Supreme Court of India
DHAL SINGH DEWANGANversusSTATE OF CHHATTISGARH
- Citation
- 2016 INSC 905
- Decided
- 23 September 2016
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- RANJAN GOGOI
Holding
The Court held that the statements were not admissible under Section 6, the circumstantial evidence did not form a complete chain, the conviction was set aside, but the murder conviction under Section 302 IPC was affirmed and the death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment.
Summary
The appellant Dhal Singh Dewangan was accused of murdering his wife and five daughters. The prosecution relied on statements of village witnesses (PWs 1,2,3,5) that they heard the appellant’s mother (PW‑6) accuse him, and on circumstantial evidence such as the presence of a blood‑stained knife and the appellant’s unconscious state. The Supreme Court examined whether the witnesses’ statements qualified as res gestae under Section 6 of the Evidence Act and whether the circumstantial evidence satisfied the five‑point test for a complete chain of proof. It held that the statements were not contemporaneous enough to be admitted under Section 6 and that the circumstantial evidence left reasonable doubt, leading to the conviction being set aside. However, the Court upheld the conviction for murder under Section 302 IPC and, finding the death sentence excessive, commuted it to life imprisonment. The appeals were therefore partially allowed.
Issues considered
- The admissibility of the statements of PWs 1, 2, 3 and 5 under Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act as part of the res gestae.
- Whether the circumstantial evidence established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt as per the five golden principles.
- The appropriateness of the death sentence under the ‘rarest of rare’ doctrine versus life imprisonment.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 106, s. 6
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302
Subjects
Section 6 Evidence Actres gestaecircumstantial evidencedeath penaltylife imprisonmentconvictionacquittalSection 302 IPCrarest of rare doctrine
Judgment
[2016] 8 S.C.R. 36
A DHAL SINGH DEWANGAN
v.
STATE OF CHHATTISGARH
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 162-163of2014)
B SEPTEMBER 23, 2016
[RANJAN GOGOi, PRAFULLA C. PANT AND
UDAY UMESH LALIT, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860: s ..J02 - Conviction and death sentence
by courts below for causing death of wife and 5 daughters -
c Prosecution case that on the fateful night, complaint lodged that
sound of shouting heard ji-om the house of the appellant - When
police reached his house, PW-6, mother of the appellant informed
that she saw appellant attacking his wife and five daughters with a
sharp edged object - Bodies of the deceased found in a room and
D appellallf lying in one corner of the same room in an unconscious
state with iron knife lying near his hand -Appellant sent to hospital
- Before the Magistrate, PW-6 did not directly attribute anything to
the appellant - However, in the opinion of trial court, her version
implicating the appellant as spoken to PWsl, 2, 3 and 5 was
admissible u/s.6 of Evidence Act - Placing reliance on those
E witnesses as well as non-explanation on part of appellant as to
how incident occurred, trial court held appellant guilty - High Court
affirmed conviction - On appeal, held: Statement of PW-6 cannot
be said to have been made so shortly after the incident so as to
form part of transaction - Since spontaneity and continuity was
F lost, statements attributed to PW-6 by other prosecution witnesses
do not satisfy the essential requirement of s.6 of Evidence Act -
Further, the doctor who had examined appellant was not called as
witness, nor any case papers of such examination were made
available - The explanation that he knew nothing as he was
unconscious, therefore, cannot be called, 'absence of explanation'
G or 'false explanation' - The extracts of General Diary were
completely silent about any relevant features regarding the role of
the appellant - Also, there was discrepancy as to seizure of cloths
worn by him at the time of occurrence - The site map shows the
house to be a single storey structure with a verandah and courtyard
open to sky - Rooms were not locked and the possibility of anyone
H
36
DHAL SINGH DEWANGAN v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 37
other than the inmates of the house getting into the house cannot A
be ruled out - Prosecution did not gather the fingerprints either in
the house or even on the iron knife which was allegedly used for
committing the offence in question - The circumstances did not form
a complete chain of circumstances as not to leave any reasonable
ground for the conclusion inconsistent with the innocence of the
8
appellant - Appellant entitled to acquittal - Evidence Act, 1872 -
s.6.
Evidence Act, 1872: s. 6 - Rationale behind - Held: It is the
spontaneity and immediacy of the statement in question which rules
out any time for concoction - For a statement to be admissible u/
s.6, it must be contemporaneous with the acts which constitute the c
offence or at least immediately thereafter - Penal Code, 1860 -
s.302.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
PER UDAY UMESH LALIT, J. (FOR HIMSELF AND D
RANJAN GOGOi, J.):
HELD: 1. According to PWs 1 and 2, after receipt of
information about the crime, they had reached Gandhi Chowk
where PW-6 was crying aloud that the appellant had killed his
wife and children. Thereafter PWs 1 and 2 along with 'CR' went E
to the police station and at their instance information was recorded
in General Diary. The extract of General Diary Entry is completely
silent about any relevant features regarding the crime or the role
of the appellant and in fact shows lack of knowledge about the
crime. All that it says is that they had heard sounds of shouting
coming from the house of the appellant. If PWs 1 and 2 were F
aware that the appellant bad killed his wife and daughters even
before they reached the police station, as they claimed in Court,
the nature of their reporting would have been completely different.
The fact that their reporting did not disclose any essential features
of the crime is accepted on record and their reporting was also G
never treated as FIR in the matter. It is difficult to rely on the
testimony of PWs 1 and 2. PWs 3 and 5 also claim that the
villagers had sent PWs 1 and 2 with 'CR' to make a report to the
police. But unlike PWs 1 and 2, these witnesses themselves bad
not gone to the police station and, therefore, their version needs
to be considered independently. [Paras 16, 17][54-F-H; 55-A-C] H
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 8 S.C.R.
A 2. The question that arises is whether such assertions on
part of PWs 3 and 5 come within Section 6 of the Evidence Act
and could be relied upon. The general rule of evidence is that
hearsay evidence is not admissible. However, Section 6 of the
Evidence Act embodies a principle, usually known as the rule of
res gestae in English Law, as an exception to hearsay rule. The
B
rationale behind this Section is the spontaneity and immediacy of
the statement in question which rules out any time for concoction.
For a statement to be admissible under Section 6, it must be
contemporaneous with the acts which constitute the offence or
at least immediately thereafter. The key expressions in the
c Section are " ... so connected ... as to form part of the same
transaction". In the said perspective, the statements attributed
to PW-6 by PWs 3 and 5 do not satisfy the essential requirements.
The house of the appellant was at a distance of 100 yards from
Gandhi Chowk, where these witnesses were stated to have found
PW-6 crying aloud. Even assuming that she did make such
0
disclosure, the spontaneity and continuity was lost and the
statements cannot be said to have been made so shortly after the
incident as to form part of the transaction. In the circumstances,
the evidence sought to be placed in that behalf through PWs 3
and 5 is rejected. Even the version of PWs 1 and 2 suffer on this
E count and will have to. be rejected. [Paras 17, 21 and 22)(55-D;
58-F-G; 59-C-D]
Gente/a Vijayvardhan Rao and another v. State of
Andhra Pradesh 1996 (5) Suppl. SCR 273 : (1996) 6
SCC 241; Krishan Kumar Malik l( State of Haryana
F 2011 (8) SCR 774 : (2011) 7 SCC 130 - relied on.
Sharad Birdichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra 1985
(1) SCR 88:(1984) 4 SCC 116 - referred to.
3. The appellant was lying unconscious at the scene of
occurrence is accepted by all the prosecution witnesses including
G the Investigating Officer, who sent the appellant for medical
attention. Since he was sent by the Investigating Officer himself,
the prosecution ought to have placed on record the material
indicating what made him unconscious, what was the probable
period of such unconsciousness and whether the appellant was
H falsely projecting it. However, nothing was placed on record.
DHAL SINGH DEWANGAN v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 39
Neither any doctor who had examined him was called as witness,· A
nor any case papers of such examination were made available. In
the absence of such material, which the prosecution was obliged
but failed to place on record, his explanation cannot be termed
as false. The explanation that he knew nothing as he was
unconscious cannot be called, 'absence of explanation' or 'false
B
explanation'. [Para 26][62-E-G]
4. The clothes of the accused were not seized immediately
at the place of occurrence. He was first sent for medical attention
and later in the day was brought back to the police station, where
the seizure took place. The Arrest Memo mentions his clothes
to be "Full Pant and Shirt" and further mentions, "nothing found c
on the person of the accused except clothes worn by him".
According to FSL report and serological report what was sent for
examination and analysis was a lungi which was found to be stained
with blood of human origin. It is not clear how lungi could be
seized if the appellant was in 'full pant and shirt" and there was D
nothing else on his person. Apart from the fact that the clothes
were not seized immediately at the place of occurrence, if the
appellant was found lying in the room in an unconscious state
with five dead bodies around, the possibility that his clothes had
otherwise got stained with blood which was spotted everywhere
including the verandah cannot be ruled out. Therefore, this E
circumstance is not conclusive in nature and tendency which could
be considered ag1dnst the appellant. [Para 27][62-H; 63-A-D]
5. The site map shows the house to be a single storey
structure with a verandah and court-yard open to sky. Though
the door of the house which opened in the gali was stated to have F
been bolted from inside, the rooms were not locked and the
possibility of a person/persons other than the inmates of the
house getting into the house cannot be ruled out. Furthermore,
the fact that the appellant was lying unconscious and no material
having been placed on record clearly indicating that the appellant G
was falsely projecting to be unconscious, the hypothesis that the
appellant could be innocent is a possibility. The prosecution did
not gather the finger prints either in the house or even on the
iron knife which was allegedly used for committing the offence in
question. If the finger prints on the knife were to be that of the
H
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 8 S.C.R.
