Holding

Section 48AA’s limitation period begins on the date the order is communicated or known to the petitioner, and the Bar Council’s power of review is not extinguished merely by the passage of sixty days.

Summary

D. Saibaba, a practising advocate, was accused by his estranged wife of professional misconduct for continuing to hold a telephone booth allotted in the handicapped quota. The Bar Council of India directed him to surrender the booth and, after his failure to do so within a short period, ordered his deletion from the roll of advocates. Saibaba surrendered the booth later and filed a review petition under Section 48AA of the Advocates Act, which the Bar Council rejected on the ground that the petition was time‑barred. The Supreme Court examined whether the phrase “the date of that order” in Section 48AA refers to the date of communication/knowledge of the order and whether the Bar Council loses its review power after sixty days. The Court held that the limitation period starts from the date the order is communicated to the petitioner and that the Bar Council’s review jurisdiction continues beyond sixty days. Consequently, the review petition was within time, Saibaba’s enrolment was restored, and the challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 48AA was dismissed.

Issues considered

The commencement of the limitation period for filing a review petition under Section 48AA – does “the date of that order” mean the date of issuance or the date of communication/knowledge?
Whether the Bar Council of India loses its power to review an order after the lapse of sixty days from the date of the order.
Whether Section 48AA of the Advocates Act is constitutionally valid or unworkable.
Whether the appellant’s conduct of holding a telephone booth warrants deletion from the roll of advocates.

Legislation cited

Advocates Act, 1961s. 18, s. 35, s. 37, s. 38, s. 48
Constitution of India

Subjects

Advocates ActSection 48AAreview jurisdictionlimitation periodstatutory interpretationprofessional misconductenrolment of advocateconstitutional validitytelephone boothhandicapped quota

Judgment

r

D. SAIBABA A
v.
BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA AND ANR.

MAY 6, 2003

B

--
[R.C. LAHOTI AND ASHOK BHAN, JJ.]

Advocates Act, 1961:

Section 35-Professiona/ misconduct~omplaint-Running of telephone
booth by Advocate-Advocate 's plea that on enrolment as Advocate he had C
discontinued running of the booth-Bar Council directing to surrender the
booth-On failure to surrender order for deletion of his name from Advocates'
Roll-Thereafter booth surrendered-Review Petition-Rejection of as barred
by time-On appeal, Held, the innocuous lapse of permitting the allotment of
the b!Joth in his name on the part of the Advocate could have been condoned- D
Hence his enrolment restored.

Section 48AA-Review-Limitation for-Held, has to be from the date
of communication or knowledge of the order and not from the date of the
order.
E
Section 48AA-Jurisdiction of Bar Council of India to review -:-Bar
Council of India or its Committee is not divested of its power to exercise
review jurisdiction merely by lapse of 60 days from the date of the order
sought to be reviewed.

Interpretation of Statutes: F
Where law provides a remedy in case of ambiguity, the provision has to
be construed as to make the availing of the remedy practical-A construction
which would render the provision nugatory ought to be avoided

Words and Phrases: G
Expression 'the date of that order-Meaning of in the context a/Section
48AA of Advocates Act, 1961.

Wife of the appellant-advocate, after their marriage has broken down,
1209 H
1210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) 3 S.C.R.

A filed a complaint under Section 35 of Advocates Act, 1961, complaining of
professional mis-conduct committed by the appellant, alleging that despite
his being a duly enrolled advocate, he was running a telephone booth
allotted to him in the handicapped person's quota.

Bar Council of India dropped the complaint. Thereafter the wife •
B lodged yet another complaint making almost identical averments.
Appellant's defence was that though he was operating a telephone booth
allotted to him from handicapped person's quota but when he applied for
his enrolment as an advocate and co"'menced apprenticeship he stopped
sitting at the booth and the same was henceforth operated by his parents.
C Bar Council of India directed the appellant to surrender the booth.
Appellant sought time for surrendering it in order to realize certain dues
from the customers. On his failure to surrender the booth, Bar Council of
India passed an order advising the State Bar Council to delete his name
from the Roll of Advocates. Thereafter, he surrendered the booth. He
sought for a review of the order of Bar Council based on the subsequent
'
D event of surrendering the booth. Bar Council rejected the review petition
on the ground that the same was barred by time.

