Holding

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in granting the interim injunction as the requisite conditions were not satisfied, and set aside the injunction order.

Summary

The first appellant, Dalpat Kumar, entered into a contract to purchase a house and obtained a decree for specific performance, after which the sale deed was executed by the court. The respondent's family repeatedly sought temporary injunctions to prevent the appellant from taking possession, which were denied by the trial court and the High Court. The respondent later filed a suit alleging fraud and again sought an interim injunction; the High Court granted it, prompting the appellant to appeal. The Supreme Court examined the criteria for granting an interim injunction under Order 39 Rule 1, emphasizing the need for a prima facie case, irreparable injury, and a balance of convenience. Finding that the respondent's conduct and the existence of a sale deed meant the appellant could be compensated by damages, the Court held that the High Court had erred in granting the injunction and set aside its order, allowing the appeal.

Issues considered

What are the essential conditions for granting an interim injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 of the CPC?
Did the High Court correctly apply the criteria of prima facie case, irreparable injury, and balance of convenience in granting the injunction?
Can an interim injunction be granted when a decree for specific performance has already been executed and the respondent alleges fraud?
Does the respondent's conduct and the possibility of compensation by damages preclude the grant of an injunction?

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 39 Rule 1, s. Section 151
Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. Section 52

Subjects

interim injunctiontemporary injunctionOrder 39 Rule 1prima facie caseirreparable injurybalance of conveniencespecific performanceproperty lawfrauddecree set aside

Judgment

A DALPAT KUMAR AND ANR.
v.
PRAlll...AD SINGH AND ORS.

DECEMBER 16, 1991

B [K. RAMASWAMY AND G. N. RAY, JJ.]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908: Order 39 Rule 1.

Temporary injunction-Nature and purpose of-Necessary conditions
for grant of interim injunction-What are.
c
Appellant's suit for specific performance of contract for purchase of a
house-Suit decreed and sale executed by coure---Repeated rejection of
respondent's application/or grant of interim injunction by civil courts-Grant
of interim injunction by High Court-1-leld High Court erred in granting
interim injunction.
D
The first appellant claimed to have entered into an agreement with
the respondent for purchase of a house. He filed a suit for specific
performance which was decreed ex-parte and the sale deed was execut•
through the court. The appellant filed execution application in which tl'f-
E respondent filed unsuccessful objections. The interim injunctions sought
by respondent's wife and sons for restraining the appellant from taking
possession of house were also repeatedly rejected by the courts.

Thereafter the respondent filed a suit alleging that the appellant
being his counsel played fraud on him. He also sought interim injunction
from dispossession. The trial court dismissed the application for interii
F
injunction. However, on appeal the High Court granted injunction re:
straining the appellants from taking possession of the house. The appel-
lants filed appeals in this Court. ·
Allowing the appeals and setting .aside the order of the High Court,
G this Court,
HELD: 1. Injunction is a judicial process by· which a party\
required to do or to refrain from doing any particular act. It is in t'."''
nature of preventive relief to a litigant to prevent future possible injury:
The court, on exercise of the power of granting ad interim injunction is to
preserve the subject matter of the suit in status quo for the time being.
H [475 F-G.

472
DALPATv. PRAHLAD

2. The grant of injunction is a discretionary relief. The exercise A
thereof is subject to the court satisfying that there is a serious disputed
question to be tried in the suit and that, on the fact<; before the court, there
is probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for by the plaintifT/
defendant. The burden is on the plaintiff by evidence aluandi by affidavit
or otherwise that there is "a prima facie case" in his favour which needs
adjudication . at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and B
infraction.of the enjoyment of his.property or the right is a condition for
grant of temporary injunction. However, prima facie case is not to be
confused with prima facie title which has to be established, on evidence at
the trial. [475G, 476B]

3. Satisfaction that there is a primafacie case by itself is not sufficient C
to grant injunction. The court further has to satisfy that non-interference
by the court would result in 'irreparable injury' to the party seeking relief
and that there io; no other remedy available to the party except one to grant
injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended
in,iury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that
there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means D
only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be
adequately compensated by way of damages. [476 C-D]

4. Further, the 'balance of convenience' must be in favour of
granting injunction. The court while granting or refusing to grant injunc-
tion should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of E
substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties,
it' the injunction is refused and compare it with that, which it is likely to
be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing
;('
competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the
court considers that pending the suit, the sub,iect matter should be
maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. [476 D-E] F
5. In a suit seeking to set aside the decree, the subject matter in the
earlier suit though became final, the court would in an appropriate case
gr?nt ad interim injunction when the party seeks to set aside the decree on
the ground of fraud pleaded in the suit or for want of jurisdiction in the
fourt which passed the decree. But the court would be circumspect before G
granting the in,iunction and look to the conduct of the party, the probable
injury to either party and whether the plaintiff could be adequately
compensated if injunction is refused. [476 F-G] ·
In the instant case, the conduct of the respondent militates against
his bonafides There is a sale-deed executed by the court in favour of the p
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] SUPP. 3 S. C.R.

