D.V. PAULversusMANISHA LALWANI

                   (2010] 10 S.C.R. 425


                            D.V. PAUL                                   A
                                 V.
                     MANISHA LALWANI
            (Civil Appeal Nos.6734-6735 of 2010)
                       AUGUST 18, 2010
                                                                        B
          [AFTAB ALAM AND T.S. THAKUR, JJ.]

      Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: s. 148 - Power of court to
extend time - Scope of - Tenant ordered to deposit
Rs. 10, 000 in trial court for payment to the landlord failing          C
which eviction to ensue - Tenant, instead of depositing in court
sent demand draft of the said amount to the landlord -
Application by landlord for eviction decree on the ground that
the tenant did not strictly comply with the order of court -
 Realising the mistake, the tenant offered to deposit the               D
amount afresh in the court - Extension of time for deposit -
Grant of - Held: Where alternative mode is not accepted as
a satisfactory solution by the parties, the only remedy left to
the party required to do an act, is to do so, in accordance with
 the terms of the decree and in case there is a delay in the            E
 doing of the act, seek extension of time on grounds that would
justify such extension - Tenant offered to deposit the amount
 afresh which shows that there was no deliberate inaction on
 his part so as to disen title him to the relief of extension of time
- In the totality of the circumstances, therefore, it is a fit case     F
 where extension of time for making of the deposit by the trial
 court ought to be granted - Madhya Pradesh
 Accommodation Control Act, 1961 - Limitation.

    The respondent-landlord filed an eviction suit against
the appellant-tenant which was dismissed. On appeal, the                G
High Court directed the appellant to deposit a sum of
Rs.10,000 as compensation in the trial court within 4
months, for payment to the respondent, failing which the
tenant was to face eviction decree. The appellant instead
                           425                                          H
    426      SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A of depositing the amount in the trial court, got a demand
  draft made in the name of the respondent and dispatched
  it to him by registered post. The demand draft was sent
  after expiry of time fixed by the High Court.
                                        ·,
      The respondent filed an application before the trial
8
  court praying for a decree stating that the deposit of
  Rs.10,000 as directed by the High Court was not made
  by the appellant. Realizing his mistake, the appellant filed
  an application praying for extension of time for deposit
C of an amount of Rs.10,000. He also filed an application
  under Section 151, CPC before the High Court setting out
  the details regarding the steps taken by him in
  compliance with the order of the High Court. The High
  Court directed the executing court to hold an inquiry into
  the matter. The said order was challenged by the
D respondent before the Supreme Court. The Supreme
  Court held that since no deposit was made, the executing
  court could proceed with the execution of decree.

      While disposing of Section 151 application, the High
E Court held that since the executing court was directed to
  proceed with the execution case, no further action was
  necessary in the said application. The High Court
  however did not consider the prayer made by the
  appellant for extension of time for making the deposit.
F The matter came up before the executing court. It held
  that there was no need for any inquiry. The High Court
  upheld the order of executing court. Aggrieved, the
  tenant filed the instant appeals.

          Disposing of the appeals, the Court
G
        HELD: 1.1. Although an inquiry into the making of the
    payment by the appellant-tenant directly to the
    respondent-landlord was held to be unnecessary, the
    question whether the appellant was entitled to extension
H
          D.V. PAUL v. MANISHA LALWANI                  427


