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Supreme Court of India

DEV RAJversusSTATE OF CHHATTISGARH

Citation
2016 INSC 554
Decided
25 July 2016
Disposal
Dismissed

Holding

The conviction under Section 302 IPC stands; hostile witness testimony is admissible when corroborated, and there is no ground for interference under Article 136.

Summary

The appellant Devraj was convicted under Section 302 IPC for murdering his cousin amid a land dispute. The prosecution relied on three eye‑witnesses, two of whom were declared hostile, but their testimony was corroborated by other evidence showing Devraj’s assault on the victim. The defence argued that hostile witness testimony should be excluded and that the injuries were insufficient to cause death. The Supreme Court held that a hostile witness’s evidence is admissible if it is corroborated and found reliable, and that the prosecution had proved the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Applying the limited scope of Article 136, the Court declined to interfere with the lower courts' findings and dismissed the appeal.

Issues considered

  • Whether testimony of witnesses declared hostile can be relied upon to sustain a conviction under Section 302 IPC.
  • Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant caused the death of the deceased.
  • Whether the Supreme Court may interfere with the findings of fact of the High Court in a criminal appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution.

Legislation cited

Subjects

murderhostile witnessevidenceArticle 136criminal appealIPC Section 302land dispute

Judgment

                        [2016] 3 S.C.R. 323



                             DEV RAJ                                    A
                                 v.
                   STATE OF CHHATTISGARH
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 423 of2015)
                           JULY25,2016                                  B

          [S.A. BOBDE AND ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.]
       Penal Code, 1860: s.302 - Murder - Prosecution case that
appellant and his brother assaulted the victim-deceased and ajier
killing him threw his body along with motorcycle below the bridge -
Trial court convicted the appellant and his brother uls.302 - High
                                                                        c
Co~rt 'upheld the conviction of the appellant however set aside the
conviction of his brother - On appeal, held: There was overwhelming
evidence to prove that there was animosity between the deceased
and the appellant over land - Eye-witnesses stated that appellant
gave lathi blows to the victim-deceased - The fact of assault by the    D
appellant was throughout maintained by the witnesses - Even though
witnesses were declared hostile they maintained their stand that they
saw appellant and accused assaulting the deceased - Prosecution
successfully proved beyond reasonable doubt that it was accused
who had caused homicidal death of the deceased - No interference
                                                                        E
with the order of conviction.
       Evidence: Testimony of hostile witnesses - Evidentiary value,
 discussed.
       Constitution of India : Art.136 - Scope of interference,
 discussed.                                                             F
        Dismissing the appeal, the Court
        HELD: 1. PW.7 wife of the deceased, PW.8, PW.13, PW.18,
  PW.3 and PW.IO all had stated that there was a land dispute
  between the parties. Witness PW.to had also stated that with
  regard to the land dispute the leg of the appellant was broken        G
  and there was animosity between the deceased and the appellant
  and accused. The plea of the appellant was that PW.13 and PW.16
  having been declared as hostile witnesses their evidence ought
· not to have been relied by the courts below more so when another
  eye-witness docs not say that deceased was assaulted by the
                                                                        H
                              323
324           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2016] 3 S.C.R.


