Holding

Section 37 of the Architects Act, 1972, only bars unregistered persons from using the title ‘architect’ and does not prohibit them from practising architectural activities, but it does prohibit the use of that title in government posts, thereby barring unregistered persons from holding posts styled ‘Architect’ or ‘Associate Architect’.

Summary

The Council of Architecture challenged NOIDA's Promotion Policy 2005, which allowed promotion to the post of Associate Architect without requiring a degree recognised by the Council. The issue was whether Section 37 of the Architects Act, 1972 bars unregistered persons from practising architectural activities and whether a government post titled "Architect" can be held by such persons. The Supreme Court examined the plain wording of Section 37, the legislative intent expressed in the Statement of Objects and Reasons, and compared the Act with the stricter regimes of the Medical and Advocates Acts. It held that the provision only prohibits the use of the title and style of "architect" by unregistered individuals, not the performance of architectural functions. However, the Court ruled that using the title in a government post creates a reasonable assumption of registration and therefore violates Section 37. Consequently, the appeal was partly allowed: the High Court's view on practice was affirmed, but its view on the nomenclature of government posts was overruled.

Issues considered

Whether Section 37 of the Architects Act, 1972 prohibits individuals not registered with the Council of Architecture from practising the activities undertaken by architects, including design, supervision and construction of buildings.
Whether a government post titled "Architect", "Associate Architect" or any similar designation can be held by a person not registered as an architect under the Architects Act.

Legislation cited

Advocates Act, 1961s. 29
Architects Act, 1972s. 14, s. 15, s. 17, s. 23, s. 2(a), s. 35, s. 37
Indian Medical Council Act, 1956s. 15(2)
U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976

Subjects

Architects Acttitle protectionprofessional regulationgovernment employmentdelegated legislationultra viresstatutory interpretationpractice of architectureuse of titleregistration

Judgment

904 [2020]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 7 S.C.R. 904 [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE
v.
MR. MUKESH GOYAL & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 1819 of 2020)
B MARCH 17, 2020
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD AND
AJAY RASTOGI, JJ.]
Architects Act, 1972 – s. 37 – Prohibition against use of title
– The High Court held that s.37 of the Architects Act does not create
C
a bar on individuals not registered with the Council of Architecture
from carrying out the duties and functions of an Architect – On
appeal, held: A plain reading of s.37 clearly supports the proposition
that the Architects Act prohibits individuals not registered with the
Council of Architecture from using the title and style of ‘Architect’
D and does not prohibit unregistered individuals from practicing the
activities undertaken by Architects such as the design, supervision
and construction of buildings – The legislature stated in the
‘Statement of objects and reasons’ that with the passing of the
legislation, it shall be unlawful for an unregistered individual to
‘designate himself ’ as an Architect – Further, it is expressly stated
E
that the legislation protects the ‘title’ of Architect but does not grant
registered Architects an exclusive right to undertake the design,
supervision and construction of buildings – Thus, it is evident that
legislature did not intend to create a prohibition on the practice of
architecture and associated activities by unregistered individuals –
F However, by virtue of the Architects Act, anybody engaging the
services of an individual calling themselves an ‘Architect’ is assured
that such an individual possesses statutorily recognised educational
qualifications and is competent to complete the task at hand – It is
in this manner that the legislature protects the common person from
untrained individuals – Thus, the decision of the High Court holding
G
that s.37 of the Architects Act does not prohibit individuals not
registered under the Architects Act from undertaking the practice
of architecture is affirmed.
Architects Act, 1972 – Whether a Government Post titled or
styled using the term ‘Architect’ can be held by individuals not
H
904
COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE v. MR. MUKESH GOYAL 905

registered with the Council of Architecture – The High Court held A
that the ‘mere nomenclature’ of a particular post will not violate the
prohibition on the use of ‘title and style’ of architect u/s. 37 – On
appeal, held: s.37 prohibits unregistered individuals from designating
themselves or referring to themselves as ‘Architects’ – If a Government
Post is titled ‘Architect’ or ‘Associate Architect’, such a person
B
certainly uses the title and style of ‘Architect’ and consequently there
is a reasonable assumption that such a person is registered under
the Architects Act and holds a degree in architecture recognised by
the Act – To promote an individual who does not possess a degree
in architecture recognised by the Act to a post titled ‘Architect’,
‘Associate Architect’ or of a similar style using the title or style of C
‘Architect’ would effectively violate the prohibition on the use of
title contained in s. 37 of the Architects Act – The text of s.37 makes
no distinction between government employees and private
individuals – Thus, authorities cannot promote or recruit individuals
who do not hold a degree in architecture recognised by the Architects
D
Act to a post that uses the title or style of ‘Architect’ – The view of
the High Court is disapproved.
Interpretation of Statutes – The first and best method of
determining the intention of the legislature is the very words chosen
by the legislature to have the force of law – In other words, the
E
intention of the legislature is best evidenced by the text of the statute
itself – However, where a plain reading of the text of the statute
leads to an absurd or unreasonable meaning, the text of the statute
must be construed in light of the object and purpose with which the
legislature enacted the statute as a whole.
Delegated Legislation – Primary Legislation – It is well F
established that delegated legislation is susceptible to invalidity on
the grounds of being ultra vires its parent legislation but also ultra
vires other primary legislation – Where the provisions of a primary
legislation (The Architect Act, 1972) are contradictory to the
provisions of a delegated legislation (The Promotion Policy 2005), G
the provisions of the primary legislation must prevail.
Partly allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. Does Section 37 of the Architects Act prohibit
individuals not registered as architects under the Architects Act
H
906 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A from practicing the activities undertaken by architects, including
the design, supervision and construction of buildings.
1.1 The text of Section 37 uses the phrase “no person shall
… use the title and style of architect”. Therefore, on a plain
reading of the section, the legal prohibition created is on the use
B of the “title and style of architect”. Title and style are distinct
from practice. While a prohibition on the use of a title merely
restricts an individual from attaching the said title to their name
in referring to or representing themselves to others, a prohibition
on practice creates a bar on the actual undertaking of specific
actions. The most compelling evidence that the two concepts
C
are materially distinct is the varied usage of the two phrases by
the legislature. [Para 26][912-F-H]
1.2 In making a distinction between individuals registered
under the statute and those not registered, the Advocates Act
clearly stipulates that unregistered individuals cannot “practice”
D the profession of law. This stands in stark contrast to the text of
the Architects Act which merely states that unregistered
individuals cannot “use the title and style of architect”. Therefore,
a plain reading of Section 37 clearly supports the proposition that
the Architects Act prohibits individuals not registered with the
E Council of Architecture from using the title and style of
“Architect” and does not prohibit unregistered individuals from
practicing the activities undertaken by architects such as the
design, supervision and construction of buildings. [Para 26][933-
D-F]
F 1.3 It is well settled that the first and best method of
determining the intention of the legislature is the very words
chosen by the legislature to have the force of law. In other words,
the intention of the legislature is best evidenced by the text of
the statute itself. However, where a plain reading of the text of
the statute leads to an absurd or unreasonable meaning, the text
G of the statute must be construed in light of the object and purpose
with which the legislature enacted the statute as a whole. Where
it is contended that a particular interpretation would lead to
defeating the very object of a legislation, such an interpretative
outcome would clearly be absurd or unreasonable. [Para 28][934-
H B-D]
COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE v. MR. MUKESH GOYAL 907

1.4 The legislature created two classes of individuals: the A
first class consisted of registered architects satisfying these
minimum qualifications and a second class of unregistered
individuals who did not satisfy these minimum qualifications. This
is the effect of Sections 2(a), 17, 23 and 35 of the Architects Act.
Crucially, the legislature chose to define an “architect” as an
B
individual registered under the Architects Act and not as an
individual practicing architecture or any cognate activities. Thus,
the legislature limited the regulatory regime created by the
Architects Act to the first class of individuals. In protecting the
public from the risk of the second class, untrained individuals,
the legislature had two options: first it could bar this second class C
of individuals from engaging in the profession altogether (as it
had done with physicians and advocates); or alternatively it could
prevent this second class of individuals from calling themselves
“Architects”. The Statement of Objects and Reasons makes it
clear that the legislature chose the second option and in fact went
D
to great lengths to clarify that choice. The legislature stated that
with the passing of the legislation, it shall be unlawful for an
unregistered individual to “designate himself” as an architect.
Further, it is expressly stated that the legislation protects the
“title” of architect but does not grant registered architects an
exclusive right to undertake the design, supervision and E
construction of buildings. Other cognate professions or
unregistered individuals may continue to carry out these activities
provided that they do not refer to themselves as “Architects”.
[Para 29][935-E-H][936-A]
1.5 It is evident that the legislature did not intend to create F
a prohibition on the practice of architecture and associated
activities by unregistered individuals. As opposed to the case of
physicians or surgeons under the Indian Medical Council Act or
advocates under the Advocates Act, the legislature consciously
chose to employ a less stringent measure in the case of architects,
G
merely prohibiting unregistered individuals from using the “title
and style” of architect. It is not for this Court to delve into why
the legislature made this choice. [Para 30][936-B-C]