Appellant filed Special Leave Petition against both the orders of Bar
Council. He filed a statutory appeal under Section 38 of the Act against
E the former order of the Bar Council. During pendency of the appeals he
also filed a writ petition challenging constitutional validity of Section 48AA
of the Act.

Appellant contended that Bar Council could not have rejected his case
as 'the date of that order' as occurring in Section 48AA should be construed
F as meaning the date of communication of the order.

Bar Council of India contended that the limitation for review petition
commences from 'the date of that order' which is sought to be reviewed;
and that the Bar Council of India becomes functus offiico on the lapse of
G 60 days from the date of the order and its jurisdiction to exercise power of
review comes to an end.

Allowing the appeals of the appellant and dismissing his writ petition
the Court

H HELD: 1.1. So far as commencement of period of limitation for filing
D. SAIBABA v. BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA 1211
the review petition is concerned, the expression 'the date of that order' as A
occurring in Section 48AA of Advocates Act, 1961 has to be construed as
meaning the date of communication or knowledge of the order to the
review-petitioner. Where the law provides a remedy to a person, the
• provision has to be so construed in case of ambiguity as to make the availing
of the remedy practical and the exercise of power conferred on the
authority meaningful and effective. A construction which would render B
the provision nugatory ought to be avoided. True, the process of
interpretation cannot be utilized for implanting a heart into a dead
provision; however, the power to construe a provision of law can always
be so exercised as to give throb to a sinking heart. (1215-C-EI
c
Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer
and Anr., (19621 1 SCR 676; State of Punjab v. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum
and Anr., (196411 SCR 971; The Assistant Transport Commr., Lucknow and
Ors. v. Nand Singh, (1979( 4 SCC 19; Raj Kumar Dey and Ors. v. Tarapada
Dey and Ors., (198714SCC398 and O.N. Mohindroo v. The District Judge,
Delhi and Anr., 1197113 sec 5, relied on. D

Principles of Statutory Interpretation (Eighth Edition, 2001) by G.P.
Singh, referred to.

1.2. Reading word for word and assigning a literal meaning to Section E
48AA would lead to absurdity, futility and to such consequences as the
Parliament could have never intended. The provision has an ambiguity
and is capable of being read in more ways than one. Therefore, the
provision is assigned a meaning - and so it be read - as would give life to
an otherwise lifeless letter and enable the power of review conferred thereby
being meaningfully availed and effectively exercised. 11218-C-DI F

t.3. The provision has to be interpreted from the point of view of
exercise of the power by the Bar Council. The interpretation ought to be
directed towards giving the expression a meaning which will carry out the
purpose of the provision and make the remedy of review conferred by the G
provision meaningful, practical and effective. The jurisdiction to exercise
power of review does not come to an end merely by lapse of sixty days from
the date of the order sought to be reviewed. The expression 'sixty days
from the date of that order' prescribes the period of limitation for invoking
the power of review. It has nothing to do with the actual exercise of power
by the Bar Council. (1218-E-Gl H
1212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 3 S.C.R.

A 2. Bar Council, if only it had exercised its review jurisdiction, would
have formed no opinion other than the one of condoning the innocuous
lapse on the part of the appellant who permitted the allotment of STD booth
to continue in his name though he had actually discontinued the operation
of the STD booth by himself. The Bar Council woutd certainly have taken •
B a sympathetic view and would not have deprived the appellant of the source

--
of his bread and butter and nipped in the bud the opportunity of blooming
into an independent advocate to an apprentice. The enrolment of the
appellant as an advocate shall stand restored. 11219-F-G; 1220-AI

3. In view of the construction placed on the language of Section 48AA,
C the challenge to the constitutional validity of the provision does not survive.
(1220-BI

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 528 of
2002. ,

D (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)
WITH
C.A. Nos. 3986, 40 I 0/2003 and I 951 of 2002.

A. Subba Rao for the Petitioner.
E
Sanjeev Sachdeva for the Respondent No. I in W.P. (C) No. 528/2002.

D. Ramakrishna Reddy and Mrs. D. Bharathi Reddy for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F R.C. LAHOTI, J. Leave granted in SLP(C) Nos.4477/2002 and 23108/
2002.

