Holding

Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is inapplicable to acquisition proceedings under the 1952 Act, and agreements under the 1952 Act cannot be reopened for re‑determination of compensation.

Summary

The appellants' lands were requisitioned and later acquired for a military cantonment under the Defence of India Act and the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952. They entered into compensation agreements under the 1952 Act, but later sought higher compensation, solatium and interest based on an arbitrator's award in a similar case. The appellants applied to the Land Acquisition Collector under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for re‑determination of compensation, which was enhanced, leading the respondents to challenge the collector’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the 1952 Act is a self‑contained code and its compensation scheme is distinct from that of the 1894 Act, so Section 28A cannot be applied to proceedings under the 1952 Act. Consequently, the agreement under the 1952 Act cannot be reopened, and no statutory right exists to re‑determine compensation by reading Section 28A into the 1952 Act. The Court dismissed the appeals.

Issues considered

The applicability of Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to acquisition proceedings under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952.
Whether an agreement entered into under the 1952 Act can be reopened or re‑determined in light of a subsequent award of higher compensation.
Whether provisions for solatium and interest under the Land Acquisition Act apply to acquisitions governed by the 1952 Act.
The jurisdiction of the Special Land Acquisition Collector to enhance compensation under Section 28A in a 1952 Act proceeding.

Legislation cited

Defence of India Act, 1971s. 23(1)
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 23, s. 23(2), s. 23A(1), s. 28A
Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952s. 8(1)(a), s. 8(3)

Subjects

Land acquisitionSection 28ARequisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act 1952CompensationSolatiumInterestContractual agreementJurisdictionStatutory interpretation

Judgment

A DA VAL SINGH AND ORS.
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

JANUARY 29, 2003

B [Y.N. KHARE, CJ., S.B. SINHA AND
DR. AR. LAKSHMANNAN, JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act, I 894/Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable
Property Act, 1952-Section 28A/Sections 8(J)(a) and 8(3):
c
Acquisition proceedings under 1952 Act-Applicability ofSection 28A-
Held: Provisions of section 28A not applicable since the mode and manner of
compensation payable for acquisition of land under 1952 Act and 1894 Act
are different and distinct.

D Agreement between parties under 1952 Act-With regard to compensation
awarded for the property acquired-Passing ofsubsequent award ofenhanced
compensation for similar class of lands-Reopening of agreement-
Permissibility of-Held: Agreement cannot be reopened in view of subsequent
award-Further there being no provision in 1952 Act/or re-determination of
E conipensation such right cannot be invoked by reading the same into the
statute-Interpretation of ~tatutes.

Appellant's lands were requisitioned and later on acquired for
establishment of Military Cantonment by the respondents. Appellants
were awarded compensation for which they entered into agreement under
F the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952.
Appellants were also granted interest and solatium. However,. several
land owners did not accept the award and made a reference. Atj>itrator
awarded higher compensation, solatium and interest. Appella~ts then
filed an application under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
for re-determination of compensation. Land Acquisition Collector
G enhanced the compensation. Respondents then filed writ petition on the
ground that the said award was illegal and without jurisdiction, relying
on *Union of India v. Hori Krishan Khosla, (dead) by Lrs. case that the
provisions of Land Acquisition Act were not applicable to acquisition
made under the 1952 Act. Single Judge of High Court set aside the
H 714
DAY AL SINGH v. \J.0.1. 715
award. Even the appeal was also dismissed. Hence the present appeals. A
Appellants inter alia contended that in *Union of India v. Huri Krishan
Khosla, (dead) by lrs. case this Court did not take into consideration the
question that if the provisions for grant of solatium and interest in terms
of Section 23A(l) and 23(2) of Land Acquisition Act would apply in
relation to acquisition under the 1952 Act, thus there is no reason as to B
why proceeding under Section 28A \Vould not be maintainable; that
although Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act per se is not applicable
to a proceeding under the 1952 Act, the said provisions should be read
into therein; that in a case \\'here the parties entered into an agreement
in terms of clause (a) of sub-section (I) of Section 8 of 1952 Act, there is C
no reason as to why the parties cannot enter into another agreement
having regard to the fact that the Arbitrator has awarded enhanced
compensation for acquisition of similarly situated lands; that the criteria
for determination of compensation being the same, the provisions of the
Land Acquisition Act should be held to be applicable being implicitly
embodied therein; that the Collector himself having made an award, the D
respondents could not have filed a writ petition; and that the respondents
having filed a writ petition after a period of eight years the same could
not have been entertained.