A     appellant. The evidence of a witness who has been declared
      hostile can be relied if there are some other material on the basis
      of which said evidence can be corroborated. More so, that part
      of evidence of a witness as contained in examination-in-chief,
      which remains unshaken even after cross-examination, is fully
      reliable even though the witness has been declared hostile. The
B
      trial began against six accused persons. PW.13 in his examination-
      in-chief took the name of the appellant alone who was stated to
      have assaulted the deceased. PW-13 did not mention in his
      examination-in-chief about the presence of other accused which
      may be a reason for the prosecution to get the witness declared
c     as hostile. Even in the cross-examination the witness repeated
      that he heard the appellant saying "Maro Sale Ko" who had
      assaulted the deceased and the deceased cried "Bachao Bachao''.
      The factum of assault by the appellant was throughout maintained
      by the witness. Thus, even though witness was declared as hostile
      witness his evidence so far as the role of the appellant is
D
      unshaken. Similar was the evidence of PW.16. The statement of
      PW-8 of assault on the deceased when read with the evidence of
      PW.13 and PW.16 clearly indicates thatit was the appellant who
      had assaulted the deceased which caused death of the
      deceased.[Paras 15, 19, 20, 21) [329-H; 330-A-B; 332-D-G; 333-
E     E-F]
             2. There being clear evidence of stopping of the motorcycle
      near pakkar tree and ensuing quarrel and assault on the appellant,
      the theory of accident as suggested by the appellant was wholly
      unreliable. The prosecution has successfully proved beyond
      reasonable doubt that it was accused who had caused homicidal
F
      death of the deceased. [Para 24) (334-B,F]
            3. The jurisdiction which this Court exercises under Article
      136 has its own self-imposed restrictions. Even though the powers
      of this Court under Article 136 are very wide, but in criminal
      appeals, this Court would not interfere with the concurrent
G     findings of facts, save in very exceptional cases. The findings
      recorded by the courts below from the evidence on record fully
      justify the conviction of accused. The findings recorded by the
      courts below can neither be said to be perverse nor contain
      any such illegality which may render the findings not reliable.
H     [Paras 25, 26, 27) [334-G; 335-F; 336-B-C)
            DEVRAJ v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH                              325


     Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana (1976) 1 SCC 389:                 A
     1976 (2) SCR 921 ; Khujji v. State of MP. (1991) 3
     SCC 627 : 1991 (3) SCR 1 ; Vinod Kumar vs. State of
     Punjab (2015) 3 SCC 220 : 2015 (1) SCR 504 ; Ganga
     Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar (2005) 6 SCC 211 ;
     Alamelu v. State (2011) 2 SCC 385 : 2011 (2) SCR
                                                                         B
     147- relied on.
                       Case Law Reference
      1976 (2)   SCR 921                relied on       Para 16
      1991 (3)   SCR    1               relied on       Para 17
                                                                          c
      2015 (1)   SCR 504                relied on       Para 18
      c2005) 6 sec 211                  relied on       Para 25
      2011 (2)   SCR 147                relied on       Para26 ·
      CRIMIN.AL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
                                                                          D
No. 423 of2015.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 07.01.2013 of the High Court
of Judicature ofChhattisgarh at Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal No. 780 of
2008.
      Akshat Shrivastava, Sarbajit Dutta, Advs. for the Appellant.        E
      C. D. Singh, AAG, Sagar Suri, Adv. for the Respondent.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
       ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. I. This appeal has been filed against
the judgment and order dated 7th January, 2013 of the High Court of       F
Chhattisgarh in Criminal Appeal No. 780 of2008. The First Additional
Sessions Judge in Sessions Trial No.396 of 2006 had convicted the
appellant-Devraj and Dinda@ Deenanath under Section 302 and 201
IPC and awarded imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/-
each for the charge levelled under Section 302 !PC and RI for three
years and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/- each for the charge under Section     G
201 IPC. Four other accused were acquitted by the First Additional
Sessions Judge. The High Court in Criminal Appeal No.780 of 2008
although acquitted the accused Dinda@ Deenanath, it confirmed the
conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC. The High Court has
set aside the conviction and sentence ofDevraj under Section 201 !PC.
                                                                          H
326            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2016] 3 S.C.R.


