DEEPAK KHINCHIversusSTATE OF RAJASTHAN

                         [2012] 5 S.C.R. 568


A                        DEEPAK KHINCHI
                                   v.
                      STATE OF RAJASTHAN
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 719 of 2012)

                           APRIL 30, 2012
B
     [AFTAB ALAM AND RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, JJ.]

         Explosive Substances Act, 1908 - ss. 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 -
    Appellant-accused traded in explosive/inflammable
C   substances - Fire broke out in his shop/ store due to which
     14 persons died and several others were injured -Sessions
    Judge vide order dated 13-9-2007 discharged the appellant
    of charges under the Act because there was no sanction to
    prosecute him - Sanction subsequently issued by District
o   Magistrate, but application by prosecution on that basis for
    framing charge against the appellant under the Act rejected
    by the Sessions Judge - Appellant submitted application u/
    s.311 CrPC alongwith fresh sanction issued by District
    Magistrate - Application under s.311 CrPC allowed by
E   Sessions Judge by order dated 16-11-2010 and trial directed
    to be proceeded with against the appellant for offences under
    the Act - Order upheld by High Court - Plea of accused-
    appellant that by passing order under s.311 of CrPC, the
    Sessions Judge had subjected him to ordeal of a trial for
F   offences under the Explosive Substances Act after a period
    of three years which had resulted in miscarriage of justice -
    Held: The offence in this case was grave and at no stage,
    sanction was refused by the competent authority - No case
    of appellant that sanction was granted by an incompetent
G   authority - Though proceedings are sought to be initiated
    under the said Act against the appellant after three years, but,
    in the facts of this case, where 14 innocent persons lost their
    lives and several persons were severely injured due to the
    blast which took place in the appellant's shop, three years

H                                568
    DEEPAK KHINCHI v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN                 569


period cannot be termed as delay - It is also the duty of the A
court to see that perpetrators of crime are tried and convicted
if offences are proved against them - It cannot be said that
the lapse of three years has caused prejudice to the accused
- The case will be conducted in accordance with the law and
the appellant will have enough opportunity to prove his B
innocence - Besides, the victim's rights are equally important-
Trial court to frame charges against the appellant under ss.
3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Act and to proceed with the trial - Criminal
Trial.

    Explosive Substances Act, 1908 - s. 7 - Consent/sanction C
to prosecute the accused - Lackadaisical approach of
prosecution in obtaining such consent/sanction in the instant
case - Deprecated.

     The accused-appellant traded in explosive/ D
inflammable substances. Fire broke out in his shop/store
due to which 14 persons died and several others were
injured. FIR was registered under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6
of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 as well as v.arious
offences under the IPC. The Sessions Judge framed E
charges against the appellant for offences under the IPC.
However, vide order dated 13-09-2007 it discharged the
appellant of the charges under the Explosive Substances
Act on the ground that no sanction to prosecute him as
contemplated in Section 7 of the Act was produced by F
the prosecution.

     Subsequently, sanction was issued by the District
Magistrate, but the application made by the prosecution
on that basis for framing charge against the appellant
under the Explosive Substances Act was rejected by G
Sessions Judge vi de order dated 15-05-2010. The
appellant submitted application under Section 311 CrPC
alongwith a fresh sanction letter dated 1-6-2010 issued
by the District Magistrate. The Sessiosn Judge accepted
the said fresh sanction and allowing the application under H
    570      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A Section 311 CrPC directed trial to be proceeded with
  against the appellant for offences under Sections 3, 4, 5
  and 6 of the Expletsive Substances Act. The order was
  upheld by the High Court.

       In the instant a1ppeal, the appellant submitted that by
8
  passing order under Section 311 of CrPC, the Sessions
  Judge had subjected the appellant to the ordeal of a trial
  for offences under the Explosive Substances Act after a
  period of three years which had resulted in miscarriage
C of justice.

