Holding

An introductory paragraph in the grounds of detention is permissible and, if merely a preamble, its vagueness does not invalidate the detention order; the substantive grounds must be clear enough to enable a representation, which was satisfied here.

Summary

The appellant, Dhananjoy Das, was detained under Section 3(3) of the National Security Act, 1980 and was served with four paragraphs of grounds. He challenged the order on the basis that the first paragraph was vague and that the grounds related to law and order rather than public order, violating his rights under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court examined whether an introductory paragraph can be part of the grounds of detention and held that the first paragraph was merely a preamble, not a substantive ground, and therefore its vagueness did not invalidate the order. The Court further held that the specific facts in paragraphs 2 and 3 were sufficient to enable the appellant to make an effective representation, and that the distinction between law and order and public order was satisfied in the Assam context. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the detention order upheld.

Issues considered

The validity of an introductory paragraph in the grounds of detention under the National Security Act.
Whether vagueness in the first paragraph infringes the appellant's right to be informed of the grounds under Article 22(5).
Whether the facts alleged pertain to maintenance of public order or merely law and order.
Whether extraneous evidence, such as the magistrate's notes, can be admitted to prove the detaining authority's satisfaction.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 22(5)
National Security Act, 1980s. Section 3(3)
Preventive Detention Act, 1950s. Section 3(1), s. Section 7

Subjects

preventive detentionvaguenessArticle 22(5)National Security Actgrounds of detentionpreamblepublic orderrepresentationextraneous evidence

Judgment

A 122

DHANANJOY DAS

v.

B DISTRICT MAGISTRATE & ANR.

August 16, 1982

' 0
[V.D. TULZAPURKAR AND R.B. MISRA, JJ.)

Constitution of India-Article 22(5)-Rights of detenu.
..
National Security ACt~ 1980-section 3(3)-Grounds of detention-Inclu-
. sion of paragraph in the nature of preamble or introduction-Validity•

National Security Act, 1980-Section 3(3)-0rder of detention-Proof of
satisfaction of detaining authority-Extraneous evidence not admissible.
D
National Security Act, 1980-section 3(3)-Grounds of detention-Vague-
~1s-Determination of.

The apPellant was detained by' an ofder made under section 3 (3) of ihe
Act.t The grounds of detention served on him consisted of 4 paragraphs. The
first part of paragraph 1 was admittedly introductory. The latter part of para.:·
E graph 1 was in the followillg terms:

"Shri Das has been playing a leading part in -the current agitation on
foreigners issue in collaboration with other active agitators who ~re
leaders of AASU, Karmachari Parishad and Gana Sangrarn Parishad,
,. by organising bundhs, non~cooperation ·programme, inciting people
to violate law from time to time. Such activities have ~isturbed peace-
ful, tolerant and harmonious life: Or society".

Paragraphs 2 and 3 gave details as to the part played by the appellant
in a programme relating to obstruction of road and rail traffic and "violation of
curfew by thousands of people. The first sentence of paragraph 4 stated: "Such
activities of Shri Dhananjoy Oas are prejudicial t""the interest of maintenance of
G public order."

The appellant challenged the order by a petition under Article 226 which
was dismissed by the High Court. ,•
, In appeal, counsel for the appellant contended that paragraph 1 of the •
,
H grounds was so vague that the order of detention must be quashed on that
ground alone, that paragraphs 2 and 3 also sufferred from vag~eness for the
ffi\!9~ th~! !h•y did not meQtigq certain necessary facts and that the facta
DHANANJOY V, DISTT. MAGISTRATE . 123

alteged in the grounds of detention only made out a case for maintenance of IaW
A
' and order and not of public order.

Counsel for the respondent submitted that paragraph 1 was only a prelude
or introductory and it did not deal with the grounds on which the District
Magistrate bad biS subjective satisfaction in passing the order.
B
Counsel for the app"ellant, on the other hand, relying on certain observa-
tions in Mohd. Yousuf Rather v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, conlended that
Arti(:te 22(5) provided for supplying of grounds and there could be no preamble
or introduction to the grounds of detention. It was submitted that the District
_ Magistrate h.imself had in his counter-affidavit treated paragraph 1 as constituting
one of the grounds of detention although ·be had subsequently changed his posi-
tion by filing a supplementary affidavit on the basiS of a note ma<le bf him
. -c
earlier in his correspondence with the State Government. Counsel contended
that the order of detention was conclusive as to the state of mind of the person
who made it and no such extraneous evidence Was admissible.

Dismissing the appeal, D
HELD : The law is by now well settled that a detenu has two ·rights
under Article 22(5) of the Constitution: (1) to be informed, as soon 2s may be,
of the grounds on which the order of detentioh 'is made, that is, the grounds
which led to the subjective satisfactioh of the detaining authority;. and (2) to be
afforded the earliest opportu~ity of making a representation against the order
of detention, that is, to be furnished with sufficient particulars to enable him to E
make a representation which on being considered may obtain relief to him.
The inclusion of an irrelevant o.r non·existent ground, among other relevant
grounds, is an infriDgement of the first of the fights and the inclusion of an
obscure or vague ground a~ong other clear and definite gro.unds is an infrige·
meat of the second of the rights. It is by yirtue 'of the second right that the
detaining authority has to supply the. material facts on the basis of which sub·
jectjve satisfaction was derived for passing th"e orde1 .of detention and this is F
...,... how th~ facts from which the inference is drawn also become a part and parcel
'i!i._,( of the grounds. (134 D-G]

(b) There is no bar, to have introductory paragraphs in the ground& of
detention. 'he observations .in Mohd. Yousuf Rather's case do opt indicate that
there can be no .preaffibJe or introductory paragraph; those observations onIY.
mean that all allegations of facts which have led to the Passing of the· order of G
dete~tion will form part of the grounds of detcntio_n. [129 G]

