Holding

In the absence of evidence of a joint family nucleus or clear intention to blend, the property cannot be presumed joint family property and the burden remains on the claimants.

Summary

The husband sold a portion of property to a third party, prompting his wife and son to file a declaratory suit claiming a two‑thirds share as joint Hindu family property. The trial court granted the suit, but the first appellate court reversed, holding the property to be self‑acquired because the plaintiffs failed to prove a joint family nucleus. The Karnataka High Court restored the trial court's decree, finding the property joint family. The Supreme Court examined whether the burden of proving the nature of the property lay on the claimants and whether any blending of self‑acquired property into the joint family stock occurred. It held that without evidence of a nucleus or clear intention to abandon separate ownership, no presumption of joint family ownership arises and the burden remains on the claimants. Consequently, the High Court's judgment was set aside and the appeal was allowed, restoring the first appellate court's decision.

Issues considered

Whether the property in question is joint Hindu family property or self‑acquired property of the husband.
Who bears the burden of proof to establish the nature of the property.
Whether the self‑acquired property was blended into the joint family property by intention.

Subjects

Hindu lawjoint family propertyself‑acquired propertyburden of proofblending of propertynucleusdeclaratory suitpartition

Judgment

J

D.S. LAKSHMAIAH AND ANR. A
v.
L. BALASUBRAMANY AM AND ANR.

AUGUST 27, 2003

[Y.K. SABHARWAL AND B.N. AGRAWAL, JJ.) B

Hindu Law:

Husband sold certain properties-Declaratory suit jointly filed by the
wife and her son against husband for their share in the properties/joint
family properties-Trial Court decreed the suit-Reversed by the first
c
appellate Court holding certain part of the property as self acquired by
the husband and the rffspondents-wife/son having failed to prove that the
properties wer.:! purchased from nucleus of joint family property -On
appeal, High Court restored the order of the trial Court holding the
property as joint family property-Blending ofproperty-Burden to prove- D
Held: since no evidence of nucleus as to purchase of the property from the
joint family having been led by the wife and son, the presumption that the
property being joint family could not be drawn-In the absence of clear
.,., intention of abandonment of right of ownership by the husband/blending
of self-acquired property into joint family property, abandonment of such E
right/blending the property into joint family account could not be infe"ed
from mere use of the property by other members-Hence, the property
cannot be held to be joint family property-Interpretation of Statutes.

Words and Phrases: F
'nucleus', 'blending of-Meaning of in the context of Hindu Law,
joint family property.

Appellant No.I-husband sold a portion of certain property in
favour of appellant No.2. The respondents-wife and son filed a G
declaratory suit for 2/3rd share and possession thereof claiming the
same to be joint family property. Trial Court decreed the suit On
appeal, the first appellate Court dismissed the suit holding that the
respondents had failed to prove that the property in question was joint
family property and not self acquired property. On appeal, High H
1•
>
14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A Court restored the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Hence the
present appeal.

The main issue that arose in the appeal was as to whether the
property transferred by appellant No.I in favour of appellant No.2 was
B self acquired property or joint Hindu family property, in which
respondent had 2/3rd share.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: I.I. In the present case, onus remained on the respondents
C and since they have failed to adduce evidence of nucleus of the
property, it could not lead to any presumption of the property being
"joint family property. (21-EJ

Appalaswami v. Suryanarayanamurti & Ors., AIR (1947) PC 189;
D Srinivas Krishnarao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango & Ors., AIR (1954)
SC 379; Mudi Gowda Gowdappa Sankh v. Ram Chandra Ravagowda
Sankh, (1969) l SCC 386; Baikuntha Nath Paramanik (dead) by His L.Rs.
& Heirs v. Sashi Bhusan Pramanik (dead) by his Lrs. & Ors., (1973) 2
SCC 334; and Surendra Kumar v. Phoo/chand (dead) through Lrs. &
E Anr., (1996) 2 sec 491, relied on.

Mal/esappa Bandeppa Desai & Anr. v. Desai Mallappa alias
Maliesappa & Anr., AIR (1961) SC. 1268; Achuthan Nair v. Chinnammu
Amma & Ors., AIR (1966) SC 411 and Malappa Girimallappa Detgeri
F & Ors. v. R. Yellappagouda Patil & Ors., AIR (1959) SC 906,
distinguished.