A           2. Aggrieved by the judgment and order of the High Court, Devraj
      has come up in this appeal.
            3. The prosecution case in brief is :
             There existed a land dispute between the deceased Devi Prasad
      @ Prachar and Devraj, Dinda @ Deenanath. Devraj and Dinda @
B     Deenanath are real brothers whereas deceased Devi Prasad was their
      cousin brother. On 26th June, 2006, after 8 p.m. when deceased Devi
      Prasad was going along with one Ratan Singh Guruji in a motorcycle he
      was intercepted by five persons near pakkar tree. The deceased was
      beaten by geda and lathi by Devraj, Dinda and others and after killing
c     him his body along with motorcycle was thrown below Rakhet Pulia.
      The body was seen on next day morning by a boy of village who informed
      the wife of the deceased. Thereafter, First Infonnation Report was lodged
      by Anita Bai at 10.15 a.m. on 27th June, 2006. Police official came on
      the spot prepared death panchnama and site plan. The statements from
      various persons were recorded. The charges were framed against six
D     accused under Section 147, 148,149, 302 and 201 !PC. The accused
      Sheonath, Thema@ Vishwanath, Devraj, Dinda@ Deenanath, Khoru
      and Dayalal were sent for trial.
            4. The prosecution examined 20 witnesses and placed reliance on
      various exhibits. Learned Additional Sessions Judge after examining the
E     statements of witnesses held charges under Section 302 and 20 I !PC
      proved against accused Devraj and Dinda @ Deenanath, other four
      accused were acquitted by the Trial Com1.
            5. The Trial Court placed heavy reliance on witnesses PW.8-
      Ratan Singh, PW. I 3-Shivlochan and PW.16-Ajar Das who were found
 F    to be eye-witnesses. The statements of witnesses were found
      corroboration from other evidence. Although witnesses PW. I 3-Shivlochan
      and PW.16-Ajar Das were declared hostile witnesses and they were
      cross-examined but the Trial Court relied on their statements having
      found to be truthful and worth reliance.
 G          6. Both Devraj and Dinda @ Deenanath filed an appeal before
      the High Court. The High Court vide its judgment and order dated 7th
      January, 20 I 3 acquitted Dinda @ Deenanath from all the charges.
      However, it confirmed the conviction of the appellant-Devraj under
      Section 302 !PC while setting aside the conviction under Section 20 I
      IPC.
 H
             DEVRAJ v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH                                 327
                  [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

      7. Devraj is before us in this appeal. Only Devraj being in this       A
appeal, we need to confine our discussion with regard to the evidence
against Devraj only and as to whether the courts below on valid materials
and evidence were justified in convicting Devraj.
      8. We have heard Shri Akshat Shrivastava, learned counsel
appearing for the appellant and Shri C.D. Singh, learned Additional           B
Advocate General for the State.
       9. Learned counsel for the appellant in support of the appeal
contended that the courts below have relied on three eye-witnesses
namely PW.8-Ratan Singh, PW.13-Shivlochan and PW.16- Ajar Das.
PW.13-Shivlochan and PW.16-Ajar Das having been declared hostile              c
witnesses, their evidence could not have been relied and PW.8-Ratan
Singh, another eye-witness having not stated that Devraj had assaulted
the deceased hence there was no evidence worth name to convict the
accused-Devraj. It is further contended that even the eye-witnesses,
PW.13 and PW.16 had only stated that they have heard the voice of
Devraj, the prosecution ought to have proved that witnesses had               D
recognised the voice of Devraj and Devi Prasad. The witnesses have
only stated that Devraj had assaulted Devi Prasad@ Prachar by Danda.
It has not been proved that injury by Danda, if any, was sufficientto kill
Devi Prasad. The Doctor in his evidence has stated that injuries which
were sustained by Devi Prasad could be possible by an accident. Thus,         E
the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that it was Devraj
who killed Devi Prasad @ Prachar. There was contradiction between
the statements of eye-witnesses, which has not been adverted to by the
courts below.
       I 0. Learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State       F
supporting the judgment of courts below contended that incriminating
evidence on the record are sufficient to convict the accused-Devraj. All
the eye-witnesses have proved the presence of accused-Devraj. The
evidence of PW.13 and PW. 16 was wholly reliable and even if they
were declared hostile witnesses their examination-in-chiefand the cross-
examination does not in any manner weaken the evidentiary value of            G
their evidence that Devraj assaulted Devi Prasad on the late evening of
26th June, 2006. Several witnesses have testified that there was land
dispute between deceased-Devi Prasad and Devraj and there being
animosity between Devi Prasad and Devraj there was a motive to kill
the deceased. The judgment of the Trial Court is based on correct             H
328             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2016] 3 S.C.R.



