Holding

A preventive detention order is invalid if the detaining authority does not demonstrate awareness of the existing custody and compelling reasons, including a real prospect of imminent release and likely prejudicial activity.

Summary

Dharmendra and Suganchand Chelawat were arrested for offences under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act and were remanded to judicial custody until 13 October 1988. While they were still in custody, a preventive detention order under Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 was passed on 11 October 1988, alleging that they might engage in transport and export of psychotropic substances if released. The appellants challenged the order by writ petitions; the Delhi High Court dismissed the petitions, but the Supreme Court allowed the appeals. The Court examined whether a preventive detention order can be validly issued against a person already in custody and held that two conditions must be satisfied: the authority must be aware of the existing custody and must have compelling reasons, i.e., a real apprehension of imminent release and likely prejudicial activity. The Court found that the grounds of detention did not show any such apprehension or material, and therefore set aside the detention order and ordered the release of the appellants. The decision clarified the limited circumstances in which preventive detention may be imposed on a detainee already in custody.

Issues considered

Whether a preventive detention order under Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 can be validly passed against a person already in judicial custody.
What constitutes "compelling reasons" for such a detention when the person is already in custody.

Legislation cited

Subjects

preventive detentionSection 3(1)narcotic drugsjudicial custodycompelling reasonsbailorder validityIndia

Judgment

DHARMENDRA SUGANCHAND CHELAWAT &
A
I SUGANCHAND KANHAIYYALAL CHELAWAT
~ v.
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

FEBRUARY 9, 1990
B
[B.C RAY, KULDIP SINGH AND S.C. AGRAWAL, JJ.]
.)
Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1988: Section '!( 1)-Detention Qrder-Detenu in jail
when order passed-Validity of.

The appellants were arrested for offences punishable under the
c
provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act,
1988. They were remanded to judicial custody till October 13, 1988. On
~. October 11, 1988 orders were passed under Section 3(1) of the Preven·
lion of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
Act, 1988 for the detention of the appellants on the ground that with a D
view to preventing the appellants from engaging in the transportation
and abetting in the export inter-state of Psychotropic Substances, it was
necessary to detain them and to keep in custody. The orders were
• served on them on October 13, 1988, while in custody. The High Court
-;. dismissed the Writ Petitions filed on behalf of the appellants, challeng-
/
ing the legality of their detention. E

In the Special Leave Petitions filed in this Court, it was contended
t11at since the appellants were in custody on October II, 1988, the date
of passing of the detention order, there was no apprehension that the
appellants would be engaging in any prejudicial activity, and the deten-
tion order could not be validly passed. F

On behalf of the respondents, it was contended that the detention
order was validly passed on October II, 1988 since the appellants had
been remanded to judicial custody upto October 13, 1988 only, and the
detaining authority could have apprehended that the remand may not
be extended beyond that date and the appellant• .nay be released from G
custody, and would b.e free thereafter to engage in prejudicial activities.

Allowing the appeals, this Court passed an order on January 11,
1990, setting aside the detention order and directing the release of the
appellants.
H

303
304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 1 S.C.R.

Giving reasons for its order, this Court,
A
HELD: Au order for detention can be validly passed against a
person in custody and for that purpose it is necessary that the grounds
of detention must show that (i) the detaining authority was aware of the
fact that the detenu is already in detention; and (ii) there were compel-
B ling reasons justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenu is
already in detention. The expression "compelling reasons" in the con-
text of 1naklr1g an order for detention of a person already in custody
implied that there must be cogent material before the detaining autho-
rity on the basis of which it may be satisfied that (a) the detenu is likely to
be releiised from custody in the near future and (b) taking into account
the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenu, it is likely that after
c his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it
is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such
activities. l313C-E]

Rattteshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate, Burdwan & Ant., [1964]
D 4 SCR 921; Masood Ala171 Etc. v. Union of India and Others, [1973] l
SCC 551; Dula/ Roy v. District Magistrate, Burdwan, [1975] l SCC
837; Vijay Kumar v. State of Jammu & Kashmir and Others, [1982] 2
SCC 43; Alijan Mian v. District Magistrate Dhanbad and Others, [1983]
4 SCC 301; Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate; Etah and Others,
[1985] 4 SCC 232; Suraj Pal Sahu v. State of Maharashtra & Others,
[1986] 4 SCC 378; Binod Singh v. District Magistrate Dhanbad, Bihar
and Others, [1986] 4 SCC 416; Smt. Shashi Aggarwa/v. State of U.P. &
Others, [1988] l SCC 436; Vijay Kumar v. Union of India, [1988] 2
SCC 57 and N. Meera Rani v. Government of Tamil Nadu & Another,
[ 1989] 4 sec 418, referred to.

