Holding

The Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 is constitutionally valid, protected by Article 31B, and its provisions, including sections 10, 11 and 23, apply to land reserved for public purpose, so the petitioners' writ petitions are dismissed.

Summary

The petitioners, owners of land in Sholapur, challenged the acquisition of their land under the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976, arguing that the Act should not apply to land reserved for public purpose under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 and that sections 10, 11 and 23 of the Act violated Articles 14 and 31 of the Constitution. The State argued that the Act, placed in the Ninth Schedule, is protected by Article 31B and that its overriding provision in Section 42 makes it applicable notwithstanding any other law. The Court examined the purpose of the Ceiling Act – to prevent concentration of urban land and to ensure equitable distribution – and held that the Act is a self‑contained code whose provisions apply even to lands earmarked for public purpose. It further held that the Act is constitutionally valid and that no discrimination arises under Article 14. Consequently, all reliefs sought by the petitioners were denied and the writ petitions were dismissed.

Issues considered

The constitutionality of sections 10, 11 and 23 of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 under Articles 14 and 31 of the Constitution
Whether the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 applies to land reserved for public purpose under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966
The effect of the Act’s placement in the Ninth Schedule and protection under Article 31B
The propriety of the State’s acquisition of the petitioners’ land under the Ceiling Act versus the Town Planning Act

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 31, s. Article 31B, s. Article 39(b), s. Article 39(c)
Land Acquisition Act, 1894
Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966s. 125, s. 126
Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976s. 10, s. 11, s. 23, s. 42

Subjects

Urban land ceilingPublic purposeArticle 14Article 31Article 31BDiscriminationLand acquisitionCompensationNinth ScheduleSection 42 overriding provisionWrit petitionConstitutional validity

Judgment

A DATIATRYA SHANKARBHAT AMBf.!...GI & ORS.
v.
STA TE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.

AUGUST I, 1989

B ,[L.M. SHARMA AND N.D. OJHA, JJ.]

Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 14 and 31-Vires of Sections
IO, 11 and 23 of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1975.
Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966: Sections 125 and
/2(r-Land reserved for pu,blic purpose-Acquisition and compensa-
c tion thereof-Applicability of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. ·f-.
Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976: Sections IO, l l
and 23-Whether violative of Articles 14 and 3 l of the Constitution of ~·
India, 1950. ·

D The State Government sanctioned development plan in respect of
land situated in Sholapur under the Maharashtra Regional and Town
Planning Act, 1966. Though the sanction covered the land of petitioners
also, some of their 11.nd was reserved for public purpose under the said
Act.

E Thereafter, the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 .(
came into force and proceedings for acquisition of land in excess of the
ceiling limit were initiated. Against such proceedings, the petitioners
have approached this Court by way of writ petitions.
'
The petitioners contended that the Urban Ceiling Act would not
F apply to the lands reserved for a public purpose under the Town
Planning Act and that the proceedings should be quashed. They also
challenged the constitutional validity of sections 10, II and 23 of the
¥
Ceiling Act, as being ultra vires of Articles 14 and 31, and prayed for a
Writ of Mandamus restraining the State Government from acquiring
the petitioners' land under the Ceiling Act.
G
Dismissing the writ petitions,

HELD: I. I. The Act has been placed in the Ninth Schedule to the
Constitution at SI. No. 132 and consequently comes under the protec-
tive umbrella of Article 31-B of the Constitution. [620A-B]
H
I.2. It is not the case of tbe petitioners that the provisions of the
616
·.,D.S. AMBALGI v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 617

Ceiling Act in any way damage or~ a basic or essential feature of A
the Constitution or its basic stnactutt. Also there is no statutory provi·
sion either in the Ceiling Act or in the Town Planning Act, which would
exclude the operation of the Ce_iling Act _,with. regard to lands reserved
for public purpose under the Town Planning Act. [620C-E] ,.,
./>, ~ i
Maharao Sahib Shri Bheem Singh_v. Union.of India.and others, B
[1985] Suppl. I S.C.R. 862; applied.