A     appreciation of evidence. The High Court also having examined the
      statements of witnesses and having come to the conclusion that there
      was sufficient material on record to convict Devraj there is no ground
      for interference by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article
      136 of the Constitution oflndia. It is well settled that this Court shall not
      reappraise the evidence and interfere with concurrent findings of facts
B
      recorded by the courts below which are sufficient for upholding the
      conviction of the accused.
            11. We have considered the arguments made by the learned counsel
      appearing for the parties and perused the records. The original records
      of the Trial Court produced before us including the statements of
c     witnesses have also been perused by us.
            12. ln the present case the deceased-Devi Prasad was going along
      with Ratan Guruji from his house on a motorcycle on Panchayat Road
      at about 8 p.m. Deceased left his house on a motorcycle with Ratan
      Singh Guruji as pillion rider for dropping Ratan Singh at village Chendra.
D     On the Panchayat Road near pakkar tree, the deceased was intercepted
      and was asked to stop the motorcycle by five persons. The quarrel took
      place between the deceased and his interceptors. The witnesses have
      specially mentioned that Devraj and Dinda@ Deenanath were present
      on the spot and Devraj hit and gave lathi blows on deceased. The
E     witnesses who saw the deceased being assaulted are Ratan Guruji,
      Shivlochan and Ajar Das. It is useful to re-capitulate the statements of
      the above eye-witnesses. Ratan Singh-PW.8 has stated that he had gone
      to Devi Prasad's house and after 8 p.m. he along with Devi Prasad left
      his house on a motorcycle and as soon as they reached at some distance
      from his house five persons were standing near the pakkar tree. Those
 F    persons got the vehicle stopped. Dinda came towards him (Ratan Guruji),
      he was having a torch and switched on the torch. In the meanwhile, a
      person ran from back side with a stick and spoke "kill him, what are you
      looking' and he gave stick blow to Devi Prasad. On receiving injury
      Devi Prasad ran towards back side crying "save save". Ratan Singh
 G    further stated that Shivlochan came on the spot and told him to come
      with him as there was risk there. PW.8-Ratan Singh further stated that
      there was a land dispute between Devi Prasad and Dev Raj.
              13. Shivlochan-PW.13 is a witness whose house is situated near
      the place where Devi Prasad was stopped. The Exhibit No.P.7 which is
      a site plan prepared at the spot clearly indicates the house ofShivlochan
 H
              DEVRAJ v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH                                329
                   [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