          Disposing of the appeal, the Court

        HELD: 1.1. The explosion which took place in the
    appellant's shop resulted in death of 14 persons. Several
0   persons were severely injured. Seriousness of the
    occurrence can hardly be disputed. The Sessions Judge
    framed charges at1ainst the appellant for offences under
    the IPC because i1n his prima facie opinion, there was
    enough material a!gainst the appellant to bring home the
E   said charges. However, insofar as offences under the
    said Act are concerned, there was much inaction
    bordering on callousness on the part of the prosecution.
    The Sessions Judge in his order expressed despair
    about the prosecution's conduct. He had called for an
F   explanation but the explanation does not appear to have
    come. This Court expresses its extreme displeasure
    about this approach of the prosecution. One wonders
    whether as desired by Sessions Judge, the inaction of
    the prosecution was conveyed to the Chief Secretary.
    Ultimately, Sessiions Judge had to discharge the
G   appellant of the said charges because there was no
    sanction. [Para 9) [577-B-E]

       1.2. However, at no point of time, sanction was
  refused. On 1-4-2008 sanction was issued by the District
H Magistrate, but the application made by the prosecution
    DEEPAK KHINCHI v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN               571


for framing charge against the appellant under the said       A
Act was rejected by Sessions Judge. This Court is prima
facie satisfied that the letter of the District Magistrate
issued on 1-4-2008 gave good and valid consent as
envisaged under Section 7 of the Act for trial of the
appellant for offences under the said Act and the             B
Sessions Judge was in error in rejecting the consent
letter by his order dated 15-5-2010. Looking to the
seriousness of the matter, that order ought to have been
challenged by the prosecution but it was not challenged.
[Paras 10, 12] [577-F-H; 580-B-C]                             c
    Rajendra Prasad v. Narcotic Cell (1999) 6 SCC 110:
1999 (3) SCR 818 and State of Himacha/ Pradesh v. Nishant
Sareen (2010) 14 SCC 527: 2010 (13) SCR 1200 - held
inapplicable.
                                                              D
    Ramjani & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan 1993 Cr.LR. (Raj.)
179 - referred to.

     2.1. The offence in this case is grave. At no stage,
sanction was refused by the competent authority. It is not E
the case of the appellant that sanction is granted by the
authority, which is not competent. It is true that the
proceedings are sought to be initiated under the said Act
against the appellant after three years. But, in the facts
of this case, where 14 innocent persons lost their lives
and several persons were severely injured due to the F
blast which took place in the appellant's shop, three
years period cannot be termed as delay. It is also the
duty of the court to see that perpetrators of crime are
tried and convicted if offences are proved against them.
It cannot be said that the lapse of three years has caused G
prejudice to the accused. The case will be conducted in
accordance with the law and the appellant will have
enough opportunity to pro'\'e his innocence. Besides,
equally dear are the victim's rights. [Para 13] [581-C-F]
                                                           H
    572      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A       2.2. It is true that Sessions Judge has, by his order
  dated 13/9/2007 discharged the appellant of the charges
  under Sections 3, 4,. 5 and 6 of the said Act because there
  was no sanction. But, the prosecution has now obtained
  sanction. The Sessions Judge has accepted the sanction
B and has directed that the trial should be started against
  the appellant for offences under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of
  the said Act, as well. The order of the Sessions Judge is
  affirmed by the impugned order passed by the High
  Court. In view of the legal position, and in the facts of the
C case, there is no reason to interfere in the matter and the
  trial court is directl~d to frame additional charges against
  the appellant under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the said Act
  and to proceed with the trial. [Para 14) [581-G-H; 582-A-
  B]

D        State of Goa v. Babu Thomas (2005) 8 SCC 130: 2005
    (3) Suppl. SCR 71~! - relied on.
                          Case Law Reference:
      1999 (3) SCR 818             held inapplicable Para 8
E
      2010 (13) SCR 1200           held inapplicable Para 8, 12
      1993 Cr.LR. (Raij.) 179      referred to         ara10,11
     2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 712 relied on                 Para13
F
        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
    No. 719 of 2012.

      From the Judgment & Order dated 24.01.2011 of the High
  Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur in SB Criminal
G Revision Petition No. 853 of 2010.

          Chinmay Khalidkar, Aruna Gupta for the Appellant.

          Prashant Bhagwati (for Milind Kumar) for the Respondent.

H         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
    DEEPAK KHINCHI v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN                  573


    (SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J. 1. Leave A
granted.