Dismissing the appeals, the Court
E
HELD I.I The Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable
Property Act, 1952 is a self-contained Code. It lays down a criteria for
determination of compensation and also provides for the mode and manner
thereof, Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, on the other hand,
lays down the factors which are required to be taken into consideration F
in determining the amount of compensation. The procedures for
determining the award of compensation, the mode and manner in which
the compensation is payable for acquisition of land under the 1952 Act
and Land Acquisition Act, 1894 are thus, distinct and different. The
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act are, ex-facie not applicable for
determination of compensation under the 1952 Act. The provisions of the G
Land Acquisition Act and the 1952 Act are, thus, not in pari-materia.
Therefore the provisions of Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act
cannot be made applicable in relation to a proceeding under the 1952
Act. (723-F-H; 724-A [

1.2. The criteria for determination of compensation in terms of sub- H
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] I S.C.R.

A section (3) of Section 8 of the 1952 Act is the price which the requisitioned
property would fetch in the open market. In any event the market value
of a property may also be determined from the stand-poirit of a willing
purchaser of the land ready and willing to offer the consideration therefor
to a bliyer. The owner of a' land normally would opt for the best offer.
B Once he has agreed to a price, so far as he is concerned the same ordinarily
should be presumed to be the best offer which he could get. (724-B-C)

Haji Mohammad Ekramul Haq v. The State of West Bengal, 'AIR (1959)
SC 488, distinguished.

*Union of India v. Hari Krishan Khosla (dead) by Lrs., (1993) Supp.
C 2 SCC 149; Union of India v. Gurbachan Singh and Ors., (1995) 1 SCC 292;
Union of India and Anr. v. Babu Singh and Ors., (19961 1 SCC 477 and
Union of India and Ors. v. Dhanwanti Devi and Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 44,
relied on.

D Hari Krishan Khosla (dead) and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr., AIR
(1975) Punjab & Haryana 74, disapproved.

Nagpur Improvement Trust and Anr. v. Vithal Rao and Ors., (1973) I
SCC 500; U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Jainul Islam and Anr., ( 19981
2 SCC 467; Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vasantrao and Ors. etc., (2002] 7
E SCC 657 and Hukam Chand and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors., (19961
5 sec 164, referred to.

2.1. The parties herein entered into agreements in terms of clause
(a) of sub-section (I) of Section 8 and thus, the same falls within the
realm of a contract, and parties thereto would ordinarily be bound thereby
F unless the same is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation etc. Once the
matter is concluded by a contract, a novation of contract would also fall
within the realm of contract only. If the contention of appellant is accepted,
a contract can be reopened only with the agreement of both the parties.
The parties must be ad-idem therefor. (726-E, Fl

G 2.2. The person whose lands were acquired, thus, having entered
into an agreement cannot be said to have any legal right which can be
enforced in a court of law so as to enable him to obtain an order from the ·
Court directing the respondents to reopen the agreement; only because
by reason of a subsequent award an enhanced amount of compensation
IH has been paid for similar class of lands. If a right to get the amount of
DAYAL SINGH v. U.0.1. 717

compensation re-determined is held to be implicit in the Act, the same A
~ for all intent and '"'ould amount to invoking the provisions of Section
28A of the Land Acquisition Act indirectly which cannot be done directly.
It is a well-settled principle of law that what cannot be done directly
cannot be done indirectly. The enforceable right to re-open a proceeding,
which has attained finality, must exist in the Statute itself. The right to B
get the amount of compensation re-determined must expressly be provided
by the statute. Such a right being a substantive one cannot be sought to
be found out by implication nor can the same be read there\vith. Therefore,
the appellants cannot invoke a right by reading the same into a statute
although admittedly there exists none. 1726-G, H; 727-A-CJ