H
908 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A 1.6 Architecture undoubtedly constitutes a highly
specialised profession requiring the possession of minimum
educational qualifications. However, architects are by and large
engaged by means of a contract for services. In other words,
architects provide a set of specialised services towards the larger
B goal of construction. Architects are not embarking on construction
independently of other actors. By virtue of the Architects Act,
anybody engaging the services of an individual calling themselves
an “Architect” is assured that such an individual possesses
statutorily recognised educational qualifications and is competent
to complete the task at hand. It is in this manner that the
C legislature protects the common person from untrained
individuals. [Para 32][937-C-E]
2. Whether a post titled “Architect”, “Associate architect”
or any other similar title using the term or style of “Architect”
can be held by a person not registered as an architect under the
D Architects Act.
2.1. If an individual is appointed to a post titled “Associate
Architect”, “Architect” or “Senior Architect”, they undoubtedly
refer to themselves and are referred to by others as “Architects”.
Holding a post using the term “Architect” has the real-world
E consequence of being referred to as an architect. This is not a
matter of mere nomenclature. As architecture is a specialised
field of study. Crucially, the scheme of the Architects Act provides
a direct nexus between the minimum educational qualifications
required to be obtained, registration as an architect under the
Act and the prohibition against the use of the title of “Architect”
F by those not registered under the Act. If a government post is
titled “Architect” or “Associate Architect”, such a person
certainly uses the title and style of “architect” and consequently
there is a reasonable assumption that such a person is registered
under the Architects Act and holds a degree in architecture
G recognised by the Act. This assumption finds statutory backing
in Section 35 of the Architects Act which provides that any
reference to an architect in any other law shall be deemed to
mean an architect registered under the Architects Act. To
promote an individual who does not possess a degree in
architecture recognised by the Act to a post titled “Architect”,
H
COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE v. MR. MUKESH GOYAL 909

“Associate Architect” or of a similar style using the title or style A
of “architect” would effectively violate the prohibition on the use
of title contained in Section 37 of the Architects Act. [Para 36][938-
D-H]
2.2. In the present case, this Court recognises the power
of NOIDA to provide and modify the minimum eligibility criteria B
for promotion of candidates to the posts of Associate Town Planner
and Associate Architect. This Court further recognises that the
authority has significant discretion in how it chooses to title the
various posts under its supervision. However, to permit NOIDA
to continue to title a post that includes individuals who are not
registered architects under the Architects Act as “Associate C
Architect” would result in a violation of Section 37 of the
Architects Act. In the case of Tulya Gogoi the High Court of
Gauhati expressly held that the prohibition on the use of title and
style of architect contained in Section 37 of the Architects Act
applies to both private individuals and government employees. D
The reasoning of the High Court on this issue commends itself
for our acceptance. The text of Section 37 makes no distinction
between government employees and private individuals.
[Para 37][939-A-C]
3. The U.P. Industrial Area Development Act provides E
NOIDA with the power to make rules for the management of its
internal affairs. In exercise of this power, NOIDA formulated the
Service Regulations of 1981. Rule 16 of the Service Regulations
sets out the ‘Sources of Recruitment’ for posts under NOIDA’s
authority. By clause (iv) of Rule 16 NOIDA has the power to
modify the sources of recruitment for posts under its supervision. F
It is in exercise of this power that NOIDA formulated the
Promotion Policy of 2005 which sets out the sources and
qualifications for recruitment in its various departments. It is well
established that delegated legislation is susceptible to invalidity
on the grounds of being ultra vires its parent legislation but also G
ultra vires other primary legislation. Where the provisions of a
primary legislation (the Architects Act) are contradictory to the
provisions of a delegated legislation (the Promotion Policy 2005),
the provisions of the primary legislation must prevail. This
principle is well established and has received articulation by this
Court on several occasions. [Para 38][939-C-F] H
910 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A Tulya Gogoi v. Association of Architects (1999) 3 Gau
LR 179 – approved.
Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India (1985) 1
SCC 641 : [1985] 2 SCR 287 – relied on.
Mukesh Kumar Manhar v. Sri Ram Singh Ahirwar 2006
B
(1) MPLJ 238; Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram
Kumar Bhardwaj (1980) 18 DLT 283; Om Prakash
Mittal v. Council of Architecture AIR 1983 Del 223;
Premendra Raj Mehta v. National Building Construction
Corporation Limited (W.P. (C) 2106 / 2012 in the High
C Court of Delhi); Sudhir Vohra v. Registrar of Companies
(W.P. (C) 934/2012 and C.M. No. 18315/2014 in the
High Court of Delhi); Council of Architecture v.
Manohar Krishnaji Ranade (2020) 16 SCC 476;
Council of Architecture v. Indian Institute of Architects
(2020) 16 SCC 475 – referred to.
D
Case Law Reference
(1999) 3 Gau LR 179 approved Para 15
(2020) 16 SCC 476 referred to Para 19

E (2020) 16 SCC 475 referred to Para 19
[1985] 2 SCR 287 relied on Para 38
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1819
of 2020.
From the Judgment and Order dated 19.02.2014 of the High Court
F
of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ Petition A No. 22155 of 2011.
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 1820-1822 of 2020.
K.K. Venugopal, AG, R. Balasubramanian, Pramod Swarup,
G Sr. Advs., V. N. Raghupathy, Ramnish Khanna, Manendra Pal Gupta,
Vijay Kumar, Thomas Oommen, Aniruddha P. Mayee, Mrs. Chinmayee
Chandra, Raj Bahadur Yadav, G.S. Makker, Ms. Alka Sinha, Ms. Pareena
Swarup, Anuvrat Sharma, Ravindra Kumar, Advs. for the appearing
parties.
H
COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE v. MR. MUKESH GOYAL 911

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.
1. The question before this Court is whether Section 37 of the
Architects Act 19721 merely prohibits the use of the title “Architect” by
individuals not registered with the Council of Architecture2 under Chapter
B
3 of the enactment or alternatively whether Section 37 actually prohibits
unregistered individuals from carrying out the practice of architecture
and its cognate activities. In other words, does Section 37 permit
individuals not registered with the Council to continue practicing the
profession of architecture in India? As a corollary to this question, this
Court is also called upon to determine whether a government post titled C
or styled using the term”Architect” can be held by individuals not
registered with the Council of Architecture.
2. The present appeals arise out of three writ petitions filed by the
first respondent before the High Court of Allahabad. The first respondent
has been working as an Architectural cum Planning Assistant in the D
service of the third respondent,the New Okhla Industrial Development
Authority3since January 1988 and claims to possess a degree in
architecture from the Indian Institute of Architects. NOIDA is an authority
created under Section 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Area Development
Act 1976 4 to supervise and manage the development of various
geographical zones of the state of Uttar Pradesh. E