F In the instant case, the detaining authority was aware of the fact
that the appellants were in custody ou the date of the passing of the
order of detention. Though . the fact that the appellants have been
remanded to judicial custody till October 13, 1988 has been mentioned,
the grounds of detention do not show that the detaining authority
apprehended that further remand would not be granted by the Magis-
G trate on October 13, 1988 and the appellants would be released from
custody on October 13, 1988. Nor is there any material in the grounds,
which may lend support to such an apprehension. On the other hand,
the bail applications moved by the appellants had been rejected by the
Sessions Judge a few days prior to the passing of detention order on
October 11, 1988. Tlie grounds disclose tliat ifie appellants were engaged
H in activities which are offences punishable with imprisonment under the

I
D.S. CHELAWAT v. U.0.1. (AGRAWAL, J,) 305

provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, A
1988. It cannot, there.fore, be said that there was a reasonable prospect
of the appellants not being further remanded to custody on October 13,
1988 and their being released from custody at the time when the order
for preventive detention was passed on October 11, 1988. J313F; 314C:EJ

In such circumstances, the order for detention of the appellants B
cannot be sustained. [314F)

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
Nos. 11 & 12 of 1990.

From the Judgment and Order dated 7.9.1989 of the Delhi High C
Court in Criminal Writ No. 591 & 591-A of 1988.

Harjinder Singh, R.N. Joshi and Latha Krishnamurthy for the
Appellants.

Soli J. Sorabjee, Attorney General, P. Parameswaran, B. Partha- D
sarthy, N.N. Johari and Uma Nath Singh for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S._C. AGRAWAL, J. These appeals, by special leave, arise out
of the judgment of the High Court of Delhi whereby the writ petitions E
filed under Article 226 of the Constitution to challenge the legality of
the orders dated October 11, 1988 passed under Section 3(1) of the
Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') for the deten-
tion of the appellants have been dismissed. This Court by the order
dated January 11, 1990 allowed the appeals and after setting aside the F
orders of detention dated October 11, 1988 directed that the appel-
lants be set at liberty forthwith and that reasoned judgment would
follow. We are hereby indicating our reasons for the order passed on
January 11, 1990.

Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat (the Appellant in Criminal G
Appeal No. 11/90) hereinafter referred to as 'Dharmendra' is the son
( of Suganchand Kanhaiyyalal Chelawat (the Appellant in Criminal
• Appeal No. 12 of 1990) hereinafter referred to as 'Suganchand'. In .ihe
grounds of detention furnished to the appellants it is stated that on
September 21, 1988 the officers of the Directorate of Revenue Intelli-
gence, Bombay Zonal Unit, searched the godown of Siddharth Trot- H
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1990] 1 S.C.R.
•
ters Pvt. Ltd., Kothari Mansion, at 357, S. V .P. Road, Bombay and
A five card board cartons contair.ing in all2,51,000 mandrax tablets
weighing 125.5 Kgs. and valued at Rs.7,53,000 were seized from there.
During the follow-up investigation the officers of the Central Excise &
Customs searched the premises of Suganchand at Indore (M.P.) which
resulted in the recovery of 51 Kgs. of mandrax tablets from a Maruti
B Van parked in the house compound on September 22/23, 1988 which
was seized. In addition to 20. 500 Kgs. of mandrax tablets, 148.300
Kgs. of methaqualone powder and 97.700 Kgs. of white powder was
recovered from the residence itself. Suganchand in his statement
which was recorded on September 23, 1988 stated that he had
manufactured mandrax tablets at his factory at Indore and that he was
assisted by his son, Dharmendra. Suganchand was arrested on
c September 23, 1988 and produced before the Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Indore on September 24, 1988 who remanded him to the
police custody till September 30, 1988. On September 30, 1988
Suganchand was remanded to judicial custody till October 13, 1988. A
bail application was submitted by Suganchand in the Sessions Court on
D September 28, 1988 and the same was rejected by the Sessions Court
on October 1, 1988.