A first appellant. If ultimately the respondent succeeds at the trial, he can bt: ·
adequately compensated by awarding damages for use and occupation
from the date of dispossession till date of restitution. Repeatedly the civil
court and the High Court refused injunction pending proceedings. For
any acts of damages, if attempted to be made, to the property, or done,
appropriate direction could be taken in the suit. If any alienation is made
B it would be subject to doctrine of lis pendense under section 52 of the
Transfer of Property Act. The High Court without adverting to any of
thes~ material circumstances held that balance of convenience lies in
favour of granting injunction. The High Court committed manifest error
of law in allowing the appeal. [476 G-H, 477 A,B-E]

C CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 5054-55 of
1991.

From the Judgment and Order dated 26.2.1991 of the Rajasthan High
Court in S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal Nos. 498 and 501 of 1990.

D A.K.Srivastava for the Appellant

Anis Ahmed Khan for the Respondents.
~-

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

E K. RAMASWAMY, J. Leave granted.

Sri S.K.Jain, on his application, is discharged.

Heard the counsel on either side. This is the fourth round of litigation
relating to the same subject matter. On June 14, 1979 the first appellant claimed
F to have entered into an agreement to purchase the residential house situated in
Jaipur for a consideration of Rs. 51,000. He laid the suit for specific perform-
ance and the suit was decreed ex-parte. On August 10, 1983, the sale-deed was
executed through court. On April 28, 1984, the respondent's wife filed Suit No.

G
83 of 1984 and also sought for temporary injunction from dispossession. In
May 1984, the Trial Court rejected the application for aci interim injunction
which was confirmed, on appeal, by the High Court on July 14, 1987.
---
Thereafter the suit was got dismissed for non-prosecution. The first appellam
filed Execution Application No. 6/85 in which the respondent filed five
unsuccessful objections. The first was dismissed on March 4, 1987. The second
one on December4, 1987, which was confirmed on revision by the High Court
H on January 20, 1988. The third one on October 4, 1987 and fourth one on
DALPATv. PRAHLAD [RAMASWAMY, J.] 475

January 17, 1989. Even thereafter 5th objection was field on May 23; 1989 A
which was dismissed on October 24, 1989. This was also confirmed by the
High Court in CivilRevision No. 109/90 dated August 7, 1990. The third round
of litigation was started at the behest of his sons in O.S. No. 278/88 claiming
to be the joint family·property and for a declaration that the sale does not bind
them and they sought for partition. They alf.o sought for ad interim injunction
which was rejected on July, 7, 1988. On appeal, the High Court in Misc. Appeal B
No. 177/88 confirmed it by the order dated July 26, 1988. The 4th round of
litigation was started by the respondent in filing the present suit on December
7, 1988 pleading, that the first appellant being his counsel played fraud on him,
in paragraphs 9 and 10, the details of which are not material for the purpose of
this case. He also sought for an interim injunction from dispossession. In the
meanwhile a part of the property, namely, shops were obtained symbolical c
possession by the first appellant. The Trial Court by order dated November 8,
1990 dismissed the application. On appeal, the High Court in Misc. Appeal
Nos. 498/90 and 501/90 by the impugned order dated February 26, 1991
allowed the applications and granted ad interim injunction restraining the
appellants fr.om talcing possession of the residential portion.
D
Order 39 Rule 1(C) provides that temporary injunction may be granted
where, in any suit, it is proved by the affidavit or otherwise, that the defendant
threatens to dispossess the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in
relation to any property in dispute in the suit, the court may by order grant a
temporary injunction to restrain such act or make such other order for the
purpose of staying and preventing ........or dispossession of the plaintiff or E
otherwise causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute
in the suit as the court thinks fit until the disposal of the suit or until further
orders. Pursuant to the recommendation of the Law Commission clause (C)
was brought on statute by s.88(i)(c) of the Amending Act 104 of 1966 with
effect from Feb. 1, 1977. Earlier thereto there was no express power except the
inherent power under s. 151 C.P.C. to gr.int ad interim injunction against F
dispossession. Rule 1 primarily concerns with the preservation of the property
in disp1 :L~ till legal rights are adjudicated. Injunction is a judicial process by
which a party is required to do or to refrain from doing any particular act. It
is in the nature of preventive relief to a litigant to prevent future possible injury.
In other words, the cowt on exercise of the power of granting ad interim
injunction is to preserve the subject matter of the suit in the status quo for the
G
time being. It is settled law that the grant of injunction is a discretionary relief.
the exercise thereof is subject to the cowt satisfying that (1) there is a serious
disputed question to be tried in the suit and that an act, on the facts before the
court, there is probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for by the
plaintiff/defendant; (2) the court's interference is necessary to protect the party H
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] SUPP. 3 S. C.R.

