DEVINDERversusSTATE OF HARYANA

                             DEVINDER                                          A
                                 v.
                         STATE OF HARYANA

                          SEPTEMBER 13, 1996
                                                                               B
            [M.K. MUKHERJEE AND S.P. KURDUKAR, JJ.]


        Indian Penal Code, 1860-Section 302:

      Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 157-Circumstances for
benefit of doubt-Non-disclosure of the names of the accused at the earliest    C
opportunity-Delay in sending the special report to the Magistrate-Benefit of
doubt can be given to the accused-:4nns Act, 1959-Ss. 25, 27-TADA Act,
s. 6.

      At about 9.00 A.M. on 26th July, 1986 the appellant was alleged to       D
have given two blows to the victim with knife-one on the left side of the
chest and the other on the abdomen, in presence of two eye witnesses, who
carried the injured to the Hospital, where he was examined by the doctor,
who certified that at the time of admission the victim was fully conscious.
The medico-legal report contained the name of his father, address, occup-
tation and an account as to how the injuries were caused to him. The A.S.I.    E
recorded the statement of P.W. 10 in the Hospital at 2.40 P.M. and the
same was treated as FIR and a case under section 307 was registered. The
injured succumbed to his injuries the next day at about 11.30 A.M. and on
his death the case was converted to section 302 IPC and then only a special
report was sent to the Magistrate. Charges were framed against the             F
accused under section 302 IPC and unde1 section 25 and 27 of the Arms
Act 1959 read with Section 6 of TADA for unlawful possesion and user of
a spring activated knife. The Designated Court, relying upon the testimony
of the eye witnesses held the accused guilty of the charges and convicted
him, against which the present appeal was moved before this Court.
                                                                               G
        Allowing the appeal, this Court

      HELD : 1.1. Though apparently there is no reason to disbelieve the
two eye witnesses, yet there are certain underlying circumstances due to
which, benefit of reasonable doubt can be given to the appellant. [253·B; C]   H
                                     249
    250                       SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
                     •
A          1.2. According to the prosecution, after the infliction of the injuries,
    the victim was immediately taken to the hospital where he was examined
    and ·a medico-legal report was prepared which contained all material
    particulars like parentage, occupation, 'and an account as to how the
    injuries were received, except the name of the assailant. Obviously these
    material particulars had been furnished either by the victim himself or by
B   the eye witnesses present. In this view of the matter, it was expected that
    if the appellant was really the assailant, then his name would have been
    disclosed by all or any one of them. Legitimately it can be inferred that at
    the earliest available opportunity the name of the appellant was not
    disclosed. [253-C-E]
c
           1.3. No special report in respect of the registration of the case was
    sent· to the Magistrate on the day of occurrence and it was forwarded to
    the Magistrate only after the case was converted to one under section 302
    IPC consequent upon the death of the victim on July 27, 1986 and was
    received in Magistrate's office at 10 P.M. This glaring circumstance indi-
D   cates that the FIR did not see the light of the day till the death of the victim
    and the version of the prosecution that the FIR was recorded on July 26,
    1986 is not t111e. [253-G-H; 254-A]

         CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
    446of1987.
E
         From the Judgment and Order dated 26.7.86 of the Designated
    Court, Rohtak, Haty~a in Sessions Case No. 550 of 1986.
                          '
          Ms. Rajni Anand (AC.) for the Appellant.
F         Prem Malhotra for the Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          M.K. MUKHERJEE, J. The subject matter of challenge in this
    appeal is the judgment and order dated May 30, 1987 rendered by the
G   Designated Court, Rohtak, while disposing of Sessions Case No. 550 of
    1986 and Arms Act Case No. 551 of 1986. By the impugned judgment and
    order the Court convicted and sentenced the appellant Devinder @ Pappy
    under Section 302 IPC and Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 read
    with Section 6 of Terrorist and disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985
H   ('TADA' for short).
                     DEVINDER v. STATE [M.K. MUKHERJEE, J.)                    251
                                                                                      '
              2. Shorn of details the prosecution case is as under : (a) Ramphal A
       (the deceased) used to sell vegetables from his shop-cum- residence in the
       Janta Colony, Rohtak city. On July 26, 1986 at or about 9 AM. the
       appellant went to his shop and asked for some vegetables on credit.
       Ramphal told the appellant that as he had not paid his earlier dues he
       would not oblige him any more. Since such refusal of Ramphal was in the B
       presence of two others, namely, Jagdish (P.W. 10) and Satbir Singh (P.W.
     . 11), the appellant felt insulted and left in a huff.