1.2. The legal principle is that there is no presumption of a property
being joint family property only on account of existence of a joint Hindu
family. The one who asserts has to prove that the property is a joint
G family property. If, however, the person so asserting proves that there
was nucleus with which the joint family property could be acquired,
there would be presumption of the property being joint and the onus
would shift on the person who claims it to be self-acquired property to
prove that he purchased the property with his own funds and not out of
H joint family nucleus that was available. (22-C-D)
D.S. LAKSHMAIAH v. L. BALASUBRAMANYAM 15

1.3. The law on the aspect of blending is well settled that property A
separate or self-acquired of a member of joint Hindu family may be
impressed with the character of joint family property if it is voluntarily
thrown by the owner into the common stock with the intention of
abandoning his separate claim therein but to establish such
abandonment a clear intention to waive separate rights must be B
established. From the mere fact that other members of the family were
'' allowed to use the property jointly with himself, or that the income of
the separate property was utilized out of generosity to support persons
whom the holder was not bound to support, or from the failure to
maintain separate accounts, abandonment cannot be inferred, for an C
act of generosity or kindness will not ordinarily be regarded as an
admission of a legal obligation. Since the respondents have not led any
evidence on these aspects, it cannot be held that the first appellant
blended the property into the joint family account. Hence, property
in question cannot be held to be joint family property. The impugned ,
judgment of the High Court is set aside and the judgment and decree D
of the first appellate Court is restored. [22-E-F-G, 23-A-B)

Lakkireddi Chinna Venkata Reddy v. Lakkireddi Lakshamama, [1964)
2 SCR 172 and K. V. Narayanan v. K. V. Ranganadhan & Ors., [1977) 1
sec 244, relied on. E
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2089 of
2000.

From the Judgment and Order dated 27.5.98 of the Karnataka High F
Court. in R.S.A. No. 213 of 1991.

S.K. Kulkarni, M. Gireesh Kumar and Ms. Sangeeta Kumar for the
Appellants.

Ms. Kiran Suri for the Respondents. G

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Y.K. SABHARWAL J. : Appellant No. 1 and respc,dent No. 2 are
husband and wife respectively. Respondent No. 1 is their son. The second H
16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
·- ~
,
A appellant purchased the property in question from the first appellant.
The respondents in this appeal are original plaintiffs. They filed a suit
for declaration of their 2/3rd share, partition and possession thereof in
respect of two properties described as Item No. 1 and Item No. 2.
According to them, Schedule Item No. 2 property came to appellant No.
B
1 (original defendant No. 1 in the suit) in partition between him and his
brothers and it is an ancestral property. The Item No. 1 property, according
to the averments in the plaint, was acquired by plaintiffs and the first
defendant out of joint Hindu family funds and the first defendant was trying
to alienate the suit property for his self benefit and not for the benefit of
c the members of the family. When, during the pendency of the suit, it came
to notice of the plaintiffs that Item No. I property had been sold by the
first appellant, on their application, appellant No. 2 was impleded as
defendant No. 2 in the suit.

D The trial court decreed the suit holding that the respondents are
entitled to 2/3rd share in the properties as also possession thereof and also
granting other consequential reliefs.

The first appellate court, however, allowed two separate appeals that
E had been filed by each of the appellant and the suit was ordered to be
dismissed. It was held that the respondents have failed to prove that Item
No. 1 property was joint Hindu family property. The said property was held
to be the self acquired property of the first appellant. It further held that
respondent No. 1 has failed to prove that any amount of income was
available in the hands of the first appellant to purchase Item No. 1 property
F noticing that except 15 guntas ofland (Item No. 2 property), there was no
ancestral property with the first appellant and that the trial court was not
correct in observing that it was for the first appellant to show that no
nucleus of ancestral property was available with him to purchase Item No.
1 property.
G
The judgment and decree of the first appellate court was challenged
by the respondents before the High Court in a second appeal (Regular I'"'

Second Appeal No. 213/91. That appeal was fited by son and mother. On
a memo filed by respondent No. I who was first appellant before the High
H Court, his second appeal was dismissed and only the claim of his mother
D.S. LAKSHMAIAH v. L. BALASUBRAMANYAM [SABHARWAL. J) 17

who prosecuted the second appeal was examined by the High Court. The A
High Court by the impugned judgment restored the judgment and decree
of the trial court, setting aside that of the first appellate court.

