Holding

The appeal is not maintainable because the High Court acted in an administrative capacity, not as a tribunal, and therefore Article 136 does not apply.

Summary

The appellants, ministerial officers of district courts in Ferozepur and Zira, were dismissed after taking part in slogans against a judicial magistrate and the district judge. They appealed the dismissal under Rule X of Chapter 18‑A of the Punjab & Haryana High Court Rules, which provides a supervisory administrative appeal to the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal. The appellants then filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court acted as a tribunal and that its decision was therefore appealable under Article 136 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court, in hearing the appeal, exercised judicial power or merely exercised administrative control under Article 235. It held that the High Court was acting in an administrative capacity, not as a judicial tribunal, and consequently the appeal was not maintainable under Article 136. The Court dismissed the appeal and directed the matter to be dealt with by the High Court under its ordinary jurisdiction (Article 226).

Issues considered

Whether the High Court, while disposing of an appeal under Rule X of Chapter 18‑A, acted as a judicial tribunal or exercised administrative control under Article 235.
Whether a decision of the High Court in such a proceeding is appealable to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. 136, s. 227, s. 235, s. 311
Government Employees (Conduct) Rules, 1966s. Rule 7(1)
Punjab Courts Act, 1918s. 35
Punjab & Haryana High Court Rules, Chapter 18‑As. Rule IX, s. Rule X

Subjects

service appealministerial staff dismissaladministrative vs judicial functionArticle 136High Court supervisory controlPunjab Courts ActSpecial Leave Petition

Judgment

DEV SINGH & ORS. A
v.
-.f REGISTRAR, PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT & ORS.
APRil: 15, 1987

[R.S. PATIIAK C.J. AND V. KHALID, J.] B
•
· · Rules and Orders of the Punjab High Court Vol. I, Chapter 18-A,
Rules IX and X: Dismissal of ministerial staff of subordinate courts by
District Judge-Service appeal disposed of by High Court-Whether
judicial decision.

Constitution of India, Articles 136 and 235: Removal from service
c
of ministerial staff by District Judge-Service appeal dismissed by High
_J,fourt-Decision whether judicial or administrative-Whether assail-
able in petition for special leave. ·

Sub-section (2) of Section 35 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 con- D
fers power of appointment of ministerial officers of all courts controlled
by a District Court and their suspension and removal on the District
Court. Sub-section (3) makes every appointment subject to such rules
as the High Court may prescribe in this behalf, while sub-section (4)
; -f111akes orders passed by the District Judge subject to the control of the
High Court. . E
• Chapter 18-A of the High Court Rules and Orders framed under
Section 35(3) conttols the appointments, promotion and punishment of
J>_.ministerial officials in the District and other civil courts, other than the
High Court. Sub-rule 2(a) of Rule IX in that Chapter enables the Dis-
trict Judge to inflict any of the penalties mentioned in sub-rule (1): F
.,.)censure, fine, recovery of any pecuniary loss, withholding of increments
or promotions, suspension, removal and dismissal of the ministerial
officers of his own court or any court subordinate to him other than the
Court of Small Causes. Sub-rule (2) of Rule X provides Ior appeals to
the High Court against penalties. Sub-rule (3) requires the persons
appea.ling to the High Court to do so by a petition to the District Judge, G
who shall forward the same to the Registrar of the High Court with
--.( remarks that !ie may wish to make. After reading the petition the High
Court may either (a) summarily reject it without hearing the petitioner;
(b) refer it to the District Judge for report and on receipt of such report
reject the petition without hearing; or (c) hear the petitioner, and where
other persons are held to be concerned such other person in open court. H
1005
1006 SUPREME COURT REPORTS t19s1J 2 s.c.R.
A Sub-rule (4) forbids the petitioners to attend personally at the High
Court unless summoned and provides for communication to them of
orders on their petitions through the District Judge.

The appellants, who were the employees in the ministerial estab-
. lishment of the courts at Ferozepur and Zlra, were alleged to have
B taken a prominent part in raising objectionable slogans against the ·
Judicial Magistrate and the District Judge, in a d@monstrati11n orga·
nised by the subordinate court officials, to protest against the slapping
of a subordinate by the Judicial Magistrate, Zira. They were charge·
sheeted for their misconduct. After enquiry it was found that they
contravened Rule 7(1) of the Government Employees (Conduct) Rules,
1966 by acting prejudicially to the public order, decency and morality
· C and were dismissed from service by the. District judge in his capacity as
the punishing authority.

The appellants preferred a service appeal before the High Court
which was dismissed.
D
While granting the special leave on 2nd April, 1982 this Court
made the following order:

"Appeal will be heard ....... on the preliminary issue as to
whether the High Court in disposal of appeal was acting in
E administrative capacity under Art. 235 or as a Tribunal or as a
High Court and the circumstances in which the appeal was main·
tained, if so."

It was contended on behalf of the appellants that the decision of
--t
the High Court in this case was the judicial decision of a tribunal which
J' could be examined by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. ~
~ismissing the appeal, the Court,

HELD: 1.1 The appeal is not maintainable. Ev•ry decision or
order by an authority which has a duty to act judicially is not subject to
G appeal to this Court. Article 136 contemplates appeals only from adjudica·
·lions, of courts and tribunals. Such adjudication must doubtless be judicial. 'r"
If the 'power exercised was administrative in nature it would exclude such a
tribunal from the ambit of Article 136. [1029C; 1028H; 10200]

1.2 Every authority which is required to act j~qicially either
H by its constitution or by virtue of the authority conferred upon it is
DEV SINGH v. PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT 1007

nQt necessarily a tribunal for the purposes of Article 136. A tribunal, A
wbose adjudication is subject to appeal must besides being under a
duty to act judicially, be a body invested with the judicial power of the
State. [1029A] •

1.3 There is a clear distinction between courts of law exercising
judicial powers and other bodies. Decisions by courts are clearly judi· B
cial. That is not the case with bodies exercising administrative or execu·
tlve powers. In certain matters even judges have to act administratively
and in so doing may have to act quasi-judicially in dealing with matters
entrusted to them. It is only where the authorities are req1d1'fd to act
judicially either by express provisions of the statute or by necessary
implicatj11n that the decision of such an authority would amount to a C
quasi-judicial proceeding. When Judge§ ill e11'.ercise of their administra·
· . tive functions decide cases \I rP!l!lllt be said that their decisions are
A either judicial 11r qq!'ll!~l!liirial decisions. The test that has to be applied
to find ou\ w,1,tei~ef ~n order Is a judicial order or not is the existence of
a Ii~ b~hy,eelJ the partjes. [1028F; 1025C] ,.
D
In the instant case, the High Court while disposing of the appeal
was not acting as a tribunal. It was 11ding purely administratively. It
was not resolving any dispyle or controversy between two adversaries
but only exer~jsing Its power of control over the subordinate judiciary
wbich is the same. as control under Article 235 -of the Constitution of
I~dia. tio~!IE1 1021c; 10298; 1013Cl E

Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh & Ors., [1955]
1 SCR 267; Bachhittar Singh v. The State of Punjab, [1962] Suppl. 3
SCR 713; Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma & Anr,
[1965] 2 SCR 366; Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar Jhun·
jhunwala, [1962] 2 SCR 339; Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Lakshmi- F
chand and others, [1963] Suppl. 1 SCR 242; Engineering Mazdoor
Sabha v. Hind Cycles Limited, Bombay, [1963] Suppl. 1 SCR 625;
Inda-China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Jasjit Singh, Additional Col-
lector of Customs & Ors., [1964] 6 SCR 594 and APHLC v. M.A.
Sangma, [1978] 1SCR393, referred to.
G
2 .1 In deciding the appeal' under Rule X in Chapter 18·A the
. High Court exercises only a supervisory administrative control over the
subordinate courts and does not act as a tribunal disposing of an appeal
involving a lis between two rival parties and arriving at a judicial
decision. [1019D]
H
1008 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1987] 2 S.C.R,

A 2.2 The appeal under Rule X(3) has to be by a petition, to be
routed through the District Judge who sends it to the Registrar of the ~~-
High Court. These are procedural formalities which normally govern ·
appeals preferred before the Hlgli Court on the adm'inistrative side.
The permission given to the authority who imposes penalty to record hi!> , ..,
own remarks which he wishes to make concerning his own order i~
B further proof of the fact that what the High Court has to consider is not
a matter on the judicial side but one in its power of control and -·•
superintendence over the subordinate courts. [1018A] )..... '

2.3 The procedure contained in Rule X(3) of hearing the petition -~ _
is not similar to the procedure followed in regular judicial proceedings. i~
It is not obligatory for the High Court to hear the petitioner. It can go
c into the papers and reject It summarily without giving the petitioner an
opportunity to be beard. Alternatively, it cy"ld get a report from the .
DistrictJudge and on receipt of such a report disiiiiSI! jt wi~llP"~ hearingA
the petitioner. Thirdly, it could give a hearing to the petiti!IRl'f '!ii~ ?WI
thpse who will be affected. This manner of disposal of the petition make&
D it apparent that it is not strictly a judicial proceeding but has all the
trappings of an administrative proceeding and an administrative
decision. U018E·H]

E
2.4 Sub-rule (4) of Rule. X again marks a complete departure
from the normal judicial proceedi11g before a court. The petitioners are
forbidden to attend personally at the High Court. They can dq sq.pnly
when summoned. In a judicial proceeding, the party has a rlgbl IQ
appear personally or through counsel. This denial also robs the appeal
+- -
of its character of a judicial proceeding. [1019C]
---{,
2.5 The/ fact that Rule X is found in Chapter 18-A, which deals . .
·
F with control, also gives the administrative shade to the proceeding un· ;i....,..
der this Rule. Section 35(4) of the Punjab Courts Act, 19J8, which '
stipulates that any order passed by the District Judge under this section
shall be subject to the control of the High Court, further fortifies tho
view that the proceedings under Rule X(3) and th_e decisions made .
thereunder are not judicial in nature. [1019E]
G
It cannot, therefore, be said that in ihe instant case the High Court
while deciding the appeal acted as a tribunal whose order can be challen-
ged before this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. [1019F]

{The Registrar to transfer the records of the case to the High
H Court. The latter to take the petition on its file as a petition under
DEV SINGH v. PUNJAB &HARYANAHIGHCOURT[KHALID,J.) 1009

Article 226 and dispose of the m@lter expeditiously.) [1029Dl A
CIVII, APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1278
of 1\182.
Fnim tjie Judgment and Order dated 3-0.9.1981 of the Punjab
and Haryana High Court in Service Appeals of the Appellants. B

V.M. Tarkunde, Mrs. Urmila Kapur and Ms. Janki Srinivasan
for the Appellants. '

Kapil Sibal and Rathin Dass for the Respondents.

Tlw Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c
KHALID, J. 1. The appellants were the employees in the· minis-
terial establishment of the Courts at Ferozepore 'and Zira having
entered into service varying from the year 1952 to 1965. They are
members of the Punjab Civil Courts Clerks Association. On 24th July, D
1980, there was an inci\lent in the Court of Shri N .S. Mundra, Judicial
Magistrate, ~st Class, Zira. On that day, one Jagdish Lal, a Senior
Ah\mad of the Court was slapped. He is one of the appellants in this
appe.al. On the day he was slapped, he presented a representation to
the District and Sessions Judge Shri Nehra. An enquiry was directed to
be held by the Senior Sub-Judge, Ferozepore into the incident. In this E
enquiry, it was found that Shri Mundra, Judicial Magistrate, Zira slap-
ped J agdish Lal. This incident caused resentment in the Association
and the Association, therefore, felt that something should be done to
d11monstrate this resentment. Accordingly, it was decided by the
Association that a request should be made to the District and Sessions
Judge, Ferozepore, to transfer Jagdish Lal from the Court at Zira to F
any other Court so that calm could be restored. The appellants among
others met the District and Sessions Judge for this purpose on 28-7-
1980. It is. alleged that the Sessions Judge did not accede to the request
of the representatives of the Association to plead their case before
him. This aggravated the situation. Though the association and their
representatives including the appellants were keen to resolve the mat- G
ter, the District and Sessions Judge adopted a hardened attitude. The
matter came to the notice of the High Court. An enquiry by Justice
S.P. Goyal of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana was directed to
be held and it was scheduled for 9th August, 1980. He was to reach the
Canal Rest House at 4.00 P.M., but he could reach only ~t 7.30 J;>,.M.
At that time, the District and Sessions Judge, along with other Judicial H
1010 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 2 $.C.R.