A appellant alone, such factor could certainly have weighed against
the appellant. However, the absence of such conclusive material
coupled with other circumstances on record do suggest
reasonable possibility of the hypothesis of innocence of the
accused. The law regarding appreciation of cases based on
circumstantial evidence is clear that the chain of evidence must
B
be so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the
conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must
exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved
namely the guilt of the accused. The prosecution, on the basis of
admissible evidence on record, has not proved its case against
c the appellant. The appellant, therefore, deserves to be acquitted.
[Paras 28, 29][63-E-H; 64-A, B-C]
PER PRAFULLA C. PANT, J. (DISSENTING):
HELD : 1. In the facts and circumstances of the case, non-
examination of some of the persons present at the spot after the
D incident is not sufficient for not relying on the statements of PW-
1, PW-2, PW-3 and PW-5 with the aid of Section 6 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872. The courts below have rightly appreciated
the entire chain of circumstances that has been narrated by these
witnesses, particularly when they have told what PW-6 herself
E told them at the square, when they reached there. The testimony
of PW-1, PW-2, PW-3 and PW-5 is admissible in evidence as being
part of the res gestae. Sections 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the Evidence Act,
1872 deal with the relevancy of facts not in issue but connected
with the facts in issue. The provisions contained therein provide
as to when the facts though not in issue are so related to each
F other as to form components of the principal fact. The facts which
are closely or inseparably connected with the facts in issue may
be s11id to be part of the same transaction. [Para 9)(67-G-H; 68-
A-B]
State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar and others (2000)
G 8 SCC 382 : 2000 (2) Suppl. SCR 712 - relied on.
2. PW-4, father-in-law of the appellant, has stated that
deceased was his daughter. He further told that he had also gone
to Nagpur to attend the marriage in which the appellant and his
daughter were present. The witness has further stated that his
H
DHAL SINGH DEWANGAN v. STATE OF CHHATTlSGARH 41
daughter complained there about the behavior of the appellant. A
He further told that the accused used to say that his family has
become large with daughters only. PW-4 further told that the
quarrel took place between the couple in Nagpur itself. The
above statement makes it clear that the appellant had the motive
for committing the murder of his wife and daughters. The only
B
other inmate in the house, i.e. PW-6 had no motive to commit the
crime, and had she attempted, she could have been easily over-
powered by the appellant and the six deceased. [Para 10)(68-C-
E]
3. Normally, it is not the duty of the accused to explain how C
the crime has been committed. But in the matters of unnatural
death inside the house where the accused had his presence, non-
disclosure on his part as to how the other members of his family
died, is an important reason to believe as to what has been shown
by the prosecution through the evidence on record is true. It is
nobody's case that any dacoity or robbery had taken place in the D
fateful night of the incident. There are six members of the family
who have been killed brutally. Simple reply by the accused in his
statement under Section 313 CrPC that he did not know as to
how the incident happened, particularly when he was in the house,
does certainly make easier to believe the truthfulness of the
evidence that has been adduced by the prosecution in support of E
charge against him. As far as statement of PW-6 is concerned,
she has turned hostile. But the reason as to why she has turned
hostile is not difficult to be found out. She was going to lose the
only son left with her. [Para 12][69-C-E]
4. The General Diary entries are summary entries relating F
to movement of police, or relating to the fact that some
information regarding an offence has been given at the police
station. The doubts created in the present case on the ground
that what more could have been mentioned in the General Diary,
or that there are minor variations in the statements of PW-1, G
PW-2, PW-3 and PW-5, cannot be said to be reasonable doubt. ·
Both the courts below, appear to have been influenced by the
brutality and the manner in which the crime is committed. But
there are no criminal antecedents of the appellant. Also, it cannot
be said that he is continuing threat to the society or that he cannot
H
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 8 S.C.R.
A be reformed or rehabilitated. The accused is from socially and
economically disadvantaged strata of the society. Therefore,
considering all the facts, circumstances and the established
principle of law sentence of imprisonment for life would meet the
ends of justice. [Paras 13, 19](69-F-G; 72-A-C]
B Himachal Pradesh Administration v. Shri Om Prakash
(1972) 1 SCC 249:1972 (2) SCR 765; Bachan Singh
v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684 - relied on.
Case Law Reference
In the Judgment of Udal'. Umesh Lalit2 J.
c 1996 (5) Suppl. SCR 273 relied on Para 19
2011 (8 ) SCR 774 relied on Para 20
1985 (1) SCR 88 referred to Para 23
In the Judgment of Prafulla C. Pant, J.
2000 (2) Suppl. SCR 712 relied on Para 11
D
1972 (2) SCR 765 relied on Para 13
(1980) 2 sec 684 relied on Para 18
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal·
Nos. 162-163 of2014.
E From the Judgment and Order dated 08.08.2013 of the High Court
of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in Crl. Ref. No. 4 of 2013 and Criminal
Appeal No. 563 of2013.
Colin Gonsalves, Sr. Adv., Shreeji Bhavsar, Himanshu Agarwal,
Ms. Preeti Pratishruti Dash, Satya Mitra, Surya Kant (A.C.), Atul Jlia,
F Sandeep Jha, Dharmendra Kumar Sinha, Ad vs. for the appearing parties.
The Judgments of the Court were delivered by
UDAY UMESH LALIT, J. I. These appeals by special leave
challenge the judgment and order dated 08.08.2013 passed by the High
Court ofChhattisgarh at Bilaspur in Criminal Reference No.4 of2013
G and in Criminal Appeal No.563 of2013 affirming the conviction of the
appellant under Section 302 !PC and confirming the sentence of death
awarded by the Sessions Judge, Durgin Sessions Trial No.96 of2012.
The appellant was awarded death sentence on six counts for having
caused the deaths pf his wife and five daughters on 19.02.2012. While
H granting special leave to appeal by order dated 17.01.2014 this Court
DHAL SINGH DEWANGAN v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 43
[UDAY UMESH LAUT, J.]
stayed the execution of death penalty till the disposal of the .present A
appeal.
2. The appellant along with his wife Thaneswari aged about 32
years and five daughters, namely, Nisha, Lakshmi, Sati, Nandini and
Sandhya, aged 15, 14, 13, 8 and 5 years respectively and his mother
Kejabai (examined as PW-6 in the trial) was residing in Village B
Mohandipat, P.S. Arjunda, Chhattisgarh. Their house, a single storey
structure with five rooms, a verandah and a courtyard, opened in a gal i.
Opposite to this house, were the houses of Aman Dewangan, Khemlal
Dewangan and Derha Dewangan. On either side of their house the
immediate neighbours were Bhan Singh Dewangan on one side and
Yogendra Sahoo on the other. The appellant with his wife and two C
daughters had gone to attend a marriage at Nagpur on 11.02.2012 and
had returned to the village at about 4-5 p.m. on 19.02.2012. After having
dinner everyone had gone to sleep by about 8:00 p.m. Nisha, Lakshmi,
Sati and Nandini were with their grandmother Kejabai in one room while
the appellant, his wife and daughter Sandhya had slept in the adjoining D
room.
3. According to the prosecution, at about I :30 a.m. on 20.02.2012
a report vide General Diary Entry No.671 was made by PW- I Ishwar
Pradhan and PW-2 Santosh Kumar, Village Kotwar. The entry Ext.P-
37 was certified in the General Diary by PW-13, Sub-Inspector Krishna E
Murari Mishra and was to the following effect:
"The information is related to the Station Officer,
K.M. Mishra, Kotwar and lshwar Pradhan s/o Avadh
Pradhan, age 38 years, R/o Mohandipat, are present at the
police station Mohandipat and stated that sounds of shouting F
are coming out from the house of the Dhal Singh Dewangan
of village Mohai1dipat so that it is expected that incident
like beating has taken place inside the house. In order to
verify the above said incident, I departed to the place of
occurrence along with my staff, 1373, 358, 252, 1316, R.
683, 1512, 664 mayak 320 and handed over the work of the G
police station to the HCM -1118.
Sd/- lllegible
Station Officer Ai:junda,
Distt. Balod, Chhattisgarh"
H
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 8 S.C.R.
A 4. According to the prosecution, the police immediately reached
the village and thereafter recorded Dehati Nalisi Ext.P-18 at the instance
of PW-6 Kejabai who allegedly informed that at about I 0:00 p.m. on
19.02.2012 she woke up after hearing cries of her daughter-in-law
Thaneshwari and had thereafter seen the appellant attacking his wife
and five daughters with a sharp edged object. This Dehati Nalisi Ext.P-
B
18 was recorded at about 3:00 a.m. on 20.02.2012, whereafter PW-13
Sub-Inspector Krishna Murari Mishra sent dead bodies ofThaneshwari,
Nisha, Lakshmi, Sati, Nandini and Sandhya to the mortuary at Gunderdehi.