The High Court has held that Item No. 2 property has been proved
to be joint Hindu family property and the respondents have share in it. The B
finding in respect of Item No. 2 property has not been challenged before
us . Even otherwise, there is no ground to upset the said finding of fact.
The only controversy that has been raised before us is in respect of Item
.,
No. 1 property. The said property was purchased by the first appellant in
the year 1970-7 L It was sold by him in favour of the second appellant in C
the year 1987 after filing of the suit. The only question to be examined
is whether Item No. 1 property was self-acquired property of the first
appellant or it was joint Hindu family property in which the respondents/
plaintiffs had 2/3rd share. Answering this question in favour of the
respondents, the High Court has held that the second appellant could only D
be entitled to purchase I/3rd share from the first appellant who had no right
to sell the remaining 2/3rd share in Item No. 1 property.

· The question to be detennined in the present case is as to who is
required to prove the nature of property whether it is joint Hindu family
property or self-acquired property of the first appellant. E

There was evidence and it has been established that Item No. 2
measuring 15 guntas of land was joint Hindu family property but,
admittedly, no evidence has been led that the said joint Hindu family
property was yielding any income or that any nucleus was available with F
the aid whereof Item No. 1 property could be purchased by the first
appellant. Admittedly, no evidence has been led on behalf of the respondents/
plaintiffs to show income from Item No. 2 property or value of the
property. At the same time no evidence has also been led by the first
appellant to prove that he had any separate income so as to acquire Item G
No. 1 property. In absence of evidence either way which party would
succeed and which fail, is the question. The legal position is well settled
as we will presently notice.

In Appalaswami v. Suryanarayanamurti & Ors., AIR (1947) PC 189, H
18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. .. ....,
A in a partition suit filed against their father by minor sons from the first
marriage, the father claimed the properties in question were his self-
acquired properties and denied that the plaintiffs had any right to seek
partition. The High Court, reversing the judgment of the trial court, held
that the view expressed by the trial court that only joint family property
B was that which the father took under partition Exhibit. A was not correct
and further held that whole of the property set out in Schedule to the written
statement of the appellant/father, which had been acquired after partition
Exhibit A was joint family property. The contention accepted by the High
Court was that the share which the father took under Exhibit A formed the •·
c nucleus from which all his further acquisitions sprang. The plea of the
father that was accepted by the Privy Council was that the whole of the
property that came to him under Exhibit A was intact and unencumbered
except a small portion sold which amount had been debited against
household expenditure. The Privy Council held that the Hindu law upon
this aspect of the case is well settled. Proof of the existence of a joint family
D does not lead to the presumption that property held by any member of the
family is joint, and the burden rests upon anyone asserting that any item
of property is joint to establish the fact. But where it is established that the
family possessed some joint property which from its nature and relative
value may have formed the nucleus from which the property in question .
E may have been acquired,. the burden shifts to the party alleging self-
acquisition to establish affirmatively that the property was acquired without
the aid of the joint family property. In the case before the Privy Council,
on facts, it was held that the burden had shifted to the father to prove self-
acquisition as it was established that the family possessed joint property
F which from is nature and relative value, may have formed the nucleus to
acquire the proper"· in question. Those properties were large in number
and have been noticed in Privy Council decision. However, on further facts
found, it was held that the father had discharged that burden. The properties
were held to be self-acquired properties of the appellant.
..
G In Srinivas Krishnarao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango & Ors., AIR
(1954) SC 379, the contention that was urged on behalf of the appellant
was that the burden was wrongly cast on the plaintiff of proving that the
acquisition of the properties were made with the aid of joint family funds,
the argument being that as the family admittedly possessed the ancestral
H Watan lands of the extent of 56 acres, it must be presumed that the
D.S. LAKSHMAIAH v. L. BALASUBRAMANYAM [SABHARWAL, J.] 19

