DEVENDRA KISHANLAL DAGALIAversusDWARKESH DIAMONDS PVT. LTD. AND ORS.

                        [2013] 17 S.C.R. 380


A               DEVENDRA KISHANLAL DAGALIA
                                  v.
          DWARKESH DIAMONDS PVT. LT[). AND ORS.
            (Criminal Appeal Nos. 1997-98 of 2013)
                       NOVEMBER 25, 2013
B
           [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA AND
                  V. GOPALA GOWDA, JJ.]

      Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss.201, 204 & 482
C - Power of the Magistrate to recall process of summons -
    Held: Once decision is taken and summons is issued, in
    absence of power of review including inherent power to do so,
    remedy fies before the High Court uls.482 CrPC or under Art.
    227 of the Constitution and not before the Magistrate - Once
D   the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence forms his
    opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding and
    issues summons u/s.204 CrPC, there is no question of going
    back following the procedure u/s.201 CrPC - In absence of
    any power of review or recall of the order of issuance of
E   summons, the Magistrate cannot recall the summon in
    exercise of power u/s.201 CrPC - Constitution of India, 1950
    - Art.227.

          Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - s. 138 - Offence
    under - Jurisdiction of the Magistrate to issue summons -
F   Held: Offence uls. 138 can be completed only with the
    concatenation of all the five components, namely, (1) drawing
    of the cheque; (2) presentation of the cheque to the bank; (3)
    returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank; (4) giving
    notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding
G   payment of the cheque amount; and (5) failure of the drawer
    to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice -
    It is not necessary that all the above five acts should have
    perpetrated at the same locality - In the case in hand, the

H                               380
DEVENDRA KISHANLAL DAGALIA v. DWARKESH DIAMONDS 381
                    PVT. LTD.

business dealing was held at Mumbai; the products were         A\
supplied from Mumbai to New Delhi, cheques were handed
over at Mumbai and the cheque.s were dishonoured by the
bankers of respondents at New Delhi, and legal notice was
issued from Mumbai - At least one act out of the five
ingredients of s. 138 having committed at Mumbai, the          B
complaint preferred by appellant before the Magistrate at
Mumbai was maintainable.

     The questions which arose for consideration in the
present appeal were 1) whether the Magistrate after
having found sufficient ground for proceeding in case
                                                               c
and issued summons under Section 204 Cr.P.C. has the
jurisdiction to recall or review the order by exercising its
power under Section 201 Cr.P.C.; and 2) whether the
petition filed by appellant under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was maintainable at           D
Mumbai on the ground that goods were supplied from
Mumbai to Delhi and cheques were handed over at
Mumbai and legal notice was issued from Mumbai.

    Allowing the appeals, the Court                            D

    HELD:1.1. The Magistrate is required to issue
summons for attendance of the accused only on
examination of the complaint and on satisfaction that
there is sufficient ground for taking cognizance of the
offence and that it is competent to take such cognizance       E
of offence. Once the decision is taken and summon is
issued, in the absence of a power of review including
inherent power to do so, remedy lies before the High
Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C or under Article 227 of
the ConstitUtion of India and not before the Magistrate.       F
[Para 14] [387-D-E]

   1.2. Section 201 Cr.P.C. can be applied immediately
on receipt of a complaint, if the Magistrate is not
competent to take cognizance of the offence. Once the          G
    382        SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 17 S.C.R.

A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence forms his
  opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding and
  issues summons under Section 204 Cr.P.C., there is no
  question of going back following the procedure under
  Section 201 Cr.P.C. In absence of any power_ of review
B or recall the order of issuance of summons, the
  Magistrate cannot recall the summon in exercise of power
  under Section 201 Cr.P.C. [Para 16] [388-8-D]

