Holding

The Court held that acquisition for a public purpose does not by itself justify invoking Section 17(4) to exclude Section 5‑A; the State must demonstrate real urgency, which was absent in the present case.

Summary

The appellants owned land that the Uttar Pradesh government sought to acquire for the construction of a district jail. The State invoked Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to dispense with the hearing provision of Section 5‑A, claiming urgency. The High Court upheld the State's action, but the Supreme Court examined whether the alleged urgency was genuine. Relying on earlier decisions, the Court held that a public purpose such as a jail does not automatically justify bypassing Section 5‑A unless the acquisition cannot tolerate even a few weeks of delay. The Court found that the State had taken more than a decade to move on the proposal, showing lethargy rather than urgency, and therefore the invocation of Section 17(4) was unlawful. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment and restored the landowners' right to object and be heard. The appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

Whether the State could invoke the urgency provisions of Section 17(1) and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to dispense with the hearing requirement of Section 5‑A for land acquisition for a district jail.
Whether the delay of several years in processing the acquisition negates the claim of urgency under the Act.

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 17(1), s. 17(4), s. 4, s. 5-A, s. 6, s. 9

Subjects

Land acquisitionUrgency provisionSection 17Section 5-APublic purposeDistrict jailHearing rightsExpropriation legislationStatutory interpretation

Judgment

[2011] 9 S.C.R. 772

->-
A DEVENDRA SINGH & ORS.
v.
STATE OF U.P. & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 6293 of 2011)
AUGUST 3, 2011
B /.

[G.S. SINGHVI AND H.L. DATTU, JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894:

c s. 4 rlw s.17(4), s.6 rlw s.17(1), and s.5-A-Acquisition of
land for constructing the District Jail - Invoking of urgency
provisions u/s 17 and dispensing with the compliance of s.
5-A - HELD: Acquisition of land for construction of District Jail,
which is a public purpose, shall not, by itself justify the
exercise of power of eliminating enquiry uls 5-A in terms of
t
...
D ....
s. 17 (1) and s.17 (4) - The Court should take judicial notice
of the fact that certain public purposes such as development
of residential, commercial, industrial or institutional areas by
their intrinsic nature and character contemplate planning,
execution and implementation of the schemes which generally
E
take time of few years - Therefore, the land acquisition for
said public purposes does not justify invoking of urgency
provisions under the Act - In the instant case, the series of
events shows lethargy and lackadaisical attitude of State ,.
Government - The authorities are not justified in invoking the
F urgency provisions u/s 17 of the Act, thereby depriving the
land-owners of their valuable right u/s 5-A to raise objections
and to be given opportunity of hearing before the authorities
in order to persuade them that their property may not be
acquired - Impugned judgment of High Court set aside -
G Judicial notice.
,,,-
The appellants filed a writ petition before the High
Court challenging the notification u/s 4 read withs. 17 (4)
and the declaration u/s 6 read with s. 17 (1) of the Land
H 772
DEVENDRA SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & 773
ORS.

Acquisition Act, 1894 issued in respect of acquisition of A
their lands, and thereby dispensing with the opportunity
of hearing and inquiry u/s 5-A of the Act. The High Court
accepted the stand of the State authorities that the land
was acquired for construction of the District Jail which
was an urgent matter, and dismissed the writ petition. B
•
Allowing the appeal filed by the landowners, the
.court

HELD: 1.1 It is well settled that acquisition of land for
public purpose by itself shall not justify the exercise of C
power of eliminating inquiry u/s 5-A in terms of s. 17 (1)
and s.17 (4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Court
should take judicial notice of the fact that certain public
purposes such as development of residential,
commercial, industrial or institutional areas by their D
intrinsic nature and character contemplate planning,
execution and implementation of the schemes which
generally take time of few years. Therefore, the land
acquisition for said public purposes does not justify the
invoking of urgency provisions under the Act. [para 9] E
[784-A-C]

1.2 In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is
clear that the District of Jyotiba Phule Nagar was created
in the year 1997 which was, however, dissolved and
recreated in 2004. The District Magistrate, Jyotiba Phule F
Nagar, had sent a proposal to the Principal Secretary,
Home/Prisons, Government of U.P. for acquisition of land
for the construction of District Jail on 24.01.2003 which
is undoubtedly a public purpose. After the lapse of 5
years in the year 2008, the State Government asked the G
District Magistrate to trace availability of lands for
acquisition for construction of the District Jail in the
proximity to District Headquarters and further requested
the Selection Committee to recommend the land suitable
for the said purpose. Thereafter, the Selection Committee H
77 4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