;..· . (c) Whether a particular paragraph in the grounds amouQts only to a
preamble or introduction or contains the grounds on the basis of which the
·detaining authority bad the subjective satisfaction for passing the· order is· to. be
determined on the facts and circumstances of C\\~ ~~~~ 1,1;~~ ~t i§ open to the
court to come to its own conclusion. (130 A-BJ
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1983] 1 S.C.R,

A (d) the grounds of detention must be i~ existence on the date of the
order and the authority concerned has to be satisfied about them on the.date of
the order. The satisfaction of the detaining authority .must be clear on the face
of the order and no extraneous evidence is admissible ·to P,rove what actually
weighed with the authority while passing the order. It is not what a patty
chooses t~ put as a gloss on the grounds of detention but it is the document
itself w~ich will be taken to be, the. proof of what weighed with the detaining
B. authority while passing the order. [135.D-E-F]

Mohd. Yousuf Rather v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, (1979) 4 S.C.C. 370,
e~plalned.

' ,_ •
Naresh Chandra Ganguli v. State of West Bengal, [1960] l S.C.R. 411;
Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, [1966] l S.C.R. 709 and State of
Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya, [1951] S.C.R. 167, referred to.

In the instant case the tenor of ihe document only indicates that the three
organisations named therein have been taking part in the current agitation on
foreigners issue in the manner stipulated in paragraph 1, in which the appellant
D has also been playing a leading part. Paragraphs 2 il.nd 3 deal with the specific
part attributed to the appellant on specific days and at specific places. That is
why the first sentence o~ Paragraph 4 stipulates that such activities of the appel-
lant are prejudicial to the interests of maintenance of public order and be was
called upon to make a representation against the allegations made in paragraphs
2 and 3 of the groundS. Significance must be attached to the difference in
language 'used ill the last sentence of paragraph l and the first sentence o'f para-
E graph 4. Paragraph 1 only contemplates that the variOus organisations have
been t~king part in the current agitation on foreigQefs issue in the various modes
enumerated therein. The document read as a who!~ indicates that paragraph 1.
of the grounds of detention is only by way of in!roduction or preamble. The
vagueness in paragraph 1 cannot be made a ground of attack on the impugned
order. [131 C-F; 131 A; 133 C-D].

I
2. The question whether a particular groun(I is vag.ue will de~end on 'the ../
facts and. circumstances of each case because vagueness is a rela1ive term. What ).__'
may be vague in one case inay not be so in similar circurustiii:tces of another
case. If the basic facts have been given in a particular case constituting the
grounds of detention whi.::h •enable the dctenu to make an effective repr.esentation,
merely because meticulous details of far;ts are abt given will not vitiate the order
of detention. [142 E-G]

Chaju Ram v. State of Jammu & Kt;ishmir, (1970) 1 S.C.C. 536; Gopal
Bauriv. District Magistrate, Burdwan & Ors., [1975] l S.C.C. 522; Dr. Ram i .j/
Krishan Bhardwajv. State of Delhi &-Ors., [1953] S.C.R. 708; Bhupen Deka v.
H State of Assam, (1981) Cri. L:J. 1743; Kam/a Kanya/al Khusalani v. State of
Maharashtra & Anr., (!981) 1 S.C.C. 748; Naresh Chandra Ganguli v. State of
.West Bengal, [1960] 1 S.C.R. 411; Ma~ood A/Qm etc.~· Union of India & Ofs,
OHANANJOY v. i>ISt'r. MAGISTRATE (Misra, J.) 12S
. . ' '
•. . [1973] 3 S.C.R. 268; Bidya Deb Barma v. District Magistratt, Tripura Agartala, A
[1969] I S C.R. 562; and Vakil Singh v. State of Jammu & Kashmi,, A.LR. 1974"
S.C. 2337, referred to.

In the instant case basic facts have been given in paragraphs 2 and 3 of
the grounds of detention to enable the a~pellant to make an effective representa-
tion. [142 G] B
· 3. The situation in Assam is a grave one and the agitation On the issue /
of foreigners has been going on for years and it has taken an ugl~ and serious
turn, and the statement of facts made in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the< grounds of
• " detention, in the pr~yalent circumstances in Assam~ relate tv the maintenan~, of
pub1ic order in view of the law laid down in Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration
& Or;. [143 H; 144 A] . , . . C
•~' •
Dr. 11am Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar (1966] l S.C.R. 709 ·and Ashok
Kumtir. v. D'e/hi Administration & Ors., A.LR. 1982 S.C. 1143, rCferred to.

' CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 199
0
of 1982.
•
From the Judgmel)t dated the 23rd February, 1982 of the
High Court of Gauhati in Civil Rule No. 6 (HC) of 1982.

S; Rangarajan, Prabir Chowdliury, B.P. Maheshwari, Suresh E
Sethi and Miss "Asha Rani Jain, for the Appellant.
J.

A.M. Mazumdar, Advocate General of Assam and S.K. Nandy
for the Respondents.

'
The Judgment '
of the Court was delivered by F
\/ MISRA, ]. Th,e present appeal by certificate is directed against
the judgment of the High Court of Gauhati dated 23rd of February,

., 1982 dismissing the petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution
challenging the order of detention of the appellant.
G
The District Magistrate, Darrang passed an order of detention
on 3rd ofJanuary, 1982 against the ·appellant under s.-3 (3) of the
National Security Act, 1980. The order of detention al11.ng with
· the grounds was supplied to the' appellant on the same day, that
is, on 3rd of January, 1982. ··The appellant was also arrested on the
H
same day. He made a representation on the 9th of January, 1982
116 SlJPRilMB COUltT RBPOilTS. {l 9S3] t • s.C.R.

A •
·through the Superintendent of Special Jail who forwarded the.same
-to the Government on 10th of January,_1982. The State Govern-
ment received the same on !Ith of January, 1982 and it was rejected
on 13t.h of January, 1982.

