D.N. TANEJAversusBHAJAN LAL

A                               D.N. TANEJA
                                      v.
                                BHAJAN LAL

                                MAY 4, 1988

B     [R.S. PATHAK, CJ, M.M. DUTT AND M.H. KANIA, JJ.]

          Contempt of Courts Act, 1971-Section 19( 1)-Interpretation
    of-When can High Court be said to exercise its jurisdiction to punish
    for its contempt--High Court exercises this jurisdiction only when it
    imposes punishment for contempt-If no punishment is imposed on
    contemnor, no jurisdiction to punish for contempt is exercised.
c
         Contempt of Courts Act, 1971-Section 19( 1)-Interpretation
    of-The right of appeal is only of the contemnor and not of the person
    who alleges that the contemnor had committed contempt of the Court-
    Remedy of the person alleging contempt lies under Article 136 of the
D   Constitution.

          Rule of Interpretation-Right of appeal is a creature of statute and
    should be considered on interpretation of provisions of the statute and
    not on the ground of propriety or any other consideration.

E         The appellant filed an application for contempt against the
    respondent in the High Court complaining of interference by the res-
    pondent with the due course of judicial proceedings. A Single Judge of
    the High Court after considering the application, affidavits and submis-
                                                                                •
    sions made on behalf of the parties took the view that it was not a fit
    case in which the court should exercise its jurisdiction under the con-
F   tempt of Courts Act and dismissed the application. The appellant filed
    the instant appeal under section 19(1) of the Act. The respondent took
    a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal under
    section 19(1). While upholding the objection and dismissing the Appeal,
    this Court,

G         HELD: The High Court derives its jurisdiction to punish for
    contempt from Article 215 of the Constitution. The appeal will lie under
    Section 19(1) of the Act only when the High Court makes an order or
    decision in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The High
    Court exercises its jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article
    2 J5 of the Constitution when it imposes a punishment for contempt.
H   When the High Court does not impose any punishment on the alleged
                                      888
                           D.N. TANEJA v. BHAJAN LAL                       889

    contemnor the High court does not exercise its jurisdiction or power to       A
    punish for contempt. The jurisdiction of the High Court is to punish.
    When no punishment is imposed by the High Court, it is difficult to say
    that the High Court has exercised its jurisdiction or power as conferred
    on it by Article 215 of the Constitution. [892C-E]                      ·
                                                                                  B
          Whenever a court, tribunal or authority is vested with a jurisdic-
    tion to decide a matter, such jurisdiction can be exercised in deciding
    the matter in favour or against a person. For example, a civil court is
    conferred with the jurisdiction to decide a suit; the civil court will have
    undoubtedly the jurisdiction to decree the suit or dismiss the same. But
i
    when a court is conferred with the power or jurisdiction to act in
    a particular manner, the exercise of jurisdiction or the power will           c
    involve the acting in that particular manner and in no other. Article 215
    confers jurisdiction or power on the High court to punish for contempt.
    The High Court can exercise its jurisdiction only by punishing for
    contempt. [893F·Gl
                                                                                  D
          The contention of the appellant that there would be no remedy
    against the erroneous or perverse decisfon of the High Court in not
    exercising its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, is not correct. When
    the High Court erroneously acquits a contemnor guilty of criminal
    contempt, the petitioner who is interested in maintaining the dignity of
    the Court will not be without any remedy. Even though no appeal is
    maintainable under section 19(1) of the Act, the petitioner in such a case    E
    can move this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. [894B-C)

          Right of appeal is a creature of the statute and the question
     whether there is a right of appeal or not will have to be considered on an
~interpretation of the provision of the statute and not on the ground of          F
   · propriety or any other consideration. [8940-E]

          A contempt is a matter between the court and the alleged
    contemnor. Any person who moves the machinery of the court for
    contempt only brings to the notice of the court certain facts constituting
    contempt of court. After furnishing such information he may still assist
    the court, but the aggrieved party under section 19(1) can only be the        G
    contemnor who has been punished for contempt of court. [894E:GJ

         Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1963] l S.C.R. 778 and
    Paradakanta Mishra v. Mr. Justice Gatikrushna Mishra, [1975] 1
    S.C.R. 524, referred to.
                                                                                  H
    890                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [1988] 3 S.C.R.

A        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
    No. 79 of 1984.

         From the Judgment and Order dated 5.10.1983 of the Punjab
    and Haryana High Court in Criminal Original Contempt Petition
    No. 27 of 1983.
B
          R.K. Garg, Mahabir Singh and S. Srinivasan for the Appellant.

         Kapil Sibal, R.N. Karanjawala, Mrs. M. Karanjawala and Ejaz
    Maq bool for the Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c
        DUTT, J. This appeal under section 19( 1) of the Contempt of
  Courts Act, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', is directed against the
  judgment and order of the Punjab & Haryana High Court dismissing
  the application for contempt filed by the appellant against Shri Bhajan
D Lal, who was then the Chief Minister of the State.