A officers were present to receive him. A demonstration was organised
by the subordinate Court officials. There was continued slogan shout- -~
ing from 4.00 P.M. till 7.30 P.M. before Justice Goyal's arrival. The
appellants are said to have taken a prominent part in raising objection-
able slogans. The slogans are:

B "N.S. Mundra Murdabad; N.S. Mundra Hai Hai; Dakia
Mahajan Superintendent Murdabad; B.S. Nehra Murda-
<
bad; B.S. Nehra naun Challa .Karo; Kata! Nehra Murda- ~·

. bad: B.S. Nehra Murdabad;"

The appellants were charg~,s!Jeeted for this conduct of theirs.
c 2. Justice Goyal alighted from bi~ .c~r and went inside the visit-
ing room of the rest house. He called the rnpr~si;ntatives of the Associ-
ation. Some of them met him. They came out aft11r Oie m@~ing. There l
were other demonstrators waiting for the result of the tnlk,s, Afi!lr they
came back, those who raised slogans disbursed. On 11th August, 198.0,
D the District Judge sent a letter to Shri G.S. Khurana, Chief Judicial
Magistrate, F~ro;z,epore, to hold preliminary e.nquiry into the demonst-
ration by the Court official_s in front of the Can.al Rest House and the
slogans raised there. Mr. J{hurana recorded the statement& of some
officers on the same day and submitted his report on that very d~y
itself. According to his report, the appellants had taken a prominent
E part in raising objectionable slogans in question. On tile basis of this
report, the District Judge placed the appellants under susp.ension by
his order dated 14-8-1980. On 12th August, 1980, the Di~trict Jw!g~
had intimated the High Court about the finding in the preliminary
report and had sought guidance of the High Court. The appellants
were supplied with the articles of the charges and statement• of impu-
F talion etc. They gave their replies. While admitting that they had
taken part in the demonstration on the day in question they denied
that they had taken a prominent part in the demonstration as leaders
in raising objectionable and defamatory slogans· against their superior
officers. A formal enquiry was ordered against these appellants. After
a detailed enquiry it was found that the appellants had contravened
G inter alia Rule 7(1) of the Government Employees (Conduct) Rules,
1966, and had thus acted prejudicially to the public order, decency and
morality and thereby contravened Rule 7(1) of the Government Emp-
loyees (Conduct) Rules, 1966. The District Judge, Ferozepore in his
capacity as the punishing authority then served a show cause notice on
all the appellants as to why the penalty of dimissal from service be not
H imposed on them. The appellants submitted their explanation. After
DEV SINGH v. PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT (KHALID, J.l 1011

considering the replies, the District Judge, by his order dated A
17.11.1980, imposed on them punishment of dismissal from service.
-~-
3. The appellants preferred a service appeal in the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. The High Court considered the
various contentions raised by the appellants in detail and dismissed the
appeal as having no merit. One of the employees who had also filed B
appeal before the High Court withdrew his appeal and is now reported
to be practising law.

This appeal has, therefore, come up before us by specjal leave
under Article 136, against the order of the Single Judge in the above
mentioned service appeal.
c
We have given only the bare facts in this judgment for the reason
that this Court issued notice on the SLP for consideration of a prelimi-
nary point only which will be evident by the orders passed on
3.12.1981, 4...J.-1982 and 2-4-1982.
D
"Order of the Court on 3-12-1981:
Issue show cause notice on SLP returnable on 4-1-1982, on
the question as to whether the High Court in disposing of
the appeal of the petitioners was acting in administrative
capacity or as a Tribunal or as High Court. There will be
interim injunction restraining the respondents from evict- E
ing petitioner No. 2 from Government accommodation
held by him on the condition that the said petitioner con-
tinue~ to P,ay re~i pr oompensation at hitherto charged,
pending notke."

"Order of the Court on 4.1.1982: F
Spe9ial le;we petjtion to be heard on the question whether
the High Court in disposing of the ~ppeal pf the petitioners
was 11ctiµg in an administrative capacity qnder Article 235
or iis I\ Tribunal or as the High Court. 'fhe special leave
petition tp be he~rd on 9.2.1982 on this question. Stay to
contiqµe !ill then." G

"Orderofthr Courton2.4.1982:
Special leave granted. Printing of records and filing of
statement of case dispensed with. Security dispensed with.
Appeal will be heard on present papers on the preliminary
issue as to whether the High Court in disposal of appeal H
1012 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 2 S.C.R.

A was acting in administrative capacity under Article 235 or
as Tribunal or as a l{igh Court and the circumstances in
which the appeal was maintained, if so. Hearing o: appeal
wiUbe.fixed on second Tuesday in July 1982 pre-emptorily
subject to ovemight's part heard." •

B From the above o. 1ers it is clear that the question that is to be decided
in this appeal is whether an appeal under Article 136 lies to this Court
from the order under challenge. That being so, it is necessary to con-
sider the nature of the appeal before the High Ccrurt and the rules
governing that appeal, before discussing the questions of law raised by
the appeirantY counsel with reference to various authorities of this
C Court, to contend that article 136 was attracted.

4. The appointment of the ministerial officers of the District
Courts and Courts of Small Causes and their suspension and removal
are provided under Section 35 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918. That
Section reads ·as follows: ·
D
( "35{1) The ministerial officers of the District Courts and
Courts of Small Causes shall be appointed and.may be
suspended or removed by the Judges of those Courts res-
pectively.

E (2) The ministerial officers of all Courts controlled by a
District Court, other than Courts of Small Causes, shall be
appointed, and may be suspended or removed by the Dis-
trict Court.

(3) Every appointment under this section shall be subject
to such rules ai; the High Court may prescribe in this
behalf, and in dealing with any matter under this Section,
· a Judge of a Court of Small Causes shall act subject to the
control of the District Court.

(4) Any order passed by a District Judge under this sec;
G tion shall be subject to the control of the High Court."

. '5. The High Court framed rules under this section for the subor-
---dinate services attached to or controlled by District Courts. Tiiese rules
apply to subordinate services attached to Civil Courts other than the
High Court, namely to ministerial and menial establishment of District
H and Sessions Judge, Sub-Judge and Courts of Small Causes. Chapter
DEVSINGJI v. PUNJAB&HARYANAHIGHCOURTIKHALID,J.I 1013

18-A of the rules is the one relevant for our purpose. A close study of A
the scheme and the various provisions of Chapter 18-A would make it
·~ abundantly clear that the appointments, promotions, punishments etc .
•;
of the ministerial officials_of the Courts subordinate to the High Court,
were fully within the powers of the District and Sessions Judge subject
to the control of the High Court. Chapter 18-A is captioned 'control'.
Though there were changes effected by notifications issued by the B
State of Punjab regarding appointments, promotions in other services,
..J, after the coming into force of the Government of India Act, 1935, it is
epoug!! to note for our purpose that the appointment, promotion and
punishment qf m,jµist.erial qfficials jn the .pistric! or other Civil Courts
;..._-( continued to be governed by the rules in Chapter 18-A of the High
Court Rules and Orders. c
6. Control in chapter 18-A is the same as control under Article
\ 235 of the Constitution of India. Articles 233, 234 and 235 of the Con-
stitution of India deal with the High Courts' control over the subordi-
nate judiciary. Article 227 deals with the power of superintendence
over all Courts by the High Court. Its predecessor section in the D
Government of India Act, 1935 was Section 224 which dealt with
administrative functions of the High Court. Article 233 deals with the
appointment of District Judges and Article 234 with the recruitment of
persons other than the District Judges to the judicial service. Article
.;
~ 235 deals with the control over subordinate courts and the control
under this Article is wider than the control under the corresponding E
provision of the Government of India Act. For our purpose, it is
" I
sufficient to note that Chapter 18-A contains provisions relating to the
control of the High Court. over the subordinate judiciary.
)-
......
7. For the purpose of this appeal, we are concerned only with
Rules IX and X of the rules in Chapter 18-A. Rule IX deals ~th F
--~ punishment. We extract the entire section since it would be profitable
to have a correct look at this section.