Dharmendra was arrested on October 4, 1988 and he was
remanded to the police custody upto October 5, 1988. On October 5,
1988 he was remanded to judicial custody till October 13, 1988. During
E the course of arguments Shri Harjinder Singh, the learned counsel for
the appellants, stated that a bail application was submitted on behalf
of Dharmendra and the same was rejected on October 5, 1988.

On October 11, 1988 orders were passed by Shri K.L. Verma,
Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance,
F Department of Revenue, under Section 3( 1) of the Act for the deten-
tion of the appellants. In the order of detention the detaining authority
has stated that he was satisfied from the record of the case with respect
to the appellants that with a view to preventing them from engaging in
the transportation and abetting in the export inter-state of Psycho-
tropic Substances it is necessary to make the order directing that the
G appellants be detained and kept in custody. The said order of deten-
tion was served on appellants on October 13, 1988 while they were in
custody, The appellants were also served with the grounds of deten· 1
tion dated October 11, 1988 as well as the documents on which reliance
was placed by the detaining authority.

H Writ Petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of lndia
D.S. CHELAWAT v. U.0.1. [AGRAWAL; J.J 307

were filed by Kumari Archana Chelawat, the daughter of Suganchand
and sister of Dharmendra, wherein the legality of the detention of the Ai
appellants was challenged before the Delhi High Court. The said writ
petitions have been dismissed b¥ the High Court by order dated
September 7, 1989. Thereafter the appellants moved this Court for
special leave to appeal against the judgment of the Delhi High Court
and special leave to appeal was granted on January 11, 1990. Hence B
these appeals.

Shri Harjinder Singh, the learned counsel for the appellants has
urged that since the appellants were in custody on October 11, 1988,
the date of passing of the impugned order of detention, there was no
apprehension that the appellants would be engaging in any prejudicial
activity and the order for detention of the appellants under Section C
3( 1) of the Act could not be validly passed. In support of the aforesaid
submission Shri Harjinder Singh has placed reliance on the decision of
this Court in Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah and Others,
[1985] 4 SCC 232; Suraj Pal Sahu v. State of Maharashtra & Others,
[1986] 4 SCC 378 and N. Meera Rani v. Government of Tamil N!adu & D
Another, [1989] 4 SCC 418.

The learned Attorney General, 6n the other hand, has supported
the decision of the High Court and has submitted that in the facts and
the circumstances of the present cases the orders for detention of the
appellants were validly passed on October 11, 1988. The submission of E
the learned Attorney General is that the appellants had been
remanded to judicial custody upto October 13, 1988 only and the
detaining authority could have apprehended that the said remand may
not be extended beyond October 13, 1988 and the appellants may be
released from custody on October 13, 1988 and thereafter they would
be free to engage in prejudicial activities. F

In view of the aforesaid submissions the question which needs
consideration is whether in the facts and the circumstances of the
present cases, the detaining authority was justified, in law, in passing
the orders for the detention of the appellants under Section 3(1) of the
Act on October 11, 1988 when the appellants were in custody. The G
question as to whether and in what circumstances an order for preven-
tive detention may be passed against a person who is already in
custody has come up for consideration before this Court. In Ramesh-
war Shaw v. District Magistrate, Burdwan & Anr., [1964] 4 SCR 921
decided by the Constitution Bench, it has been laid down that the
question as to whether an order for detention can be passed- against a H
308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1990] 1 S.C.R.