             (b) About twenty minutes thereafter the appellant came back with a
      knife and remarked that he would teacfl him (Ramphal) a lesson for
      insulting him in the presence of others. Ramphal, who was then cooking,         C
      stood up and attempted to escape. He however could not succeed in his
      attempt as the appellant gave him two blt>ws with the knife - one of the left
      side of the chest and the other on the abdomen. Jagdish and Satbir Singh,
      who were there still then, and one U mesh, who reached there by chance,
      witnessed the assault.
                                                                                      D
            (<;:) Jagdish and Umesh then carried Ramphal in a rickshaw to the
      Medical College Hospital, Rohtak where he was examined by Dr. Sushil
      Kumar Jain (P.W. 5) first, After examination, Dr. Jain sent a medico legal
      report (Ex. PS) and a mkka (Ex. PD) to the Police Post attached to the
      hospital where an entry in terms thereof was made by Constable Mangal           E
      Singh (P.W. 1) in the daily diary book at 1.45 P.M. (Ex. PE).

             (d) In the me.~time, however, - at 11.30 AM. to be precise - the
      City Police Station, R,qhtak had received a telephonic message from the
      above Police Post abo~t the admission of Ramphal in the hospital with
·'    injuries on his person and, after recording that message in the daily dairy F
      book (Ex; PF), ASI Tota Ram (P.W. 12) had left for the hospital. Reaching
      there he found Jagdish present and recorded him statement (Ex. PZ) at
      2.40 P.M. which was treated as the FIR. After forwarding the statement to
      the Police Station for registering a case, Tota Ram took up investigation
      and went to the spot. He prepared a rough site plan and seized some G
      blood-stained earth therefrom in the presence of Jagdish and Satbir.

           (e) Ramphal, who was admitted as an indoor patient in the hospital,
      was operated upon by Dr. Pradeep Kumar (P.W. 7) for his injuries but he
      succumbed to them on the following day i.e. July 27, 1986 at 11.30 AM.
      On receipt of that information the case which was earlier registered against    H
    252                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A   the appellant under Section 307 l.P.C. was converted into one under
    Section 302 1.P.C. and a special Report (Ex. PH) was sent to the local
    Magistrate, ASI Tota Ram then went to the hospital and after holding
    inquest upon the dead body of Ramphal, sent it for autopsy which was
    performed by Dr. M.K. Bishnoi (P.W. 9).
B         (f) In course of the investigation the appellant was arrested on July
    29, 1986 and pursuant to a statement made by him to Tota Ram on July
    31, 1986 (Ex. PEE) a spring activated knife concealed under the bricks in 1
    a deserted kotha towards the southern boundary wall of Hanuman Park,
    Rohtak was recovered in the presence of Jagdish (P.W. 10) and Daya
c   Chand. After recovery of the knife a separate case was registered against
    the appellant under the Arms Act, 1959 read with Section 6 of TADA.