of time for making of the deposit continued to remain          A
relevant and was required to be answered by the High
Court on its own merits. The High Court failed to do so
while disposing of Section 151 application, which was not
correct. The trial court was, however, correct in holding
that it could not extend time for making the deposit as the    B
same was stipulated by the High Court. Even the
executing court could not go behind the decree. Holding
of an inquiry into the question whether the appellant had
made the payment directly to the respondent was also
correctly found to be unnecessary by the trial court, no       c
matter the Supreme Court had left conducting of such an
inquiry open to the executing court. The fact was that the
appellant did not make the deposit in the manner
required in the decree. Whether or not the alternative
mode for payment was equally good, may not have called
                                                               0
for any consideration, if the parties had agreed to accept
the alternative mode, as a satisfactory compliance with
the decree to give quietus to the controversy. Where
alternative mode is not accepted as a satisfactory
solution by the parties, the only remedy left to the party
required to do an act, is to do so, in accordance with the     E
terms of the decree and in case there is a delay in the
 doing of the act, seek extension of time on grounds that
would justify such extension. [Paras 13-14] [436-D-H; 437-
A-F]
                                                               F
     1.2. Section 148, CPC clearly reserves in favour of the
court, the power to enlarge the time required for doing
an act prescribed or allowed by the Code. A plain reading
of Section 148 shows that whett any period or time is
granted by the court for doing any act, the court has the      G
discretion from time to time to enlarge such period even
if the time originally fixed or granted by the court has
expired. It is evident from the language employed in the
provision that the power given to the court is
discretionary and intended to be exercised only to meet        H
   428      SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A the ends of justice. The power to fix the time for doing of
  an act must carry with it the power to extend such period,
  depending upon whether the party in default makes out
  a case to the satisfaction of the court which has fixed the
  time. There is nothing in Section 148 or in any other
8 provisions of the Code to suggest that such a power of
  extension of time cannot be exercised in a case like the
  one at hand. Where the court has the power to fix time
  and that power is not regulated by any statutory limits, it
  has in appropriate cases, the power to extend the time
c fixed by it. It is common ground that neither the CPC nor
  the provisions of M.P. Accommodation Control Act places
  any limitation on the power of the court in a case like the
  one in hand. [Para 17, 21) [438-F-G; 442-A-B-C-D)

       Mahanth Ram Dasv. Ganga Das 1961 (3) SCR 763;
D Chinnamarkathian v. Ayyavoo 1982 (1) SCC 159; Jogdhayan
  v. Babu Ram 1983 (1) SCC 26 Johri Singh v. Sukh Pal Singh
  1989 (4) SCC 403; Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari v. Lakshmi
  Narayan Gupta 1985 (3) SCC 53; Sa/em Advocate Bar
  Association TN. v. Union of India 2005 (6) SCC 344 - relied
E on.

       1.3. The appellant made out a case for extension. It
  was not seriously disputed that the appellant
  misunderstood the order of the High Court leading to the
F preparation of the bank draft of Rs.10,000/- in the name
  of the respondent and its dispatch under Registered AD
  cover to the respondent. Although this was not a strict
  compliance with the direction issued by the High Court
  regarding the deposit .before the trial court but this
G certainly established the bonafides of the appellant, which
  was a weighty consideration while examining the request
  for extension of time. That apart the fact that the appellant
  had offered to deposit the amount of Rs.10,000 afresh
  also shows that there was no deliberate inaction on his
  part so as to disentitle him to the relief of extension of
H
           D.V. PAUL v. MANISHA LALWANI                   429


time. In the totality of the circumstances, therefore, it is a    A
fit case where extension of time for making of the deposit
by the trial court ought to be granted. The prayer for
extension of time for making the deposit of Rs.10,000 is
allowed with cost. [Para 22-24) [442-E-H; 443-A-D]
                                                                  B
                     Case Law Reference:
    1961 (3) SCR 763          relied on             Para 17
     1982 (1) sec 159         relied on             Para 18
     1983 (1) sec 26          relied on             Para 19       c
     1989 (4) sec 403         relied on             Para 19
     1985 (3) sec 53          relied on             Para 19
     2005 (6) sec 344         relied on             Para 20       D
    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
6734-6735 of 2010.

    From the Judgment & Order dated 30.07 .2009 of the High
Court of Judicature at Jabalpur (M.P.) in MCC No. 7148 of         E
2009 in First Appeal No. 108 of 2003.

   Harish N. Salve, Siddhartha Chowdhury, Kavin Gulati,
Meenakshi Grover for the Appellant.

     Ravindra Shrivastava, Akshat Shrivastava, Anup Jain (for     F
P.P. Singh) for the Respondent.

