DHARMENDRA KUMAR SINGHversusTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.

                          [2020] 12 S.C.R. 557                            557


                DHARMENDRA KUMAR SINGH                                    A
                                  v.
           THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
                (Civil Appeal No. 12202 of 2018 etc.)
                        OCTOBER 28, 2020                                  B
  [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND HRISHIKESH ROY, JJ.]
      Uttar Pradesh Mining Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963:
      Rules 68 and 40(h) – Mining lease – Extension of – Sought
by the lease-holders – For the obstructed period of lease, due to         C
judicial pronouncements – Held: The proposition that interdicts
posed by a competent Court should not put a party at a disadvantage,
cannot be a blanket proposition – The court has to consider the
context in which the interdict was passed, in the present case it is to
preserve the forest area – The right to extension of lease either flow
                                                                          D
from the statutory provisions or from the terms of the lease – The
obstructed period by reason of judicial interdict, by itself will not
give window to extend the lease – Extension of lease cannot be
granted in exercise of Rule 68 as the same is worded in restrictive
manner – The new mining policy of the State also has no provision
for grant of extension of time for the obstructed period – Terms of       E
the lease too do not provide for any such consequences – Only
Rule 40(h) provides for the consequences of disruption – Therefore,
the appropriate course would be not to extend the lease for the
obstructed period, but to refund the security deposit and the amount
deposited by lease-holders as advance royalties, in terms of Rule
                                                                          F
40(h) – Since the monies have remained blocked and the mining
was prevented for no fault of the lease-holders, in order to do
complete justice, in exercise of power u/Art. 142 of the Constitution,
the monies are directed to be refunded with simple interest @ 9%
p.a.
      Disposing of the appeals, the Court                                 G

      HELD : 1. The right to extension of lease either flow from
a statutory provision or from the terms of the lease between the
concerned parties. If there has been an obstructed period by
reason of a judicial interdict, that itself will not give window to
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                                 557
558            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2020] 12 S.C.R.


A     extend the lease by not following the statutory provisions,
      especially when the terms of the lease do not provide for any
      consequences thereof. [Para 36][578-D-E]
            Vijay Kumar Dwivedi v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2016)
            4 All LJ 690 – approved.
B     2.1 The statutory provision of Rule 68 of the Uttar Pradesh Mining
      Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963 is in the nature of a relaxation
      rule in special cases and has to be read with the Rules which
      provide the manner in which the exploitation of minerals should
      take place. The statute was worded in a restrictive manner
C     deliberately giving only a restricted window and this legislative
      intent ought not to be defeated by supplanting it with any other
      interpretation. [Para 35][577-F-G; 578-A-B]
            Sukhan Singh v. State of UP & Ors. (2015) 2 All LJ
            619 – approved.
D           Mohammad Yunus Hasan v. State of UP & Ors. (2016)
            4 All LJ 4 – referred to.
             2.2 It is a well settled principle of interpretation that when
      the words of a statute are clear and unambigous, recourse to
      different principles of interpretation, other than the rule of literal
E     construction, cannot be resorted to. If a fresh grant or extension
      has to be made under the Mining Rules, it must be in accordance
      with Chapter II, and the provision for auction of leases in Chapter
      IV is in furtherance of a transparent procedure. [Para 35][578-B-
      C]
F           Delhi Transport Corporation v. Balwan Singh and Ors.
            2019 SCC Online SC 276 – relied on.
            3. The State of UP had issued a New Mining Policy on
      12.6.2017 and this policy has no provision for grant of extension
      of time for obstructed period of mining lease and all mining leases
G     were to be permitted by e-tendering or e-auction alone. If the
      mining lease is extended for the obstructed period, it would
      amount to violation of this New Mining Policy and since the
      extension would have to be granted now, it cannot be accepted
      that this should relate back to the date of the lease and not as on
      date. [Para 39][579-B-D]
H
  DHARMENDRA KUMAR SINGH v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                             559
               PRADESH & ORS.

      4. Rule 40(h) of the Mining Rules provides for the                   A
consequences of the disruption of mining operations in a lease
area owing to any special circumstances and requires the DM,
with the prior approval of the State Government, to adjust the
amount equivalent to the installments payable during the
disrupted period against forthcoming installments. Thus,
                                                                           B
monetary adjustment is all that has been provided for by the
statute making the legislative intent obvious, i.e., that if some
amounts have been paid as installments under the mining lease
for the period when the beneficiary is not able to operate the
mining area, only that amount is liable to be refunded. The State
of UP is only liable to refund (i) any security deposit; or (ii) advance   C
royalties paid to them, for this obstructed period – something to
which the State of UP has already consented before this Court.
[Para 40][579-D-G]
      5. The proposition that interdicts posed by a competent
court should not put a party at a disadvantage, cannot be a blanket        D
proposition. The Court will have to consider the context in which
the interdict was passed, i.e., to preserve the forest area. It is a
different matter that some leases were ultimately found as within
the restricted area and some outside (as is the case of the
appellants). Even if the notification of the State of UP dated
31.7.2014 is taken into account, and the authorisation of the DMs          E
to extend the lease where no third party interest was created
and the leases were prevented from operation for no fault
attributable to the leaseholders, the subsequent transparent
policy of 2017 would weigh in favour of not exercising the
jurisdiction to extend the leases for the obstructed period. [Para         F
41][580-C-F]
      6.1 Therefore, the appropriate course of action to be
adopted in the present case cannot be to extend the lease for the
obstructed period but to direct that the security deposit, if not
already refunded, should be refunded and the amount deposited              G
by the appellants/leaseholders as advance royalties to the
respondent/State be also paid back to them along with something
more. [Para 42][580-F-G]


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560            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2020] 12 S.C.R.