8 The order of detention was challenged by the. appellant on
two grounds : (1) that the grounds of' detention were vague, and
(2) that the facts narrated in the grounds related to law and order
situation and not to public order. The High Court repelled both
the grounds and dismissed the writ petition by its order dated 23rd •
_qf February, 1982. The High Court, however, granted a certificate
c for leave to appeal to this Court. ·

Before dealing with the contentions in •this case oJi behalf
of the parties it will be· appropriate at this ·stage to refer to the .
grounds of detention which were served on the appellant :
.D
'.'!. Sri Dhananjay Das, aged about 50 is the President of
Purbancbalia Lok Parishad, Tezpur ·Unit. He is a
contractor by profession. Sri Das has been playing
a leading part in the current agitation on foreigners
·issue in collaboration with other active agitators who .
E are leaders of AASU, Karmachari Parishad and Gana
Sangram Parishad, by organising bundhs, non-coopera-
tion programme, inciting people to violate law from:
time to time. Such activities have· disturbed peaceful,
tolerant and harmonious life of society.

F 2. In connection with the programme of Rasla Roko
CoJllmencing from 0/50 hrs. of 31.1,2.81 to 1700 hrs.
of 1.1.82 Sri Das in collaboration with others like
Nabab Shahjamal, Biren Baishya etc. mobilised
thousands of people from Parbatia, and other neigh-
G bouring areas of the town· to give obstructions to
motor vehicles on 31.12.81 and railway traffic on
1.1.82. At the instigation of Sri Das the people came
· in large numbers violating prohibitory orders. On
l. I.82 the crowd was instigated by him and aforesaid
H associates to pelt stones, brickbats etc. on police
personnel on duty. This led to greater violence in
which railway slippers were burnt, and driver of fire-
bllANANJOY v. nistT. MAGiSTRATE (Misra, i.) 127
brigade was shot at. Ultimately firing was resorted to A
and three persons died.of bullet injury.

3. On 2.1.~2, when the. whole Tezpur Town was under
curfew, Sri Das along with his other associates mobi-
lised people of Parbatia etc. and led a procession of
thousands of people · through curfew-bound areas B
raising slogans instigating people to violate curfew. '
This crowd had to be dispersed by use of force.

4. Such activities of Sri Dhananjoy Das are prejudicial
to the interest of maintenance of public order. It
is essential therefore that . in order . to prevent him
c
from induJging in such like. prejudi~i~l acts, Sri Das
is detained under National Se'curity Act."

· Shri Rangarajan, counsel for th,e appellant, seriously con-
T
tended that the first paragraph of the grounds is so vague that 'the D
order of detention must be quashed on this ground alone.
Shri A.M. Majumdar, Advocate General of Assam, on. the other
hand has contended that the I st paragraph of the grounds was on1y
a _prelude or introductory and does not deal with the gro/mds on which
.the District Magistrate had his subjective _satisfaction for passing
the order of detention·. E
There is no doubt th at If the first paragraph of the grounds ·
constitute the grounds of detention,. it is vague and the order of
detention must be quashed on the ground of vagueness with regard
to the statements contained therein. Th~refore,.the main question
for consideration in this case is whether the first paragraph of the F
grounds is merely introductory or a preamble or a prelude. Shri
Rangarajan contends that there could be no ·prelude or preamble. to
the grounds. Article 22 (5) of the Constitution provides for •
supplying the grounds of detention. In support of his contention
he placed reHance on Mohd. Yousuf Rather v. State of Jammu. &
G~
Kashmir & Ors.(l) · In .that case Dr. Singh vi for the State I
strenuously submitted that the first paragraph of the grounds
supplied to 'the petitioner was of an introductory nature, that
paragraphs 2; 3, 4 and 5 referred to the events which furnished the

en [19791 4 sec no.' H
128 SiJPREME COURT REPORtS [1983] I s.c:R.

A background and that the penultimate paragraph alone contained
the grounds of uetention as such. He· submitted that it was per-
missible to separate the introduction and the recital of events
constituting the background from the grounds of detention and. if
that was done it would be apparent that the order of detention
suffered from no infirmity. He sought to draw support for his
B submission from the decision in Naresh'Chandra Ganguli v. State
of West Bengal.(1) In that case sections 3 and 7 of the Preventive
Detention Act 1950 were the subject matter of consideration and
this Court held that the two sections read together contemplate that
the copy of the order passed by the detaining authority under s. 3 '
c (2) of the Act to be served on. the detenu should contain, (I) a
preamble reciting in terms one or more of the sub-clauses of els. (a)
and (b) of s. 3 (1) .as its object or objects, (2) the grounds contem-
plated bys. 7, namely, the c6nclusions of fact, which. led to the
passing of the order of detention, informing the detenu as to why
he was &tained, and (3) particulars, if and where necessary, but not
D those referred to in sub-ss. 3 and (4) of s. 3 of the Act. This case thus
contemplated of a preamble ·or introductory part in the grounds of
detention. ··

Shri Raugarajan for the. appellant, however, contended that,
the view taken in N.C. Ganguli's case (supra) does not hold ·the field
E and he referred to the following observations made . by Chinnappa
Reddy J. in Mohd. Yousuf Rather's case (supra) :