2.1. The primary object and the purpose of the Ceiling Act is to
provide for the imposition of a ceiling OD vacant land in urban agglo-
merations, for the acquisition of such land iD·eicess of the ceiling limit to
regulate the construction of buiJdlnp ·on such land and for matters C
connected therewith, with a view to preventing the concentration of
urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteer-
ing therein, to bring about an equilahle distribution of land is urban
agglomerations to subserve the common good, in furtherance of the
Diredive Principles of~ 39(b) and (c). The land to the extent which ran.
within the celling area stands in a class different from the land which is D
in excess of the ceiling area and is liable to be declared surplus to give
effect to the purpose and object of the Ceiling Act. [6wG-Hi 621A, B & G]

2.2. In the instant case, the purpose and object of the Ceiling Act
is entirely different from just acquiring a bit of land here or a bit of land
there for some public purpose. The Ceiling Act is a self-conlained Code E
having an overriding provision in Section 42. Once the land falls beyond
the ceiling limit precribed by the Ceiling Act and is capable of being
acquired as surplus land under Section 10 thereof it wonld be wbolly
inappropriate to acquire the same very land or a portion thereof nuder
the Town Planning Act inasmuch as it wonld inter alia apparently result
in misuse of public funds by granting higher compensation when the F
purpose of acquisition can be achieved OD payment of the lesser amount
of compensation prescribed in Section 11 of the Ceiling Act. [624A, B, F & G]

Union of India etc. v. Va//uri Basavaiah Chowdhary etc. etc.,
[1979] 3 S.C.R. 802; State of Gujarat &. Others v. Parshottamdas
Ramdas Patel & Others, [1988] I S.C.R. 997; relied on. G

Nagar Improvement Trust & Another v. Vitha/ Rao & Others,
[ 1973] 3 S.C.R. 39, distinguished.

Prakash Chand Amichand Shah v. State of Gujarai ~nd others,
(1986] I S.C.C. 581; referred to. H
618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1989] 3 S.C.R.

A 3. The alleged discrimination that if the purpose of reservation is
construction of buildings, the land will be given compengtiam under the
Ceiling Act whereas when the purpose of reservation is pub, gardens
etc. compensation wonld be given Wider the Town Plannl,. Act, does
not exist. The provisions of the Ceiling Act are applicPble with regard to
vacPDt IPDd PDd if for SPJDe fortnitous circwnstanees a particnlar cau-
B gory of land does not fall within the definition of vacant land the provi-
sions with regard to the vacant IPDd CPD obviously not be applied to
such IPDd. The IPDds falling Wider the two categories constitnte sepa-
rate classes and cannot consequently be treated alike. [624B, C & D f

c 1981.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition Nos. 1830-~2 of

(Under rtrlicle 32 of the Constitution of India).
··~
U.R. Lalit, V.N. Ganpule, A.B. Lal and Ms. Punam Kumari for
the Petitioners.
D
V.C. Mahajan, Ms. A Subhashini, P.H. Parekh, A.S. Bhasme
and A.M. Khanwilkar for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

E OJHA, J. The petitioners in these petitions under Article 32 of
the Constitution hold land within the city of Sholapur in the State of
Maharashtra. According to the petitioners development plan has been
sanctioned with regard to land situated in the city of Sholapur includ-
ing the petitioners' land under the Maharashtra Regional and Town
Planning Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the Maharashtra Act .:.,
I
F No. 37 of 1966) and some land of the petitioners was reserved for
public purpose under that Act. The Urban Land (Ceiling & Regula·
tion) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Act was brought into
force on 28th February, 1976 and proceedings for acquisition of vacant
land in excess of the ceiling limit placed under the Act were initiated
against the petitioners. These writ petitions have been filed for the
G following reliefs:

(a) It may be declared that the Urban Ceiling Act does not apply
to lands reserved for a public purpose under the Maharashtra
Regional Town Planning Act, 1966:

H (b)The proceedings for detennination of ceiling be declared void
and quashed so far as the lands are reserved for public purpose;
,,
··-

D,S, AMBALGI v, STATE OF MAHARASHTRA IOJHA, J.J 619

1 (c) The State Government be restrained from taking any action A
under Section 10(3) of the Ceiling Act;

(d) The Jina! statement under Section, 9 of the Ceiling Act be
amended suitably;

(e) A Writ of Mandamus or in the nature of Mandamus be B
issued restraining the State Government or its agents from
acquiring and/or taking possession of final plots Nos. 26, 22, 42,
28A and 44A/1;
~· (f) Sections 10, 11 and 23 of the Ceiling Act be declared ultra
' vires of Articles 14 and 31 of the Constitution;
c
i'-
(g) Any other order and/or direction as this Hon'ble Court may
deem fit, be passed.
'
It has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners
that Section 125 of the Maharashtra Act No. 37 of 1966 contemplates, D
inter a/ia, !hat any land required, reserved or designated in a develop-
ment plan for a public purpose shall be deemed to be land needed for a
public purpose within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
_> whereas Section U6 thereof contains the procedure for acquisition of
land required for public purposes. According to learned counsel if land
is acquired as contemplated by Sections U5 and 126 aforesaid, the E