is at indication mark No.5. Shivlochan in his statement has stated that he   A
knew both the accused-Devraj and deceased-Devi Prasad. Shivlochan
belongs to the same village Sayar Rai of which accused and deceased
belonged. In examination-in-chief, Shivlochan stated that he was returning
to his house from his sister's house when he saw the deceased-Devi
Prasad near pakkartree. Devraj came from the front and some dialogues
                                                                              B
entered between them. Thereafter, Devraj assaulted Devi Prasad by
wood or stone. Thereafter, Devi Prasad started running. The witness
was cross·examined on behalf of the accused and in his cross-examination
he stated that he heard the voice of Devraj who was saying "Maro Sale
Ko" and it was Devraj who hit the Devi Prasad@ Prachar and Prachar
shouted "Bachao Bachao" which he heard.                                       c
        14. Another eye-witness PW.16-Ajar Das has been examined by
 the prosecution. The house of Ajar Das is also near to the scene of
 occurrence which is shown in Exhibit No.P-7 as indication mark 8. Ajar
 Das stated that he knew the deceased and the accused. Deceased Devi
 Prasad was cousin brother of Devraj and Dinda @ Deenanath. The               D
 quarrel had earlier taken place between Devi Prasad and Devraj. He
 was returning to his house from village Gangapur and when he was
 going through Panchayat Road adjoining pakkar tree near Jam tree
 accused Devi Prasad had given three lathi blows to Devi Prasad. Accused
 Devraj told Shivlochan that he should run away' otherwise he will also be
 assaulted oil which he ran away. The prosecution took permission of          E
 the Court for asking question after declaring the witness as hostile. On
 which the witness again stated that he has forbidden Devraj from beating
 Devi Prasad. He further stated that he had also seen that while beating
 Devi Prasad, Devraj was saying that he has been tortured throughout
 life. Devraj and Dinda had beaten the deceased in the night and the          F
 dead body of Devi Parasad was found below the Rakhet Pulia in the
_morning. He further stated that due to land dispute between Devi Prasad
 and Devraj and Dinda, they entered into "marpeet". 1n the cross-
 examination he stated that he has seen accused-Devraj giving three
 lathi blows. However, he does not know to whom the blows were given
 since it was dark. There is overwhelming evidence on the record to           G
 prove the land dispute between Devraj, Dinda with Devi Prasad-
 deceased.
      15. Anita Bai-PW.7 wife of the deceased, Ratan Singh-PW.8,
Shivlochan-PW.13, Shivram-PW.18,Ram Kewal-PW.3 and Narayan
Prasad-PW.! 0 all had stated that there was a land dispute between the        H
330            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2016) 3 S.C.R.



A     parties. Witness PW. I 0-Narayan Prasad had also stated that with regard
      to the land dispute the leg ofDevraj was broken and there was animosity
      between Devi Prasad and accused-Devraj and Dinda. The arguments
      which have been raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that
      PW.13 and PW.16 having been declared as hostile witnesses their
      evidence ought not to have been relied by the courts below more so
B
      when Ratan Singh another eye-witness does not say that deceased Devi
      Prasad was assaulted by Devraj. At this juncture it is relevant to examine
      the question as to what extent evidence of hostile witnesses can be
      relied by the Court while recording conviction.
             16. In a three-Judge bench judgment of this Court in Blwgwan
c     Singh v. State of Harymw, (1976) 1 SCC 389, the witness Jagat
      Singh was declared hostile. The appellant was convicted under Section
      165A IPC. It was contended that the whole case is destroyed since the
      witness was declared as hostile. In the aforesaid decision the Court
      held thatthere is no legal bar to base a conviction upon his testimony if
D     corroborated by other reliable evidence. Following was stated 111
      paragraph 8 :
              "8. We have carefully perused the evidence of Jagat
            Singh. who was examined in the trial after more than a
            year of detection of the case. The prosecution could have
E           even avoided requesting for permission to cross-examine
            the witness uiider Section 154 of the Evidence Act. But the
            fact that the court gave permission to the prosecutor to
            cross-examine his own witness, thus characterising him as,
            what is described as a hostile witness, does not completely
            efface his evidence. The evidence remains admissible in
F           the trial and there is no legal bar to base a conviction
            upon his testimony if corroborated by other reliable
            evidence. We are satisfied in this case that the evidence of
            Jagat Singh, but for whose prompt assistance the case
            would not have seen the light of day and whose statement
G           had immediately been recorded by the D.S.P., is amply
            corroborated by other evidence mentioned above to inspire
            confidence in his testimony. Apart from that the fact of
            recovery of the gold coins in the pocket of the appellant
            gave a seal of.finality to the truth of the charge against
            the appellant. If Jagat Singh had accepted the bribe he
H           would have been guilty under Section 161 IPC. There is,
             DEVRAJ v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH                                331
                  [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

