DHANNALALversusD.P. VIJAYVARGIYA AND ORS.

                              DHANNALAL                                         A
                                     v.
                   D.P. VIJAYVARGIYA AND ORS.

                               MAY 7, 1996

               [N.P. SINGH AND FAIZAN UDDIN, J.J.j                              B

      Motor Vehicles Act, 1988: Section 166(3).

       Claim petition-filed beyond presc1ibed poiod of limitation with ap-
plication for condonation of dela)-Period of limitation deleted dwing pen-      c
dency of petition-Amending Act-'--Application of-To pending petition,.._
Held : claimant was entitl_ed lo benefit of amended provision-Howeve1;
amended Act would not apply to petition filed beyond limitation poiod and
rejected and the claimant had allowed the same to become final--Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939, Section 110-A(J).
                                                                                D
      The appellant while going on road became victim of an accident,
because of the rash and negligent driving of the scooter by res·pondent. The
appellant suffered serious injuries and was ad1nitted in Hospital, the same
day. Due to the accident the appellant became permanently disabled, as
his left leg abrive thigh and hip had been fractured. He also lost his          E
employment as a Driver. The claim petition for compensation \\-'as filed
before the Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal along with an
application for condonation of delay which was of four days only. The
Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the claim petition. The validity of the
said order was challenged by the respondent before the High Court. The
High Court set aside the order of the Tribunal aforesaid condoning the          F
delay saying that in view of Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
the power of condonation by the Tribunal had been withdrawn and any
claim must he filed within the period prescribed therein. Being aggrieved,
the appellant preferred the present appeal.
                                                                                G
      Allowing the appeal, this Court

       HELD : 1.1. Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has been
omitted by Section 53 of the Motor Vehicles (Am.endment) Act, 1994 which
came into force w.e.f. 14.11.1994. The effect of the Amending Act is that
w.e.f. 14.11.1994 there is no limitation for filing claims before the Tribunal H
                                      417
    418                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A in respect of any accident. It can be said that Parliament realised the grave
                                                                     ·~· repre-
    injustice and injury which was being caused to the heirs and legal
    sentatives of the victims who died in accidents by rejecting their claim
    petitions only on ground of limitation. It is a matter of common knowledge
    that majority of the claimants for such compensation are ignorant about
    the period during which such claims should be preferred. After the death
B
    due to the accident, of the bread earner of the family, in many cases such
    claimants are virtually on the streets. Even in cases where the victims
    escape death some of such victims are hospitalised for months if not for
    years. Parliament rightly thought that prescribing a period of limitation
    and restricting the power of Tribunal to entertain any claim petition
C   beyond the period of twelve months from the date of the accident was
    harsh, inequitable and in many cases was likely to cause injustice to the
    claimants. [421-A-E]

           1.2. From the Amending Act it does not appear that the said sub·
D   section (3) has been deleted retrospectively. But at the same time, there is
    nothing in the Amending Act to show that benefit of deletion of sub-section
    (3) of Section 166 is not to be extending to pending claim petitions where
    a plea of limitation has been raised. When sub-section (3) of Section 166
    has been omitted, then the Tribunal has to entertain a claim petition
    without taking note of the date on which such accident had taken place,
E   The claim petitions cannot be thrown out on the ground that such claim
    petitions were barred by time when sub-section (3) of Section 166 was in
    force. (421-F, 422-C]

          2.1. In view of sub-section (6) of Section 158 of the Act the officer
F   incharge of the police station is enjoined to forward a copy of informa,
    !ion/report regarding the accident to the Tribunal having jurisdiction. A
    copy thereof has also to be forwarded to the cuncerµed insurer. It also
    requires that where a copy is made available to the owner of vehicle, he
    shall within thirty days of receipt of such copy forward the same to the
    Claims Tribunal and insurer. In this background, the deletion of sub·sec·
G   lion (3) from Section 166 should be given full effect so that the object of
    deletion of said section by the Parliament is nut defeated. (422-G]

           2.2. The matter will be different if any claimant having filed a petition
    for claim beyond time which has been rejected by the Tribunal or the High
H   Court, the claimant does not challenge the same and allows the said
         DHANNALAL v. D.P. VUAYVARGIYA [N.P. SINGH, J.)              419

judicial order to become final. The aforesaid Amending Act shall be of no   A
help to such claimant. [423-D]

     . CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7881 of
1996.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 31.7.95 of the Madhya Pradesh        B
High Court in C.R. No. 56 of 1994.

     T.C. Sharma, Ajay Sharma, Ms. Neelam Sharma, Rajeev Sharma,
Sudesh Chand, (Kailash Vasdev A.C.) for the Appellant.