This common judgment disposes of two appeals by special leave under
Article 136 of the Constitution, an appeal under Section 38 of the Advocates
G Act; 1961, and a civil writ petition laying challenge to the constitutional
validity of Section 48AA of the Advocates Act, I 961, hereinafter, the Act for
short.

Smt. D. Anuradha, the respondent No. I in the Civil Appeals is the wife
of D. Saibaba, the appellant. The marriage has broken down and the spouses·
H have fallen apart. On 25.8. I 999, the wife filed a complaint under Section 35
D. SAi BABA v. BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 1213
of the Act complaining of professional misconduct committed by the appellant, A
alleging that in spite of his being a duly enrolled advocate, he was running
a telephone booth allotted to him in the handicapped person's quota. After
.. hearing the appellant's response the State Bar Council of India, vide its order
dated 6.11.1999, directed the complaint to be dropped forming an opinion

- that no case for proceeding against the appellant was made out. On 30.12.1999,
the wife lodged yet another complaint making almost identical averments.
The appellant filed a detailed reply. He submitted that the complaint was
malicious, originating from a disgruntled wife who has even lodged criminal
case against him and was out to harass the appellant. The appellant's defence
B

was that he is a handicapped person. Pressed by family circumstances,
including financial stringency, he applied for a STD booth being licensed to c
him in the handicapped persons quota, which, on consideration of the merits
of the prayer, was allowed to him. He did operate the STD booth. On 4.12.1997
he was married to the respondent no. I. Thereafter, sometime in mid-1998, he
applied for his enrolment as an advocate and commenced apprenticeship
under a senior lawyer. Eversince that day he stopped sitting at the telephone
booth which was thenceforth operated by his parents. His father had retired D
by that time.

By order dated 20.2.200 I, the Bar Council of India directed the appellant
to surrender the STD booth, presumably fonning an opinion that whosoever
might be conducting the STD booth actually, yet the booth was allotted in the
E
name of the appellant and the surrender would bring to an end the controversy
so far as the appellant's conduct as an advocate is concerned. The appellant
sought some time for surrendering the licence of telephone booth because
certain dues were to be realised from customers which would be difficult to
do in the event of the business being suddenly discontinued. As the appellant.
failed to surrender the STD booth, the Bar Council of India passed an order F
dated 31.3.2001 advising the. State Bar Council to delete the name of the
appellant from the rolls of advocates. On 26.4.200 I, the appellant smTendered
the booth. The appellant sought for a review of the order of the Bar Council
of India based on the subsequent event of the telephone booth having been
surrendered. Vide order dated 26.8.200 I, the Bar Council of India has rejected
the petition for review on the ground that the same was barred by time. As
G
against the order dated 26.8.2001 the appellant has filed appeal by special
leave. As against the order dated 31.3.2001 the appellant has filed a statutory
appeal under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961 and also an appeal by
special leave.
'\
H
•
1214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 3 S.C.R.

A Section 48AA of the Advocates Act, 1961 reads as under:-

"48AA. Review. - The Bar Council of India or any of its committees,
other than its disciplinary committee, may of its own motion or
otherwise review any order, within· sixty days of the date of that
order, passed by it under this Act."
B
In the opinion of the Bar Council of India the limitation commences
from 'the date of that order' which is sought to be reviewed. The submission
of the review-petitioner was that he could not have sought for review of the
order unless the order was communicated to him and therefore the expression
-
'the date of that order' should be construed as meaning the date of
C communication of the order. The Bar Council of India formed an opinion that
there is a lacuna in the provision which cannot be removed by it. The Bar
Council in its impugned order compared the provisions of Section 48AA
with the provisions contained in Sections 37 and 38 of the Act. Section 37 ,
provides for an appeal against an order of the disciplinary committee of a
D State Bar Council being preferred to the Bar Council of India within 60 days
of 'the date of the communication of the order' to the person aggrieved.
Section 38 provides for an appeal by any person aggrieved by an order
contemplated therein being preferred to the Supreme Court within 60 days of
'the date on which the order is communicated to him'. The opinion formed
by the Bar Council is that the employment by Parliament of different
E phraseology in Sections 37 and 38 and Section 48AA is suggestive of the
legislative intent that while the limitation for an appeal under Sections 37 or
38 is to be calculated from 'the date of the communication of the order', the
limitation for review under Section 48AA commences from 'the date of the
order' sought to be reviewed and not from the date of communication of the
p order. The review petition was dismissed as barred by limitation without
going into the merits.

