Supreme Court of India
DARSHAN SINGHversusSTATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.
- Citation
- 2010 INSC 45
- Decided
- 15 January 2010
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- DALVEER BHANDARI
Holding
The appellant’s act of firing the gun was justified under the right of private defence, and the trial court’s acquittal is restored.
Summary
The case arose from a land‑dispute in which Gurcharan Singh attacked Bakhtawar Singh with a gandasa, after which Darshan Singh, the son of Bakhtawar, fired two shots from his licensed gun, killing Gurcharan Singh. The accused pleaded private defence, claiming a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt. The trial court acquitted the accused, but the Punjab & Haryana High Court set aside the acquittal and convicted them. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the scope of sections 96, 97 and 100 of the IPC, the requirement of reasonable apprehension, and the principle that an appellate court should not disturb a trial‑court acquittal unless it is perverse. The Court held that the appellant faced a genuine threat of death, that the force used was proportionate, and that the trial court’s view was a plausible one. Consequently, the High Court’s judgment was set aside and the acquittal restored.
Issues considered
- The appellant’s act of firing the gun is examined to see whether it falls within the right of private defence under ss.96, 97 and 100 IPC.
- Whether the trial court’s acquittal was a possible or plausible view that should not be interfered with by the appellate court.
- Whether the injuries to the prosecution witnesses required a conviction of the accused.
- Whether the right of private defence extends to causing death when there is reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt.
- The correctness of the High Court’s reversal of the acquittal.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 100, s. 96, s. 97, s. 99
Subjects
private defenceright of self‑defenceland disputemurderacquittalreasonable apprehensionproportionalitypresumption of innocenceburden of proof
Judgment
[2010) 1 S.C.R. 642
A DARSHAN SINGH
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1057 of 2002)
JANUARY 15, 2010
B
[DALVEER BHANDARI AND ASOK KUMAR
GANGULY, JJ.)
Penal Code, 1860:
c
ss. 96, 97 and 100 - Right to private defence - Exercise
of - Land dispute between parties - Gun shot injury by .
accused resulting in death of deceased - Plea of private
defence by accused - Acquittal by trial court - Set aside by
High Court and conviction of accused - On appeal, held: Law
0
does not require a law-abiding citizen to behave like a coward
when confronted with an imminent unlawful aggression -
When there is real apprehension that aggressor might cause
death or grievous hurt, right of private defence of defender
extends to killing the aggressor - On facts, accused had
E serious apprehension of death or at least grievous hurl when
he exercised his right of private defence to save himself -
Role attributed to accused is fully covered by his right of
private defence - Trial court's view is the possible view and
is based on the entire evidence on record - Thus, order of
F acquittal restored.
Right to private defence - Guiding principles for exercise
of right to private defence - Explained.
G Appeal: Appeal against acquittal - Scope of interference
- Held: If trial court's view is a possible or plausible view, then
appellate court or High Court is not justified in interfering with
it- There is presumption of innocence which is further fortified
with the acquittal of accused by trial court.
H 642
DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB & A.NR. 643
According to the prosecution case, there was a A
dispute between two brothers GS and BS with regard to
partition of land. On the fateful day, the complainant party
were irrigating their fields and cutting the ridges. GD and
AS were also present. BS gave gandasa blow causing
injuries on the chest of GS. GS then attacked BS with a B
gandasa on his head and BS fell down. Thereafter, the
appellant-son of BS fired two shots from his licensed gun
which hit GS in the chest and some of the pellets hit GR
and GD. GS died on the spot. Appellant claimed right of
private defence. Trial court acquitted the appellant and c
BS. High Court set aside the order of acquittal and
convicted them. Hence the present appeal. During the
pendency of the appeal BS died.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
D
HELD: 1. In the facts and circumstances of the
instant case, the appellant had the serious apprehension
of death or at least the grievous hurt when he exercised
his right of private defence to save himself. The role
attributed to the appellant is fully covered by his right of E
private defence. The impugned judgment of the High
Court is set aside and the judgment of acquittal of the trial
court is restored. [Paras 37 and 65) (668-E; 677-A-B]
SCOPE AND FOUNDATION OF PRIVATE DEFENCE:
F
2.1. In order to justify the act of causing death of the
assailant, the accused has simply to satisfy the court that
he was faced with an assault which caused a reasonable
/apprehension of death or grievous hurt. The question
whether, the apprehension was reasonable or not is a G
question of fact depending upon the facts and
circumstances of each case and no strait-jacket formula
can be prescribed in this regard. The weapon used, the
manner and nature of assault and other surrounding
circumstances should be taken into account while H
644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 1 S.C.R.
A evaluating whether the apprehension was justified or
not? (Para 23] (664-A-C]
2.2. When enacting ss. 96 to 106 IPC excepting from
its penal provisions, certain classes of acts, done in good
8 faith for the purpose of repelling unlawful aggressions,
the Legislature clearly intended to arouse and encourage
the manly spirit of self-defence amongst the citizens,
when faced with grave danger. The law does not require a
law-abiding citizen to behave like a coward when confronted
C with an imminent unlawful aggression. There is nothing
more degrading to the human spirit than to run away in
face of danger. The right of private defence is thus
designed to serve a social purpose and deserves to be
fostered within the prescribed limits. [Paras 24 and 38]
D (664-F-H; 668-F-G]
Mahandi v. Emperor (1930) 31 Criminal Law Journal
654 (Lahore); Alingal Kunhinayan and Anr. v. Emperor Indian
Law Reports 28 Madras 454; Ranganadham Perayya
(1957) 1 Andhra Weekly Reports 181, referred to.
E
Russel on Crime 11th Edn., Vol.1, p.491; Penal Law of
India by Hari Singh Gour 11th Edition 1998-99; Principles
of Penal Laws' by Bentham, referred to.
2.3. The right to protect one's own person and
F property against the unlawful aggressions of others is a
right inherent in man. The duty of protecting the person
and property of others is a duty which man owes to
society of which he is a member and the preservation of
which is both his interest and duty. It is, indeed, a duty
G which flows from human sympathy. But such p11ote1tion
must not be extended beyond the necessities of the case,
otherwise it will encourage a spirit or lawlessness and
disorder. The right has, therefore, been restricted to
offe,nc:es against the human body and those relating to
H agg~ssion on property. [Para 29) [665-F-H; 666-A-BJ
DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. 645
2.4. When there is real apprehension that the A
aggressor might cause death or grievous hurt, in that
event the right of private defence of the defender could
even extend to causing of death. A mere reasonable
apprehension is enough to put the right of self-defence
Into operation, but it is also settled position of law that a B
right of self-defence is only right to defend oneself and
not to retaliate. It is not a right to take revenge. [Para 30)
[666-C]
2.5. Right of private defence of person and property
is recognized in all free, civilsed, democratic societies C
within certain reasonable limits. Those limits are dictated
by two considerations: (1) that the same right is claimed
by all other members of the society and (2) that it is the
State which generally undertakes the responsibility for
the maintenance of law and order. The citizens, as a D
general rule, are neither expected to run away for safety
when faced with grave and imminent danger to their
person or property as a result of unlawful aggression, nor
are they expected, by use of force, to right the wrong done
to them or to punish the wrong doer of commission of E
offences. [Para 31) [666-D-F]
Article on 'Private Defense' by Michael Gorr published
Jn Journal "Law and Philosophy" Volume 9, Number 3 I
August 1990 p. 241, referred to. F
2.6. The basic principle underlying the doctrine of the
right of private defence is that when an individual or his
property is faced with a danger and immediate aid from
the State machinery is not readily available, that individual
is entitled to protect himself and his property. The right G
of private defence is availa!1ble only to one who is
suddenly confronted with the necessity of averting an
impending danger not of self creation. That being so, the
necessary corollary is that the violence which the citizen
defending himself or his property is entitled to use must H
646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 1 S.C.R.