acquisitions were made with the aid of joint family funds and, therefore, A
the burden lay on the defendants who claimed that they were self-acquired
acquisitions to establish that they were made without the aid of joint family
funds and that the evidence adduced by them fell far short of it and that
the presumption in favour of the plaintiff stood unrebutted. It was noticed
by this Court that on the question of the nucleus, the only properties which B
were proved to belong to the joint family were the Watan lands of the extent
of about 56 acres bearing an annual assessment of Rs. 49. There was no
satisfactory evidence about the income which these lands were yielding at
the material time. Under these circumstances, noticing with approval the
aforesaid Privy Council decision, it was held that whether the evidence C
adduced by the plaintiff was sufficient to shift the burden which initially
rested on him to establish that there was adequate nucleus out of which
the acquisition could have made is one of fact depending on the nature and
extent of the nucleus. The important thing to consider is the income which
the nucleus yields. A building in the occupation of the members ofa family
and yielding no income could not be a nucleus out of which acquisitions D
could be made, even though it migh be of considerable value. On the other
hand, a running business in which the capital invested is comparatively
small might conceivably produce substantial income which may well form
the foundation of the subsequent acquisitions.
E
In Mudi Gowda Gowdappa Sankh v. Ram Chandra Ravagowda
Sankh, [1969] l SCC 386, noticing the observations of Sir John Beaumont
in Appalaswami 's case (supra), it was reiterated that the burden of proving
that any particular property is joint family property in the first instance is
upon the person who claims it to be so. But if the possession of a nucleus
of the joint family property is either admitted or proved, any acquisition F
made by a member of the joint family is presumed to be joint family
property. This is, however, subject to the limitation that the joint family
property must be such as with its aid the property in question could have
been acquired. It is only after the possession of an adequate nucleus is
shown, that the onus shifts on to the person who claims the property as G
self-acquisition to affirmatively make out that the property was acquired
without any aid from the family estate. We are unable to accept the
contention of learned counsel for the respondents that the aforesaid later
observations have been made without re<.Sons or that the Privy Council's
decision does not hold so. The observation that only after possession of H
20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A adequate nucleus is shown that the onus shifts also get support from
Srinivas Krishnarao Kango's case (case) where, while considering the
question of shifting of burden, it has been held that the important thing to
consider is the income which the nucleus yields.

In Baikuntha Nath Paramanik (dead) by His L.Rs. & Heirs v. Sashi
B
Bhusan Pramanik (dead) by his L.Rs & Ors., [1973] 2 SCC 334, this Court
again held that when a joint family is found to be in possession of nucleus
sufficient to make the impugned acquisitions then a presumption arises that
the acquisitions standing in the names of the person who were in the
.
management of the family properties are famil:' acquisitions.
c
In Surendra Kumar v. Phoolchand (dead) through LRs & Anr.,
(1996] 2 SCC 491, this Court held that where it is established or admitted
that the family which possessed joint property which from its nature and
relative value may have formed sufficient nucleus from whic'1 the property
D in question may have been acquired, the presumption arises that is was the
joint property and the burden shifts to the party alleging self-acquisition
to establish affirmatively that the property was acquired without the aid of
the joint family funds.
..
E We may now refer to three decisions whereupon reliance has been
placed by learned counsel for the respondents. In Mallesappa Bandeppa
Desai & Anr. v. Desai Mallappa alias Mallesappa & Anr., AIR (1961) SC
1268, this Court held that where a manager claims that any immovable
property has been acquired by him with his own separate funds and not
F with the help of the joint family funds of which he was in possession and
charge, it is for ti;., to prove by clear and satisfactory evidence his plea
that the purchase money proceeded from his separate fund. The onus of
proof in such a case has to be placed on the manager and not on his
coparceners. It is difficult to comprehend how this decision lends any "
G support to the contention of the respondents that in absence of leading any
evidence, the claim of appellant No. I of the property being self-acquired
has to fail. In the cited decision, the manager was found to be in possession
and in charge of joint family funds and, therefore, it was for him to prove
that despite it he purchased the property from his separate funds. In the
H present case, admittedly, no evidence has been led by the respondents that
D.S. LAKSHMAIAH v. L BALASUBRAMANYAM [SABHARWAL, J.) 21

the first appellant was in possession of any such joint family funds or as A
to value or income, if any, of Item No. 2 property.