According to PW-13, the bodies of Thaneshwari, Nisha, Lakshmi,
Sandhya and Sati were lying in a room marked as Room No.4 in the site
c map Ext.P-25 and the appellant was found lying in one corner of the
same room in an unconscious position with an iron knife lying near his
left hand. The body ofNandini was lying in Room No. I, as mentioned in
the site map Ext.P-25. PW-13 also sent the appellant in an ambulance
to Primary Health Centre, Atjunda with a constable.
D 5. PW-7 Dr. Ajay Pal Chandrakar. Medical Officer, Primary
Health Centre, Gunderdehi, conducted post-mortem on the dead bodies
of Sati, Nisha and Sandhya on 20.02.2012. The post-mortem began at
10:40a.m.
a] In his post-mortem report Ext.P-27. he found following
E injuries on the dead body ofSati:
"(i) One deep incised wound at the back side of joint of
skull and neck in the size of 6" x 3".
(ii) One incised wound over right hand at the base of middle
finger and index finger to wrist joint, of size 5" x 2.5"."
F
Both the injuries were caused by sharp edged weapon. In his
opinion, cause of death was cardio respiratory arrest due to excessive
bleeding on account of the said i11juries. All the injuries were ante 111orte111
and the death was homicidal in nature.
b] PW-7 also conducted post-mortem on the body ofNisha
G
and found the following injuries:
"(i) One deep incised wound at the joint of skull and neck
region of size 7" x 4".
(ii) One incised wound at the joint of right hand wrist of
H
DHAL SINGH DEWANGAN v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 45
[UDAY UMESH LAUT, J.]
size4" x3". A
(iii) One incised wound below the right hand elbow joint of
size 3" x I";
(iv) One incised wound over right arm of size 2" x 2"."
All the injuries were ante mortem and caused by sharp edged B
weapon. Cause of death was opined as cardio respiratory arrest due to
excessive bleeding on account of the said injuries and the death was
homicidal in nature.
c] PW-7 thereafter conducted post-mortem on the body of
Sandhya and found one incised wound on the back ofneck C
of the deceased at the joint of skull in the size of 6" x 2",
·from the left to right side of neck region and all blood vessels
were cut. He opined that the cause of death was excessive
bleeding on account ofabove injury and shock due to cardio
respiratory arrest. All the injuries were ante 111orte111, caused
by sharp edged weapon and death was homicidal in nature. D
6. On the same day, PW-14 Dr. Chandrabhan Prasad, Block
Medical Officer, Community Health Centre Gunderdehi performed post-
mortem on the bodies ofThaneshwari, Lakshmi and Nandini.
a] PW-14 vide post-mortem repo11 Ext.P-64 noticed the
E
following injuries on the dead body ofThaneshwari:
(i) Deep incised wound below left lower costal region of
size l" x W', intestines visible through wound;
(ii) Deep incised wound below right costal region of size 2"
x I" horizontal, intestines visible; F
(iii) Deep incised wound over left lower costal region
horizontal, of size 2" x Yi''
(iv) Deep incised wound over left dorsal hand of size 3" x
2" horizontal
G
(v) Deep incised wound over left axillary fossa of size I" x
Y:i"
(vi) Deep incised wound over right dorsal hand of size 3" x
W' horizontal
H
46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 8 S.C.R.
A (vii) Deep incised wound over left temporal region of skull
of size 2" x W'
(viii) Deep incised wound over right dorsal and palm hand
of size 5" x 4", carpal bone cut;
(ix) Deep incised wound over left side of nose
8
(x) Deep incised wound over left eyebrow obliquely placed
upto nose of size 4" x 2"."
According to him, the cause of death was acute hemorrhagic
shock due to multiple injuries, all the injuries were ante mortem and the
c death was homicidal in nature.
b] He also conducted autopsy over the dead body of Laxmi
and in post-mo1tem report Ext.P-65, he noticed the following
injuries:
(i) Deep incised wound over right dorsal hand of size 2" x
D W' x Yi", whole face and hand blood stained
(ii) Deep incised wound over left buttock of size 2" x Y2"
(iii) Deep incised wound over left cheek of size 1" x Yi''
(iv) Deep incise wound over right nose upto ear
E (v) Deep incised wound over right wrist of size I" x W'
(vi) Nape of neck 50% cut
(vii) Deep incised wound over right face of size 2" x Y,"
(viii) Deep incise wound over right shoulder of size l" x
F YS"."
The cause of death was acute hemorrhagic shock due to multiple
injuries, all the injuries were ante mortem and the death was homicidal
in nature.
c] He also conducted postmortem over the dead body of
G Nandini vide Ext.P-66, wherein he found that there was
one deep incised wound over occipital region of size 5" x
W' x \4''. The cause of death was acute hemorrhagic shock
due to head injury which was a/lfe mortem and the death
was homicidal in nature.
H
DHAL SINGH DEWANGAN v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 47
[UDAY UMESH LAUT, J.]
7. Dehati Nalisi Ext.P-18 recorded at 3:00 a.m. led to the A
registration of FIR Ext.P-51 dated 20.02.2012 bearing No.18 of2012 at
about 4: 10 p.m .. On 20.02.2012 the appellant was brought back to the
police station at about 6:30 p.m. whereafter vide Ext.P-16 the clothes of
the accused which were stated to have blood-st:iins were taken in
custody. The accused was arrested vide arrest memo Ext.P-62 on the
B
same day.
8. During investigation, statements of various witnesses were
recorded. On 06.03.2012 PW-6 Kejabai was produced before Judicial
Magistrate, First Class, Gunderdehi, at the request of the police to record
her statement under Section 164 of Code of Criminal Procedure ( 'The
Code' for short), which statement was recorded as under: C
"States on affirmation ... my name is Smt. Kejabai w/
o Dan Singh, Occupation-Agriculture/Labour, R/o
Mohandipat, Police Station-Arjunda, District-Balod
(Chhattisgarh).
D
On oath:
(I) Last month about on date 12-13, my son and my
son's wife went to Nagpur at marriage function. After 8-
10 days, they came to Mohandipat being dispute. They went
to Pallekalan from there. Thereafter, they came to E
Mohandipat at 4:45 p.m. in the evening. That day was
Sunday. After taking meal and all slept, at night about I 0
p.m. I heard a sound like a cat howling. I afraid and went
towards daughter-in-law's room. I saw there, dead body of
younger child. Thereafter, I ran away shouting. I returned
home yet. I came together some people and saw the son F
was fainted and saw the dead body of children. I want to
say just this.
Typing has done as per my direction Narrator is
correct & accepted.
Sd/- Illegible Sd/- Illegible G
. 06.03.2012 06.03.2012
Srikant Srivastava Srikant Srivastava
J.M.F.C., Dondalohara J.M.F.C., Dondalohara
Dist. Chhattisgarh Distt. Chhatisgarh
H
48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2016] 8 S.C.R.
A I, Kejabai Dewangan have signed voluntarily, read out and
understood."
Thus, as against the version in Dehati Nalisi Ext.P-18 implicating
the appellant, her statement before the Magistrate did not directly attribute
anything to the appellant.
B 9. On 19.03.2012 a sealed packet containing an iron knife along
with requisition Ext.P-61 was sent to PW-14 Dr. Chandrabhan Prasad
seeking his opinion whether the injuries suffered by deceased
Thaneshwari, Nisha, Lakshmi, Nandini, Sati and Sandhya could be caused
by that knife. It was of iron metal with total length of 40 cm and the
c length of the blade was 5 cm. The knife was stained with blood. A
report in the affirmative was given by PW-14 on the back side of the
requisition Ext.P-61 under his signature.
I 0. After completing the investigation, charge-sheet Ext.P-74 was
filed on 27.04.2012 against the appellant for the offence punishable under
D Section 302 !PC on six counts. The prosecution examined 14 witnesses
in support of his case, the noteworthy being:-
1. PW-1 Ishwar Pradhan Sarpanch of the village stated that
around l 0:30 p.m. on 19.02.2012, PW-2 Santosh, Village Kotwar came
to his house and told him that the appellant had killed his wife and
E daughters. Thereafter, PW-I reached Gandhi Chowk (stated to be at a
distance of I 00 yards from the house of the appellant) where he found
PW-6 Kejabai sitting in the square with PW-2 Santosh Kumar, PW-3
Neel Kanth, PW-5 Dan Singh. According to the witness, PW-6 Kejabai
told them that the appellant had killed his wife and children whereafter
they went to the house of the appellant and saw that blood was lying
F near the door of the room of the appellant. They locked the door of the
house. Then along with PW-2 Santosh, Village Kotwar and one Chait
Ram Sahu, this witness went to the police station Arjunda and gave
information which was extracted in General Diary at Ext.P-37. The
witness further stated that after the police reached the village, they
G entered the house and took the appellant to the hospital in an ambulance
as he was in an unconscious condition.