"It is impossible to agree with the submission
of Dr. Singhvi. The annexure to the order · of
detention detailing · the grounds of detention
F has been fully extracted by my learned brother
Shinghal J. We are unable to see how factual allega-
tions such as those contained in the paragraphs I to
s· of the ·grounds of detention can be said to be
.. •

merely introductory. or as constituting the back-
ground. ll,n · Naresh Chandra Ganguli v. State of W.B.
G what was read by the Supreme Court as the 'pream-
ble' ·was the recital in terms of section 3 (1) clause (a)
and (b) of the Preventive Detention Act, namely : that
the detenu was being detained in pursuance of a dcten-
-'
Fl.
.(1) [1%0] I SC.R. 411.
DHANANJOY v. DISTT. MAGISTRATE (Misra, J.) 129

lion order made in exercise ofthe power conferred by A
section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act ·on .the
gr.,und that the detenu was acting in a .manner preju-
dicial to the maintenance of public order as evi-
denced by the particulars. given :!hereafter. The
particulars given in the subsequent paragraphs, the
Court said, constituted the grounds. We do .not. B
understand "flfaresh Chandra Ganguli v. $tale of W.B.
as laying down that it is permissible to dissect or
trisect the grounds of detention into introduction,
.b~ckground and ·'grounds' as such. There is · no
warra~t. for any such division. •
c
The distinction made in Nai·esh Chandra Ganguli case ·
between the 'preamble', meaning thereby the recital in
terms of the statutory provision and the 'grounds' mea-
ning thereby the conclusions of fact which led to the'
passing of the order of detention does not justify any D
disiinction being made between introductory facts,
background facts, and 'grounds' as such. All allega-
tions of fact which have ,led . to the passing of the
-Order of detention are 'grounds' of detention. If such
allegations are irrelevant or vague .the detenu is entitled
to be releaSed.'' E

Shinghal J., with· whom Sarkiiria J. concurred,' however, did not
go to the extent. of saying that there cannot he a preamble or
introduction to the grounds. According to the counsel for the
appellant _the observatfons made by Chinnappa Reddy J. would F
be taken to be the observations made by the Full Court inasmuch
as he agreed with the vie\v expressed by Sarkaria and Shinghal
JJ.'

Be !hat as it m_ay, the observations ~eferred to above do not
indicate that there can be no preamble or introductory para in the G
grounds of detention. .There is no bar to have introductory para-
graphs in the grounds, The observations only mean all allegations
of facts which have led to the pass.ing of the order of detention )Viii
form part of the grounds of detention. · It is, therefore, difficult to
accept the contention that there co_uld be no introductory para in. ·H
. tlie grounds. '

..
i3o SuPRJ!ME COURT REPORTS 11983) i s.c.R.
A Wh.ether a particular paragraph in the grounds amounts only
io a preamble or introduction is to be determined on the facts ana
circumstances of each case and it is open to the Court to come to
its own conclusion whether that paragraph is only .an introductory
para or contains the grounds on· the basis of which tlie detaining
authority had the subjective satisfaction for passing the order of
B detention.

'Preamble' has been defined in the Oxford English Dictionary
to mean a preliminary statement in speech or writing; an introduc-
tory paragraph, s~ction, or clause; a preface, prologue, introduction.
c It has further been defined there as "an introductory paragraph"
or part in a statute, deed, or other document setting forth the
ground and intention of it." The preamble thus betokens that which
follows.

The first part of paragraph 1 of the order of detention in the
D instan4 case is admittedly introductory where it says :
I •

'.'Sri Dhaoanjoy Das, aged about 50 years ia the Presi-
dent of Purbanchalia Lok Paiishad, Tezpur Unit. He is a
contractor by professii>n."
E The dispute is about the nature of the latter part of paragraph.
I. It says : •

"Sri bas has been playing a leading part in the current
agitation on foreigners issue iri collaboration with other
F active agitators who are leaders of AASU, Karmachari
Parishad and Gana Sangram Parishad, by organising
bundhs, non-cooperation programme, inciting ·people to
violate law from time to time. Such activities have distur-
bed peaceful, tolerant and harmonious life of society."
'
G Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the grounds of detention deal with specific
instances of the activities of the appellant. The penultimate
paragraph 4 of the grounds says :

"Such activities of Sri Dhananjoy Das are prejudicial
H to the lnteres( of maintenance of public order."

'
biiANANJOY v. i>1sri. MAGISTRATE (Misia, i.) i:H
A
Significance must be attached to the language used in the last
sentence of the !st paragraph and the !st sentence of the last
paragraph, the former says :

"Such activities have disturbed peaceful, tolerant and
harmonious life of society." B
While the latter i.e., the !st sentence .of the last paragraph 4 states
that:

"Such activities of Sri Dhananjoy Das are prejudicial ·to
the interest of maintenance of public order." C

The tenor of the document indicate that the appellant has been
\
playing a leading part in the current agit~ti<in on foreigners issue in
collaboration with other active agitators wbo are leaders of· AASU,
Karmachari Parishad and Gana Sangram Parishad by organising
bundhs, non-cooperation programm~. inciting. people to violaJe D
law from time to time. It only indicates that the three organisations
have been taking part in the current agitation on foreigners issue in
the manner stipulated in the first paragraph, in which the appellant
· has also been playing a leading part. Paragraphs · 2 and 3 of the
grounds deal with specific part attributed to the appellant ·on specific
days and at specific places. That is why . the first sentence of the E
last paragraph 4 stipulates such acti•ities of Sri Dhananjoy Das are
prejudicial to the interests of maintenance of public order and the
appellant was called upon to make a representation against the
allegations made against him in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the grounds.
The first paragraph only contemplates that the various organisations
have been taking part in the current agitation against the foreig- F
ners issue in the various modes enumerated therein.

Shri Rangarajan sought to derive support for his contention
from averments made in paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit .filed
by the District Magistrate on 24th of January, 1982.wherein it has G
been stated that ground No' I is Clear, specific' and eloquent which
provided all the opportunities to the detenu to submit his represen-
tation. This averment was in reply to the allegation made in the
writ petition that paragraph I of the grounds was vague and
indefinite. ' Therefore, on the own showing of. the :Qistrict Magist- H
rate, he treated paragraph I a_s _constituting one 'of the grounds of
detention. Later on he sought permission of the Court to file a·
132 SUPREME COURT RE!>ORTS (1983] I s.c.R.