     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     T.S. THAKUR, J. 1. Leave granted.
                                                                  G
      2. This appeals arise out of orders dated 17th June, 2009
and 30th July, 2009 passed by the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh at Jabalpur whereby an application seeking extension
of time for deposit of a sum of Rs.10,000/- by the appellant in
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    430      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A terms of a judgment and decree dated 4th May, 2006 passed
  by the High Court in FA No.108/2003 has been dismissed.

          3. The respondent Smt. Manisha Lalwani filed a suit for
    eviction of the appellant under the M.P. Accommodation Control
8   Act, 1961 before the Additional District Judge, Fast Track
     Katni, alleging nuisance within the meaning of Section 12(1)(c)
    of the Act, for default in payment of rent contrary to Section
    12(1)(a), damage to the premises contrary to Section 12(1)(k)
    and material alteration of the accommodation to the detriment
C   of the landlord's interest diminishing the value of the property
    contrary to Section 12(1 )(m) of the M.P. Accommodation
    Control Act, 1961 as grounds for eviction. The suit was
    contested by the appellant and eventually dismissed by the Trial
    Court holding that none of the allegations made by the
    respondent had been proved by her. Aggrieved by the said
D   dismissal, the respondent appealed to the High Court of
    Judicature at Jabalpur. The High Court passed an order dated
    4th May, 2006 holding that the appellant was not in default of
    payment of rent so as to justify an order of his eviction under
    Section 12(1 )(a) of the Act. The Court further held that the
E   respondent had failed to prove that the appellant had caused
    any nuisance or that he had caused substantial damage to the
    premises owned by the landlord as envisaged under Section
    12(1 )(a) of the Act. In so far as construction of a wall by the
    tenant contrary to Section 12(1 )(m) was concerned, the High
F   Court held that the additional construction raised by the tenant
    did not provide any cause of action for his eviction. The Court
    further held that in order to warrant eviction the construction
    must be of such as materially alters the accommodation. The
    Court found that the construction made in the instant case was
G   of a temporary character and that such construction could be
    removed at any time without causing any damage to the
    building. As regards demolition of a wall by the appellant-tenant,
    the same was found to be detrimental to the interest of the
    landlord as it diminished the value of the accommodation
H
 D.V. PAUL v. MANISHA LALWANI [T.S. THAKUR, J.] 431


substantially. Relying upon Section 12(10) of the Act the Court       A
held that it was lawful to determine and direct payment of
compensation to the landlord for the damage caused to him.
The Court accordingly determined the damage at Rs.10,000/-
and modified the decree passed by the Trial Court to the effect
that the appellant shall deposit a sum of Rs.10,000/- by way of       B
compensation in the Trial Court within four months from the date
of the judgment of the High Court for payment to the landlord.
In case the appellant failed to deposit the amount so
determined, the Trial Court was directed to pass a decree for
eviction of the tenant under Section 12(1 )(m) of the Act. In case,   c
however, the deposit was made within the specified period, the
suit filed by the respondent-landlady was to stand dismissed.

      4. The appellant's case is that aforementioned order of the
High Court was communicated to him by his lawyer on
telephone followed subsequently by the receipt of a copy of the       D
said order. The appellant's further case is that due to
inadvertence he did not notice that the amount of Rs.10,000/-
had to be deposited before the Trial Court. The result was that
instead of depositing the sum of Rs.10,000/- before the Trial
Court, the appellant got a demand draft prepared in the name          E
of the respondent from the Bank of Baroda at Katni Branch on
24th August, 2006. A copy of the deposit slip has been
produced by the appellant in support of his version that a
demand draft was indeed prepared in the name of the
respondent for a sum of Rs.10,000/- from the Bank                     F
aforementioned. The appellant's further case is that the
demand draft was then sent by Registered ~ost A.O. No.6868
through the Katni Branch Post Office to the address of the
respondent at Jabalpur. The registered envelop was received
at the respondent's house by her maid servant Durga who               G
made an endorsement on the receiving slip, a true copy
whereof has also been enclosed as Annexure P3 to the
petition. According to the appellant even in the past he had sent
demand drafts to the respondent for payment of rent due to her
which drafts were received by her maid servant.                       H
    432     SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010) 10 S.C.R.