A not be unduly disproportionate to the injury which is
sought to be averted or which is reasonably
apprehended and should not exceed its legitimate
purpose. [Para 33) [667-B-C]
2.7. According to s. 99 IPC the injury which is inflicted
8
by the person exercising the right should commensurate
with the injury with which he is threatened. At the same
time, it is difficult to expect from a person exercising this
right in good faith, to weigh "with golden scales" what
maximum amount of force is necessary to keep within the
C right every reasonable allowance should be made for the
bona fide defender. It would be wholly unrealistic to
expect of a person under assault to modulate his defence
step by step according to attack. [Paras 35) [667-F-G]
D Robert B. Brown v. United States of America (1921) 256
US 335, referred to.
2.8. The right of private defence extends to the killing
of the actual or potential assailant when there is a
E reasonable and imminent apprehension of the atrocious
crimes enumerated in the six clauses of section 100 IPC.
According to the combined effect of two clauses of s. 100
IPC taking the life of the assailant would be justified on
the plea of private defence; if the assault causes
reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt to the
F person exercising the right. A person who is in imminent
and reasonable danger of losing his life or limb may in
the exercise of right of self-defence inflict any harm, even
extending to death on his assailant either when the
assault is attempted or directly threatened. It is necessary
G that the extent of right of private defence is that the force
used must bear a reasonable proportion of the injury to
be averted, that is the injury inflicted on the assailant
must not be greater than is necessary for the protection
of the person assaulted. A person in fear of his life is not
H expected to modulate his defence step by step, but at the
DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. 647
; same time it should not be totally disproportionate. [Paras A
36 and 39] [667-H; 668-A..C; 669-A-B]
3. The following principles of right to private defence
emerge on scrutiny of the relevant judgments~
(i) Self-preservation is the basic human instinct and B
is duly recognized by the criminal jurisprudence of
all civilized countries. All free, democratic and
civilized countries recognize the right of private
defence within certain reasonable limits.
c
(ii) The right of private defence is available only to one
who is suddenly confronted with the necessity of
averting an impending danger and not of self-
creation.
(iii) A mere reasonable apprehension is enough to D
put the right of self defence into operation. In other
words, it is not necessary that there should be an
actual commission of the offence in order to give rise
to the right of private defence. It is enough if the
accused apprehended that such an offence is E
contemplated and it is likely to be committed if the
right of private defence is not exercised.
(iv) The right of private defence commences as soon
as a reasonable apprehension arises and it is co- F
terminus with the duration of such apprehension.
(v) It is unrealistic to expect a person under assault
to modulate his defence step by step with any
arithmetical exactitude.
G
(vi) In private defence the force used by the accused
ought not to be wholly disproportionate or much
greater than necessary for protection of the person
or property.
H
648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A (vii) Even if the accused does not plead self-defence,
it is open to consider such a plea if the same arises
from the material on record.
(viii) The accused need not prove the existenc-e-Of the
right of private defence beyond reasonable doubt.
B
(ix) The IPC confers the right of private defence only
when that unlawful or wrongful act is an offence.
(x) A person who is in imminent and reasonable
c danger of losing his life or limb may in exercise of self
defence inflict any harm even extending to death on
his assailant either when the assault is attempted or
directly threatened. [Para 58] [674-B-H; 675-A-D]
State of Orissa v. Rabindranath Dalai and Anr. 1973 Crl
D LJ 1686 (Orissa) (FB), approved.
Laxman Sahu v. State of Orissa 1986 (1) Supp SCC
555; Raghavan Achari v. State of Kera/a 1993 Supp. (1) SCC
719; Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1993 SC 970; Puran
E Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab (1975) 4 SCC 518;
Bhagwan Swaroop v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1992) 2 SCC
406; Kashmiri Lal and Ors. v. State of Punjab (1996) 10 SCC
471; James Martin v. State of Kera/a (2004) 2 SCC 203;
Gotipul/a Venkatasiva Subbrayanam and Ors. v. The State
F of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. (1970) 1 SCC 235; Mahabir
Choudhary v. State of Bihar (1996) 5 SCC 107; Munshi Ram
and Ors. v. Delhi Administration (1968) 2 SCR 455; State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Ramesh (2005) 9 SCC 705; Triloki Nath
and Ors. v. State of UP. (2005) 13 SCC 323; Vidhya Singh
G v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1971) 3 SCC 244; Jai Dev v.
State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 612; Buta Singh v. The State
of Punjab (1991) 2 sec 612, relied on.
4.1. The High Court in the impugned judgment
reversed the trial court's judgment of acquittal and
H convicted the accused. Admittedly, appellant fired from
DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. 649
his 12-bore double barrel gun which '1ad a number of A
pellets. High Court disbelieved the trial court's version
thatGS and GD did not receive fire arm injuries because
no pellet or pellets were recovered from their bodies. In
the impugned order, the High Court without giving any
r.ogent reasons set aside the well considered judgment B
of the trial court. When a shot was fired from a 12-bore
gun and if no pellet was recovered, then the trial court is
not wrong in arriving at the conclusion that the injuries
were not caused by a fire arm. The High Court on this
point discarded the reasoning of the trial court without c
any sound basis. [Paras 59 and 60] [675-D-F]
4.2. The High Court gave the finding that "since it is
a case of dual version, one given by the complainant, who
appears to be a truthful witness when he has not
concealed the role of his father and explained the injury D
of BS. On the contrary, the accused persons came. with
untenable defence." While arriving at this conclusion, the
High Court did not follow the consistent legal position.
The High Court or the appellate court would not be
justified in setting aside a judgment of acquittal only on E
the ground that the version given by the complainant is
more truthful. [Para 61] [675-G-H; 676-A-B] ·
4.3. High Court unnecessarily laid stress on the point
of recovery of the gun at the instance of appellant. The F
accused has not denied the incident. The case of the
defence is that their case is covered by the right of private
defence. Appellant admitted in his statement u/s. 313
Cr.P.C., 1973 that he had fired from his licensed gun in
his right of private defence. High Court without properly G
comprehending the entire evidence on record reversed
the well reasoned judgment of the trial court. [Para 63)
[676-E-F]
4.4. In a case of acquittal, if the trial court's view is a
possible or plausible view, then the appellate court or the H
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 1 S.C.R.
A High Court would not be justified in interfering with it.