A supplementary affidavit, which was allowed. In the supplementary
affidavit he averred that paragraph I of the grounds constitute only
a preamble or introd'uctory para and the grounds on which be had
subjective satisfaction for passing 'the order of detention ·against the
appellant were contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the grounds· of
detention. In support of the application for permission to file a
supplem.entary affidavit by way of clarifica;ion he relied on. the
parawise comments made by him which he had sent to the Govern-
ment under his memo. • No. DCM. 49/8·!/29 dat!d , I 5th. of
January 1982 with a· copy to the Senior Government Advocate~
While dealing with paragraphs 9 and IO of the petition the
District Magistrate had commented • tbat pa~a 1 of the grounds of
c . detention 'is of the nature of introduction and para 4 is of the
nature of conclusion. It was also submitted for the appellant
that the District Magistrate having once admitted in the
counter affidavit that para l of the grounds of detention constitufe
grounds of detention he could not subsequently turn turtle and , say
that i( was only by way of introduction or preamble and he could
D not have been allowed to change his position by filing a supple-
1;rientary affidavit. The order of detention, said the counsel, is
conclusive as to the state of mind of !he person who made it and
that no extraneous eyidence ·can be takenr into consideration to
prove that state of mind and hence any additional evidence such as
the note made by the District Magistrate was not admissible to·
E prove that the rule has been complied with. Such evidence could •
· not have been given by the District Magistrate in view of the earlier ·-
affidavit dated 24th of January, 1982. expressly saying that para-
graph I is th; ground which is clear, specific ~nd eloquent. In .
support of his contention he placed reliance on Dr. Ram Manohar
F Lohia v. State of Bihar.( 1 )
\_;
The Advocate General of Assam, on the other hand, has
contended that the counter affidavit filed earlier by the District
Magistrate was just in reply to the averments made in the .writ peti-
tion and therein it was stated that ground No. l of the grounds of
G detention was vague and indefinite and' in reply the.reto the District
Magistrate denied the vagueness of ·that ground. The District
Magistrate, however, has clarifie.d the position in his para-wise· ,.
comments which he had sent to the Government by memo. •
..
H (I) [1966] 1 S.C.R. 709.
. DHANANJOY V. DISTT. MAGISTRATB .(Mimi, J.) . 133
A
No. DCM. 49/81/29 dated 15th of January, 1982. He clarified the
position fhat paragraph 1 of the grounds of detention was only· a
preamble or introduction. This was done by him long before the
filing of the writ petition itself and, therefore, the supplementary
. affidavit filed by him clarifying the posi,tion cannot be said to be an
after-thought and the High co·urt accepted the position that the , B
District Magistrate did not take into consideration the statement of
facts made in paragraph I of the grounds of detention.

The grounds of.detention read as a w"hole leave no room tor
doubt that paragraph I of the grounds of detention was only by
way of introduction or as a p~eamble. In substance, it only indicates
c
. ,,.
/ r.....,
the modus operandi adopted by the various organisations to the
current agitation on foreigners issue in Assam. The 2nd and 3rd
}
paragraphs of the grounds of d.etention allege a specific part played
by the appellant in that agitation; On a perusal of. grounds of
detention as a whole we are satisfied that the view ~aken by the
High Cqurt that the !st paragraph of the grounds 'of detention was
D
only a preamble, pre)ude, or introductory para is correct. If this.
be the position then the vagueness in the I st paragraph cannot be
ma.de a ground of al)ack on the impugned order.

The Advocate General feebly sought to contend that assuming
that !st paragraph. of the grounds also constituted the. grounds· for E
detention there was no vagueness in as much as the material facts
. d.etailed in paragraphs 2 and 3 were sufficient to enable the appellant
to make an effective representation. For example, bundh referred : to'
in paragraph 1 has been detailed in the 2nd paragraph, non.coopera-
tion referred to in paragraph 1 has also been clarified by necessary
implication in para 2 in as much as Rasta Roko programme or F
creating obstacles in .the roads necessarily helped the non'coopera-
tion by preventing people from attending their offices or performing
theirstatutory duties.

In the view that we have taken that the Is( paragraph of the
grounds is only introductory it is not necessary ·.to deal with this G
aspect of the m;tter at length .
•
This takes us to the vaiueness in parag~aphs 2 and 3 of
the ground~ of detention which specifically refer to the part played ff
by the appellant in the agitation 9n specific dates.

..
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983) l S,C.R

A In ·ground No. 2 it· has not been mentioned that 'Nabab
Shahjamal and Biren Baishya etc. were leaders or even connected
with any of·the organisations mentioned in ground No. I. It was
not even stated that all the instances referred to took place in
Tezpur town. It has also not been stated what were exactly the acts
of instigation by the detenu: The place and the manner of inciting
B people who came in large numbers to violate prohibitory orders or
to pelt stones has n_ot been mentioned·.

In ground No. 3 no particulars were given about when the
order of curfew was promulgated and by whom. It is only baldly
' the detenu "with his other associates mobilised people
stated that
c of parbatia etc." The people assembled had come from other places.
These places were not mentioned. None of the details of the slogans ·
by way of instigating people to violate the curfew had been men-
tioned and thus grounds Nos. 2 and 3 also suffer from vagueness
and this was quite sufficient to vitiate the proceedings.
D
The law is by now well settled that a detenu has two rights ·
under Art. 22 (5) ofthe Constitution : (I) to be informed, as soon .
as may be, of the grounds on which the order of detention is made,
that is, the grounds which led to the subjective satisfaction of the
detaining authority, and (2) to be afforded the earliest opportunity
E of making a representation against the order of detention, that is,
to be furnished with sufficient particulars to enable him to make a
representation which on being considered ma)l obtain· relief to him.
The inclusion of an irrelevant or non-existent ground, among other
relevant grounds is an infringement 'or the first of the rights and the
inclusion of an obscure or vague· ground among other clear and
F definite grounds is an infringement of the second of the rights.
Therefore in this view of the legal position if the grounds are vague
and indefinite that would amount to an infringement of the second ·
\ __ '
right of the appellant. It is by virtue of the second right that the
detaining authority has to supply the material facts on the basis of
which subjective satisfaction was derived for passing the order of
G detention and this is how tile facts from which the inference is 'drawn
also become a part and par.eel of the · grounds. · Therefore, the
important question is whether grounds Nos. 2 and :i are ~o vague ·as
to infringe the second right of the appellant conferred by t\rt. 22 (5)
.,
of the Constitution,
I '
DHANANJOY v. DISTT. MAGISTRATE (Misra, J.) 135