During the pendency of these appeals the appellant has filed an original
petition laying challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 48AA on
the ground that the provision (as construed by the Bar Council of India) is
G unworkable .and hence liable to be struck down. The appeals and the civil
writ petition were placed for hearing analogously.

We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant/writ- petitioner
and the respondents, Bar Council of India and Smt. D. Anuradha, the
complair.ant. At the hearing of the appeals it was urged that there was a
H doubt whether the Bar Council of India has committed an arithmetical error
.. D. SAll3ABA v. BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA [R.C. LAHOTJ. J.) 1215
in calculating the period of limitation and therefore whether the review petition A
could at all be held barred by time. So, the learned counsel for the Bar
Council of India sought to support the order dismissing the. review petition
on the alternative ground that on the language of Section 48AA, the Bar
Council of India becomes functus officio on the lapse of 60 days from the
date of the order and its jurisdiction to exercise power of review comes to an B
end, and therefore also the impugned order dated 26.8.200 I has to be sustained.
However, the learned counsel for the parties agreed that the two questions
relating to interpretation of Section 48AA are of frequent occurrence and the
Bar Council of India is also feeling difficulty in several cases, and therefore
desires both the questions may be answered by the Court. Accordingly, the
appeals have been heard. C
So far as the commencement of period of limitation for filing the review
petition is concerned we are clearly of the opinion that the expression 'the
date of that order' as occurring in Section 48AA has to be construed as
meaning the date of communication or knowledge of the order to the review-
petitioner. Where the law provides a remedy to a person, the provision has D
to be so construed in case of ambiguity as to make the availing of the remedy
practical and the exercise of power conferred on the authority meaniµ-gful
and effective. A construction which would render the provision nugatory
ought to be avoided. True, the process of interpretation cannot be utilized for
implanting a heart into a dead provision; however, the power to construe a E
provision of law can always be so exercised as to give throb to a sinking
heart.

An identical point came up for the consideration of this Court in Raja
Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy land Acquisition Officer and Anr.,
[ 1962] 1 SCR 676. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, contemplates F
an application seeking reference to the Court being filed within six months
from the date of the Collectorqs award. It was held that 'the date of the
award' cannot be determined solely by reference to the time when the award
is signed by the Collector or delivered by him in his office. It must involve
the consideration of the question as to when it was known to the party
concerned either actually or constructively. If that be the true position, then G
placing a literal and mechanical construction on the words 'the date of the
award' occurring in the relevant section would not be appropriate. It is fair
and just that a_ decision is communicated to the party whose rights will
ultimately be affected or who will be affected by the decision. The knowledge,
either actual or constructive, of the party affected by such a decision, is an H
1216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20031 3 S.C.R.

A essential element which must be satisfied before the decision can be brought
into force. Thus construed, the making of the award cannot consist merely of
the physical act of writing an award or signing it or even filing it in the office
..
of the Collector ; it must involve the communication of the said award to the
party concerned either actually or constructively. A literal or mechanical way
B of construing the words 'from the date of the Collector's award' was held to
be unreasonable. The court assigned u practical meaning to the expression by
holding it as meaning the date when the award is either communicated to the
party or is known by him either actually or constructively.

The view taken in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh 's ·~ase (supra) by
C two-Judges Bench of this Court was affirmed by a three-Judg<:s Bench of this
Court in Stale of Punjab v. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum and Anr.. [1964] I
SCR 971. This Court added that the knowledge of the award does not mean
a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made ; the knowledge
must relate to the essential contents of the award.

