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Supreme Court of India

D.RAMACHANDRANversusR.V. JANAKIRAMAN AND ORS.

Citation
1999 INSC 97
Decided
11 March 1999
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Holding

The election petition discloses a cause of action and cannot be dismissed in limine; therefore, the High Court’s order striking out the petition is set aside.

Summary

In the 1996 Pondicherry Legislative Assembly election, D. Ramachandran filed an election petition alleging that R.V. Janakiraman, who was declared elected, committed multiple corrupt practices including falsifying voter lists, exceeding expenditure limits, and using government servants for canvassing. Janakiraman denied the allegations and moved to strike out several paragraphs of the petition, contending that the petition did not disclose any cause of action or material facts, invoking Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC. The Madras High Court accepted this preliminary objection and dismissed the petition in limine without a trial. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that for a preliminary objection the petition’s averments must be taken as true to see if they disclose a cause of action, and found that the petition indeed did so, rendering the High Court’s dismissal untenable. The Court also ruled that Order 6 Rule 16 was inapplicable because the petition was not vitiated by any of the defects listed, and that a pleading cannot be partially struck out under Order 7 Rule 11. Consequently, the High Court’s order was set aside, the election petition was restored, and the application to strike out the petition was dismissed.

Issues considered

  • Whether a preliminary objection under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be decided by assuming the petition’s averments true to determine if a cause of action exists.
  • Whether the election petition can be struck out in part or dismissed in limine under Order 6 Rule 16 or Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.
  • Whether the petition discloses a cause of action or material facts sufficient to warrant a trial.
  • Distinction between "material facts" and "full particulars" in the context of election petitions.
  • Applicability of Sections 81, 83 and 85 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 to the present petition.

Legislation cited

Subjects

election petitionpreliminary objectioncause of actionstriking out pleadingOrder 7 Rule 11Order 6 Rule 16material factsfull particularsRepresentation of the People Actvoid election

Judgment

                          D.RAMACHANDRAN                                          A
                                      v.
                    R.V. JANAKIRAMAN AND ORS.

                             MARCH 11, 1999

   [DR. AS. ANAND C.J., M. SRINIVASAN AND R.P. SETHI, JJ.)                        B

      Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 : Order 15 Rule 1 and Order 14.

       Election Petition-Dismissal in limine-Justification--Test of-Held :
 The avennents in the petition should be assumed to be true and coult has to
find out whether the avennents disclose a cause of action or triable issue as
                                                                                  c
such-<:oult can not probe into the facts on the basis of the controversy raised
in the coullter.

       Order 7 Rule 11 (a }-Election petition-Dismissal in limine-Justifica-
tion of-Returned candidate filed application for striking out palt of the D
allegations made in the election petition on the ground that the avennents in
the election petition did not disclose a cause of action and any , triable
issue-Held : Coult cannot dissect the the pleading into several palts and
consider whether each one of them discloses a cause of actioli-There cannot
be a parlial rejection of the plaint or petition--ln the circumstances of the
case, the election petition discloses a cause of action and hence cannot be E
dismissed in limine. without a trial-Representation of the People Act, 1951,
Ss. 81, 83 and 85.

       Order 6 Rules 2 and 6--Election petition---Pleading~Striking out
of-Returned candidate filed application for striking out the pleadings on the     F
ground that the election petition did not project any materialfacts and thereby
any triable issue-However, there was no avennent that the election petition
was vitiated by all or any of the defects mentioned in O. 6 R. 16-:-Held :
Striking out palts of the pleadings, notjustified-Distinction between "material
facts" and "full parliculars" to be kept in mind.
                                                                                  G
      Words and Phrases :

      "Material facts" and ''full palticular(-,-Meaning of.

       In the general elections held to the State Legislative Assembly, the
first respondent was declared elected. The appellant filed an election H
                                     983
    984                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [1999] 1 S.C.R.