      therefore, clear abetment by the appellant of the offence              A
      under Section 161 !PC and the ingredients of Section 165-
      A !PC are established against him. "
      17. Another judgment which needs to be noted is Khujji v. St(lte
of M.P., (1991) 3 SCC 627. This Court in the above case held that
merely because a witness was declared hostile, his entire evidence cannot    B
be treated as effaced from the record,his testimony, to the extent found
reliable, can be acted upon. In paragraph 6 following was observed:
        "6...... The evidence of PW 3 Kishan Lal and PW 4 Ramesh
      came to be rejected by the trial court because they were
      declared hostile to the prosecution by the learned Public              c
      Prosecutor as they refused to identify the appellant and
      his companions in the dock as the assailants of the
      deceased. But counsel for the State is right when he submits
      that the evidence of a witness, declared hostile, is not
      wholly effaced from the record and that part of the evidence
      which is othenvise acceptable can be acted upon. It seems              D
      to be well settled by the decisions     of this Court- Bhagwan
                                    r/9 7 6 1 sec 389        ·
      Sin~h v. State of Haryana, ' ~                  , Rabindra Kumar
                                  1976          233
      Dey v. Stale of Orissq/          ; ./ sec      and Syad Akbar v.
        -·             ·    fl9oo 1 sec 30
      State of Karnataka,        ~           ' - that the evidence of a
      prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely                  E
      because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and
      cross-examined him. The evidence of such witnesses cannot
      be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether
      but the same can be accepted to the extent their version is
      found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof .... "
                                                                             F
       18. The above propositions have again been reiterated by this
Court in Vi11od Kum(lr vs. State of P1111jab, (2015) 3 SCC 220, where
in paragraph 31 following has been stated:
      "31.     The next aspect which requires to be adverted to
      is whether testimony of a hostile evidence that has come               G
      on record should be relied upon or not. Mr. Jain, learned
      senior counsel for the appellant would contend that as
      PW-7 has totally resiled in his cross-examination, his
      evidence is to be discarded in toto. On a perusal of the
      testimony of the said witness, it is evincible that in
      examination-in-chief, he has supported the prosecution                 H
332            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2016] 3 S.C.R.


A           story in entirety and in the cross-examination he has taken
            the path of prevarication. In Blwgwm1 Singh V. State of
            Haryana· 0976J 1 sec 389 . it has been laid doll'n that even
            if a witness is characterized has a hostile witness, his
            evidence is not completely effaced. The said evidence
            remains admissible in the trial and there is no legal bar to
B
            base a conviction upon his testimony. if corroborated by
            other reliable evidence. In Klwji@Surendra Tiwari V. State
            of Madhya Pradesh•n 99 i; 3 sec 627 . the Court after
            referring to the authorities in Blzagwan Singh (supra).
            Rabindra Kumar Dey V. State of Orissa,( 1976J ./sec 233 and
c           Syad Akbar V. State of Kamataka•n 9811J 1 sec 311 . opined
            that the e-vidence of such a witness cannot be effaced or
            washed off the record altogether, but the same can be
            accepted to the extent it is found to be dependable on a
            careful scrutiny thereof "
D            19. The evidence of a witness who has been declared hostile can
      be relied if there are some other material on the basis of which said
      evidence can be corroborated. More so, that part of evidence of a witness
      as contained in examination-in-chief, which remains unshaken even after
      cross-examination, is fully reliable even though the witness has been
 E
      declared hostile.

             20. It is relevant to note that the trial began against six accused
      persons. Shivlochan-PW.13 in his examination-in-chief took the name
      of Devraj alone who was stated to have assaulted Devi Prasad.
      Shivlochan did not mention in his examination-in-chiefaboutthe presence
 F    of other accused which may be a reason for the prosecution to get the
      witness declared as hostile. It is, however, relevant to note that even in
      the cross-examination the witness repeated that he heard Devraj saying
      "Maro Sale Ko" who had assaulted Devi Prasad and Devi Prasad @
      Prachar cried "Bachao Bachao". The factum of assault by Devraj was
      throughout maintained by the witness. Thus, even though witness was
 G    declared as hostile witness his evidence so far as the role of Devraj is
      unshaken. Similarly, evidence of Ajar Das-PW.16, where in his
      examination-in-chief he stated that accused Devraj gave three lathi blows
      to Devi Prasad which was seen by him. The witness fu1ther stated that
      Devraj threatened him to run away otherwise he shall also be assaulted.
 H    Even after the witness was declared hostile he maintained his stand that
              DEVRAJ v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH                                 333
                   [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

