Holding

Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 is not applicable to offences under IPC Sections 279 and 304-A where death is caused by rash or negligent driving.

Summary

The appellant, a bus driver for Haryana Roadways, knocked down and killed a cyclist and was convicted under IPC Sections 279 (rash driving) and 304-A (causing death by negligence). He appealed, seeking the benevolent provision of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, arguing that he could be released on probation. The Supreme Court held that Section 4 can be invoked only when the court deems it "expedient" after considering the nature of the offence, and that offences involving death due to rash or negligent driving are too serious to merit such leniency. The Court emphasized the alarming rise in road accidents in India and the need for deterrence, concluding that the nature of the offence precludes the application of the probationary provision. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 can be invoked for a conviction under IPC Sections 279 and 304-A (death caused by rash or negligent driving).
Whether the nature of the offence under Sections 279/304-A bars the application of the benevolent provision of Section 4.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 279, s. 304-A
Probation of Offenders Act, 1958s. 4

Subjects

Probation of Offenders ActSection 4IPC 279IPC 304-Aroad accidentdeterrencesentencingnature of offenceexpedient

Judgment

A DALBIR SINGH ~ ..._
v.
STATE OF HARYANA

MAY4, 2000

B [K.T. THOMAS AND DORAISWAMY RAJU, JJ.]

Pmbation of Offenders Act , 1958-S. 4. )--
Road Accident-Death due to rash and negligent driving Conviction
under Ss. 279 and 304-A, Penal Code-Invoking Claim under S. 4-Grant of-
c Held, in view of galloping trend in mad accidents in the countly and its
devastating consequences, lenience cannot be shown to the offenders-Thus,
benevolent pmvisions of S. 4 held not attracted-Penal Code, 1860-Ss. 279
and 304-A. ~·

D Penology-Death due to rash and negligent driving-Sentence-Imposi-
tion of-Held, deterrence should be the prime consideration-Every offender
should have fear psyche of sentence-Penal Code 1860-Ss. 279 and 304-A.

Words & Phrases:

E "expedient"-Meaning of in the context of S. 4 of the probation of ~
Offenders Act, 1958.

Appellant, while driving a bus, knocked down a cyclist and crushed
him to death. Both the trial court and sessions court holding the accused
guilty of rash and negligent driving, convicted and sentenced him under
F Ss. 279 & 304-A of the Penal Code. High Court dismissed the Revision
Petition. Hence the present appeal.

On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that the benevolent
provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 should be invoked in
G favour of the accused.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD : 1.1. Appellant accused convicted for offences under Ss. 279
and 304-A of the Penal Code, 1860 is not entitled to the benevolent provi-
.H sion of S. 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (P.O. Act). [1006-B]
1000
DALBIR SINGH v. STATE 1001

" ~
1.2. The provision of S. 4 of the Act can be invoked only if the court A
forms as opinion that having regard to the circumstances of the case
including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is
expedient to release him on probation of good conduct. Thus, Parliament
has left it to the court to decide when and how the Court should form such
opinion. However, one of the circumstances which cannot be side-lined in
B
forming the said opinion is ''the nature of the offence". [1004-G; B; CJ

-{ 1.3. There is sufficient indication in the Act that releasing the con-
victed person on good conduct must appear to the court to be expedient.
The word "expedient'' had been thoughtfully employed by the Parliament
in the section so as to mean it as "apt and suitable to the end in view''. It is c
used in the context of casting a duty on the court to take into account ''the
circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence". This means
Section 4 can be resorted to when the court considers the circumstances of
the case, particularly the nature of the offence, and the court forms its
opinion that it is suitable and appropriate for accomplishing a specified
object that the offender can be released on probation of good conduct. D
[1004-C; G-H]

State of Gujarat v. Jamnadas G. Pabri & Ors., Am (1974) SC 2233,
referred to.
;; Black's Law Dictionary & Webster's New International Dictionary, E
referred to.

2. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S.
4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under S. 304-A IPC,
that road accidents have proliferated to alarming extent and the toll is
galloping up day-by-day in India, and that no solution is in sight nor F
~· suggested by any quarters to bring them down. Bearing in mind the
galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating conse-
quences visiting the victims and their families, criminal courts cannot treat
___, the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the be-
nevolent provisions of Section 4 of the PO Act. [1005-A; E] G
3. While considering the quantum of sentence, to be imposed for the
~ offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of
the prime considerations should be deterrence. A rash and negligent driver
must always keep in his mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the
offence for causing death of a human being due to his callous driving of H
1002 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 3 S.C.R.
A vehicle he cannot escape from jail sentence. This is the role which the courts
can play, particularly at the level of trial courts, for lessening the high rate of
motor accidents due to callous driving of automobiles. (1005-F-H; 1006-A]

State of Kamataka v. Krishna alias Raju, (1987) 1 SCC 538, referred
to.
B
Aitha Chander Rao v. State ofAndhraPradesh, [1981) Supple. SCC 17,
distinguished. >·
CRIMINAL_ APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 426
of 2000.
c
From the Judgment and Order dated 7.2.2000 of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court Crl.R. No. 130 of 2000.

Surya Kant for the Appellant.

D The Judgment of the CoUrt was delivered by

IBOMAS, J. When automobiles have become death traps any leniency
shown to drivers who are found guilty of rash driving would be at the risk
of further escalation of road accidents. All those who are manning the steering
of automobiles, particularly professional drivers, must be kept under constant
E reminders of their duty to adopt utmost care and also of the consequences
befalling them in cases of dereiication. One of the most effective ways of
keeping such drivers under ·mental vigil is to maintain deterrent element in
sentencing sphere. Any latitude shown to them in that sphere would tempt
them to make driving frivolous and frolic.
F A man who drove a stage carriage knocked down a cyclist who
succumbed to this injuries. The said driver was convicted of the offence
relating to rash or negligent driving and he was sentenced to a term of
imprisonment. His appeal and revision were dismissed by the Sessions Court
and the High Court respectively. He has riow come up with the special leave
G petition. Leave is granted.

After hearing learned counsel for the appellant we did not fee~ the
necessity to wait for the arguments on behalf of the respondent-State. So we
did not issue notice to the State.

H Appellant was driving a bus which belonged to Haryana Roadways. It
DALBIR SINGH v. STATE [THOMAS, J.] 1003
was on 4.7.1994 at 6.15 P.M. that the cyclist was knocked down in front of A
the main gate of the Board of School Education at Bhiwani. The cyclist was
just going out of the office of the Board where he was working. The bus,
after hitting him down, dragged him for some distance. He was crushed to
death. The driver was convicted under Section 279 and Section 304-A of the
IPC, and was sentenced to imprisonment for three months and one year
B
respectively under the above two counts. He made a two-fold plea in the trial
court. One was that he was not the person who drove the vehicle. The other
·~ was that the accident happened due to the negligence of the cyclist. Both the
pleas were repelled by the trial court and the Sessions Court. On the positive
side both the said courts found that the incident happened within the town
area whereat offices are situated and hence the need to be greatly circumspect C
while driving motor vehicles was act adhered to by the appellant and such
carelessness resulted in the instantaneous death of the young man who was
crushed under the wheels of the vehicle. The revision filed by the appellant
before the High Court was dismissed in limine.

Learned counsel pleaded for invocation of the benevolent provision of D
the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (for short "the PO Act").

As a precedent learned counsel cited the decision of this Court in Aitha
Chander Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [1981] Supple. SCC 17. But we
may point out that the two Judge Bench, which extended the benefit of
E
Section 4 of the P.O. Act to the accused in that case, made it clear that such
a course was resorted to "having regard to the peculiar circumstances of this
case". None of the peculiar circumstances has been specified in the decision
except that the negligence on the part of the driver in that case was only
contribut01y. The said decision, therefore, cannot be treated as an authoti~y
to support the contention that the court should, as a normal rule, invoke the F
provisions of the P.O. Act when the accused is convicted of the offence under
Section 304-A of IPC in causing death of human beings by rash or negligent
driving.