Shri Rangarajan referred to Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. Str;te A

- of Bihar and Ors.(') wherein the Constitution Bench held :

"If oil its face an order of detention is in terms of the
rule, ordinarily, a court is bound to . stay its hands and
uphold the order. When an order is on the face of it not B
in terms of the rule, a court cannot enter into an investiga-
tion whether the order of detention was in fact in terms of
the rule. So the St~te cannot be heard/ to say or prove
that an order 1was in fact made to prevent acts prejudicial
to public order though the orqer ·does not say so ... The
' state of the mind of the person.
order is conclusive as to the ·c
wh~ made it and no evidence is admissible to prove that
state of ·mind. Extraneous evidence sucli as the note
made by the District Magistrate was not admissibl.e to
prove that the rule has been complied. with.'! ·

There is no .denying the fact that the ground of detention ·D
must be in existence on the date when the order was passed and
the authority concerned has to be satisfied about the grounds of
detention on the date of the order and the satisfaction of the
detaining authority must be clear on the face of it from· the grounds
of detention and no extraneous evidence. is admissible to prove what
actually weighed with the detaining authority while passing the E
order of detention.
)

It must, however, be kept in mind that it is not ·what a party
choose to put a gloss on the grounds of detention but" it· is th.e
document itself which will be taken to be the proof of what weighed
F
with the detaining authority while passing the order of detention
and it is for the Court to decide whether certain paragraphs of the
·grounds of detention were only by way of introduction or. preamble
or constitute the grounds of detention itself. As observed earlier,
we have meticulously perused the grounds of detention and the
tenor of the document read as a whole indicates that the !st para- G
graph of the grounds of detention is only by way of introduction or .
preamble. •

Before dealing with this question of vagueness about paragraph
H
(I) [1966) l S.C,R:7Q9,

·.
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1983J I S.C.R.

A , No. 2 ~nil 3 of the grounds we would like to deal with certain
autborfries which have been cited on behalf of the appellant to
indicate what constitutes the grounds of detention. In the State o/
Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya(') this Court held :

"Clause (5) of Art. 22 confers· two. rights on the
detenu, namely, first, a right to be informed of the
grounds on which the ord<!r of detention bas bei;n made, ·
and secondly, to be afforded the earliest opportunity to·
make a representation against the order; and though these
rights are linked together, they are two distinct rights. If
c grounds which have a rational connection with the objects
mentioned in s. 3 are supplied, the first condition is com-
plied with.. But the right to make a representation implie~ .
that ihe detemj should have information so as to enable
him to make a representation, an,d if the grounds supplied
are not sufficient to enable the detenu to make a repre-
D . . '
• sental!on, he can rely on the second right. He may if he
likes ask for further particulars which will· enablo him to
make a,representatio·n. On an infringement· of either of
'· these two rights the detained person has a right to approach
the oourt, and even if an infringement of the second right
under Art. 22 (S) is alone established be is entitled to be
E ,released.''
,i
As observed earlier it is ,on account of the second right that it \.

becomes necessary to give facts on which the conclusion is based.
By now it is well settled that the grounds of detention co.nstitute the
F, facts also on which the conclusion has been drawn .. ·

The learned counsel for the appellant cited . various cases by
way of example in which in somewhat similar situation the grounds
of detention were branded as vague. In Chaju Ram v. State of ' '
Jammu and Kashmir(') the gronnds charged the detenu with having
'G conspired with some leaders of Democratic ,Conference and having
incited landless people of R.S. .Pura Tehsil to forcibly occupy the
land comprised in Nandpur Mechanised Farm and to have persua-
ded t,hem to resist violently any attempt . to evict them. _No details
H
(1) [1951) SCR 167,
(2) [197011 sec 536.
\
DHANANJOY v. DISTT. MAGISTRATE (Misra, J.) 137 '

of the leaders of the conference or of the persons incited or the dates A.
on which he conspired or incited the squatters or the time when
such conference took place, were mentioned. In the facts . and
circumstanc~s of the case it was held by this Court : ,

"It would be impossible for anybody to make a B
representation against such grounds. · These grounds, on
the authorities of this 'Court, too numerous to be cited ·
here, must be held to be vague."

The next case cited was that of Gopa/ Bauri v. Distrlcr Magist-
• rate Burdwan & Ors.(') The grounds which bad been furnished to a
the detenu in that case described the occurrences of two successive

·~
days, namely, March 20 and 21, 1973. Ground No. 1 charged the
. '
detenu with regard to the incid_ence of March 20, 1973 that he with
other associates committed theft of ball bearings and wheels of the
bucket carriages of the rope-way lines near Harisbpur village and
the supply of sand to the collieries was suspended. Likewise, about D
the incidence of March 21, 1973 the second ground charged the
detenu that he with ~ther associates committed theft of ball bearings
and wheels of the bucket. carriages from the rope-way lines at
Palashbon village causing suspension of supply of sand to the
collieries. The detenu was not communicated- the names of the
· particular associates from whose possession recovery of the stoleri E
articles, the subject matter - of 'thefts disclosed in the two grounds,
·~
was made and on the facts and circumstances of that case it was
found that the grounds of detention were vague.

