DARSHAN SINGH AND ORS.versusGURDEV SINGH

                     DARSHAN SINGH AND ORS.                                   A
                                      v.
                            GURDEV SINGH

                          SEPTEMBER 5, 1994

         [K. RAMASWAMY AND N. VENKATACHALA, JJ.J                              B

     Limitation Ac~ 1963 : Sections 3, 6, 7 and ~Schedule-Article 65.

      Limitation-Suit for possession-Minor--Suit filed within 12 years--
Held barred by Limitation-Suit should have been filed within three years of   C
cessation of disability i.e. attaining majority.

      Constitution of India, 1950: Article 136.

        Concumnt findings as to fabrication of will for gaining wrongful pos-
session of suit property-Interference with by Supreme Court-Held not jus- D
lifted.

      The respondent, a minor at the time of death of his father, attained
majority on April 17, 1977. On November 4, 1982 he filed a suit for
possession of the suit properties within 12 years under Article 65 of the
Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963.      Inappeal to this Court, it was     E
contended for the appellant that the suit ought to have been filed within
three years from the date of cessation of respondent's disability and since
it was filed beyond three years it was barred by limitation.

      Disposing of the appeal, this Court
                                                                              F
      HELD : 1. The suit of the respondent is barred by limitation. Though
in a given case, the defendant may have perfected ti~e by adverse posses·
sion during minority of the plaintiff by remaining in continuous and
uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the immovable property as-
serting his own exclusive right, title or interest in immovable property to G
the knowledge of the plaintiff, on cessation of the disability, even though
the period of limitation prescribed in third Column of the Schedule might
have expired by emux of time,- section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963 longates
the right and enlarges the limitation and entitles the minor, insane or idiot
to institute the suit or make the applic!ltion within the same period
prescribed in the Third Coluinn of the Schedule to the Act, after the H
                                      95
    96                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A                              •
    disability to which the minor, the insane or the idiot has been subjecte~
    to, ceased. [97-B; F; G]

       · 2. Section 8 of the Limitation Act is ~ special exception ~o Section 6
    or 7 and the period of limitation though barred under section 3 is available
    to persons under disability specified in section 6 or 7 and the right to lay
B   the suit or application after disability ceases under section 6 or 7 is
    regulated by the limitation prescribed by section 8. In other words, in each
    case the litigant is entitled to a fresh starting period of limitation from the
    date of cessation of disability subject to the condition that in no case the
    period extended by this process under section 6 or 7 shall exceed three
C   years from the date of cessation of the disability. [99-A·B·C]

          3. All the courts have concurrently found as a fact that the appellant
    had fradulently brought a fabricated will to gain wrongful possession of
    the suit property and was in enjoyment thereof. After the judgment of the
    High Court, the respondent came into possession of the soi~ property in
D   execution of the decree. Therefore, it is not a fit case for interference under
    Article 136 of the Constitution. [99-D-E]

            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6034 of
    1994.
E        From the Judgment and Order dated 2.3.94 of the Punjab & Haryana
    High Court in R.S.A. No. 31of1987,                          '

         Ashim Vachar, S.Prasad, Ms. Bharati Anand and Mobil Mathur for
    the Appellants.
F           Hardev Singh and Ms. Madho Moolchandani for the Respondent.

            The following Order of the Court was delivered :

            Leave granted. .
G          The appeal arises from the judgment and decree dated March 2,
    1994 in R.S.A. No. 31/87 of Punjab & Haryana High Court. The respondent
    filed the suit for possession on November 4, 1982. Admittedly, he was a
    minor at the time of the death of his father. It is also an admitted fact that
    he attained majority on April 17, 1977. He filed the suit for possession of
H   the plaint schedule proportion within 12 years under Article 65 of the
                 DARSHAN SINGH v. GURDEV SINGH                           97

Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, Act 21 of 1963 (for short 'the Act').    A
It is contended for the appellant that the suit ought to have been filed
within three years from the date of cessation of respondent's disability but
it was filed beyond three years and that, therefore, the suit is barred by
limitation. A conjoint reading of ss. 6(1) and 8 of the Act shows that where
a person is entitled to institute a suit, the limitation begins to run for a   B
minor or insane, or an idiot to institute the suit be within the same period
after the disability has ceased as would otherwise have been allowed from
the time specified therefor in the 3rd Column of the Schedule i.e. 3 years
from the date of cessation of disability. We find force in the contention.

