Holding

The Court dropped further disciplinary proceedings but ordered the Central Vigilance Commission to investigate and determine the quantum of loss to the banks.

Summary

The Delhi Development Authority (DDA) had awarded a plot of land to Skipper Construction Co. (Pvt.) Ltd., which later sought a bank guarantee from New Bank of India for the balance payment. The bank officials allegedly facilitated the guarantee with irregularities, prompting a disciplinary inquiry. The Supreme Court, applying the Wednesbury test under Article 14, dropped further disciplinary proceedings against the officials but held that the matter required a detailed assessment of the loss suffered by the banks. Consequently, the Court directed the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) to investigate the alleged malfeasance and quantify the loss, also instructing the CVC to consider the CBI report. The Court’s order effectively disposed of the petition while mandating a separate inquiry.

Issues considered

The applicability of the Wednesbury principle in reviewing the disciplinary action against bank officials under Article 14.
Whether the Administrative Authority should take further steps against the erring bank officials.
The necessity for a CVC investigation to ascertain the quantum of loss to the banks due to alleged malfeasance and misfeasance.

Subjects

bank guaranteeadministrative lawWednesbury principleArticle 14Central Vigilance Commissiondisciplinary actionmalfeasancemisfeasancepublic sector banksloss assessment

Judgment

DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY A
V.

SKIPPER CONSTRUCTION CO. (PVT.) LTD. AND ANR.

NOVEMBER 13, 2002

[UMESH C. BANERJEE AND SHIVARAJ V. PATIL, JJ.] B

Bank Guarantee-Role played by Bank officials-Loss to Bank-
Administrative Authority initiated disciplinary action against the erring Bank
officials-Supreme Court dropped the proceedings in the light of Wednesburry C
principles-Administrative Authority did not take appropriate steps-Central
Vigilance Commission to investigate into the n1atter to ascertain quantun1 of
loss suffered by banks by malfeasance and misfeasance of erring officials and
submit report-Directions issued

Respondent, a construction Company engaged in the development D
and construction of commercial and residential complexes was a successful
bidder in respect of plot of land auctioned by the appellant and had
deposited part payment and subsequently, some more amount was paid
to the appellant. Appellant agreed to recover balance amount with certain
... rate of interest in instalments. Respondent approached a Bank for issuance
of bank guarantee for the balance amount and interest. Bank guarantee E
was allowed by mortgaging certain properties belonging to respondent,
personal guarantee of its directors, lien over unsold space and collateral
security of counter guarantee of the company. This Court noticed
irregularities committed by the bank officials in advancement of loans and
bank guarantees and, therefore, got the matter enquired into by a sitting F
Judge of High Court. In the meanwhile, on the question of issuance of bank
guarantee for and on behalf of respondent, two Dy. Governors of the
Reserve Bank of India also submitted their report. This Court vide its
judgment dated 17.11.2000, upon consideration of the Commission Report
and in the light of Wednesbury principles, dropped further proceedings
against the erring officials. Administrative Authority did not feel it G
expedient to take any step or steps against the erring officials.

Considering the matter further, this Court

ORDERED:
177
H
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A The matter requires a further look by the Court for the purposes of ...
ascertainment of the quantum of loss suffered by the bank or banks by
reason of malfeasance and misfeasance of the concerned officials of the
public sector banks, irrespective of factum of death or retirement. The
Central Vigilance Commission shall investigate the matter in terms of this
B .order without being inhibited by any restraint or any other Report or
Reports for the purposes of assessment of the situation. In this context
that the Commission should also take note of the Report of the Deputy
Superintendent of Police, CBI, New Delhi. (186-G-H; 187-A-B)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition No.
C (C) No. 21000 of 1993.
From the Judgment and Order dated 9.12.1993 of the Delhi High
Court in suit No. 770 of 1993.

Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, K.J. John, Jana Kalyan Das, R.C. Gubrele,
D V.K. Verma, M/s. Rajinder Narain & Co., S.P. Sharma, H.S. Parihar, P.R.
Ramasesh, K.K. Gupta, Anil K. Chopra, Mrs. Manita Sharma, Sunil Dogra,
Ms. Sayali Phakat, for M/s. Suresh A. Shroff & Co., C.N. Sree Kumar,
Arvind Kumar Sharma, S.K. Verma, Davinder Kumar, for Mis. J.B.D. &
Co., Ms. Manjula Gupta, Sandeep Narain, for Mis. S. Narain & Co., H.K.
Puri, K.S. Rana, Mrs Sumita Mukherjee, A. Mariarputham, Ms. Aruna
E Mathur, for Mis. Arputham, .Aruna & Co., Ms. Abba R. Sharma, Ms.
Sushma Suri, Arun K. Sinha, P. Parmeswaran, 8. Krishna Prasad, Prem
Malhotra, Ms. S. Janani, Abhijat, P. Medh, Ashok Mathur, Annam D.N.
Rao, Ravindra Kumar, Chander Shekhar Ashri, S. Uday Kumar Sagar,
Ramesh Babu M.R., Rajeev Sharma, Vishnu B. Saharaya, for M/s. Saharya
F & Co., Ms. Asha Jain Madan, B.K. Satija, P.K. Manohar, Sanjay R. Hegde,
Pradeep Mishra, S. Muralidhar, P.H. Parekh, K.B. Rohtagi, Krishnamurti
Swami, Ashok K. Srivastava, Ms. Indua Malhotra and Ms. Nasmine Tarapore,
for M/s. Narendra Lal & Co., for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
BANERJEE, J. Mis Skipper Constructions (P) Ltd. was incorporated
on 14th February, 1986 to undertake development and construction of
commercial and residential complexes. The activity is generally financed
from advances/deposits from prospective buyers. Skipper has had five other
associates : Skipper Tower Private Limited; Skipper Builders Private ·Limited;
H Skipper Salis Private Limited; Skipper Properties Private Limited; and Anand
j
D.D.A. v. SKIPPER CONSTRUCTION CO. (PVT.) LTD. [BANERJEE. J.] J79

Construction (Delhi) Private Limited. A
The contextual facts depict that in an auction held on 8th October. 1980
in respect of the plot of land in Jhandewalan. the bid of Rs. 982 lacs offered
by Skipper Constructions was accepted by the Delhi Development Authority
(DDA herein). The Company had deposited Rs. 245.75 lacs on the date of
auction and the balance amount of Rs. 736.25 lacs was required to be deposited B
within 90 days. The records depict that the Company was able to raise a sum
of Rs. 645.66 lacs from the flat owners in stages, out of which Rs. 583.25
lacs were paid to the DDA towards the cost of the land. The DDA, however,
had agreed to recover the balance amount of Rs. 398.75 lacs together with
interest at the rate of 18% per annum amounting to Rs. 392.61 lacs accumulated C
up to the end of year 1985 in five equal instalments in 2-112 years and
delivered possession of the land against bank guarantee for the like amount.
The Company accordingly approached the New Bank of India, Tolstoy Marg
Branch in January 1986 with the request for issuance of bank guarantee of
Rs. 7.90 crores to be executed in favour of the DDA. The said guarantee "as
required to be given as the cost of land was not paid in full by the Company D
to the DDA. The Company proposed to construct the flats on a portion of the
Jhandewalan Tower, New Delhi.

The facts further depict that on receipt of the letter dated 23rd January,
1986 from the Skipper Company, the Tolstoy Marg Branch of New Bank of
India recommended the facility of having the bank guarantee sanctioned by E
charging I% commission per annum on diminishing balance of half yearly
rests together with a margin of 15% in the form of FDR main security by
equitable mortgage of property No.3, Aurangzeb Road, New Delhi and the
lien over unsold space in ,Jhandewalan Tower amounting to Rs.676.09 lacs
along with collateral security of counter guarantee of the Company and F
personal guarantee of the Directors Tejwant Singh and Harpreet Singh having
net means of Rs. 2,78,000 and Rs. 2,51,706 respectively.