       Ada/at Prasad vs. Roop/al Jindal and others (2004) 7
    sec 338 - relied on.
c
       2.1. The offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable
  Instruments Act, 1881 can be completed only with the
  concatenation of all the five components, namely, (1)
  drawing of the cheque; (2) presentation of the cheque to
D the bank; (3) returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee
  bank; (4) giving notice in writing to the drawer of the
  cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount; and
  (5) failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days
  of the receipt of the notice. It is not necessary that all the
E above five acts should have perpetrated at the same
  locality; it is possible that each of those five acts were
  done at five different localities, but a concatenation of all
  the above five is a sine qua non for the completion of the
  offence under Section 138 of the Act. [Para 17] [388-F-H;
F 389-A-B]
      2.2. In the case in hand it is admitted that the
  business dealing was held at Mumbai; the products were
  supplied from Mumbai to New Delhi, ch"eques were
  handed over at Mumbai and the cheques were
G dishonoured by the bankers of respondents at New Delhi,
  and legal notice was issued from Mumbai. Thus, at least
  one act out of the five ingredients of Section 138 of the
  Act having committed at Mumbai, the complaint preferred
  by the appellant-complainant before the Magistrate at
H Mumbai was maintainable. [Para 18] [394-E, F]
DEVENDRA KISHANLAL DAGALIA v. DWARKESH DIAMONDS 383
                    PVT. LTD.

   Mis. Escorts Limited v. Rama Mukherjee, 2013 (f4,)          A
SCALE 487 - relied on.

    K. Bhaskaran vs. Shankaran Vaidhyam Ba/an & Anr.
(1999) 7 SCC 510: 1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 271 - referred to.

                    Case Law Reference:                        B

  (2004) 1 sec 338             relied on      ·Para 15
  2013 (11) SCALE 487           relied on      Para 17
  1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 271       referred to    Para 17         c
    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No.1997-98 of 2013.

     From the Judgment and Order 06.12.2012 of the High
Court of Bombay in Criminal Writ Petition Nos, 3992 and 3993   D
of 2011.

    K.R. Iyengar, Sushi! Karanjkar, Ratnakar Singh, Sandeep
Singh, K.N. Rai for the Appellant.

   Uday B. Dube, Sanjay Kharde, Asha Gopalan Nair, Mohit       E
Monga, H.K. Monga, Parmanand Gaur for the Respondents.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. 1. Leave                   F
granted. These appeals have been preferred by the appellant-
complainant against the judgment and order dated 6th
December, 2012 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay in Criminal Writ Petition Nos.3992 and 3993 of 2011.
By the impugned judgment the High Court set aside the order    G
passed by Sessions Judge in CRA No.301 of 201 O and upheld
the order passed by the Special Metropolitan Magistrate.

   2. The appellant filed complaints being CC No.3142/SS/
2008 and CC No.3286/SS/2008 under Section 138 of
                                                               H
        384         SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 17 S.C.R.

    A   Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the N.I.
        Act') in the Court of the Special Metropolitan Magistrate at
        Small Causes Court on 28th July, 2008 and 18th August, 2008.
        Learned Metropolitan Magistrate after recording of the pre-
        summoning evidence issued summons on the accused under
    B   Section 204 Cr.P.C. The accused-respondents 1, 2 & 3 then
        filed application under Section 201 Cr.P.C. for return of
        complaint for want of jurisdiction. They alleged that the entire
        transaction took place at New Delhi and only the legal notice
        was issued from Mumb_ai and hence the learned Magistrate has
    c   no jurisdiction to try and entertain the complaint. A similar
        application was filed by the accused in CC No.3286/SS/2008.
        Thereafter, the learned Magistrate by order dated 5th January,
        201 O allowed the application under Section 201 Cr.P.C. and
        returned the complaint for want of jurisdiction. A similar order
        was passed by the learned Magistrate in CC No.3286/SS/
    0
        2008.

             3. Being aggrieved, the appellant-complainant filed
        Criminal Revision Applications Nos.301 & 302 of 2010 before
        the Sessions Court, Greater Bombay. Learned Sessions Judge
    E   by the judgment and order dated 2nd November, 2011 allowed
        the criminal revision applications and set aside the orders of
        learned Magistrate and the matter was remitted back to the
        Magistrate. However, at the instance of Respondent Nos.1, 2
        & 3 the order passed by the Sessions Judge was set aside
    F   by the High Court by the order impugned.
1


