Holding

Section 11(8) allows a landlord to claim additional accommodation for any bona‑fide business purpose, but eviction can be ordered only after a finding that the claim is bona‑fide and that the tenant’s comparative hardship does not outweigh the landlord’s advantage.

Summary

The landlord (Davis) owned a building where he ran a hotel‑bar and sought eviction of his tenant (Sebastian), who operated a provision shop, under Section 11(8) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, claiming a bona‑fide need for additional accommodation for a jewellery and textile business. The tenant argued that the premises were his sole source of livelihood and the landlord already had vacant premises elsewhere. The Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority dismissed the eviction petition on grounds of lack of bona‑fide need and comparative hardship. The High Court also dismissed the revision but failed to record a finding on comparative hardship. The Supreme Court held that "personal use" under Section 11(8) is wide enough to include any bona‑fide business purpose, but eviction may be granted only after a finding that the landlord’s claim is bona‑fide and that the tenant’s hardship does not outweigh the landlord’s advantage. Since the High Court omitted the required hardship finding, the appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for fresh consideration.

Issues considered

The scope of "personal use" under Section 11(8) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965
Whether Section 11(8) permits a landlord to claim additional accommodation for a new business as opposed to expansion of an existing business
The requirement of a bona‑fide need by the landlord under Section 11(8)
The necessity of a comparative hardship finding under the first proviso to Section 11(10) before granting eviction
Whether the High Court erred by not recording a finding on comparative hardship

Legislation cited

Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965s. 11(10), s. 11(3), s. 11(8)

Subjects

Rent ControlEvictionPersonal useComparative hardshipStatutory interpretationLandlordTenantKerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act

Judgment

A DAVIS
v.
SEBASTIAN

AUGUST 19, 1999

B [V.N. KHARE AND SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI, JJ.]

Rent Control & Eviction:

Kera/a Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965:
c Sub-sections (3), (8), (JO) of Section I /-Comparative hardship-
Petition for eviction of tenant from part of the premises on the ground of
personal bona fide requirement for doing additional business-Tenant
contested on the ground that the running of business in the tenanted premises
was his only source of income and that landlord had additional place for
D doing additional business-Rent Controller and Appellate Authority dismissed
the petition holding that landlord was not in need of premises and that
tenant would be put to greater hardship-In revision High Court did not
give a finding on comparative hardship-Held, eviction ·petition may be
rejected where tenant would suffer greater hardship as a result of eviction
E than the benefit that would be gained by landlord-Court must give finding
on the question of comparative hardship-As High Court did not consider
the question of comparative hardship matter remitted to the High Court for
fresh consideration and disposal.

Section 11 (8)-Requirement of "personal use "-Expression ""personal
F use", held, was of wide import and nothing in the sub-section restricted it-
Requirement of sub-section (8) would be complied with on satisfaction about
bona fide need ofadditional accommodation for personal use ofihe landlord-
Use to which such additional accommodation is to be put would depend
upon the landlord-In case of non-residential premises, use could be either
for new business or for expansion of existing business. -
G
Section I I (3) and I I (8)-Held, re.quirements of Section I I (3) and
I I (8) are different_ and there is no scope for a case falling under Section
I I (3) to have recourse to Section I I (8) and thereby diluting Section I I (3)-
Therefore, it cannot be said that if expression "personal_ use" in sub-section
H (8) is to be interpreted to include "use for any business", it will dilute the f
612
DA VIS v. SEBASTIAN 613

rigour of sub-section (3). A-
Words and Phrases "Personal use" and "additional accommodation"-
Meaning of.

Interpretation of Statutes-Basic Rules-Plain meaning-Words in the
statute should be given their natural ordinary meaning-Nothing should be B
added nor should any word be treated as otiose.