A      5. The appellant alleges that although the respondent had
  received the bank draft sent to her, the same was not encashed
  nor any acknowledgement sent to the appellant. He did not even
  receive any communication from the landlady pointing out that
  the amount had to be deposited in the Trial Court and not to
B be paid directly to her. The silence and inaction on the part of
  the respondent was according to the appellant deliberate and
  under the advice of her husband who is a practicing lawyer and
  also the power of attorney holder of the respondent.

       6. Four months after the demand draft was sent the
C respondent filed an application before the Trial Court praying
  for a decree under Section 12(1 )(m) of the Act stating that the
  deposit of Rs.10,000/- directed by the High Court had not been
  made by the appellant. The error in the making of the deposit
  thus came to the knowledge of the appellant only when he
D received a copy of the application moved by the respondent.

       7. In the meantime, the respondent had challenged the
  order passed by the High Court in FA No.108 of 2003 before
  this Court by way of Special Leave Petition which was
E dismissed by this Court on 16th March, 2007. Realising his
  mistake the appellant appears to have addressed a
  communication to the Post Master, Jabalpur for verification
  whether letter sent by him under Registered A.O. No.6868, had
  been delivered to the respondent. A communication was also
F addressed to the Branch Manager, Bank of Baroda, Katni, for
  a certificate to the effect that bank draft No.VG220839 dated
  24th August, 2006 was issued by the said bank in favour of the
  respondent and whether or not the said draft had been
  encashed. Yet another communication was addressed to the
  Bank Manager, Bank of Baroda Napier Town, Jabalpur,
G demanding a certificate whether the demand draft in question
  had been encashed. Simultaneously, an application was moved
  before the Ill, Additional District Judge, Katni, praying for
  deposit of a fresh draft for an amount of Rs.10,000/- in the CCD
  account of the Court in terms of the order of the High Court. A
H
D.V. PAUL v. MANISHA LALWANI [T.S. THAKUR, J.]              433


fresh bank draft was also enclosed with the said application.       A
Not only that the appellant also moved MCC 1876 of 2007
under Section 151 Code of Civil Procedure before the High
Court at Jabalpur setting out in detail the facts leading to the
delay in submission of the demand draft before the Trial Court
and steps that the appellant had taken in compliance with the       B
order passed in appeal. In the said application the High Court
 passed an order on 6th December, 2007 in which it noticed
the denial of the respondent as to the receipt of the bank draft
 by her. The reply of the respondent, however, was silent as to
whether any maid servant by the name Durga was employed             c
 by her and whether Durga had received the bank draft in
 question. The Court in that view considered it necessary to
 direct an inquiry in to the matter particularly whether the maid
 servant of the respondent had received the bank draft on behalf
 of the decree holder and whether the draft is being retained by    0
 the decree holder. The Executing Court was directed to record
 evidence to be led by the parties within a period of six weeks.

     8. The above order was challenged by the respondent
before this Court in C.A. Nos.3234-35 of 2009 which were
disposed of by order dated 5th May, 2009. This Court held that      E
execution of the decree passed by the Trial Court need not be
held up only because of the inquiry which the High Court had
directed into the question of deposit of the amount by the
appellant. This Court felt that since no deposit had been made
in terms of the decree passed by the High Court, the Executing      F
Court could proceed with the execution of decree passed on
4th May, 2006. At the same time this Court left it open to the
Executing Court to proceed with the inquiry as directed by the
High Court. The operative portion of the order passed by this
Court reads as under:                                               G

     "We have heard Mr. Ravindra Shrivastava, learned senior
     counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-decree
     holder and Mr. Rohit Arya, learned senior counsel for the
     respondent and have also considered the conditional
                                                                    H
    434      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010) 10 S.C.R.