             4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
        submitted that the Magistrate after finding sufficient ground for
        proceeding and after issuance of summons under Section 204
    G   Cr.P.C., has no jurisdiction to recall or review the order by
        exercising power under Section 201 Cr.P.C. It is further
        contended that the High Court failed to consider the aforesaid
        fact and has no answer to the issue as was raised and decided
        by the learned Magistrate. Further, according to the learned
        counsel for the appellant, in the matter under Section 138 of
    H
DEVENDRA KISHANLAL DAGALIA v. DWARKESH DIAMONDS 385
   PVT. LTD. [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

the N.l.Act the appellant having been iss4ed legal notice from A
Mumbai, the Magistrate has jurisdiction to try and entertain the·
oomp~i~.                                                          •·
     5. Per contra, according to the learned counsel for the
respondents, the High Court of Bombay has taken due course
                                                                     81
and settled all the questions raised in the complaint filed by the
appellant. The complaint filed by the appellant is silent with
regard to place where (a) the order was given by the
respondent; (b) goods were supplied; (c) the payment was
agreed to be made: (d) the cheques in question were issuEjd:         C
(e) the cheques in question were dishonoured and (f) t~e
parties to the petition intended to make and receive the same.
It is accepted that the notice in question was issued from
Mumbai. It is contended that issuance of notice would not by
itself give rise to a cause of action for filing the complaint at
Mumbai.                                                              D

     6. Further, according to the respondents the appellant has
concealed the relevant facts purposefully, particularly the fact
that the entire transaction had taken place at D~lhi and,
therefore, the Magistrate has returned the complaint under           E
Section 201 Cr.P.C.

    7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and
perused the record.

     8. The main questions involved in the present case are :        F

      (i)    Whether the Magistrate after having found
             sufficient ground for proceeding in case and
             issued summons under Section 204 Cr.P.C. has
             the.jurisdiction to recall or review the order by       G
             exercising its power under Section 201 Cr.P.C.;
             and

      (ii)   Whether thepetition under Section 138 of the N.I.
             Act was maintainable at Mumbai on the ground
                                                                     µ
    386         SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 17 S.C.R.


A               that goods were supplied from Mumbai to Delhi
                and cheques were handed over at Mumbai and
                legal notice was issued from Mumbai.

         9. To decide the issue, it is necessary to notice the relevant
    provisions of the Cr.P.C. as discussed hereunder:
8
         Chapter XV of Cr.P.C. relates to complaints to the
    Magistrates whereas Chapter XVI relates to commencement
    of proceedings before the Magistrates.

c         10. Section 200 of Cr.P.C. relates to examination of
    complaint. A Magsitrate taking cognizance of an offence on
    complaint is required to examine the complaint and both the
    complainant and witness present, if any. On such examination
    of the complaint and the witness, if the Magistrate is of the
0   opinion that there is no ground for proceeding, he has to
    dismiss the complaint under Section 203 Cr.P.C.

        11. Section 201 Cr.P.C. lays down the procedure to be
  followed by the Magistrate not competent to take cognizance
  of the offence. If the complaint is made to a Magistrate who is
E not competent to take cognizance of the complaint he shall
  return the written complaint for its presentation before a proper
  court and if the complaint is not in writing, direct the complainant
  to move before the proper court.

F      12. Section 202 contemplates "postponement of issue of
  process" on receipt of a complaint in the circumstances
  mentioned therein. If the Magistrate is of the opinion that there
  is no sufficient ground for proceeding, under Section 203
  Cr.P.C. he can dismiss the complaint by briefly recording his
G reasons.

         13. The commencement of proceedings before the
    Magistrate under Chapter XVI starts with issue of process
    under Section 204 Cr.P.C. If in the opinion of a Magistrate
    taking cognizance of the offence there is sufficient ground for
H
DEVENDRA KISHANLAL DAGALIA v. DWARKESH DIAMONDS 387
   PVT. LTD. [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]                           .t
proceeding, and the case appears to be a summons-case, he A
shall issue his summons for the attendance of the accused, but
if it is a warrant-case, he may issue a warrant, or, if he thinks
fit, a summons, for causing the accused to be brought or to
appear at a certain time before such Magistrate or (if he has.
no jurisdiction himself) some other Magistrate having B
jurisdiction. No summons or warrant shall be issued against the
accused under sub-section (1) until a list of the prosecution
witnesses has been filed. In a proceeding instituted upon a
 complaint made in writing, every summons or warrant issued
 under sub-section (1) shall be accompanied by a copy of such        c
 complaint.