In J)r. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj v. Sla/e of Delhi & Ors.(') one of
the grounds df detention mentioned was. that :
F

"You have been organi~ing the movement (Praja
Parishad Movement) by enrolling volunteers among the
refugees in your capacity as President of the Refugee
Association of Bara Hindu Rao."
G
'.['his ground was held to be vague and efen though thej other
grounds , were not vague, the detention was held to b~ not in

(tJ [19751 1 sec 522. B
(2) [1953]'.SCR 708.

' ---- -
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1983) 1 S.C.R.

·A accordance with the procedure established by law and was therefore
illegal.

In Bhupen Deka v. State of Assam(') only ground No. I was
germane to the supplies and services essential to the community.
The other. grounds did not pertain to mainten.ance of supplies and
B services essential to the community. The Court on the facts held
that

" ... there is nothing in the ground to show disclosure
of any material fact as to when, where, how and in what
manner the bundhs, picketings, satyagraha had taken place •
and how and in what manner they affected tbe supplies and
services essential to the community. There is not a single .~-,
specific date or time of the bundhs, picketings, satyagraha ' .
nor is there any indication as to bow the "supplies and
services" essential to the community were affected."
D \
fa the circumstances the ordeP of detention was declared invalid
and void on the ground of vagueness.

Shri Rangarajan also referred to Kam/a Kanya/a/ Khushalani
v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.(') io contend that this case has
added new dimension to various features of and concept of liberty
enshrined in Art. 21. In the ab.ave case this Court observed : ~·

"This Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of !Mia(') has
widened the hqrizon of Article 21 and added new dimen-
F sions to various features of and concept of liberty enshrin-
ed in Article 21. In view of the decision in the aforesaid
case, Article 22(5) of the oonstitution assumes a new com-
plexion and has to be construed liberally and meaningfully
so as to permit the legislature to impose the mini~um
possible curbs on the precious tights of'a_ citizen, by virtue
G of preventive detenti6n. If a procedure under Article 21
has (o be reasonable, fair and just, then the words 'effec- ·
live representation' appearing in Article 22(5) must be
.. .._
(I) [198!] Cri. t.J. 1743.
'
12) (1981] 1 s.c.c. 748.
(3) [1978) 2 S.C.R. 621.
DHANANJoY v. biS1T. MAGISTRATE (Mista, i.) 139

construed so as to provide a real and meaningful opportu-
A
nity to the detenu to explain his case i.o the detaining
authority in his representation. If the words 'effective
representation' are interpreted in an artificial or fanciful
manner, then it would defeat the very object not only of
{ Article 22 (5) but also of Article 21 of the Constitu-
B
. tion.''

The Advocate General of Assam, however, on the other band
cited cases in which in, simHar situations the grounds were not
branded as vague. He referred to Naresf! Ci.andra Ganguli v. State
of Wes't Bengal (supra). In that case the argument was that the c
grounds contained in paragraph 4 were vague and indefinite and
not enabling the. person. detained . to make his representation. It
appeared from the said paragraph ·that the detenu in 1fhat case
intended to proceed to Delhi on October 9, t 958 with view to. a
instigate plans against the personal security of the Prime Minister:
The place, date and purpose of the planned nefarious activities had D
all been stated as clearly as could be expected. · The · argument,
however, was that it was necessary to state the details of the
plans hatched · in Delhi. This Court dealing with the point
observed :

"There are several answers to this contention. Paragraph 4 E
has reference to something which was apprehended but
lay in the womb of the foture. From the nature of the
fact that it was not an eve11t which had already happended
but what was apprehended to .be in the contemplation of
the detenu and his associates, if any, no further details of
the plan could possibly be disclosed." F

Reliance was placed in that case on the State of Bombay v. Atma
Ram Sridhar Vaidya (supra) wherein it was held that vagueness is a
relative term. It was obse~ved further :
G
"Its meaning must vary with the facts and circums-
tances of eac'.! case. What may be said to be vague in one
case may not .be so in another, and it could not be asserted
as a general rule that a ground is necessarily vague if the
only answer of"the detained person can be to deny it. If .the
. statement of facts is capable of being clearly understood.
140 StrPREMll C()iJRT RllPOllTS (1983] I s.C.R.
A and is sufficiently definite to enable the detained person to
make his representation, it cannot be said that it is vague'.
Further, it cannot be denied that particulars of what has
taken place, can be more definitely stated than those of
events which are yet in the offing. In the very nature of
things, the main object of the Act is to prevent persons
8 from doing something which comes within the purview of
any one of the sub-clauses of cl. (a) of s. 3 (I) of the
Act."

v.
Next reliance was placed on Masood Alam etc. Union of India
& Ors. ('). In this case also the order of detention w~s challenged
c on the ground of vagueness of some of the grounds. Reference was
specially made to thr last two lines of ground No. I relating to the I •. (
collection of Rs. 700 for Youth Majlis and to grounds Nos. 2 and.
3. In the facts and circumstances of the case this Court held :

D "If, the last two lines are read, as they should be,
along with the remaining contents of ground No. l it
cannot be said that the petitioner was unable to tender his
explanation with respect to the allegation con.tained therein.
Quite clearly, the exact point of time and the people from
whom small amounts were collected could not possibly be
E stated with precision. Grounds Nos. 2 and 3, as is clear,
contain precise details in the various clau'ses enumerated
therein. According to ground No. 2 the petitioner has
extra-territorial loyalties and, therefore, he is a threat to
security of India and this conclusion is arrived at on the
basis of the instances stated in els. (a) to (CI) which are
F precise and definite. Similarly, ground No. 3 says that the -,
petitioner has been exciting communal feelings among the
Muslims in India and contributing to communal distur-
bances in Aligarh city and this conclusion is basedI on
·instances stated in els. (a) to (d) which are precise and
definite. The instances under both these grounds are
G relevant and germane to the object which is sought to be
achieved by s. 3 of the Act for the purpose of detaining
persons who are likely to act in a manner prejudicial to
the security of the State or maintenance of public order."