A recommended the acquisition of the land in question as
suitable for the construction of the Jail but it took two
years for the State Government to issue the Notifications
u/ss. 4 and 6 respectively, thereby invoking the urgency
provisions u/s 17 of the Act. The series of events shows
B lethargy and lackadaisical attitude of the State
Government. In the circumstances, the respondents are
not justified in invoking the urgency provisions u/s 17 of
the Act, thereby depriving the appellants of their valuable
right u/s 5-A to raise objections and to be afforded
c opportunity of hearing before the authorities in order to
persuade them that their property may not be acquired.
The impugned Judgment of the High Court is set aside.
[paras 11 and 14-15] [786-E-H; 787-A-B; 788-C-D]

Dev Sharan & Others v. State of U.P. 2011 (3) SCR 728
D =(2011) 4 SCC 769; and Radhy Shyam v. State of U.P.
(2011) 5 sec 553 - relied on

Deepak Pahwa v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, 1985 (1)
SCR 588 =
(1984) 4 SCC 308; and Chameli Singh v. State
=
E of U.P., 1995 (6) Suppl. SCR 827 (1996) 2 sec 549 -
distinguished.
Case Law Reference:
2011 (3) SCR 728 relied on para 6
F "
c2011 > 5 sec 553 relied on para 6
1985 (1) SCR 588 distinguished para 7
1995 (6) Suppl. SCR 827 distinguished para 7
G CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
6293 of 2011. ~,.

From the Judgment and Order dated 08.10.2010 of the
'High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in CMWP No. 61903 of
H 2010.
DEVENDRA SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & 775
,., ORS.

Prashant Kumar (for AP & J Chambers) for the Appellants. A

K.K. Venugopal, Shail Kumar Dwivedi, AAG (State of
U.P.), G.V. Rao and Ankur Talwar for the Respondents.
-~

• The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
H.L. DATIU, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal, by special leave, is directed against the
Judgment and Order dated 08.10.2010 passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.
61903 of 2010 whereby, the writ petition filed by the appellants
.c
challenging the acquisition of their land for construction of
~ District Jail by invoking Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") was
,,J
dismissed.
D
3. The facts of the present appeal are as follows:-

The District Magistrate, Jyotiba Phule Nagar, had sent a
proposal to the Principal Secretary, Home/Prisons Section 4,
Government of U.P. for acquisition of land situated at Amroha- E
Naugawan Sadat Road for the construction of District Jail vide
\/, letter dated 24.01.2003. After the gap of 5 years, the Special
)' Secretary, Prisons Administration and Reforms, Government
of U.P., had requested the District Magistrate to find the
available lands for acquisition, for the said purpose, in the
F
proximity of theDistrict Head Quarters vide letter dated
16.01.2008. Subsequently, the District Magistrate traced and
informed the availability of such lands in village Dasipur and
other nearby villages for possible acquisition to the Special
.... Secretary vide letter dated 25.2.2008. Thereafter, the Special
""1'
Secretary directed the Selection Committee to inspect the G
available lands regarding the feasibility of their acquisition for
the construction of Jail vide letter dated 22.04.2008.
Accordingly, the Selection Committee, after conducting detailed
spot inspection of the available lands, found and recommended
H
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

"'
A that the lands at village Dulhar Sant Prasad were suitable for
construction of Jail on 05.05.2008. In this backdrop, the
respondent had issued a notification dated 05.03.2010 under
Section 4 read with Section 17(4) of the Act for acquisition of
20.870 hectares of land at village Dulhapur Sant Prasad, Tehsil •
B Amroha, Jyotiba Phule Nagar for public purpose of construction
of District Jail. The same was published in the local
newspapers on 26.03.2010. The relevant part of the notification
is extracted below:
"UTTAR PRADEHS SHASAN KARAGAR
c PRASHASAN EVEM SUDHAR ANUBHAG - 4
The Governor is pleased to order the publication of the
following English translation of Notification No. 443/22-4- 1
2010-101 (b) 2000 dated 05 March, 2010 for general
information: .....
D
NOTIFICATION
No. 443/22-4-2010-101 (b) 2000
Lucknow: Dated 05 March 2010
Under subsection (1) of section 4 of the Land Acquisition
E Act, 1894 (Act No. 1 of 1984 (sic.)), the Governor is
pleased to notify for general information that the land
mentioned in the schedule below is needed for the public
purpose namely, for construction of the District Jail in ~