Thus, the primary source of information of the witness was PW-
2 Santosh, Village Kotwar and after reaching Gandhi Chowk he had
heard PW-6, Kejabai implicating the appellant. Though he went to the
police station thereafter, Ext.P-37 extract of the General Diary Entry
H
DHAL SINGH DEWANGAN v. STATE OF CHI-IATTISGARH 49
[UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]
does not disclose any awareness of the essential features or details of A
the crime or the fact that the murders had taken place.
II. PW-2 Santosh, village Kotwar, stated that Jeevan Dewangan,
neighbour of the appellant came to his house at about 11 :00 p.m. and told
him that the appellant had murdered his wife and daughters with an iron
knife, whereafter he along with PW-I lshwar Pradhan and PW-3 Neel B
Kanth had gone to the house of the appellant. They found the wife and
children of the appellant lying dead and the appellant in an unconscious
condition. Thereafter, he along with PW- I Ishwar Pradhan and one
Vijay went to the police station and gave relevant information. According
to the witness, by the time they came back, the pol ice had already reached
the village and PW-6 Kejabai had disclosed to the police that it was the c
appellant who had killed his wife and five children. The witness further
stated that the appellant was moved to the hospital in an ambulance as
he was unconscious.
The source of information for this witness was one Jeevan
Dewangan. Going by the version of this witness, he and PW- I were D
already aware that the wife and children were lying dead in the house of
the appellant before they reached the police station. However, extract
Ext.P-37 of the General Diary does not disclose any such knowledge or
awareness.
III. PW-3 Neel Kanth stated that at about 12.00 midnight E
Ganga Ram Sahu and Chait Ram knocked the door of his house and
informed him that the appellant had killed his wife and five daughters.
The witness reached Gandhi Chowk where he found PW-6 Kejabai
crying loudly that the appellant had killed his wife and five children. All
the villagers thereafter went to the house of the appellant and found that F
there were blood stains in the verandah. PW- I lshwar Pradhan was
then sent along with PW-2 Santosh and Chait Ram to make a report to
the police. According to the witness the police reached the village after
an hour and thereafter they went to the house of the appellant. The
wife and the children of the appellant were lying dead while the appellant
was lying in an unconscious condition. G
According to the version of this witness, everyone was aware
of the fact that the murders had taken place. Yet, the reporting vide
Ext.P-3 7 is otherwise.
IV PW-4 Anjor Singh Dewangan, father-in-law of the appellant I-I
50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 8 S.C.R.
A stated that he had come to know from the villagers that the appellant
had killed his wife and five daughters. This witness did not say that he
had heard PW-6 Kejabai implicating the appellant.
V PW-5 Dan Singh Dewangan, step father of the appellant
stated that at about 12 midnight PW-2 Santosh, Chait Ram and Ganga
B Ram came and called him. They also awoke PW- I Ishwar Pradhan.
According to the witness he went towards the house PW-6 Kejabai
along with PW- I lshwar Pradhan and found that PW-6 Kejabai was
crying aloud that the appellant had killed his wife and five daughters.
According to the witness after seeing the place of incident PW- I Ishwar
Pradhan, PW-2 Santosh, Village Kotwar and Chait Ram went to the
c police station to lodge the report. This witness also stated that when the
police came they found the wife and five daughters of the appellant
lying dead and the appellant was lying unconscious.
VI PW-6 Kejabai in her examination stated as under:
D "My son Dhal Singh's wife's name is Thaneshwari Bai.
My son the accused and Thaneshwari Bai had five
daughters whose names are Sandhya, Nisha, Laxmi, Sati,
Nandini. My son was involved in the work of cutting &
selling chicken. My daughter-in-law Thaneshwari and
above stated five girls are dead. They died during
E Mahashivratri of this year.
Incident occurred about 8 months back. Before the incident,
my son Dhal Singh, daughter-in-law Thaneshwari and their
two daughters had gone to Nagpur to attend the marriage
of brother-in-law and sister-in-law of my son and they came
F back on Sunday. They came back to home at around 5.00
O' clock in the day. Incident occurred on same day. We
went to sleep at 8.00 O'clock in the night after taking dinner
I and four girls were sleeping in my room. My son, the
accused daughter-in-law Thaneshwari and youngest
G daughter Sandhya were sleeping in another room. I woke
up in the night and reached to verandah for drinking water.
I saw the girl Sandhya lying unconscious in the front of
room of my son Dhal Singh. Thereafter, opening the door
of the house I fled crying outside on the road. I don't know
what I was crying because I was not in conscious state of
H
DHAL SINGH DEWANGAN v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 51
[UDAY UMESH LAUT, J.]
mind. As I was crying outside like mad, the villagers came A
there. I cannot tell the facts stated by me to the villagers.
I don't know if I had come back to the village because I
was not in conscious state of mind."
The aforesaid statement, though generally consistent with her
statement under Section 164 of the Code, was against the assertions B
made in Dehati Nalisi Ext.P-18. She was declared hostile and was
permitted to be cross-examined by the public prosecutor. She denied
having stated about the incident to PW- I Ish war Pradhan, PW-2 Santosh,
Village Kotwar, PW-5 Dan Singh and to other villagers as well as to the
police, as alleged. She accepted her statement given under Section I 64
of the Code. c
11. The medical evidence on record was unfolded through PW-7
Dr. Ajay Pal Chandrakar and PW-14 Dr. Chandrabhan Prasad, as stated
above. PW-13 Sub-Inspector Krishna Murari Mishra proved extract of
General Diary Entry at Ext.P-37 and site map Ext.P-25. He said that he
had found the appellant lying in an unconscious condition and had sent D
him to the Primary Health Centre, Arjunda with a constable. In his
statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the
appellant claimed innocence and submitted that he knew nothing as he
was unconscious.
12. After considering the evidence on record, the Sessions Court, E
District Durg by its judgment and order dated 23.04.2013 in Sessions
Case No.96 of 2012 found the appellant guilty of offence punishable
under Section 302 !PC on six counts. Though the statement of PW-6
Kejabai in court had not attributed any criminal act to the appellant, in
the opinion of the trial court, her version implicating the appellant, as F
spoken to by PWs I, 2, 3 and 5 would be admissible under Section 6 of
the Evidence Act. Placing reliance on those statements of PW s I, 2, 3
and 5 as well as failure on part of the appellant in not offering any
explanation how the crime was committed, the trial court found that the
Prosecution was successful in bringing home the case against the
appellant. Having thus convicted the appellant on six counts under Section G
302 IPC, by a separate order of even date, the trial court awarded death
sentence to the appellant, subject to confirmation by the High Court in
terms of Chapter 28 of the Code.
13. The Reference under Section 366 of the Code for confirmation
H
52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 8 S.C.R.
A of death sentence was registered as Criminal Reference No.4 of 2013
in the High Cou11 ofChhattisgarh at Bilaspur. The appellant also filed
an appeal against his conviction and sentence vide Criminal Appeal
No.563 of2013. The Reference as well as the appeal were dealt with
and disposed of by the High Court vide its judgment and order dated
08.08.2013. It was observed by the High Com1 as under:
B
'"23. Minute examination of the evidence, oral and
documentary available on record, makes it clear that on
19.2.2012 the accused/appellant had killed his wife and five
daughters by causing them nun1ber of injuries on their vital
pa11s by chopper/knife used for cutting hen.
c
24. As per deposition of Kejabai (PW-6), on the fateful
night, the accused/appellant was the only male member in
his house and he was sleeping along with his wife
Thaneshwari ·and youngest daughter Sandhya, whereas
Kejabai was sleeping with his four daughters in a separate
D room and door of the house was bolted from inside. Thus
the possibility of entry by some stranger in the house of the
accused/appellant is not there. Since the accused/appellant
was the only inmate of the house, it is for him to explain as
to how six dead bodies have been found there. However,
E no such explanation has been offered by him in his statement
under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. As per Section 106 of the
Evidence Act, it is the duty of the accused to explain the
incriminating circumstance proved against him while making
a statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. Keeping silent
and not furnishing any explanation is an additional link in
F the chain of circumstances to sustain the charges against
him. Furthennore, as per FSL report Ex.P/69 blood was
found on the clothes of the accused/appellant and the
weapon of offence chopper/knife and as per serological
report Ex.P/72, the blood present on the clothes and the
G knife was found to be human blood.
25. The evidence of Kejabai (PW-6) also makes it clear
that upon seeing the dead body ofSandhya, she came out
of the house screaming. This witness has expressed her
ignorance as to the things disclosed by her to the villagers.
H However, from the statements of PW-I, PW-2, PW-3 and
DHAL SINGH DEWANGAN v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 53
[UDAY UMESH LAUT, J.]
PW-5, it is apparent that immediately after the incident, A
Kejabai informed them that it is the accused/appellant who
killed his wife and five daughters. These witnesses have
categorically stated that immediately after the incident they
came to know about the commission of murder by the
accused/appellant and they also remained firm in their cross-
8
examination."
The High Court further found the statements of PWs I, 2, 3 and
5 admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act and stated as under:
"27. After minute examination of the evidence of PW- I,
PW-2, PW-3 and PW-5, we are of the considered view c
that the same is admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence
Act as res gestae. For these witnesses, there was no
occasion for concoction or improvement by any means at
that juncture. The fact that immediately after seeing the
dead body Kejabai came out of the house and narrated the
incident to the villagers has been duly proved by these D
witnesses."