       Section 3 of the Act posits that the period of limitation applicable to C
a suit or other proceedings, if the period prescribed in the Schedule gets ,
expired, the suit or application becomes barred by limitation though the
right may subsist. However, s.3 says that in particular circumstances, the
limitation gets modified by the provisions of SS. 4 to 24 of the Act. Article
65 in Part V of the Schedule regulates limitation of the suits relating to D
immovable property. For possession of immovable property or any interest
 therein based on title, the period of limitatiqn prescribed is 12 years which
begins to run when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to
the plaintiff. Section 6 deals with legal disability under sub-s. {1) thereof
where a person entitled to institute a suit or at the time from which the
prescribed period is to be reckoned. A minor or insane or an idiot, may E
institute the suit or make an application within the same period, after the
disability has ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time
specified therefor in the third Column of the Schedule. In other words,
though in a given case, the defendant may have perfected title by adverse
possession during minority of the plaintiff by remaining in continuous and F
uninterrupted possesion and enjoyment of the immovable property asscert-
ing his own exclusive right, title or interest in immovable property to the
knowledge of the plaintiff, on cessation of the disability, even though the
period of limitation pres.cribed in third Column of the Schedule might have
expired by efflux of time, s. 6 alongates the right and enlarges the limitation
and entitles the minor, insane or idiot to institute the suit or make the G
application within the same period prescribed in the Third Column of the
Schedule to the Act, after the disability to which the minor, the insane or
the idiot has been subjected to, ceased. Se~tion 8 makes special exception
to s.6. In other words, notwithstanding the availablily of limitation in the
Third Column of the Schedule prescribed under the relevant Article, the H
    98                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A   suit or application shall be filed within three years from the cessation of
    the disability or the death of a person affected thereby engrafting the
    language thus :-

            · "8. Special exceptions. - Nothing in Section 6 or in Section 7 applies   ''
                                                                                       ~-
             to suits to enforce rights of pre-emptions, or shall be deemed to
B            extend, for .more than three years from the cessation of the
              disability or the death of the person affected thereby, the period
              of limitation for any suit or application.

          In other words, s.8 is a proviso to s.6 or 7. A combined effect of s.6
C and 8 read with Third Column of the appropriate Article would be that a
  person under disability may sue after cessation of disability within the same
  period as would otherwise be allowed from the time specified therefor in
  the third column of the Schedule but special limitation as an exception has
  been provided in s.8 laying down that extended period after cessation of
D the disability would not be beyond three years from the date of cessation
  of the disability or death of the disabled person. Take for instance, if a
  minor acquires a cause of action to sue for possession of immovable
  property but due to b.eing minor, s.6 aids him to lay the suit wihin the same
  period of 12 years after attaining majority. Suppose he dies, his legal
  representatives would be entitled to lay the suit within three years from the
E date of his attaining majority though he may die after the expiry of three
  years since his right to file the suit is extended only up to three years from
  the date of his attaining majority. In other words, cessation of disability of
  death whichever occurs earlier. The date of death of disabled person does
  not provide further extended cause of action, a period beyond three years
F after the disability ceases and death. Take another fustances, where a cause
  of action for possession has arisen when the minor was at the age of 16
  years; On his attaining majority, he gets three years' period but Article 65
  Column 3, gives him the right to file a suit within 12 years from the date
  the defendant acquires prescriptive title. His cessation of disability· and
  expiry of three years under s.8 does not take away his right to file the suit
G within 12 years under Article 65. In other words the benefit of ·s.6 is
  available to him. Take a third 1::ase, where the cause of action had arisen
  to a minor when he was at the age of 4 years. During his minority, the 12
  years' prescriptive period expired by afflux of time at his attaining 16 years
  but on his becoming major, his disability ceases. Therefore, he gets a
H further period of three years from the date of cessation of disability to file
                  DARSHAN SINGH v. GURDEV SINGH                            99

a suit for recovery of the possession from the defendant who claims adverse A
possession to the plaintiff. Thus considered that s.8 is a special exception
to s.6 or 7 and the period of limitation though barred under s.3, remained
available to persons under disability specified in s.6 or 7 and the right to
lay the suit or application after disability ceased under s.6 or 7 is regulated
by the limitation prescribed by s.8.
                                                                                 B
      In other words, in each ~e. the litigant is entitled to a fresh starting
period of limitation from the date of cessation of disability subject to the
condition that in no case the period extended by this process under s.6 or
7 shall exceed three years from the date o( cessation of the disability.
Consider from this perspective, we are clearly of the opinion that the suit      C
of the respondent is barred by limitation. But unfortunately, the attention
of the High Court was not drawn to· s.8 of the Act which laid down to its
contra conclusion.

       However, we have to see whether it is a fit case for om· interference
under Article 136 of the Constitution. All the courts including the High         D
Court concurrently found as a fact that the appellant is ,a stranger to. the
family of the respondent and that he forged the 'Will', the last testimentary
disposition of the father of the respondent and on its bas.is the appellant
wrongfully came into the possession of the suit property. Thereby he had
fraudulently brought a fabricated 'Will' to gain wrongful possession of the      E
suit property and was in enjoyment thereof. After the judgment of the High
Court, the respondent came into possession of the suit property in execu-
tion of the decree. Therefore, we decline to interfere in this appeal.
However, we point out that the respondent may not be entitled for mesne
profits or damages against the appellant. The appeal is accordingly ·dis-
posed of. No costs.                                                              F
T.NA.                                                    Appeal disposed of.