lnAchuthan Nairv. Chi'!nammuAmma& Ors., AIR (1966) SC 411,
it was noticed that there were number of properties owned by joint family
which were received at the time of separate under a deceree passed in a B
partition suit. The claim of the defendants in the written statement was that
the property in question had been purchased from the private funds of
defendant No. 1 and her son defendnat No. 4. In this decision too, it was
reiterated that when it is proved or admitted that a family possessed
"' sufficient nucleus with the aid of which the member might have made the
c
acquisition, the law raises a presumption that it is a joint family property
and the onus is shifted to the individual member to establish that the
property was acquired by him without the aid of the said nucleus. After
noticing this settled propositions, it was observed that if a property is
acquired in the mane of a karanvan, there is a strong presumption that is
D
is a tarwad (joint Hindu family) property and the presumption must hold
good unless and until it is rebutted by acceptable evidence. This Court did
not hold that if a property is acquired in the name of karta, the law as to
presumption or shifting of onus would be different. The question of
0

presumption would depend upon the facts established in each case. In the
• present case, no evidence of nucleus having been led, onus remained on
E
the respondents and, therfore, there could be no question of presumption
about the property being joint family property.

The last decision relied upon is Malappa Girimallappa Betgeri &
Ors. v. R. Yel/appagouda Patil & Ors., AIR (I 959) SC 906. It cites with F
approval the earlier decision in the case of Srinivas Krishnarao Kango
(supra). On facts, it was noticed that the courts below had held that the
property provided a sufficient nucleus of joint family property out of which
the properties in question might have been acquired and the sufficiency of
f nucleus is again a question of fact. In view of those circumstances, there G
was presumption of the properties being properties of joint family and the
said presumption had not been displaced.

In view of the aforesaid discussion, the respondents having failed
to discharge the initial burden of establishing that there was any nucleus H
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
•
A in the fonn of any income whatsoever from Item No. 2 property and no
other nucleus was claimed, the burden remained on the respondents to
establish that Item No. I property was joint family property. In this view,
the fact that the first appellant has not led any evidence to establish his
separate income is of no consequence insofar as the claim of the respondents
is concerned. Under these circumstances, for failure to lead evidence, the
B
respondents' claim of Item No. I to be joint family property would fail
as rightly held by the first appellate court.

The legal principle, therefore, is that there is no presumption of a
property being joint family property only on account of existence of a joint •
c Hindu family. The one who asserts has to prove that the property is a joint
family property. If, however, the person so asserting proves that there was
nucleus with which the joint family property could be acquired, there
would be presumption of the property being joint and the onus would shift
on the person who claims it to be self-acquired property to prove that he
D purchased the property with his own funds and not out of joint family
nucleus that was available.

Another contention urged for the respondents was that assuming
Item No. I property to be self-acquired property of appellant No. I, he
blended the said property with the joint family property and, therefore, it
E has become the joint family property. Assuming the respondents can be •
pennitted to raise such a plea without evidence in support thereof, the law
on the aspect of blending is well settled that property separate or self-
acquired of a member joint Hindu family may be impressed with the
character of joint family property if it is voluntarily thrown by the owner
F into the common stock with the intention of abandoning his separate claim
therein but to establish such abandonment a clear intention to waive
separate rights must be established. From the mere fact that other members
of the family were allowed to use the property jointly with himself, or that
the income of the separate property was utilized out of generosity to
G support persons whom the holder was not bound to support, or from the
failure to maintain separate accounts, abandonment cannot be inferred, for
an act of generosity or kindness will not ordinarily be regarded as an
admission of a legal obligation (see lakkireddi Chinna Venkata Reddy v.
Lakkireddi Lakshamama, [1964] 2 SCR 172 and K. V. Narayanan v. K. V.
Ranganadhan & Ors., [I 977] I SCC 244.
H
D.S. LAKSHMAIAH v. L. BALASUBRAMANYAM [SABHARWAL, J.] 23

In the present case, respondents have not Jed any evidence on the A
aforesaid aspects and, therefore, it cannot be held that the first appellant
blended Item No. I property into the joint family account.

In view of aforesaid discussion, Item No. I property cannot be held
to be joint family property. The impugned judgment of the High Court is, B
therefore set aside and the appeal allowed and the judgment and decree
of the first appellate court is restored. In the circumstances of the case,
parties are left to bear their own costs.

.. S.K.S . Appeal allowed.

•