     2. This appeal, by .grant of special leave, is directed
against judgment and order dated 24/01/2011 passed by the
High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur. By the impugned judgment, B
learned Single Judge dismissed Criminal Revision Petition
No.853 of 2010 filed by the appellant challenging order of Addi.
Sessions Judge (Fast Track), Chittorgarh allowing application
submitted by the prosecution under Section 311 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, "the Code") and
directing that trial should proceed against the appellant for C
offences under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Explosive
Substances Act, 1908.

      3. Before, we turn to the facts of the case, it is necessary
to have a look at Section 7 of the Explosive Substances Act, D
1908 (for short, "the said Act"), as the controversy revolves
round the 'consent to prosecute' contemplated therein. It reads
thus:

    "Section 7: No court shall proceed to the trial of any person E
    for an offence against this Act except with the consent of
    the Central Government."

    It must be stated here that by Act 54 of 2001, Section 7
was amended and the words 'Central Government' were
substituted by the words 'District Magistrate'.                  F

     4. The appellant claims to be a trader registered under the
provisions of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994. According to
him, he deals in Kerosene, lubricants, paints, varnish, thinner,
petroleum products and has a license for the storage of G
solvents, petrochemicals and raw materials used for the
purpose of blasting for mining, roads and other end uses. The
prosecution alleges that on 2/5/2006 at about 6.40 p.m. a fire
broke out in the shop/store of the appellant situated at
Gandhinagar Vistar Yojana, Chittorgarh, Rajasthan due to which H
    574      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A many children, women and men were burnt alive. The SHO,
  Reserve Center, Chittorgarh, upon receiving telephonic
  information from an unknown caller, visited the spot and
  registered the First Information Report against three persons
  under Sections 285, 286, 323, 324, 304 of the Indian Penal
B Code (for short, "the IPC" ) as well as under Sections 3, 4, 5
  and 6 of the said Act. The appellant was arrayed as accused
  1. Upon completion of the investigation, charge sheet was filed
  before the learned CJM, Chittorgarh under Sections 285, 286,
  323, 324 and 304 of the IPC as well as under Sections 3, 4, 5
c and 6 of the said Act. In respect of the offences under the
  provisions of the said Act, no consent of the competent authority
  was taken.

         5. After committal of the case before the Sessions Court,
    the case was registered as Sessions Case No.53 of 2006.
D   After the arguments on charge were heard on 71812007, the
    Sessions Court directed the prosecution, in the interest of
    justice, to file a reply, inter alia, stating why mandatory
    permission under Section 7 of the said Act was not taken and
    indicating the correct legal position in that behalf. The case was
E   posted for hearing cm 22/8/2007. Though opportunity was given,
    Addi. Public Prosecutor did not file any reply nor did he submit
    any written argumemts. He prayed that another opportunity be
    given to him to file reply. In the interest of justice, learned
    Sessions Judge adjourned the case. On 10/9/2007, an
F   application was moved by the Addi. Public Prosecutor
    stating that he had written a letter to the SHO through the
    Superintendent of Police but no reply has been received so far.
    The case was, therefore, posted for hearing on 12/9/2007. Even
    on 12/9/2007, the sanction was not produced. Argrlments of
G   parties were heard and on 13/9/2007, learned Sessions Judge
    discharged the appellant of the offences under the said Act.
    While discharging the appellant of the said offences, learned
    Sessions Judge noted that though the hearing was repeatedly
    postponed, Addi. Public Prosecutor failed to produce the
H   sanction and state the correct legal position. The question
     DEEPAK KHINCHI v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN                     575
          [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]