     14. The aforesaid provisions make it clear that the
Magistrate is required to issue summons for attendance of the
accused only on examination of the complaint and on
satisfaction that there is sufficient ground for taking cognizance   D
of the offence and that it is competent to take such cognizance
of offence. Once the decision is taken and summon is issued,
in the absence of a power of review including inherent power
to do so, remedy lies before the High Court under Section 482
Cr. P.C or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and not    E
before the Magistrate.

     15. Issue with regard to the power of Magistrate to recall
process of summons fell for consideration before a three-Judge
Bench of this Court in Ada/at Prasad vs. Roop/al Jindal and
                                                                     F
others, (2004) 7 SCC 338. Therein the following observation
was made by this Court:

     "15. It is true that if a Magistrate takes cognizance of an
     offence, issues process without there being any allegation
     against the accused or any material implicating the             G
     accused or in contravention of provisions of Sections 200
     and 202, the order of the Magistrate may be vitiated, but
     then the relief an aggrieved accused can obtain at that
     stage is not by invoking Section 203 of the Code because
     the Criminal Procedure Code does not contemplate a              H
    388           SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 17 S.C.R.

A         review of an orde~. Hence in the absence of any review
          power or inherent power with the subordinate criminal
          courts, the remedy lies in invoking Section 482 of the
          Code."

        16. Section 201 Cr.P.C., as noticed earlier, can be applied
8
  immediately on receipt of a complaint, if the Magistrate is not
  competent to take cognizance of the offence. Once the
  Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence forms his opinion
  that ther~. is sufficient ground for proceeding and issues
  summons under Section 204 Cr.P.C., there is no question of
C going back following the procedure under Section 201 Cr.P.C.
  In absence of any power of review or recall the order of issuance
  of summons, the Magistrate cannot recall the summon in
  exerc\se of power under Section 201 Cr.P.C. The first question
  is thus answered in negative and in favour of the appellant.
D
        17. The question concerning the jurisdiction of Magistrate
  to issu~ summons fell for consideration before this Court in Ml
  s. Escorts Limited vs. Rama Mukherjee (Criminal Appeal
  No.1457 of 2013), 2013 (11) Scale 487. In the said case the
E Court noticed the earlier decision in K. Bhaskaran vs.
  Shankaran Vaidhyam Ba/an & Anr., (1999) 7 SCC 510. In the
  light of the language used in Section 138 of the Act, the Court
  found five components in Section 138 of the Act, namely,

          ( 1)    drawing of the cheque;
F
           '2)    presentation of the cheque to the bank;

          (3)     returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank;

           (4)     giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque
G                · demanding payment of the cheque amount; and

           (5)    failure of the drawer to make payment within 15
                  days of the receipt of the notice."

H
DEVENDRA KISHANLAL DAGALIA v. DWARKESH DIAMONDS 389
   PVT. LTD. [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

      After saying so, this Court held that offence under Section      A
138 of the Act can be completed only with the concatenation
of all the above components and for that it is not necessary that
all the above five acts should have perpetrated at the same
locality; it is possible that each of those five acts were done at
five different localities, but a concatenation of all the above five   B
is a sine qua non for the completion of the offence under
Section 138 of the Act. Having noticed the aforesaid provisions,
this court in Escorts Ltd. held as follow:

       "5. It is apparent, that the conclusion drawn by the High       C
       Court, in the impugned order dated 27.4.2012, is not in
      consonance with the decision rendered by this Court in
      Nishant Aggarwal vs. Kai/ash Kumar Sharma, {2013(7)
       Scale 753] . Therein it has been concluded, that the
       Court within the jurisdiction whereof, the dishonoured
       cheque was presented for encashment, would have the             D
      jurisdiction to entertain the complaint filed under Section
       138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
  :
      6. In addition to the judgment rendered by this Court in
      Nishant Aggarwal's case, another bench of this Court has         E
      also arrived at the conclusion drawn in Nishant
      Aggarwal's case, on the pointed issu_e under
      consideration. In this behalf, reference may be made to
      the decision rendered in FIL Industries Limited vs. lmtiyaz
      Ahmed Bhat, Criminal Appeal No. 1168 of 2013 (arising            F
      out of SLP (Cr!.) No.8096 of 2012), decided on 12.8.2013.
      This Court in the above matter held as under