The appellant was owner of a building in which he was running a hotel
and a ba.r and had also let out•a part or the building ("the premises") to the
respondent who was running a shop there. Appellant sought eviction of the
respondent from the premises under Section 11(8) of the Kerala Buildings C
(Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 on bona fide personal requirement of
the tenanted premises for use as jewellery and textile shop. The eviction was
contested by the respondent on the basis that running the provision shop in
the premises was· his sole source of income for his livelihood whereas
appellant had other vacant accommodation for doing the additional business. D
Rent Controller found that appellant was not in need of additional
accommodation and that if the respondent was evicted he would be put to more
hardship than the benefit that would be fetched to the appellant, and thus
dismissed the eviction petition of the appellant. On appeal, the Appellate
Authority held against the appellant both on the bona fide requirement and
on the question of comparative hardship. Appellant, thereafter, filed a revision E
before the High Court which was also dismissed. However, High Court did
not consider the comparative hardship, to the parties while dismissing the
revision. Hence the appeal.

It was contended by the appellant tliat Section 11(8) of the Act enabled F
a landlord to claim additional accommodation for his bona fide personal use
and that the High Court was wrong in confining the personal use of the
landlord-appellant to expansion of additional business only.

It was contended by the respondent that for purposes of starting any
business the provision of Section 11(3) of the Act would have to be invoked G
and that Section 11(8) applies only when the landlord's need for additional
accommodation relates to expansion of his existing business.

Allowing the appeal, this Court

HELD: 1.1. Section 11(10) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent H
614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A Control) Act, 1965 is in the nature of a proviso to sub-sections (3), (4) and
(8). It mandates that if the Rent Controller is satisfied that the claim of the
landlord under sub-sections (3), (4), (7) and (8) is bona fide, he shall make an
order thereunder but if he is not so satisfied he shall make an order rejecting
the application. The first proviso to sub-section (10) provides an additional
B ground for rejection of the application under sub-section (8) and, that is, if
the Controller is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant
by ordering his eviction will outweigh the advantage to the landlord. In the
event of granting the application the second proviso come into operation and
empowers the Rent Controller to grant reasonable time to the tenant for
putting the landlord in possession of the building that may be extended from
C time to time up to three months. While providing a ground to a landlord to
claim additionai accommodation for his personal use, possible care has been
taken to safeguard the interest of a tenant. [617-F, G, H; 618-A-B)

1.2. The legislative mandate to the Rent Controller is not to pass an
order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant
D. is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade
or business carried on in such building and if there is no other suitable
building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or
business. Thus, it is seen that whereas before passing an order under sub-
section (8), the requirement of comparative hardship is to be considered by
E the Rent Controller and it is only when the hardship that may be caused to
the tenant by granting an order in favour of the landlord will outweigh the
advantage to the landlord that the Rent Controller has to reject the application.
But unde.r sub-section (3) no order of eviction against the tenant can be
passed if he is dependant for his levelihood mainly on the income derived
from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other
F suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such
trade and business. There is yet another feature, which distinguishes sub-
section (3) from sub-section (8). Whereas possession of another building in
the same city, town or village except when the Rent Controller is satisfied
for special reasons, is a bar for passing an order of eviction under sub-
G section (3) but the basis of claiming such an order under sub-section (8) is
that the landlord is in occupation of a part of the building and he need the
remaining part of the building or a portion thereof in occupation of the
tenant as additional accommodation for his personal use. Thus it is seen that
the requirements of sub-section (3) a~d sub-section (8) are different. There,
is no scope for a case falling under sub-section (3) to have recourse to su~·
H section (8) and thus diluting sub-section (3). Therefore the contention of the
DA VIS v. SEBASTIAN 615

respondent that the expression "personal use" under sub-section (8) if A
interpreted to include "use for any business", it will dilute the rigour of
Section 11(3) of the Act, is devoid of merit. [620-F-G-H; 621-A-C]

1.3. Even after holding that bona fide requirement of the landlord for
additional accommodation for personal use is established, the relief under
sub-section (8) of Section 11 cannot be granted to him without recording a B
finding under the first proviso to sub-section (10) of Section 11 of the Act
in favour of the landlord. Since the High Court did not consider this aspect,
the matter has to go to the High Court for fresh consideration in the light
of this judgment. [621-D-E-F)

