Holding

The power to commute a sentence under Section 433(d) Cr.P.C. lies solely with the appropriate Government; a High Court cannot assume that power or issue mandatory directions that deprive the Government of its discretion.

Summary

The respondent, Manohar Lal, was convicted under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and sentenced to one year of simple imprisonment plus a fine. The trial court and the First Appellate Court upheld the conviction and sentence, holding that the power to commute under Section 433(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 resides exclusively with the appropriate Government. The Delhi High Court, relying on earlier Supreme Court directions in Santosh Kumar and N. Sukumaran Nair, commuted the sentence by ordering the respondent to pay a fine of Rs 20,000 and directing the Government to formalise the commutation. The State appealed, contending that the High Court had no jurisdiction to assume the statutory power of commutation and that such direction defeated legislative intent to impose a minimum sentence for food adulteration offences. The Supreme Court held that the High Court cannot usurp the power vested in the appropriate Government under Section 433(d) and set aside the High Court’s order, clarifying that precedent cannot be mechanically applied to confer jurisdiction absent statutory authority.

Issues considered

The High Court's jurisdiction to exercise the power of commutation of sentence under Section 433(d) Cr.P.C.
Whether a High Court can issue a mandatory direction to the appropriate Government, removing its discretion.
The applicability of the Supreme Court's directions in Santosh Kumar and N. Sukumaran Nair as a general rule for commutation.
The effect of legislative intent to prescribe a minimum sentence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act on the exercise of commutation powers.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 433(d)
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954s. 16, s. 2(ia)(a), s. 7

Subjects

Section 433 CrPCcommutation of sentencePrevention of Food Adulteration Actjudicial precedentlegislative intentappropriate GovernmentHigh Court jurisdiction

Judgment

DELHI ADMINISTRATION (NOW N.C.T. OF DELHI) A
V.

MANOHAR LAL

AUGUST 29, 2002

[DORAISWAMY RAJU AND SHIVARAJ V. PATIL, JJ.) B

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Section 433 (d)-Commutation of
se/1/ence-Power of-Trial court convicted and sentenced offender under
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954-First Appellate Court confirmed C
the same-High Court commuted the se/1/ence and issued mandatory directions
to Government--Correctness of-Held, High Court cannot assume powers
when statute specifical~v ell/rusts it to the appropriate Govemment-Prevention
of Food Adulteration Act. 1954.

Precedent--Not to be applied mechanically-Courts to find out the ratio, D
ascertain the law and then apply it appropriately to the cases before them.

Respondent was convicted and sentenced for an offence under
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. First Appellate Court upheld
the conviction and refused to grant benefit of commutation of sentence to
respondent. Respondent challenged the order of sentence but not E
conviction. High Court relying on *Santosh Kumar's case and the
statement of counsel for the State conceding that the case in hand was
similar to *Samosh Kumar's case granted benefit of commutation of
sentence under Section 433(d) Cr.P.C. and directed the respondent to
deposit Rs. 20,000 as fine in trial court and inform Government of such F
deposit.

In appeal to this Court, State contended that High Court could not
order for commutation of sentence, once conviction of respondent was
upheld and no jurisdictional or other error of any kind was also found in
the sentence imposed and that the offence of food adulteration is a social G
evil and when legislature has mandated a minimum sentence for a given
violation, it would not be proper for ordering commutation resulting in
circumvention of.legislative intention.

Disposing of the appeal, the Court
H
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A HELD: I. I High Court was merely swayed by considerations of
,judicial comity and propriety and failed to see that merely because this
Court has issued directions in some other cases, to deal with ihe fact
situation in those other cases, in the purported exercise of its undoubted
inherent and plenary powers to do complete justice, keeping aside even
technicalities, High Court, exercising statutory powers under the Criminal <
B Laws of land, could not afford to assume to itself the powers or jurisdiction
to do the same or similar things. High Court and all other courts in the
country were no doubt ordained to follow and apply the law declared by
this Court, but that does not absolve them of the obligation and
responsibility to find out the ratio of the decision and ascertain the law, if
C any, so declared from a careful reading of the decision concerned and only
thereafter proceed to apply it appropriately to the cases before them.
15-F-H; 6-AJ