whether if a sanction is produced in future, the appellant could     A
be tried for offences under the said Act was kept open by him.
He sought for an explanation from the District Magistrate,
Chittorgarh why sanction was not obtained though 14 persons
had died and a number of persons had received severe burn
injuries in the disastrous fire accident. Learned Sessions Judge     B
also called for an explanation as to why the Chief Secretary,
State of Rajasthan should not be informed about the unhappy
state of affairs due to which he was constrained to discharge
the appellant of the offences under the said Act. Learned
Sessions Judge, however, noted that it was his prima facie view      c
that the appellant had not taken adequate care while conducting
his business of storing and marketing of inflammable
substances. He further noted that prima facie, it was evident
that carelessness of the appellant led to the fire in his shop
killing 14 persons and injuring many. He, therefore, directed        D
that charge for the offences under Sections 285, 286 and 304
of the IPC be framed against the appellant on the next date of
hearing of the case. It is pertinent to note that the appellant
challenged order dated 13/9/2007 before learned Single Judge
of the Rajasthan High Court. The said petition was dismissed.
                                                                     E
     6. G>n 3/4/2008, the SHO, Reserve Centre, Kotwali moved
an application through the Addi. Public Prosecutor along with
sanction letter issued on 1/4/2008 by the District Magistrate,
Chittorgarh. On 15/5/2010, learned Sessions Judge rejected
the application on the ground that sanction to prosecute the         F
appellant under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 has been granted by
the District Magistrate, however, it is not under Section 7 of the
said Act. A copy of the sanction order is annexed to the appeal
memo at Ex-P/6. It would be advantageous to produce the
relevant portion of the said sanction order.                         G

    "From the investigation of the case it has been revealed
    that the accused while acting negligently and in violation
    of the rules of the license kept in his shop in residential
    area highly inflammable substance solvent with the               H
    576      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A         knowledge that it could at any time cause heavy loss to
          life and property but then also he committed this act due
          to which the explosion took place and the incident
          happened and damage has been caused to life and
          property.
B
                Therefore, against the accused Deepak Khichi S/o
          Madan Lal Khichi R/o Gandhi Nagar Chittorgarh prima
          facie the case under section 3, 4, 5, 6 of the Explosive
          Substance Act, 1908 is found to have been proved due
          to which under section 7 of the Explosive Substance Act,
c         1908 the sanction for prosecution upon the filing of the
          challan before a competent court is granted."

      It is surprising that in a serious case like this, the
  prosecution should not challenge order dated 15/5/2010
D passed by learned Sessions Judge.

         7. The prosecution again submitted an application
    purported to be under Section 311 of the Code along with
    sanction dated 1/6/2010 issued by the District Magistrate,
E   Chittorgarh. As stated h1:ireinabove, the said application was
    allowed by learned Sessions Judge oh 16/11/2010. By the
    impugned order passed by the Rajasthan High Court the order
    passed by learned Sess.ions Judge was upheld. Hence, the
    present appeal.

F      8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, at some
  length. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the courts below
  erred in allowing the application filed by the prosecution after
  a delay of about three years. He submitted that it was not open
  to the prosecution to ma1ke repeated attempts to get sanction
G from the competent authority. Counsel submitted that by
  passing order under Section 311 of the Code, the trial court
  has subjected the appellant to the ordeal of a trial for the
  offences under the said Act after a period of three years. This
  has resulted in miscarriage of justice. Counsel submitted that
H since the prosecution had deliberately delayed obtaining
      DEEPAK KHINCHI v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN                    577
           [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
sanction, it cannot be now allowed to fill in the lacuna. Such a     A
course will result in abuse of process of court. In support of his
submissions, counsel relied on the judgments of this court in
Rajendra Prasad v. Narcotic Ce/1 1 and State of Himacha/
Pradesh v. Nishant Sareen 2.
                                                                     B
     9. The explosion which took place in the appellant's shop
resulted in death of 14 persons. Several persons were severely
injured. Seriousness of the occurrence can hardly be disputed.
Learned Sessions Judge has framed charges against the
appellant for offences under the IPC because in his prima facie
opinion, there is enough material against the appellant to bring     C
home the said charges. It is unfortunate that so far as offences
under the said Act are concerned, there should be so much
inaction bordering on callousness on the part of the prosecution.
Learned Sessions Judge has in his order expressed despair
about the prosecution's conduct. He had called for an                D
explanation but the explanation does not appear to have come.
We express our extreme displeasure about this approach of
the prosecution. We wonder whether as desired by learned
Sessions Judge, the inaction of the prosecution was conveyed
to the Chief Secretary. Ultimately, learned Sessions Judge had       E
to discharge the appellant of the said charges because there
was no sanction.