There is presumption of innocence and that presumption
is further fortified with the acquittal of the accused by the
trial court. Appellate court or High Court would not be
justified in reversing the judgment of acquittal unless it
B comes to a clear conclusion that the judgment of the trial
court is utterly perverse and, on the basis of the evidence
on record, no other view is plausible or possible than the
one taken by the appellate court or the High Court. In the
instant case, after marshalling and scrutinizing the entire
c prosecution evidence, the trial court's view is not only the
possible or plausible view but it is based on the correct
analysis and evaluation of the entire evidence on record.
No other view is legally possible. [Paras 62 and 64) [676-
C-D; G]
D Cases Law Reference :
(1921) 256 us 335 Referred to. Para 34
(1930) 31 Criminal Law
Journal 654 (Lahore) Referred to. Para 38
E
Indian Law Reports
28 Madras 454 Referred to. Para 38
(1957) 1 Andhra
Weekly Reports 181 Referred to. Para 38
F 1973 Crl. LJ 1686
(Orissa) (FB) Approved. Para 40
1986 (1) Supp
sec 555 Relied on. Para 41
G 1993 Supp. (1)
sec 119 Relied on. Para 42
AIR 1993 SC 970 Relied on. Para 43
H
DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. 651
(1975) 4 sec 518 Relied on. Para 44 A
(1992) 2 sec 406 Relied on. Para 45
(1996) 10 sec 471 Relied on. Para 47
(2004) 2 sec 203 Relied on. Para 48
B
(1970) 1 sec 235 Relied on. Para 49
(1996) 5 sec 101 Relied on. Para 50
(1968) 2 SCR 455 Relied on. Para 51
c
(2005) 9 sec 105 Relied on. Para 52
(2005) 13 sec 323 Relied on. Para 53
(1971) 3 sec 244 Relied on. Para 54
AIR 1963 SC 612 Relied on. Para 55 D
(1991) 2 sec 612 Relied on. Para 57
CRIMINAL AP PELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 1057 of 2002.
E
From the Judgment & Order dated 06.08.2002 of the High
Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal
No. 446-DBA of 1994.
R.K. Kapoor, Sanjana J. Bali, Shweta Kapoor, Harish
F
Chandr~ Pant, Mansi Dhiman, Gunjan Sinha, Anis Ahmed
Khan, D.P. Singh, Premjit Singh Dhaliwal, Shuchta Srivastava,
Kuldip Singh, Ajay Pal Satyapal Khushal Chand Pasi for the
appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by G
DALVEER BHANDARI, J. 1. This appeal is directed
against the judgment and order of the Punjab & Haryana High
Court in Criminal Appeal No.446-(Division Bench) of 1994
dated 6.8.2002. H
652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A 2. Both Darshan Singh and Bakhtawar Singh were
acquitted by the Sessions Court, Ludhiana. The said judgment
of acquittal was set aside by the High Court of Punjab &
Haryana at Chandigarh.
3. Darshan Singh and Bakhtawar Singh filed appeal
8
against the said judgment before this court. During the
pendency of this appeal, Bakhtawar Singh died and
consequently the appeal filed by him abated.
4. Brief facts which are necessary to dispose of this appeal
C are recapitulated as under:-
The dispute is between very close and mtimatEf family
members. Deceased Gurcharan Singh was the brother of
Bakhtawar Singh and uncle of Darshan Singh. He was the father
0 of Gurdish Singh, PW7, the informant. The agriculture fields of
both brothers, Gurcharan Singh and Bakhtawar Singh were
situated adjoining to each other. According to the prosecution,
on 15.7.1991 at about 8 a.m. Gurdish Singh, PW7 and his
father, Gurcharan Singh were irrigating their aforesaid fields
E and were also mending its ridges and at that time Gurdev Singh,
PW8 and Ajit Singh were also present there. In the meantime,
Darshan Singh and Bakhtawar Singh came there from the side
of their fields raising lalkaras and abused the complainant party.
Darshan Singh, accused was armed with D.B.B.L. gun and his
father Bakhtawar Singh was carrying a Gandasa and they were
F saying that they would teach a lesson to the complainant party
for cutting the ridges.
5. According to the further story of the prosecution,
Bakhtawar Singh gave a Gandasa blow causing injuries on the
G chest of Gurcharan Singh. Gurcharan Singh was also having a
Gandasa with him and in order to save himself he also caused
injury on the head of Bakhtawar Singh. Thereafter, Darshan
Singh fired two shots from his licensed gun which hit Gurcharan
Singh in the chest and some of the pellets hit Gurdish Singh
H PW7 on his left upper arm and Gurdev Singh, PW8 on his left
DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. 653
(DALVEER BHANDARI, J.)
thigh. Gurcharan Singh fell down and died at the spot. Gurdish A
Singh and others retraced their steps in order to save
themselves. Both the accused in order to save themselves ran
towards their respective houses. Gurdish Singh, PW7 left the
dead body of Gurcharan Singh and proceeded to the police
station to lodge a report. Gurdev Singh PW8 also accompanied B
him. They met Om Prakash, ASI at about 9 a.m. at Barnala
crossing where Gurdish Singh PW? gave his statement. It was
then read over and explained to him who signed the same
admitting the contents thereof to be correct. Om Prakash, ASI
made his endorsement (Ex. N/1) and forwarded the statement c
to the poli.ce station, Rajkot and on the basis of which the case
was registered against both the accused.
6. Om Prakash, ASI accompanied Gurdish Singh and
Gurdev Singh to the place of occurrence. He prepared inquest
report in respect of the dead body of Gurcharan Singh and then D
sent the dead body for post-mortem examination through
Constable Milkba Singh and Head Constable Pargat Singh.
Om Prakash, ASI lifted blood stained earth from the place
where dead body of Gurcharan Singh was lying and took the
same into possession after preparing the recovery memo. One E
gandasa and an empty cartridge of 12 bore were found lying
near the dead body. The gandasa and the empty cartridge were
also taken into possession. The Investigating Officer prepared
visual site plan of the place of occurrence with marginal notes.
Gurdish Singh and Gurdev Singh's injury statements were also F
prepared and sent for medico legal examination.
7. Dr. Mukesh Gupta PW4 conducted post-mortem
examination on the dead body of Gurcharan Singh on
15.7.1991 at 4.30 p.m. On the same day at 5.50 p.m. Dr. Gupta G
also conducted medico legal examination of Gurdev Singh and
found one abrasion on his left thigh. Dr. Gupta found a
superficial abrasion on Gurdish Singh on his elbow. Darshan
Singh and Bakhtawar Singh were arrested on 28.7.1991. The
factum of the incident has not been denied by the accused and H
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A they claimed right of private defence.
8. According to the prosecution, the motive of the crime
was dispute regarding partition of land between both brothers
Bakhtawar Singh and Gurcharan Singh. One year prior to the
present incident, the village Panchayat had got the dispute
8
compromised by a written agreement. There was a common
well situated in the adjoining land. As a result of the
compromise, the well along with a small piece of land attached
to it was given to Gurcharan Singh and the land of common
C pathway leading to the well was given to the accused party. The
compromise was not accepted by the accused party and they
wanted repartition of the land attached to the well. This
grievance led to this unfortunate incident.