The factual score further depicts that the application of the party for
issue of guarantee was duly receive<! by the Head Office and after initial
quib.bles, the proposal was finally sanctioned by the Board of New Bank of G
India and the limit was enhanced from Rs. 7.90 crores to Rs.8.70 crores.

The role played by the bank officials, however, did not find favour
with this Court and without much of a narration on the factual score since the
matter is kept pending in this Court for quite some time, it would be worthwhile
only to noto that liberality in advancement of loans and bank guarantees H
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A prompted this Court to have the matter inquired into by a sitting Judge of the
High Court.

Presently for our purpose, we are concerned with the Report as detailed
out by Justice Saharya, a former Judge of the Delhi High Court and a former
Chief Justice of Punjab and Haryana High Court.
B
Significantly, however, the issue was examined by the two Deputy
Governors of the Reserve Bank of India relating to the question on the
issuance of the guarantee for and on behalf of Skipper Constructions by the
New Bank oflndia and Canara Bank. The Report of the Governors stands out
to be singularly singular in its vagueness and we do think it fit, however, to
C put on record relevant extracts of the same.

"6.25. In regard to the conspiracy, the persons referred to represent
different interests and con°t:!•1encies. There is no clear evidence that
there was any communication amongst them in the matter nor was
there any concerted action apparent. In fact, there has been resistance
D with some of them at different points of time, to the whole proposal.
There is, therefore, no evidence beyond a remote suspicion of any
conspiracy.
6.26. The question of loss to the banks is extremely critical because
neither malafides nor personal gains have been established. Hence ~
E further action can be supported only on the basis of crystallisation of
loss. The properties under dispute are still under examination in the
courts. PNB is pursuing the matter in various judicial fora. At this
stage, therefore, it is not possible to assess whether a loss would
occur and if it occurs, what would be the extent of loss.
F 6.27 Responsibility of the CMDs & Board Directors.

6.28 As regards the relative role of ~he persons referred to, the matter
has been dealt extensively in the context of analysing the statements
•'
made by them. The banks' Boards as institutions have been found to
be not actively involved though the Board of New Bank of India has
G a greater responsibility in the matter. Hence personal responsibility
cannot be fixed in the case of seven (7) members of the Board referred
to viz. Smt. T.R. Sahni, S/Shri Sudarshan Lal, S.S. Ranade, J.P.
Awasthi, J.K. Sawhney, Dr. M.R. Kotdawala and Shri D. Seetharama.

In respect of CMDs, the role of Canara Bank being a partiCipant
H rather than a lead bank, there is no evidence to show that there was
D.D.A. v. SKIPPER CONSTRUCTION CO. (PVT.) LTD. [BANERJEE. J.] 181

any act of omission or commission on the part of late Shri B. Ratnakar A
in this regard and E.C. would not hold him responsible. The primary
responsibility for initiating the case, considering it, taking it repeatedly
before the Board, getting it approved, following it up at the
implementation stage in whatever manner that happened should
squarely be placed on the then CMD of the New Bank of India (viz.
Shri R.C. Suneja). However, action· can justifiably be contemplated B
once the loss to the bank is established and crystallized."

It is on the basis of the Report of the Deputy Governors of the Reserve
Bank of India that Canara Bank officials as well wanted to put on record a
clean chit to late Shri B. Ratnakar and the only person in terms of the report C
of the Deputy Governors responsible for financial irregularities seems to be
R.C. Suneja.

The defence of Suneja, however, in the affidavit had been a complete
denial and a categoric denial as to the existence of any procedural illegality
neither any malfeasance or misfeasance stand out to be noticed by the scrutiny D
'of account by the two Deputy Governors of the Reserve Bank of India. The
Board itself sanctioned guarantee upon proper inquiries being made and Mr.
Suneja is not the only person in the Board who was responsible for the grant
and it is in this context the Report stands contradicted by Mr. Suneja recording
therein that no individual responsibility can be foisted on to the latter as
otherwise it would be travesty of justice and to seek a scapegoat in Mr. Suneja. E
We do find some justification in such a statement why alone and not other
members of the Board including the representatives of the Reserve Bank of
India the answer seems to be delightfully vague in the two Deputy Governors'
Report.