2.3. It is a well-settled principle of law that the Court cannot read
c
anything into the statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous.
-y The Court has to find out legislative intent only from the language
employed in the statutes. Surmises and conjectures cannot be restricted
to for interpretation of statutes. 1727-C-DI
D
Union of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De
Gama, AIR 119901 SC 981; Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill Pvt.
lid and Ors.• 120021 9 SCALE I 02 and Mis. Unique Buty/e Tube Industries
Pvt. lid. v. UP. Financial Corporation and Ors., 120021 9 SCALE 778,
referred to.
E
3. In the writ petition filed against the award passed by the Collector
respondent submitted that as the provision of Section 28A of the Land
Acquisition Act being not applicable, the Special Land Acquisition
Collector acted illegally and without jurisdiction in reopening the matter
and passing a supplementary award. Such a contention was raised on the F
basis of a decision of this Court. Furermore, the Special Land Acquisition
Collector is a creature of the statute. He therefore, was bound to act
within the four-corners thereof. If he has passed an order invoking a
provision of law which was not applicable, he committed jurisdictional
error and the order impugned before High Court by the respondents was
a nullity. Therefore, the submission that the respondent was not a person G
aggrieved and thus could not have maintained the writ petition cannot be
accepted. [728-A-CJ

4. Primarily a question of delay and latches is a matter which is
required to be considered by the writ court. Once the writ court has
exercised its jurisdiction despite delay and latches on the part of the H
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] I S.C.R.

A respondents, it is not for this court at this stage to set aside the order of
High Court on that ground alone particularly when the impugned
judgment is legally sustainable. 1728-DI -
CIVIL APPELLATE .JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 635 of
2003.
B
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.1.2000 of the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana in LPA 971 of 1999.

WITH

C C.A. Nos. 636 to 638 of 2003.

O.P. Sharma, N.N. Goswami R.C. Rubrele, K.R. Gupta, Nanita Sharma,
Vivek Sharma, Abhishek Atrey, P.S. Narasimha, P. Sridhar, V.G. Pragasam,
Hemant Sharma, R.N. Poddar and 8.V. Balaram Das for the appearing parties.

D The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.B. SINHA, J. Leave granted.

Applicability of Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 .in a ~
proceeding under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property
E Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1952 Act') is in question in these
appeals, which arise out of judgments and orders passed by Punjab & Haryana
High Court in L.P.A. No. 971 of 1999, C.W.P. No. 183 of 1994, L.P.A. No.
914 of 1999 and L.P.A. No. 42 of 2000. ·

The factual matrix of the matter may be adverted to from the Civil
F Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.533 of 2001. The
lands of the appellants were requisitioned under the Defence of India Act,
1971 for establishment of Military cantonment in the year 1972. They were
later on acquired in terms of Section 23(1) of the Defence of India Act. An
award of compensation was pronounced on 6th March, 1975 in the following
terms :-
G
"I. Area assessed on flat Rs. 16,000 per acre
.,_
2. Nahri/Chani Rs. 14,000
,.,
.:>. Chali Mustan Rs . 10,800
"
HI 4. Banani Rs. 9,000
DAYAL SINGH v. U.0.1. [S.B. SINHA . .I.] 719

5. Coir Mumkin/Bajar Rs. 4,500 per acre A
It is not in dispute that the appellants in relation to the a1nount of
co111pensation awarded by the respondents herein for acquiring their properties
entered into agreements in the prescribed fonn under the provisions of the
1952 Act, which was made operative for the residual matters flowing from
the proceedings of acquisition of lands upon repeal of the Defence of India B
Act, I971.

Questioning the non-inclusion of interest in the said award they filed a
writ petition before the High Court which was marked as C. W.P. No.4983 of
1976 which were allowed. A special leave petition filed by the respondents C
herein before this Court marked as Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.74 of
1998 questioning the said order of the High Court was dismissed .on 4th
September, 1984. Another writ petition was filed by the Appellant claiming
solatium before the High Court which was marked as C.W.P. No.1813 of
_, 1978 and the same was also allowed. It is, however, not in dispute that
several other land owners did not accept the said award and made a reference D
which was referred to an arbitration of the Additional District Judge. By an
award dated 20.11.1987 in the case of one NihaI Singh, the said Arbitrator
awarded higher compensation together with solatium and interest.
Compensation awarded to said Nihal Singh by the Arbitrator was at the
following rates :-
E
"I. Land situated on either side of
National Highway leading from
Bhatinda to Bana Rs. 16.80 sq.yd
upto depth of 5000 mts.

,_. 2. Land upto depth of 500 mts. The F
Municipal limits/fencing of
Cantonment from boundry 3rd
phase of Urban Estate of
Bhatinda Town. Rs. 16 per sq.yd
G
3. For the rest of acquired land Rs. 8.50

The said Nihal Singh had also been paid solatium @ 30% and interest
@ 9% per annum for one year after acquisition and thereafter @ 15% per
annum till realisation.
H
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) I S.C.R.