9. The prosecution examined 11 witnesses. Dr. Mukesh
D Gupta, PW4 who conducted the post-mortem examination
found the following injuries on the dead body of Gurcharan
Singh:-
"1. There were 14 wounds in an area of 20 cm x 18
cm on left side of the chest above the nipple. One
E
of the wounds which was above the nipple was
having inverted margins. A wad was recovered
from this wound. This wound was 1cmx1 cm. The
9 wounds which measured 0.75 cm x 0.75 cm which
were on the chest and shoulder also had inverted
F margins. Out of these wounds 6 were found to
entering chest cavity and 6 pellets were recovered
from the chest cavity. The remaining 3 wounds were
having everted margins. These were near the axilla
and each wound measured 1 cm x 1 cm. One of
G the 14 wounds which measured 0.75 cm x 1.5 cm
was having inverted margins. It was skin deep and
was on the shoulder, upper part·of humerous and
clavicle bones were found to be fractured. 4th and
5th rib of the left side of the chest were also found
H to be fractured.
DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. 655
[DALVEER BHANDARI, J ]
2. There were 7 wounds in an area of 20 cm x 8 cm A
on the upper part of the chest on its right side above
the nipple. Out of these wounds 3 wounds
measuring 0. 75 cm x 1 cm each was having
inverted margins, these were skin deep. 2 wounds
were having everted margins having a dimension B
of 1 x 1 cm each near the axilla. A pellet was
recovered from near the axilla. The remaining 2
wounds were near the top of right shoulder
measuring 0. 75 x 1.5 cm each with inverted
margins. These were skin deep. c
3. An incised wound 8 cm x 0.5 cm skin deep on the
left side of chest 3 cm above the nipple. It was
horizontally placed."
10. Dr. Mukesh Gupta found following injury on the person D
of Gurdev Singh:-
"An abrasion measuring 1 cm x 0.5 cm on the front and
inner side of left thigh. It was a superficial abrasion reddish
in colour, over the junction of upper 1l3rd and lower 2/3rd E
of the thigh. There was damage to the pajama
corresponding to the injury."
11. According to the doctor, the injury was simple in nature
and was caused within 24 hours. Doctor also found injury on
Gurdish Singh to be superficial. The same reads as under:- F
"A very superficial abrasion 1 cm x 0.5 cm on the upper
side of left '1.!PPer arm 12 cm above the elbow. It was
reddish in col0ur."
12. It may be relevant to mention that Dr. M.S. Gill, PW5, G
who conducted the medical examination of Bakhtawar Singh
found the following injuries on his person:-
"1. An incised wound 7 cm x 0.5 cm on the parietal region
of the right side of head. It was placed anterior posteriorly. H
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A The wound was bone deep and 4 cm above the right pinna.
Clotted blood was present."
13. According to doctor. this injury was caused by sharp-
edged weapons.
B 14. Both Gurdish Singh, PW? and Gurdev Singh, PW8 are
the eye-witnesses who gave detailed description of the
occurrence. After examining the prosecution evidence, the
following statements of Darshan Singh and Bakhtawar Singh
were recorded under section 313 Cr. P.C .. The relevant portion
C of the statement of Darshan Singh reads as under:-
"! am innocent. In fact the complainant party had gone back
from the agreement got effected by the Panchayat one year
prior to the occurrence. In accordance with the said
D compromise we had ploughed the land which was earlier
under common pathway. One day prior to the occurrence
we had irrigated that portion of the land. On the day of
occurrence when we went to the fields, Gurcharan Singh
(deceased) along with 3-4 outsiders came to our field and
remarked that we would be taught a lesson for irrigating
E
the land. Immediately thereafter Gurcharan Singh gave a
gandasa blow hitting my father Bakhtawar Singh on the
head as a result of which he fell down. I felt that my father
had been killed. Gurcharan Singh then advanced towards
me holding the gandasa. I apprehended that I too would
F be killed and I then pulled the trigger of my gun. Gurcharan
Singh fell to the ground and his companions took to their
heels. I then took Bakhtawar Singh in injured condition to
Govt. hospital, Sudhar. Police came to the hospital at about
5 p.m. We were kept under guard and brought to the police
G station on the next day after getting my father discharged.
We have been falsely implicated in this case.
Bakhtawar Singh (accused) pleaded as under:-
"! am innocent. It was the complainant party who had
H
DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. 657
[DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
resiled from the compromise got effected by Panehayat A
about a year before the occurrence. We had ploughed the
land which had fallen to our share and one day prior to the
occurrence we had irrigated the same. On the day of
occurrence when we went to the fields Gurcharan Singh
(deceased) along with 3-4 outsiders came to our field and B
remarked that we would be taught a lesson for irrigating
the land. Immediately thereafter Gurcharan Singh gave a
gandasa blow on my head as a result of which I fell down.
Gurcharan Singh then advanced towards Darshan Singh
holding his gandasa whereupon Darshan Singh fired a c
shot from his gun. I was taken to Government hospital,
Sudhar by Darshan Singh. Police came there on the same
day at about 5 p.m. and to9k us to the police station after
getting me discharged. I have been falsely involved in this
case." D
15. According to the verslans of the accused Darshan
Singh and Bakhtawar Singh, Gurcharan first gave Gandasa
blow hitting Bakhtawar Singh on the head and the injury caused
on Bakhtawar Singh was an inQi§ed wound of 7 cm x 0.5 cm.
on the parietal region of the right @Ide of head. The wound was E
bone deep and 4 cm above the right pinna and clotted blood
was present and after receiving these injuries in order to save
himself, Darshan Singh fired at Qurcharan Singh and as a result
of which he died. According to the accused, the entire act is
covered by the right of privat@ defence. According to the F
prosecution, Bakhtawar Singh gave first injury on the chest of
Gurcharan Singh whereas according to the defence the first
Injury was given by Gurcharan Singh to Bakhtawar Singh. The
appellant Darshan Singh fired only after the serious incised
wound by a Gandasa was inflicted on his father Bakhtawar G
Singh and at that time in order to 5ave his life he fired 2 shots
which hit the deceased Gurcharan Singh leading to his death.
16. The point for determination is the place where the
unfortunate incident had taken place. According to Bhupinder H
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A Singh Patwari, PW3, point 'A' in site plan Ex.PC denotes the
place where the dead body of Gurcharan Singh was said to
be lying and this point is in Khasra No.10. He further testified
that accused Bakhtawar Singh was recorded in cultivating
possession of Khasra No.10. According to the finding of the
a trial court, it clearly shows that Bakhtawar Singh was in
possession of Khasra No.10. According to Bhupinder Singh
Patwari, Point 'E' is in Khasra No.10 from where Darshan
Singh had allegedly fired at Gurcharan Singh. According to the
site plan prepared by Bhupinder Singh Patwari, Point 'F' is the
c place where the dispute took place with Bakhtawar Singh.
According to the Patwari, this point 'F' is in Khasra No.10 at a
distance of 5 karms which is equivalent to 27.5 feet from the
aforesaid pathway and point 'A' is at a distance of 7 karms
from point 'F'. Thus, from this evidence it is evident that the
occurrence took place inside Khasra No.10 which was in
0
possession of Bakhtawar Singh accused. Gurcharan Singh
covered a distance of about 7 karms which is equivalent to 37.5
feet.