- provisions of the Land Acquisition Act shall apply to the acquisition of
the said land with the modification that the market value of the land
shall be computed as contemplated by sub-section (3) of Section 126
whereas if the land was acquired under the Act, compensation payable
~
I
would be much less as contemplated by Section 11 of the Act and that
too with a ceiling of two lakhs of rupees as provided by sub-section (6) F
thereof. It has been urged that it is left to the sweet will of the
authorities concerned to acquire land either uqder ,Sections 125 and
126 of the Maharashtra Act No. 37 of 1966 or under the provisions of
Section 10 of the Act and that since in the event of proceedings for
acquisition being taken under Section 10 of the Act as is sought to be
done in the case of the petitioners the compensation payable would be G
far less than the compensation payable if the acquisition is made under
~ the Maharashtra Act No. 37 of 1966, discrimination under Article 14
of the Constitution was writ large, and in this view of the matter the
petitioners are entitled to the reliefs claimed in these writ petitions.

Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are of the H
620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 3 S.C.R.

A opinion that none of the reliefs prayed for in the writ petitions can be
granted to the petitioners. At the very outset, it may be pointed out
that the Act has been placed in the 9th Schedule to the Constitution at
SI. No. 132 and consequently comes under the protective umbrella of
Article 31-B of the Constitution. In Maharao Sahib Shri Bheem Singh
v. Union of India and others, (1985] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. Page 862 it has
B been held by a Constitution Bench of this Court that the Act is con-
stitutionally valid save and except Section 27(1) to the extent
mentioned in the judgment. With regard to sub-section (6) of Section
11, it has specifically been held at page 879 of the Report that this
sub-section which provides that compensation payable under Section _ (
11 shall in no case exceed two lakhs of rupees is valid. The amount thus "I'
payable is not illusory and the provision is not confiscatory. Rupees
c two lakhs are not like a farthing even if the excess land may be a for- ~
tune. In this connection, it may be pointed out that it has not been
urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the provisions of
the Act which have been impugned in the present writ petitions in any
way damage or destroy a basic or essential feature of the Constitution
D or its basic structure. No statutory provision either in the Act or even
in the Maharash'tra Act No. 37 of 1966 has been brought to our notice
excluding the operation of the Act with regard to lands reserved for
public purpose under the Maharashtra Act No. 37 of 1966. On the
other hand, there is a specific overriding provision in Section 42 of the
Act which provides that the provisions of this Act shall have effect
E notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith in any other law for
the time being in force or any custom usage or agreement or decree or
order of a Court, Tribunal or other authority. It is in this view of the
matter that we are of the opinion that none of the relief prayed for in
the present writ petitions can be granted.
-
F What has, however, been urged by the learned counsel for the
petitioners is that notwithstanding the specific relief (f) referred to
above, the petitioners are really not challenging the validity of Sec-
tions 10, 11 & 23 of the Act but they are challenging the action which is
being taken with regard to the petitioners' land on the ground that it is
discriminatory. We find no substance in this submission either.
G
In Union of India etc. v. Va//uri Basavaiah Chaudhary etc. etc.,
(1979] 3 S.C.R. Page 802 it was pointed out by a Constitution Bench of ~
this Court that the primary object and the purpose of the Act as the
long title and preamble show, is to provide for the imposition of a
ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, for the acquisition of
H such land in excess of the ceiling limit to regulate the construction of
D.S. AMBALG! v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (OJHA, J.I 621
~
\
buildings on such land and for matters connected therewith, with a A
view to preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands of a
few persons and speculation and profiteering therein, and with a view
to bringing about an equitable distributinn of land in urban agglomera-
tions to subserve the common good, in furtherance of the Directive
-J_ Principles of Article 39(b) and (c). That this was the object and the
B
purpose of the, Act has been reiterated in a recent decision of this
Court in State of Gujarat & others v. Parshottamdas Ramdas Patel &
Others, [1988] l S.C.R. Page 997.