"IX- Punishment-(1) The following penalties may for
g,ood and sufficient reasons be imposed upon members of
t'1.e miqisterial staff:- G

:~ (j) ci:n&µre,
(ii) Fine of an amount not exceeding one month's salary
for misconduct or neglect in the performance of
duties, H
1014 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 2 S.C.R.

A (iii) Recovery from _Pay of the whole or part of any
pecuniary loss caused to Government by negligence
or breach of orders, ·
(iv) Withholding of increments or promotion inclwfr .:•.
stoppage at efficiency bar,
..
B (v) Suspension,
(vi) Removal, and
(vii) Dismissal.·
(2)(a) Any-o.f ihe above penalties may be inflicted by the
Disirict Judge on the ministerial officers of his own Court of
c any Court subordinate to him other than a Court of Small
Causes, and on the menials of his own Court.
'
_ '(b) The Judge of a Court of Small Causes may inflict
any of the above penalties on the ministerial. officers or
D menials of his own Court.

(c) The District Judge may, with the previous sanc-
tion of the High Court, delegate to any Subordinate Judge
the power to inflict penalties given in clause (a) to be exer-
cised by the Subordinate Judge in any specified portion of
E the district subject to the control of the District Court.
Ncite:- This delegation has been made to the Senior Sub-Judge, 1st
Class, in each district in regard to the process-serving establishment of
all Courts in the district except that of the District Judge's Court and
the Court of the Judge, Small Causes, Lahore, Amritsar and Delhi.

(d) Any Subordinate Judge may fine, in an amount not
exceeding one month's salary, any ministerial officer of his
own Court for misconduct or neglect in the performance of
his duties.

(e) The Senior Subordinate Judge may inflict any of the
G above penalties on menials of his own Court or the Courts
of other Subordinate Judges in the same district."

'>__,In Sub-Rule (1), eight penalties are categorised. Sub-Rule (2)
enables the District Judge to inflict any of the penalties mentioned in
Sub-Rule (I). Rule IX(2)(c) enables the District Judge, with the previ-
H ous sanction of the High Court, to delegate to any Subordinate Judge
DEV SINGH v. PUNJAB & HARY ANA HIGH COURT (KHALID, J.( 1015

the power to inflict _penalties given in clause (a). Then comes the A
important section that deals with appeals i.e. Rule X. We think it
useful to extract the Rule in full.

"X. Appeals.-(1) The District Judge may on appeal or
otherwise reverse or modify any order made under rule
IX(2) by any Court under his control including a Court of B
Small Causes, and his order shall be final:

Provided that nothing in this rule shall preclude the
High Court from altering where it deems fit any such appel-
late order of a District Judge on pf!tition by an aggrieved
person or otherwise: c
Provided further that the District Judge shall not
enhance any punishment but should, if he considers
enhancement desirable, refer the case to the High Court for
orders.
D
(2) Appeals against penalties inflicted by a District
Judge shall lie to the High Court in the following cases
only:-
, "i·
(a) Penalties mentioned in Rule IX(iii) to (viii) in
respect of ministerial servants, holding perma- E
nent and pensionable posts; ·

(b) Orders of substantive appointment by,promotion
or otherwise to a permanent and pensionable
post the maximum pay of which is Rs. 75 or more
.___.).·_ permensem; F

(c) Orders of temporary appointment which is to last
more than three months or has in fact lasted more
than three months in respect of posts the
maximum pay of which is Rs. 75 or more per
mensem. G

(3) Persons appealing to the High Court under this
rule shall do so by petition. Such petition, accompanied by
a copy of the order complained against, shall be presented
to the District Judge who passed the order within one
month of the date of such order (the period between the H
1016 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 2 S.C.R.

date of application for the copy and the date on which it is
A
supplied being excluded). The District Judge will forward
the petition to the Registrar of the High Court without
unnecessary delay, and in forwarding the same he will be at
liberty to record any remarks which he may wish to make
concerning any matter stated in the petition.
B
After reading the petition, the High Court may >---
either-
...__...
(a) Summarily reject it without hearing the peti· !
tioner;
c (b) refer it to the District Judge for report and on
receipt of such report reject the petition without ).
hearing the petitioner; or
(c) hear the petitioner, and in cases where other
persons are held to be concerned in the subject of
D the petition, such other person in open Court.

Nothing in these rules shall debar the High Court or a
District Judge, from altering, if deemed fit, any order of
punishment or appointment not provided for above which
may be passed by a District Judge, Senior Subordinate
E Judge or the Judge of a Small Causes Court in respect of
niinisterial or menial establishment when an aggrieved
person petitions or otherwise. District and Sessions Judges
should not, therefore, withhold any petition addressed to
the High Court whether an appeal lies to it in the case or
not under these rules. In a case in which no appeal lies the
F District and Sessions Judge should forward it without any
comments and relevant documents unless he wishes to do
so or is so required by the High Court.

(4) Petitioners are forbidden to attend personally at
the High Court unless summoned to do so. Orders on their
G petitions will be communicated to them through the Dis·
trict Judge concerned.

(5) In order that a dismissed official may be able to
exercise his right of appeal, the charge against him should
be reduced to writing, his defence should either be taken
H in, or reduced to writing and the decision on such defence
DEV SINGH v. PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT [KHALID, J.] 1017

should also be in writing. The record of the charge, defence A
and decision should in all cases be such as to furnish suffi-
cient information to the appellate authority to whom the
dismissed official may prefer an appeal.