3. Exercising its powers under Section 19 of the U.P. Industrial
Area Development Act and with the approval of the state government,
NOIDA framed the Service Regulations of 1981 for the recruitment
and promotion of employees in its various departments. One of the
departments under NOIDA’s purview is the Department of Planning F
and Architecture where the first respondent is employed. Regulation 16
of the Service Regulations 1981 sets out the ‘Sources of Recruitment’.
Under sub-clause (iv) of clause (2) of Regulation 16, NOIDA has been
conferred with the power to modify the sources of recruitment or the
percentage of candidates appointed through promotion and direct G
recruitment. Thus, under the Service Regulations 1981, NOIDA has the
power to lay down the conditions and qualifications for promotion from
1
“Architects Act”
2
“Council”
3
“NOIDA”
4
“U.P. Industrial Area Development Act” H
912 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A the feeder cadre to various posts in the Department of Planning and
Architecture.
4. NOIDA spelt out the qualifications and conditions required for
the promotion to various posts in the Recruitment and Promotion Policy
20055. The Department of Planning and Architecture consists of two
B cadre streams, the Planning cadre stream and the Architecture cadre
stream. The Planning cadre stream consists of the following posts (in
ascending order of seniority): (i) Planning Assistant; (ii) Associate Town
Planner; (iii) Town Planner; and (iv) Senior Town Planner. The
Architecture cadre stream consists of the following posts (in ascending
order of seniority): (i) Architecture Assistant; (ii) Associate Architect;
C
(iii) Architect; and (iv) Senior Architect. In practice, the two cadres
draw on a common pool of candidates, the only distinction being made
when specific work orders are issued.
5. The Promotion Policy 2005 provided that for the post of
Associate Town Planner, 60 per cent of recruitment would take place
D by way of promotion, the eligibility criteria being fifteen years’
experienceas a Planning Assistant. Similarly, for the post of Associate
Architect, 60 per cent of the posts were to be filled through promotion,
the eligibility criteria being fifteen years’ experience as an Architecture
Assistant. The remaining 40 per cent of posts were to be filled through
E direct recruitment, with a degree in Architecture and Town Planning
and a degree in Architecture stipulated as essential qualifications for
appointmentas an Associate Town Planner and Associate Architect
respectively.
6. A meeting was held by NOIDA on 20 March 2006 to decide
F whether a degree in Architecture and Town Planning and a degree in
Architecture was necessary for candidates who were to be promoted to
the posts of Associate Town Planner and Associate Architect. An opinion
was soughtfrom the Mukhya Nagar Gram Niyojak, Uttar Pradesh (Town
and Country Planning Department, Uttar Pradesh). In a letter dated 22
December 2008, the Mukhya Nagar Gram Niyojak recommended that
G a degree or diploma in the relevant subjects should be an essential
qualification for candidates seeking promotion. NOIDA subsequently
sought the opinion of the state government on the same question. During
this period, promotions to the post of Associate Town Planner and
Associate Architect have continued to remain in abeyance, resulting in a
5
H “Promotion Policy 2005”
COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE v. MR. MUKESH GOYAL 913
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

situation where employees who have served for as many as twenty-five A
years being denied consideration for promotion.
7. Before the High Court of Allahabad, the first respondent filed
three writ petitions.6 In the writ petitions, the first respondent also
impleaded the present appellant, the Council of Architecture which is
the regulatory body for the profession of architecture in India. By the B
writ petitions, the first respondent sought two reliefs:
(i) A writ of mandamus directing NOIDA to enforce the
provisions of the Architects Act by ensuring that only persons
registered with the Council of Architecture are appointed to
the post of Associate Town Planner / Associate Architect; C
and
(ii) The post of Associate Town Planner / Associate Architect
be filled entirely through promotion of the senior most
Architect cum Planning Assistant holding the necessary
qualifications. D
By an amendment to Writ Petition 22155 of 2011 made in 2013,
the first respondent challenged the Promotion Policy 2005 in so far as it
permitted the promotion of candidates to the post of Associate Town
Planner/Associate Architect without requiring that such candidates should
hold a degree in Architecture recognised under the Architects Act. E
8. The High Court of Allahabad observed that Regulation 16 of
the Service Regulations 1981, conferred NOIDA with the power to lay
down the conditions and qualifications for promotions in the authority’s
various departments. NOIDA had laid down these conditions and
qualifications in the Promotion Policy 2005. The High Court noted that F
the sole ground for challenging the Promotion Policy 2005 was that it
allegedly fell foul of Sections 14 and 37 of the Architects Act. Relying
extensively on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in
Mukesh Kumar Manhar v Sri Ram Singh Ahirwar (“Mukesh
Kumar Manhar”)7 the High Court held that Section 37 of the Architects
Act does not create a bar on individuals not registered with the Council G
from carrying out the duties and functions of an Architect. The High
Court held that Section 37 only prohibits unregistered individuals from

6
W.P. 57577 of 2008; W.P. 65973 of 2008; W.P. 22155 of 2011.
7
2006 (1) MPLJ 238 H
914 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A using the title “architect”. As a necessary adjunct of this reasoning, the
High Court held that the Promotion Policy 2005, which allowed for
individuals not holding a degree in architecture being appointed to the
Class II post of Associate Architect, did not contravene Section 37 of
the Architects Act in so far as they would be carrying out the activities
B of an architect.
9. In disposing of the writ petitions, the High Court of Allahabad
held that the “mere nomenclature of the particular post will not in any
way be said to violate the provisions of the Architects Act 1971”.
Therefore, the High Court permitted NOIDA to continue referring to
the Class II posts as Associate Town Planner and Associate Architect.
C
The High Court further noted that as a central legislation, the requirements
set out in the Architects Act could not be read into the Promotion Policy
2005 which is a regulation formulated under a state legislation, namely
the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act.
Submissions
D
10. The Council of Architecture has challenged the decision of
the High Court in holding that Section 37 of the Architects Act does not
prohibit individuals not registered with the Council from practicing
architecture in India. According to the Council, such an interpretation
defeats the object and purpose of the Architects Act. It is submitted
E that:
(i) The object of the Architects Act is to ensure that only
qualified architects are permitted to provide architectural
services for the purposes of construction and building activity
in India;
F
(ii) The Architects Act is a comprehensive legislation which
regulates the qualifications, registration and disciplinary
facets of architecture in India and therefore Section 37
cannot be read only as protecting against the use of the title
“Architect” but it must be read to prohibit unqualified
G individuals from practicing architecture;
(iii) Under Section 37 of the Architects Act, only individuals
registered with the appellant Council are permitted to render
architectural services in India;

H
COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE v. MR. MUKESH GOYAL 915
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(iv) The High Court has construed Section 37 narrowly and such A
an interpretation risks allowing unqualified individuals from
practicing the profession of supervising buildings and
construction; and
(v) In its decision in Mukesh Kumar Manhar the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh directed the state government to cease B
using the nomenclature of “Assistant Architect” or
“Architect” in regard to posts where the eligibility criteria
did not require appointees to hold a degree in architecture.
11. As the present controversy impacts all persons engaging in
the practice of architecture in India, including thousands of individuals C
employed in various government departments holding posts titled
“Associate Architect” or “Architect”, this Court considered it fit to issue
notice to the Union of India. During the course of the hearing,
Mr KK Venugopal, learned Attorney General of India appeared for the
Union and submitted that:
D
(i) According to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
Architects Act, the legislation aims to protectthe title of
architects but does not grant architects an exclusive right
over the activities of designing, supervising and constructing
buildings;
E
(ii) Section 37 of the Architects Act is titled “Prohibition against
the use of title” and prohibits individuals from using the “title
and style of architect”. The legal bar created is therefore
limited to the use of “title” and does not prohibit the “practice”
of architecture;
F
(iii) The Architects Act does not contain a prohibition on the
practice of architecture or the designing, supervising
orconstruction of buildings by individuals not registered with
the Council; and
(iv) The definition of “architect” provided by the Architects Act
G
is a person whose name appears on the register of Architects
maintained with the Council and not individuals engaged in
the design, supervision or construction of buildings in India.
Therefore, the Architects Act regulates individuals registered
with the Council and does not controlthe practice of activities
undertaken by individuals falling outside the regulatory regime H
applicable to registered Architects.
916 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A Scope of the present appeal
12. In the writ petitions before the High Court of Allahabad, the
question before the court was whether the 2005 Promotion Policy adopted
by NOIDA permitting candidates who do not hold a degree in architecture
to hold the post of Associate Architect violated the provisions of the
B Architects Act. The answer to that question substantially turned on an
interpretation of the Architects Act. Primarily, the issue is whether the
Architects Act prohibits individuals not registered with the Council from
holding of the title of “architect” or prohibits them from practicing the
activities undertaken by architects. This is the question that we are called
upon to answer. If Section 37 of the Architects Act prohibits individuals
C not registered with the Council from practicing the activities commonly
undertaken by an architect, the 2005 Promotion Policy will violate Section
37 as it allows unregistered individuals to undertake the activities of an
architect. However, if Section 37 only prohibits individuals not registered
with the Council from holding the title of “architect”, then the Promotion
D Policy 2005 is valid insofar as it permits unregistered individuals from
practicing architecture and only the question of the nomenclature of the
post remains to be decided. It is to this controversy that we now turn.
Decisions of the High Courts
13. Since the adoption of the Architects Act in 1972, there have
E been several pronouncements by High Courts on whether Section 37
should be interpreted as prohibiting individuals not registered with the
Council from undertaking the activities of designing, supervising and
constructing buildings in India. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v
Ram Kumar Bhardwaj8 the respondents challenged the power of the
F Delhi Municipal Corporation to stipulate who a “Licensed Architect”
was. It was contended by the respondents that the adoption of the
Architects Act represented a comprehensive regulatory framework and
the Delhi Municipal Corporation could no longer impose restrictions on
who a “Licensed Architect” was in a manner contrary to the provisions
of the enactment. Justice V S Deshpande (as the learned Chief Justice
G then was) speaking for a Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi
observed:
“2. … The Architects Act, 1972 sets out the qualification to be
possessed by the persons to be registered as architects under the
said Act. It also prohibits persons who do not have such registration
H 8
(1980) 18 DLT 283
COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE v. MR. MUKESH GOYAL 917
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