      Pramod Dayal and S.M. Suri for the Respondent.                        c
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      N.P. SINGH, J. Leave granted.

       The appellant while going on read on 4.12.1990 became victim of an D
accident, because of the rash and negligent driving of the scooter by
respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the 'respondent'). The appel-
lant suffered serious injuries and was admitted in Badwah Hospital, the
same day. On 7.12.1990 he was shifted M.Y. Hospital, Indore and was
treated as an indoor patient till 27.9.1991. Be.cause of the accident the
appellant became permanently disabled, as his left leg above thigh and hip E
had been fractured. He also lost his services as a Driver. The claim petition
for compensation was filed before the Additional Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal, Badwah (hereinafter referred to as the 'Tribunal') on 7.12.1991
along with an application for condonation of delay which was of four days
only. The Tribunal by its order dated 18.11.1993 condoned the delay in F
filing the· claim petition. The validity of the said order was challenged by
the respondent before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur. The
High Court by its order dated 31.7.1995 set aside the order of the Tribunal
aforesaid condoning the delay saying that in view of sub-section (3) of
Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the G
'Act') the power of condonation by the Tribunal has been withdrawn and
any claim must be filed within the period prescribed therein. The High
Court further observed that by prescribing the fixed period for filing the
petition for claim, the intention was that the 'sword of liability of paying
compensation in respect of accident caused by motor vehicle should not
be permitted to hover on the head ?f the person owning the said vehicle H
    420                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS I1996] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A and person driving such vehicle.' ll was also pointed out that the position
    was different under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 in which sub-section (3)
    of Section 110-A although prescribed a period of sex months for filing an
    application for compensation from the date of the accident, but vested
    power in Tribunal lo entertain such application even after the expiry of the
    said period of six months, if the Tribunal was satisfied that the claimant
B   was prevented by sufficient causes from making the application in time.

         Sub-section (3) of Section 110-A of the :vlotor Vehicles Act, l939
    provided:

                1rNo application for such compensation shall be entertained
c           unless   it is n1a<lc \Vithin six months of the occurrence of the
            accident :

                Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the applica-
            tion after the expiry of the said period of six months if it is satisfied
0           that the applicant \Vas prevented by sufficient cause fron1 1naking
            the application in time."

           The Act which repealed the earlier Motor Vehicks Act of 1939 came
    in force w.e.f. 1.7.1989. The new Act prescribed a period of limitation for
    filing the claim petition in sub-section (3) of Section 166. Said sub-section
E   provided:

                "No application for such compensation shall be entertained
            unless it is made \vithin six n1onths of the occurrence of the
             accident.

F                Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the applica-
             tion after the expiry of the siti<l period of six months but not later
            than twelve 1nonths, if it is satisfied that the applicant was
            prevented by sufficient cause fron1 making the application in time."

          According to the High Court, as proviso lo sub-section (3) of Section
G 166 of the Act said that Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after
    the expiry of the said period of six months 'but not later than twelve
    months', any application filed beyond the period of twelve months from the
    date of the accident cannot be entertained as nu discretion had been left
    \Vith the Tribunal to consider tbc circumstances because of which the
H application for claim could not be filed within the period of twelve months
         DHANNALAL v. D.P. VIJAYVARGIYA [N.P.SINGH,J.]                     421

of the occurrence of the accident.                                                A

        Before the scope of sub-section (3) Section 166 of the Act is ex-
amined, it may be pointed out that the aforesaid sub-section (3) of Section
166 of the Act has been omitted by Section 53 of the Motor Vehicles
(Amendment) Act, 1994 which came in force w.e.f. 14.11. 1994. The effect
                                                                                  B
of the Amending Act is thatw.e.f 14.-11.1994 there is no limitation for filing
claims before the Tribunal in respect of any accident. It can be said that
Parliament realised the grave injustice and injury which was being caused
to the heirs and legal representatives of the victims who died in accidents
by rejecting their claim petitions only on ground of limitation. IL is a matter
of common knowledge that majority of the claimants for such compensa-             c
tion arc ignorant about fhc period during which such claims should be
preferred. After the death due to the accident, of the bread earner of the
 fan1ily, in many cases such claimants are virtually on the streets. Even in
 cases where the ;ictims escape death some of such victims are hospitalised
for months if not for years. In the present case itself the applicant claims      D
 that he met with the accident on 4.12.1990 and he was being treated as an
'indoor patient till 27.9.1991. According to us, in its wisdom the Parliament,
rightly thought that prescribing a period of limitation and restricting the
power of Tribunal to entertain any claim petition beyond the period of
twelve months from the date of the accident was harsh, inequitable and in
 many cases was likely to cause injustice to the claimants. The present case      E
 is a glaring example where the appellant has been deprived by the order
 of the High Court from claiming the compensation because of delay of only
 four days in preferring the claim petition.