A           6.2 The appellants’ monies have remained blocked and
      mining was prevented for no fault of theirs, despite success in
      earlier legal proceedings, and this aspect has to be balanced with
      the statutory provision or for that matter, even the contractual
      provisions not providing for extension of leases. Therefore, by
      exercising jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of
B
      India to do complete justice inter se the parties, it is directed that
      the monies have remained blocked, the monies should carry
      simple interest @ 9% per annum. [Para 43][580-G; 581-A-B]
            6.3 Insofar as the security deposit is concerned, if it has
      already been refunded, it would naturally not carry any interest
C     and if not, then it will carry interest from the date it ought to have
      been refunded after the expiry of the lease till it is actually refunded
      in case of expired leases. On the other hand, so far as the advance
      royalties for the obstructed period are concerned, the said
      amounts will carry interest @ 9% per annum from the date the
D     obstruction occurred, i.e., 29.8.2018 and 5.2.2019, as applicable
      to the respective appellants, till the date of payment. [Para
      44][581-B-D]
            Nar Narain Mishra v. The State of UP and Ors. 2013
            SCC Online All 13919 ; Sulekhan Sing & Company
E           and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2016) 4 SCC
            663 : [2016] 1 SCR 91; Deepak Kumar and Ors. v.
            State of Haryana and Ors. (2012) 4 SCC 629: [2012]
            4 SCR 819 – relied on.
            Banwasi Seva Ashram v. State of U.P & Ors. (1986) 4
F           SCC 753: [1987] 1 SCR 336; Jagdish Prasad Nishad
            v. State of UP & Ors. (2015) 128 RD 150; Beg Raj
            Singh v. State of UP & Ors. (2003) 1 SCC 726: [2002]
            5 Suppl. SCR 530 – referred to.
                              Case Law Reference
G     [1987] 1 SCR 336                 referred to              Para 8
      [2016] 1 SCR 91                  relied on                Para 14
      [2012] 4 SCR 819                 relied on                Para 21
      [2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 530          referred to              Para 25
H
  DHARMENDRA KUMAR SINGH v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                                  561
               PRADESH & ORS.

      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 12202                     A
of 2018.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 13.07.2018 of the National
Green Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi in O.A. No. 429 Of 2016.
      With
                                                                                B
      Civil Appeal No. 11368 of 2018, Civil Appeal No. 5257, 5093 AND
7002 of 2019.
      N. Venkatraman, ASG, Raghvendra Singh,Sr.Adv./AG, Mukul
Rohatgi, Ranjit Kumar, S.P. Singh, V.Shekhar, Sr. Advs, Utkarsh Sharma,
Sharad Chauhan, Rounak Parekh, Ms. Mrinal Gopal Elker, Mrs. Rachna              C
Gupta, Rajeev Kumar Dubey, Ashiwan Mishra, Ms. Sheetal Rajput,
Kamlendra Mishra, Gurmeet Singh Makker, Rajan Kr.Chourasia, Nishesh
Sharma, Suhasini Sen, V.Chandrashekara Bharathi, Dr. Nishesh Sharma,
Rajan Kumar Chaurasia, T. N. Singh, Vikas K.Singh, Pranaya Kumar
Mohapatra, Advs. for the appearing parties.
                                                                                D
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
       1. An ideological battle often rages between preservation of
environment and economic development. Mining activity and the manner
in which it is carried on has had its proponents and opponents. Its necessity   E
as an input for economic development is recognised but mining activity
throughout our country for minerals or sands has had a troubled history
on account of large-scale violations. This has also resulted in a ban on
mining activity in certain areas at certain times – not the ideal method,
but leaving little option open because of the rampant misuse of the licences
                                                                                F
to mine. The present litigation, in a sense, flows from the concern to
regulate mining activity in eco-sensitive areas.
      The Factual Development:
       2. The fact flow of the present case shows that what we are
faced with today has its seeds in prior litigation and orders passed in the     G
past in the interest of ecology, yet some persons who had succeeded in
the initial battle to carry out mining activity are faced with the
consequences of orders passed in other litigations. It is this conundrum,
which would have to be resolved by this Court.

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562                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 12 S.C.R.


A             3. Mining leases granted to projects in the mineral rich district of
      Sonbhadra, carved out of the district Mirzapur in the State of Uttar
      Pradesh (for short ‘State of UP’) in 1989 is the starting point. The All
      India Kaimur People’s Front (for short ‘AIKPF’) filed an application
      before the National Green Tribunal, New Delhi (for short ‘NGT’), being
      O.A. No.429/2016, inter alia seeking directions for immediate prohibition
B
      of alleged illegal mining in the vicinity of Kaimur Wildlife Sanctuary located
      in Village Billi Markundi in Sonbhadra District. The area being ecologically
      sensitive and preservation of wildlife being the objective, the NGT issued
      notices in the matter.
            4. In pursuance of this initial development, a Notification dated
C     20.3.2017 was issued by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate
      Change (for short ‘MoEFCC’) declaring the “area in question” as an
      Eco-Sensitive Zone (for short ‘ESZ’) under sub-section (1) and clauses
      (v) and (xiv) of sub-section(2) and (3) of the Environment (Protection)
      Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘EPA’).
D            5. The State of UP set out the factual position about the grant of
      leases before the NGT in an affidavit filed in this behalf. Thirty-three
      leases were stated to be operational outside ESZ. The NGT called upon
      the State of UP to explain the position of these leases in view of the
      order it had passed on 4.5.2016 in T.N. Godavarman Thirumalpad v.
E     Union of India and Ors.1 by way of which the NGT had directed the
      State of UP to cancel all mining leases and all other non-forestry activities
      on the areas notified under Section 4 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927
      (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Forest Act’). In order to appreciate the
      ramifications, Section 4 of the Forest Act is extracted hereinunder:

F               “4. Notification by State Government.—(1) Whenever it has
                been decided to constitute any land a reserved forest, the State
                Government shall issue a notification in the Official Gazette—
                (a) declaring that it has been decided to constitute such land a
                reserved forest;
G               (b) specifying, as nearly as possible, the situation and limits of
                such land; and
                (c) appointing an officer (hereinafter called “the Forest Settlement-
                officer”) to inquire into and determine the existence, nature and
      1
H         In M.A. No. 1166 and 1164 of 2015 decided on 4.5.2016
  DHARMENDRA KUMAR SINGH v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                                 563
     PRADESH & ORS. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