The conditions for applying Section 4 of the P.O. Act have bee1_1 G
delineated in the commencing portion of the provision in the following
words :

"When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not
punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the Court by
which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to H
1004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] 3 S.C.R.
A the circumstances of the the case including the nature of the offence ~- ....
and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on
probation of good conduct ........ "

Parliament made it clear that only if the court fmms the opinion that
it is expedient to release him on probation for his good conduct regard
B being had to the circumstances of the case. One of the circumstances
which cannot be sidelined in fo1ming the said opinion is "the nature of the
offence." )·

Thus Parliament has left it to the court to decide when and how the
court should form such opinion. It provided sufficient indication that releasing
c the convicted person on probation of good conduct must appear to the court
to be expedient. The word "expedient" had been thoughtfully employed by
the Parliament in the section so as to mean it as "apt and suitable to the end
in view". In Block's Law Dictionary the word "expedient" is defined as
"suitable and appropriate for accomplishment of a specified object" besides
D the other meaning referred to earlier. In State of Gujarat v. Jamnadas G.
Pabri & Ors., AJR (1974) SC 2233 a three Judge Bench of this Court has
considered the word "expedient". Learned J~ges have observed in paragraph
21 thus :

"Again, the word 'expedient' used in this provisions, has several '
E shades of meaning. In one dictionary sense, 'expedient' (adj.) means
'apt and suitable to the end in view'; 'practical and efficient';
' '

'politic'; 'profitable'; 'advisable', 'fit, proper and suitable to the
circumstances of the case'. In another shade, it means a device
'characterised by mere utility rather than principle conducive to
F special advantage rather than to what is universally right' (see
Webster's New International Dictionary)." -\
It was then held that the court must construe the said word in keeping
with the context and object of the provision in its ~<lest amplitude. Here the
word "expedient" is used in Section 4 of the P.O. Act in the context of casting
G a duty on the court to take into account "the circumstances of the case
including the nature of the offence......... ". This means Section 4 can be
resorted to when the court considers the circumstances of the case, particu-
larly the nature of the offence, and the court forms its opinion that it is
suitable and appropriate for accomplishing a specified object that the offender
H can be released on probation of good conduct.
DALBIR SINGH v. STATE [THOMAS, J.] 1005
Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on Section A
4 of the P.O. Act for applicatiQn to a convicted person under Section 304-
A of IPC, that road accidents have proliferated to alarming extent and the
toll is galloping up day-by-day in India, and that no solution is in sight not
suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented
two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents than by most
B
diseases, so much so the Indian highways are among the top killers of the
country" the saturation of accidr;!nts toll was not even half of what it is today.
-'4_ So V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision thus :

"Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute ab-
stractions. In our current conditions, the law under Section 304-A C
IPC and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the
fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy duty vehicles and of
speeding menaces."

In State of Kamataka v. Krishna alias Raju, [1987] 1 SCC 538 this
Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was D
convicted under Section 304-A IPC to remain in force although the High
Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted
of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing death of a human being.
In that case this Court erihanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for
}T six months besides imposing a fine. E
Bearing in mind the galloping trend inroad accidents in India and the
'.
devastating consequences visiting the victims and their families, criminal
courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as
- attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the P.O. Act. While
considering the quantum of sentence, to be imposed for the offence of causing F
death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime consid-
erations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of
the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly
inf01m himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or
inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He
G
cannot and should not take a chance think that a rash driving need not
necessarily cause any accident; or even if any accident occurs it need not
necessarily result in the death of any human being; or even if such death
ensues he might not be convicted of the offence; and lastly that even if he
is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the court. He must always
keep in his mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence for H
1006 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 3 S.C.R.
A causing death of a human being due to his callous driving of vehicle he
cannot escape from jail sentence. This is the role which the courts can play,
particularly at the level of trial courts, for lessening the high rate of motor
accidents due to callous driving of automobiles.

Thus, bestowing our serious consideration on the arguments addressed
B by the learned counsel for the appellant we express our inability to lean to
the benevolent provision to Section 4 of the P.O. Act. The appeal is accord-
ingly dismissed.

S.V.K. Appeal dismissed .