(6) Establishment orders, in which an appeal lies lo
the High Court as a matter of right, should state briefly the B
claims of the persons appointe.fl as well as those of their
,,./\ seniors, if any, who are considered· unfit for the appoint-
ments in question, and where the order of seniority has not
been followed the reasons for departure from it should be
stated."
c
8. Rule X(l) deals with the powers of the District Judge to
,\reverse or modify any order made under Rule IX(2) passed by any
Court under his control. This sub-section contains two provisos. The
first proviso gives the High Court an absolute power to alter when it
deems fit any order passed by the District Judge in appeal when an
aggrieved person moves the High Court or even suo moto. The second D
proviso restricts the powers of the District Judge to enhance any
punishment imposed and makes it subject to the orders of the High
Court when such a case is referred to the High Court for orders. Rule
; -~ X(2) deals with appeals against penalties inflicted by District Judge as
in the case on hand. This section provides that appeals shall lie to the

- High Court from orders imposing penalties by the District Judge, but
not in all cases. Appeals lie only against orders imposing penalties
mentioned in Rule IX(iii) to IX( viii). In other words, an appeal does
E

j- not lie when t!te District Judge passes an order imposing a penalty of
censure or of fine of not more than one month's salary for misconduct
or neglect in the performance of duties.
~ F
9. We are not concerned here with the orders mentioned in Rule
X(2)(b) and (c). Sub-rule (3) of Rule X deals with the procedure in
filing appeals to the High Court. It states that appeals shall be by a
petition. It obligates presentation of the petition to the District Judge
who passed the order within the time prescribed therein. The District
Judge is directed to forward the petition to the Registrar of the High G
Court without unnecessary delay. The District Judge is given powers
to record his remarks which he may wish to make concerning any
matter stated in the petition.

10. A reading of this sub-rule makes it abundantly clear that the

. appeal to be heard by the High Court is something which it has to do in H
1018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 2 S.C.R.

A exercise of its powers of control over the subordinate courts on the
administrative side. The appeal .has to be by a petition. It.is to be
routed through the District Judge who sends it to the Registrar of the
High Court. These are the procedural formalities which normally
govern appeals preferred before the High Court, on the administrative
B side. The permission given to the authority who imposes penalty to
record his own remarks which he wishes to make concerning his own
order is further proof of the fact that what the High Court has to
consider is not a matter on the judicial side but one in its power of
control and superintendence over the subordinate courts. Appeals
under the general law have their own procedure, which is different ~-
from the procedure detailed for the appeals under these rules of the
C deciding authority forwarding the appeal through the proper channel
to the controlling authority and of the freedom of the deciding autho-
rity to give its own remarks over and above the order already passed.
This procedure robs the appeal to the High Court of the characteristics
of the normal appeal culminating in judicial orders. The matter will be
D further clear when we look at the procedure that is to be followed by
the High Court in disposing of the appeals contained in this sub-
section itself.

11. Rule X(3) enables the High Court to summarily reject the
appeal without hearing the petitioner or refer it to the District Judge
E for report and on receipt of such report reject the petition without
hearing the petitioner; secondly to hear the petitioner, and in cases
where other persons are held to be concerned in the subject of the
petition, such other person in open court. The procedure contained in
this rule of hearing the petition is not similar to the procedure fol-
lowed in regular judicial proceedings. Under these rules it is not
F obligatory for the High Court to hear the petitioner. It can go into the
papers and reject it summarily without giving the petitioner 'an .~--....
opportunity to be heard. It can also refer it to the District Judge for
report. The second method of disposal of this petition is to get a report
from the District Judge and on receipt of such a report to dismiss it
without hearing the petitionet and thirdly to give a hearing to the
G petitioner and also those who will be affected by the disposal of the
petition. The manner of disposal of the petition under this rule makes
it abundantly clear that this petition which the appellants call an
appeal is not strictly a judicial proceeding involving a !is between two
adversaries and the decision thereon is not a judicial decision. It has all
the trappings of an administrative proceeding and an administrative
H decision.

• ••
DEV SINGH v. PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT [KHALID, J.] 1019

Sub·clause (4} gives further insight into the nature of the appeal. A
It reads:

"(4) Petitioners are forbidden to attend personally at the
High Court unless summoned to do so. Orders on their
petitions will be communicated to them through the District
Judge concerned." B

This again marks a complete departure from the normal judicial pro-
ceeding before a court. The petitioners are forbidden to attend
-..-;_ personally at the High Court. They can do so only when summoned
to do so. In a judicial proceeding, the party has a right to appear
personally or through his counsel. Here that right is denied to him.
This denial also robs the appeal of its character of a judicial proceed-
c
ing. Orders passed by the High Court on such petitions will be com-
municated to the parties through the District Judge concerned.

12. A close study of these rules leaves no doubt in our mind that
in deciding the appeal under Rule X, the High Court exercises only a D
supervisory administrative control and does not act as a Tribunal dis-
posing of an appeal involving a lis between two rival parties and arriv-
ing at a judicial decision. As indicated above Rule X is in Chapter
18-A which deals with control. This gives the administrative shade to
the proceeding under this rule. Section 35(3) contains the rule making
power. Section 35(4) stipulates that any order passed by the District E

- Judge under this section shall be subject to the control of the High
Court, thus fortifying our conclusion that the proceedings under this
section and the decisions made thereunder are not judicial in nature.
This appeal can be disposed of with this conclusion and it is not neces-
sary to refer to the various authorities cited before us. However, for
the completeness of the judgment, we think it proper to briefly refer F
to the various authorities cited before us, for and against ihe position
that the High Court, while deciding this appeal, acted as a Tribunal
whose order can be challenged before this Court under Article 136 of
the Constitution, though in our view the decisions cited dealt with
situations different from the one we are dealing here.
G
13. In Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh and
Others, [1955] 1 SCR 267 a Constitution Bench of this Court was
considering the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of
the Constitution in an election case. It is not necessary for our purpose·
to state the facts of the case here. It was contended that the special
jurisdiction that was conferred in. the Election Tribunal could be in- H
1020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 119811 i s.t.R..
A voked by an aggrieved party only by meilll~ of an election petition,
whose decision was final and conchlsive and that therefore a challenge
to the order of the Tribunal Ullder Article 136 of the Constitution was
not maintainable. To support this contention Article 329 and the non-
obstante clause therein were called in to aid. This Court repelled that
contention as untenable though apparently attractive. This Court held
B that the expression 'Tribunal' as used ·in Article 136 did not mean snlile"
thing as 'Court', but included in its ambit all adjudicating bodies
proivded they were constituted by the State and were invested with
!-.
the judicial as distinguished from purely administrative or executive ftme•
tions. This decision has been pressed into service by the appeilants'
counsel to contend that the High Court in the case on hand having
c been constituted by the State and invested with judicial power was a
Tribunal and therefore, its decision could be examined by this Court
under Article 136. In our view, this decision cannot help the appellants
because this decision clearly held that if the power exercised was
administrative in nature it would exclude such a Tribunal from the
ambit of Article 136.
D
14. In Bachhittar Singh v. The State of Punjab, [1962) Suppl. 3
SCR 713, an employee in PEPSU was dismissed by the Revenue Sec-
retary. Against this order he preferred an appeal to the State Govern-
ment. The Revenue Minister, PEPSU felt that the order of dismissal
was too harsh and instead, he should be reverted and made an
E endorsement to that effect on the file, but no written order was served
on the employee. After the merger of PEPSU with Punjab, the
Revenue Minister, Punjab, sent the file to the Chief Minister for his
-
advice. The Chief Minister passed an order confirming the order of
dismissal and the order was duly communicated to the employee. This
order was challenged by him before the High Court. It was contended
F before the High Court by the State of Punjab, with success, that the
order of dismissal started with proceedings beginning with the enquiry
and culminating in punishment and that the first part involved a deci-
sion on evidence while the second part of taking action an administra-
tive one. This dichotomy was ingeniously put forward before this
Court to render the appeal not maintainable by contending that the
G order of dismissal was not a judicial order. This Court repelled that
contention. This Court held that departmental proceedings taken
against a Government servant were not divisible in the sense in which
the High Court understood it. There is just one continuous proceed-
ing though there are two stages in it. Mudholkar, J. speaking for the
H Constitution Bench observed thus in repelling this contention:
m!V §IHOil v. PUNJAB I< HARYANA HIGH COURT [KHALID, J.) 1021