D In The Assistant Transporl Commr .. Lucknow and Ors. v. Nand Singh,
[1979] 4 SCC 19, the question of limitation for filing an appeal under Section
I 5 of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1935, came up for the
consideration of this Court. It provides for an appeal being preferred 'within
thirty days from the date of such order'. The taxation officer passed an order
on October 20/24, 1964 which was received by the person aggrieved on
E October 29, I 964. The appeal filed by him was within thi1ty days - the
prescribed period of limitation, calculated from October 29, 1964, but beyond
thirty days of October 24, I 964. It was held that the effective date for
calculating the period of limitation was October 29, 1964 and not October
24, 1964.
F
In Raj Kumar Dey and Ors. v. Tarapada Dey and Ors.. [ 1987] 4 SCC
398, this Court pressed into service two legal maxims guiding and assisting
the Court while resolving an issue as to calculation of the period of limitation
prescribed, namely, (i) the law does not compel a man to do that which he
could not possibly perform, and (ii) an act of the court shall prejudice no
G man. These principles support the view taken by us hereinabove. Any view
to the contrary would lead to an absurdity and anomaly. An order may be
passed w'ithout the knowledge of anyone ex.cept its author, may be kept in the
file and consigned to record room or the file may lie unattended, unwittingly
or by carelessness. In either case, the remedy against the order would be lost
H by limitation though the person aggrieved or affected does not even know
D. SAIBABA v. BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA (R.C. LAHOTI J.) 1217
what order has been passed. Such an interpretation cannot be countenanced. A
How can a person concerned or a person aggrieved be expected to
exercise the right of review conferred by the provision unless the order is
communicated to or is known to him either actually or constructively? The
words 'the date of that order', therefore, mean and must be construed as
meaning the date of communication or knowledge, actual or constructive, of B
the order sought to be reviewed.

In O.N. Mohindroo v. The District Judge, Delhi and Anr., (1971) 3
SCC 5, interpreting the pari materia provision contained in Section 44A of
the Act, this Court held that the word 'otherwise' used in the context of the C
power of review exercisable "of its own motion or otherwise" must be assigned
a wide meaning and it will cover a case where the review jurisdiction is
sought to be exercised by a reference made to the Bar Council. The provision
entitles a person aggrieved to invoke review jurisdiction of the Bar Council
by moving an appropriate petition for the purpose. It was also held that the
review jurisdiction conferred on the Bar Council is wide and reference cannot D
be made to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code so as to limit the
width of review jurisdiction by drawing an analogy from the provisions of
the Civil Procedure Code or the Criminal Procedure Code.

Placing such a construction, as we propose to, on the prov1s1on of
Section 48AA is permitted by well settled principles of interpretation. Justice E
G.P. Singh states in Principles of Statutory Interpretation (Eighth Edition,
2001), "It may look somewhat paradoxical that plain meaning rule is not
plain and requires some explanation. The rule, that plain words require no
construction, sta11s with the premise that the words are plain, which is itself
a conclusion reached after construing the words. It is not possible to decide F
whether certain words are plain or ambiguous unless they are studied in their
context and construed." (p.45) The rule of literal interpretation is also not to
be read literally. Such flexibility to the rule has to be attributed as is attributable
to the English language itself.

The learned author states again, "In selecting out of different G
interpretations 'the court will adopt that which is just, reasonable and sensible
rather than that which is none of those things' as it may be presumed 'that
the Legislature should have used the word in that interpretation which least
offends our sense of justice'. (p.113, ibid) "The courts strongly Jean against
a construction which reduces the statute to a futility. A statute or any enacting H
provision therein must be so construed as to make it effective and operative
1218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 12003 I 3 S.C.R.

A 'on the principle expressed in the maxim: u/ res magis valea.r quam pereal'.
(p.36, ibid) "If the language used is capable of bearing more than one
construction, in selecting the true meaning regard must be had to the
consequences resulting from adopting the alternative constructions. A
construction that results in hardship, serious inconvenience, injustice, absurdity
B or anomaly or which leads to inconsistency or uncertainty and friction in the
system which the statute purports to regulate has to be rejected and preference
should be given to that construction which avoids such results."(pp.112-113,
ibid).