A The appellants herein having regard to the said award filed application
under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act for redetermination of ')(
compensation. It is not in dispute that a Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana
High Court in Hari Krishan Khosla (dead.) and Ors. v. Union of India and
Anr., AIR ( 1975) Punjab & Haryana 74 had held that even where an acquisition ).

B
is made under the Defence of India Act, provisions of Section 28A of Land '
Acquisition Act would be applicable. Presumably, relying on or on the basis
of the said decision, the Special Land Acquisition Collector, before whom
¥
the said purported application under Section 28A was filed, enhanced the
compensation by an order dated 30th May, 1988. The said award indisputably
was not implemented.
c This Court in Union of India v. Hari Krishan Khosla (Dead) by L.Rs.,
[1993] Supp.2 SCC 149, however, held that the provisions of Land Acquisition
Act are not applicable in respect of an acquisition made under the 1952 Act. 'f-

Thereafter, the respondent herein filed a writ petition questioning the
D said award on the ground that as the provisions of Section 28A of the Land
Acquisition Act were not applicable in relation to acquisition under the Defence
of India Act or the 1952 Act, the said award dated 30th May, 1988 was
illegal and without jurisdiction. Before the High Court, the appellants herein,
inter alia, raised a question of maintainability of the writ petition on the +·
ground of delay and latches on the part of the respondents, as allegedly the
E writ petition had been tiled after a period of five years. By reason of a
judgment and order dated 1.4.1999, a learned Single Judge of the High Court
upon setting aside the order of the Special Land Acquisition Collector dated
30.5.1988 allowed the writ petition where-against the appella.nts preferred an
intra-court appeal which also came .to be dismissed by reason of the impugned
F judgment dated 27th January, 2000. -4-
Mr. O.P. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellants in the Civil Appeals arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil)
Nos. 11687 and 17079 of2000 and SLP (Civil) No. 1430 of2003 (CC 4700
of 2001) would contend that no doubt this Court in Union of India v.
G Gurbachan Singh and Ors., [ 1995] I SCC 292 and Union of India and Anr.
v. Babu Singh and Ors., [1996] I SCC 477 following its decision in Hari
Krishan Khosla 's case (supra) has held that in relation to an acquisition under -:;...
the provisions of the 1952 Act, Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act
would not be maintainable but therein this Court did not take into consideration
H the question that if the provisions for grant of solatium and interest in terms
DAY AL SINGH v. U.0.1. [S.B. SINHA,!.]. 721

• of Sections 23A( I) and 23(2) of Land Acquisition Act would apply in relation A
to acquisition under the I 952 Act, there is absolutely no reason as to why a
proceeding under Section 28A would not be maintainable. Learned counsel
in support of his argument placed strong reliance on a Seven-Judge Bench of

- this Court in Nagpur Improvement Trust and Anr. v. Vithal Rao and Ors.,
[I 973] I SCC 500, UP. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Jainu/ Islam and Anr.,
[I 998] 2 SCC 467 and a recent judgment of this Court in Nagpur Improvement B
Trust etc. v. Vasantrao and Ors. etc., [2002] 7 SCC 657.

Mr. P.S. Narasimhma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellants in Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.533
of 2001, would submit that although Section 28A of the Land Acquisition C
Act per se is not applicable to a proceeding under the 1952 Act, the said
provisions should be read into therein. The learned counsel drew our attention
to the said provisions of Section 28A of the Act and submitted that in a case
where the parties entered into an agreement in terms of clause (a) of sub-
section (1) of Section (8) of the 1952 Act, there is no reason as to why the
parties cannot enter into another agree1nent having regard to the fact that the D
Arbitrator has awarded enhanced compensation for acquisition of similarly
situated lands. The learned counsel drawing our attention to the provisions of
sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the 1952 Act would submit that compensation
required to be paid even under the I 952 Act being on the market value of the
land, and, thus, the criteria for determination of compensation being the E
same, the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act should be held to be
applicable being implicitly embodied therein. In support of the said contention,
strong reliance was placed on Haji Mohammad Ekramul Haq v. The State of
West Bengal, AIR (1959) SC 488.