District Jyotiba Phule Nagar.
F Being of opinion that provisions of subsection (1) of section
17 of the said Act are applicable to the said land in as
much as the said land is urgently required for construction
of the District Jail in District Jyotiba Phule Nagar and that
in view of the pressing urgency it is as well necessary to
G eliminate to delay likely to be caused by an enquiry under ...
section 5-A of the said Act the Governor is further pleased
to direct, under subsection (4) of section 17 of said Act,
that the provisions of section 5-A shall not apply."

H 4. Since the appellants' land was also included in the
DEVENDRA SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & 777
,.. ORS. [H.L. DATTU·, J.)

notification, they made representations dated 07.04.2010 and A
20.08.2010 to the Land Acquisition Officer, the District
Magistrate, Jyotiba Phule Nagar, the Chief Minister and the
Home Secretary, Government of U.P. with the request that their.
... land may not be acquired as they had raised construction of
• houses, tube wells and lands are under cultivation. They also B
suggested the availability of large tracts of alternative lands with
no construction and irrigation facility situated within one
Kilometer towards North. However, the concerned authorities
did not reply to these representations of the appellants.
Subsequently, the appellants, aggrieved by the said notification, c
filed Writ Petition No. 22252 of 2010 before the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad, which was dismissed vide its Order
~ dated 22.04.2010 without deciding any issue on merits on the
ground that the writ petition is premature as the declaration
,,, under. Section 6 has not been issued. The High Court further D
granted liberty to the appellants to raise all the available
grounds, including the applicability of Sections 17(1) and 17(4)
of the Act, in order to challenge the acquisition of their land once
the State Government proceeds to issue Notification under
Section 6(1) of the Act. Thereafter, the State Government
E
issued a Notification dated 06.08.2010 under Section 6 read
with Section 17(1) of the Act whereby, it directed the Collector
~
of Jyotiba Phule Nagar to take possession of the said land on
~
the expiry of 15 days from the date of publication of the Notice
under Section 9(1) even in the absence of any award being
made under Section 11. Eventually, the Public Notice dated F
03.09.2010 was issued, which expressed the intention of the
Government to take possession of the said land, in which it was
directed to the appellants to appear before the Special Land
.... Acquisition Officer, Jyotiba Phule Nagar. The appellants, being
"'~. aggrieved, filed a Writ Petition before the High Court of G
Judicature at Allahabad interalia questioning the correctness
of the Notification dated 5.3.2010 issued under Section 4 read
with Section 17(4) and Notification dated 6.8.2010 issued
under Section 6 read with Section 17(1) thereby dispensing with
the opportunity of hearing and enquiry under Section 5-A of the H
778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [2011) 9 S.C.R.

A Act. The High Court, vide its impugned Judgment and Order
dated 8.10.201 O, dismissed the Wirt Petition and allowed the
respondents to proceed further with acquisition of the said land
in terms of the Act on the ground that the construction of the
District Jail is an urgent matter which has been mentioned in
B the Notification under Section 4 as the very purpose of
acquisition of the land. Aggrieved by this Judgment and Order
of the High Court, the appellants are before us in this appeal.
''

5. The issue involved in the present appeal for our
C consideration is: Whether the respondent is justified in invoking
the urgency provision under Section 17(1) and excluding the
application of Section 5-A in terms of Section 17(4) of the Act
for acquisition of the land for construction of District Jait.