from describing themselves as architects and also deals with A
disciplinary action for misconduct of architects. It is, therefore, a
complete enactment the effect of which is that a person cannot
call himself an architect unless he is registered under the said
Act. Of course, unlike the Advocates Act, which restricts
the right to practice in courts only to the advocates qualified
B
thereunder, the Architects Act does not restrict the practise
by architects to persons registered under the said Act.
Therefore, some persons who cannot call themselves
architects may still be free to do the work which is ordinarily
done by architects and they are not dealt with by the
Architects Act.Whether the Corporation can deal with such C
persons is not a question which arises before us. Our consideration
is limited to the question whether the Corporation can regulate
the profession and the practice of architects registered under the
Architects Act, 1972 by insisting that the architects practising in
Delhi and submitting plans for construction of buildings for the
D
approval of the Corporation must possess licences issued by the
Corporation.”
(Emphasis supplied)
On the question of whether the Delhi Municipal Corporation could
regulate architects already registered with the Council of Architecture, E
the Division Bench held:
“The Architects Act, 1972 is a special law dealing with the
qualifications to be possessed by persons for being registered as
architects and restricting the term “architect” or “registered
architects” to such persons only. Since the possession of a F
registration certificate under the Architects Act, 1972 is regarded
by Parliament as sufficient qualification for the practice of
architects and since all related questions have been dealt with in
respect of architects by the said Act, it became unnecessary for
the Corporation to do so thereafter.”
G
The question before the High Court of Delhi was whether the
Delhi Municipal Corporation could require that architects submitting plans
for the construction of new buildings must possess a license issued by it.
While answering this in the negative, the Division Bench specifically
observed that unlike the Advocates Act 19619, the Architects Act did
9
“Advocates Act”
H
918 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A not restrict the practice of architecture to persons registered under the
Architects Act. The High Court observed that even after the adoption
of the Architects Act, there continue to exist individuals who cannot call
themselves architects but are free to carry out the work which is ordinarily
done by architects.
B 14. In Om Prakash Mittal v Council of Architecture10 Sections
35 and 37 of the Architects Act were challenged as ultra vires Articles
14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India before a single judge of the
High Court of Delhi. It was contended that Section 37 restricted the use
of the title of “architect” to a certain category of qualified persons as
distinct from other qualified persons, a distinction not supported by a
C
rational nexus with the objects of the Architects Act. In dismissing the
constitutional challenge, Justice S B Wad cited the Statement of Objects
and Reasons of the Architects Act.The High Court of Delhi held:
"Article 19(6) empowers State to make law relating to the
professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising
D any profession laying down professional qualifications for the
profession of architecture as done by the Act and prohibiting
persons who do not fulfil the said qualifications from posing
themselves as architects is constitutionally permissible. The
restriction, if at all, is a reasonable restriction. There is no merit
E in the petitioner’s contention that there is no nexus with
the object of the Act. The object of the Act, as stated above,
is to prevent unqualified persons calling themselves as
architects and undertaking the construction of buildings
which are uneconomical or unsafe and who are bringing the
profession of architect into disrepute. The provision is
F essentially in the interest of the general public and it is
meant for protecting the public from unqualified persons
working as architects. The restriction imposed by Section 37
does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution."
(Emphasis supplied)
G
In dismissing the constitutional challenge, the Single Judge of the
High Court of Delhi held that one of the objects of the Architects Act
was to prevent unqualified persons “calling themselves as architects”
which can result in untrained individuals being tasked with the critical
10
H AIR 1983 Del 223
COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE v. MR. MUKESH GOYAL 919
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

work of construction. This may lead to unsafe buildings. Section 37 was A
enacted to protect citizens from being misled by untrained persons and
mistakenly entrusting them with the task of construction. Even though
the Single Judge undoubtedly recognised the need for trained and qualified
architects, Section 37 was interpreted as creating a bar on individuals
representing themselves to be qualified architects and not as creating a
B
bar on untrained individuals practicing the tasks undertakenby architects.
15. The issue of using the nomenclature “architect” in government
services has also arisen before the High Courts. In Tulya Gogoi v
Association of Architects11 an order of the Government of Assam
was challenged. The said order re-named the post of “Architectural
C
Draftsman P.W.D.” as ‘‘Junior Architect”. The individuals whose posts
were to be renamed had at the time obtained a diploma certificate in
Architectural Assistantship which was not recognised by either the
Central Government or the Council of Architects. The order was
challenged by the Association of Architects, Assam as violating Section
37 of the Architects Act as it would effectively allow the concerned D
individuals to hold the title of “Architect” without holding a qualification
recognised by the Council. In response, it was contended that Section
37 was intended to prevent private individuals from calling themselves
“Architects” and misleading the general public, but this rationale did not
extend to government employees.Therefore, it was urged thatthe
E
government was free to designate its posts howsoever it saw fit. In
rejecting this distinction between private architects and employees of
the government, Chief Justice Brijesh Kumar (as the learned judge then
was) speaking on behalf of a Division Bench of the High Court of Gauhati
held:
“12. It is no doubt that the argument as advanced on behalf of the F
appellants is attractive, but it hardly appeals us. It is true, looking
into the sudden spurt in the activity of building, constructed for
factories, industries, housing colonies, office complexes, etc., it
was considered that the profession of architecture must be
regulated. Only those who have proper education and training G
and are qualified to work as such may alone be permitted to work
as architects. It is a legislation especially dealing with architects.
Meaning of the word ‘architect’ has been statutorily provided
under clause (a) of Section 2 where it has been provided that it
11
(1999) 3 Gau LR 179 H
920 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A means one whose name is entered in the register. … Conduct of
an architect is effectively controlled by Section 30. As a
Government servant may be punished under the
Government rules, but still he may practice the profession
of architecture. But check is placed by Section 30 under
which the name of an architect is even liable to be removed
B
from the register disentitling him to practice. Therefore,
the argument that being in Government service an architect
is accountable to his employer according to the rules does
not hold good since mere punishment as a Government
employee may not be enough to debar him from practising
C as an architect which is only controlled under Sections 22,
29 and 30 of the Act, 1972.
…
“15. … Apart from the categories as indicated above, no other
exception to the applicability of Section 37 has been
D provided much less on the ground that one is engaged in
private profession or in Government employment….”
(Emphasis supplied)
The High Court rejected the argument that the object of Section
E 37 to prevent misrepresentation by untrained individuals engaged in
architectural activities only applied to private individuals and not
government employees. The High Court observed that even where the
rules of service stipulated by the government provided for the regulation
of architects, the provisions of the Architects Act allowing for the
registration and de-registration of architects provided an overarching
F regulatory framework to protect the integrity of the architectural
profession. The Actensures that individuals who did not possess a
statutorily recognised qualification cannot refer to themselves as
“Architects”. Crucially, the High Court observed that Section 37 did not
carve out an exception for government employees, therefore the
G prohibition on the use and the “title and style of architect” contained in
Section 37 applied to both private individuals and government employees.
16. Both the appellant and the Union of India have relied on the
decision of the Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in
Mukesh Kumar Manhar and it would be pertinent at this juncture to
discuss the judgement. The facts of that case were substantially similar
H
COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE v. MR. MUKESH GOYAL 921
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