             "3. The facts very briefly are that the respondent
             delivered a cheque dated 23rd December, 2010
             for an amount of '29,69, 7461-(Rupees Twenty Nine         G
             lakhs sixty nine thousand seven hundred forty six
             only) on Jammu and Kashmir Bank Limited,
             Branch Imam Saheb, Shopian, to the appellant
             towards some business dealings and the
             appellant deposited the same in UCO Bank,                 H
    390   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 17 S.C.R.


A          Sopore. When the cheque amount was not
           encashed and collected in the account of the
           appellant in UCO Bank Sopore, the appellant filed
           a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable
           Instruments Act, 1881 before the Chief Judicial
B          Magistrate, Sopore. The respondent sought
           dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the
           Chief Judicial Magistrate had no territorial
          jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. By order
          dated 29th November, 2011, the learned Chief
c         Judicial Magistrate, Sopore, however, held that he
          had the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.
          Aggrieved, the appellant filed Criminal
          Miscellaneous Petition No. 431 of 2011 under
           Section 561 A of the Jammu and Kashmir
          Criminal Procedure Code and by the impugned
D
          order dated 2nd June, 2012, the High Court
          quashed the complaint saying that the Court at .
          Sopore had no jurisdiction to receive and entertain ·
          the complaint.
E          4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties
          and we find that in K.Bhaskaran v. Sankaran
           Vidyabalan and Another, (1999) 7 SCC 510, this
           Court had the occasion to consider as to which
           Court would have the jurisdiction to entertain the
F         complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable
           Instruments Act and in paras 14, 15 and 16 of the
          judgment in the aforesaid case held as under:-

          "14. The offence under Section 138 of the Act can
          be completed only with the concatenation of a
G
          number of acts. Following are the acts which are
          components of the said offence: (1) Drawing of the
          cheque, (2) Presentation of the cheque to the
          bank, (3) Returning the cheque unpaid by the
          drawee bank, (4) Giving notice in writing to the
H
DEVENDRA KISHANLAL DAGALIA v. DWARKESH DIAMONDS 391
   PVT. LTD. [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

         drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the            A
         cheque amount, (5) failure of the drawer to make
         payment within 15 days of the receipt of the
         notice.

         15. It is not necessary that all the above five acts
         should have been perpetrated at the same locality.
         It is possible that each of those five acts could be
         done at 5 different localities. But concatenation of
         all the above five is a sine qua non for the
         completion of the offence under Section 138 of the       C
         Act. In this context a reference to Section 178(d)
         of the Code is useful. It is extracted below:

         'Where the offence consists of several acts done
         in different local areas, it may be inquired into or
         tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of         D
         such local areas. "

         16. Thus it is clear, if the five different acts were
         done in five different localities any one of the
         courts exercising jurisdiction in one of the five
                                                                  E.
         local areas can become the place of trial for the
         offence under Section 138 of the Act. In other
         words, the complainant can choose any one of
         those courts having jurisdiction over any one of
         the local areas within the territorial limits of which
         any one of those five acts was done. As the              F
         amplitude stands so widened and so expansive it
         is an idle exercise to raise jurisdictional question
         regarding the offence under Section 138 of the
         Act."
                                                                  G
          5. It will be clear from the aforesaid paragraphs of
          the judgment in K. Bhaskaran's case (Supra) that
          five different acts compose the offence under
          Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and
          if any one of theSJtjqve different acts was done in     H ,
    392   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 17 S.C.R.


A          a particular locality the Court having territorial
          jurisdiction on that locality can become the place
          of trial for the offence under Section 138 of the
          Negotiable Instruments Act and, therefore, the
          complainant can choose- any one of those courts
B         having jurisdiction over any one of the local area
          within the territorial limits of which any one of the
          five acts was done. In the facts of the present case,
          it is not disputed that the cheque was presented
          to the "UCO Bank at Sopore in which the appellant
c         had an account and, therefore the Court at Sopore
          had territorial jurisdiction to entertain and try the
          complaint.