6. The learned counsel Shri. Prashant Kumar submits that
D the district of Jyotiba Phule Nagar came into existence on
24.04.1997. Since then, the State Government had not shown
any kind of urgency and was only considering the proposal of
acquiring the land for the public purpose of construction of the
District Jail. It was only in the year 2010 that the State
E Government had issued Notifications under Sections 4 and 6,
invoking urgency provision as contemplated by the Sections
17(1) and 17 (4). In other words, the lackadaisical attitude of
the State Government since the creation of the new district
•
nearly 13 years ago does not exhibit or depict any kind of
F urgency but only lethargy on their part in acquiring the land.
Therefore, the urgency contemplated in the Act cannot be
equated with dereliction of responsibility on the part of the
State Government. The learned counsel contends that the
respondents had unnecessarily invoked the urgency provisions
G under Section 17 (1) read with Section 17 (4) for acquisition
of the land for construction of the District Jail in view of the delay · ··
of 13 years in the issuance of the Notification under Section 4
of the Act and still, the said land is under the possession of the
appellants. The learned counsel argues that invoking of the
urgency provisions under Section 17(4), which excludes the
H application of Section 5-A, by the respondents in the absence
DEVENDRA SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & 779
ORS. [H.L. DATIU, J.]

of any real urgency as contemplated by Section 17, amounts A
to illegal deprivation of the right to file objection and hearing of
the appellants under Section 5-A of the Act. He submits, relying
on various decisions of this Court, that the expropriatory
legislation like Land Acquisition Act must be given strict
construction. He further submits that Section 5-A is a B
substantial right and akin to Fundamental Right which
embodies. a principle of giving of proper and reasonable
opportunity to the land owner to persuade the authorities
against the acquisition of hi!> land which can be dispensed with
only in exceptional cases of real urgency. The learned counsel c
relies on the decision of this Court in Dev Sharan & Others v.
State of U.P. (2011) 4 SCC 769 in support of his contention
that dispensing with the opportunity of hearing and enquiry
~nder Section 5-A of the Act in view of prolonged lethargy of
almost 13 years on the part of respondents by invoking D
emergency provisions under Section 17 is illegal and
unjustified. The learned counsel has further cited catena of
Judgments of this Court in support of his arguments which has ·
already been dealt with by this Court in Radhy Shyam v. State
of u.P. c2011) 5 sec 553.
E
7. Per Contra, the learned senior counsel Shri. K.K.
Venugopal submits that the newly created district of Jyotiba
Phule Nagar does not have a District Jail tolodge the prisoners
of the district who are presently accommodated in the
Moradabad District Jail, wherein the total population of inmates F
exceeds by more than three times the capacity of the Jail,
causing great hardships to inmates. Further, producing of the
prisoners from Moradabad Jail to various Courts in Jyotiba
Phule Nagar raises financial and security concerns. He submits
that since the creation of the new district, the State Government ... G.
has been making continuous efforts for acquisition of land to __
construct the District Jail. However, the process of construction
of Jail could not be carried forward due to subsequent
dissolution of the district vide Notification dated 13.04.2004,
which was challenged before the High Court and later, the High H ·
. -

780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS - - [2011] 9 S.C.R. -

A· Court quashed the said Notification of Dissolution. Pursuant to
this Order of the High Court, the district was recreated in 2004.
He further submits that the State Government had issued a
Notification dated 5.3.2010 under Section 4 read with Section
17 (4) of the Act for acquisition of the said land for public ..
B purpose of urgent construction of Jail in the newly created •
district by invoking Section 17(4) of the Act in order to eliminate
delay likely to be caused by enquiry under Section 5-A of the
~ct. Subsequently, in view of the said urgency, the State
Government had issued Notification dated 6.8.2010 under
c Section 6 read with Section 17(1) of the Act and published it
in the Newspaper along with a Public Notice ·under Section 9
of the Act dated 20.08.2010, all within a period of 5 months.
Further, the respondents, after hearing the objections and
. claims of the appellants dated 03.09.2010 regarding the
D compensation and measurement of the land under Section 9
of the Act, handed over the possession of the said land to the ·
Senior Superintendent of Jails, Mordabad, on 07.01.2011. The
learned senior counsel submits that there is no lethargy or ·
negligence on the part of the State Government to acquire the
said land. He further supports the observation of the High Court
E in the impugned Judgment that construction of Jail is an urgent
matter requiring acquisition of the land by invoking urgency
provisions under Section 17 (1) and Section 17(4) thereby
dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. He
further contends that the right of the citizens of filing of
F objections and opportunity of hearing under Section 5-A are
subject to the provisions of Section 17 of the Act and the same
can be legally curtailed in the event of any pressing need and
urgency for acquisition of land in order to eliminate delay likely --
to be caused by an enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. The
G learned senior counsel further submits that Dev Sharan's Case
(Supra) upon which, the appellant had placed strong reliance
is not relevant and applicable to the present case because in ·
that case, this Court invalidated the acquisition of land by
invoking urgency provisions for construction of a new Jail when
H
DEVENDRA SINGH & ORS. v. SlAll:: Of- U.tJ. & 781
ORS. [H.L. DATIU, J.]
old Jail was already existed in District Shahjahanpur but was A
located in a densely populated area which needs to be shifted.
Learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the decisions
of this Court in Deepak Pah.wa v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, (1984)
-~ 4 SCC 308 and Chameli Singh v. State of U.P., (1996) 2 SCC
~
549 in support of his arguments that even the delay and lethargy .8
on the part of the respondents will not disentitle them to invoke
urgency provisions under Sections 17 of the Act.