to those before us. The petitioners before the High Court of Madhya A
Pradesh were employed as “Draughtsman” and “Head Draughtsman”
and held architectural degrees recognised by the Architects Act. Their
next promotional post was that of “Assistant Architect – Class II”. One
of the pre-requisites for appointment as “Assistant Architect – Class II”
was the completion of a degree in architecture. In 1991 the relevant
B
recruitment rules were modified and the requirement of a degree in
architecture was removed as a pre-requisite for appointment as
“Assistant Architect – Class II”. The petitioners contended that the
amendment to the recruitment rules violated the provisions of the
Architects Act.According to the petitioners, the Act restricted the practice
of architecture to persons possessing a degree in architecture and C
registered with the Council of Architects. In dismissing the petitioners’
case, Chief Justice R V Raveendran (as the learned judge then was)
speaking for a Division Bench of the High Court compared the provisions
of the Architects Act to those of the Advocates Act and the Indian
Medical Council Act 195612. The court held:
D
“10. There is a significant difference between the Architects Act
1972 dealing with the profession of Architects and enactments
dealing with Medical and Legal professions. Section 15(2) of
The Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 bars any person other
than medical practitioners enrolled on the State Medical
Registers from practicing medicine or holding the office as E
‘physician’ or ‘surgeon’ in any Government Institution or
other Institution maintained by any local or other Authority.
Similarly, section 29 of the Advocates Act, 1961, provides
that only one class of persons are entitled to practice the
profession of law, namely, advocates entered in the Roll of F
any Bar Council under the provisions of the Advocates Act.
Thus there is a clear bar on persons who are not enrolled with the
State Medical Council or State Bar Council from practising as a
Medical Practitioner or an Advocate.
11. In contrast, the Architects Act 1972 does not prohibit G
persons other than those who are registered as Architects
from practising the profession. As noticed above, Section
37 only prohibits any person other than a registered
architect using the title and style of Architect. It does not
12
“Indian Medical Council Act” H
922 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A prohibit a person, who is not a registered as an Architect
with the Council of Architecture from carrying on or
discharging any function that can be carried on by a
registered Architect. …”
(Emphasis supplied)
B The High Court noted that both the Indian Medical Council Act
and the Advocates Act expressly restrict the practice of medicine and
law to individuals registered under the two statutes respectively. When
examined in juxtaposition to these two statutes, the choice of the legislature
to restrict the “title and style of architect” in Section 37 of the Architects
C Act as opposed to the very practice of the profession is significant.
Relying on this distinction, the High Court ultimately held that:
“13. … there can be no objection for a rule providing for non-
architects being promoted to a particular Class II post, which may
involve planning, designing and supervision of Building
D constructions. What is prohibited and what is objectionable
in law is calling the persons discharging such functions
related to architecture, as ‘Architects’ when they are not
registered as Architects. … Even Engineers, who do not
have a degree in Architecture (and who are not registered
Architects) but having qualifications in Engineering and
E experience in design and supervision, may perform the
function which are normally performed by an Architect. But
such Engineers who are not registered Architects and
posted to the Class-I or II posts, dealing with architectural
aspects and designs, cannot be called as ‘Architects’ or
F ‘Assistant Architects’ unless they are registered Architects
under the Architects Act … A draughtsman who is a registered
Architect, when promoted to Class II post, can however be called
as ‘Assistant Architect’.
14. We recognise the freedom and choice, vested in the executive,
G to prescribe the qualifications for various posts. But the
qualifications prescribed, should not violate any statutory provision,
nor suffer from the vice of arbitrariness or mala fides. Statutory
preferences should not be ignored. Architecture is a specialised
technical field dealing with design and execution of buildings and
structures. …”
H
(Emphasis supplied)
COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE v. MR. MUKESH GOYAL 923
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

The High Court held that the Architects Act merely prohibited A
individuals not registered with the Council of Architecture from referring
to themselves as “Architects” but did not prohibit unregistered persons
from carrying out the practice of architecture. Even engineers, who are
not registered with the Council may perform the functions of designing
and supervising construction. Significantly, the High Court held that it
B
was not open for the government to refer to such unregistered engineers
or other individuals as “architects” unless they are registered under the
Architects Act.
17. Similar observations were made by a single judge of the High
Court of Delhi in Premendra Raj Mehta v National Building
C
Construction Corporation Limited13. The dispute arose by way of a
public interest litigation challenging the award of a consultancy service
contract to a foreign firm not registered under the Architects Act and
not having taken permission from the Central Government in accordance
with the proviso to Section 37 of the Act. In response to the public
interest litigation, it was contended that Section 37 only prohibits a person D
other than a registered architect from using the title of “architect” and
any firm can bid for tenders provided they have on their rolls an architect
registered under the Architects Act. In dismissing the challenge to the
grant of the consultancy service contract, Justice V K Jain observed
that:
E
“8. A plain reading of Section 37 of the Act which appears
under the heading “Prohibition against the use of title”
would show that thoughthe aforesaid provision bars a
person other than a registered architect or a firm of
architects from using the title and style; it does not prohibit
him from rendering architectural service so long as he does F
not use the expression architect and does not describe his
firm, if any, as a firm of architects. Had the legislative intent
been to prevent rendering of architectural services by any person
other than a person registered under the provision of the Act,
Section 37 of the Act would have been worded altogether G
differently. For instance, Section 29 of the Advocates Act, 1961
prohibits a person unless he is enrolled as an advocate from
practicing in any Court or before any authority or persons. ….
Section 15(2) of the Medical Council Act, 1956 also expressly
13
W.P. (C) 2106 / 2012 H
924 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A prohibits a person other than a medical practitioner registered in
any State, signing or authenticating a medical or fitness certificate,
giving evidence as an expert and hold office as Physician or
Surgeon or any other office in the Government or any institution
maintained by a local or other authority. No similar provision is,
however found in the Architects Act. The learned counsel for
B
the petitioners contended that in my view rightly too that
such an interpretation may result in unqualified persons
providing services such as supervision of construction of
buildings and the construction supervised by such persons
may not be safe and economical, but, then, the remedy lies
C in the Parliament amending the provision of the Act so as
to prohibit unqualified persons from rendering architectural
services, and not in the Court taking an interpretation which
a plain reading of Section 37 does not suggest. Moreover
such an unqualified person, after coming into force of the Act
cannot represent themselves to be architects though they may
D
continue to provide services such as supervision of construction
of buildings.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi observed that a plain
E reading of Section 37 leads to the conclusion that Section 37 merely acts
as a prohibition on the use of the title “Architect” and does not prohibit
individuals not registered under the Architects Act from undertaking the
practice of architecture. Importantly, the Single Judge observed that
although this may result in certain unregulated individuals engaging in
the practice of architecture: (i) such untrained individuals cannot refer
F to themselves as “architects” and are thus unlikely to be entrusted with
tasks requiring specialised architectural knowledge; (ii) the court cannot
construe a statutory provision in a manner contrary to its plain meaning
merely to address a perceived societal harm; and (iii) if the legislatureis
of the opinion that the risk of untrained individuals who cannot refer to
G themselves as “architects” engaging in the business of designing and
supervising construction is real, it can always amend Section 37 to prohibit
the practice of such activities by unregistered individuals as the legislature
has done in the cases of the Advocates Act and the Indian Medical
Council Act.

H
COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE v. MR. MUKESH GOYAL 925
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

18. In Sudhir Vohra v Registrar of Companies14 three writ A
petitions were filed before a single judge of the Delhi High Court. The
first writ petition sought a mandamus directing the Registrar of Companies
and Ministry of Corporate Affairs to prohibit the registration of any
company or limited liability partnership which stated that it provided
architectural services. The second writ petition sought a direction
B
cancelling the permission granted to an architecture firm from Singapore
to set up a wholly owned subsidiary in India. The third writ petition
sought the quashing of a Ministry of Corporate Affairs’ circular which
stipulated that if a company or limited liability partnership had as one of
its stated objectives the providing of architectural services, such an entity
could not be incorporated without a no-objection certificate from the C
Council of Architecture. Justice Rekha Palli summarised the issues raised
by the three writ petitions:
“6. Thus, what emerges is that the first two writ petitions seek (i)
a direction that only architects registered under the Act can provide
architectural services; and (ii) no company/LLP can use the title D
and style of ‘architect’ or its derivatives.
7. The third writ petition essentially seeks directions to the contrary.
The main thrust of the third writ petition is that the Act only restricts
the use of the title and style of ‘architect’, and it neither precludes
companies/LLPs from rendering architectural services nor E
prevents them from mentioning the same as one of their objects
in their MOA.”
In answering the questions raised by the writ petitions, the High
Court of Delhi was essentially asked to consider whether the Architects
Act precludes unregistered architects (including legal entities) from F
providing architectural services, or alternatively whether the Act merely
prohibits unregistered architects and entities from using the “title and
style of architect”. After examining the provisions of the Architects Act,
the Single Judge held:
“40. On a careful examination of the aforesaid provisions of the G
Advocates Act and CA Act viz-a-viz the provisions of the
Architects Act, it is apparent that the latter does not contain any
prohibitory provisions similar to the ones in the former two. The
Architects Act neither prescribes that only registered
14
W.P. (C) 934/2012and C.M. No. 18315/2014 H
926 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A architects can provide architectural services, nor contains
any clause prohibiting companies and LLPs from providing
architectural services. In fact, what emerges from the entire
scheme of the Architects Act is that it neither defines as to
who can provide architectural services nor puts any fetters
on persons who wish to provide architectural services. It
B
merely defines an architect to mean a person whose name
is entered in the register maintained by the COA and lays
down the mandatory qualifications for an entry in the said
register. On the other hand, the Advocates Act and CA Act include
specific provisions laying down as to who can practice as an
C advocate or accountant.
41. Thus, the Act, while clearly prescribing that unregistered
persons, including juristic entities, cannot describe or style
themselves as architects, does not preclude any one from providing
architectural services. Merely because the Act includes a
D specific provision prescribing that only a registered architect
can use the title of an ‘architect’ or style himself/herself as
an ‘architect’, it cannot be concluded that the Act in any
manner envisages that architectural services can be
rendered only by those to whom the Act applies.”
E (Emphasis supplied)
The Single Judge concluded that the scheme of the Architects
Act does not define a set of individuals who can provide architectural
services. Merely because the statute stipulates that nobody other than
individuals who are registered with the Council of Architects can use
F the title of “Architect” cannot mean that the Act restricts the practice of
architecture as a whole to those registered with the Council.
Controversy at the Supreme Court
19. During the course of the present proceedings, the Learned
Attorney General has placed before us a compilation of relevant material
G including an order dated 14 February 2017 of a two-judge bench of this
Courtin Council of Architecture v Manohar Krishnaji Ranade15
(“Manohar Ranade”). We have extracted the relevant portion of the
order below:

15
H C.A. Nos 3346-3348 of 2005
COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE v. MR. MUKESH GOYAL 927
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

“While we find no reason to interfere with the impugned judgement A
and order dated 29th November, 2004 passed by the Bombay High
Court in Writ Petition No. 1830 of 1988 and connected matters,
we are of the view that the High Court was in error in rejecting
the contention of the appellant that practice under the Architects
Act, 1972 is not restricted only to the architects. It is not correct B
to say that any one can practice as an architect even if he is not
registered under the Architects Act, 1972.”
Placing reliance on this order, the appellant contended that the
question of whether Section 37 prohibits the practice of architecture by
unregistered individuals is no longer res integra. It was urged that this
C
Court has already held that the practice of architecture is limited to
architects registered under the Architects Act. The order arising out of
Manohar Ranade has been followed by a three-judge bench of this
Court in an order dated 11 September 2017 in Council of Architecture
v Indian Institute of Architects.16 The order of the three-judge bench
states that: D
“Having heard learned counsel for the parties and keeping in view
the order dated 14th February, 2017, passed in Civil Appeal Nos.
3346-3348 of 2005, we dispose of the present appeal in similar
terms. To have clarity, we reproduce the relevant passage as under:
- E
“While we find no reason to interfere with the impugned judgement
and order dated 29th November, 2004 passed by the Bombay High
Court in Writ Petition No. 1830 of 1988 and connected matters,
we are of the view that the High Court was in error in rejecting
the contention of the appellant that practice under the Architects F
Act, 1972 is not restricted only to the architects. It is not correct
to say that any one can practice as an architect even if he is not
registered under the Architects Act, 1972.”
The appeal is disposed of in the above terms…”
20. The controversy in Manohar Ranade concerned whether G
the Municipal Corporation could issue licenses to individuals not registered
under the Architects Act for the completion of certain tasks that are
otherwise undertaken by architects. In answering this question, Justice

16
C.A. No 12649 of 2017 H
928 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A A P Shah (sitting as a judge of the High Court of Bombay) and Justice
Dharmadhikari stated:
“7. The next issue is whether the engineers or surveyors possessing
necessary qualifications can discharge functions which are also
discharged by an architect under the Architects Act, 1972?
B
,,,
8. In the above circumstances we are not inclined to accept
the case of the petitioners that the Architects Act restricts
practice of architecture to persons registered under the
said Act. Therefore qualified engineers who cannot
C themselves call on Architects may still be free to do the
work which is ordinarily done by the Architects and it would
be open for the Corporations to regulate licensing in favour of
such qualified engineers.”
(Emphasis supplied)
D
The High Court of Bombay rejected the contention that the practice
of architecture is restricted to registered architects under the Architects
Act. The High Court of Bombay held that the practice of architecture is
not restricted to architects registered under the Architects Act, and even
qualified engineers are free to carry out the work ordinarily done by
E architects.
21. The order of this Court dated 14 February 2017 states that
“the High Court was in error in rejecting the contention of the appellant
that practice under the Architects Act, 1972 is not restricted only to the
architects.” The appellant was the Council of Architecture. The order is
F based on the premise that the contention of the Council of Architecture
before the High Court of Bombay was that the “practice under the
Architects Act, 1972 is not restricted only to architects.” The order stated
that the High Court was wrong in rejecting this contention.Therefore,
the order of this Court dated 14 February 2017 clearly sought to lay
G down the proposition that the “practice under the Architects Act, 1972 is
not restricted only to architects.” Having laid down this proposition, it
would appear that the use of the word “not” in the next line is inadvertent.
In the previous sentence the court expounded the position that the practice
of architecture cannot be restricted to registered architects under the
Architects Act. Hence, it would be an incorrect interpretation of the
H
COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE v. MR. MUKESH GOYAL 929
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

order to hold that in the very next line, the court would have laid down a A
contrary proposition. Therefore, the effect of the order as a whole is to
lay down the principle that individuals can practice as architects even if
they are not registered under the Architects Act. The subsequent order
of this Court dated 11 September 2017 which quotes and follows the
earlier ordershould also be read in this light. Therefore, the two orders
B
of this Court do not further the case urged by the appellant but support
the position set out by the Union of India, succinctly advanced in the
submissions of the learned Attorney General.
Regulatory Scheme of the Architects Act
22. Before embarking on our analysis of whether the Architects C
Act prohibits the practice of architecture by individuals not registered
with the Council of Architects, it is pertinent to examine the scheme of
the Architects Act in its entirety. The Architects Act is a special legislation
creating an exhaustive regulatory regime applicable to the profession of
architecture. Clause (a) of Section 2 of the Architects Act defines an
architect as follows: D

“(a) “architect” means a person whose name is for the time being
entered in the register;”
The “register” is further defined as:
“(e) “register” means the register of architects maintained under E
section 23;”
Section 3 of the Architects Act brings into existence the Council
of Architecture. Under Section 14 of the Act, only qualifications included
in the Schedule to the Act or notified under Section 15 of the Act shall be
recognised as valid qualifications for the purposes of enrolling in the F
register under the Architects Act. Clause (2) of Section 14 permits any
authority in India which grants architectural qualifications not already
included in the Schedule of the Act to apply to the Central Government
to have such qualification recognised as a valid architectural qualification
for the purposes of registration under the Architects Act. Section 17 of G
the Architects Act states that:
“17. Effect of recognition.—Notwithstanding anything contained
in any other law, but subject to the provisions of this Act, any
recognised qualification shall be a sufficient qualification for
enrolment in the register.”
H
930 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A The import of Sections 14, 15 and 17 is that if an individual wishes
to be a registered architect under the Architects Act, they must receive
an educational qualification that is recognised as a valid qualification by
virtue of its inclusion in the Schedule to the Architects Act or a notification
under Section 15. The Schedule to the Architects Act contains a list of
qualifications that are recognised in law as sufficient to warrant the
B
holder of the qualification being enrolled as a registered architect.Thus,
by creating a system of statutorily recognised educational qualifications,
the Architects Act regulates those individuals who are eligible to be
registered architects under the Act.
23. Section 23 of the Architects Act provides that:
C
“23. Preparation and maintenance of register.—(1)The
Central Government shall, as soon as may be, cause to be prepared
in the manner hereinafter provided a register of architects for
India.
D (2) The Council shall upon its constitution assume the duty of
maintaining the register in accordance with the provisions of this
Act.
(3) The register shall include the following particulars, namely:—
(a) the full name with date of birth, nationality and residential
E address of the architect;
(b) his qualification for registration, and the date on which he
obtained that qualification and the authority which conferred
it;
(c) the date of his first admission to the register;
F
(d) his professional address; and
(e) such further particulars as may be prescribed by rules.”
Section 23 provides for the maintenance of a register of architects
in India. As the term “architect” itself is defined to mean an individual
G registered under the Architects Act, the effect of registration of an
individual under the Act is firstly to maintain a list of individuals who
have astatutorily recognised educational qualification in the field of
architecture and secondly to bring such individuals within the regulatory
regime of the Architects Act. Section 29 sets out the procedure for the
H removal of individuals from the register, including on the ground of such
COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE v. MR. MUKESH GOYAL 931
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

individuals having misrepresented material facts at the time of registration, A
being undischarged insolvents, or having been convicted of offences
involving moral turpitude. Section 30 provides the procedure for inquiries
into misconduct by architects and Section 31 provides for the surrender
of certificates by registered architects. Section 35 of the Architects Act
stipulates that:
B
“35. Effect of registration.—(1)Any reference in any law for
the time being in force to an architect shall be deemed to be a
reference to an architect registered under this Act.
(2) After the expiry of two years from the date appointed under
sub-section (2) of section 24, a person who is registered in the C
register shall get preference for appointment as an architect under
the Central or State Government or in any other local body or
institution which is supported or aided from the public or local
funds or in any institution recognised by the Central or State
Government.”
D
The consequence of Section 35 is that,where a statute refers to
an “architect” such reference shall be deemed to mean a registered
architect under the Architects Act. Clause (2) of Section 35 creates a
statutory preference in favour of registered architects with respect to
the appointment of candidates by the Central or state governments or
local bodies or institutions which receive state aid. E