     10. As stated hereinabove, on 1/4/2008 sanction was
issued by the District Magistrate, Chittorgarh, but the              F
application made by the prosecution for framing charge against
the appellant under the said Act was rejected by learned
Sessions Judge. We are prima facie satisfied that the letter of
the District Magistrate, Chittorgarh issued on 1/4/2008 gave
good and valid consent as envisaged under Section 7 of the           G
Act for trial of the appellant for offences under the said Act and
the learned Sessions Judge was in error in rejecting the
consent letter by his order dated 15/5/2010. The proper course
1.   (1999) s sec 110.
2.   (2010) 14 sec 527.                                              H
    578      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A   for the prosecution was to challenge that order and have it set
    aside by the High Court. Instead of taking that course, a fresh
    sanction was issued by the District Magistrate, Chittorgarh on
    1/6/2008. The prosecution then filed an application under
    Section 311 of the Cocle. It was prayed that sanction issued
B   under Section 7 of the said Act by the District Magistrate be
    taken on record and the appellant be tried for offences under
    Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the said Act. Learned Sessions Judge
    while granting the said application, relied on the judgment of
    Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench in Ramjani & Ors. v. State
c   of Rajasthan3 wherein it was held that where sanction under
    Section 7 of the said Act is not obtained, the prosecution will
    have to be quashed but it would be open to the prosecution to
    start the prosecution afresh after obtaining sanction from the
    competent authority. The High Court upheld this order.
D        11. Before dealing with the submissions of learned
  counsel, we shall refer to the judgments on which reliance is
  placed by learned counsel for the appellant. In Rajendra
  Prasad, this court explained when a court can exercise its
  power of recalling or re ..summoning witnesses. While repelling
E the contention raised by counsel for the appellant therein that
  power under Section 311 of the Code was being exercised to
  fill in the lacuna, this court observed that a lacuna in the
  prosecution must be understood as the inherent weakness or
  a latent wedge in the matrix of the prosecution case. The
F advantage of it should normally go to the accused in the trial of
  the case, but an oversight in the management of the prosecution
  cannot be treated as irreparable lacuna. This court clarified that
  no party in a trial can be foreclosed from correcting errors and
  if proper evidence was not adduced or a relevant material was
G not brought on record due to any inadvertence, the court should
  be magnanimous in permitting such mistakes to be rectified.
  This court observed that after all, function of the criminal court
  is administration of criminal justice and not to count errors
  committed by the partie~s or to find out and declare who among
H 3.   1993 Cr.LR. (Raj.) 179.
     DEEPAK KHINCHI v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN                      579
          [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]

the parties performed better. In our opinion, the appellant cannot     A
draw any support from this judgment because it arose out of a
totally different facts scenario. If at all the observations of this
court quoted by us would help the prosecution rather than the
appellant. No question of sanction was involved in that case.
The prosecution and defence had closed their evidence and              B
thereafter at the instance of the prosecution, two of the
witnesses who had already been examined, were summoned
for the purposes of proving certain documents for prosecution.
In the circumstances, the question arose whether by making
application under Section 311 of the Code, the prosecution             c
was trying to fill in the lacuna. In our opinion, Rajendra Prasad
has no application to the present case. We do not want to
express any opinion as to whether in this case, the application
was made rightly under Section 311 of the Code by the
prosecution. We find that, in substance, the application filed by
                                                                       0
the prosecution was for tendering the consent/sanction of the
District Magistrate, on record and requesting the court to start
trial against the appellant for the offences punishable under the
said Act. Learned Sessions Judge granted the said
application.
                                                                       E
      12. In Nishant Sareen, the respondent therein was caught
red-handed accepting bribe from the complainant. Sanction
was sought by the Vigilance Department under Section 19 of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 to prosecute the
respondent. The Principal Secretary (Health) found no                  F
justification in granting sanction to prosecute the respondent.
Sanction was refused. Thereafter, Vigilance Department took
up the matter again with the Principal Secretary (Health) for
grant of sanction. The matter was reconsidered. Though no
fresh ·material was available for further consideration, the           G
competent authority granted sanction to prosecute the
respondent. It is in these circumstances that this court observed
that sanction to prosecute a public servant on review could be
granted only when fresh materials have been collected by the
investigating agency subsequent to earlier order.                      H
    580       SUPREME COURT REPORTS              · [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A Reconsideration can be done by the sanctioning authority in the
  light of the fresh material, prayer for sanction having been once
  refused. This case also can have no application to the facts of
  the present case. H1~re, initially prosecution did show
  lackadaisical approach in obtaining sanction. But, at no point
B of time, sanction was refused. On 1/4/2008, the District
  Magistrate granted sanction but learned Sessions Judge
  rejected the application. Looking to the seriousness of the
  matter, that order OU!~ht to have been challenged by the
  prosecution but it was not challenged. Thereafter, the District
c Magistrate again granted sanction. Learned Sessions Judge
  took that sanction on record and directed the trial to proceed
  against the appellant for offences under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6
  of the said Act. The High Court affirmed the view taken by
  learned Sessions Jud~1e. To these facts, judgment in Nishant
  Sareen, where sanction was refused earlier by the Principal
0
  Secretary (Health) and was granted on the same material later
  on, can have no applic:ation.