8. The issue before us is no more res integra as it has
already been decided by this Court in Radhy Shyam's Case
(Supra) in which one of us was the party (G.S. Singhvi, J.)
c
wherein this Court has considered the development of the
jurisprudence and law, with respect to invoking of the urgency
~
provisions under Section 17 visa- vis right of the landowner to
.) file objections and opportunity of hearing and enquiry under
Section 5-A of the Act, by referring to plethora of earlier D
decisions of this Court. This Court had culled out various
principles 1governing the acquisition of the land for public
purpose by invoking urgency thus:
"From the analysis of the relevant statutory provisions and E
interpretation thereof by this Court in different cases, the
~
following principles can be culled out:
J
(i} Eminent domain is a right inherent in every sovereign
to take and appropriate property belonging to citizens for
F
public use. To put it differently, the sovereign is entitled to
reassert its dominion over any portion of the soil of the
State including private property without its owner's consent
provided that such assertion is on account of public
-'"'1
exigency and for public good - Dwarkadas Shrinivas v.
Sholapur Spg. and Wvg. Co. Ltd. 46 , Charanjit Lal G
Chowdhury v. Union of lndia 47 and Ji/ubhai Nanbhai
Khachar v. State of Gujaraf.48.
(ii}The legislations which provide for compulsory
acquisition of private property by the State fall in the H
782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 9 S.C.R.

A category of expropriatory legislation and such legislation
must be construed strictly - DLF Qutab Enclave
Complex Educational Charitable Trust v. State of
Haryana 49 ; State of Maharashtrp v. B. E. Billimoria 50 and
Dev Sharan v. State of U.P. 242 ~

B •
{iii) Though, in exercise of the power of eminent domain,
the Government can acquire the private property for public
purpose, it must be remembered that compulsory taking
of one's property is a serious matter. If the property
belongs to economically disadvantaged segment of the
c society or people suffering from other handicaps, then the
court is not only entitled but is duty-bound to scrutinise the
action/decision of the State with greater vigilance, care
and circumspection keeping in view the fact that the
•·
landowner is likely to become landless and deprived of the
·D only source of his livelihood and/or shelter. '
(iv) The property of a citizen cannot be acquired by the
State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities without
complying with the mandate of Sections 4, 5-A and 6 of
E the Act. A public purpose, however, laudable it may be
does not entitle the State to invoke the urgency provisions
because the same have the effect of depriving the owner ~

of his right to property without being heard. Only in a case \
of real urgency, the State can invoke the urgency
F provisions and dispense with the requirement of hearing
the landowner or other interested persons.
(v) Section 17(1) read with Section 17(4) confers
extraordinary power upon the State to acquire private
,.. .
property without complying with the mandate of Section
G 5-A. These provisions can be invoked only when the •
purpose of acquisition cannot brook the delay of even a
few weeks or months. Therefore, before excluding the
application of Section 5-A, the authority concerned must
be fully satisfied that time of few weeks or months likely
H to be taken in conducting inquiry under Section 5-A will.
DEVENDRA SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF U.1-'. & 783
ORS. [H.L. DATTU, J.]
~.
in all probability, frustrate the public purpose for which A
land is proposed to be acquired.

(vi) The satisfaction of the Government on the issue of
urgency is subjective but is a condition precedent to the
__. exercise of power under Section 17(1) and the same can
B
l be challenged on the ground that the purpose for which the
private property is sought to be acquired is not a public
purpose at all or that the exercise of power is vitiated due
to mala fides or that the authorities concerned did not
apply their mind to the relevant factors and the records.
c
(vii) The exercise of power by the Government under
Section 17(1) does not necessarily result in exclusion of
Section 5-A of the Act in terms of which any person
"! interested in land can file objection and is entitled to be
) heard in support of his objection. The use of word "may" D
in subsection (4) of Section 17 makes it clear that it merely
enables the Government to direct that the provisions of
Section 5-A would not apply to the cases covered under
sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 17. In other words,
invoking of Section 17(4) is not a necessary concomitant E
of the exercise of power under Section 17(1).