      extent of any rights alleged to exist in favour of any person in or      A
      over any land comprised within such limits or in or over any forest-
      produce, and to deal with the same as provided in this Chapter.
      Explanation.—For the purpose of clause (b), it shall be sufficient
      to describe the limits of the forest by roads, rivers, ridges or other
      well-known or readily intelligible boundaries.                           B
      (2) The officer appointed under clause (c) of sub-section (1) shall
      ordinarily be a person not holding any forest-office except that of
      Forest Settlement-officer.
      (3) Nothing in this section shall prevent the State Government
      from appointing any number of officers not exceeding three, not          C
      more than one of whom shall be a person holding any forest-
      office except as aforesaid, to perform the duties of a Forest
      Settlement-officer under this Act.”
      The purport of the Notification is, thus, to specify as to what lies
within the limits of reserved forest area.                                     D
       6. The NGT in the said proceedings noted the admission of the
State of UP that some active leases still remained in force on lands
which were covered under the Notification issued under Section 4 of
the Forest Act for which the corresponding notification under Section 20
of the Forest Act had still not been issued. Section 20 of the Forest Act      E
reads as under:
      “20. Notification declaring forest reserved.—(1) When the
      following events have occurred, namely:—
      (a) the period fixed under section 6 for preferring claims have
                                                                               F
      elapsed and all claims (if any) made under that section or section
      9 have been disposed of by the Forest Settlement-officer;
      (b) if any such claims have been made, the period limited by section
      17 for appealing from the orders passed on such claims has
      elapsed, and all appeals (if any) presented within such period have
      been disposed of by the appellate officer or Court; and                  G

      (c) all lands (if any) to be included in the proposed forest, which
      the Forest Settlement-officer has, under section 11, elected to
      acquire under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), have
      become vested in the Government under section 16 of that Act,
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564            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 12 S.C.R.


A           the State Government shall publish a notification in the Official
            Gazette, specifying definitely, according to boundary-marks erected
            or otherwise, the limits of the forest which is to be reserved, and
            declaring the same to be reserved from a date fixed by the
            notification.
B           (2) From the date so fixed such forest shall be deemed to be a
            reserved forest.”
             Thus, what had not been done was that the consequences of the
      area falling in the reserved forest area in terms of Section 4 Notification
      did not follow a Notification under Section 20 of the Forest Act. The
C     NGT, thus, directed vide order dated 13.7.2018 that all leases under
      Section 4 area be prohibited by the State of UP forthwith. The review
      filed by the State of UP came to be dismissed vide order dated 29.8.2018.
      We may note at this stage that what is impugned is the aforesaid order
      dated 13.7.2018 by the appellants before us, except for appellants in
      C.A. No. 5093/2019 where order dated 25.3.2019 of the NGT has been
D     impugned. However, this order was also decided in terms of the main
      impugned order dated 13.7.2018
             7. The fallacy, in our view, which occurred in the proceedings
      before the NGT was that leaseholders of the leases were not made
      parties, not even in a representative capacity, yet, they suffered the
E     consequences of the aforesaid order inasmuch as the District Magistrate
      (for short ‘DM’), Sonbhadra, issued administrative orders (on 29.8.2018
      and 5.2.2019) in pursuance of the aforesaid order of the NGT prohibiting
      mining and transportation of gettis/boulders till the next order. This
      effectively stopped the mining activity. The appellants naturally being
F     aggrieved filed appeals before this Court as being the affected parties
      under Section 22 of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 (hereinafter
      referred to as the ‘NGT Act’) arraying the State of UP, its concerned
      departments and officers, MoEFCC, as well as AIKPF (the original
      petitioners before the NGT) as respondents. The appeals, inter alia,
      are predicated on the respective lands and corresponding leases being
G     actually excluded from the purview of the Notification issued under
      Section 4 of the Forest Act, the lands in question being ‘pahadh lands’,
      i.e., uncultivable waste lands belonging to the Revenue Department.
      Since there are different appeals and different dates involved, for clarity
      of facts, we are setting forth below the particulars of the lease details
H     and the suspension orders of the respective appellants as under:
DHARMENDRA KUMAR SINGH v. THE STATE OF UTTAR   565
   PRADESH & ORS. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

                                               A




                                               B




                                               C




                                               D




                                               E




                                               F




                                               G




                                               H
566               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2020] 12 S.C.R.


A              Prior Litigations:
             8. In order to appreciate the contention of the appellants, it would
      be apposite to trace out two lines of legal developments, which have
      arisen since the issuance of Notification under Section 4 of the Forest
      Act wherein lies the genesis of the dispute. The first line of legal
B     development arose from Notification No. 3723/14-b-4(67)69 dated
      5.11.1969 issued by the State of UP under Section 4 of the Forest Act.
      The Notification included in its compass large tracts of land in Village
      Billi Markundi declaring that it has been decided to constitute such land
      as reserved forest. The corresponding Notification under Section 20 of
      the Forest Act was to be issued. However, the 1969 Notification came
C     under scrutiny of this Court upon a letter being received from the Banwasi
      Seva Ashram operating in Sonbhadra District highlighting the plight of
      the Adivasis living in the area and their related rights with respect to the
      land. The adjudication resulted in a judgment being pronounced on
      20.11.1986 in Banwasi Seva Ashram v. State of U.P & Ors.2 wherein
D     a slew of directions were passed relating, inter alia to the land which
      had been notified under Section 4 of the Forest Act but where no
      subsequent notification had been issued under Section 20 of that Act. It
      was directed that the Forest Settlement Officer (for short ‘FSO’) shall
      scrutinize all claims and thereafter the matter be placed before the
      Additional District Judge (for short ‘ADJ’) as a suo moto appeal. The
E     State Government was required to give effect reserving such lands under
      Section 20 of the Forest Act which were found to be covered under
      Section 4 of the Forest Act. Claims were filed before the FSO (including
      those of the predecessors of the appellants herein) to be excluded from
      Section 4 Notification and they succeeded in the same. A decision was
F     to be taken by the ADJ as the appellate authority and the order passed
      by the said authority on 30.9.1994 confirmed the findings of the FSO.
      The Forest Department thereafter filed a large number of review petitions
      against that order, which came to be allowed, albeit after a period of
      eight (8) years, in terms of the order dated 31.5.2003. Thus, the appellants/
      predecessors of appellants before us (who were affected parties in those
G     proceedings) approached the High Court by way of different writ petitions
      and all these petitions came to be allowed in terms of the order in Writ
      Petition No.29546/2003 titled Ved Prakash Garg & Ors. v. Additional
      District Judge, which itself was deciding the grievance of a large number