The 1952 Aet was enacted to provide for the requ1s1t10ning and p
acquisition of immovable property for the purposes of the Union. The history
of the said legislation and the purport and object thereof need not be noticed
by us in view of the question involved herein. Section 3 of the said Act
provides for power of the Central Government to requisition immovable
property. Section 4 empowers the competent authority to take possession of
the requisitioned property. Section 5 which provides for rights over G
requisitioned property reads thus :-

"Rights over requisitioned property.- (1) All property requisitioned
under section 3, shall be used for such purposes as may be mentioned
in the notice of requisition.
H
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] I S.C.R.

A (2) Where any premises are requisitioned under section 3, the
competent authority may order the landlord to execute such repairs as
may be necessa')' and are usually made by landlords in that locality
and as may be specified in the notice, within such reasonable time as
may be mentioned therein, and if the landlord fails to execute any
re.pairs in pursuance of such order, the competent authority may cause
B the repairs specified in the order to be executed at the expense of the
landlord and the. cost thereof may, without prejudice to any other
mode of recovery, lie deducted from the compensation payable to the
landlord."

C A requisitioned property can be released from requisition in terms of
Section 6. Section 7 confers power upon the Central Government to acquire
the requisitioned property. The principles and method of determining
compensation are laid down in Section 8 of the said Act which i·eads as "f-
under:-
/I
D. "8. Principles and method of determining compensation.- (I) Where
any property is requisitioned or acquired under this Act, there shall ,
be paid compensation the amount of which shall be determined in the
manner and in accordance with the principles hereinafter set out, that
is to say, -
-+
E (a) where the amount of compensation can be fixed by agreement,
it shall be paid in accordance with such agreement;

(b) where no such agreement can be reached, the Central Government
shall appoint as arbitrator a person who is, or has been, or is
qualified for appointment as, a Judge of a High Court;
F (c) the Central Government may, in any particu-lar case, nominate
~-
a person having expert knowledge as to the nature of the property
requisitioned or acquired to assist the arbitrator and where such
nomination is made, the person to be compensated may also
nominate an assessor for the same purpose;

G (d) at the commencement of the proceedings before the arbitrator,
the Central Government and the person to be compensated shall
state what in their respective opinion is a fair amount of
compensation;

(e) the arbitrator shall, after hearing the dispute, make an award
H dete1mining the award of compensation which appears to him to
DAY AL SINGH v. U.O.l. [S.B. SINHA, J.] 723

be just and specifying the person or persons to whom such A
compensation shall be paid; and in making the award, he shall
have regard to the circumstances of each case and the provisions
of sub-sections (2) and (3), so far as they are applicable;

(f) where there is any dispute as to the person or persons who are
entitled to the compensation, the arbitrator shall decide such B
dispute and if the arbitrator finds that more persons than one are
entitled to compensation, he shall apportion the amount thereof
amongst such persons;

(g) nothing in the Arbitration Act, 1940 shall apply to arbitrations
under this section. c
Sub-sections (2A) and (2B) of Section 8 of the 1952 Act lay down the
mode and 1nanner for detennination of co1npensation on requisitioning of the
property.

Sub-Section (3) of Section. 8 thereof reads as under: D
/' (3) The compensation payable for the acquisition of any property
under section 7 shall be the price which the requisitioned property
would have fetched in the open market. If it had remained in the
, + same condition as it was at the time of requisitioning and been sold
on the date of acquisition." E
The acquisition of the lands of the appel Ian ts as also the award and the
writ petitions, as noticed hereinbefore, have been made and disposed of prior
to com,ing into force of Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act.

The 1952 Act is a self-contained Code. The 1952 Act not only lays F
down a criteria for determination of compensation but also provides for the
mode and manner thereof. The procedures for determining the award of
compensation are not the same.

The provisions of the Land Acquisition Act are, ex-facie not applicable
for determination of compensation under the 1952 Act. The provisions of the G
Land Acquisition Act and the I 952 Act are, thus, not in para-materia. Section
23 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, on the other hand, lays down the
factors which are required to be taken· into consideration in determining the
amount of compensation. The mode and manner in which the compensation
payable for acquisition of land under the I 952 Act and Land Acquisition Act, H
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] I S.C.R.

A 1894 are, thus, ::listinct and different. We fail to see as to how the provisions
of Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act can be made applicable in
relation to a proceeding under the 1952 Act.