A person who is in detention or in jail will always have to be determined
in the circumstances of each case and it has been observed:

"As an abstract proposition of law, there may not be any
doubt thats. 3(1)(a) does not preclude the authority from
passing an order of detention against a person whilst he is
B in detention or in jail; but the relevant facts in connection
with the making of the order may differ and that may make
a difference in the application of the principle that a deten-
tion order can be passed against a person in jail. Take for
instance, a case where a person has been sentenced to
rigorous imprisonment for ten years. It cannot be seriously
suggested that soon after the sentence of imprisonment is
c pronounced on the person, the detaining authority can
make an order directing the detention of the said person
after he is released from jail at the end of the period of the
sentence imposed on him. In dealing with this question, )
again the considerations of proximity of time will not be
D irrelevant. On the other hand, if a person who is under-
going imprisonment, for a very short period, say for a
month or two or so, and it is known that he would soon be
released from jail, it may be possible for the authority to
consider the antecedent history of the said person and
decide whether the detention of the said person would be
E necessary after he is released from jail, and if the authority
is bona fide satisfied that such detention is necessary, he
can make a valid order of detention a few days before the
person is likely to be released."

In Masood Alam Etc. v. Union of India and Others, [1973] 1 SCC
F 551 it has been held that merely because the person concerned has
been served with the order of detention while in custody when it is
expected that he would soon be released that service cannot invalidate
the order of detention. This Court has observed as under:

"The real hurdle in making an order of detention against a
0 person already in custody is based on the view that it is
futile to keep a person in dual custody under two different
orders but this objective cannot hold good if the earlier
)
custody is without doubt likely to cease very soon and the
detention order is made merely with the object of render-
ing it operative when the previous custody is about to
H cease."
D.S. CHELAWAT v. U.0.1. {AGRAWAL, J.) 309

In Dula/ Roy v. District Magistrate, Burdwan, [ 1975] 1 SCC 837 it
was held that if a person was serving a long time of imprisonment or A
was in jail custody as an undertrial and there was no immediate or
early prospect of his being released on bail or otherwise, the authority
would not legitimately be satisfied on the basis ·of his past history or
antecedents that he was likely to indulge in similar prejudicial
activities after his release in the distant or indefinite future. B

In Vijay Kumar v. State of Jammu & Kashmir and Others, [1982]
2 SCC 43 this Court has observed:

"Preventive detention is resorted to, to· thwart future
action. Ifthe detenu is already in jail charged with a serious
offence, he is thereby prevented from: acting in a manner c
prejudicial to the security of the State. May be, in a given
case the.re yet may be need to order preventive detention of
a person already in jail. But in such a situation the detain-
ing authority must disclose awareness of the fact that the
person against whom an order of preventive detention is D
being. made is to the. kµowledge of the authority already in
jail and yet for compelling reasons a preventive detention
order need to be made."

In Alijan Mian v. District Magistrate, Dhanbad and Others,
[1983 J 4 sec 301 in the grounds of detention it was stated that the E
subject is in jail and is likely to be released on bail and that if he was
allowed to remain at large, he will indulge in activities prejudicial to
the maintenance of public order. After considering the said statement
in the grounds of detention this Court has observed:

"The position would have been entirely different if the F
\ petitioners were in jail and had to remain in jail for a pretty
' long time. In such a situation there could be no apprehen-
sio'l of breach of 'public order' from the petitioners. But
the detaining authority was satisfied that if the petitioners
were enlarged on .bail, of which there was every likelihood,
it was necessary to prevent them from acting in a manner G
prejudicial to public order."
( In Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah and Others, (supra)
'.
in the grounds of detention it was m~ntioned that the detenu had filec:I
an application for bail and there was positive apprehension that after
having bail he would come out of jail and would indulge in activity H
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] ~ S.C.R.

prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. This Court has
A observed:

"On a reading' of the grounds, particularly the paragraph
which we have extracted above, it is clear that the order of
detention was passed as the detaining authority was
B apprehensive that in case the detenu was released on bail
he would again carry on his criminal activities in the area. If
the apprehension of the detaining authority was true, the
bail application had to be opposed and in case bail was
granted, challenge against that order in the higher forum
had to be raised. Merely on the ground that an accused in
detention as an under-trail prisoner was likely to get bail an
c order of detention under the National Security Act should
not ordinarily be passed. We are inclined to agree with
counsel for the petitioner that the order of detention in the
circumstances is not sustainable and is contrary to the well
settled principles indicated by this Court in a series of cases
relating to the preventive detention ...