(viii) The acquisition of land for residential, commercial,
. industrial or institutional purposes can be treated as an
j
acquisition for public purposes within the meaning of
Section 4 but that, by itself, does not justify the exercise F
of power by the Government under Sections 17(1) and/
or 17(4). The court can take judicial notice of the fact that
planning, execution and implementation of the schemes
relating to development of residential, commercial,
industrial or institutional areas usually take few years. G
"' ,... J. Therefore, the private property cannot be acquired for such
purpose by invoking the urgency provision contained in
Section 17(1). In any case, exclusion of the rule of audi
alteram partem embodied in Sections 5-A(1) and (2) is not
at all warranted in such matters." H
784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 9 S.C.R.

A 9. In view of the above it is well settled that acquisition of •
the land for public purpose by itself shall not justify the exercise
of power of eliminating enquiry under Section 5-A in terms of
Section 17 (1) and Section 17 (4) of the Act. The Court should
take judicial notice of the fact that certain public purpose such
B as development of residential, commercial, industrial or ~

•
institutional areas by their intrinsic nature and character
contemplates planning, execution and implementation of the
schemes which generally takes time of few years. Therefore,
the land acquisition for said public purpose does not justify the
invoking of urgency provisions under the Act. In Radhy Shyam
c (Supra), this Court, whilst considering the conduct or attitude
of the State Government vis-avis urgency for acquisition of the
land for the public purpose of planned industrial development
in District Gautam Budh Nagar, has observed: •
D "In this case, the Development Authority sent the proposal
sometime in 2006. The authorities up to the level of the
"
Commissioner completed the exercise of survey and
preparation of documents by the end of December 2006
but it took one year and almost three months for the State
E Government to issue notification under Section 4 read with
Sections 17(1) and 17(4). If this much time was
consumed between the receipt of proposal for the
;
acquisition of land and issue of notification, it is not
possible to accept the argument that four to five weeks \
F within which the objections could be filed under sub-
section (1) of Section 5-A and the time spent by the
Collector in making enquiry under sub-section (2) of
Section 5-A would have defeated the object of the
acquisition. n
G
10. Moreover, in Dev Sharan Case (Supra) the acquisition ,,..
of land for construction of new District Jail, since the old Jail ~

was overcrowded and causing hardships including health and
hygiene concerns to the inmates, by invoking urgency provision
under Section 17 was quashed on the ground that the
H government machinery had functioned at very slow pace in
DEVENDRA SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & 785
ORS. [H.L. DATIU, J.]
,.,
processing the acquisition which clearly evinces that there was A
no urgency to exclude the application of Section 5-A of the Act.
The Court further observed:

"35. From the various facts disclosed in the said affidavit
it appears that the matter was initiated by the B
1 Government's Letter dated 4-6-2008 for issuance of
Section 4(1) and Section 17 notifications. A meeting for
selection of a suitable site for construction was held on 27-
6-2008, and the proposal for such acquisition and
construction was sent to the Director, Land Acquisition on
2-7- 2008. This was in turn forwarded to the State
c
Government by the Director on 22-7-2008. After due
consideration of the forwarded proposal and documents,
_,, the State Government issued Section 4 notification, along
with Section 17 notification on 21-8-2008. These
) notifications were published in local newspapers on 24- D
9-2008.
36. Thereafter, over a period of 9 months, the State
Government deposited 10% of compensation payable to
the landowners, along with 10% of acquisition expenses E
and 70% of cost of acquisition was deposited, and the
proposal for issuance of Section 6 declaration was sent
,. to the Director, Land Acquisition on 19-6-2009. The
} Director in turn forwarded all these to the State Government
on 17-7-2009, and the State Government finally issued the F
Section 6 declaration on 10-8-2009. This declaration was
published in the local dailies on 17-8-2009.
37. Thus the time which elapsed between publication of
Section 4(1) and Section 17 notifications, and Section 6
... I'\_. declaration in the local newspapers is 11 months and 23 G
days i.e. almost one year. This slow pace at which the
government machinery had functioned in processing the
acquisition, clearly evinces that there was no urgency for
acquiring the land so as to warrant invoking Section 17(4)
of the Act. H
786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

~
A 38. In Para 15 of the writ petition, it has been clearly stated
that there was a time gap of more than 11 months between
Section 4 and Section 6 notifications, which demonstrates
that there was no urgency in the State action which could
deny the petitioners their right under Section 5-A. In the
B counter which was filed in this case by the State before ,.
the High Court, it was not disputed that the time gap
between Section 4 notification read with Section 17, and
Section 6 notification was about 11 months.