       13. In this connection, we may usefully refer to the judgment
  of this court in State of Goa v. Babu Thomas4. In that case,
E the respondent therein was employed as Joint Manager in Goa
  Shipyard Limited, a Government of India Undertaking under the
  Ministry of Defence. He was arrested by the CID, Anti-
  Corruption Bureau of Goa Police on the charge that he
  demanded and accepted illegal gratification from an attorney
F of M/s. Tirumalla Servk:es in order to show favour for settlement
  of wages, bills/arrears certification of pending bills and to show
  favour in the day-to-day affairs concerning the said contractor.
  The first sanction to prosecute the respondent was issued by
  an incompetent authority. The second sanction issued
G retrospectively after the cognizance was taken was also by an
  incompetent authority. This court held that when Special Judge
  took cognizance, there was no sanction under the law
  authorizing him to tal<e cognizance. This was a fundamental

H   4.   c2oos) a sec 130.
    DEEPAK KHINCHI v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN                      581
         [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
error which invalidated the cognizance as being without               A
jurisdiction. However, having regard to the gravity of the
allegations leveled against the respondent, this court permitted
the competent authority to issue a fresh sanction order and
proceed afresh against the respondent from the stage of taking
cognizance of the offence. It is pertinent to note that the offence   B
therein was committed on 14/9/1994. Looking to the
seriousness of the offence, this court permitted the competent
authority to issue fresh sanction order after about 10 years. We
have no hesitation in drawing support from this judgment. The
offence in this case is equally grave. At no stage, sanction was      c
refused by the competent authority. It is not the case of the
appellant that sanction is granted by the authority, which is not
competent. It is true that the proceedings are sought to be
initiated under the said Act against the appellant after three
years. But, in the facts of this case, where 14 innocent persons
                                                                      0
lost their lives and several persons were severely injured due
to the blast which took place in the appellant's shop, three years
period cannot be termed as delay. It is also the duty of the court
to see that perpetrators of crime are tried and convicted if
offences are proved against them. We are not inclined to
accept the specious argument advanced by learned counsel              E
for the appellant that the lapse of three years has caused
prejudice to the accused. The case will be conducted in
accordance with the law and the appellant will have enough
opportunity to prove his innocence. Besides, equally dear to us
are the victim's rights.                                              F

      14. It is true that learned Sessions Judge has, by his order
dated 13/9/2007 discharged the appellant of the charges under
Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the said Act because there was no
sanction. But, the prosecution has now obtained sanction. The         G
Sessions Judge has accepted the sanction and has directed
that the trial should be started against the appellant for offences
under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the said Act, as well. The order
of the Sessions Judge is affirmed by the impugned order
passed by the High Court. In view of the legal position as            H
    582       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A discussed above, and in the facts of the case, as narrated
  above, we see no reason to interfere in the matter and we direct
  the trial court to frame additional charges against the appellant
  under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the said Act and to proceed
  with the trial. Needleiss to say that the stay of further
8 proceedings granted by' this court on 5/7/2011 shall stand
  vacated.

          15. Appeal is disposed of in the aforestated terms.

   8.8.8.                                    Appeal disposed of.