ln ~uraj Pal iahu v. State of Maharashtra & Others, (supra) after
cm1s1dering the earlier decisions this Court has observed:

"If there was an imminent possibility of the man being set
E at liberty and his detention coming to an end, then it
appears, as a principle, if his detention is otherwise neces-
sary and justified then there is nothing to prevent the
appropriate authorities from being satisfied about the
necessity of passing an appropriate order detaining the
person concerned ...
F
In Binod Singh v. District Magistrale, Dhanbad, Bihar and
Uthers, I J986] 4 sec 4 i6 it has been laid down:
I
·'If a man is in custody and there is no imminent possibility
of his being released, the power of preventive detention
G should not be exercised. In the instant case when the actual
order of detention was served upon the detenu, the detenu
was in Jail. There is no indication that this factor or the
question that the said detenu might be released or that
there was such a possibility of his release, was taken into
consideration by the detaining authority properly and
seriously before the service of the order. A bald statement
D.S. CHELAWAT v. U.0.1. [AGRAWAL, J.l 311

is merely an ipse dixit of the officer. If there were cogent A
materials for thinking that the· detenu might be rdea>cLi
then these should have been made apparent.··

In Smt. Shashi Aggarwal v. State of U.P. & Others, [ i988] l SCC
436 this Court while referring to the decision in Ramesh Yadav v.
Dmrict Magistrate, Etah (Supra) has observed: B

"What was stressed in the above case is that an apprehen-
sion of the detaining authority that the accused if enlarged
on bail would again carry on his criminal activities is by
itself not sufficient to detain a person under the National
Security Act .. ,
c
This Court has further observed:

"Every citizen in this country has the right to have recourse
to law. He has the right to move the Court for bail when he
is arrested under the ordinary law of the land. If the State D
thinks that he does not deserve bail the State could oppose
the grant of bail. He cannot, however, be interdicted from
moving the court for bail by clamping an order ,f deten-
tion. The possibility of the court granting bail may not be
sufficient. Nor a bald statement that the person would
repeat his criminal activities would be enough. There must E
also be credible information or cogent reasons apparent on
the record that the detenu, if enlarged on bail, would· act
prejudicially to the interest of public order."

In Vijay Kumar v. Union of India, [1988] 2 SCC 57, it has been
held that two facts must appear from the grounds of detention, F
namely:
\
(i) awareness of the detaining authority of the fact that the
detenu is already in detention, and

(ii) there must be compelling reasons justif:,ing such detention, G
despite the fact that the detenu is already under detention.
/
Shetty, J., in.his concurring judgment, has posed the question:
what should be the compelling reason justifying the preventive deten-
uon, if the person is already in jail and where should one find it? The
learned judge has rejected the contention that it can be found from H
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 1 S.C.R.

material other than the grounds of detention and the connected facts
A therein and has held that apart from the grounds of detention and the
connected facts therein, there cannot be any other material which can
enter into the satisfaction of the detaining authority. The learned /
judge has also observed that if the activities of the detenu are not
isolated or casual and are continuous or part of the transaction or
B racket, then, there may be need to put the person under preventive
detention, notwithstanding the fact that he is under custody in connec-
tion with a case. The learned judge has quoted the following observa-
tions from the judgment of this Court in Suraj Pal Sahu v. State of
Maharashtra, (Supra):

"But where the offences in respect of which the detenu is
c accused are so interlinked and continuous in character and
are of such nature that these affect continuous maintenance
of essential supplies and thereby jeopardize the security of
the State, then subject to other conditions being fulfilled, a
man being in detention would not detract from the order
D being passed for preventive detention."

In N. Meera Rani v. Government of Tamil Nadu and Another,
(Supra) the legal position has been summed up as under:

"We may summarise and reiterate the settled principle.
E Subsisting custody of the detenu by itself does not invali-
date an order of his preventive detention and the decision
must depend on the facts of the particular case; preventive
detention being necessary to prevent the detenu from act-
ing in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or
to the maintenance of public order etc. ordinarily it is not
F needed when the detenu is already in custody; the detain-
ing authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsist- I
I
ing custody of the detenu and take that factor into account
while making the order; but, even so, if the detaining
authority is reasonably satisfied on cogent material that
there is likelihood of his release and in view of his antece-
G dent activities which are proximate in point of time he must
be detained in order to prevent him from indulging in such
prejudicial activities the detention order can be validly
made even in anticipation to operate on his release. This
appears to us, to be the correct legal position."