A         decree and the application for extension of time and other
          materials on record. In our view, for the purpose of
          executing the decree, whether money has been deposited
          or not, it was not necessary to hold an inquiry whether in
          fact Smt. Durga had received the bank draft or not .
B         because in the conditional decree of the High Court, it was
          made clear that such amount must be deposited in the trial
          Court which was not done by the respondent. In this view
          of the matter, we are of the view that there is no reason
          why the Executing Court shall not proceed with execution
c         of the decree passed on 4th May, 2006, and accordingly,
          we direct the Executing Court to proceed with the
          execution case passed on 4th May, 2006. However, it
          would be open to the Executing Court to proceed with the
          inquiry as directed by the High Court.
D               With these observations and/or modification, these
          appeals are disposed of. There will be no order as to
          costs."

       9. When MCC No.1876 of 2007 came up for orders
E before the High Court the same was disposed of by the order
  impugned in this appeal holding that since an inquiry into the
  question whether the bank draft sent by the appellant has been
  received by the respondent through her maid servant has been
  declared to be unnecessary by this Court and since this Court
F has directed the Executing Court to proceed with the execution
  case, no further action or direction was necessary in the said
  application. What is noteworthy is that the High Court did not
  examine the question whether the prayer made by the appellant
  for extension of time for making the deposit could be
G considered and granted. It simply disposed of the application
  seeking extension of time only because this Court had not
  favoured the conduct of an inquiry into the question whether the
  bank draft had been sent to the respondent and had been
  received by her through her maid servant.

H         1O. When the matter was taken up for hearing before the
 D.V. PAUL v. MANISHA LALWANI [T.S. THAKUR, J.] 435


Executing Court two applications came up for consideration,          A
one filed by the appellant and the other by the respondent. The
application made by the appellant, sought an inquiry into the
question whether the bank draft sent by the appellant had been
received by the respondent. The decree holder's application
on the other had pointed out that since the High Court had           B
disposed of MCC No.1876 of 2007 by its order dated 17th
June, 2009, there was no need for conducting any inquiry. Both
these applications were disposed of by the Executing Court on
7th July, 2009·. The Executing Court held that since there was
no need for any inquiry for the execution of the decree, it was      c
unnecessary to go on with any such inquiry especially when the
decree holder was no longer demanding any such inquiry. All
the applications filed before the Executing Court were
accordingly disposed of.

     11. Aggrieved by the above order, the appellant preferred       D
MCC No.7148 of 2009, which was dismissed by the High Court
on 30th July, 2009, relying upon the order passed by this Court
on 5th May, 2009 and that passed by the High Court on 17th
June, 2009. The present appeals assail the correctness of the
said two orders.                                                     E

      12. We have heard learned r:0unsel for the parties at length
and perused the record. An inadvertent mistake in the deposit
of the amount directed by the High Court has turned out to be
a fertile ground for time consuming and expensive litigation         F
before this Court and the Courts below. The essence of the
matter is that the High Court had directed deposit of Rs.10,000/
- towards compensation payable to the respondent landlady for
the damages caused to the premises in the occupation of the
tenant-appellant. The appellant's case was that instead of the       G
deposit of the said amount before the Trial Court as directed
by the High Court, he had committed a bonafide mistake in
getting the bank draft for the said amount prepared in the name
of the respondent and sending the same to her under
Registered A.O. In support of that submission, the appellant had
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    436      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A   produced material to show that a bank draft had indeed been
    prepared in the name of the respondent and dispatched to her
    at her Jabalpur address.

          13. Since the respondent denied the receipt of such a draft,
    the question whether or not the draft had been sent and if so
8
    received by the respondent through her maid servant fell in issue
    for purposes of determining whether the appellant had complied
    with the directions contained in the decree. The High Court
    directed an inquiry into the matter by its interim 9rder dated 6th
C   December, 2007. This Court in appeal against the said order
    considered such an inquiry to be unnecessary. This Court
    proceeded on the basis that since the deposit was directed to
    be made in the Trial Court, any other form of deposit would
    necessarily stand excluded including a direct payment to the
    landlady by way of a draft. This Court held that since the deposit
D   had not been made, the execution could go on without waiting
    for the result of the inquiry, as a condition precedent. Those
    observations made by this Court were understood by the High
    Court to mean as though the question whether time for making
    of the deposit could be extended stood foreclosed that was not
E   in our opinion a correct appreciation of the order passed by
    this Court. MCC No.1876 of 2007 made a prayer for extension
    of time for making of the deposit. Even assuming that an inquiry
    into the making of the payment by the appellant directly to the
    respondent was not necessary, the question that was still
F   required to be answered was whether time for deposit of the
    amount in accordance with the directions issued by the High
    Court could be extended. Unfortunately, the High Court did not
    advert to that question. It appears to have proceeded on the
    assumption that since an inquiry into the payment of the amount
G   directly to the respondent was not favoured by this Court and
    the Executing Court was directed to go on with the execution,
    nothing really survived for consideration in MCC No.7148 of
    2007. That was, in our opinion, not wholly correct. This Court
    was only dealing with the interim order passed in MCC 7148
H   of 2007 on 30th July, 2007. Even if the said order was set
 D.V. PAUL v. MANISHA LALWANI [T.S. THAKUR, J.] 437