It was argued on behalf of the appellant that as stated by all the
prosecution witnesses including the Investigating Officer, the appellant
was found in an unconscious condition and was removed to the hospital
but no medical reports were placed on record by the prosecution. The E
High Court dealt with the submission as under:
"30. We also find no force in the argument of counsel for
the appellant that the police has not produced medical report
of the appellant clarifying his position as to how he fell
unconscious when bodies of the deceased persons were F
recovered from his house and what treatment was given to
him in hospital. It appears that during killing of six persons
and after seeing their blood, the accused/appellant might
have tired or lost his mental balance. In such a situation,
even ifthe appellant was lying unconscious near the dead G
bodies, it hardly makes any difference for proving his
involvement in commission of the offence. It is not the
case of the defence that some third person had entered the
house, assaulted the appellant and then committed murder
of six persons."
H
54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 8 S.C.R.
A Having affirmed the conviction of the appellant as recorded by
the trial court, the High Court observed that the instant case did satisfy
the parameters laid down by this Comt and was "rarest of rare cases"
justifying capital punishment. The High Court thus confirmed the death
sentence awarded to the appellant.
B 14. In this appeal challenging the correctness of the orders of
conviction and sentence, we have gone through the entire record and
considered rival submissions. The matter principally raises two questions
(a) whether the statements of PWs I, 2, 3 and 5 are admissible under
Section 6 of the Evidence Act and coJld be relied upon and (b) whether
the circumstances on record satisfy the principles laid down by this Court
c in its various judgments as regards appreciation of cases based on
circumstantial evidence.
15. The evidence of witnesses PWs I and 2 discloses that the
primary source of their knowledge about the crime was Jeevan Dewangan
who had disclosed it to PW-2, who in turn disclosed it to PW- I. Similarly,
D the source of information about the crime for PW-3, was the disclosure
by Ganga Ram Sahu and Chait Ram. Chait Ram had also gone along
with PWs 1 and 2 to the police station. However, none of these three
persons, namely, Jeevan Dewangan, Ganga Ram Sahu and Chait Ram
were examined by the prosecution. No reason fortheirnon-examination
E is placed on record. The non-examination of these persons goes to the
root of the matter and raises serious doubts.
16. According to PWs 1 and 2, after receipt of information about
the crime, they had reached Gandhi Chowk where PW-6 Kejabai was
crying aloud that the appellant had killed his wife and children. Thereafter
F PWs I and 2 along with Chait Ram went to the police station and at their
instance information was recorded in General Diary at Ext.P-37. The
extract of General Diary Entry is completely silent about any relevant
features regarding the crime or the role of the appellant and in fact
shows lack of knowledge about the crime. All that it says is that they
had heard sounds of shouting coming from the house of the appellant. It
G is not the case of the Prosecution, that the recording vide Ext.P-37 was
in any way incorrect. The version of PWs 1 and 2 in Court is thus
completely inconsistent with the contemporaneous record, namely, extract
Ext.P-37. If they were aware that the appellant had killed his wife and
daughters even before they reached the police station, as they now claim
H in Court, the nature of their reporting would have been completely
DHAL SINGH DEWANGAN v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 55
[UDAY UMESH LAUT, J.]
different. The fact that their reporting did not disclose any essential A
features of the crime is accepted on record and their reporting was also
never treated as FIR in the matter. We find it extremely difficult to rely
on the testimony of PWs I and 2 and would presently eschew from our
consideration the statements of these two witnesses.
17. We are now left with PWs 3 and 5. Even according to PW- B
3 his source of knowledge about the crime was disclosure by Ganga
Ram Sahu and Chait Ram. He further said that after reaching Gandhi
Chowk he found PW-6 Kejabai was crying aloud that it was the appel !ant
who had ki lied his wife and five children. To si mii ar effect is the assertion
of PW-5. These two witnesses also claim that the villagers had sent
PWs I and 2 with Chait Ram to make a report to the police. But unlike C
PWs I and 2, these witnesses themselves had not gone to the police
station and therefore their version needs to be considered independently.
The question that arises is whether such assertions on part of PWs 3
and 5 come within Section 6 of the Evidence Act and could be relied
upon. D
18. Before we deal with the applicability of Section 6 of the
Evidence Act to the facts of the present case, we may quote the Section
6 and illustration (a) below said Section:-
"6. Relevancy of facts forming part of same
transaction. - Facts which, though not in issue, are so E
connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the same
transaction, are relevant whether they occurred at the same
time and place or at different times and places."
Illustration
F
"(a) A is accused of the murder of B by beating him.
Whatever was said or done by A or B or the by-standers at
the beating, or so shortly before or after it as to form part
of the transaction, is a relevant fact."
19. In Genie/a Vijayvardlum Rao mu/ mwtltr v. State ofA11dlim G
Pradesli 1, a bus was set on fire which resulted in the death of 23
passengers. Statements of two seriously injured fellow passengers were
recorded by the Magistrate as it was thought that they might succumb to
their injuries, in which event their statements could be pressed into service
1
<1996) 6 sec 241
H
56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 8 S.C.R.
A under Section 32 of the Evidence Act. Fo1tunately, they survived. But
while answering the question whether those statements could now be
relied upon under Section 6, this Court found that there was appreciable
interval between the criminal act and the recording of their statements
by the Magistrate and as such the statements could not be relied upon
with the aid of Section 6. It was observed:-
B
"15. The principle of law embodied in Section 6 of the
Evidence Act is usually known as the rule of res gestae
recognised in English law. The essence of the doctrine is
that a fact which, though not in issue, is so connected with
the fact in issue "as to form part of the same transaction"
c becomes relevant by itself. This rule is, roughly speaking,
an exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence is
not admissible. The rationale in making certain statement
or fact admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act is
on account of the spontaneity and immediacy of such
D statement or fact in reiation to the fact in issue. But it is
necessary that such fact or statement must be a part of the
same transaction. In other words, such statement must have
been made contemporaneous with the acts which constitute
the offence or at least immediately thereafter. But if there
was an interval, however slight it may be, which was
E sufficient enough for fabrication then the statement is not
part of res gestae. In R. v. Lillynwn 2 a statement made by
a raped woman after the ravishment was held to be not
part of the res gestae on account of some interval of time
lapsing between the act of rape and the making of the
F statement. Privy Council while considering the extent up to
which this rule ofres gestae can be allowed as an exemption
to the inhibition against hearsay evidence, has observed in
Teper v. R. ·1 thus:
''The rule that in a criminal trial hearsay evidence is
o admissible if it forms part of the res gestae is based on the
propositions that the human utterance is both a fact and a
means of communication and that human action may be so
interwoven with words that the significance of the action
2
( 1895-99) All. E.R. 586
H ' ( 1952) 2 All. E.R. 447
DHAL SINGH DEWANGAN v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 57
[UDAY UMESH LAUT, J.]
cannot be understood without the correlative words and A
the dissociation of the words from the action would impede
the discovery of the truth. It is essential that the words
sought to be proved by hearsay should be, if not absolutely
contemporaneous with the action or event, at least so clearly
associated with it that they are patt of the thing being done,
8
and so an item or part of the real evidence and not merely
a reported statement."
The correct legal position stated above needs no further
elucidation.
16. Here, there was some appreciable interval between c
the acts of incendiarism indulged in by the miscreants and
the Judicial Magistrate recording statements of the victims.
That interval, therefore; blocks the statements from
acquiring legitimacy under Section 6 of the Evidence Act.
The High Court was, therefore, in error in treating Exts. P-
71 and P-75 as forming patt of res gestae evidence." D
20. In Kri~'/um Kumar Malik v. State ofllaryww~, while testing
the veracity of the version of the prosecutrix that she was subjected to
rape, the fact that she had ample opportunity and occasion to disclose to
her mother and sister soon after the criminal act, in which case their
statements could have lent assurance, was taken into account. This E
Comt observed as under:-
"33. As per the FIR lodged by the prosecutrix, she first
met her mother Narayani and sister at the bus-stop at
Kurukshetra but they have also not been examined, even
though their evidence would have been vital as F
contemplated under Section 6 of the Evidence Act, 1872
(for short "the Act") as they would have been res gestae
witness.es. The pl!tpose of incorporating Section 6 in the
Act is to complete the missing links in the chain of evidence
of the solitary witness. There is no dispute that she had G
given full and vivid description of the sequence of events
leading to the commission of the alleged offences by the
appellant and others upon her. In that narrative, it is amply
clear that Bimla Devi and Ritu were stated to be at the
'(2011) 7 sec 130 H
58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 8 S.C.R.
A scene of alleged abduction. Even though Bimla Devi may
have later turned hostile, Ritu could still have been examined,
or at the very least, her statement recorded. Likewise, her
mother could have been similarly examined regarding the
chain of events after the prosecutrix had arrived back at
Kurukshetra. Thus, they would have been the best persons
B
to lend support to the prosecution story invoking Section 6
of the Act.