Saharya Commission did go into the issue and indicated in a tabular F
column the norms required to be followed when a bank guarantee is issued
and the status in respect of its compliance. A very significant finding in the
report is to be found wherein it is clear that the Board of Directors of the New
Bank of India had specifically declined on 13 .3. I 986 the proposal of giving
Skipper a bank gu'arantee and in fact that meeting was a follow-up of an earlier G
Board meeting of 18.2. I 986 where also the Board had not been too enthusiastic
about the proposal. However suddenly in the meeting of 17.3.1986 the Skipper
case rose from the dead like a phoenix and the matter was reconsidered when
the same was not even on the agenda.

The report indicates further that there were several lacunae in terms of H
182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A supervision by intermediary authorities such as Regional Office and also wrong
forms were used in the transaction.

While inquiring into the role of the individual officers and the members
of Board the Commission comes to a finding that there was complete lack of
prudence on the part of the officials. Further, the Commission comes to a
B definite finding after discussing the role played by the various officers at
different levels in the hierarchy of the bank as follows : .

"I have no hesitation to conclude that the transaction from its very
inception was unsafe. It was not adequately secured. It was not
profitable. It was, therefore, not prudent for the two banks to get into
c it. I have also no hesitation to conclude that the concerned officials
of the said two banks did not act diligently or prudently in extending
the facility to the Company."

In fine, the report concluded as below :

D (a) that the two Banks granted the facility of Bank Guarantee in
violation of statutory norms as well as established practices and
procedures;
(b) that Mr. R.C. Suneja, Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the
New Bank of India while holding public office in fiduciary
E capacity was the prime functionary, who, intentionally,
fraudulently and to further the interests of the Company played
a major role in the grant of the facility thereby defrauding the
bank and causing it huge losses;
(c) that other functionaries of the New Bank of India as named in
Issue No.2 violated the established norms and procedure in grant
F of the facility as well as non-fulfillment of the conditions laid
down in the Bank Guarantee;
(d) that Mr. B.R. Ratnakar, Chairman-cum-Managing Director,
Canara Bank, intentionally and with knowledge that sanction of
the proposal was neither in consonance with the norms nor was
G it for the benefit and in the interest of the Bank, involved the
Bank in the transaction;
(e) that the other functionaries of the Canara Bank as named in Issue
No.2 directly assisted the Company to get participation of Canara
Bank in the unprofitable transaction and did not ensure fulfillment
H of the conditions contained in the guarantee;
0.0.A. v. SKIPPER CONSTRUCTION CO. (PVT.) LTD. [BANERJEE, l.) J83

(f) that it stands established that the two banks intentionally and A
with full knowledge sacrificed all norms, caution, care and
prudence in granting the facility;
(g) that the concerned functionaries of the Reserve Bank of India
did not take due notice of the quarterly/half yearly reports
submitted by its nominee Directors and therefore due to their B
inaction corrective steps could not be initiated within time;.
(h) that because of the inaction of the senior functionaries of the
Department of Banking in dealing with the allegations/complaints
against Mr. R.C. Suneja, initiation of corrective measures got
delayed to a point when substantial damages had already been C
caused; and
(i) that the manner of scrutiny of proposal of the Company, the
grant of the facility, the monitoring of the conditions of the
facility, inaction on the reports by the RBI Nominee Director
and inaction on the complaints made to Government especially D
the one made by 28 sitting M.Ps. establishes that things were
"rotten" and stinking not only in the two Banks but all over.

It is indeed essential to note that in spite of concluding that there were
in fact intentional acts on the part of the officials the Commission did not,
however, feel it expedient to note or quantify the amount of misfeasance and E
malfeasance on the part of the bank officials.