      2
H         (1986) 4 SCC 753
     DHARMENDRA KUMAR SINGH v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                              567
        PRADESH & ORS. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

of claimants similarly placed as the appellants herein against the order       A
dated 31.5.2003. The view adopted was predicated on the stand of the
State of UP itself having taken a decision that the land in question be
treated as land belonging to the Revenue Department of the State and
on which the mining operations should be permitted. A direction was
issued that the application for renewal of mining leases be considered
                                                                               B
and the order dated 31.5.2003 was set aside. An SLP against this order
came to be dismissed by this Court on 22.11.2018, in SLP (C) (Diary)
No. 33675 of 2018. The proceedings in respect of exclusion of the
subject land in question from the purview of Section 4 of the Forest Act,
thus, attained finality.
       9. The second line of litigation pertains to events of 1992 when        C
the Uttar Pradesh State Cement Corporation (for short ‘UPSCCL’)
became a sick industry and was put to auction where M/s Jayprakash
Associates Limited (for short ‘JAL’) emerged as the highest bidders.
The significance of this event is that it culminated in the order in the
T.N. Godavarman case dated 4.5.2016, on which considerable reliance            D
has been placed in the impugned order before us.3 The assets purchased
by JAL included a mining lease of 2168 hectares of area of which some
portions were included within Section 4 Notification area. Claims were
initiated by JAL praying for exclusion of the said lands from Section 4
Notification. This matter came up to this Court, when in 2010 it was
transferred to the NGT. The NGT passed a detailed judgment in this             E
very matter on 4.5.2016 with directions, inter alia to the State of UP to
cancel all mining leases whether fresh or renewed and all other non-
forestry activities on the Section 4 lands and to issue a notification under
Section 20 immediately. The effect of these directions was that the
finality of the settlement proceedings concluded in terms of Banwasi           F
Seva Ashram4 case was reiterated and urgency to carry out the process
under Section 4 and Section 20 of the Forest Act was emphasised.
      10. The significance of the aforesaid two rounds of litigation
assumes importance in view of the reliance placed on them in the
impugned order but also by the appellants to buttress their claim that the     G
procedure with regard to the leases in their favour came to be settled in
terms thereof.

3
    (supra)
4
    (supra)                                                                    H
568             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                              [2020] 12 S.C.R.


A            The Current Litigation:
               11. We now turn to the present civil appeals in which notices
      were issued and the matters were clubbed. In the counter affidavit
      dated 23.4.2019 filed by the State of UP the factual progression discussed
      aforesaid in respect of the land excluded from the purview of Section 4
B     was set out. The State of UP also sought permission of the Court with
      respect to issuance of the notification under Section 20 for those lands,
      which did come under Section 4 of the Forest Act. The question was
      crystallised in the counter affidavit as that if the notification under Section
      20 had not been issued and certain parts of the lands covered under the
      notification under Section 4 had been deleted by the competent authorities
C     (i.e., the FSO, thereafter ADJ, and finally the High Court) whether such
      deleted lands shall be treated as non-forest lands without issuance of
      notification under Section 20 of the Forest Act. As is the normal working,
      a series of orders had to be passed by this Court due to delay on behalf
      of the State of UP and it is only on 15.7.2020 that this Court noted that
D     the Section 20 notification had finally been issued on 15.6.2020. Thus, it
      was noted by this Court on that date that the only question now remaining
      to be determined was with regard to the extension of leases for the
      period for which the mining leases of the appellants were not permitted
      to operate and sought the assistance/view of the State of UP on this
      aspect.
E
             12. The State respondents filed an additional affidavit dated
      6.8.2020 setting forth its stand. It was contended by the State of UP
      that no permission for mining can be granted for the obstructed period
      as there does not exist any provision for grant of such permission for
      mining in case of disruption of mining operations under the Uttar Pradesh
F     Mining Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as
      the ‘Mining Rules’).5 On 10.8.2020 while noticing the aforesaid and
      upon a query from the Court, the State of UP conceded that it was
      willing to refund the proportionate amount of the lease money, for which
      period the leases have not been permitted to operate. This was objected
G     to by the appellants. Thus, the Court crystallised the issue to be
      determined and the only aspect to be examined by this Court, as whether
      in view of judicial pronouncements the appropriate order to pass would
      be for refund of the lease amount for the period it was not permitted to
      5
        Framed under Section 15 of the Mines and Mineral (Development and Regulation)
H     Act, 1957
     DHARMENDRA KUMAR SINGH v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                                  569
        PRADESH & ORS. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

operate, or whether the leases are liable to be renewed for the period of          A
obstructed time. It is within the contours of the aforesaid proposition
that learned counsel for the parties have taken their stand, both in terms
of the written synopses and by making submissions in the Court.
          The Stand of the State of UP:
         13. The State of UP crystallised the factual issue by setting out         B
that the total number of permitted operational mining leases prior to the
impugned order in the district in question were 82 – 64 leases in Village
Billi Markundi and only 29 of such leases were covered by the impugned
order. The impugned order resulted in 41 leases ceasing to exist/being
banned and 29 leases out of them have been covered by Section 20                   C
notification. The notification had resulted in 5 out of 29 leases falling
within the radices of 100 metres of the forest land and out of the remaining
24 leases, 12 have expired and 12 subsist. We are concerned with the
latter. The consequence of the impugned order and the order of the DM
was that the mining operations had been obstructed pursuant to impugned
order dated 13.7.2018 till the issuance of the notification under Section          D
20 of the Forest Act. The State of UP contended that it had only complied
with the impugned order and if these mining leases are now extended
there would be consequences flowing to the State of UP, on account of
judicial orders. We may notice that some of the leases expired during
the obstructed period while other leases have continued and thus in the            E
latter cases the issue would only be to further extend the lease for the
obstructed period while in case of the earlier situation permission would
have to be given to mine for an extended period relatable to the obstructed
period. The delay on the part of the State of UP in issuance of the
Section 20 notification has been placed at the door of an apprehension
that it should not be construed as violative of the orders passed in Banwasi       F
Seva Ashram6case.
      14. In what manner should such cases be dealt with, judicial opinions
expressed in this behalf have been sought to be referred to as a consistent
view of the Allahabad High Court in this behalf, being the local court
dealing with the aspect of mining leases in the cases:                             G
          a. Sukhan Singh v. State of UP & Ors.7 an opinion was rendered
          that the mere filing of an application either for the grant of a lease
6
    (supra)
7
    (2015) 2 All LJ 619                                                            H
570             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 12 S.C.R.