1.2. In *Santosh Kumar's and **N. Sukwnaran Nair's cases no law has
been declared nor any principle or question of law has been decided or
D laid down and this Court gave certain directions to dispose of the matter
in the special circumstances noticed by it and the need felt. The same could
not have been mechanically adopted as a general formula to dispose of,
as a matter of routine, all cases coming before any or all the courts as an
universal and invariable solution in all such future cases also. Thus, High
E Court had no justifying reason to disturb the conclusion of First Appellate
Court. 16-A-Ci

*Santosh Kumar v. Municipal Corporation and Anr., 1200019 SCC 151
= 2000 Crl. L.J. 2777 and **N. Sukumaran Nair v. Food Inspector,
Mavelikara, 1199719SCC101, referred to.
i
F 2.1. In the instant case, High Court commuted the sentence and
issued a mandatory direction to Government with no discretion or liberty
left with it to exercise powers under Section 433 (d) Cr.P.C., the same being
part of the residuary sovereign power of the State, except to 'formalise
the same', on payment of fine amount specified by Court. This is nothing
G but assuming powers where there are none for High Court and where the
statute concerned specifically entrusts it to only the appropriate
Gover.nment. J6-G-HJ

State of Punjab v. Kesar Singh. 119961 5 SCC 495, relied on.

H 2.2. Even the appropriate Government may not, as a matter ·or
) DELMI ADMINISTRATION v. MANOI-JAR LAL (D. RA.JU. .I.] 3
routine course, indulge in exercise of such powers at its sweet will, pleasure A·
and whim or fancy. The powers conferred upon the appropriate
Government under Section 433 Cr.P.C. have to be exercised in accordance
with rules and established principles-reasonably and rationally, keeping
in view the reasons germane and relevant for purpose of law under which
conviction and sentence has been imposed, commiserative facts B
necessitating commutation, and interests of society and public interest. The
exercise of any power vested by statute in·a public authority is to be always
''iewed as in trust, coupled with a duty to exercise the same in larger public
and societal interest, too. When, legislature concerned has chosen to
mandate for the imposition of a minimum sentence in a given situation,
responsibility of the appropriate Government becomes all the more greater C
and power under Section 433, Cr.P.C. may have to be exercised with great
circumspection. Otherwise, legislative will might become a mere dead-
letter at the whim of the executive. 17-A-C)

2.3. This judgment shall not be construed to take away the benefit,
if any, already given to an accused, purporting to follow the earlier D
decisions. In the instant case, accused has remitted sum of Rs. 20,000.
Treating this and such cases where already orders have been passed by
Courts, at least, the appropriate Government would do well to grant relief
to accused concerned. If, in any case, it is considered by Government, in
its discretion, not advisable to do so, it is always open to Government E
concerned to either move the very Court or Appellate/Revisional forum
to modify orders so as to leave the matter to the sole discretion of
appropriate Government, to be exercised in accordance with law. 17-D-FI

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 863
of 2002.
F
From the Judg111ent and Order dated 24.4.2001 of the Delhi High Court
in Crl. R.P.No.188 of 200 I.

Harish N. Salve. Solicitor General, Ranji Kumar, Arun K. Singh, (NP),
Ms. Usha Mann, Siddharth Choudhary, D.S. Mabra and Ms. Binu Tamta for G
the appearing pa11ies.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered

0. RAJU, J. Leave granted.

The respondent has been _convict_ed for an offence under Section 16 H
.•..!
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A read with Section 7 for the violation of Section 2(ia) (a),U) of the Prevention
of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') by the
Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, on 9.5.2000 in case No. 42 of 1994.
Thereupon, on 12.5.2000 he was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment
for one year, in addition to a tine of Rs. 2000 in default of payment of which •
to undergo a further sentence of simple imprisonment for one month.
B Thereafter, the respondent went on appeal and the learned Additional Sessions
Judge, New Delhi, by his judgment dated 20.3.200 I in Crl. Appeal No. I I of
2000 affirmed the findings of the trial cou11 that the offence has been properly
proved on the basis of proper and sufficient materials and consequently
sustained the conviction. So far as the question of sentence is concerned,
c adverting to the claim made for the benefit of Section 433 (d) of the Criminal
Procedure Code, the Appellate Judge found it not possible for him to grant
relief on the view that the power to commute under the said provision vests
with the State Government and it was not permissible for him to adopt the
course made in 1996 (2) FAC. 187 by this Court, in exercise of its inherent
powers. The sentence imposed by the trial court was also, thus, confirmed.
D
Aggrieved, the respondent pursued the matter on revision before the
High Court in Crl. Revision Petition No.188 of 200 I. The conviction of the
respondent was not challenged by the respondent before the High Court. So
far as the sentence is concerned, adverting to the certificate of the Director,
Central Food Laboratory, wherein it was found stated that the colouring
E
matter was not injuries to health and placing reliance upon the decision of
this Court reported in 2000 Crl. L. J. 2777, wherein a direction was issued
by this Court to the Government under Section 433 Cr. P.C. benefit of Section
433 (d) Cr. P.C. was claimed for the respondent. Taking into account the
same and the concession said to have been made by the counsel for the State,
F the learned Judge in the High Court felt persuaded to extend the benefit of
commutation of sentence, as envisaged under Section 433 (d) Cr. P.C. and
directed the respondent to deposit in the trial court Rs. 20,000 as fine. in
commutation of the sentence of imprisonment and inform the Government of
such deposit for fonnalising the matter by passing appropriate orders under
Section 433 (d) Cr.P.C. it was also ordered that on deposit of the fine amount,
G the sentence of imprisonment imposed shall stand suspended. Aggrieved
against this order of the High Court dated 24.4.2001 this appeal has been
filed by the Delhi Administration.

The learned Solicitor General, appearing for the appellant, contended
that the High Court could not order for the commutation of the sentence,
H
DELHI ADMINISTRATION'" MANOHAR LAL (D. RAJU. J.] 5
once the conviction of the respondent has been upheld and no jurisdictional A
or other error of any kind was also found in the sentence imposed. Placing
reliance upon a decision of this Court reported in State of Punjab v. Kesar
Singh, [ 1-996] 5 SCC 495, it has been urged that the power under Section 433
CR. P.C. has to be exercised by the State Government, in its discretion and
it is not for the High Court to pass an order for commutation and direct the
State Government to formalise the same on deposit of the fine amount specified B
by the Court. Argued the learned Solicitor General fm1her that the offence of
Food Adulteration is a social evil and when the legislature, keeping in view
of the same, has mandated a minimum sentence for given violation, it would
not be proper for ordering commutation resulting in circumvention of the
legislative intention. Orders of this nature passed in large numbers in New C
Delhi and all over other places in the country are said to be causing severe
impediment in the effective enforcement of the provisions of the Act to curb
the social evil, having further wide ramifications on the society, Shri Ranjit
'II '
Kumar, learned senior counsel, appearing for the respondent with equal force
and vehemence contended that once the so-called adulteration was considered
to be not injurious to health, there is nothing illegal in the course adopted by D
... the High Court, and following the earlier decisions of this Court reported in
N. Sukumaran Nair v. Food inspector, Mavelikara, [ 1997] 9 SCC I 0 I and
Santosh Kumar v. Municipal Corporation and Anr., [2000] 9 SCC 151 ,
more so when the counsel appearing for State in the High Court conceded to
the fact that the case on hand is similar. It was also submitted that the E
respondent has since remitted sum of Rs. 20.000 and the interests of justice
would not suffer a casualty, by allowing the order of the High Court to stand
and the Government passing orders commuting the sentence of imprisonment
into one of fine, as indicated by the High Com1.

We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel F
appearing on either side. Apparently, the learned Judge in the High Court
was merely swayed by considerations of judicial comity and propriety and
failed to see that merely because this Court has issued directions in some
other cases, to deal with the fact situation in those other cases, in the purported
exercise of its undoubted inherent and plenary powers to do complete justice, G
keeping aside even technicalities, the High Court, exercising statutory powers
under the Crim in al Laws of the land, cou Id not afford to assume to itself the
powers or jurisdiction to do the same or similar things. The High Court and
all other courts in the country were no doubt ordained to follow and apply
the law declared by this Court, but that does not absolve them of the obligation /
and responsibility to find out the ratio of the decision and ascertain the law. H
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A if any, so declared from a careful reading of the decision concerned and only
thereafter proceed to apply it appropriately. to the case before them. Considered
in that context. we could not find from the decisions repo11ed in [ 1997] 9. '
SCC I0 I (supra) and (2000) 9 SCC 151 (supra) any law having been declared .l
or any principle or question of law having been decided or laid down therein
and that in those cases this Court merely proceeded to give ce11ain directions .: ...
B to dispose of the matter in the special circumstances noticed by it and the
need felt, in those cases, by this Court to give such a disposal. The same IO

could not have been mechanically adopted as a general formula to dispose of,
as a matter of routine, all cases coming before any or all the cou11s as an
...
universal and invariable solution in all such future cases also. The High
c Court had no justifying reason to disturb the conclusion of the first Appellate
Court, in this regard.