Reading word for word and assigning a literal meaning to Section
C 48AA would lead to absurdity, futility and to such consequences as the
Parliament could have never intended. The provision has an ambiguity and
is capable of being read in more ways than one. We must, therefore, assign
the provision a meaning - and so read it - as would give life lo an otherwise
lifeless letter and enable the power of review conferred thereby being
meaningfully availed and effectively exercised.
D
On the same principle the provision has to be interpreted from the point
of view of exercise of the power by the Bar Council. The interpretation ought
to be directed towards giving the expression a meaning which will carry out
the purpose of the provision and make the remedy of review conferred by the
E provision meaningful, practical and effective. How can the Bar Council of
India or any of its Committees exercise their power to review unless the
matter is before them? The jurisdiction to exercise power of review does not
come to an end merely by lapse of sixty days from the date of the order
sought to be reviewed. In view of the construction which \~e have placed
hereinabove, in our opinion, the expression 'sixty days from the date of that
F order' prescribes the period of limitation for invoking the power of review.
It has nothing to do with the actual exercise of power by the Bar Council. In
other words, merely by lapse of sixty days from the date of the order sought
to be reviewed, the Bar Council of India or any of its Committees is not
divested of its power to exercise review jurisdiction. That is the only reasonable
construction which can be placed on the provision as framed; though we
G cannot resist observing that the provision is not happily drafted.
In ordinary course, having held that the application filed by the petitioner
for invoking review jurisdiction was well within limitation and that the
jurisdiction to review was not lost by the Bar Council of India merely by
H lapse of sixty days from the date of the order sought to be reviewed, we
D. SAIBABA v. BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA [R.C. LAHOTI J.) 1219

would have left this matter to be heard and decided on merits by the Bar A
Council of India. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
case, we are not inclined to remand the matter and we feel that the ends of
justice would be better satisfied if the controversy is set at rest here itself,
fully and finally. During the course of hearing, the learned counsel for the
parties too agreed to such a course being appropriate to follow. We, therefore,
take up the merits of the controversy as well. B
The undisputed facts and the material brought on record clearly show
that the present one is a case which can be called an attempt to make a
mountain out of a molehill. The appellant is a handicapped person. He was
allotted an STD booth in the quota of handicapped persons for earning his C
livelihood much before he was enrolled even as a lawyer and commenced
apprenticeship. He firmly claims to have kept himself busy in his legal
profession from 10 to 5 p.m. by attending the Courts in morning and evening
in the chambers of his senior. His father had retired from service. The parents
took up looking after of the STD booth. As the allotment stood in the name
of the appellant, he was advised by the Bar Council to surrender the booth. D
The only ground on which he sought for time for acting on the counsel
tendered by the Bar Council was that outstanding dues were to be collected
which it would have been difficult to do if he had abruptly surrendered the
booth licence. However, the Bar Council was not inclined to give more time.
Faced with this situation, the appellal!t, within a few days of the order of the E
Bar Council, surrendered the licence to operate the STD booth and invited
the attention of the Bar Council for .taking this event into consideration and
recalling or suitably modifying its earlier order. The appellant, a handicapped
person, whose marriage also unfortunately broke down, was keen on pursuing
his career as an advocate and was still under apprenticeship when the series
of events forming subject matter of this Iiiigation happened. We have no F
reason to fonn any opinion other than this that the Bar Council, if only it had
exercised its review jurisdiction, would have formed no opinion other than
the one of condoning the innocuous lapse on the part of the appellant who
permitted the allotment of STD booth to continue in his name though he had
actually discontinued the operation of the STD booth by himself. The Bar G
Council would certainly have taken a sympathetic view and would not have
deprived the appellant of the source of his bread and butter and nipped in the
bud the opportunity of blooming into an independent advocate to an apprentice.

In our opinion, all the appeals filed by appellant deserve to be allowed
and are allowed accordingly. The impugned orders of the Bar Council are set H
1220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 3 S.C.R.

A aside. The enrolment of the appellant as an advocate shall stand restored.
So far as the civil writ petition is concerned, the vires of Section 48AA
of the Act were sought to be challenged only on the ground that the provision
was unworkable and unreasonable and, therefore, suffered from inherent
infirmity. In view of the construction which we have placed on the language
B of Section 48AA, the challenge to the constitutional validity of the provision
does not survive and the petition is held liable to be dismissed: It is dismissed
accordingly.

K.K.T. Petition dismissed/Appeals allowed.

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