          In the application for contempt, it was, inter alia, alleged by the
    appellant that one Shri Devinder Sharma was a Forest Minister in the
    Council of Ministers headed by Shri Bhajan Lal. The said Devinder
    Sharma was defeated in the legislative assembly election held in 1982.
E   Shri Bhajan Lal, because of his political and personal relations with·
    Shri Devinder Sharma, was personally very keen on giving him an
    office of profit. In order to achieve this objective, Bbajan Lal got an
    Ordinance being Ordinance No. 44 of 1982 promulgated by the Gover-
    nor. The Ordinance, inter alia, provided the constitution of a Forest
    Development Board. According to the appellant, such Board was con-
F   stituted with a view to appointing the said Devinder Sharma as its
    Chairman.

        It was further alleged by the appellant that the constitutional
  validity of the said Ordinance was challenged by twelve Indian Forest
  Officers including the appellant by filing a writ petition in the High
G Court. It was alleged that the respondent, Bhajan Lal, through Shri
  R.K. Vashisth, the Superintendent of Police, pressurised and
  threatened the writ petitioners to withdraw the said writ petition and,
  pursuant to that, eleven officers withdrew from the petition. It was
  only the appellant who continued to prosecute the writ petition and, as
  a consequence of which, the appellant was transferred from the Forest
H Expert Special Project Cell to the Forest Department, Haryana, on
                          D.N. TANEJA v. BHAJAN LAL [DUTT, J.]                  891

          March 18, 1983. The further allegation of the appellant was that after       A
          having failed to threaten and demoralise the appellant through indirect
          means the respondent, Bhajan Lal, called him to his official residence
          on July 26, 1983 through the Acting Chief Conservator of Forests and
          criminally intimidated him to withdraw the writ petition.
                                                                                       B
                Thereafter, the appellant filed an application for contempt
          against the respondent, Bhajan Lal, in the High Court complaining of
          interference by the respondent with ihe due course of judicial proceed-
          ings. The application was admitted and a rule nisi was issued upon the
          respondent. The respondent appeared in the rule and opposed the
          same by filing an affidavit denying all the allegations made against him
          by the appellant.                                                            C

               The learned Single Judge of the High Court, after considering
         the application, affidavits and the submissions made on behalf of the.
         parties, took the view that there were circumstances to indicate that it
         was not a fit case in which the court should exercise its jurisdiction 0
         under the Act. In that view of the matter, the learned Judge dismissed
         the application and discharged the rule nisi.

                It is apparent from the facts stated above that the/
                                                                      allegations
         made by the appellant, if proved would consitute a criminal contempt.
                                                                a
         It is also not disputed by the parties that it was case of criminal
                                                                                       E
         contempt as defined in section 2( c) of the Act. The scope and ambit of
         this judgment will, therefore, be confined to criminal contempt .

•                    Mr. Sibbal, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respon-
               dent, has taken a preliminary objection to the ·maintainability of the .
    .,,,,., appeal under section 19( 1) of the Act. It is contended by him that as no F
           -., punishment was imposed on the respondent by the High Court in
               exercise of its jurisdiction to· punish for contempt, section 19(1) is
               inapplicable and the appeal is incompetent. Section 19(1) provides as
               follows:

                           "19(1). An appeal shall lie as of right from any order      G
                     or decision of a High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction
                     to punish for contempt-

                           (a) where the order or decision is that of a single
                               judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of
                               the Court;                                              H
    892                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [1988] 3 S.C.R.

                      (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to
A
                          the Supreme Court.

                      Provided that where the order or decision is that of
                the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union terri-
                tory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court."
B
           The right of appeal will be available under sub-section (1) of
    section 19 only against any decision or order of a High Court passed in
    the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In this connec-
    tion, it is pertinent to refer to the provision of Article 215 of the
    Constitution which provides that every High Court shall be a court of
    record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the
c   power to pumsh for contempt of itself. Article 215 confers on the High
    Court the power to punish for contempt of itself. In other words, the
    High Co11rt derives its jurisdiction to punish for contempt from Article
    215 of the Constitution. As has been noticed earlier, an appeal will lie
    under section 19( 1) of the Act only when the High Court makes an
D   order or decision in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt.
    It is submitted on behalf of the respondent and, in our opinion rightly,
    that the High Court exercises its jurisdiction or power as conferred on
    it by Article 215 of the Constitution when it imposes a punishment for
    contempt. When the High Court does not impose any punishment on
    the alleged contemnor, the High Court does not exercise its jurisdic-
E   tion or power to punish for contempt. The jurisdiction of the High
    Court is to punish. When no punishment is imposed by the High
    Court, it is difficult to say that the High Court has exercised its juris-
    diction or power as conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution.