" ..... Thete ls just one continuous proceedings though A
there are two stages in it. The first is coming to a conclusion
on the evidence as to whether the charges alleged against
the Government servant are established or not and the
second is reached only if it is found. that they are so
established. That stage deals with the action to be taken
against the Government servant concerned. The High B
Court accepts that the first stage is a judicial proceeding
and indeed it must be so because charges have to be
framed, notice has to be given and the person concerned
has to be given an opportunity of being heard. Even so far
as the second stage is concerned, Article 311(2) of the Con-
stitution requires a notice to be given to the person con- C
cerned as also an opportunity of being heard. Therefore,
this stage of the proceeding is no less judicial than ihe
earlier one. Consequently any action decided to be taken
against a Government servant found guilty of misconduct is
a judicial order and as such it cannot be varied at the will of
the authority who is empowered to impose the punishment. D
Indeed, the very object with which notice is required to be
given on the question of punishment is to ensure that it will
be such as would be justified upon the char,ses established
and upon the other attendant circumstances of the case. It
is thus wholly erroneous to characterise the'taking of action
against a person found guilty of any charge at a departmen- E
tal enquiry as an administrative order."
i
This judgment will not help us in this case. It only lays down a general
principle that a departmental enquiry and a decision is one continuous
process consisting of the enquiry part and the decision making part,
both the aspects of which are judicial in nature, and the decisions :taken F
therein are in exercise of judicial power. · · ··
. . . . . .

15. The counsel for the appellants placed stro~g reiiance on the :'
decision of a Constitution Bench in the case· of AssoCiated Cement ·
Companies Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma and another, (1965] 2 S(:R 366, to
contend that the decision of the High Court in this case was a judicial G
decision of a Tribunal within the scope of Article 136. In that judg-
ment this Court considere.d most of its previous decisions relating. to
the scope of Article 136. What fell to be decided. ·in .that case was
whether the State Government was a Tribunal when it exercised its .
authority under Rule 6(5) and 6(6) of the Punjab Welfare Officers
Recruitment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1957..Jt is necessary to H
1022 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 2 S.C.R.

A briefly state the facts of the case. The employer•company appointed
the first respondent as a Welfare Officer as required by the Factories
Act, 1948 and as per the rules mentioned above. The letter of appoitti'
ment stated that the first respondent was liable to be transferred from
one unit of the company to another and that his services could be
terminated by one month's notice or with one month's pay in lieu
B thereof. The Welfare Officer was not prepared to go to a place to
which he was transferred. Thereupon the company terminated the
services of the 1st respondent with one month's salary. He llppealed lei
the State of Punjab under Rule 6(6). The State of l'uttjab tlrdered hiS
re.instatement. As the previous concurren~e of the Labour Commis"
sioner, as required by rule 6(3), proviso (2) was not ciliiaified, the
C company brought the matter to this Court under Article 136(1) of the
Constitution. A preliminary objection was raised before this Court
that the appeal to this Court was incompetent because the second )._
respondent was not a Tribunal when it decided the apjleal. within the
meaning of Article 136(1) of the Co11stitution. Rule 6( 6) read as
follows:
D
"6( 6) A welfare officer upon whom the punishment
mentioned in clause (v) tlf sub-rule (3) is imposed may
appeal to the State Government against the order of
punishment within thirty days from the date of rec~ipt of ).-
the order by him, The decision of the State Government
E shall be final and binding."

It was by virtue of this rule that the State Government got the powers
of appeal. Dealing with the preliminary objection the Constitution ,_.
Bench speaking through Gajendragadkar, CJ referred to this Court's
earlier decision-in Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Sh yam Sundar Jhun-
F jhunwala and Others, [1962) 2 SCR 339, and observed as follows: >--
" ..... On the preliminary question as to whether the appe-
als were competent, the learned Judge agreed with the
majority decision that the Central Government was a tri-
bunal within the meaning of Article 136(1). Construing
G Article 136(1), the learned Judge observed that courts and
tribunals act judicially in both senses which he had earlier
discussed and in the term 'tribunal' are included all others,
which are not so included. Among the powers of the State,
said Hidayatullah, J., is included the power to decide con-
troversies between parties. This is undoubtedly one of the
H attributes of the State and is aptly called the judicial power
Dljy SJN(lH v. PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT [KHALID, J.! 1023

of the State. Broadly speaking, certain special matters go A
b~fore tribunals, and the residue goes before the ordinary
courts of civil judicature. Their procedures may differ,
but the functions are not essentially different (pp. 362-63).
Thus, it would be noticed that all the learned Judges who
heard this case, were agreed in taking the .view that the
essential power which was exercised by the courts and tri- B
. ,..../
\
bunals alike was the judicial power of the State."

16. This Court then referred to its decision in Jaswant Sugar
--1 Mills Ltd. v. Lakshmichand and Others, [1963] Suppl. 1 SCR 242 in
which the finding that an appeal under Article 136(1) against the order
of a Conciliation Officer was incompetent, was considered. Under c
clause 29 of the orc\er promulgated in 1954 under the U.P. Industrial
Dispute~ A~t, 1947, the Conciliation Officer could grant or refuse
p.yrmissi911 to alter the terms of employment of workmen at the inst-
imce of the employer. This Section did not suit the employer. That was
challenged before this Court. This Court held that the Conciliation
Officer was not a Tribunal because he was not invested with the judi- D
cial power of the State as he was empowered merely to lift the ban
statutorily imposed on the employers' rights and was not authorised to
pronounce a final and binding decision in any dispute. Regarding the
conclusion in that case this Court observed as follows:

" ..... The condition precedent for bringing a tribunal E
- within the ambit of Article 136, observed Shah, J., who
spoke for the Court, 'is that it should be constituted by the
State' and he added that a tribunal would be outside the
ambit of Article 136 if it is not invested with any part of the
judicial functions of the State but discharges purely
administrative or executive duties. After examining the F
scheme of the relevant provision, it was observed that 'in
deciding whether an authority required to ad judicially
when dealing with matters effecting rights of citizens may
be regarded as a tribunal' though not a court, the princi-
pal incident is the investiture of the 'trappings of a court'-
such as authority to 1determine matters in cases initiated by G
parties, sitting in public, power to compel attendance of
witnesses and to examine them on oath, and others ...... .
Some, though not necessarily all such trappings, will ordi-
narily make the authority which is under a duty to act judi-
cially, a 'tribunal'."
H
1024 SUPREME COURT REPORTS U9B7J 2 s.c::.R..
A 17. Then dealing with the question whether the State Govern·
ment when it exercised its authority under rule 6(5) and rule 6(6) was a
tribunal or not, this Court observed as follows: ~

"The question which we have to decide in the present
appeal is whether the State Government is a tribunal when
B it exercises its authority under Rule 6(5) or Rule 6(6). No
rules have been made prescribing the procedure which the
State Government should follow in dealing with appeals
under these two sub-rules, and there is no statutory pruvi-
sion conferring on the State Government any specific pow-
ers which are usually associated with the trial in !)pllrts and
which are intended to help the court in reaching its deci•
c sions. The requirements of procedure which is followed in
courts and the possession of subsidiary powers which are
given to courts to try the cases before them, are described
as trappings of the courts, and so, it may be conceded that
these trappings are not shown to exist in the case of the
D , State Government which hears appeals under Rule 6(5)
and Rule 6(6). But as we already stated, t!tli ~nsideration
about the presence of all or some of the trappings of a .ci:i1m
is really not decisive. The presence of some of the trapping5
may assist the determination of the question Qi 41 w~etber
the power exercised by the authority which possessc• tbll . ').- '
E said trappings, is the judicial power of the State or not. The
main and the basic test however, is whether the adjudicat-
ing power which a particular authority is empowered to
exercise, has been conferred on it by a statute and can be
described as part of the State's inherent power exercised in
discharging its judicial functions. Applying this test, there
F can be no doubt that the power which the State Govern-
ment exercises under Rule 6(5) and Rule 6(6), is a part of
the State's judicial power. It has been conferred on the
State Government by a statutory Rule and it can be exer-
cised in respect of disputes between the management and
its Welfare Officers. There is, in that sense, a lis; there is
G affirmation by one party and denial by another, and the
dispute necessarily involves the rights and obligations of
the parties to it. The order which the State Government
ultimately passes is described as its decision and it is made
final and binding. Besides, it is an order passed on appeal.
Having regard to these distinctive features of the power
H conferred on the State Government by Rule 6(5) and Rule
DEV SINGH v, PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT (KHALID, J.l 1025

6(6), we feel no hesitation in holding that it is a Tribunal A
within the meaning of Article 136(1)."
~
What follow~ from this case and the authorities referred therein is this:
The State is invested in some cases with a power to decide contro-
versies between parties. This power is undoubtedly one of the attri-
butes of the State and that is called the judicial power of the State. B
What has to be remembered is that this power is exercised to resolve
-~ I
controwrsles between parties. In Associated Cement's case also this
Court took notice of the fact that a dispute existed between the
management and its welfare officer. It was held that there existed a !is
-'-I the decision of which !is was rendered by the State in exercise of its
judicial power. This was the test that has to be applied to find out c
whether an order is a judicial order or not.
~ 18. In Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles Limited, Born-
bay, [1963) Suppl. 1SCR625 the question considered by a Constitution
Bench was wb<:\ber the decision of an arbitrator to whom industrial
disp1,1\1;s were volun,tarily referred under Section 10-A of the Industrial D
nisputes Act, 1947. was quasi-judicial in character and his decision
awou!ll~U to a determination or order under Article 136(1) of the
C\'lnstltution of India. This Court held that for invoking Article 136(1),

- .-J, two conditions must be satisfied-(1) The proposed appeal must be
from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order, that is
.. to say, it must not be against a purely executive or administrative
order. If the determination or order giving rise to the appeal is a
E

judicial or quasi-judicial determination or order, the first condition is

... satisfied. (2) The second condition imposed by the Article is that the
said determination or order must have been made or passed by any
Court or Tribunal in the territory of India. These conditions, there-
fore, require that the order complained against must have a judicial or F
~
quasi-judicial character and the authority whose order is complained
against must be a Court or a Tribunal. Unless both the conditions are
satisfied, Article 136(1) cannot be invoked. The decision of the
arbitrator, it was held, could be characterised as quasi-judicial one,
but the power of the arbitrator is not in exercise of the sovereign
power or one by conferment of a statutory power by the State. He gets G
- -I the power to adjudicate by virtue of the authority given by the parties.
It was held that an appeal from the order of the arbitrator did not lie
under article 136(1) of the Constitution.

19. In Indo-China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Jasjit Singh, Addi-
tional Collector of Customs and Others, [1964] 6 SCR 594 the question H
1026 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 2 S.C.R.

A debated was whether the Central Board of Revenue exercising its
appellate power under Section 190 of the Sea Customs Act or the ).-
Central Government exercising its revision jurisdiction under Section
191 could be held to be a Tribunal under Article 136 .. This Court
repeated the principle laid down in the earlier decisions that two con-
ditions have to be satisfied before an appeal could be entertained in
B this Court under Article 136: the order impugned must be an order of a
judicial or quasi-judicial character and should not be purely an ).-. "
administrative or executive order; and that the said order should have
been passed either by a Court or a Tribunal in the territory of India.
After examining the earlier decisions and the tests laid down therein .-., ..--
.and also after examining the procedure prescribed in the Act in rela-
C tion to the adjudication of disputes under these sections, it was held
that the Central Board of Revenue and the revisional authority, the
Central Government, had the character of a Tribunal under Article ).
136 of the Constitution and thus the preliminary objection that the
appeal was not maintainable was overruled. Since great stress was laid
by the learned. counsel for the appellants on this authority, we woµld
D like to extract the relevant portion on which such reliance was placed
to distinguish it from the facts of our case.