Furthermore, the criteria for determination of compensation in terms of
sub-section (3) of Section 8 must be viewed with the limitations contained
B therein. In any event the marl<et-value of a property may also be determi!led
from the stand-point of a willing purchaser of the land ready and willing to
offer the consideration therefor to a buyer. The owner of a land normally
would opt for the best offer. Once 11e. has agreed to a price; so far as he is
concerned the same ordinarily should be presumed to be the best offer which
C he could get.

It may be true that--in Haji Mohammad Ekramul Haq 's case (supra) this
Court observed that even in the matter of payment of compensation under the
1952 Act, the criteria laid down under the Land Acquisition Act would be
applicable. However, Section 8 of the 1952 Act underwent amendments and
D the provisions of the 1952 Act having not only laid down a complete machinery
but also the mode and manner of determining compensation, the said decision
of this Court cannot be said to have any application in the instant case.

This Court in Gurbachan Singh's case (supra) and Babu Singh's case
(supra), in view of the aforementioned distinction following the judgment of
+'
E this Court in Hari Krishan Khosla 's case (supra) clearly laid down the law
that Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be applied in relation
to an acquisition proceeding under the 1952 Act.

Reliance placed by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the
Petitioner in Hukam Chand and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors., reported
F in [ 1996) 5 SCC 164 is mis-placed. Therein the questions raised herein did
not fall for consideration. In the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, a provision
exists for reference whereas in terms of the provisions of 1952 Act, only in
the event the owner of the land does not accept the amount of compensation
offered to him, the dispute in relation thereto may be referred to an arbitrator.
G We may note that although in these cases the dispute as regards amount of
compensation was not referred to arbitrator, but the appellants herein filed
writ petitions claiming solatium and interest. They, thus, did take the matter
to a competent court of law and the said proceeding had a direct bearing on
the amount of compensation received by them. In the event it be held that the
provisions of Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act is maintainable in a
H proceeding under the 1952 Act, not only there would be an enhancement in
DAYAL SINGH v. U.0.1. [S.B. SINHA, J.] 725
the quantum of compensation but also corresponding enhancement in solatium A
) and interest, which, in view of the orders passed in the writ petitions, would
be impermissible.

In Union of India and Ors. v. Dhanwati Devi and Ors., reported in
[1996] 6 SCC 44 a three judge bench of this Court held:
B
"14. The question, therefore, en1erges whether it is necessary for the
State Legislature to expressly specify that interest or solatium shall
not be payable for the lands or property acquired under Section 7( I)
of the Act. Sub silentio is eloquent. It would further be seen that
Section 8 of the Central Act equally does not provide for payment of C
solatium and interest. The Act was passed in the year I 968 while the
Central Act was passed in I 952. It would, therefore, be reasonable to
y conclude that the State Legislature was cognizant of the express
proVisions for payment of interest and solatium available in the
Acquisition Act. The Act omitted similar provisions for payment of
interest and solatium as part or component of compensation, obviously D
to fall in line with the Central Act."

The Bench agreed with the reasonings in Hori Krishan Khos/a case
·l (supra).

The ratio of Dhan·wanti Devi case applies in the instant case. E

The decision of this Court in Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra) may
not be of much assistance in the instant case inasmuch as therein it was
noticed that the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965, Nagpur
Improvement Trust Act, 1936 as also the Punjab Town Improvement Act, F
I 922 which fell for consideration therein had a common scheme and pattern
as the State legislations relate to Town Planning and Development and in
terms of which, each one of them as regards acquisition of land, the Land
Acquisition Act, I 984 was made applicable with certain modifications as
• contained in the Schedules appended thereto. In that view of the matter, the
Bench followed the earlier decision of this Court in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas G
Parishad (supra) [wherein one of us (Hon'ble the Chief Justice) was a
member]. Therein Hari Krishan Khosla (supra) was held to be not applicable
as provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, as amended by the I 984 Act
relating to determination and payment of compensation, were held to be
applicable to acquisition of land for the purposes of the Adhiniyam. H
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] I S.C.R.

A As at present advised and furthermore in view in the factual matrix
involved in the present appeals, we do not intend to enter into the question
as to whether the said decisions have correctly been rendered or not.

It is the admitted case of the appellants that they entered into with the
respondents agreements as regards the amount of compensation payable for
B acquisition of their lands in the prescribed form in terms of clause (a) of sub-
section (I) of Section 8. What was only questioned by them in the writ
proceedings was non-payment of solatium and interest. The High Court in
the said writ proceedings indisputably came to the conclusion that even
solatium and interest was payable. The correctness or otherwise of the said
C decisions is not in question.