2. It is a well-settled principle of interpretation that words in a statute
c
shall be given their natural, ordinary meaning; nothing should be added to
them nor should any 1Vord be treated as otiose. Two comprehensive expressions
"additional accommodation" and "personal use" are employed in sub-section
(8). The expression "additional accommodation" takes in both residential as
well as non-residential buildings. "Personal use" is also an expression of D
wide amplitude. There is nothing in the sub-section, which restricts the
import of that expression. The said requirement of sub-section (8) will be
complied with -0n the satisfaction of the Controller about bona fide need of
the additional accommodation for personal use of the landlord. To what use
the additional accommodation should be put, is the choice of the landlord. In E
the case of a non-residential building whether a new business should be set
up in the additional accommodation or whether it should be used for expansion
of the existing business, is left entirely to the option of the landlord. This
being the intendment of the legislature, the court cannot impose any restriction
with regard to the use of the additional accommodation from which the
eviction of the tenant is sought. (618-D-E-F-Gl F
Shri Balaganesan Metals v. Shri MN. Shanmugham Chetty & Ors.,
[1987) 1 SCR 586, relied upon.

Joseph v. Francis, (1965) Ker LT 1113., approved.
G.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 14072 of
1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 28.7.94 of the Kerala High Court
in C.R.P. No. 1778of1991.
H
616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A K. Sukumaran, Ms. S. Karthika, Jayanth Muthuraj, N.R. Shankar and G.
Prakash for the Appellant.

M.P. Vinod, Ramesh Babu, M.R., Roy Abraham and N. Sudhakaran for
the Respondent.

B The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI, J. This appeal is from the
judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala at
Emakulam in C.R.P. No.1778 of 1991-C dated July 28, 1994. The polemic
centres round interpretation of the expression 'personal use' in sub-section
C (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965
(for short 'the Kerala Act').

A brief narration of the facts giving rise to this appeal is necessary to
appreciate the question involved in this case. The question of bona fide
re.quirement of additional accommodation under Section 11 (8) of the Act alone
D is canvassed before us so we are confining the facts relevant to that ground.
The appellant is the landlord and the respondent is the tenant of a shop room
which is a portion of the main building oflrinjalakkuda Village, Mukundapuram
Taluk, (hereinafter referred to as 'the preinises '). In the main building the
appellant was running the business of hotel-cum-bar. On.the plea that he had
E made all preparations for starting a jewellery shop and a textile shop and bona
fide requires additional accommodation for the proposed business, he filed ..
R.C.P.No.31 of 1983 seeking eviction of the respondent from the premises. The
ground of bona fiae requirement of the appellant for additional accommodation
was opposed by the respondent. He averred that he was running a provision
shop in the premises which was his sole source of income for his livelihood
F and the appellant was having other vacant accommodation ·which he let out
to others. The learned Rent Controller recorded the finding that the appellant
was not in need of additional accommodation. It was also found that if the
respondent was evicted from the premises he would be put to more hardship
than the benefit that would be fetched to the appellant. In that view of the
G matter, the Rent Controller dismissed the eviction petition on 7th June, 1986.
The landlord unsuccessfully assailed the said order \>efore the Appellate
Authority in R.C.A. No.39 of 1990. Both, on the question of bona fide
requirement of the landlord and on the question of comparative hardship, the
Appelltte Authority held against the appellant/landlord. Aggrieved thereby,.
the appellant filed C.R.P. No.1778 of 1991-C before the High Court of Kerala.
H The Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the Revision on 28th July
DAVIS v. SEBASTIAN (S.S. MOHAMMED QUADRI, J.] 617

: 1994. It is against that order of the High Court, the appellant is in appeal by A
special leave.

Mr. K. Sukumaran, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant,
invited our attention to sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Act and
argued that it enabled a landlord to claim additional accommodation for his
bona fide personal use and that the High Court committed grave error of law B
in confining the personal use of the landlord to expansion of the existing
business only.

Mr. Ramesh Babu, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, has
contended that for purposes of starting any business the provisions of
Section 11(3) will have to be invoked and that Section 11(8) applies only when C
the landlord's need for additional accommodation relates to expansion of his
. existing business; if Section l l (8) is interpreted as contended by the appellant,
then rigour of Section 11(3) will be diluted and it will bP, circumvented by
having recourse to sub-section (8).
D
To appreciate the contentions of the learned counsel, it will be
appropriate to refer to sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Act which

- -- reads as under :

"11(8). A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may
apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant E

- occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the
. building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires
additional accommodation for his personal use."