17. The trial court came to the conclusion that the presence
E of Gurdev Singh and Gurdish Singh at the time of alleged
occurrence is highly doubtful. Dr. Mukesh Gupta also stated that
injuries on the person of Gurdev Singh and Gurdish Singh could
be caused by friendly hands and can be self suffered. He further
stated in the cross examination that duration of the injuries was
F less than 6 hours. As per the prosecution case, the injuries were
allegedly rec.. ived by them at about 8 a.m. No pellet was
recovered from the injuries of these witnesses namely, Gurdev
Singh and Gurdish Singh. According to the trial court, the
possibility of these injuries on their person having been
G fabricated at a later stage cannot be ruled out. The trial court
also held that there was no mention of the injuries received by
Gurdish Singh and Gurdev Singh in the inquest report whereas
this fact finds mention in the first information report. According
to the prosecution, Gurdish Singh suffered pellet injury on the
H left upper arm whereas, Gurdev Singh was hit on his left thigh.
DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANk. 659
[OALVEER BHJ>.NDARI, J.]
If it was so, there would have been mention of this f1,3ct in the A
inquest report or the investigating officer must have prepared
their injury statement, but neither any such injury statement was
prepared at the spot nor their medical-examination was carried
out. Om Prakash, ASI, in his cross-examination has admitted
that he came to know about the injuries of Gurdish Singh and B
Gurdev Singh only when they gave their supplementary
statements at the bus stand. According to the findings of the
trial court, their injury statement was prepared at the spot and
they were medically examined by Dr. Mukesh Gupta. Thus,
according to the trial court the injuries were fabricated with c
connivance with the investigating officer just in order to make
Gurdish Singh and Gurdev Singh stamp witnesses.
18. The trial court after discussing the entire evidence
came to the conclusion that two counter versions of the case
have been presented and, in the view of the trial court, the D
defence version is more probable and nearer to the truth for
the following reasons:
(i) The delay in lodging the FIR impells the court to
scrutinize the evidence of witnesses regarding the E
actual occurrence with greater care and caution.
(ii) The crucial point to be decided in this case was that
who was the aggressor or which of the parties can
have the motive to open the attack?
.
The trial court held that "if the accused were already
F
cultivating the land as per compromise, then it does
not appeal to reason as to why they would feel
aggrieved. On the other hand there was strong
motive for Gurcharan Singh to assault the accused G
person as he has resiled from the compromise."
(iii) The next crucial point according to the trial court
was as to where the incident took place? According
H
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 OJ 1 S.C.R.
A to the trial court the incident had taken place in the
field of the accused.
(iv) According to the trial court, the presence of the
prosecution witnesses Gurdev Singh and Gurdish
Singh at the time of alleged occurrence is highly
B
doubtful. Dr. Mukesh Gupta stated that the injuries
on Gurdev Singh and Gurdish Singh could be
caused by friendly hands and can be self suffered.
(v) No pellet was recovered from the injuries of the
C prosecution witnesses namely, Gurdev Singh and
Gurdish Singh. The possibility of the injuries on their
persons having been fabricated at a later stage
cannot be ruled out.
D The trial court found that, in the instant case, it
appeared that the inquest report was prepared first
and the FIR was prepared at some later stage
because there was no mention about the injuries of
Gurdev Singh and Gurdish Singh in the inquest
report, whereas this fact is mentioned ln the FIR.
E
According to Hie prosecution case, Gurdlsh Singh
suffered a pellet injury on his left upper arm
whereas, Gurdev Singh was hit on his left thigh. This
was so mentioned in the FIR. If it was so, this fact
would have been mentioned in the inquest report
F or the Investigating Officer ll'\USt have prepared their
injury statement, but no such injury statement was
prepared at the spot nor their medical examination
was got done.
G In the cross-examination, Om Prakash ASI had
admitted that he came to know about the Injuries
of Gurdish Singh and Gurdev Singh only when they
gave their supplementary statements at the bus
stand. The finding of the trial court is that the injuries
H were fabricated with the connivance of the
DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. 661
[DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
Investigating Officer just in order to make Gurdlsh A
Singh and Gurdev Singh stamp witnesses.
(vi) Gurdish Singh P.W.7 had admitted that his father
Gurcharan Singh was face to face when Bakhtawat
Singh gave Gandasa blow from above to downward
vertically on the chest of Gurcharan Singh. However,
a
Dr. Mukesh Gupta contradicted him and stated Lnat
injury no.3 on the person of Gurcharan Singh was
skin deep and was horizontally placed and was
possible by a fall on a sharp edged weapon. From
this it can safely be concluded that it was not c
Bakhtawar Singh who gave Gandasa blow to
Gurcharan, Singh in the manner as suggested by
the prosec'ution. It is most likely that Gurcharan
Singh suffered injury no. 3 by a fall on his own
Gandasa and this was the reason that the wound D
was only skin deep. The story put forth by the
prosecution that Gurcharan Singh was cutting
weeds of ridges with Gandasa is not believable.
Gurdish Singh stated that he was collecting the cut
weeds. They were not having any Kassi or Khurpa E
and it was not possible to cut weeds of ridges with
Gandasa.
(vii) The trial court came to a clear conclusion that
Bakhtawar Singh was injured at point 'F' as shown F
in the site plan at the hands of Gurcharan Singh
(deceased). Gurcharan Singh after causing that
injury forwarded towards Darshan Singh armed with
Gandasa and at that point Darshan Singh had no
option but to open fire and Gurcharan Singh died
G
of that fire<;rm injury. The trial court came to the
definite conclusion that Darshan Singh fired a shot
in his right of private defence.
(viii) The trial court after marshalling the entire evidence
came to the conclusion that seeing from all angles, H
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A the probabilities of the case are much more in
favour of the defence than in favour of the
prosecution. The possibility of the injuries having
been caused to Gurcharan Singh by Darshan Singh
in exercise of private defence cannot be ruled out.
B Thus, the prosecution has failed to prove its case
against the accused person beyond any
reasonable doubt and the benefit has to be given
to them.
19. We deem it appropriate to briefly discuss the principle
C of right of private defence and how the courts have crystallized
this principle in some important judgments.
20. Relevant provisions dealing with the right of private
defence are sections 96 and 97 of the Indian Penal Code.
D
"96. Things done in private defence. - Nothing is an
offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private
defence.
97. Right of private defence of the body and of property.
E - Every person has a right subject to the restrictions
contained in Section 99, to defend-
First.- His own body, and the body of any other
person, against any offence affecting the human body;
F
Secondly.- The property, whether moveable or
immoveable, of himself or of any other person, against any
act which is an offence falling under the definition of theft,
robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, or which is an
attempt to commit theft, robbery, mischief or criminal
G trespass."