37. Section 6 of the Act has an exception to the general
rule whereunder hearsay evidence becomes admissible. But
as for bringing such hearsay evidence within the ambit of
c Section 6, what is required to be established is that it must
be almost contemporaneous with the acts and there cou Id
not be an interval which would allow fabrication. Jn other
words, the statements said to be admitted as forming part
of res gestae must have been made contemporaneously
D with the act or immediately thereafter. Admittedly, the
prosecutrix had met her mother Narayani and sister soon
after the occurrence, thus, they could have been the best
res gestae witnesses, still the prosecution did not think it
proper to get their statements recorded. This shows the
negligent and casual manner in which the prosecution had
E conducted the investigation, then the trial. This lacunae has
not been explained by the prosecution. The prosecution has
not tried to complete this missing link so as to prove it, beyond
any shadow of doubt, that it was the appellant who had
committed the said offences."
F 21. The general rule of evidence is that hearsay evidence is not
admissible. However, Section 6 of the Evidence Act embodies a principle,
usually known as the rule of res gestae in English Law, as an exception
to hearsay rule. The rationale behind this Section is the spontaneity and
immediacy of the statement in question which rules out any time for
Q concoction. For a statement to be admissible under Section 6, it must be
contemporaneous with the acts which constitute the offence or at least
immediately thereafter. The key expressions in the Section are " ... so
connected ... as to form part of the same transaction". The statements
must be almost contemporaneous as ruled in the case of Kris/um Kumar
Malik (Supra) and there must be no interval between the criminal act
H
DHAL SINGH DEWANGAN v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 59
[UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]
and the recording or making of the statement in question as found in A
Gentela Vijayvardlum Rao's case (Supra). In the latter case, it was
accepted that the words sought to be proved by hearsay, if not absolutely
contemporary with the action or event, at least should be so clearly
associated with it that they are part of such action or event. This
requirement is apparent from the first illustration below Section 6 which
B
states .... "whatever was said or done .... at the beating, or so shortly
before or after it as to form part of the transaction, is a relevant fact."
22. Considered in the aforesaid perspective, we do not find the
statements attributed to PW-6 Kejabai by PWs 3 and 5 to be satisfying
the essential requirements. The house of the appellant, according to the
record, was at a distance of I 00 yards from Gandhi Chowk, where c
these witnesses are stated to have found PW-6 Kejabai crying aloud.
Both in terms of distance and time, the elements of spontaneity and
continuity were lost. PW-6 Kejabai has disowned and denied having
made such disclosure. But even assuming that she did make such
disclosure, the spontaneity and continuity was lost and the statements D
cannot be said to have been made so shortly after the incident as to form
part of the transaction. In the circumstances, we reject the evidence
sought to be placed in that behalf through PWs 3 and 5. Even if we were
to accept the version of PWs I and 2, the same would also suffer on this
count and will have to be rejected.
E
23. We are therefore left with certain pieces of circumstantial
evidence and have to see if those circumstances bring home the case of
the prosecution. The principles how the circumstances be considered
and weighed are well settled and summed up in S/umtd Birdic/umtl
Sarda v. State of Malum1slttra-' as under:
F
"153. A close analysis of this decision would show
that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case
against an accused can be said to be fully established:
(I) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is
to be drawn should be fully established. G
It may be noted here that this Com1 indicated that the
circumstances concerned "must or should" and not "may
be" established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal
distinction between "may be proved" and "must be or should
'(1984) 4 sec 116 H
60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20 I 6] 8 S.C.R.
A be proved" as was held by this Court in Shiva.ii Sahabrao
Bobade and another v. State of Maharashtra• where
the observations were made:
"Ce11ainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must
be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict
B and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is
long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions."
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with
the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say,
they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except
C that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be ofa conclusive nature and
tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except
the one to be proved, and
D
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to
leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent
with the innocence of the accused and must show that in
all human probability the act must have been done by the
accused.
E
154. These five golden principles, if we may say so,
constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on
circumstantial evidence."
24. We now consider the circumstances which have weighed with
the Courts below:-
F
a] The appellant was the only male member residing with
his mother, wife and five daughters.
b] The house in question which opened in a gali was bolted
from inside on the fateful night.
G c] The appellant was found lying unconscious in a room
where there were five dead bodies with another dead body
in the adjoining room.
d] A knife, which could possibly have caused injuries to the
H " (1973) 2 sec 793
DHAL SINGH DEWANGAN v. STATE OF CHHATT1SGARH 61
[UDAY UMESH LAUT, J.]
deceased, was lying next to his left hand. A
e] His clothes - "lungi" to be precise, were found to be
having blood stains with blood of human origin.
f]He had offered no explanation how the incident had
occurred and as such a presumption could be drawn against
him under Section I 06 of the Evidence Act. B
In the face of these circumstances, according to the Courts below,
the only possible conclusion or hypothesis could be the guilt ofthe appellant
and nothing else. The absence of any explanation on part of the appellant
was taken as an additional link in the chain by the High Court.
c
25. In Slum1d Birdicluuul Santa's case (Supra), the absence of
explanation and/or false explanation or a false plea was considered in
the context of appreciation of a case based on circumstantial evidence.
It was observed:-
"150. The High Court has referred to some decisions of
D
this Court and tried to apply the ratio of those cases to the
present case which, as we shall show, are clearly
distinguishable. The High Court was greatly impressed by
the view taken by some courts, including this Court, that a
false defence or a false plea taken by an accused would be
an additional link in the various chain of circumstantial E
evidence and seems to suggest that since the appellant had
taken a false plea that would be conclusive, taken along
with other circumstances, to prove the case. We might,
however, mention at the outset that this is not what this
Court has said. We shall elaborate this aspect of the matter
F
a little later.
151. It is well settled that the prosecution must stand or
fall on its own legs and it cannot derive any strength from
the weakness of the defence. This is trite law and no decision
has taken a contrary view. What some cases have held is
G
only this: where various links in a chain are in themselves
complete, then a false plea or a false defence may be called
into aid only to lend assurance to the court. In other words,
before using the additional link it must be proved that all the
links in the chain are complete and do not suffer from any
H
62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 8 S.C.R.
A infirmity. It is not the law that where there is any infirmity
or lacuna in the prosecution case, the same could be cured
or supplied by a false defence or a plea which is not accepted
by a court.
161. This Court, therefore, has in no way departed from
B the five conditions laid down in Hanumant case 7 •
Unfortunately, however, the High Court also seems to have
misconstrued this decision and used the so-called false
defence put up by the appellant as one of the additional
circumstances connected with the chain. There is a vital
difference between an incomplete chain of circumstances
c and a circumstance which, after the chain is complete, is
added to it merely to reinforce the conclusion of the court.
Where the prosecution is unable to prove any of the essential
principles laid down in Hanumant case, the High Court
cannot supply the weakness or the lacuna by taking aid of
D or recourse to a false defence or a false plea. We are,
therefore, unable to accept the argument of the Additional
So Iic itor-General."
26. Even otherwise, the fact that the appellant was lying
unconscious at the scene of occurrence is accepted by all the prosecution
E witnesses including the Investigating Officer, who sent the appellant to
the Primary Health Centre for medical attention. Since he was sent by
the Investigating Officer himself, the prosecution ought to have placed
on record the material indicating what made him unconscious, what was
the probable period of such unconsciousness and whether the appellant
was falsely projecting it. However, nothing was placed on record. Neither
F any doctor who had examined him was called as witness, nor any case
papers of such examination were made available. In the absence of
such material, which the prosecution was obliged but failed to place on
record, his explanation cannot be termed as false. The explanation that
he knew nothing as he was unconscious cannot be called, 'absence of
G explanation' or 'false explanation'. So the last item in the list of
circumstances cannot be taken as a factor against the appellant.
27. Coming to the circumstance at SI. No.(e) as mentioned above,
the clothes of the accused were not seized immediately at the place of
occurrence. He was first sent to the Primary Health Centre for medical
7
H (1952) SCR 1091
DHAL SINGH DEWANGAN v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 63
[UDAY UMESH LAUT, J.]
attention and later in the day was brought back to the police station, A
where the seizure took place. The seizure memo Ext.P-16 does not
mention the word "lungi" but uses the expression "lstamali". Even if
"lstamali" is taken to be' lungi', the Arrest Memo Ext.P-62 mentions his
clothes to be "Full Pant and Shirt" and further mentions, "nothing found
on the person of the accused except clothes worn by him". According to
B
FSL report Ext.P-69 and serological report Ext.P-72 what was sent for
examination and analysis was a lungi which was found to be stained
with blood of human origin. It is not clear how lungi could be seized if
the appellant was in 'full pant and shirt" and there was nothing else on
his person. The constable who had taken the appellant to the Primary
Health Centre and who could have thrown better light on this aspect, c
was not examined. Apart from the fact that the clothes were not seized
immediately at the place of occurrence, ifthe appellant was found lying
in the room in an unconscious state with five dead bodies around, the
possibility that his clothes had otherwise got stained with blood which
was spotted everywhere including the verandah cannot be ruled out. In
D
our view, therefore, this circumstance is not conclusive in nature and
tendency which could be considered against the appellant.