A petition before the High Court making the following allegations. The first
    respondent and his family were not residents of the Assembly Constituency
    in question but the first respondent managed to. get the names recorded
    as voters in the constituency. The first respondent indulged in character
    assassination against the appellant personally attacking him in TV inter-
    view, in printed pamphlets distributed through his agents and workers
B   with his consent and knowledge and in the election campaign meetings.
    The first respondent deliberately and purposely violated the relevant rules
    and regnlations. The first respondent incurred expenditure in excess of the     "
    permitted limit of Rs 30,000 and did not disclose all the expenses in the
    accounts. The first respondent utilised the services of Government ser-
c   vants who canvassed for him in the elections. There were 3216 names in .
    the voters' list who could not have polled at all as 1455 were not available
    at the addresses mentioned, 1554 had gone out of Pondicherry and some
    of them were even out of India while 207 were dead. Though it was brought
    to the notice of the Returning Officer who had accordingly informed the
    concerned polling officers of polling booths, 2000 of them had been shown
D
    to have polled their votes. The first respondent had indulged in several        ..
    corrupt practices as a result of which the result of the election was                ,,
    materially effected. The appellant prayed for declaring the election of the
    first respondent to be void and declaring himself to be validly elected to
    the Assembly from the constituency in question.
E
           The first respondent filed a detailed counter-affidavit denying each
    one of the allegations made in the election petition. But there was no
    mention in the counter-affidavit that the allegations made in the election
    petition were vitiated by all or any of the defects in Order 6 Rule 16 of the
    Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. With regard to some of the allegations made
F
    in the election petition, a plea was raised by the first respondent that they
    did not disclose a cause of action.

        Thereafter, the first respondent filed an application praying for
  striking out certain paragraphs of the election petition and consequently
G rejecting the entire petition in limine. In the said application the first
  respondent averred that the various allegations in the election petition did
  not project any material facts and thereby any triable issue. The High
  Court held that the preliminary objection taken as to the maintainability
  of the election petition was sustainable in law and, therefore, dismissed the     ""
H election petition in limine without a trial. Hence this appeal.
                                                                                         .
                  D. RAMACHANDRAN v. R.V. JANAKIRAMAN                          985
          I
         I Allowing the appeal, this Court                                            A
           HELD : 1.1. It is well settled that in all cases of preliminary objec-
    tion, the test is to see whether any of the reliefs prayed for could be granted
    to the appellant if the averments made in the petition are proved to be
    true. For the pu~pose of co11sidering a preliminary objection, the aver-
    ments in the petition should be assumed to be true and the court has to           B
    find out whether those averments disclose a cause of action or triable issue
    as such. The court cannot probe into the facts on the' basis of the con-
    troversy raised in the counter. [989-A-B]

           1.2. It is not the case of the first respondent that the pleasing in the
    election petition is vitiated by all or any one of the defects mentioned in
                                                                                      c
    Order 6 Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Hence, striking out
    parts of the pleading in this case was not at all justified under Order 7
    Rule ll(a) CPC. [989-C]

          1.3. Further, the election petition as such does disclose a cause of D
    action, which if unrebutted could void the election, and the provisions of
    Order 7 Rule ll(a) CPC cannot therefore be invoked in this case. There
    is no merit in the contention that some of the allegations are bereft of
    material facts and as such do not disclose a cause of action. It is elemen-
    tary that under Order 7 Rule ll(a) CPC, the Court cannot dissect the
    pleading into several parts and consider whether each one of them dis- E
    closes a cause of action. Under the Rule, there cannot be a partial rejection
•   of the plaint or petition. The election petition in this case could not have
    been rejected in limine without a trial. [990-F-H]

          Roop Lal Sathi v. Nachhattar Singh Gill, [1982] 3 SCC 487, relied on.       F
           2. High Court has not kept in mind the distinction between "material
    facts" and "full particulars." The trial court may decide the application of
    the first respondent in the light of the relevant judgments of this court, in
    particular, those laying down the difference between "material facts" and
    "full particulars." [990-H; 991-A]                                            G
          L.R. Shivaramagowda v. T.M. Chandrasekhar, [1998] 6 SCALE 361,
    relied on.

