisions in the statutes.
23. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any infirmity
or illegality in the impugned judgment warranting interference.
_, The appeal, being devoid of any merit, is dismissed accordingly, D
~ but without any costs.
1
D.G. Appeal dismissed.

)