he forbidden Devraj from assaulting Devi Prasad. He further stated that A
he saw Devraj and Dinda assaulting Devi Prasad in the night and on the
next day the dead body was found below Rakhet Pulia. The witness
further stated that due to land dispute Devraj and Dinda had assaulted ·
Devi Prasad. In cross-examination he voluntarily stated that he had seen
the accused giving three lathi blows. Further, he stated that he did not
                                                                         B
see that whom he has beaten because it was dark. The statement in
cross-examination in no manner dilute the value of the evidence. It was
Devi Prasad who received injury whose dead body was found next day
morning. The statement that it was Devraj who gave three lathi blows
obviously referred to lathi blow to Devi Prasad-deceased. Thus, we
conclude that in spite of witnesses PW.13 and PW.16 having been          c
declared as hostile witnesses their evidence that Devraj assaulted Devi
Prasad is unshaken and has rightly been relied by the com1s below in
recording conviction.
       21. As noted above Ratan Guruji was pillion rider along with
deceased-Devi Prasad and after they proceeded from the house of Devi           D
Prasad on the motorcycle after some distance near pakkar tree they
were stopped by five persons. The vehicle was got stopped by those
persons they asked as to who is sitting behind, upon this Devi Prasad
said that Ratan Guruj i of Chandra was sitting. Then Dinda came towards
them having a torch with him. Ratan Guruj i stated that one person came
from behind with geda and shouted "maro, kya dekh rahe ho" and he              E
assaulted Devi Prasad with geda. Devi Prasad on being assaulted ran
towards back side and shouted "bachao bachao". Thus, statement of
Ratan Guruj i of assault on Devi Prasad when read with the evidence of
PW.13 and PW.16 clearly indicates tli ... 1 it was Devraj who had assaulted
Devi Prasad which caused death of the deceased.                                F
         22. Learned coun:;el for the appellant has further contended that
  injury given by danda cannot be said to be sufficient for death of a
  person and there is no evidence to indicate that the injury caused by
  Devraj was sufficient for death. He further submitted that Dr. K.P.
  Vishwakarma-PW.20, in his statement stated that injuries which were
                                                                               G
  found in the person of Devi Prasad-deceased could have been received
  in an accident. We have gone through the statement of Dr. K.P.
  Vishwakarma-PW.20 and the post111011em report. The Doctor-PW.20
. in his statement after referring to the injuries received by the deceased
  fiasclearly stated that only some of the injuries could have been caused
  by accident.                                                                 H
334            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2016] 3 S.C.R. ·