39. The construction of jail is certainly in public interest and
c for such construction land may be acquired. But such
acquisition can be made only by strictly following the
mandate of the said Act. In the facts of this case, such
acquisition cannot be made by invoking emergency •
provisions of Section 17. If so advised, the Government
D can initiate acquisition proceeding by following the .
provision of Section 5-A of the Act and in accordance with
law."

11. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it
E is clear that the District of Jyotiba Phule Nagar was created in
the year 1997 which was, however, dissolved and recreated
in 2004. The District Magistrate, Jyotiba Phule Nagar, had sent
a proposal to the Principal Secretary, Home/Prisons, ;
Government of U.P. for acquisition of land for the construction \

F of District Jail on 24.01.2003 which is undoubtedly a public
purpose. After the lapse of 5 years in the year 2008, the State
Government asked District Magistrate to trace availability of
lands for acquisition for construction of the District Jail in the
proximity to District Headquarters and further requested the
G
Selection Committee to recommend the land suitable for the
said purpose. Thereafter, the Selection Committee
recommended the acquisition of the said land as suitable for
the construction of the Jail but it took two years for the State
... r -
Government to issue the said Notifications under Section 4 and
Section 6 respectively, thereby invoking the urgency provisions
H
DEVENDRA SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & 787
ORS. [H.L. DATTU, J.]
1
~ under Section 17 of the Act. The series of events shows lethargy A
and lackadaisical attitude of the State Government. In the light
of the above circumstances, the respondents are not justified
in invoking the urgency provisions under Section 17 of the Act,
thereby depriving the appellants of their valuable right to raise
~
objections and opportunity of hearing before the authorities in B
) order to persuade them that their property may not be acquired.

12. The decision of this Court in Chameli Singh (Supra),
upon which Shri. K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel for
the respondents has placed reliance, has already been
considered and distinguished by this Court in Radhy Shyam c
Case (Supra) in the following terms:

"74. In State of U.P. v. Pista Devi, Rajasthan Housing
" Board v. Shri Kishan and Chameli Singh v. State of U. P.
)
the invoking of urgency provision contained in Section D
17(1) and exclusion of Section 5-A was approved by the
Court keeping in view the acute problem of housing, which
was perceived as a national problem and for the solution
of which national housing policy was framed and the
imperative of providing cheaper shelter to Dalits, tribals E
and other disadvantaged sections of the society."
13. Learned senior counsel for the respondents also relied
.. on the decision of this Court in Deepak Pahwa Case (Supra).
> In that case, the land was acquired by invoking urgency
provisions under Section 17 for the purpose of construction of F
a New Transmitting Station for the Delhi Airport after the
correspondence of nearly eight years among the various
Departments of the Government before the Notification and the
declaration was published in the Gazette. This Court has held
that mere pre-notification delay would not render the invocation G
'""1- of the urgency provisions void as very often, the delay increases
the urgency of the necessity for acquisition. We are afraid that
the decision will not come to the rescue of the respondents
because this Court has observed that delay only accelerates
or increases the urgency of need of acquisition, which H
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

A contemplates that delay does not create a ground or cause for • "
urgency but increases the already existing urgency for
acquisition of land for any public purpose. Therefore, the delay,
by itself, does not create urgency for acquisition but accelerates
urgency only in case it already exists in the nature of the public
B purpose.
"
14. For the reasons aforesaid, we hold that the State
Government was not justified, in the facts of this case, to invoke
the emergency provision of Section 17(4) of the Act. Therefore,
the appellants cannot be denied of their valuable right under
c Section 5-A of the Act.
15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned
Judgment and Order of the High Court dated 08.10.2010 is set
aside. No order as to costs. ~

D
R.P. Appeal allowed.
"