21. Section 100 of the Indian Penal Code is extracted as
under:
H "100. When the right of private defence of the body
DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. 663
[DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
extends to causing death. -- The right of private defence A
of the body extends, under the restrictions mentioned in
the last preceding section, to the voluntary causing of death
or of any other harm to the assailant, if the offence which
occasions the exercise of the right be of any of the
descriptions hereinafter enumerated, namely: -- B
First. -- Such an assault as may reasonably cause the
apprehension that death will otherwise be the
consequence of such assault;
Secondly. -- Such an assault as may reasonably cause the C
apprehension that grievous hurt will otherwise b~ the
consequence of such assault;
Thirdly. -- An assault with the intention of committing rape;
Fourthly. -- An assault with the intention of gratifying D
unnatural lust;
Fifthly. -- An assault with the intention of kidnapping or
abducting;
E
Sixthly. -- An assault with the intention of wrongfully
confining a person, under circumstances which may
reasonably cause him to apprehend that he will be unable
to have recourse to the public authorities for his release."
22. Section 100 of the Indian Penal Code justifies the F
killing of an assailant when apprehension of atrocious crime
enumerated in several clauses of the section is shown to exist.
First clause of Section 100 applies to cases where there is
reasonable apprehension of death while second clause is
attracted where a person has a genuine apprehension that his G
adversary is going to attack him and he reasonably believes
that the attack will result in a grievous hurt. In that event he can
go to the extent of causing the latter's death in the exercise of
the right of private defence even though the latter may not have
inflicted any blow or injury on him. H
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R
A 23. It is settled position of law that in order to justify the
act of causing death of the assailant, the accused has simply
to satisfy the court that he was faced with an assault which
caused a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt.
The question whether the apprehension was reasonable or not
B is a question of fact depending upon the facts and
circumstances of each case and no strait-jacket formula can
be prescribed in this regard. The weapon used, the manner and
nature of assault and other surrounding circumstances should
be taken into account while evaluating whether the
c apprehension was justified or not?
SCOPE AND FOUNDATION OF THE PRIVATE DEFENCE
24. The rule as to the right ofprivate defence has been
stated by Russel on Crime (11th Edn., Vol.1, p.491) thus:
D
" ..... a man is justified in resisting by force anyone who
manifestly intends and endeavours by violence or surprise
to commit a known felony against either his person,
habitation or property. In these cases he is not obliged to
retreat, and may not merely resist the attack where he
E
stands but may indeed pursue his adversary until the
danger is ended, and if in a conflict between them he
happens to kill his attacker, such killing is justifiable."
When enacting sections 96 to 106 of the Indian Penal
F Code, excepting from its penal provisions, certain classes of
acts, done in good faith for the purpose of repelling unlawful
aggressions, the Legislature clearly intended to arouse and
encourage the manly spirit of self-defence amongst the citizens,
when faced with grave danger. The law does not require a
G law-abiding citizen to behave like a coward when confronted
with an imminent unlawful aggression. As repeatedly observed
by this court there is nothing more degrading to the human
spirit than to run away in face of danger. The right of private
defence is thus designed to serve a social purpose and
H deserves to be fostered within the prescribed limits.
,
DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. 665
[DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
25. Hari Singh Gour in his celebrated book on Penal Law A
of India (11th Edition 1998-99) aptly observed that self-help is
the first rule of criminal law. It still remains a rule, though in
process of time much attenuated by considerations of
necessity, humanity, and social order. According to Bentham,
in his book 'Principles of Penal Laws' has observed "the right B
of defence is absolutely necessary". It is based on the cardinal
principle that it is the duty of man to help himself.
26. Killing in defence of a person, according to the English
law, will amount to either justifiable or excusable homicide or C
chance medley, as the latter is termed, according to ·the
circumstances of the case.
27. But there is another form of homicide which is
excui'able in self-defence. There are cases where the necessity
for self-defence arises in a sudden quarrel in which both parties D
engage, or on account of the initial provocation given by the
person who has to defend himself in the end against an assault
endangering life.
28. The Indian Penal Code defines homicide in self- E
defence as a form of substantive right, and therefore, save and
except the restrictions imposed on the right of the Code itself,
it seems that the special rule of English Law as to the duty of
retreating will have no application to this country where there
is a real need for defending oneself against deadly assaults.
F
29. The right to protect one's own person and property
against the unlawful aggressions of others is a right inherent in
man. The duty of protecting the person and property of others
is a duty which man owes to society of which he is a member
and the preservation of which is both his interest and duty. It G
is, indeed, a duty which flows from human sympathy. As
Bentham said: "It is a noble movement of the heart, that
indignation which kindles at the sight of the feeble injured by
the strong. It is noble movement which makes us forget our
danger at the first cry of distress ..... It concerns the public safety H
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 1 S.C.R.
A that every honest man should consider himself as the natural
protector of every other." But such protection must not be
extended beyond the necessities of the case, otherwise it will
encourage a spirit or lawlessness and disorder. The right has,
therefore, been restricted to offences against the human body
B and those relating to aggression on property.
30. When there is real apprehension that the aggressor
might cause death or grievous hurt, in that event the right of
private defence of the defender could even extend to causing
of death. A mere reasonable apprehension is enough to put
C the right of self-defence into operation, but it is also settled
position of law that a right of self-defence is only right to defend
oneself and not to retaliate. It is not a right to take revenge.
31. Right of private defence of person and property is
D recognized in all free, civilsed, democratic societies within
certain reasonable limits. Those limits are dictated by two
considerations : (1) that the same right is claimed by all other
members of the society and (2) that it is the State which
generally undertakes the responsibility for the maintenance of
E law and order. The citizens, as a general rule, are neither
expected to run away for safety when faced with grave and
imminent danger to their person or property as a result of
unlawful aggression, nor are they expected, by use of force, to
right the wrong done to them or to punish the wrong doer of
F commission of offences.
32. A legal philosopher Michael Gorr in his article "Private
Defense" (published in the Journal "Law and Philosophy"
Volume 9, Number 3 /August 1990 at Page 241) observed as
under:
G
"Extr3me pacifists aside, virtually everyone agrees that it
is sometimes morally permissible to engage in what
Glanville Willams has termed "private defence", i.e., to
inflict serious (even lethal) harm upon another person in
H
DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. 667
[DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
order to protect oneself or some innocent third party from A
suffering the same ...
33. The basic principle underlying the doctrine of the right
of private defence is that when an individual or his property is
faced with a danger and immediate aid from the State
machinery is not readily available, that individual is entitled to
8
protect himself and his property. The right of private defence
is available only to one who is suddenly confronted with the
necessity of averting an impending danger not of self creation.
That being so, the necessary corollary is that the violence which
the citizen defending himself or his property is entitled to use C
must not be unduly disproportionate to the injury which is sought
to be averted or which is reasonably apprehended and should
not exceed its legitimate purpose.
34. This court in number of cases have laid down that when 0
a person is exercising his right of private defence, it is not
possible to weigh the force with which the right is exercised.
The principle is common to all civilized jurisprudence. In Robert
B. Brown v. United States of America (1921) 256 US 335, jt
is observed that a person in fear of his life in not expected to E
modulate his defence step by step or tier by tier. Justice Holmes
in the aforementioned case aptly observed "detached reflection
cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife".
35. According to Section 99 of the Indian Penal Code the
injury which is inflicted by the person exercising the right should F
commensurate with the injury with which he is threatened. At
the same time, it is difficult to expect from a person exercising
this right in good faith, to weigh "with golden scales" what
maximum amount of force is necessary to keep within the right
every reasonable allowance should be made for the bona fide G
defender. The courts in one voice have said that it would be
wholly unrealistic to expect of a person under assault to
modulate his defence step by step according to attack.