H
(I) [1973] 3 SCR 268.

•
l>l!ANAN!OY v.. DISTT. MAGISTRATE (Misra, J.) 141

State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya (supra) was A
sought to be distinguished by the Advocate General and referred to,
the following observations made by the Court :

"This however does not mean that' all facts leading to
the conclusion mentioned in the grounds must be conveyed
to the detained person at the same time the grounds are
B
conveyed to him. The facts on which the conclusion
mentioned in the grounds are based must be available to
the Government, but there may be, cases where there is
delay or difficulty, in collecting the exact date or it may
• not be convenient to set out all the facts in the first com-
munication. If the second commupication contains no
c
fnrther conclusion of fact from facts, but only furnishes all
or some of the ·facts on which the first mentioned conclu-
sion was founded it is obvious that no fresh ground for
which the order of detention was made is being furnished
to the detained person by the second communication which D
follows sometime after the first co.mmunication."

Next reliance was placed on· Bidya Deb Barma v. District
• I
Magistrate, Tripura, Agartala.(\) In that case also the impugned
order was challenged on the ground of vagueness inasmuch as the
ground did not give any details since no particulars of time, place E
and circumstances had been mentioned and relevant and irrelevant
matters had also been included. In the circumstances of the case
this Court negatived the contention and ~bserved : ·
I
"The grounds begin !>Y stating generally what the acti-
vities were. They' consisted of instigation of tribal people , F
to. practise jhumin'g and preventing the authorities from
' delivering paddy to Government uuder the procurement
schemes. This instigation it is said was through mass and
secret meetings and resulted in violent resistance to Govern-
ment. Having said this the grounds then specify the places
where and the dates on which the meetings were held and G
the date on which and place at which the resistance took
place. In our . judgment more detailed information was
not necessary to give the detenns an opportunity to make
their representations."
H
(I) [1969] l SCR 562.
•
14~ SUPRilMil COURT REPORTS [1983] l s.c.a
A In Vakil Singh v. State of Jammu & Kashmir(') this Court
observed :

" 'Grounds' within the contemplation of s. 8 (l) of the
Act means 'materials' on which the order of detention
8 is primarily based. Apart from conclusions of facts
'grounds' have· a factual constituent, also. They must
. contain the pith and substance of primary facts but not.
subsidiary facts or evidential details. This requir<ment
as to the communication of all essential constituents of
grbunds was complied with in the present case. The basic
c facts, as distinguished from factual details, were in-
corporated in the .material communicated to the detenu.
He was told the name of the notorious PAK agent 'and
courier ... through whom he was supplying the information
about the Indian Army. He was informed about the places
in Pakistan which he was visiting. He was further told that
\ D in lieu of the supply of this information he had been
receiving money from Pakistan. Nothing more was required
to be intimated to enable'him to make an effective repre-
sentation. The facts which were not disclosed were not
basic facts and their non-disclosure did not affect the
petitioner's right o~ making a representation."
E

After analysing the various cases cited on either side we are
of the view that the question whether a particular ground is vague
will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case because
vagueness is a relative term. What may be vague in one case may
F not be so in similar circumstances of the other case. If the basic
facts.have been given in a particular case constituting the grounds of
detention which enable the detenu to make1 an effective representa-
tion, merely because meticulous details of 'facts are not given will
not vitiate the order of detention. We have· meticulously examined I
paragraphs 2 · and 3 of the grounds of detention and we are satisfied
that basic facts have given to enable. the appellant to make an
effective repre~ent~tion. Of course, it would ·have been better if
other minute details had als9 b<en given. \ l_

H
(1) A,l.R. 1974 $.C. 2337.
DHANANJOY v. Dl~TT. MAGISTRATE (Misra, J.) 143

A
Lastly we take up the plea raised on behalf of the appellant
that the facts alleg~d in the groundsof detention only make out a
case for maintenance of law and order and not of public order.
The difference between the' expressions 'law and order' and 'public •
order' has been the subject matter of consideration by this Court on
various occasions.' In Dr . . Ram .Manohar Lohia. v. · State. of Bihar B
(supra) this Court observed : · '

"What was meant by the 'maintenance of public order'
was the prevention of disorder of a grave nature, a disorder
which the authority thought was necessary to prevent in.
view of the emergent situation created by external· aggres· c
sion; whereas the expression 'maintenance of law and
order' may mean prevention of disorder of comparativ~ly
lesser gravity and of local sig~ificance only.''.

Again, the distinction was brought out in Ashok Kumarv. Delhi
Administration & Ors.,(') to which one of lis was a party. This Court D
\
observed:

"The true distinction between the areas of "pnblic
order" and "law ,and ·order" lies riOt in the nature or
quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach E
upon society: The distinction between the two concepts of
"'law and order" and "public order" is a fine one but tJ;tis
does not mean that there can be n9 overlapping. A~ts
similar in nature but committed in different contexts and
circumstances · might cause different reactions. In one
case it might affect specific individuals only and therefore F
fouch the problem of law and order while in another it
might affect public order. The act by itself therefore is not
determinant of its own gravity. It is the potentiality of the
act to disturb the even tempo of the life of ·the community
which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public
order.'' G

The situation in Assam is a grave one and the agitation on the
issue of foreigners has been going on for years and it has faken an
ugly and serious turn,and th.e statements of facts made in paragraphs
H
(I) A.J.R. 1982 S<;:. 114~ .

•
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983] I s.c.R.

A 2 and 3 of the grounds of detention in the prevalent circumstaoces in
Assam relate to the maintenance of public order lirl view of the law
laid down in the above case .

• For the foregoing di~cussion the appeal must fail. It is
accordingly dismissed.
B
H.L.C. Appeal dismissed.

t •
I .
..,..
•

•