A            or for the renewal of a lease does not confer a vested right for the
             grant or renewal of a lease and, an application has to be disposed
             of on the basis of the rules as they stand on the date of the disposal
             of the application. This was in the context of the applicability of
             G.O. dated 31.05.2012 to pending applications seeking a fresh
             lease or for renewal of a lease under Chapter II of the Mining
B
             Rules as decided in Nar Narain Mishra v. The State of UP and
             Ors.8 (This view received the imprimatur of the Supreme Court
             in Sulekhan Singh & Company and Ors. V. State of Uttar
             Pradesh & Ors.9).
             b. In Mohammad Yunus Hasan v. State of UP & Ors.10 Rule
C            68 of the Mining Rules dealing with the relaxation of applicability
             of the Mining Rules by the State Government was interpreted to
             determine the contours of the power which could be exercised in
             terms of the said Rule. Rule 68 reads as under:
                “68. Relaxation of rules in special cases.- The State Government
D               may, if it is of opinion that in the interest of mineral development
                it is necessary so to do, by order in writing and for reasons to
                be recorded authorised in any case the grant of any mining
                lease or the working of any mine for, the purpose of winning
                any minerals on terms and conditions different from those laid
E               down in these rules.”
             The aspect of ‘interests of mineral development’ was emphasised
      and it was opined that the Rule does not confer a power on the State to
      extend a lease beyond the contracted period without adhering to the
      procedure under Chapter II11 and IV12 of the Mining Rules. The
F     conclusion reached was that this Rule 68 could not be an aid to extend
      the term of an expired lease to compensate any loss caused to such
      leaseholder, if their lease has been terminated or curtailed during the
      subsistence period due to an order of the competent authority. Moreover,
      the right to an extension of lease must either flow from a statutory provision
      or from the terms of the lease between the concerned parties.
G

      8
        2013 SCCOnline All 13919
      9
        (2016) 4 SCC 663
      10
         (2016) 4 All LJ 4
      11
         Grant of Mining Lease
      12
H        Auction Lease
     DHARMENDRA KUMAR SINGH v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                                571
        PRADESH & ORS. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

          c. In Vijay Kumar Dwivedi v. State of Uttar Pradesh13 the              A
          validity of permission granted by the State Government to
          leaseholders to continue with the excavation for the period during
          which they were obstructed/restrained from carrying out such
          activities during the subsistence of their leases due to orders of
          the High Court or of competent authorities was examined. Relying
                                                                                 B
          upon the observations in Mohammad Yunus Hasan14 case, the
          Allahabad High Court directed that no person shall be permitted
          to excavate minor minerals on the basis of lease deeds or
          permission granted subsequent to G.O. dated 31.5.2012 under the
          garb of renewal of an expired lease, extension of lease, grant of a
          fresh lease, or permission to excavate during the obstructed period.   C
          Additionally, no Form MM-11 shall be issued in favour of any
          person with an expired lease or an order be granted subsequent
          to 31.5.2012 in their favour for excavation of minor minerals in
          the name of renewal of lease, extension of term of expired lease,
          or permission for the obstructed period on the plea that a valid
                                                                                 D
          lease was granted but excavation could not be carried for some
          days during the subsistence period due to orders of the High Court/
          competent authorities. This was so as the G.O. dated 31.5.2012
          recorded a decision, which had been taken in the interests of
          transparency and fair competition, to grant leases through the E-
          tendering system by inviting tenders under Chapter IV of the           E
          Mining Rules.
       15. In the conspectus of the aforesaid facts and judicial
pronouncements, the developments which have taken place post this
situation were set out. The State of UP issued a New Mining Policy on
12.6.2017. In terms of this policy there is no provision for grant of            F
extension of time for obstructed period of mining lease and all mining
leases were to be permitted by e-tendering or e-auction alone.
       16. It is also contended before us on behalf of the State of UP by
learned senior counsel, Mr. V. Shekhar that there was no legal provision/
rule or any provision in the respective lease deeds to pay damages in            G
case of disruption of mining leases and the consequences of such
disruption are set out in Rule 40(h) of the Mining Rules, which reads as
under:
13
     (2006) 4 All LJ 690
14
     (supra)                                                                     H
572                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2020] 12 S.C.R.


A               “40. Liberties, powers and privileges.— (h) In the event of
                disruption of mining operation in the lease area owing to any special
                circumstances, the District Magistrate with the prior approval of
                the State Government shall adjust the amount equivalent to the
                installment payable during the disrupted period, online against the
                forthcoming installment.”
B
             Thus, in the event of disruption of mining operations in the leased
      areas owing to any special circumstances, the DM, with the prior approval
      of the State Government shall adjust the amount equivalent to the
      installment payable during the disrupted period against the forthcoming
      installment. Thus, it was contended that the State of UP is only liable to
C     refund (i) any security deposit, or (ii) advance royalties paid to it.
            17. It was emphasised that in view of the judicial pronouncement
      in Vijay Kumar Dwivedi15 case it is clear that after 31.5.2012, no
      permission for mining can be granted to excavate during the obstructed
      period. In the absence of any provision under the Mining Rules for
D     grant of extension of expired mining lease or renewal of the same for
      the obstructed period in case of disruption to mining operation, any
      extension of lease was contended to be unsustainable in law.
             18. The sequitur to G.O. dated 31.5.2012 was pleaded to have
      been explained in the Nar Narain Mishra case16 where the Allahabad
E     High Court observed that any submission that ‘imarti patthar or building
      stone’ is not covered by the G.O. dated 31.5.2012 cannot be accepted.
      This was predicated on the reasoning that the G.O. did not confine itself
      to the word ‘boulder’ found in riverbeds as the same can be used for
      minerals found in riverbeds as well as those found in ‘in situ rock deposit’.
F     This was also stated to be evident from Schedule I and II of the Mining
      Rules which make it clear that the word ‘boulder’ is included in the
      heading of ‘building stone’ as well as found in a mixed form in the
      riverbed. Item 5 of Schedule I and Item 4 of Schedule II both use the
      word ‘boulder’ as building stones as well as when found in a mixed form
      in riverbeds.
G
            19. The High Court, thus, passed directions rejecting the prayers
      made for consideration of applications for renewal of mining leases which
      were pending on 31.5.2012 and applications for grant of fresh leases
      15
           (supra)
      16
H          (supra)
     DHARMENDRA KUMAR SINGH v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                                  573
        PRADESH & ORS. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