36. The courts have always consistently held that the right
of private defence extends to the killing of the actual or potential H
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 OJ 1 S.C.R.
A assailant when there is a reasonable and imminent
apprehension of the atrocious crimes enumerated in the six
clauses of section 100 of the IPC. According to the combined
effect of two clauses of section 100 IPC taking the life of the
assailant would be justified on the plea of private defence; if
B the assault causes reasonable apprehension of death or
grievous hurt to the person exercising the right. A person who
is in imminent and reasonable danger of losing his life or limb
may in the exercise of right of self-defence inflict any harm, even
extending to death on his assailant either when the assault is
C attempted or directly threatened. When we see the principles
of law in the light of facts of this case where Darshan Singh in
his statement under section 313 has categorically stated that
"Gurcharan Singh gave a gandasa blow hitting my father
Bakhtawar Singh on the head as a result of which he fell down.
I felt that my father had been killed. Gurcharan Singh then
0
advanced towards me holding the gandasa. I apprehended that
I too would be killed and I then pulled the trigger of my gun in
self defence." Gurcharan Singh died of gun shot injury.
37. In the facts and circumstances of this case the
E appellant, Darshan Singh had the serious apprehension of
death or at least the grievous hurt when he exercised his right
of private defence to save himself.
BRIEF ENUMERATION OF IMPORTANT CASES:
F 38. The legal position which has been crystallized from a
large number of cases is that law does not require a citizen,
however law-abiding he may be, to behave like a rank coward
on any occasion. This principle has been enunciated in
Mahandi v. Emperor [(1930) 31 Criminal Law Journal 654
G (Lahore); Alinga/ Kunhinayan & Another v. Emperor Indian
Law Reports 28 Madras 454; Ranganadham Perayya, In re
(1957) 1 Andhra Weekly Reports 181.
39. The law clearly spells out that right of private defence
H is available only when there is reasonable apprehension of
DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. 669
[DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
receiving the injury. The law makes it clear that it is necessary A
that the extent of right of private defence is that the force used
must bear a reasonable proportion of the injury to be averted,
that is the injury inflicted on the assailant must not be greater
than is necessary for the protection of the person assaulted. A
person in fear of his life is not expected to modulate his defence B
step by step, but at the same time it should not be totally
disproportionate.
40. A Full Bench of the Orissa High Court in State of Orissa
v. Rabindranath Da/ai & Another 1973 Crl LJ 1686 (Orissa)
(FB) summarized the legal position with respect to defence of C
person and property thus: "In a civilized society the defence of
person and property of every member thereof is the
responsibility of the State. Consequently, there is a duty cast
on every person faced with apprehension of imminent danger
of his person or property to seek the aid of the machinery D
provided by the State but if immediately such aid is not
available, he has the right of private defence.
41. In Laxman Sahu v. State of Orissa 1986 (1) Supp
sec 555 this court observed that it is needless to point out in E
this connection that the right of private defence is available only
to one who is suddenly confronted with immediate necessity
of averting an impending danger not of his creation.
42. In Raghavan Achari v. State of Kera/a 1993 Supp. (1)
SCC 719 this court observed that "No court expects the citizens F
not to defend themselves especially when they have already
suffered grievous injuries".
43. In Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1993 SC 970
this court held that "the accused has taken a specific plea of G
right of self-defence and it is not necessary that he should prove
it beyond all reasonable doubt. But if the circumstances warrant
that he had a reasonable apprehension that death or grievous
hurt was likely to be caused to him by the deceased or their
companions, then if he had acted in the right of self-defence, H
670 SlJPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 1 S.C.R.
A he would be doing so lawfully."
44. In Puran Singh & Others v. The State of Punjab
( 1975) 4 sec 518 this court observed that in the following
circumstances right of private defence can be exercised :-
B i. There is no sufficient time for recourse to the public
authorities
ii. There must be a reasonable apprehension of death
or grievous hurt to the person or danger to the
c property concerned.
iii. More harm than necessary should not have been
caused.
45. In Bhagwan Swaroop v. State of Madhya Pradesh
D (1992) 2 sec 406 this court had held as under:-
"It is established on the record that Ramswaroop was
being given lathi blows by the complainant party and it was
at that time that gun-shot was fired by Bhagwan Swaroop
to save his father from further blows. A lathi is capable of
E
causing a simple as well as a fatal injury. Whether in fact
the injuries actually caused were simple or grievous is of
no consequence. It is the scenario of a father being given
lathi blows which has to be kept in mind and we are of the
view that in such a situation a son could reasonably
F apprehend danger to the life of his father and his firing a
gun-shot at that point of time in defence of his father is
justified."
46. The facts of this case are akin to the facts of the instant
G case.
47. In Kashmiri Lal & Others v. State of Punjab (1996)
10 sec 471, this court held that "a person who is unlawfully
attacked has every right to counteract and attack upon his
H assailant and cause such injury as may be necessary to ward
DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR 671
[OALVEER BHANDARI, J]
off the apprehended danger or threat." A
48. In James Martin v. State of Kera/a (2004) 2 SCC 203,
this court again reiterated the principle that the accused need
not prove the existence of the right of private defence beyond
reasonable doubt. It is enough for him to show as in a civil case 8
that the preponderance of probabilities is in favour of his plea.
49. In Gotipul/a Venkatasiva Subbrayanam & Others v.
The State of Andhra Pradesh & Another (1970) 1 SCC 235,
this court held that "the right to private defence is a very valuable
right and it has been recognized in all civilized and democratic C
societies within certain reasonable limits."
50. In Mahabir Choudhary v. State of Bihar (1996) 5 SCC
107 this court held that "the High Court erred in holding that the
appellants had no right to private defence at any stage. o
However, this court upheld the judgment of the sessions court
holding that since the appellants had right to private defence
to protect their property, but in the circumstances of the case,
the appellants had exceeded right to private defence. The court
observed that right to private defence cannot be used to kill the E
wrongdoer unless the person concerned has a reasonable
cause to fear that otherwise death or grievous hurt might ensue
in which case that person would have full measure of right to
private defence including killing".
51. In Munshi Ram & Others v. Delhi Administration F
(1968) 2 SCR 455, this court observed that "it is well settled
that even if the accused does not plead self defence, it is open
to consider such a plea if the same arises from the material
on record. The burden of establishing that plea is on the
accused and that burden can be discharged by showing G
preponderance of probabilities in favour of that plea on the basis
of materials available on record.
52, In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramesh (2005) 9 SCC
705, this court observed "every person has a right to defend H
672 , SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A "his own body and the body of another person against any
offence, affecting the human body. The right of self defence
commences as soon as reasonable apprehension arises and
it is co-terminus with the duration of such apprehension. Again,
it is defensive and not retributive right and can be exercised
B only in those cases where there is no time to have recourse to
the protection of the public authorities."
53. In Triloki Nath & Others v. State of U.P. (2005) 13
sec 323 the court observed as under:-
c "No decision relied upon by the Appellants lays down a
law in absolute terms that in all situations injuries on the
persons of the accused have to be explained. Each case
depends upon the fact situation obtaining therein."