However, once it is held that Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act
is not applicable in relation to lands of the appellants the only question which
survives for consideration is as to whether the appellants have an)( legal right
to force the respondents herein to enter into a fresh agreement relying on or
· ·D on the awards passed by the arbitrator in 1987.

The answer' to the said question, in our considered opinion, must be
rendered in the negative. It has rightly been accepted at the bar that in the
event a reference is made to an Arbitrator by the owner of the lands, Section
28A of the Land Acquisition Act would not be applicable.
E
The parties herein entered into agreements in terms of clause (a) of
sub-section (I) of Section 8 and, thus, the same falls within the realm of a
contract, and parties thereto would ordinarily be bound thereby unless the
same is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation etc.

F Once the matter is concluded by a contract, a novation of contract
would also fall within the realm of contract only. If the contention of Mr.
Narasimha is accepted, a contract'can be reopened only with the agreement
of both the parties. The parties must be ad-idem therefor.

The person whose lands were acquired, thus, having entered into an
G agreement cannot be said to have any legal right which can be enforced in
a court of law so as to enable him to obtain an order from the Court directing
the Union of India to reopen the agreement; only because by reason of a
subsequent award an enhanced amount of compensation has been paid for
similar class of lands. If a right to get the amount of compensation re-
H determined is held to be implicit in the Act, the same for all intent and
DAY AL SINGH v. U.0.1. [S.B. SINHA.!.] 727
purport would amount to invoking the provisions of Section 28A of the Land A
Acquisition Act indirectly which cannot be done directly. It is a well-settled
principle of law that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.

The enforceable right to re-open a proceeding, which has attained
finality, must exist in the Statute itself.
B
The right to get the amount of co1npensation re-determined n1ust
expressly be provided by the statute. Such a right being a substantive one
cannot be sought to be found out by iinplication nor can the same be read
therewith.

The appellants, thus, cannot invoke a right by reading the same into a C
statute although admittedly there exists none.

It is a well-settled principle of law that the court cannot read anything
into the statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. The court has
to find out legislative intent only fro1n the language e1nployed in the statutes. D
Surmises and conjectures cannot be restricted to for interpretation of statutes.
[See Union of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De
Gama, AIR (1990) SC 981].

This Court in Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill Pvt. Ltd.
and Ors., (2002) 9 SCALE I 02, has observed :- E
"Scope of the legislation on the intention of the legislature cannot be
enlarged \\'hen the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous.
In other words statutory enactments must ordinarily be construed
according to its plain meaning and no words shall be added, altered
or modified unless it is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a provision p
from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally
irreconcilable with the rest of the statute"

[See also Mis Unique Butyle Tube Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. U.P. Financial
Corporation and Ors., (2002) 9 SCALE 778].
G
For the views we have taken, we are of the opinion that it is not
necessary to go into the larger question raised by the learned counsel for the
parties in these 1natters.

Submission of Mr. Narasimha to the effect that the Collector himself
having made an award by order dated 30th May, 1988 the Central Government H
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] l S.C.R.

A could not have filed a writ petition, is stated to be rejected. The contention
of the Central Government, respondent herein, in the writ petition was that
as the provision of Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act being not
applicable, the Special Land Acquisition Collector acted illegally and without
jurisdiction in reopening the matter and passing a supplementary award. Such
a contention was raised on the basis of a decision of this Court. Furthermore,
B the Special Land Acquisition Collector is a creature of the statute. He, therefore,
was bound to act within the four-corners thereof. If he has passed an order
invoking a provision of law which was not applicable, he committed
jurisdictional error and the order impugned before the High Court by the
respondents was a nullity. We, therefore, cannot accept the contention of the
C appellants that the respondent was not a person aggrieved and thus could not
have maintained the writ petition.

It was submitted that the respondents having filed a writ petition after
a period of eight years, the same ought not to have entertained. Primarily a
question of delay and latches is a matter which is required to be considered
D by the writ court. Once the writ court has exercised its jurisdiction despite
delay and latches on the part of the respondents, it is not for us at this stage
to set aside the order of the High Court on that ground alone particularly
when we find that the impugned judgment is legally sustainable.

For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in these appeals
E which are accordingly dismissed but in the facts and circumstances of the
case, there shall be no order as to costs.

N.J. Appeals dismissed.