28. The site map Ext.P-25 shows the house to be a single storey
structure with a verandah and court-yard open to sky. Though the door
of the house which opened in the gali was stated to have been bolted
from inside, the rooms were not locked and the possibility of a person/ E
persons other than the inmates of the house getting into the house cannot
be ruled out. Furthermore, the fact that the appellant was lying
unconscious and no material having been placed on record clearly
indicating that the appellant was falsely projecting to be unconscious,
the hypothesis that the appellant could be innocent is a possibility. The F
prosecution did not gatherthe finger prints either in the house or even on
the iron knife which was allegedly used for committing the offence in
question. If the finger prints on the knife were to be that of the appellant
alone, such factor could certainly have weighed against the appellant.
However, the absence of such conclusive material coupled with other
circumstances on record do suggest reasonable possibility of the G
hypothesis of innocence of the accused. The law regarding appreciation
of cases based on circumstantial evidence is clear that the chain of
evidence must be so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for
the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must
H
64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 8 S.C.R.
A exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved namely
the guilt of the accused. In our view, the circumstances at SI Nos. a, b,
c and d mentioned above do not form a complete chain of evidence as
not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with
the innocence of the appellant nor do the circumstances exclude every
possible hypothesis except the guilt of the accused.
B
29. In the circumstances, we hold that the prosecution, on the
basis of admissible evidence on record, has not proved its case against
the appellant. The appellant, therefore, deserves to be acquitted.
Concluding thus, we allow these appeals, set aside the judgments of
conviction and sentence recorded by the Courts below against the
c appellant and acquit him of all the charges leveled against him. The
appellant be set at liberty immediately unless his custody is required in
any other case.
PRAFULLA C. PANT, J. 1. I have the benefit of going through
the draft judgment of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit. With
D great regard, I beg to differ with his Lordship, on the point that the
prosecution has failed to prove the charge against the appellant.
2. The prosecution story, medical evidence on record, and
statements of witnesses of facts have already been narrated by his
Lordship Justice Lalit. Briefly stated, prosecution story is that on
E 19.02.2012 between 10.00 to 11.00 p.m. the appellant Dhal Singh
Dewangan has committed murder of his wife Thaneshwari and five
minor daughters, namely, Nisha, Laxmi, Sati, Nandini and Sandhya with
a knife. PW-6 Kejabai, mother of the appellant, came out of the house
at about 10.30 p.m. shouting that the accused is assaulting his wife and
F daughters. PW-I lshwar Pradhan, Sarpanch of the village, on receiving
information about it through PW-2 Santosh Kumar Mahar, went to the
spot, whereafter he along with Santosh Kumar Mahar and two others
went to the Police Station, Arjunda (Distt. Balod, Chhattisgarh). The
police, on their information, made Entry No. 671 in the General Diary
and PW-13 Krishna Murari Mishra, Station House Officer, rushed to
G the spot at about 1.30 a.m., i.e. in the wee hours of 20.02.2012. A
Dehati Nalishi (Ext. P-18) at the instance of PW-6 Kejabai was registered
at about 3.00 a.m. and the crime relating to offence punishable under
Section 302 of Indian Penal Code (IPC) was investigated. The dead
bodies were sealed and inquest report prepared by the police. The
H autopsy on three of six dead bodies, namely, that of Sati, Nisha and
DHAL SINGH DEWANGAN v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 65
[PRAFULLA C. PANT, J.]
Sandhya was conducted on 20.02.2012 by PW-7 Dr. Ajaypal Chandrakar. A
The post mortem examination ofrest of the three dead bodies, namely,
that of Thaneshwari, Laxmi and Nandini was done by PW-14 Dr.
Chandrabhan Prasad, on the very day (20.02.2012). Blood stained
knife, blood stained clothes and blood stained soil etc. were seized by
the police and witnesses interrogated. On completion of investigation
B
charge-sheet was filed against the appellant for trial in respect of offence
punishable under Section 302 IPC. The case was committed to the
court of Sessions for trial. After the charge was framed, total fourteen
Prosecution Witnesses were examined.
3. Out of the prosecution witnesses, PW-I lshwar Pradhan,
Sarpanch, PW-2 Santosh Kumar Mahar, PW-3 Neelkanth Sahu, PW-4 C
Anjor Singh and PW-5 Dan Singh Dewangan have given evidence as to
the fact that when they reached the square of the village, they saw that
PW-6 Kejabai was shouting and crying loudly about the incident, and
told that the appellant has killed his wife and daughters. The appellant
was in the house. D
4. Relevant portion of statement of PW- I Ishwar Pradhan,
Sarpanch of the village, is repr~duced below: -
" .... .!returned to my house at around 10.30 P.M. Santosh
Kumar Mahar (PW-2), the village Kotwar, came to my
house and told me that Dhal Singh had cut his wife and E
children in his house. On receiving this information I reached
Gandhi Chowk on my motor cycle. I met Santosh Kumar,
the Kotwar, Neelkanth Sahu, Dan Singh Dewangan, Kejabai
and Jhaggar ..... who all were sitting in the square. Kejabai
told there that Dhal Singh has cut his wife and children in F
his house. On hearing this I didn't believe, therefore, I
suggested that lets go to the spot and see. Then we went
to the house ofDhal Singh. Blood was lying near the door
of the room where Dhal Singh (was) slept. We locked the
door of the house. Dhal Singh was present in his house
............................ After locking the door, I, (with) G
Santosh Kumar, the Kotwar and Chaitram went to Police
Station Arjunda and gave information.
The police came to the village Mohandipat along with
us. The S.P..... also reached there. The police (interacted)
H
66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 8 S.C.R.
A with Kejabai there. Kejabai told that the accused Dhal
Singh has cut his wife and children with knife. The police
entered (in) the house and we kept standing outside the
house. We called ambulance No. l 08 there and took Dhal
Singh to the hospital in it because he was in half
( un )conscious condition ........ "
B
5. PW-2 Santosh Kumar Mahar has narrated the incident as
under: -
" ............ The incident occurred on 19.02.2012 at 11.00
PM. J ivan Dewangan, the neighbour of accused, came to
c my house and told that the accused has murdered his wife
Thaneshwari and daughters with iron knife used for cutting
chicken. Thereafter, I, (with) Neelkanth Sahu, (and) Ishwar
Pradhan, the Sarpanch went to the house of accused. We
went inside the room and saw that the accused was present
in the room of his wife. His wife was lying dead there.
D The four children were also lying dead there. Wife of the
accused was lying dead on the cot and four children were
lying on the ground. The accused was lying there in
unconscious condition. One iron knife was also lying by his
side, and one child was lying in the room of her grandmother.
E She (the granddaughter) was also dead and back of her
neck was cut. Hand, leg and neck of the wife and children
were cut. Blood was found on the room and verandah.
Then I went to Police Station, A1junda along with
Sarpanch and Vijay and gave information about the incident.
F .................... The police personnel enquired about the
incident from the neighbours and Kejabai, the mother of
the accused. Kejabai was behaving like mad, but she told
that the accused has cut and killed his wife and five children.
The police personnel sent the accused to the hospital in
ambulance No. 108 ............ .
G
...... The police seized one knife, bottle of liquor, blood
stained pillow, plain earth. blood smeared earth from the
place of incident in the night of the incident. ........... "
The witness has also proved the seizure memo (Ext. P-1 and P-
2). The witness has further proved the inquest report and other
1-1
DHAL SINGH DEWANGAN v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 67
[PRAFULLA C. PANT, J.]
documents. A
6. PW-3 Neelkanth Sahu, corroborating the above facts, states
that he came to know about the incident at about mid night through
Gangaram Sahu and Chaitram Yadav, who knocked his door. When he
opened the door, he was told that Dhal Singh has killed his wife and five
daughters. They further told him that Kejabai, mother of the accused, B
has told about the incident. He further told that when he reached Gandhi
Chowk, Kejabai was already present there and crying loudly. This witness
also corroborates that Kejabai told him that Dhal Singh has killed his five
children and wife.
7. PW-5 Dan Singh Dcwangan has also narrated the incident and c
stated that he got information about the incident at about mid night. He
further told that when he went to the house of Kejabai along with
Sarpanch, Kejabai was telling that the accused Dhal Singh had cut his
wife and five children with the knife. Corroborating the fact that the
incident was got reported through Sarpanch to the police, this witness
has also stated that the deceased Thaneshwari was lying dead on the D
cot and the four children were lying dead on the ground. The accused
was also there lying on one side. One girl was lying in the room in which
Kejabai used to sleep. One knife was also lying by the side of the
accused.
8. The above statements of the witnesses have been read in E
evidence by the trial court and the High Court with the aid of Section 6
of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. My Lord Justice Uday Umesh Lal it
has opined that these statements do not fulfill the requirement of
spontaneity and continuity, and as such, cannot be read with the aid of
Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act, particularly when Ji van Dewangan, F
Gangadhar and Jhaggar, who told them about what PW-6 Kejabai was
disclosing, were not examined.
9. However, in my opinion, in the facts and circumstances of the
case, non-examination of Jivan Dewangan, Gangaram and Jhaggar is
not sufficient for not relying on the statements of PW- I Ish war Pradhan, G
PW-2 Santosh Kumar Mahar, PW-3 Neelkanth Sahu and PW-5 Dan
Singh Dewangan with the aid of Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872. The courts below have rightly appreciated the entire chain of
circumstances that has been narrated by these witnesses, particularly
when they have told what PW-6 Kejabai herself told them at'the square,
H
68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 8 S.C.R.