A .plain reading of the provision, extracted above, shows that the
requirements of sub-section (8) under which the claim is made by the landlord F
are : (i) a landlord is occupying only a part of a building; (ii) the tenant is
occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building; and
(iii) the landlord requires additional accommodation/or his personal use. We
may notice here that sub-section (10) is in the nature of a proviso to sub-
sections (3), (4) and (8). It mandates that if the Rent Controller is satisfied that G
the claim of the landlord under sub-sections (3), (4), (7) and (8) is bona fide,
he shall make an order thereunder but if he is not so satisfied he shall make
an order rejecting the application. The first proviso to sub-section (10) provides
an additional ground for rejection of the application under sub-section ·(8)
and, that is, if the Controller is satisfied that the hardship which may be
caused to the tenant by ordering his eviction, will outweigh the advantage H
618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A to the landlord. In the event of granting the application the second proviso
comes into operation and empowers the Rent Controller to grant reasonable
time to the tenant for putting the landlord in possession of the building which
ma~ be extended from time to time up to three months. While providing a
<
ground to a landlord to claim additional accommodation for his personal use,
possible care has been taken to safeguard the interest of a tenant.
B
There is no controversy in regard to compliance of requirements of (i)
and (ii) of sub-section (8) noted above. In hoc requirement (iii), the landlord
has to show that he bona fide requires additional accommodation for his
personal use. The High Court held that the requirement of the landlord should
c relate to the same purpose, namely, for expansion of his existing business of
hotel-cum-bar and that as the appellant intended to start a different business,
namely, the jewellery and textile business, in the additional accommodation,
the case did not fall under Section 11(8) of the:Kerala Act.

Now, what is the meaning of the expression 'personal use' in sub-
D section (8)? It is a well-settled principle of interpretation that words in a
. statute shall be given their natural, ordinary meaning; nothing should be
added to them nor should any word be treated as otiose. Two comprehensive

E
expressions 'additional accommodation' and 'personal use' are employed in
sub-section (8). The expression 'additional accommodation' takes in both
residential as well as non-residential buildings. 'Personal use' is also an
-
expression of wide amplitude. There is nothing in the sub-section which
restricts the import of that expression. The said requirement of sub-section
(8) will be complied with ~n the satisfaction of the Controller about bona fide
need of the additional accommodation for personal use of the landlord. To
what use the additional accommodation should be put, is the che!Ge of the
F landlord. In the case of a nan-residential building whether a new business
should be set up in the additional accommodation or whether it should be
used for expansion of the existing business, is left entirely to the option of
the landlord. This, being the intendment of the legislature, the Court cannot
impose any restriction with regard to the use of the additional accommodation
from which the eviction of the tenant is sought.
G
In Joseph v. Francis, [1965] KLT 1113, a learned Single Judge of the
Kerala High Court correctly construed Section 11 (8) of the Kerala Act when
he held that it was the landlord's choice to decide what business he would
carry on and that a Court would not be justified in saying that he required·.
r
H the building bona fide for his own use only if he required it for expanding
DA VIS v. SEBASTIAN [S.S. MOHAMMED QUADRI, J.] 619
his existing trade. A
Thus, it follows that the phrase 'additional accommodation for personal
use of the landlord' may relate to residential purpose as well as for non-
residential purpose. Where it relates to non-residential purpose there is no
reason to restrict personal use of the landlord for the purpose of only
expansion of the existing business. He can put the additional accommodation, B
so long as he bona fide need it, to any business or purpose of his choice.

Here, it may be useful to refer to in pari materia enactments of other
States. In Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act,
1960, Section l0(3)(c) deals with granting order of eviction on the plea of C
additional accommodation. It provides that in the case of non-residential
building the landlord has to show that he requires t~e additional accommodation

-- for the purpose of a business which he is carrying on; thus under Andhra
Act additional accommodation can be sought for purposes of the business
which the landlord is carrying on. So also under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil
Nadu Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act 1960, the additional accommodation D
for non-residential purposes can be claimed for purposes of the business
which the landlord is carrying on.