~ It is in this background that the submission of learned counsel for
the petitioners about discrimination in the matter of implementation
+ or taking action under the Act has to be considered. While elaborating c
this argument of discrimination it wa~ pointed out by learned counsel
for the petitioners that if land belonging to 'A' and 'B' within an urban
agglomeration is reserved for a public purpose under development
scheme and 'A' is holding land within ceiling area whereas 'B' holds
land in excess of such ceiling area, 'A' will get compensation under the
Maharashtra Act No. 37 of 1966 whereas 'B' will get compensation D
under the Ceiling Act and the basis and method of compensation will
drastically vary. In support of this submission reliance was placed on a
_.,-1 decision of this Court in Nagpur Improvement Trust & Another v.
Vithal Rao & Others, [1973] 3 S.C.R. Page 39. In that case land was
sought to be acquired under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act.
1936. In a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution the E

- validity of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act was challenged inter
alia on the ground that the said Act was in violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution inasmuch as it empowered the acquisition of lands at

-~
prices lower than those which could have been payable if they had
been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. The writ petition was
allowed by the High Court and it was held that paragraphs 10(2) and F
10(3) in so far as they added a new clause 3(a) to section 23 and a
proviso to sub-section (2) of section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 were ultra vires as violating the guarantee of Article 14 of the
Constitution.

Suffice it to say, so far as this submission is concerned that the G
)Ir _land to the extent which falls within the ceiling area stands in a class
different from the land which is in excess of the ceiling area and is
liable to be declared surplus to give effect to the purpose and object of
the Act. What is the purpose and object of the Act has already been
noticed earlier. Further unlike the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act,
1936 the validity whereof was 'challenged in the case of Vithal Rao H
-:t
~
622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I 1989) 3 S.C.R.
~
I
A (supra), the Act has been placed in the 9th Schedule. As a result
thereof the Act comes within the protective umbrella of Article 31-B
of the Constitution which was not available to the Nagpur Improve-
ment Trust Act.

The decision in the case of Vithal Rao (supra) came up for con- Y
B sideration before a Constitution Bench of this Court with reference to
Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 in Prakash Chand Amichand Shah
v. State of Gujarat and others, I1986) 1 S.C.C. Page 581. It was held:

"In order to appreciate the contentions of the appellant it is ~
necessary to look at the object of the legislation in question
as a whole. The object of the Act is not just acquiring a bit of "+"
c land here or a bit of land there for some public purpose. It
consists of several activities which have as their ultimate
object the orderly development of an urban area. It envis-
ages the preparation of a development plan, allocation of
land for various private and public uses, preparation of a
D Town Planning Scheme and making provisions for future
development of the area in question. The various aspects of
a Town Planning Scheme have already been set out. On the
final Town Planning Scheme coming into force under Sec- ..(
tion 53F of the Act there is an automatic vesting of all lands
required by the local authority. It is not a case where the
E provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 have to be set
in motion either by the Collector or by the Government." ..

It was further held:

"The provision under consideration in the above decision
F corresponds to Section 11 and to Section 84 of the Act,
which we are now considering. Section 59 of the Nagpur
Improvement Trust Act, 1936 provided that the Trust might,
with the previous sanction of the State Government
acquire land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 as modified by the provisions of the said Act for
G carrying out any of the purposes of the said Act. But the
provisions which are questioned before us are of a different
pattern altogether. They deal with the preparation of a
scheme for the development of the land. On the final
scheme coming into force the lands affected by the scheme
which are needed for the local authority for purposes of the
H Scheme automatically vest in the local authority. There is
D:S. AMBALGI >. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [OJHA, J.[ 623

...;)
no need to set in motion the provisions of the Land Acqm- · A
sition Act, 1894 either as it is or as modified in the case of
acquisition under Section 11 or Section 84 of the Act. Then
the Town Planning Officer is authorised. to determine
whether any reconstituted plot can be given to a person
whose land is affected by the scheme. Under Section 51(3)
of the Act the final scheme as sanctioned by the Govern- B
ment has the same effect as if it were enacted in the Act.
The scheme has to be read as part of the.Act. Under Sec'.
tion 53 of the Act all rights of the private owners in the·
original plots would· determine and certain consequential
rights in favour of the owners would arise therefrom. If in
the sch.eme, reconstituted or final plots are allotted to them C
+ they become owners of such Jina! plots subject tci the rights
settled by the Town Planning Officer in the final scheme. · ·
In !\(lme fases the original plot of an owner might com-
pletely be allotted to the local authority for a public
purpose. Such private owner may be paid compensation or
a reconstituted plot in some other place. It may be a smal- D
ler or a bigger plot. It may be that in some cases it may not
be possible to allot a final plot at all. Sections 67 to 71 of
the Act provide for certain financial adjustments regarding
payment of money to the local authority or to the owners of
the original plots. The development and planning carried

-
out under the Act is primarily for the benefit of public. The E
local authority is under an obligation to function according
to the Act. The local authority has to bear a part of the
expenses of development. It is in one sense a package deal.
The proceedings relating to the scheme are not like acquisi-
tion proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. •
Nor are the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 F
made applicable either without or with modifications as in
the case of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936. We
do not understand the decision in Nagpur Improvement
Trust case as laying down generally that wherever land is
taken away by the government under a separate statute
compensation should be paid under the Land Acquisition G
Act, 1894 only and if there is any difference between the
compensation payable under the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 and the compensation payable under the statute con-
cerned the acquisition under the statute would be dis-
criminatory. That case is distinguishable from the present
case." H
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1989] 3 S.C.R.