      In this background, now it has to be examined as to what is the effect      F
of omission of sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act. From the Amend-
ing Act it does not appear that' the said sub-section (3) has been deleted
retrospectively. But at the same ti1ne, there is nothing in the Amending Act
to show that benefit of deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166 is not to
be e>-iended to pending claim petitions where a plea of limitation has been
raised. The effect of deletion of sub-section (3) from Section 166 of the G
Act can be tested by an illustration. Suppose an accident had taken place
two years before 14.11.1994 when sub-section (3) was omitted from Section
166. For one reason 'or the other no claim petition had been filed by the
victim or the he_irs of the victim till 14.JJ .1994. Can _a claim petition be not
filed after 14.11.1994 in respect of such accident? Whether a claim petition H
    422                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A   filed after 14.11.1994 can be rejected by the Tribunal on the ground of
    limitation saying that the period of twelve months which had been
    prescribed when sub-section (3) of Soction 166 was in force having expired
    the right to prefer the claim petition bad been extinguished and shall nofbe
    revived after deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166 w.e.f. 14.11.1994?
    According to us, the answer should be in negative. When sub-section (3)
B
    of Section 166 has been omitted, then the Tribunal has to entertain a claim
    petition without taking note of the date on which such accident had taken
    place. The claim petitions cannot be thrown out on the ground that such
    claim petitions were barred by time when sub-section (3) of Section 166
    was in force. It need not be impressed that Parliament from time to time
C   has introduced amendments in the old Act as well as in the new Act in
    order to protect the interest of the victims of the accidents and their heirs
    if the victims die. One such amendment has been introduced in the Act by
    the aforesaid Amendment Act 54 of 1994 by substituting sub-section (6) of
    Section 1.58 which provides :
D
                "A.s soon as any information regarding any accident involving
            death or bodily injury to any person is recorded or report under
            this section is completed by a police officer, the officer incharge
            of the police station shall forward a copy of the same within thirty
            days from the date of recording of information or, as the case may
E           be, on completion of such report to the Claims Tribunal having
            jurisdiction and a copy thereof to the concerned insurer, and where
            a copy is made available to the owner, he shall also within thirty
            days of receipt of such report, forward the same to such Claims
             Tribunal and Insurer.   11




F
    In view of sub-section (6) of Section 158 of the Act the officer in charge of
    the police station is enjoined to forward a copy of information/report
    regarding the accident to the Tribunal having jurisdiction. A copy thereof
    has also to be forwarded to the concerned insurer. It also requires that
    where a copy is made available to the owner of the vehicle, he shall within
G   thirty days of receipt of such copy forward the same to the Claims Tribunal
    and insurer. In this background, the deletion of sub-section (3) from
    Section 166 should be given full effect so that the object of deletion of said
    section by the Parliament is not defeated. ff a victim of the accident or
    heirs of the deceased victim can prefer claim for compensation although
H   not being preferred earlier because of the expiry of the period of limitation
         DHANNALAL v. D.P. VIJAYVARGIYA [N.P. SINGH, J.]                   423

prescribed, how the victim or the heirs of the deceased shall be in a worse       A
position if the question of condonation of delay in filing the claim petition
is pending either before the Tribunal, High Court or the Supreme Court.
The present appeal is one such case. The appellant has been pursuing from
Tribunal to this Court. His right to get compen.sation in connection with
the accident in question is being resisted by the respondents on the ground
                                                                                  B
of delay in Gling the same. H he had not filed any petition for claim till
14.11.1994 in respect of the accident which took place on 4.12.1990, in view
of the Amending Act he became entitled to file such claim petition, the
period of limitation having been deleted, the claim petition which has been
filed and is being pursued upto this Court cannot be thrown out on the
ground of limitation.                                                             c
       The matter will be different if any claimant having filed a petition for
claim beyond time which has been rejected by the Tribunal or the High
Court, the claimant does not challenge the same and allows the said judicial
order to become final. The aforesaid Amending Act shall be of no help to
such claimant. The reason being that a judicial order saying that such            D
petition of claim was barred by limitation has attained finality. But that
principle will not govern cases where the dispute as to whether petition for
claim having been filed beyond the period of twelve months from the date
of the accident is pending consideration either before the Tribunal, High
Court or this Court. In such cases, the benefit of amendment of sub-section       E
(3) of Section 166 should be e>.iended.

      Accordingly, we allow this appeal and set aside the order passed by
the High Court. We direct the Tribunal to entertain the petition for claim
filed on behalf of the appellant and to dispose of the same as early as
possible in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs.             F
v.s.s.                                                       Appeal allowed.