          (g) The blood-stained earth recovered from the spot, the shirt
    removed from the dead body of Ramphal and the knife recovered pursuant
    to the statement of the appellant were sent to the Forensic Science
D   Laboratory (F.S.L.), Madhuban for chemical examination and human
    blood was detected on all those articles on such examination. On comple-
    tion of the inves.tigation ASI Tota Ram submitted two separate charge-
    sheets against the appellant; one under Section 302 l.P.C. for the murder
    of Ramphal on July 26, 1986 and the other under Section 25 and 27 of the
E   Arms Act, 1959 read with Section 6 of TADA for un_lawful possession and
    user of a spring actuated knife.

          3. The two cases arising out of the above charge-sheets were clubbed
    and tried together and were disposed of by the impugned judgment in the
    manner indicated above.
F
          4. The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges levelled against
    him and his defence was that at the instance of Jagdish and Ramphal he
    was falsely implicated in the case as he had, three days prior to the alleged
    murder of Ramphal, a quarrel with Jagdish and Umesh over their mis-
G   behaviour in their locality under the influence of liquor.

          5. In support of their respective cases prosecution examined twelve
    witnesses and the defence one.

          6. To sustain the charge of murder levelled against the appellant the
H prosecution rested its case principally upon the ocular version of J agdish
               DEVINDER v. STAIB [M.K. MUKHERJEE,J.)                      253

(P.W. 10) and Satbir (P.W. 11). The Designated Court found them to be            A
the most probable and natural witnesses and as their evidence stood amply
corroborated by the evidence of the doctors, the recovery of the knife
pursuant to the statement of the appellant, and the report of the Forensic
Science Laboratory held the appellant guilty of both the charges levelled
against him.                                                                     B
       7. Having carefully gone through the entire materials on record, we
are unable to sustain the impugned judgment. Though apparently there is
not reason to disbelieve the two eye witnesses, there are certain underlying
circumstances which persuade us to give the benefit of reasonable doubt
to the appellant. According to the prosecution case - and as testified by        C
Jagdish - immediately after the assault Ramphal was taken to the hospital
by him (Jagdish) and Umesh (not examined), who were present at the time
of the assault. Dr. Jain testified that at the time of admission Ramphal was
fully conscious and his blood pressure and pulse were normal. From the
medico legal report (Ex. PS) that the doctor sent to the police after            D
examining Ramphal we find that apart from his name, the father's name of
Ramphal, his address, his occupation and an account as to how the injuries
were caused find place. Obviously all these particulars had been furnished
by Ramphal, and/or Jagdish and Umesh, who had accompanied him. In
that context it was expected, if really the appellant was the assailant, that
his name would be disclosed by all or any of them while furnishing the           E
cause of the injuries. It can, therefore, be legitimately inferred that at the
earliest available opportunity the name of the appellant was not disclosed.


       8. It was, however, contended by Mr. Malhotra appearing on behalf
of the respondent that since the F.I.R. was lodged by Jagdish with               F
promptitude and therein the name of the appellant as the assailant had
been mentioned, non-disclosure of his name earlier before the doctor, whq
was under no statutory obligation to record the name of the assailant, was
of no moment. If the F.I.R. was recorded at 2.40 P.M. (on July 26, 1986)
as indicated therein we might have persuaded ourselves to accept the
contention of Mr. Malhotra but we find, suprisingly enough, that no special      G
report in respect of the registration of the case was sent to the Magistrate
on that day; and, indeed, as the evidence on record unmistakably shows
that it was forwarded to the Magistrate only after the case was converted
to one under Section 302 IPC consequent upon the death of Raniphal on
July 27,_1986 and received in his office at 10 P.M. This glaring circumstance    H
    254                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A   prompts us to hold that the F.I.R. did not see the light of the day till the
    death of Ramphal and the version of the prosecut on that the F.I.R. was
    recorded on July 26, 1986 is not true.

          9. For the foregoing discussion the prosecution case as presented
    before the Court cannot be accepted. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set
B   aside the conviction and sentence recorded against the appellant and
    acquit him. The appellant, who is in jail, be released forthwith unless
    wanted in connection with some other case.

    H.K.                                                       Appeal allowed.