A from the species of injury. In other words, irreparable injury or damage would
ensue before the legal right would be established at trial; and (3) that the
comparative hardship or mischief or inconvenience which is likely to occur
from withholding the injunction will be greater than that would be likely to
arise from granting it.
B Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiff by evidence aluandi by affidavit
or otherwise that there is "a prima facie case" in his favour which needs
adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction
of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition for the grant of
temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie
title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial. Only primafacie case
C is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a
decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not
sufficient to grant injunction. The court further has to satisfy that non-
interference by the court would result in "irreparable injury" to the party
seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one
to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of appre-
D hended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that
there must be no physical possibility of reparing the injury, but means only that
µie injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately com-
pensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that "the balance of
convenience" must be in favour of granting injunction. The court while
granting or refusing to grantinjunction should exercise sound judicial discre~
E tion to find the amount of substantial mischief of injury which is likely to be
caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that it is
to
likely to be caused the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing
competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the court
considers that pending the suit, the subject matter shouid be maintained in
status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus the court has to exercise its
F sound judiciat discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim
injunction pending the suit
Undoubtedly, in a suit seeking to set aside the decree, the subject matter
in the earlier suit, though became final, the court would in an appropriate case
grant ad interim injunction when the party seeks to set aside the decree on the
G ground of fraud pleaded in the suit or for want of jurisdiction in the court which
passed the decree. But the court would be circumspect before granting the
injunction and look to the conduct of the party, the probable injuries to either
party and whether the plaintiff could be, adequately compensated if injunction
is refused. This case demonstrates (we are not expressing any opinion on the
plea of fraud or their relative merits in the case or the validity of the decree
H impugned), suffice to state that the conduct of the respondent militates against
the bonafides. At present there is a sale-deed executed by the court in favour
DALPAT v. PRAHLAD [RAMASWAMY, J.] 477

of the first appellant If ultimately the respondent succeeds at the trial. They can A
be adequately compensated by awarding damages for use and occupation from
the date of dispossession till date of restitution. Repeatedly the civil court and
the High Court refused injunction pending proceedings. For any acts. of
damage, if attempted to make, to the property, or done, appropriate direction
could be taken in the suit If any alienation is made it would be subject to
doctrine of /is pendense under s. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act The High B
Court without adverting to any. of these material circumstances held that
balance of convenience lies in favour of granting injunction with the following
observations, keeping in mind history, various facts which have been brought
to my notice, and looking to the balance of convenience and irreparable loss,
I think it will be in the interest of justice to allow these appeals and grant
temporary injunction that the appellants may not be dispossessed from the suit c
property". The phrases "prima facie case"; "balance of convenience" and
"irreparable loss" are not rhetoric phrases for incantation, but words of width
and elasticity, to meet myriad situations presented by man's ingenuinity in
given facts and circumstances, but always is hedged with sound exercise of
judicial discreation to meet the ends of justice. The facts are eloquent and speak
for themselves. It is well nay impossible to find from facts prima facie case and D
balance of convenience. The respondents can be adequately compensated on
their success.

In our considered view, the High Court committed manifest error of law
in jumping t6 the above conclusion to allow the appeal. This appeal is,
accordingly, allowed. The order of the High Court is set aside and that of the
E
trial court is confinned. It is made clear that any observations made either by
the trial court or the High Court or of this court should be taken to be not

-
relevant at the trial on merits. These are our only prima facie observations,
subject to adduction of evidence and proof ai the trial on merits in the suit The
parties are directed to bear their own costs. ·

T.N.A. Appeals allowed.