          Surinder Singh v. Hardial Singh, [1985] 1 SCC 91; Manohar Joshi v.
    Nitin Bhaurao Patil, [1996] 1 SCC 169; Moreshwar Save v. Dwarkadas                H
                                                                                  '\

    986                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (1999] 1 S.C.R.

A Yashwantrao Pathrikar, [1996) 1 SCC ·3~4; Ramakant Mayekar v. Celine
    D'Silva (Smt.); Ram Chand Bhatia v. Shri Hardyal, [1986) 2 SCC 121 and        •
    Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, [1986) Suppl. 315, held inapplicable.

            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5354 of
    1997.
B
         From the Judgment and Order dated 165.97 of the Madras High
    Court in E.P. No. 3/96 and O.A. Nos. 36, 186 of 1997.

          A.K. Ganguli, Krishnamurthi Swami and A. Raghunath for the Ap-
    pellant.
c
         V.T. Gopalan, R. Mohan, S. Srinivasan, Mahabir Singh, V. Sudeer,
    M.A. Chhinnaswamy and V.G. Pragasam for the Respondents.

            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

D         SRINIVASAN, J. Aggrieved by the dismissal of his Election Petition
    E.P. 3/1996 on a preliminary issue, the appellant has approached this
    Court.

           2. In the general elections held in 1996 to the Legislative Assembly
E   of Pondicherry, the first respondent was elected from No. 7 Nellithope
    Constituency with 8803 votes. The appellant secured 7354 votes while the
    votes polled by respondents 2 fo 7 are not worthy of mentioning. The 8th
    respondent in this appeal is the Returning Officer. The appeal is contested   •
    by the first respondent whose application O.A. No 36/87 for striking out
    paras 6 to 10, 11 to 18, 19, 20, 26, 31 and 32 of the Election Petition and
F   consequent rejection of the said petition at the threshold without going to
    trial was allowed by the High Court.                                              >-

         3. ·In the Election Petition, the appellant made the following allega-
  tions. The first respondent and his family were not residents of No. 7,
  Nellithope Assembly Constituency but the first respondent managed to get
G the names recorded as voters in the constituency. The first respondent
  indulged in character assassination against the appellant personally attack-
  ing him in T.V. interview, in printed pamphlets distributed through his
  agents and workers with his consent and knowledge and in the election
  campaign meetings. The 1st respondent deliberately and purposely violated
H the relevant rules and regulations. The ls.t respondent incurred expenditure
7
           D. RAMACHANDRAN v. R.V. JANAKIRAMAN [SRINIVASAN, J.] 987

...,   in excess of the permitted limit of Rs. 30,000 and did not disclose all the      A
       expenses in the accounts. The first respondent utilised the services of
       Government servants who canvassed for him in the elections. There were
       3216 names in the voters' list who could not have polled at all as 1455 were
       not available at the addresses mentioned, 1554 had gone out of Pondicher-
       ry and some of them were even out of India while 207 were dead. Though
                                                                                        B
       it was brought to the notice of the Returning Officer who had informed
       the concerned polling officers of polling booths, 2000 of them had been
       shown to have polled their votes. The first respondent had indulged in
       several corrupt practices as a result of which the results of the election
       were materially affected. The appellant prayed for declaring the election
       of the first respondent to be void and declaring himself to be validly elected   c
       to the Assembly from the constituency in question.

              4. The first respondent filed a detailed counter:affidavit denying each
       one of the allegations made in the election petition in December 1996.
       There was no whisper therein that any of the allegations in the petition was D
       vague or made in such a way that the respondent was not in a position tc.
       understand and meet the same. Nor was there any averment that any part
       of the election petition was unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious
       or would tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit.
       There was also no averment to the effect that the election petition was
       otherwise an abuse of process of Court. With regard to some of the E
       allegations made in the petition, a plea was raised by the first respondent
       that they did not disclose a clause of action.