aside, the question whether the appellant was entitled to             A
extension of time for making of the deposit would have
continued to remain relevant and had to be answered by the
High Court on its own merits. The High Court failed to do so
while disposing of MCC No.1876 of 2007, which was not
ro~ct.                                                                B
      14. The Trial Court was, however, correct in holding that it
could not extend time for making the deposit as the same had
been stipulated by the High Court nor could the Executing Court
go behind the decree. Holding of an inquiry into the question         C
whether the appellant had made the payment directly to the
respondent was also correctly found to be unnecessary by the
Trial Court, no matter this Court had left the conduct of such an
inquiry open to the Executing Court. The fact of the matter was
that the appellant had not made the deposit in the manner
required in the decree. Whether or not the alternative mode for       D
payment was equally good, may not have called for any
consideration, if the parties had agreed to accept the alternative
mode, as a satisfactory compliance with the decree to give
quietus to the controversy. Where alternative mode is n0t
accepted as a satisfactory solution by the parties, as in the         E
present case the only remedy left to the party required to do
an act like making of a deposit vas to do so in accordance
with the terms of the decree and in case there was a delay in
the doing of the act, seek extension of time on grounds that
would justify such extension. Since the High Court has failed         F
to consider the request made by the appellant on merits we
would have in the ordinary course remitted the matter to the
High Court for consideration of the application afresh and for
appropriate orders. We, however, feel that multiple rounds of
litigation on the subject, not only in the Courts below but in this   G
Court have already proved expensive, time consuming and
cumbersome for the parties. We, therefore, consider it
unnecessary to remit the matter back to the High Court only for
consideration of the application for extension of time. In the
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    438       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A   peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we are ourselves
    inclined to intervene and pass suitable orders on the subject.

          15. Two aspects need to be examined on the question of
    extension of time. The first is whether extension can be legally
    granted in a case like the one at hand where non making of
8
    the deposit would result in a civil consequence like a decree
    of eviction against the appellant. The second is whether in the
    facts and circumstances of the case, extension of time is
    justified for making of the deposit, and if so, on what terms.

C        16. In so far as the first aspect is concerned Section 148
    of the CPC, in our opinion, clearly reserves in favour of the
    Court the power to enlarge the time required for doing an act
    prescribed or allowed by the Code of Civil Procedure. Section
    148 of the Code may at this stage be extracted:-
D
          "148. Enlargement of time.

                 Where any period is fixed or granted by the Court
          for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Code,
          the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge
E         such period [not exceeding thirty days in total], even though
          the period originally fixed or granted may have expired."

       17. A plain reading of the above would show that when any
  period or time is granted by the Court for doing any act, the
F Court has the discretion from time to time to enlarge such
  period even if the time originally fixed or granted by the Court
  has expired. It is evident from the language employed in the
  provision that the power given to the Court is discretionary and
  intended to be exercised only to meet the ends of justice.
G Several decisions of this Court have explained the ambit and
  scope of the powers exercisable under Section 148 of the
  CPC. In Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das, 1961 (3) SCR 763,
  this Court observed:

          "Section 148 of the Code, in terms, allows extension of
H         time, even if the original period fixed has expired, and
D-_V. PAUL v. MANISHA LALWANI [T.S. THAKUR, J.] 439