In the instant case also the purpose and object of the Act being
entirely different from just acquiring a bit of land here or a bit of land
there for some public purpose, and the Act being a self-contained
Code having an overriding provision in Section 42, the decisicn in the
case of Vithal Rao (supra) is wholly inapplicable in so tar as acquisi-
tion of surplus land under the Act is concerned.
B
It was also urged that if one person holds land in excess of ceiling
area and the excess therein is reserved for a public purpose under the
development scheme there will still be discriminatory results if the
land in excess of ceiling is reserved for different purposes. According ·~
to learned .counsel if the purpose of reservation is construction of
C buildings the land will be given compensatiqn under the Ceiling Act +
whereas when the purpose of reservation is parks, gardens etc. com-
pensation would be given under the Maharashtra Act 37 of 1966. The
result, according to learned counsel, is discriminatory. This submission

'°
again has apparently no substance inasmuch as the provisions of the
Ceiling Act are applicable with regard vacant land and if for some
D fortuitous circumstances a particular category of land does not faB
within the definition of vacant land lbe provisions with regard to
vacant land can obviously not be applied to such land. Here again, the
lands falling under the two categories constitute separate classes and
cannot consequently be treated alike.

-
E Learned counsel for the petitioners also referred ,to some other
cases wherein a similar view, as in the case of Vithal Rao (supra), was
taken but we do no consider it necessary to deal with those cases
separately for the reasons already stated above. With regard to the
submission of learned counsel that the question as to whether a land
• reserved for public purpose under the Maharashtra Act No. 37 of 1966
F should be acquired under that Act or under Section 10 of the Act has
been left to the sweet will of the authority concerned, we are of the
opinion that it is riot so. Once the land falls beyond the ceiling limit
prescribed by the Act and is capable of being acquired as surplus land
under Section 10 of the Act it would be wholly inappropriate to
acquire the same very land or a portion thereof under the Maharashtra
G Act No. 37 of 1966 inasmuch as it would inter alia apparently result in
misuse of public funds by granting higher compensation when the .,..'
purpose of acquisition c.an be achieved on payment of the lesser
amount of compensation prescribed in Section 11 of the Act.

In the case of Parshottamdas Patel (supra}, the State Govern-
H ment of Gujarat issued a notification.under section 4(1) of the Land
D.S. AMBALGI v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [OJHA, J.] 625

~ Acquisition Act, 1894 stating that the lands of the respondents were A
likely to be needed for the public purpose of providing housing accom-
modation for the employees of the Municipal Corporation. Sub-
sequently, a notification under Section 6 of the said Act declaring that
the aforesaid lands along with· the other lands were needed for the said
public purpose, was also made. In the meantime, the Act came into
--..!._ force and the respondents filed writ petitions contending inter alia that B
the acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act should be
proceeded with and the acquisition proceedings to the extent it related
to the surplus land under the ceiling law should be dropped. The writ
\ petitions were allowed. Reversing the judgment of the High Court,
.~Ibis Court held:
c
"The declaration made by the High Court in these
+ cases that the land acquisition proceedings did not suffer
from an infirmity which indirectly suggests that the pro-
ceedings should go on is again erroneous. It is open to the
State Government to drop the land acquisition proceedings
and to withdiaw the lands from aeq uisition under sect.ion D
48 of the Larid Acquisition Act, 1894. We are informed
that the State Government has in fact subsequently with-
drawn 'these lands from acquisition. Tiie proceedings under
the Larid Acquisition Act, 1894 cannot therefore have any
bearing on the question whether the lands in question are
vacant lands or not for purposes of the ceiling· law con- E
tained in the Act. When the lands in question or bulk of

- them are likely to be acquired under the ceiling law by
paying compensation as provided therein, it would not be
proper to compel the Government to acquire them•under
the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. As
already stated the Act has the overriding effect on all other F
laws."

In view of the foregoings discussion, we find no merit in these
writ petitions and they are accordingly dismissed. There shall, how-
ever, be no order as to costs.
G
G.N. Petitions dismissed.
)op