           6. Learned counsel for the respondent, however,
          relied on the decision of this Court in Harman
D          Electronics Private Limited and Another v.
          National Panasonic India Private Limite,d, (2009)
           1 SCC 720, to submit that the Court at Shopian
           would have the territorial jurisdiction. We have
          perused the aforesaid decision of this Court in
E         Harman Electronics Private Limited (Supra) and
          we find on a reading of paragraphs 11 and 12 of
          the judgment in the aforesaid case that in that
          case the issue was as to whether sending of a
          notice from Delhi itself would give rise to a cause
F         of action for taking cognizance of a case under
          Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
          when the parties had been carrying on business
          at Chandigarh, the Head Office of the respondent-
          complainant was at Delhi but it had a branch at
G         Chandigarh and all the transactions were carried
          out only from Chandigarh. On these facts, this
          Court held that Delhi from where the notice under
          Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was
          issued by the respondent would not have had
          jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under
H
DEVENDRA KISHANLAL DAGALIA v. DWARKESH DIAMONDS 393
   PVT. LTD. [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

         Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.' A
         This question does not arise in the facts of the
         present case.
         7. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow the appeal,
         set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court
                                                            8
         and remand the matter to the Chief Judicial
         Magistrate, Sopore for decision in accordance with
         law."

                                         (emphasis is ours).
                                                               c
         7. In view of the above, having taken into
         consideration the factual position noticed by the
          High Court in paragraph 13 of the impugned
         judgment, we are of the view, that the High Court
          erred in concluding that the courts at Delhi, did not 0
          have the jurisdiction to try the petition filed by the
          appellant under Section 138 of the Negotiable
          Instruments Act. The impugned order dated
          27.4.2012 passed by the High Court is accordingly
          liable to be set aside. The same is, therefore,
          hereby set aside.                                      E
          8.    Despite the conclusion drawn by us
          hereinabove, it would be relevant to mention, that
          our instant determination is based on the factual
          position expressed by the High Court in paragraph F
          13 of the impugned order. During the course of
          hearing, whilst it was the case of the learned
          counsel for the appellant (based on certain
          documents available on the file of the present
          case) to reiterate that the cheque in question, G
          which was the subject matter of the appellant's
          claim under Section 138 of the Negotiable
          Instruments Act, was presented for encashment at
          Delhi; it was the contention of the learned counsel
          for the respondent, that the aforesaid che9ue was H
    394         SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013) 17 S.C.R.


A               presented for encashment at Faridabad. It was
                accordingly submitted, that the jurisdictional issue
                needed to be decided by accepting, that the
                dishonoured cheque was presented at Faridabad.
                It is not possible for us to entertain and adjudicate
B               upon a disputed question of fact. We have
                rendered the instant decision, on the factual
                                        '
                position taken into consideration by the High
                Court. In qase, the respondent herein is so
                advised, it would be open to him to raise an
c               objection on the issue of jurisdiction, based on a
                factual position now asserted before us. The
                determination rendered by us must be deemed to
                be on the factual position taken into consideration
                by the High Court (in paragraph 13, extracted
                above), while disposing of the issue of jurisdiction.
D
                In case the respondent raises such a plea, the
                same shall be entertained and disposed of in
                accordance with law."

         18. In the case in hand it is admitted that the business
E   dealing was held at Mumbai; the products were supplied from
    Mumbai to New Delhi, cheques were handed over at Mumbai
    and the cheques were dishounoured by the bankers of
    respondents at New Delhi, and legal notice was issued from
    Mumbai. Thus, at least one act out of the five ingredients of
F   Section 138 of the Act having committed at Mumbai, the
    complaint preferred by the complainant before the Magistrate
    at Mumbai was maintainable. The second question is thereby,
    answered in affirmative and in favour of the appellant.

         19. In view of the reasons recorded above, we have no
G   other option but to interfere with the impugned order passed
    by the High Court. We accordingly, set aside t_he order dated
    6th December, 2012 passed by the High Court, affirm the order
    passed by the Sessions Judge and allow the appeals.

H   Bibhuti Bhushan Bose                              Appeals allowed.