          It is, however, strenuously urged by Mr. R.K. Garg, learned
F   Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, that when the High
    Court acquits a contemnor after hearing the parties and after consider-
    ing the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court does so also
    in the exercise of its jurisdiction as conferred by Article 215 of the
    Constitution. Counsel submits that jurisdiction tci punish for contempt
    includes also the jurisdiction to dispose of the case either by punishing
G   the contemnor or by acquitting him. In support of the contention much
    reliance has been placed on behalf of the appellant on a decision of this
    Court in Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, I1963] 1 SCR 778
    wherein S.K. Das, J. observed "jurisdiction means authority to
    decide." Relying upon the said observation it is submitted by Mr.
    Garg that the jurisdiction of the High Court to punish for contempt
H   also includes the jurisdiction to decide whether such punishment
                         D.N. TANEJA v. BHAJAN LAL [DUTT, J.]                 893

         should be imposed or not and when the High Court comes to the
                                                                                     A
         finding that such punishment should not be imposed on the contemnor
         or that no contempt has been committed by the alleged contemnor and
         acquits him, such decision of the High Court acquitting the contemnor
         is made in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. We
         are unable to accept this contention. The said observation, in our
         opinion, should not be read dehors the context in which it was made.        B
         In that case, the Sales Tax Officer disallowed the claim of the peti-
         tioner to exemption from payment of Sales Tax under a certain notifi-
         cation. An appeal preferred by the petitioner to the Court of the Judge
         (Appeals), Sales Tax, Allahabad, was dismissed. The question that
         came up for consideration before this Court was whether a writ of
         certiorari could be issued for quashing the order of Assessment on the
         ground that the authority concerned had erroneously exercised its           c
         jurisdiction by not granting exemption to the petitioner. In that context
         the said observations was made and which was immediately followed
         by further observation:

                    "Whenever a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal is               D
                    empowered or required to enquire into a question of law .or
                    fact for the purpose of giving a decision on it, its findings
                    thereon cannot be impeached collaterally or on an applica-
                    tion for certiorari but are binding until reversed on appeal.
                    Where a quasi-judicial authority has jurisdiction to decide
                    a matter, it does not lose its jurisdiction by coming to a       E
                    wrong conclusion whether it is wrong in law or in fact."
•
                There can be no doubt that whenever a court, tribunal or autho-
     .   rity is vested with a jurisdiction to decide a matter, such jurisdiction
    ~ can be exercised in decidiri"g the matter in ~vour or ~gainst a person.
      · For ex301ple, a civil court is conferred with the jurisdiction to decide a F
        suit; the civil court will have undoubtedly the jurisdiction to decree the
        suit or dismiss the same. But when a court is conferred with the power
        or jurisdiction to act in a particular manner, the exercise of jnrisdiction
        or the power will involve the acting in that particular manner and in no
        other. Article 215 confers jurisdiction or power on the High Court to
        punish for contempt. The High Court can exercise its jurisdiction only G
    ~   by punishing for contempt. It is true that in considering a question
        whether the alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not, the court
        hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and, if
         necessary, examines witnesses and, thereafter, pas·ses an order either
         acquitting or punishing him for contempt. Wiien the High . Court
         acquits the contemnor, the High Court does not exercise its jurisdic-       H
    894                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [19881 3 S.C.R. ~

    tion for contempt, for such exercise will mean that the High Court
A
    should act in a particular manner, that is to say, by imposing punish-
    ment for contempt. So long as no punishment is imposed by the High
    Court, the High Court cannot be said to be exercising its jurisdiction
    or power to punish for contempt under Article 215 of the Constitution.
        It does not, however, mean that when the High Court errone-
B
  ously acquits a contemnor guilty of criminal contempt, the petitioner
  who is interested in maintaining the dignity of the court will not be
  without any remedy. Even though no appeal is maintainable under
  section 19( 1) of the, Act, the petitioner in such a case can move this
  Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Therefore, the conten-
  tion, as advanced on behalf of the appellant, that there would be no
c remedy against the erroneous qr perverse decision of the High Court
  in not exercising its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, is not correct.
  But, in such a case there would be no right of appeal under section
  19(1), as there is no exercise of jurisdiction or power by the High
  Court to punish for contempt. The view which we take finds support
  from a decision of this Court in Paradakanta Mishra v. Mr. Justice
D Gatikrushna Mishra, I1975 I 1 SCR 524.
        Right of appeal is a creature of the statute and the question
  whether there is a right of appeal or not will have to be considered on
  an interpretation of the provision of the statute and not on the ground ~.
  of porpriety or any other consideration. In this connection, it may be
E noticed that there was no right of appeal under the Contempt of
  Courts Act, 1952. It is for the first time that under section 19( 1) of the
  Act, a right of appeal has been provided for. A contempt is a matter
  between the court and the alleged contemnor. Any person who moves
  the machinery of the court for contempt only brings to the notice of the ,
  court certain facts constituting contempt of court. After furnishing ,:"--
F such information he may still assist the court, but it must always be
  borne in mind that in a contempt proceeding there are only two
  parties, namely, the court and the contemnor. It may be one of the
  reasons which weighed with the Legislature in not conferring any right
  of appeal on the petitioner for contempt. The aggrieved party under
  section 19(1) can only be the contemnor who has been punished for
G contempt of court.
           For the reasons aforesaid, there is substance in the preliminary      f-
     objection raised as to the maintainability of the appeal. In our view the
     appeal is incompetent and is, accordingly, dismissed. There will, how-
     ever, be no order as to costs.
     H.S.K.                                                Appeal dismissed.