Incidentally, :his Court in its decision pertaining to an issue of more or
less similar nature did hear the matter in great length in the matter of proposal
to reopen the quantum of punishment imposed in the departmental inquiry held
on certain officers of the Delhi Development Authority who were connected F
with the land of DDA allotted to Skipper Construction Company. It was
proposed to consider imposition of higher degree of punishment in view of
the role of those officers since the Court had no occasion to examine whether
the right punishments were awarded to the officers in accordance with the
known principles of law or whether the punishment required any upward G
revision. It is in the light of the above situation this Court by its order dated
17.11.2000 and upon reliance to the Wednesbury principles stated the law to
be as below:

" ...........where administrative action is challenged under Article 14 as
being discriminatory equals are treated unequally or unequals are H
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A treated equally, the question is for the Constitutional Courts as primary
reviewing courts to consider correctness of the level of discrimination
applied and whether it is excessive and whether it has_ a nexus with
the objective intended to be achieved by the administrator. Here the
court deals with the merits of the balancing action of the administrator
and is, in essence, applying "proportionality" and is primary reviewing
B authority.

But where an adm_inistrative action is challenged as "arbitrary"
under Article 14 on the basis of Royappa E.P. Royappa v. State of
TN., [1974] 4 SCC 3 (as in cases where punishments in disciplinary
cases are challenged), the question will be whether the administrative
c order is "rational" or "reasonable" and the test then is the Wednesbury
test. The courts would then be confined only to a secondary role and
will only have to see whether the administrator has done well in his
primary role, whether he has acted illegally or has omitted relevant
factors from consideration or has taken irrelevant factors into
D consideration or whether his view is one which no reasonable person
could have taken. If his action does not satisfy these rules, it is to be
treated as arbitrary. [In G.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council,
[ 1991] 3 SCC 91 at 111 Venkatachaliah J. (as he then was) pointed
out that "reasonableness".ofthe administrator under Article 14 in the
context of administrative law has to be judged from the stand point
E of Wednesbury rules. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India, [1994] 6
SCC 651 at 679-80), Indian Express Newspapers Bombay (P) Ltd. v.
Union of India, [1985] l SCC 641 at 691, Supreme Court Employees'
Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, [1989] 4 SCC 187 at 241 and U.P.
Financial Corpn. v. Gem Cap (India) (P) Ltd., [1993] 2 SCC 299 at
F 307 while judging whether the administrative action is "arbitrary"
under Article 14 (i.e. otherwise then being discriminatory), this Court
has confined itself to a Wednesbury review always.

Thus, when administrative action is attacked as discriminatory
under Article 14, the principle of primary review is for the courts by
G applying proportionality. However, where administrative action is
questioned as "arbitrary:" under Article 14, the principle of secondary
review based on Wednesbury principles applies.

Proportionality and punishments in service law

.The principles explained in the last preceding paragraph in respect
H
D.D.A. v. SKIPPER CONSTRUCTION CO. (PVT.) LTD. [BANERJEE. J.]] 85

of Article 14 are now to be applied here where the question of A
"arbitrariness" of the order of punishment is questioned under Article
14.

In this context, we shall only refer to these cases. In Ran/ii Thakur
v. Union of India, (1987] 4 SCC 611 this Court referred to
''proportionality" in quantum of punishment but the Court observed B
that the punishment was "shockingly" disproportionate to the
misconduct proved. In B.C. Cha111rvedi v. Union of India, (1995] 6
SCC 749 this Court stated that the Court will not interfere unless the
punishment awarded was one which shocked the conscience of the
court. Even then, the court would remit the matter back to the authority C
and would not normally substitute one punishment for the other.
However, in rare situations, the court could award an alternative
penalty. It was also so stated in Ganayutham Union of India v.
Ganayutham, (1997] 7 SCC 463.

Thus, from the above principles and decided cases, it must be held that D
where an administrative decision relating to punishment in disciplinary cases
is questioned as "arbitrary" under Article 14, the court is confined to
Wednesbury principles as a secondary reviewing authority. The court will not
apply proportionality as a primary reviewing court because no issue of
fundamental freedoms nor of discrimination under Article 14 applies in such
a context. The court while reviewing punishment and if it is satisfied that E

.. Wednesbury principles are violated, it has normally to remit the matter to the
administrator for a fresh decision as to the quantum of punishment. Only in
rare cases where there has been long delay in the time taken by the disciplinary
proceedings and in the time taken in the courts, and such extreme or rare cases
can the court substitute its own view as to the quantum of punishment."
F
• In fine, however, this Court in the last noted decision of which one of
us (U.C. Banerjee, J.) was a party concluded :

"In the result, we do not propose to pursue the matter further and
we drop further proceedings. The show-cause notice is disposed of G
accordingly."