A            23. Dr. K.P. Vishwakarma in his statement has stated that the
      cause of death is head injury caused to the deceased. Thus, there is
      Doctor's evidence that all the injuries which were found on the person
      of the deceased could not have been caused due to the accident that is
      falling below Rakhet Pulia.
B            24. There being clear evidence of stopping of the motorcycle near
      pakkar tree and ensuing quarrel and assault on Devraj the theory of
      accident as sought to be suggested by the learned counsel for the appellant
      is wholly unreliable. The details in the Pandmama of the dead body and
      position of the dead body as stated.by Anup Shai Rajwade, Inspector of
      Police-PW.11, in his statement completely bely the theory of accident.
c     Jn the examination-in-chief he stated about the injuries, further stated
      that in between both the legs, between the thigh one white bottle of one
      litre having half bottle of liquor was kept and at a distance of 4 ft. the
      motorcycle was there key of which was put on a stone. He further
      stated that motorcycle was not damaged since only back light was
D     damaged which indicates that motorcycle was brought and thrown in
      the water. The manner in which liquor bottle was kept between the thigh
      of dead body and glass of back light of the motorcycle alone being
      damaged does not support the theory of accident. Thus, there are more
      than one reasons for rejecting the theory of accident and there was
      evidence to prove that the deceased was assaulted and murdered and
E     thereafter body and the motorcycle was brought and put below the Pu lia.
      Both Trial Court and the High Court have referred to and relied on
      sufficient evidence for convicting the accused. We, ourselves after going
      through the evidence relied on by the courts below for convicting the
      accused, are of the opinion that the prosecution has successfully proved
 F    beyond reasonable doubt that it was accused who had caused homicidal
      death of the deceased.
             25. We are also conscious that the jurisdiction which this Court
      exercises under Article 136 has its own self-imposed restrictions. It is
      sufficient to refer to this Court's decision reported in Ganga Kumar
G     Srivastava v. State of Bihar, (2005) 6 SCC 211, where this Court
      after referring to various decisions has laid down certain principles for
      exercising the power of this Court under Atticle 136. It is useful to refer
      to paragraph 10 of the judgment, which is :
             "10. From the aforesaid series of decisions of this Court on
 H           the exercise of power of the Supreme Court under A1ticle 136
             DEVRAJ v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH                                 335
                  [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

      of the Constitution following principles emerge:                       A
      (i) The powers of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution
      are very wide but in criminal appeals this Court does riot
      interfere with the concurrent findings of fact save in exceptional
      circumstances.
      (ii) It is open to this Court to interfere with the findings of fact    B
      given by the High Court, ifthe High Court has acted perversely
      or otherwise improperly.
      (iii) It is open to this Court to invoke the power under Article
      136 only in very exceptional circumstances as and when a
      question oflaw of general public importance arises or a decision        c
      shocks the conscience of the Court.
      (iv) When the evidence adduced by the prosecution fell short
      of the test ofreliability and acceptability and as such it is highly
      unsafe to act upon it.
      (v) Where the appreciation of evidence and finding is vitiated          D
      by any error of law of procedure or found contrary to the
      principles ofnaturaljustice, errors ofrecord and misreading of
      the evidence, or where the conclusions of the High Court are
      manifestly perverse and unsupportable from the evidence on
      record."                                                               .E
       26. To the similar effect, another judgment of this Court reported
in Almnelu v. State, (2011) 2 SCC 385, where this Court held that
even though the powers of this Court under Article 136 are very wide,
but in criminal appeals, this Court would not interfere with the
concurrent findings of facts, save in very exceptional cases. Following
                                                                              F
was laid down in paragraph 19:
      "19. We have considered the submissions made by the
      learned counsel for the parties. Before we embark upon
      an examination ofthe evidence, we may point out that even
      though the powers of this Court under Article I 36 of the
                                                                              G
      Constitution are very wide, but in criminal appeals, this
      Court would not interfere with the concurrent findings of
      facts, save in very exceptional cases. Jn an appeal under
      Article I 36 of the Constitution, this Court does not normally
      appreciate the evidence by itself and go into the question
      of credibility of witnesses. The assessment of the evidence             H
336            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2016] 3 S.C.R.



A           by the High Court is accepted as final except where the
            conclusions recorded by the High Court are ma11ifestly
            perverse and unsupportable by the evidence on record.
            Keeping in view the aforesaid principles, we have exami11ed
            the findings recorded by the courts below. "
B            27. On the principles as laid down by this Court for exercise f
      jurisdiction under Article 136, we are satisfied that the findings recorded
      by the courts below from the evidence on record fully justify the conviction
      of accused. The findings recorded by the cou11s below can neither be
      said to be perverse nor contain any such ilie gal ity which may render the
      findings not reliable.
c
            28. We thus do not find any merit in this appeal. The appeal is
      dismissed.


      Devika Gujral                                              Appeal dismissed.


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