0 54. In Vidhya Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1971)
3 sec 244, the court observed that "the right of self-defence
is a very valuable right, serving a social purpose and should
not be construed narrowly. Situations have to be judged from
the subjective point of view of the accused concerned in the
E surrounding excitement and confusion of the moment,
confronted with a situation of peril and not by any microscopic
and pedantic scrutiny. In adjudging the question as to whether
more force than was necessary was used in the prevailing
circumstances on the spot it would be inappropriate, as held
F by this court, to adopt tests by detached objectivity which would
be so natural in a court room, or that which would seem
absolutely necessary to a perfectly cool bystander. The person
facing a reasonable apprehension of threat to himself cannot
be expected to modulate his defence step by step with any
arithmetical exactitude of only that much which is required in
G the thinking of a man in ordinary times or under normal
circumstances."
55. In Jai Dev v. State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 612 the
court held as under:-
H
DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 0i ANR. 673
[DALVEER BHANDARI, J.)
"as soon as the cause for the reasonable apprehension A
has disappeared and the threat has either been destroyed
or has been put to rout, there can be no occasion to
exercise the right of private defence."
56. In order to find out whether right of private defence is B
available or not, the injuries received by the accused, the
imminence of threat to his safety, the injuries caused by the
accused and the circumstances whether the accused had time
to have recourse to public authorities are all relevant factors to
be considered.
r C
57. In Buta Singh v. The State of Punjab (1991) 2 SCC
612, the court noted that a person who is apprehending death
or bodily injury cannot weigh in golden scales in the spur of
moment and in the heat of circumstances, the number of inj~ries
required to disarm the assailants who were arme"d with D
weapons. In moments of excitement and disturbed mental
equilibrium it is often difficult to expect the parties to preserve
composure and use exactly only so much force in retaliation
commensurate with the danger apprehended to him where
assault is imminent by use of force, it would be lawful to repel E
the force in self-defence and the right of private-defence
commences, as soon as the threat becomes so imminent. Such
situations have to be pragmatically viewed and not with high-
powered spectacles or microscopes to detect slight or even .
marginal overstepping. Due weightage has to be given to, and F
hyper technical approach has to be avoided in considering
what happens on the spur of the moment on the spot and
keeping in view normal human reaction and conduct, where
self-preservation is the paramount consideration. But, if the fact
situation shows that in the guise of self-preservation, what really G
has been done is to assault the original aggressor, even after
the cause of reasonable apprehension has disappeared , the
plea of right of private defence can legitimately be negatived.
The court dealing with the plea has to weigh the material to
conclude whether the plea is acceptable. It is essentially, as
H
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A noted above, a finding of fact."
58. The following principles emerge on scrutiny of the
following judgments:
(i) Self-preservation is the basic human instinct and is
B duly recognized by the criminal jurisprudence of all
civilized countries. All free, democratic and civilized
countries recognize the right of private defence
within certain reasonable limits.
c (ii) The right of private defence is available only to one
who is suddenly confronted with the necessity of
averting an impending danger and not of self-
creation.
(iii) A mere reasonable apprehension is enough to put
D the right of self defence into operation. In other
words, it is not necessary that there should be an
actual commission of the offence in order to give
rise to the right of private defence. It is enough if the
accused apprehended that such an offence is
E contemplated and it is likely to be committed if the
right of private defence is not exercised.
(iv) The right of private defence commences as soon
as a reasonable apprehension arises and it is co-
F terminus with the duration of such apprehension.
{v) It is unrealistic to expect a person under assault to
modulate his defence step by step with any
arithmetical exactitude.
G (vi) In private defence the force used by the accused
ought not to be wholly disproportionate or much
greater than necessary for protection of the person
or property.
H
DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB & At:~. 675
[DALVEER BHANDARI, J.)
(vii) It is well settled that even if the accused does not A
plead self-defence, it is open to consider such a
plea if the same arises from the material on record.
(viii) The accused need not prove the existence of the
right of private defence beyond reasonable doubt. 8
(ix) The Indian Penal Code confers the right of private
defence only when that unlawful or wrongful act is
an offence.
(x) A person who is in imminent and reasonable C
danger of losing his life or limb may in exercise of
self defence inflict any harm even extending to
death on his assailant either when the assault is
attempted or directly threatened.
D
59. The High Court in the impugned judgment has reversed
the trial court's judgment of acquittal and convicted the accused.
Admittedly, Darshan Singh fired from his 12-bore double barrel
gun which had a number of pellets. The High Court disbelieved
the trial court's version that Gurdish Singh and Gurdev Singh
did not receive fire arm injuries because no pellet or pellets E
were recovered from their bodies. In the impugned order, the
High Court without giving any cogent reasons has set aside the
well considered judgment of the trial court.
60. In our view, when a shot was fired from a 12-bore gun F
and if no pellet was recovered, then the trial court is not wrong
in arriving at the conclusion that the injuries were not caused
by a fire arm. The High Court on this point discarded the
reasoning of the trial court without any sound basis.
61. The High Court gave the finding that "since it is a case G
of dual version, one given by the complainant, who appears to
be a truthful witness when he has not concealed the role of his
father and explained the injury of Bakhtawar Singh. On the
contrary, the accused persons have come with untenable
H
676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A defence." While arriving at this conclusion, the High Court in the
impugned judgment has not followed the consistent legal
position as crystallized by various judgments of this Court. The
High Court or the Appellate Court would not be justified in
setting aside a judgment of acquittal only on the ground that the
B version given by the complainant is more truthful.
62. In a case of acquittal, if the trial court's view is a
possible or plausible view, then the Appellate Court or the High
Court would not be justified in interfering with it. It is the settled
legal position that there is presumption of innocence and that
C presumption is further fortified with the acquittal of the accused
by the trial court. The Appellate Court or the High Court would
not be justified in reversing the judgment of acquittal unle~s it.
comes to a clear conclusion that the judgment of the trial court
is utterly perverse and, on the basis of the evidence on record,
D no other view is plausible or possible than the one taken by the
Appellate Court or the High Court.
63. The High Court has unnecessarily laid stress on the
point of recovery of the gun at the instance of Darshan Singh.
E The accused has not denied the incident. The case of the
defence is that their case is covered by the right of private
defence. Darshan Singh in his statement under Section 313 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has admitted that he had
fired from his licensed gun in his right of private defence. The
F High Court without properly comprehending the entire evidence
on record reversed the well reasoned judgment of the trial court.
64. In the instant case after marshalling and scrutinizing the
entire prosecution evidence, we are clearly of the view that the
trial court's view is not only the possible or plausible view but it
G is based on the correct analysis and evaluation of the entire
evidence on record. Rationally speaking, no other view is legally
possible.
65. Consequently, this appeal is allowed and the impugned
H judgment of the High Court is set aside and the judgment of
DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. 677
[DALVEER BHANDARI J.]
acquittal of the trial court is restored. The role attributed to the A
appellant is fully covered by his right of private defence.
Consequently, the appellant is acquitted. The appellant was
released on bail by this Court. He need not surrender. The
appeal is accordingly allowed and disposed of.
B
N.J. Appeal allowed.
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