H In this case this Court has pointed out that there was no indication in
•
D.S. CHELAWAT v. U.O.I. [AGRAWAL, J.l 313

the detention order read with its annexure that the detaining authority
A
considered it likely that the detenu could be released on bail and that
the contents of the order showed the satisfaction of the detaining
authority that there was ample material to prove the detenu's compli-
city in the Bank dacoity including sharing of the booty in spite of
absence of his name in the FIR as one of the dacoits. The Court held
that the order for detention was invalid since it was made when the B
detenu was already in jail custody for the offence of bank dacoity with
no prospect of his release.

The decisions referred to above lead to the conclusion that an
order for detention can be validly passed against a person in custody
and for that purpose it is necessary that the grounds of detention must C
show that (i) the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the
detenu is already in detention; and (ii) there were compelling reasons
justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenu is already in
detention. The expression "compelling reasons" in the context of
making an order for detention of a person already in custody implies
that there must be cogent material before the detaining authority on D
the basis of which it may be satisfied that (a) the detenu is likely to be
released from custody in the near future, and (b) taking into account
the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenu, it is likely that
after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities
and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging
in such activities. E

If the present cases are examined in the light of the aforesaid
principles, it can be said that the first condition is satisfied in as much
as the grounds of detention show that the detaining authority was
I aware of the fact that the appellants were in custody on the date of
passing of the order of detention. Can it be said that there was a F

' compelling reason for passing the order for the detention of the appel-
lants, although they were in custody? The learned Attorney General
wants the said question to be answered in the affirmative. He has
invited our attention to the grounds of detention and has submitted
that the appellants were found engaging in the transportation and
abetting in the export inter-state of Psych tropic Substances and in the G
event of their release from custody, the appellants would continue to
engage in those activities. The learned Attorney General has also
pointed out that the appellants had been remanded to judicial custody
upto October 13, 1988 only and their further remand could be refused.
by the Magistrate and the appellants could be released from custody
on October 13, 1988. The submission of the learned Attorney General H
•
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1990] 1 S.C.R.

is that, keeping in view the activities of the appellants and the likeli-
hood of their being released from custody on their remand being not
extended by the Magistrate on October 13, 1988, the detaining author-
ity, on October 11, 1988, when it passed the order of detention, was
satisfied that the detention of the appellants was necessarv even
though they were in custody at that time.
B
-Ne have given our careful consideration to the aforesaid submis-
sion of the learned Attorney General. We are, however, unable to
agree with the same. In the grounds of detention the detaining autho-
rity has only mentioned the fact that the appellants has been remanded
to judicial custody till October 13, 1988. The grounds of detention do
c not show that the detaining authority apprehended that the further
remand would not be granted by !he Magistrate on October 13, 1988,
and the appellants would be released from custody on October 13,
1988. Nor is there any material in the grounds of detention which may
lend support to such an apprehension. On the other hand we find that
the bail applications moved by the appellants had been rejected by the
D Sessions Judge a few days prior to the passing of the order of detention
on October 11, 1988. The grounds of detention disclose that the appel-
lants were engaged in activities which are offences punishable with
imprfsonment under the provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. It cannot, therefore, be said that
there was a reasonable prospect of the appellants not being further
E remanded to custody on October 13, 1988 and their being released
from custody at the time when the order for preventive detention of
that appellant was passed on October 11, 1988. In the circumstances,
we are of the view that the order for detention of the appellants cannot
be sustained and must be set aside and the appellants should be
released forthwith. These are the reasons on the basis of which we
F passed the order for the release of the appellants on January 11, 1990.
It is, however, clarified that in case the appellants are releaSfd from
custody in the aforesaid criminal proceedings, the question of their
preventive detention under the Act on the above material may be
reconsidered by the appropriate authority in accordance with law and
this decision shall not be construed as an impediment for that purpose.
G
N.P.V.

y