A when they reached there. The testimony of PW- I Ishwar Pradhan,
PW-2 Santosh Kumar Mahar, PW-3 Neelkanth Sahu and PW-5 Dan
Singh Dewangan is admissible in evidence as being part of the res gestae.
Sections 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 deal with the
relevancy of facts not in issue but connected with the facts in issue.
The provisions contained therein provide as to when the facts though
B
not in issue are so related to each other as to form components of the
principal fact. The facts which are closely or inseparably connected
with the facts in issue may be said to be part of the same transaction.
I 0. It is also relevant to m1.ntion here that PW-4 Anjor Singh
Dewangan, father-in-law of the appellant, has stated that deceased
c Thaneshwari was his daughter. He further told that he had also gone to
Nagpur to attend the marriage in which the appellant and Thaneshwari
were present. The witness has further stated that his daughter complained
there about the behavior of the appellant. He further told that the accused
used to say that his family has become large with daughters only. PW-
D 4 Anjor Singh Dewangan further told thatthe quarrel took place between
the couple in Nagpur itself. He further told that after the marriage, the
appellant, Thaneshwari and their daughters came back to their house.
The above statement makes it clear that the appellant had the motive for
committing the murder of his wife and daughters. The only other inmate
in the house, i.e. PW-6 Kejabai had no motive to commit the crime, and
E
had she attempted, she could have been easily over-powered by the
appellant and the six deceased.
11 . As to the lapses in the investigation pointed out by learned
senior counsel for the appellant regarding the fact that clothes of the
accused were not seized immediately and seizure memo (Ext. P-16)
F does not mention the word "Lungi", I do not think it sufficient to doubt
the credibility of the prosecution story. In paragraph 41 of Stale o/W.B.
v. Mir Molwmmad Omar and olhers 1, this Court has observed as
under: -
" ..... Castigation of investigation unfortunately seems to be
G a regular practice when the trial courts acquit the accused
in criminal cases. In our perception it is almost impossible
to come across a single case wherein the investigation was
conducted completely flawless or absolutely foolproof. The
function of the criminal courts should not be wasted in
1
(2000J s sec 382
H
DHAL SINGH DEWANGAN v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 69
[PRAFULLA C. PANT, J.]
picking out the lapses in investigation and by expressing A
unsavoury criticism against investigating officers. If
offenders are acquitted only on account of flaws or defects
in investigation, the cause of criminal justice becomes the
victim. Effort should be made by cou11s to see that criminal
justice is salvaged despite such defects 111
B
investigation ........ "
12. Normally, it is not the duty of the accused to explain how the
crime has been committed. But in the matters of unnatural death inside
the house where the accused had his p1 ~sence, non-disclosure on his
part as to how the other members of his family died, is an important
reason to be Iieve as to what has been shown by the prosecution through
c
the evidence on record is true. It is nobody's case that any dacoity or
robbery had taken place in the fateful night of the incident. There are
six members ofthc family who have been killed brutally. Simple reply
by the accused in his statement under Section 313 Cr PC that he did not
know as to how the incident happened, particularly when he was in the D
house, does certainly make easier to believe the truthfulness of the
evidence that has been adduced by the prosecution in support of charge
against him. As far as statement of PW-6 Kejabai is concerned, she has
turned hostile. But the reason as to why she has turned hostile is not
difficult to be found out. She was going to lose the only son left with
E
her.
13. As to the fact that in the General Diary entry (Ext. P-3 7)
there is no mention ofcommission of murder of his wife and children by
the appellant, it is sufficient to say that the General Diary entries are
summary entries relating to movement of police, or relating to the fact
that some information regarding an offence has been given at the police F
station. The doubts created in the present case on the ground that what
more could have been mentioned in the General Diary, or that there are
minor variations in the statements of PW-I lshwar Pradhan, PW-2
Santosh Kumar Mahar, PW-3 Neelkanth Sahu and PW-5 Dan Singh
Dewangan, cannot be said to be reasonable doubt. And this Court cannot G
close its eyes to the ring of truth in the prosecution evidence. In Himaclwl
Pradesh Administration v. Sliri Om Prakasfi 1 , in paragraph 7, this
Court has observed as under: -
" ........... It is not beyond the ken of experienced able and
' <t 972) 1 sec 249 H
70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 8 S.C.R.
A astute lawyers to raise doubts and uncertainties in respect
of the prosecution evidence either during trial by cross-
examination or by the marshalling of that evidence in the
manner in which the emphasis is placed thereon. But what
has to be borne in mind is that the penumbra ofuncertainty
in the evidence before a comt is generally due to the nature
B
and quality of that evidence. It may be the witnesses as are
lying or where they are honest and truthful, they are not
ce1tain. It is therefore, difficult to expect a scientific or
mathematical exactitude while dealing with such evidence
or arriving at a true conclusion. Because of these difficulties
c corroboration is sought wherever possible and the maxim
that the accused should be given the benefit of doubt
becomes pivotal in the prosecution of offenders which in
other words means that the prosecution must prove its case
against an accused beyond reasonable doubt by a
sufficiency of credible evidence. The benefit of doubt to
D
which the accused is entitled is reasonable doubt - the
doubt which rational thinking men will reasonably, honestly
and conscientiously ente1tain and not the doubt ofa timid
mind which fights shy-though unwittingly it may be -
or is afraid of the logical consequences, ifthat benefit was
E not given. Or as one great Judge said it is "not the doubt of
a vacillating mind that has not the moral courage to decide
but shelters itself in a vain and idle scepticism". It does not
mean that the evidence must be so strong as to exclude
even a remote possibility that the accused could not have
committed the offence. If that were so the law would fail
F
to protect society as in no case can such a possibility be
excluded. It will give room for fanciful conjectures or
untenable doubts and will result in deflecting the course of
justice if not thwarting it altogether. It is for this reason the
phrase has been criticised. Lord Goddard, C.J., in Rox v.
G Kritz [1950 (l) KB 82 at 90], said that when in explaining
to the juries what the prosecution has to establish a Judge
begins to use the words "reasonable doubt" and to try to
explain what is a reasonable doubt and what is not, he is
much more likely to confuse the jury than ifhe tells them in
plain language. "It is the duty of the prosecution to satisfy
H
DHAL SINGH DEWANGAN v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 71
[PRAFULLA C. PANT, J.]
you of the prisoner's guilt". What in effect this approach A
amounts to is that the greatest possible care should be taken
by the Court in convicting an accused who is presumed to
be innocent till the contrary is clearly established which
burden is always in the accusatory system, on the
prosecution. The mere fact that there is only a remote
B
possibility in favour of the accused is itself sufficient to
establish the case beyond reasonable doubt.. ... "
14. In the light of the law laid down, as above, on careful scrutiny
of the evidence on record, in my opinion, there is no room for reasonable
doubt in the present case as to the truthfulness of the evidence adduced
against the appellant that he has committed murder of his wife and five
c
daughters on 19.02.2012 between I 0.00 and 11.00 p.m. in his house.
15. In the above circumstances, I concur with the view taken by
the trial court and the High Court that it is proved on record beyond
reasonable doubt that accused Dhal Singh Dewangan has committed
murder of his wife and five daughters. As such, the conviction deserves D
to be upheld.
16. Now, 1 come to the issue of sentence. Mr. Colin Gonsalves,
learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that the
High Court has erred in affirming the death sentence awarded by the
trial court. He fwiher contended that no adequate opportunity was given E
to the convict to present the mitigating circumstances. He further argued
that the burden of proof to show the impossibility of reformation of the
accused was on the State.
17. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State submitted
that it is one of the rarest of rare cases. It is further submitted that F
considering the brutality of the offence, the convict deserves no leniency
and the courts below have rightly awarded/confirmed the death sentence.
18. I have carefully considered the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in the present case in the light of law laid down by this
Court on the point. In B(IC/i(ln Singh v. St(l/e ofPu11j"b.1, in paragraph G
206, this Court has given examples of some of the mitigating
circumstances which include the probability of the accused not committing
criminal acts of violence as would constitute a continuing threat to society,
and the probability that the accused can be reformed and rehabilitated.
'<I980J 2 sec 684 H
7l SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 8 S.C.R.
A 19. ln the instant case, the State has failed to show that the appellant
is a continuing threat to the society or that he is beyond reformation and
rehabilitation. Both the courts below, in my opinion, appear to have been
influenced by the brutality and the manner in which the crime is
committed. But this Court cannot ignore the fact that there are no criminal
antecedents of the appellant. Also, it cannot be said that he is continuing
B
threat to the society or that he cannot be reformed or rehabilitated. It is
also pertinent to mention here that the accused is from socially and
economically disadvantaged strata of the society. Therefore, considering
all the facts, circumstances and the established principle oflaw laid down
by this Court, in the present case, sentence of imprisonment for life
c would meet the ends of justice.
20. Accordingly, the appeals are partly allowed. The conviction
of the appellant under Section 302 IPC stands affirmed. However, the
sentence of death is set aside, instead the appellant is sentenced to
imprisonment for life.
D
Dcvika Gujral Appeals allowed.
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