In Shri Balaganesan Metals v . .shri MN. Shanmugham Chetty and
.Ors., [1987) I RCR 586, while construing Section (10)(3Xc) of Tamil Nadu.Act, E
this Court held that once a landlord has satisfied the Controller that he was

... bona fide in need of additional accommodation for residential or non-residential
purposes and that the advantage derived by him by an order of eviction will
outweigh the hardship caused to the tenant, then the landlord is entitled to
an order of eviction irrespective of any other consideration.
F
It may be pointed out here in contra distinction to the other enactments
that under Section 11(8) of the Kerala Act claim for additional accommodation
is not confined to expansion of the business which the landlord is carrying
on. As pointed above, the landlord has a wider choice under Section 11(8)
of the Act. He can use it at his option in case of non-residential accommodation, G
either for expansion of existing business or for a new business.

The contention that if the expression 'personal use' under sub-section
(8) is interpreted to include 'use for any business', it will dilute the rigour of
·Section 11(3), which is devoid of merit. We shall notice sub-section (3) of
..... Section 11 of the Act here to examine the contention of the learned counsel: H
620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A "Section 11(3). A landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court for an
order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the
building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation
or for the occupatiOn by any member of his family dependent on him:

Provided that the Rent Control Court shall not give any such
B direction if the landlord has another building of his own in his
possession in the same city, town or village· except where the Rent
Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular
case it will be just and proper to do so:

Provided further that the Rent Control Court shall not give any
c direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant
is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income de~ived from any

D
trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other
suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on
such trade or business."

(Provisos 3 and 4 are not relevant for our purposes).
-
To secure the eviction of a tenant under sub-section (3), a landlord has
to show that : (i) he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or
for the occupation of any member of his family dependent on him; (ii) the
E building of which eviction is sought, is in the occupation of a ten~t; and
(iii) he does not have another building of his own in his possession in the
same city town or village or if he has such a building in his possession, the .
Rent Controller will have to be satisfied for special reasons that it will be just
and proper to order eviction of tenant from the building in occupation of the
tenant. The legislative mandate to the Rent Controller is not to pass an order
F directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is
depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or
business carried on in such building and if there is no other suitable building
available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business.
Thus, it is seen that whereas before passing an order under sub-section (8),
G the requirement of comparative hardship is to be considered by the Rent
Controller and it is only when the hardship that may be caused to the tenant
by granting an order in favour of the landlord will outweigh the advantage
to the landlord that the Rent Controller has to reject the application. But under
sub-section (3) no order of eviction against the tenant can be passed if he
is dependent for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade
H or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building
DAVIS v. SEBASTIAN [S.S. MOHAMMED QUADRI, J.) 621
- available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business. A
There is yet another feature which distinguishes sub-section (3) from sub-
section (8). Whereas possession of another building in the same city, town
or village except when the Rent Controller is satisfied for special reasons, is
a bar for passing an order of eviction under sub-section (3) but the basis of
claiming such an order under sub-section (8) is that the landlord is in
occupation of a part of the building and he needs the remaining part of the B
building or a portion thereof in occupation of the tenant as additional
accommodation for his personal use. Thus it is seen that the requirements of
sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) are different. There is no scope for a case
falling under sub-section (3) to have recourse to sub-section (8) and thus
diluting sub-section (3). C
Now, the germane aspect which remains to be adverted to is the
requirement of the first proviso to sub-section (10) of Section II, namely,
comparative hardship to the tenant. The learned Rent Controller as well as the
Appellate Authority held against the appellant on this aspect. The High Court
did not consider this aspect in the view it had taken of Section 11(8) of the D
Act.

For all the above reasons, we are of the opinion that even after holding
that bona fide iequirement of the landlord for additional accommodation for
personal use is established, the relief under sub-section (8) of Section I I,
cannot be granted to him without recording a finding under the first proviso E
to sub-section (I 0) of Section I I of the Act in favour of the landlord. Since,
the High Court did not consider this aspect, we are of the opinion that_ the
matter has to go back to the High Court for fresh consideration in the light
of this judgment. The judgment and order of the Division Bench under .appeal
is, therefore, set aside and the case is remitted to the High Court for fresh F
disposal in accordance with law.

The appeal is allowed as indicated above. No costs.

RK.S. Appeal allowed.