               5. Sometime after filing such a counter-affidavit, the first respondent
       filed on 22.1.97 Original Application No. 36/97 praying for striking out F
       paragraphs 6 to 20, 26, 31 and 32 of the election petition and consequently
       rejecting the entire election petition in limine. In the said application the
       first respondent averred that the various allegations in the election petition
       did not project any material facts and thereby any triable issue. A perusal
       of the said application shows that the only° basis on which the prayer therein
       was made was that the allegations contained in the election petition did G
       not disclose a cause of action and no triable issue arose thereon. The
       appellant filed a counter-affidavit to the said application opposing the
       same. Apart from that, the appellant filed O.A. No. 186/97 on 12.3.1997
>
       praying for permission to file original documents filed along with the reply
       statement as Annexures 21 to 29. That application was also opposed by the H
    988                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [1999] 1 S.C.R.
A first respondent and a counter-affidavit was filed.
         6. The High Court heard the two applications. The High Court
    framed three points for consideration as follows :

                (1) whether the original documents filed along with the reply
B           statement, as enclosures 21 to 29 more fully described in the
            Schedule are relevant, as necessary and receivable at this stage, on
            the facts and in the circumstances of the case.

                (2) whether preliminary objections taken as to the main-
            tainability of the Election Petition is sustainable in law, on the facts
c           and in the circumstances of the cases; and

                (3) What is the consequence to flow from the sustainability or
             otherwise of the objections so taken."

  Point No. 1 was answered against the appellant and his application O.A.
D No. 186/97 was dismissed. Point No. 2 was answered in favour of the first
  respondent and his application O.A. No.36/97was allowed. Consequently,
  under Point No. 3 the Court rejectd the main E.P. No. 3/96.

        7. It is that judgment of the High Court which is challenged before
E us. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the appellant, the
  judgment of the learned Judge is obviously based upon a confusion of ideas
  and failure to appreciate the distinction between the provisions in Sections
  81, 83 and 85 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter
  referred to as the 'Act') on the one hand and Order VI, Rule 16 and Order
  VII, Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code on the other. The learned judge
F has chosen to test the veracity and sufficiency of the allegations in the
  election petition by taking note of the facts pleaded by the first respondent
  in his counter affidavit. In the circumstances, the learned senior counsel
  appeariiig for the first respondent has rightly concentrated on supporting
   the conclusion of the High Court rejecting the election petition and did
G not make any serious effort to support the reasoning contained in the
  judgment.

        8. We do not consider it necessary to refer in detail to any part of
  the reasoning in the judgment; instead, we proceed to consider the argu-
  ments advanced before us on the basis of the pleadings contained in the
H election petition. It is well settled that in all cases of preliminary objection,
           D. RAMACHANDRAN v. R.V. JANAKIRAMAN (SRINIVASAN, J.)                 989
~                                                   '·
       the test is to see whether any of the reliefs prayed for could be granted to    A
       the appellant if the averments made in the petition are proved to be true.
       For the purpose of considering a preliminary objection, the averments in
       the petition should be assumed to be true and the Court has to find out
       whether those averments disclose a cause of action or triable issue as such.
       The Court can not probe into the facts on the basis of the controversy
                                                                                       B
...    raised in the counter .