under Chapter II of the Mining Rules which were also pending on the                A
same day. An SLP preferred against this judgment was dismissed on
4.3.2016. Not only that, it was emphasized that the Supreme Court
itself in the Sulekhan Singh17 case approved of the decision in Nar
Narain Mishra18 case.
       20. The concluding argument was that the aforesaid position leaves          B
no manner of doubt that the appellants were not entitled to any extension
or renewal of their old leases and at the most are entitled to refund of
their respective lease amounts for the period for which the leases were
not permitted to operate, an aspect which has already been conceded on
behalf of the State Government in the proceedings dated 10.8.2020.
Thus, the permission sought by the appellants for operating the expired            C
mining lease for the obstructed period was strongly opposed, leaving it
for the appellants to file an application under Rule 40(h) if the amount is
to be refunded or adjusted.
       21. We may note the supporting arguments of AIKPF qua the
impugned order of the NGT, which drew our attention to the prohibition             D
of mining in ESZ declared around the Kaimur National Park and that not
being challenged by the appellants and hence the consequences of mining
activity for the obstructed period did not facilitate extension of leases.
The aspect arising from the GO dated 31.5.2012 and the contentions of
the State Government in that behalf was also sought to be supported by             E
the observations of the Supreme Court in Deepak Kumar and Ors. v.
State of Haryana and Ors. 19 which in turn had extracted the
recommendations of Ministry of Environment and Forest regarding the
definition of the term ‘minor mineral’, which it said meant building stone,
gravel, ordinary clay, ordinary sand other than sand used for prescribed
purposes and any other material which the Central Government may, by               F
notification declare to be a minor mineral.20
       The Appellants’ Case:
      22. The contentions of the appellants, on the other hand, led by
learned senior counsel, Mr. Mukul Rohatgi and Mr. S.P. Singh are                   G
predicated on the settlement of the controversy in question in the
aforementioned prior rounds of litigation which came up right to this
17
   (supra)
18
   (supra)
19
   (2012) 4 SCC 629
20
   Section 3(e) in The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957   H
574             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2020] 12 S.C.R.


A     Court and the appellants had succeeded in the same. The land for which
      mining leases were granted to the appellants were excluded from the
      purview of the Section 4 notification in pursuance of the settlement
      proceedings concluded as per directions in Banwasi Seva
      Ashram21case. These settlement proceedings are pleaded to have been
      ignored while passing the impugned order and that too without notice to
B
      the appellants.
             23. The appellants plead that suspension of the mining leases is
      not on account of any factor attributable to them, i.e., there is no illegal
      mining or any such factor, which may weigh against the appellants. The
      delay in issuance of the Section 20 notification was solely because of
C     the delayed State action, and the issue was finalised only on 15.6.2020
      whereby the land categorised as revenue land was excluded from the
      purview of forest land. The appellants alleged to have suffered for no
      fault of theirs but on account of the litigation initiated behind their back
      and the inaction of the State. This was, it was contended, a “third chapter
D     of litigation” on the very question of the consequences of Section 4
      notification – the first round in pursuance of the Banwasi Seva
      Ashram22case right up to this Court and then the exclusion claim of
      JAL which culminated in the order of the Tribunal dated 4.5.2016, which
      it was contended, would have no bearing on their leases.
E            24. The plea of the State of non-grant of extension of leases is
      stated to be contrary to record as that power has been exercised in the
      past under Rule 68 of the Mining Rules. Illustratively, two judgments
      have been referred to where such extension of lease is recognised: J.P.
      Yadav v. Kanhaiya Singh & Ors.23 and Jagdish Prasad Nishad v.
      State of UP & Ors.24 In J.P. Yadav, the Apex Court observed that
F     Rule 68 confers upon the State the powers to extend lease for the
      obstructed period and subsequently in Jagdish Prasad Nishad, the High
      Court reiterated that any different view taken with respect to Rule 68
      and the powers it confers on the State would be in violation of the
      observations of the Supreme Court in J.P. Yadav. Rule 68, it was urged,
G     is comprehensive and complete in all respects and in the absence of any
      specific legislation recourse can be had to the said Rule.

      21
         (supra)
      22
         (supra)
      23
         CA No. 8621/2013 decided on 19.9.2013
      24
H        (2015) 128 RD 150
     DHARMENDRA KUMAR SINGH v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                               575
        PRADESH & ORS. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

        25. On a linked aspect, keeping in mind the predicament that the        A
appellants find themselves in on account of Court orders, learned counsel
relied upon the observations in Beg Raj Singh v. State of UP & Ors.25
for the proposition that the ordinary rule is that the Court should try to
place the successful party in the same position which they had been in,
if the wrong complained against them would not have been done to
                                                                                B
them. Moreover, it was argued that, it is a well-settled proposition of law
that an act of the Court shall prejudice no one and the same is reflected
in the maxim, ‘Actus curiae neminem gravabit’. The factual matrix
dealt with the same issue of extension of mining leases and in pursuance
of the judgment, the State of UP had issued a notification dated 31.7.2014
to all DMs stating that the judgment makes it clear that wherever no            C
third party interest had been created, the area is vacant and it is
established that the leaseholder has been prevented from operating its
mining lease for any period for no fault attributable to them, then the
extension of mining lease for the corresponding period can be provided.
The case of the appellants is submitted to squarely fall within the aforesaid
                                                                                D
compass.
       26. The appellants plead that the G.O. dated 31.5.2012 and for
that matter the New Mining Policy of 2017 will have no bearing as that
aspect stands elucidated vis-à-vis the judgment in M/s. Peethambra
Granite Pvt. Ltd. v. State of UP & Ors.26 by the High Court Judicature
at Allahabad. In this case, the directions issued in Vijay Kumar Dwivedi27      E
case have been held to have no application to granite building stone (in
situ rock) as the mineral was not covered by the G.O. dated 31.5.2012.
This aspect is stated to have been clarified by the subsequent G.O. dated
26.2.2013 and the G.O. dated 22.10.2014, the latter, in fact, cancelled
the G.O. dated 31.5.2012 as also the G.O. dated 26.2.2013. Since                F
31.5.2012 itself, a total of 35 mining leases are stated to have been
granted or renewed in District Sonbhadra.
      27. We may add that Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel,
advanced the additional plea of G.O. dated 31.5.2012 not being applicable
on account of the lease being granted prior to that date in 2012.               G
      28. On the aspect on which a Court query was posed, i.e., if this
Court is not agreeable to renew the leases, what could be the method of
25
   (2003) 1 SCC 726
26
   WRIT - C.No. - 30066 of 2017 decided on 18.2.2020
27
   (supra)                                                                      H
576                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2020] 12 S.C.R.