That apart, Section 433 of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973 also
enacts that the appropriate Government may, without the consent of the person
sentenced, commute, among other things enumerated therein a sentence of
'•
D simple imprisonment for fine. This Court in State of Punjab v. Kesar Singh
(supra), though while considering clause (b) of the very provision has observed
as follows: "The mandate of Section 433, Cr. P.C. enables the Government
in an appropriate case to commute the sentence of a convict and to prematurely
order his release before expiry of the sentence as imposed by the Courts ...... That
apart, even if the High Com1 could give such a direction, it could only direct
E
consideration of the case of premature release by the Government and could
not have ordered the premature release of the respondent itself. The right to
exercise the power under Section 433. Cr. P.C. vests in the Government and
has to be exercised by the Government in accordance with the rules and
established principles. The impugned order of the High Court cannot, therefore,
F be sustained and is hereby set aside" From the nature and content of the
order passed by the High Court in this case, it cotdd be seen that no discretion
-..;;::::
or Iiberty whatsoever has been left with the State Government to exercise
powers under Section 433 (d), Cr.P.C. at its discretion the same being part
of the residuary sovereign power of the State. So far as the case on hand is
concerned not only the High Court had decided to commute but issued a
G mandatory direction_ to the Government with no discretion or libe11y left with -'
it, except to ·formalise the same,' on payment of the fine amount specified
by the Court. This is nothing but assuming powers where there ai·e none fot
-~ ..
the High Court and where the statute concerned specifically entrusts it to
only the appropriate Government.
H
DELHI ADMINISTRATION v. MANO HAR LAL [D. RAJU, J.] 7
We are also of the view that even the appropriate Government may not, A
' as a matter of routine course, indulge in exercise of such powers at its sweet
will, pleasure and whim or fancy. As observed earlier, the powers conferred
upon the appropriate ·Government under Section 433, Cr. P.C. have to be
exercised in accordance with rules and established principles-reasonable and
rationally, keeping in view the reasons germane and relevant for the purpose B
of law under which the conviction and sentence has been imposed,
commiserative facts necessitating the commutation, and the interests of the
society and public interest. The exercise of any power vested by the statute
in a public authority is to be always viewed as in trust, coupled with a duty
to exercise the same in larger public and societal interest, too. When, the
legislature concerned has chosen to mandate for the imposition of a minimum C
sentence in a given situation, their responsibility of the appropriate Government
becomes all the more greater and power under Section 433, Cr.P.C., may
have to be exercised with great circumspection, Otherwise, the legislative
" f
will might become a mere dead-letter at the whim of the executive.

Be that, as it may, this judgment shall not be construed to take away D
the benefit, if any, already given to an accused, purporting to follow the
.. . earlier decisions, as has been done in this case. To some extent, this situation
seems to have arisen due to a misunderstanding of the impact of the two
judgments, noticed above and the reporting of such cases as though they
constituted any precedent for future guidance. So far as the case on hand is E
concerned, it has been represented that the accused has remitted the sum of
Rs. 20.000 as stipulated by the learned Judge in the High Court and treating
this and such cases where already orders have been passed by Courts, at
least, the appropriate Government would do well to grant relief to the accused
concerned. If in any case, it is considered by the Government, in its discretion,
not advisable to do so, it is always open to the Government concerned to F
either move the very Court or the Appellate/ Revisional forum to modify the
orders so as to leave the matter to the sole discretion of the appropriate

.
Government, to be exercised in accordance with law.

- The appeal is allowed to the extent the extent of clarifying the position
of law to be followed and disposing of the same in the light of the further G
directions, contained supra.

N.J. Appeal allowed.

•\