              9. Under Order VI, Rule 16, the Court is enabled to strike out a
       pleading (a) which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious
       or (b) which may tend to prejudice embarrass or delay the fair trial of the
       suit; or (c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. We        c
       have already pointed out that it is not the case of the first respondent that
       the pleading in the election petition is vitiated by all or any one of the
       aforesaid defects mentioned in the rule. Hence striking out parts of the
       pleading in this case was not at all justified.
                                                                                       D
              10. On the other hand, Rule 11 of Order VII enjoins the Court to
       reject the plaint where it does not disclose a cause of action. There is no
       question of striking out any portion of the pleading under this rule. The
       application filed by that first respondent in 0.A. No. 36/97 is on the footing
       that the avennents in the election petition did not contain the material facts E
       giving rise to a triable issue or disclosing a cause of action. Laying stress
       upon the provisions of Order VII, Rule ll(a), learned senior counsel for
       the first respondent took us through the entire election petition and
       submitted that the averments therein do not disclose a cause of action. On
 .,,   a reading of the petition, we do not find it possible to agree with him. The F
       election petition as such does disclose a cause of action which if unrebutted
       could void the election and the provisions of 0. VII R ll(a) C.P.C. can
       not therefore be invoked in this case. There is no merit in the contention
       that some of the allegations are bereft of material facts and as such do not
       disclose a cause of action. It is elementary that under 0. VII R. ll(a)
       C.P.C., the Court can not dissect the pleading into several parts and G
       consider whether each one of them discloses a cause of action. Under the
       rule, there can not be a partial rejection of the plaint or petition. See Roop
 >     Lal Sathi v. Nachhattar Singh Gill, [1982] 3 S.C.C. 487. We are satisfied that
       the election petition in this case could not have been rejected in limine
       without a trial.                                                               H
    990                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [1999] 1 S.C.R.
                                   .,                                                ...
A          11. Designedly, we are refraining from adverting to the arguments
    pertaining to each allegation of corrupt practice, lest any observation by us
    might affect the views of the trial judge. Suffice it to point out that this
    court has repeatedly clarified the difference between "material facts" and
    "full particulars" and the different consequences of failure to set out either
B   of them: In L.R. Shivaramagowda, Etc. v. TM. Chandrashekar Etc., (1998)
    6 Scale 361 cited by counsel on both sides, the case law has been traced
    and the propositirms are reiterated.

           12,The following rulings relied on by learned senior counsel for the
    first respondent have no application here as they were all rendered in
C   election petitions disposed after trial.

          (a) Surinder Singh v. Hardial Singh & Ors., [1985] 1 S.C.C. 91.

          (b) Manohar Joshi v. Nitin Bhaurao Patil & Anr., (1996] 1 S.C.C. 169.

D         (c) Moreshwar Save v. Dwarkadas Yashwantrao Pathrikar, [1996) 1
    S.C.C. 394.

          ( d) Ramakant Mayekar Etc. v. Celine D'Silva (Smt.) Etc., [1996) 1
    S.C.C. 399.

E         13. The decision in Ram Chand Bhatia v. Shri Hardyal, [1986) 2
    S.C.C. 121 making a distinction between statements assailing personal
    character and those assailing public or political character vf a candidate is
    not relevant at this stage. As pointed out by the Bench in that case, the
    question would depend on the facts of each case. Such facts can be
    determined only at the trial. The decisfon inAzhar Hussain V. Rajiv Gandhi,
F   [1986) Supp. S.C.C. 315 relied on by learned senior counsel turned on the
    facts of the case and has no relevance in this case:

          1{ In the view, we have expressed, it is not necessa:ry for us to refer
    in detiil to the rulings relied upon by l~arned for the ap.pellant .      ·
G        15. As regards O.A. 186/97, the approach of the learned judge is
  totally erroneous as he has not kept in mind the dist.inction between
  "material facts" and "full particulars''. Nor has be correctly appreciated the
  decisions of this Court referred to by him. We do not want to express any'
  opinion at this stage on the additional documents produced by the appel-
H !ant. The trial court may decide the application in the light of the relevant
           D. RAMACHANDRAN v. R.V. JANAKIRAMAN (SRINIVASAN, J.]                991

    ..j~dgments of this Court, in particular, those laying down the difference A
       betWeen "material facts" and "full particulars". Hence th~ order in O.A.
       i86/97 is set aside <:nd the application is remanded for fresh disposal in
       accordance with· law.

             16. in the result, we hold that the judgment of the High Court is
      unsustainable and it is hereby set aside. The appeal is allowed and E.P.        B
      3/96 is restored to file. O.A. 36/97 stands dismissed. We request the High
      Court to expeditiously dispose of the election petition on merits. There will
      be no order as to costs.

      v.s.s.                                                      Appeal allowed.
                                                                                      c




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