" ......The fact that the status of the Cu~toms Officer who
adjudicates under Section 167 (12A) and section 183 of the
Act is not that of a Tribunal, does not make any difference
E when we reach the stage of appeal or revision. A period of
limitation is prescribed for the appeal, a procedure is pre-
scribed by Rule 49 that the appeal or revision must be
-
accompanied by a copy of the decision or order complained
against, and the obvious scheme is that both the appellate
and the revisional authorities must consider the matter jud-
F icially on the evidence and determine it in accordance with
law. It is obvious that heavy fines are imposed in these
proceedings and the confiscation orders passed may affect
ships of very large value. By his appeal or revisional appli-
cation the ship owner naturally contends that the order of
confiscation is improper or invalid and he sometimes urges
G that the fine imposed is unreasonable and excessive. Where
disputes of this character are raised before the appellate or
the revisional authority, it would be difficult to accede to
the argument that the authority which deals with these dis-
putes in its appellate or revisional jurisdiction is not a tri-
bunal under Article 136. These authorities are constituted
H by the legislature and they are empowered to deal with the
DEV SINGH v. PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT (KHALID, J.J 1027

disputes brought before them by aggrieved persons. Thus, A
the scheme of the Act, the nature of the proceedings
brought before the appellate and the revisional authorities,
the extent of the claim involved, the nature of the penalties
imposed and the kind of enquiry which the Act contemp-
lates, all indicate that both the appellate and the revisional
authorities acting under the relevant provisions of the Act B
constitute Tribunals under Article 136 of the Constitution,
because they are invested with the judicial power of the
State, and are required to act judicially. Therefore, we
must over-rule the preliminary objection raised by. the
Additional Solicitor General and proceed to deal with the
appeal on the merits." c
This judgment can be easily distinguished from the case on hand on the
finding that the High Court in this case, as already indicated by us, was
acting purely administratively and was not making a judicial decision
and the procedure adopted was totally different from the procedure in
a Court. This decision, therefore, cannot create any hurdle for our D
conclusi,on against the appellants.

20, In APHLC v. M.A. ,Sangma, [1978] 1 SCR 393 this Court was
dealing with t!!e jurisdiction of the Election Commission to decide the
question of a symbol (o the parties contesting the election. It was held
- that the decision from the Election Commission was amenable to E
appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India since the powers
were conferred on the Election Commission by rules, that the Election
Commission was dealing with the matter between two rival parties and
that the decision taken was a judicial decision. Here again, the Court
reiterated the several tests to determine whether a particular body or
authority was a Tribunal within the ambit of Article 136 or not. These F
tests are not exhaustive. The two necessary pre-requisites for that
authority to come within Article 136( 1) are that it must be constituted
by the State and invested with some judicial power of the State. These
two tests, it was held, were unfailing one, while some of the other test
or tests may not be present. At pages 409 and 410 the matter is made
.-1·· abundantly clearin the following statement oflaw by the Court: G

" ......There is thus a lis between two groups of the
Conference. The Commission is undoubtedly the specified
and exclusive adjudicating authority of this lis. The Com-
mission is created by the Constitution and the power to
adjudicate the dispute flows from Article 324 as well as H
1028 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 2 S.C.R.

A from Rule 5 and is thus c8~!~rr~!J llll~~r the law as a fr~~:
tion of judicial power of t~~ St~\!'· TJi,e 9'.W\11\ssion has
prescribed its own rrocecjµf!' jp !ti~ ~¥m bols Onler,
namely, to give a n~ar\ng tp, !~E P1\rliE~ wlwn there is a
disp~te with regMfl )R fecognition or regarding choice of
symbols ..... " ·
B
" ....... To q;pe~\, tb~ p.mver \g d~ei!le $is frnrtiou·
lar dispute is i1 part pf the !ilatll'fi judicial power and that
power is conferred on the Election Commisson by Article
324 of the Constitution as also by rule 5 of the rules. The
principal and non-failing test which must be p~es~l\l i11
~- ...
c order to determine wheth':'~ ~ qgqy Bf 11ut!l<iFilY is il tli•
bunal within the ambit of f\rti~le j:36(1), is fulfil!~!:! in this
case when the Election O~mJ11issim1. i~ required to adjudi·
cate a dispute betwee11 two parties, one group asserting to
be recognised politicf!l party of !he State and the other
group controverting the proposition before it, bu.t at the
D same time not laying any claim to be that party ....... "

21. We have considered the above decisions carefully. In our
view, the principles laid down in these cases cannot help the appe\:
!ants in support of the plea that the High Court ":hile P,isposing 'df the
appeal was acting as a tribunal. Th';' r~levan\ proyisipµ.s Ql!llled in t!le
E earlier part of the judgment rel~ting !P \Jie ~ppe~I in Ql!tosti\l!l, iq '!l!f
judgment, clearly establish that the.\'figq Opqf\ ~et~\I Pll thl' a<!minis·
trative side in deciding the appe~l:

22. TJiere is a clear distinction between courts of law exercising
judicial powers and other bodies. Decisions by courts are clearly judi·
F cial. That is not the case with bpqies exercjsjpg adj11iqistn1tive or
executive powers. In certain matters Her Judges have to act
administratively and in so doing may have to act quasi-judicially in
dealing with the matters entruste~ ·to them. It is only where the
authorities are required to act judicially ei!\ler by express provisions of
the statute or by necessary implication tha\ t!le decisions of such an
G authority would amount to a quasi·juqicial proceeding. When Judges
in exercise of their administrative fimctiplls <:lecicte cases it cannot be
said that their decisions are either juilicial or quasi·judicjal decisions.

23. Every decision or order by an autl!ori!Y which hftS a duty to act
judicially is not subject to appeal to this Court. Article 136 contemp·
H !ates appeals to this Court only from adjudications of courts and tri·
9EV Sll'IGfl ~- P~JAJI fl'. HARYANAHIGH COURT [KHALID, J.[ 1029

P!lPlll~: &u~!i llf!i!!fliFMi'll! mp.~t ~ou~f!ess be judicial. This does not A
m~!lll !lli!I f)¥el1' i!!!!ll9Fi!¥ f'hich is required to act jµdicially, either by
it~ PP!JS!jfµtipn or by virtue of the authority conferred upon it, is neces-
s11rily ii tritim111I for th!! purpose of Article 136. A tribunal, whose
11cli114i~?tion js sµbject to appeal, must besides being under a duty to act
j111!i~jij!ly, p~ ~ lmdY ilw~~!~d with the judicial power of the State.
B
24. 111 lh~ !!Plleill b~fpre the High Court, the High Court was follow-
ing its own procedure, a proc~dure not normally followed in judicial
matters. The High Court was not resolving any dispute or controversy
between two adversaries. In other words, while deciding this appeal
there was no Jis before the High Court. The High Court was only
!lJ!:~rc~ing ils power of control while deciding this appeal. We have, c
tllerefon:, ng pesitatiml to hold that the appeal is not maintainable.
How~v~r. w~ do not propose to dismiss it without leaving any remedy
. to the appellants. We direct the Registrar to transfer the records of the
case lo the Punjab )nd Haryana High Court requesting the High Court
to take this petition on its file as a petition under Article 226 and
dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible on the available D
pleacljngs and documents. There will be nq ord.er as to costs.

P.S.S. Appeal dismissed .
. ....

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