A     grant of compensation, calculations have been filed by the appellants.
      Losses are stated to include idling of machinery and other infrastructure,
      the payment of salaries, providing staff accommodation as also the costs
      of litigation as part of calculation of compensation.
             29. We may note in the end that one of the pleas advanced was
B     that the State Government itself had not been satisfied with the impugned
      order and had preferred Civil Appeal Nos.8804-8805/2019. However,
      when this fact was pointed out to Mr. V. Shekhar, learned senior counsel,
      on instructions, sought to withdraw the appeal stating that whatever be
      the grievance against the impugned order, the same did not survive and
      that the State Government was not desirous of pursuing the appeal. The
C     appeal was, thus, dismissed as withdrawn on 29.9.2020 and the judgment
      was reserved in these appeals.
                The Path We Take:
            30. We have given considerable thought to the issue at hand,
D     keeping in mind the past litigation, the statutory provisions and the narrow
      compass in which we have to examine the issue at hand.
             31. There is no doubt that the prior rounds of litigation resulted in
      orders favouring the appellants. The present round of litigation, however,
      arose on account of an endeavour to prevent alleged illegal mining in the
E     vicinity of the Kaimur Wildlife Sanctuary located in Village Billi Markundi
      in Sonbhadra District. The Notification dated 20.3.2017 of the MoEFCC
      declared the ‘area in question’ as an ESZ under the provisions of the
      EPA. The sequitur was that the State of UP placed before the NGT the
      factual position relating to the grant of leases and according to them,
      there were stated to be 33 leases operational outside the ESZ. The
F     NGT wanted to examine this on account of the orders passed on 4.5.2016
      in T.N. Godavarman Thirumalpad28 case for cancellation of all mining
      leases and all other non-forestry activities on areas notified under Section
      4 of the Forest Act. The whole object was to find out as to what lay
      outside of the reserved limit of the forest area and it was found that
G     there were some active leases still in force on the lands which were
      covered under the notification issued under Section 4 of the Forest Act.
      But despite this, the notification under Section 20 of the Forest Act had
      not been issued. The directions which arose from the impugned order
      of the NGT on 13.7.2018, were towards this objective.
      28
H          (supra)
     DHARMENDRA KUMAR SINGH v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                               577
        PRADESH & ORS. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

        32. We have already noted that the leaseholders were, however,          A
not made parties, not even in a representative capacity. This is the
reason that these aspects could not be examined with the assistance of
the appellants by the NGT, and the mining activity was stopped resulting
in the appeals before us. We, thus, called upon the State of UP to
perform their statutory duty of issuance of the notification under Section      B
20 of the Forest Act and after some delay, the same was issued only on
15.6.2020. It is only at that stage that the leases which were not covered,
as in the case of the appellants, had a final clarity and the issue, received
a closure. However, this did prevent the mining activity till then, from
the time it was banned by the NGT. In the mean time, there are leases           C
which have expired and there are other leases which are still in force as
is apparent from the detailed chart which we have set out at the inception
of our judgment.
      33. Insofar as the question whether to adopt the course of
extending the leases for the obstructed period or in some way                   D
compensating the appellants for the same, is what was debated and we
have already noted the rival contentions of the two parties.
       34. We have, at the inception, stated that we are conscious of the
statutory provisions and, thus, would not like to infringe the same, apart
from the fact that it may not be an appropriate course of action as it may      E
open other floodgates as if these rounds are not enough!
       35. The judicial opinions referred to by learned counsel for the
State of UP no doubt lead to a more or less consistent view that a mere
filing of an application either for the grant of a lease or for the renewal
                                                                                F
of a lease does not confer a vested right for either grant or renewal of a
lease (Sukhan Singh29 case). The statutory provision of Rule 68 of the
Mining Rules, which has been strongly relied upon by learned counsel
for the appellants, is in the nature of a relaxation rule in special cases
and has to be read with the Rules which provide the manner in which
the exploitation of minerals should take place (Mohammad Yunus                  G
Hasan30case). Thus, the expression used is “in the interest of mineral
development it is necessary so to do…” The idea, thus, is that the

29
     (supra)
30
     (supra)                                                                    H
578                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 12 S.C.R.


A     objective of exercising such power should be to aid the development of
      minerals and such judicial view is of significance as there was always a
      possibility of the misuse of such power, considering the history of mineral
      exploitation in our country. The statute was worded in a restrictive
      manner deliberately giving only a restricted window and this legislative
B     intent ought not to be defeated by supplanting it with any other
      interpretation. It is a well settled principle of interpretation that when the
      words of a statute are clear and unambigous, recourse to different
      principles of interpretation, other than the rule of literal construction,
      cannot be resorted to.31 If a fresh grant or extension has to be made
      under the Mining Rules, it must be in accordance with Chapter II, and
C     the provision for auction of leases in Chapter IV is in furtherance of a
      transparent procedure.
             36. We do find ourselves in agreement with the submission of the
      learned counsel for the State that the right to extension of lease either
      flow from a statutory provision or from the terms of the lease between
D
      the concerned parties. If there has been an obstructed period by reason
      of a judicial interdict, that itself will not give window to extend the lease
      by not following the statutory provisions, especially when the terms of
      the lease do not provide for any consequences thereof.
E           37. We may notice that this view has been adopted by the
      Allahabad High Court in Vijay Kumar Dwivedi32 case where the same
      question was examined. The leaseholders were obstructed/restrained
      from carrying out the mining activity during the subsistence of their leases
      upon the orders of the High Court or of the competent authority. The
F     High Court adopted the view that after the issuance of the G.O. dated
      31.5.2012 this could not be done.
             38. We are conscious of the fact that the G.O. dated 31.5.2012
      also finds elucidation in certain other judicial pronouncements and that
      this aspect was clarified by the subsequent G.O. dated 26.2.2013 and
G
      then both the G.Os. were cancelled vide G.O. dated 22.10.2014, which
      would hold the field. In pursuance thereof, 35 mining leases are stated
      to have been issued but that itself would not make a difference because
      31
           Delhi Transport Corporation v. Balwan Singh and Ors., 2019 SCC OnLine SC 276
      32
           (supra)
H
     DHARMENDRA KUMAR SINGH v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                              579
        PRADESH & ORS. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