The situation presently is slightly different. The Administrative Authority
did not feel it expedient to take any step or steps as against the erring officials
and discharged its obligation by recording the above.

H
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A The Report of the Deputy Governors as regards the relative role of
persons who have in fact dealt with the matter is rather significant. The clean
chit has been made available to Smt. T.R. Sahni, S/Shri Sudarshan Lal, S.S.
Ranade, J.P. Awasthi, J.K. Sawhney, Dr. M.R. Kotdawala and D. Seetharama
and the CMD of the New Bank of India has been found to be squarely
B responsible for such a mess up and having irregularity obviously the decision
was not of one individual but of the body in its entirety. It is thus extremely
significant as to how the responsibility stands foisted on to one individual rather
than a body of persons who had taken up on themselves to sanction the limit
or for issuance of the guarantee. We thus are not in a position to record our
concurrence with report of the Deputy Governors of the Reserve Bank of India.
C Undue burden stands foisted on to one particular individual, whereas others
have not been assigned any role which runs counter obviously to the entire
bankii:tg practice. We are not trying to exclude Mr. Suneja but he cannot be
held to be the only responsible officer for a transaction of this magnitude :
Incidentally, as noticed above, it is not the Managing Director only who takes
D the decision but the Board itself and when that be the usual practice, this
anxiety to let off others does not stand to reason and hence we find some
justification in the criticism levelled by the learned Advocate appearing for
Mr. Suneja. It seems the two Governors of the Reserve Bank of India have
been proceeding more on ethical value rather than practicability of the situation
ethical since in common and popular acceptation no one ought to speak ill of
E a dead man. Canara Bank has been let off absolutely free the only reason
available that the latter is not a lead bank, rather a participant bank : a
participant bank thus can do no wrong if that be the methodology of working ....
of the banking structure of the country it is a sad day for the entire banking
industry. We, however, refrain ourselves from making any further comments
thereon by reason of the proposed order, which we record hereinbelow.
F
Order

In our view, the matter requires a further look by a functionary of the
· Stat~ for the purposes of ascertainment of the quantum of Joss suffered by the
bank or banks by reason of malfeasance and misfeasance of the concerned
G officials of the public sector banks, in particular that of Canara Bank and New
Bank of India, irrespective of factum of death or retirement. The matter in
issue is to be dealt with and be considered by the Central Vigilance
Commission for the purposes aforesaid. We are aware of the factum of there
being a Report of the Central Vigilance Commission, but unfortunately this
H Court had not had the privilege of having a detailed Report in the matter by
D.D.A. v. SKIPPER CONSTRUCTION CO. (PVT.) LTD. [BANERJEE, J.) 187

reason of certain technicality. We do feel it expedient on that score to record A
that the Central Vigilance Commission shall investigate the matter in terms
of this order as an independent agency of the country without being inhibited
by any restraint or any other Report or Reports for the purposes of assessment
of the situation. It is in this context, however, that the Commission should also
take note of the Report of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, CBI, New B
Delhi.

The observations made in this order are confined to the disposal of the
objection pertaining to Saharya Commission's Report being a part of I.A.
No.56, which stands disposed of earlier. They are not to be taken as any
expression on merits affecting the investigation to be made by the Central C
Vigilance Commission pursuant to this order.

The Commission is however further directed to file a present status
Report pertaining to its earlier Report dated Isl July, 1992 by Shri Harinder
Singh, Director, Central Vigilance Commission, bearing No.V25/BNK 19.
D
The Registry is directed to communicate this order to the Central
Vigilance Commission so as to enable the Commission to complete the inquiry
within a period of 18 months and file a Report in a sealed cover before this
Court.

S.K.S. Matter is pending.

'