24. Lastly, we may refer to the provision at the heart of the present
controversy, Section 37 of the Architects Act which states:
“37. Prohibition against use of title.—(1) After the expiry of
one year from the date appointed undersub-section (2) of section F
24, no person other than a registered architect, or a firm of
architects shall use the title and style of architect:
Provided that the provisions of this section shall not apply to—
(a) practice of the profession of an architect by a person
designated as a “landscape architect” or”naval architect”; G
(b) a person who, carrying on the profession of an architect in
any country outside India,undertakes the function as a
consultant or designer in India for a specific project with the
prior permission of the Central Government.
Explanation.—For the purposes of clause (a),— H
932 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A (i) “landscape architect” means a person who deals with the
design of open spaces relating toplants, trees and landscape;
(ii) “naval architect” means an architect who deals with design
and construction of ships.”
(Emphasis supplied)
B
Clause (2) of Section 37 states that any person who contravenes
the prohibition created in clause (1) of Section 37 shall be punishable on
first conviction with a fine that may extend to five hundred rupees and
on subsequent convictions with imprisonment which may extend up to
six months or a fine not exceeding one thousand rupees or both.
C
Questions before this Court
25. The present case raises two questions that this Court must
answer:
(i) Question 1: Does Section 37 of the Architects Act prohibit
D individuals not registered as architects under the Architects
Act from practicing the activities undertaken by architects,
including the design, supervision and construction of
buildings; and
(ii) Question 2: Whether a post titled “Architect”, “Associate
E architect” or any other similar title using the term or style
of “Architect” can be held by a person not registered as an
architect under the Architects Act.
Question 1
26. In answering the first question we must begin with the text of
F Section 37. The provision uses the phrase “no person shall … use the
title and style of architect”. Therefore, on a plain reading of the section,
the legal prohibition created is on the use of the “title and style of
architect”. Title and style are distinct from practice. While a prohibition
on the use of a title merely restricts an individual from attaching the said
G title to their name in referring to or representing themselves to others, a
prohibition on practice creates a bar on the actual undertaking of specific
actions.The most compelling evidence that the two concepts are
materially distinct is the varied usage of the two phrases by the legislature.
For example,clause (2) of Section 15 of the Indian Medical Council Act
states:
H
COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE v. MR. MUKESH GOYAL 933
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

“(2) Save as provided in section 25, no person other than a medical A
practitioner enrolled on a State Medical Register,—
(a) shall hold office as physician or surgeon or any other office
(by whatever designation called) in Government or in any
institution maintained by a local or other authority.
(b) shall practice medicine in any State;…” B

(Emphasis supplied)
In setting out the legal bar applicable toindividuals not registered
on the State Medical Register, the Indian Medical Council Act clearly
uses the term “practice” as distinct from “hold office” or “style and C
title”. Similarly, Section 29 of the Advocates Act provides that:
“29. Advocates to be the only recognised class of persons
entitled to practise law.—Subject to the provisions of this Act
and any rules made thereunder, there shall, as from the appointed
day, be only one class of persons entitled to practice the profession D
of law, namely, advocates”
(Emphasis supplied)
In making a distinction between individuals registered under the
statute and those not registered, the Advocates Act clearly stipulates
that unregistered individuals cannot “practice” the profession of law. E
This stands in stark contrast to the text of the Architects Act which
merely states that unregistered individuals cannot “use the title and style
of architect”. Therefore, a plain reading of Section 37 clearly supports
the proposition that the Architects Act prohibits individuals not registered
with the Council of Architecture from using the title and style of
F
“Architect” and does not prohibit unregistered individuals from practicing
the activities undertaken by architects such as the design, supervision
and construction of buildings.
27. It has been contended that one of the objects and purposes of
the Architects Act is to prevent untrained individuals from designing,
supervising and constructing buildings. It has further been contended G
that registration under the Architects Act forms an essential part of the
regulatory regime for architects as it ensures that architects possess
adequate educational qualifications.Therefore, it is urged that Section
37 must be read in a manner which prohibits unregistered individuals
from practicing the profession of architecture and cognate activities in H
934 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A order to prevent the harms arising from unqualified individuals providing
critical architectural services. These submissions are ultimately premised
on the argument that even if a plain reading of Section 37 does not
support the argument of a prohibition on “practice” this Court must
nonetheless read the provision to include a prohibition on practice in
order to avoid defeating the object and purpose of the Architects Act.
B
28. It is well settled that the first and best method of determining
the intention of the legislature is the very words chosen by the legislature
to have the force of law. In other words, the intention of the legislature
is best evidenced by the text of the statute itself. However, where a
plain reading of the text of the statute leads to an absurd or unreasonable
C meaning, the text of the statute must be construed in light of the object
and purpose with which the legislature enacted the statute as a whole.
Where it is contended that a particular interpretation would lead to
defeating the very object of a legislation, such an interpretative outcome
would clearly be absurd or unreasonable. To determine whether the
D interpretation arrived at on a plain reading of the provision truly defeats
the object of the statute as a whole, we may briefly delve into the
legislative history of the Architects Act. To answer the question whether
reading Section 37 as a prohibition merely on the use of the title and
style of “Architect” by unregistered individuals would in truth defeat the
object and purpose of the Architects Act this Court may examine the
E reasons behind the enactment as a whole.
29. The “Statement of Objects and Reasons” given by the
legislature in passing the Architects Act have been extracted below:
“Since independence and more particularly with the implementation
F of the Five-Year Plans, the building construction activity in our
country has expanded almost on a phenomenal scale. A large
variety of buildings, many of extreme complexity and magnitude
like multi-storeyed office buildings, factory buildings, residential
houses, are being constructed each year. With this increase in
the building activity, many unqualified persons calling
G themselves as Architects are undertaking the construction
of buildings which are uneconomical and quite frequently
are unsafe, thus bringing into disrepute the profession of architects.
Various organisations, including the Indian Institute of Architects,
have repeatedly emphasised the need for statutory regulation to
H protect the general public from unqualified persons working as
COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE v. MR. MUKESH GOYAL 935
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

architects. With the passing of this legislation, it will be A
unlawful for any person to designate himself as ‘architect’
unless he has the requisite qualifications and experience
and is registered under the Act.
…
3. The legislation protects the title “architects” but does B
not make the design, supervision and construction of
buildings as an exclusive responsibility of architects. Other
professions like engineers will be free to engage
themselves in their normal vocation in respect of building
construction work provided that they do not style C
themselves as architects.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Architects Act
makes it evident that the legislature was undoubtedly concerned with
the risk of unqualified persons undertaking the construction of buildings D
leading to costly and dangerous buildings. In guarding against this risk,
the legislature first set out a minimum standard of statutorily recognised
qualifications to be met before an individual is designated as an architect
under the Architects Act. This is done by Sections 14, 15 and 17 of the
Act. Next, the legislature created two classes of individuals: the first E
class consisted of registered architects satisfying these minimum
qualifications and a second class of unregistered individuals who did not
satisfy these minimum qualifications. This is the effect of Sections 2(a),
17, 23 and 35 of the Architects Act. Crucially, the legislature chose to
define an “architect” as an individual registered under the Architects
Act and not as an individual practicing architecture or any cognate F
activities.Thus, the legislature limited the regulatory regime created by
the Architects Act to the first class of individuals. In protecting the public
from the risk of the second class, untrained individuals, the legislature
had two options: first it could bar this second class of individuals from
engaging in the profession altogether (as it had done with physicians and G
advocates); or alternatively it could prevent this second class of individuals
from calling themselves “Architects”. The Statement of Objects and
Reasons makes it clear that the legislature chose the second option and
in fact went to great lengths to clarify that choice. The legislature stated
that with the passing of the legislation, it shall be unlawful for an
unregistered individual to “designate himself” as an architect. Further, it H
936 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A is expressly stated that the legislation protects the “title” of architect but
does not grant registered architects an exclusive right to undertake the
design, supervision and construction of buildings. Other cognate
professions or unregistered individuals may continue to carry out these
activities provided that they do not refer to themselves as “Architects”.
B 30. It is evident that the legislature did not intend to create a
prohibition on the practice of architecture and associated activities by
unregistered individuals. As opposed to the case of physicians or surgeons
under the Indian Medical Council Act or advocates under the Advocates
Act, the legislature consciously chose to employ a less stringent measure
in the case of architects, merely prohibiting unregistered individuals from
C using the “title and style” of architect. It is not for this Court to delve into
why the legislature made this choice. However, during the course of
these proceedings a cogent and pragmatic reason for this choice has
been placed before this Court, by the learned Attorney General of India
and by way of the erudite opinion of Chief Justice Raveendran in the
D decision in Mukhesh Kumar Manhar to which we may briefly advert.
31. The profession of architecture involves a wide range of
activities including inter alia:
(i) Taking instructions from clients and preparing designs;