we have to see what are the subsequent developments and what course            A
to adopt as on date. Even if we consider the interpretation sought to be
put forth by learned senior counsel for the appellants of an expanded
view of Rule 68, giving power to the State to extend the lease for the
obstructed period, would it now be exercisable is the question.
                                                                               B
       39. The State of UP had issued a New Mining Policy on 12.6.2017
and this policy has no provision for grant of extension of time for
obstructed period of mining lease and all mining leases were to be
permitted by e-tendering or e-auction alone. If the mining lease is
extended for the obstructed period, it would amount to violation of this       C
New Mining Policy and since the extension would have to be granted
now, we are unable to accept the contention of the learned senior counsel
for the appellants that this should relate back to the date of the lease and
not as on date.
       40. We may also notice that the statutory rule, Rule 40(h) of the       D
Mining Rules, extracted in para 16 itself, provides for the consequences
of the disruption of mining operations in a lease area owing to any special
circumstances and requires the DM, with the prior approval of the State
Government, to adjust the amount equivalent to the installments payable
                                                                               E
during the disrupted period against forthcoming installments. Thus,
monetary adjustment is all that has been provided for by the statute
making the legislative intent obvious, i.e., that if some amounts have
been paid as installments under the mining lease for the period when the
beneficiary is not able to operate the mining area, only that amount is
                                                                               F
liable to be refunded. This is what forms the basis of the submission
made on behalf of the State of UP that they are only liable to refund (i)
any security deposit; or (ii) advance royalties paid to them, for this
obstructed period – something to which the State of UP has already
consented before us as recorded in our order dated 10.8.2020. The              G
view taken by the High Court in Nar Narain Mishra33 case no doubt
was in the context of the applicability of the G.O. dated 31.5.2012 and
received the imprimatur of the Supreme Court in Sulekhan Singh34
33
     (supra)
34
     (supra)                                                                   H
580                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2020] 12 S.C.R.


A     case. But we have also to note that the observations dealt with the issue
      also on the submission advanced that ‘imarti patthar or building stone’
      is not covered by the G.O. dated 31.5.2012 and that contention was not
      accepted. The word ‘boulder’ was held to be included in the heading of
      ‘building stone’ as well as when found in a mixed form in riverbeds and
B     the prayer of the leaseholder was not accepted.
             41. We are conscious of the fact, as already noticed, that the
      appellants have suffered in the second round and the plea advanced on
      their behalf that if there were interdicts posed by a competent court that
C     should not put a party at a disadvantage. This rule is ordinarily to be
      accepted for placing a successful party in the same position, which they
      had been in, if the wrong complained against them would not have been
      done to them.35 However, this cannot be a blanket proposition and we
      have to consider the context in which the interdict was passed, i.e., to
D     preserve the forest area. It is a different matter that some leases were
      ultimately found as within the restricted area and some outside (as is the
      case of the appellants). Even if we take the notification of the State of
      UP dated 31.7.2014 into account, and the authorisation of the DMs to
      extend the lease where no third party interest was created and the leases
E     were prevented from operation for no fault attributable to the leaseholders,
      the subsequent transparent policy of 2017 would weigh in favour of not
      exercising the jurisdiction to extend the leases for the obstructed period.
            42. We, thus, find that the appropriate course of action to be
      adopted in this case cannot be to extend the lease for the obstructed
F
      period but to direct that the security deposit, if not already refunded,
      should be refunded and the amount deposited by the appellants/
      leaseholders as advance royalties to the respondent/State be also paid
      back to them along with something more.
G           43. We now come to that something more and we are taking
      recourse to that course of action by exercising our jurisdiction under
      Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do complete justice inter se


      35
H          (supra)
  DHARMENDRA KUMAR SINGH v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                                 581
     PRADESH & ORS. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

the parties. We do this, keeping in mind that the appellants’ monies have      A
remained blocked and mining prevented for no fault of theirs, despite
success in earlier legal proceedings, and this aspect has to be balanced
with the statutory provision or for that matter, even the contractual
provisions not providing for extension of leases. We are, thus, of the
view that since these monies have remained blocked, the monies should          B
carry simple interest @ 9% per annum.
       44. Insofar as the security deposit is concerned, if it has already
been refunded, it would naturally not carry any interest and if not, then it
will carry interest from the date it ought to have been refunded after the     C
expiry of the lease till it is actually refunded in case of expired leases.
On the other hand, so far as the advance royalties for the obstructed
period are concerned, the said amounts will carry interest @ 9% per
annum from the date the obstruction occurred, i.e., 29.8.2018 and
5.2.2019, as applicable to the respective appellants, till the date of         D
payment.
      Conclusion:
       45. The appeals are, thus, decided as aforesaid with the limited
directions and to the extent the observations in the impugned order are        E
in contradiction thereto are set aside. It is directed that the following
amounts be refunded to the appellants:
      i. Security deposit, if not already refunded, with simple interest @
      9% per annum from the date it ought to have been refunded after
      the expiry of the lease till it is now actually refunded, in case of     F
      expired leases; and
      ii.Advance royalties, if not already refunded, with simple interest
      @ 9% per annum from the date of the obstruction occurred, i.e.,
      29.8.2018 and 5.2.2019 as applicable to the respective appellants,       G
      till the date of payment.
      iii. Both the aforementioned amounts be refunded within two
      months from today.

                                                                               H
582             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2020] 12 S.C.R.


A            46. The appeals are disposed of in terms aforesaid, leaving the
      parties to bear their own costs. All pending applications also stand
      disposed of.

      Kalpana K. Tripathy                                   Appeals diposed of.
B




C




D




E




F




G




H