    Section 149 is equally liberal. A fortiori, those sections A
    could be invoked by the applicant, when the time had not
    actually expired. That the application was filed in the
    vacation when a Division Bench was not sitting should have
    been considered in dealing with it even on 13.7.1954,
    when it was actually heard. The order, though passed after B
    the expiry of the time fixed by the original judgment, would
    have operated from 8. 7 .1954. How undesirable it is to fix
    time peremptorily for a future happening which leaves the
    Court powerless to deal with events that might arise in
    between, it is not necessary to decide in this appeal. These      c
    orders turn out, often enough to be inexpedient. Such
    procedural orders, though peremptory (conditional decrees
    apart) are in essence, in terrorem, so that dilatory litigants
    might put themselves in order and avoid delay. They do
    not, however, completely estop a Court from taking note 0
    of events and circumstances which happen within the time
    fixed. For example, it cannot be said that, if the appellant
    had started with the full money ordered to be paid and
    came well in time but set upon and robbed by thieves the
    day previous, he could not ask for extension of time, or that E
    the Court was powerless to extend it. Such orders are not
    like the law of the Medes and the Persians. Cases are
    known in which Courts have moulded their practice to meet
    a situation such as this and to have restored a suit or
    proceeding, even though a final order had been passed."
                                                                      F
      18. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in
 Chinnamarkathian v. Ayyavoo, 1982 (1) SCC 159, where this
Court declared that the scope and exercise of the jurisdiction
to grant time to do a thing, in the absence of a specific provision
to the· contrary curtailing, denying or withholding such              G
jurisdiction, the jurisdiction to grant time would inhere in its
ambit the jurisdiction to extend time initially fixed by it. The
Court also called in the principle of equity when circumstances
are to be taken into account for fixing a length of time within
which a certain action is to be taken, the Court retains itself the   H
    440       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A   jurisdiction to re-examine the alteration or modification which
    may necessitate extension of time. The following passage from
    the decision is apposite:

          "It is well accepted principle statutorily recognized in
          Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure that where a
8
          period is fixed or granted by the Court for doing any act
          prescribed or allowed by the Code, the Court may in its
          discretion from time to time enlarge such period even
          though the period originally fixed or granted may expire. If
          a Court in exercise of the jurisdiction can grant time to do
c         a thing, in the absence of a specific provision to the
          contrary curtailing, denying or withholding such jurisdiction,
          the jurisdiction to grant time would inhere in its ambit the
          jurisdiction to extend time initially fixed by it. Passing a
          composite order would be acting in disregard of the
D         jurisdiction in that while granting time simultaneously the
          Court denies to itself the jurisdiction to extend time. The
          principle of equity is that when some circumstances are
          to be taken into account for fixing a length of time within
          which a certain action is to be taken, the Court retains to
E         itself the jurisdiction to re-examine the alteration or
          modification of circumstances which may necessitate
          extension of time. If the Court by its own act denies itself
          the jurisdiction to do so, it would be denying to itself the
          jurisdiction which in the absence of a negative provision,
F          it undoubtedly enjoys."

        19. Reference may also be made to the decisions of this
    Court in Jogdhayan v. Babu Ram, 1983 (1) SCC 26, Johri
    Singh v. Sukh Pal Singh, 1989 (4) SCC 403 and Ganesh
G   Prasad Sah Kesari v. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta, 1985 (3) SCC
    53.

         20. In Sa/em Advocate Bar Association, T.N. v. Union of
    India, 2005 (6) sec 344, this Court had an occasion to
    examine whether the restriction placed by the amendment of
H   Section 148 on the power of the Court to grant extension of
 D.V. PAUL v. MANISHA LALWANI [T.S. THAKUR, J.] 441


time beyond 30 days was reasonable. This Court held that a            A
power that is inherent in the Court to pass orders that it
considers necessary for meeting the ends of justice and
preventing abuse of the process of the Court cannot be taken
away by putting an upper limit on the period for which an
extension can be granted. Extension beyond the maximum                B
period of 30 days was accordingly held permissible in the
following words:

             "The amendment made in Section 148 affects the
     power of the Court to enlarge time that may have been fixed
     or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed
                                                                      c
     or allowed by the Code. The amendment provides that the
     period shall not exceed 30 days in total. Before
     amendment, there was no such restriction of time. Whether
     the Court has no inherent power to extend the time beyond .
     30 days is the question. We have no doubt that the upper D
     limit fixed in Section 148 cannot take away the inherent
     power of the Court to pass orders as may be necessary
     for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process of
     the Court. The rigid operation of the section would lead to
     absurdity. Section 151 has, therefore, to be allowed to E
     operate fully. Extension beyond maximum of 30 days, thus,
     can be permitted if the act could not be performed within
     30 days for reasons beyond the control of the party. We
     are not dealing with a case where time for doing an act
     has been prescribed under the provisions of the Limitation F
     Act which cannot be extended either under Section 148
     or Section 151. We are dealing with a case where the
     time is fixed or granted by the court for performance of an
     act prescribed or allowed by the court."
                                                                      G
      21. It is not in the light of the above decisions open to the
respondent to argue that a Court can fix time for the doing of
an act like making of a deposit, in the instant case, but has no
jurisdiction to extend the said period even when a case for such
extension is clearly made out. The power to fix the time for
                                                                      H
    442      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 11"1 S.C.R.


A doing of an act must in our opinion carry with it the power to
  extend such period, depending upon whether the party in
  default makes out a case to the satisfaction of the Court who
   has fixed the time. There is nothing in Section 148 of the CPC
   or in any other provisions of the code to suggest that such a
B power of extension of time cannot be exercised in a case like
  the one at hand. The argument that the power to extend time
   cannot be exercised where the act in question is stipulated in
  a conditional decree has not impressed us. We see no reason
  to draw a distinction depending on whether the prayer for
c ·extension is in regard to a conditional order or a conditional
  decree. The heart of the matter is that where the Court has the
   power to fix time and that power is not regulated by any
   statutory limits, it has in appropriate cases the power to extend
  the time fixed by it. It is common ground that neither the CPC
   nor the provisions of M.P. Accommodation Control Act places
0
  any limitation on the power of the Court in case like the one in
   hand.

           22. Coming then to the second aspect, namely, whether
    the appellant has made out a case for extension, our answer
E   is in the affirmative. That the appellant had misunderstood the
    order of the High Court leading to the preparation of the bank
    draft of Rs.10,000/- in the name of the respondent and its
    dispatch under Registered AD cover to the respondent has not
    been seriously disputed before us. We are satisfied that the
F   appellant did get a bank draft prepared and dispatched to the
    address of the respondent. This may not have been a strict
    compliance with the direction issued by the High Court
    regarding the deposit before the Trial Court but this certainly
    establishes the bonafides of the appellant, which is a weighty
G   consideration while examining the request for extension of time.
    It is true that the respondent denied the receipt of the bank draft
    but that is not of much significance. What is important is whether
    the appellant has made out a case for extension based on what
    he had done in discharge of his obligation - no matter on an
H   erroneous understanding of the direction of the Court.
 D.V. PAUL v. MANISHA LALWANI [T.S. THAKUR, J.] 443


     23. That apart the fact that the appellant had offered to     A
deposit the amount of Rs.10,000/- afresh also shows that there
was no deliberate inaction on his part so as to disentitle him
to the relief of extension of time.

     24. In the totality of the circumstances, therefore, we
                                                                   B
consider it to be a fit case where extension of time for making
of the deposit by the Trial Court ought to be granted. We
accordingly allow the prayer for extension of time to make the
deposit of Rs.10,000/- by eight weeks from today. The
extension is, however, subject to payment of cost of Rs.10,000/    C
-. We make is clear, that in case the appellant deposits a total
sum of Rs.20,000/- within two months from today the suit filed
by the respondent shall stand dismissed as directed by the
High Court in the appeal mentioned above failing which the
decree passed by the Trial Court shall revive and be executed
in accordance with law.                                            D
       25. These appeals are, with the above direction, disposed
of.

D.G.                                     Appeals disposed of.
                                                                   E