E (ii) Site evaluation and analysis;
(iii) Site design and development;
(iv) Structural design;
(v) Design of sanitary, plumbing, sewage, drainage, and water
supply structures;
F
(vi) Design and structural integration of electrical and
communications systems;
(vii) Incorporation of heating, air-conditioning, ventilation and
other mechanical systems including fire detection and
G prevention systems; and
(viii) Periodic inspection and evaluation of construction work.
These activities are undertaken by architects but are also carried
out by architects in concert with a range of other actors including draughts
persons, builders, engineers, and designers. If the legislature were to
H
COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE v. MR. MUKESH GOYAL 937
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

impose an absolute prohibition against unregistered individuals from A
‘practicing architecture’ there would be considerable confusion as to
what activities formed the practice of architecture and what did not. It
may have resulted in a host of other legitimate professionals being barred
from engaging in the design, supervision and construction of buildings
merely because they were not registered under the Architects Act.
B
Further, as the learned Attorney General of India brought to our attention,
these varied professions form essential cogs in the overall machinery of
construction in India and the design, supervision and construction of new
structures cannot bedone by architects alone. It would be unreasonable
from a regulatory perspective to ask all professions touching upon the
construction of new structures to obtain a degree in architecture. C
32. Architecture undoubtedly constitutes a highly specialised
profession requiring the possession of minimum educational qualifications.
However, architects are by and large engaged by means of a contract
for services. In other words, architects provide a set of specialised
services towards the larger goal of construction. Architects are not D
embarking on construction independently of other actors. By virtue of
the Architects Act, anybody engaging the services of an individual calling
themselves an “Architect” is assured that such an individual possesses
statutorily recognised educational qualifications and is competent to
complete the task at hand. It is in this manner that the legislature protects
the common person from untrained individuals. E

33. For the above reasons, we affirm the decision of the High
Court of Allahabad on the first question and hold that Section 37 of the
Architects Act does not prohibit individuals not registered under the
Architects Act from undertaking the practice of architecture and its
cognate activities. F

Question 2
34. The second question before this Court is whether a post titled
“Architect”, “Associate architect” or any other similar title using the
term or style of “Architect” can be held by a person not registered as an G
architect under the Architects Act. On this question, the High Court of
Allahabad held that the “mere nomenclature” of a particular post will
not violate the prohibition on the use of “title and style” of architect
under Section 37. In other words, even an individual not registered as an
architect under the Architects Act can hold a post titled “Architect” or
H
938 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A “Associate Architect” because the name of the post amounted to “mere
nomenclature”.
35. While we have held that Section 37 does not prohibit the
practice of architecture by unregistered individuals, it certainly does
prohibit unregistered individuals from using the “title and style” of architect.
B Under the scheme of the Architects Act, only individuals possessing the
statutorily recognised minimum educational qualifications can apply for
registration as an “Architect” under the Act. Registration as an architect
under the statute is thus a guarantee of possessing certain minimum
educational qualifications. Section 37 prohibits unregistered individuals
from designating themselves or referring to themselves as “architects”.
C The consequence of this regulatory regime is that when an individual is
called an “Architect” a reasonable person would assume that they are a
registered architect under the Architects Act and as a consequence
possess the requisite educational qualifications and specialised knowledge
associated with architects.
D 36. If an individual is appointed to a post titled “Associate Architect”,
“Architect” or “Senior Architect”, they undoubtedly refer to themselves
and are referred to by others as “Architects”. Holding a post using the
term “Architect” has the real-world consequence of being referred to
as an architect. This is not a matter of mere nomenclature. As noted
E above, architecture is a specialised field of study. Crucially, the scheme
of the Architects Act provides a direct nexus between the minimum
educational qualifications required to be obtained, registration as an
architect under the Act and the prohibition against the use of the title of
“Architect” by those not registered under the Act. If a government post
is titled “Architect” or “Associate Architect”, such a person certainly
F uses the title and style of “architect” and consequently there is a
reasonable assumption that such a person is registered under the
Architects Act and holds a degree in architecture recognised by the
Act. This assumption finds statutory backing in Section 35 of the
Architects Act which provides that any reference to an architect in any
G other law shall be deemed to mean an architect registered under the
Architects Act. To promote an individual who does not possess a degree
in architecture recognised by the Act to a post titled “Architect”,
“Associate Architect” or of a similar style using the title or style of
“architect” would effectively violate the prohibition on the use of title
contained in Section 37 of the Architects Act.
H
COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE v. MR. MUKESH GOYAL 939
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

37. In the present case, we recognise the power of NOIDA to A
provide and modify the minimum eligibility criteria for promotion of
candidates to the posts of Associate Town Planner and Associate
Architect. We further recognise that the authority has significant discretion
in how it chooses to title the various posts under its supervision. However,
to permit NOIDA to continue to title a post that includes individuals who
B
are not registered architects under the Architects Act as “Associate
Architect” would result in a violation of Section 37 of the Architects
Act. In the case of Tulya Gogoi the High Court of Gauhati expressly
held that the prohibition on the use of title and style of architect contained
in Section 37 of the Architects Act applies to both private individuals and
government employees. The reasoning of the High Court on this issue C
commends itself for our acceptance.The text of Section 37 makes no
distinction between government employees and private individuals.
38. The U.P. Industrial Area Development Act provides NOIDA
with the power to make rules for the management of its internal affairs.
In exercise of this power, NOIDA formulated the Service Regulations D
of 1981. Rule 16 of the Service Regulations sets out the ‘Sources of
Recruitment’ for posts under NOIDA’s authority. By clause (iv) of Rule
16 NOIDA has the power to modify the sources of recruitment for
posts under its supervision. It is in exercise of this power that NOIDA
formulated the Promotion Policy of 2005 which sets out the sources and
qualifications for recruitment in its various departments. It is well E
established that delegated legislation is susceptible to invalidity on the
grounds of being ultra viresits parent legislation but also ultra vires
other primary legislation. Where the provisions of a primary legislation
(the Architects Act) are contradictory to the provisions of a delegated
legislation (the Promotion Policy 2005), the provisions of the primary F
legislation must prevail. This principle is well established and has received
articulation by this Court on several occasions. In Indian Express
Newspapers v Union of India17 Justice Venkataramiah speaking for a
three-judge Bench of this Court stated:
“75. A piece of subordinate legislation does not carry the same G
degree of immunity which is enjoyed by a statute passed by a
competent Legislature. Subordinate legislation may be questioned
on any of the grounds on which plenary legislation is questioned.
In addition, it may also be questioned on the ground that it does
17
(1985) 1 SCC 641 H
940 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A not conform to the statute under which it is made. It may further
be questioned on the ground that it is contrary to some
other statute. This is because subordinate legislation must
yield to plenary legislation. It may also be question on the ground
that it is unreasonable, unreasonable not in the sense of not being
reasonable, but in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary. …”
B
(Emphasis supplied)
The distinction made by the Allahabad High Court, that the
Promotion Policy 2005 was passed under a state legislation, namely the
U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, and thus did not need to comport
C with the terms of the Architects Act as a central legislation is incorrect.
39. For the reasons stated above, in response to the first question
we affirm the decision of the High Court of Allahabad and hold that
Section 37 of the Architects Act does not prohibit individuals not
registered under the Architects Act from undertaking the practice of
D architecture and its cognate activities. In response to the second question
we disapprove of the view of the High Court of Allahabad and hold that
NOIDA cannot promote or recruit individuals who do not hold a degree
in architecture recognised by the Architects Act to a post that uses the
title or style of “architect”. However, the authority is free to change the
nomenclature of the post to any alternative as long as it does not violate
E the provisions of the Architects Act by using the style and title of
“architect” in its name.
40. The appeals are partly allowed in the above terms. There
shall be no order as to costs.

F Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Ankit Gyan Appeals partly allowed.

G

H