Supreme Court of India
COUNCIL FOR TECHNICAL EDUCATIONversusSHRI PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE OF ARCHITECTURE & ORS.
- Citation
- 2019 INSC 1224
- Decided
- 8 November 2019
- Disposal
- Disposed off
Holding
For recognition of degrees and diplomas in architecture, the Architects Act, 1972 prevails and AICTE has no regulatory authority over architectural education.
Summary
The Supreme Court examined a series of appeals concerning the conflict between the Architects Act, 1972 and the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) Act, 1987 over who has the final authority to approve and monitor architectural education institutions. The Court held that the 1972 Act, which specifically deals with recognition of architectural qualifications and the profession of architects, prevails over the 1987 Act for matters of degree and diploma recognition. It rejected AICTE's claim that the later statute impliedly repealed the earlier one, emphasizing that a special law does not automatically yield to a general law without clear legislative intent. The Court also ruled that the definition of "technical education" in the AICTE Act must be construed to exclude "architecture" to avoid absurd results. Consequently, AICTE cannot impose regulatory measures on architectural courses, and institutions must comply with Council of Architecture (CoA) norms. The Court dismissed AICTE's appeal and disposed of the other batch appeals, directing compliance with CoA standards and dissolving interim orders.
Issues considered
- The extent to which the Architects Act, 1972 and the AICTE Act, 1987 overlap in regulating architectural education.
- Whether the later AICTE Act impliedly repeals the earlier Architects Act in matters of approval and monitoring of architecture courses.
- Whether the definition of "technical education" under the AICTE Act should exclude "architecture" for purposes of regulatory authority.
- Who is the ultimate authority for granting recognition to architectural qualifications – the Central Government in consultation with CoA or AICTE?
Legislation cited
- All India Council for Technical Education Act, 1987s. 10, s. 11, s. 22, s. 23, s. 25, s. 2(g), s. 3
- Architects Act, 1972s. 14, s. 15, s. 16, s. 17, s. 18, s. 19, s. 20, s. 21, s. 25, s. 2(d), s. 3, s. 35, s. 43, s. 44, s. 45
- Constitution of Indias. Art.77
Subjects
architectural educationstatutory interpretationimplied repealspecial law vs general lawregulatory authorityCouncil of ArchitectureAICTErecognition of qualificationsintake capacitynorms and standards
Judgment
464 [2019]
SUPREME COURT 15 S.C.R. 464
REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.
A ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECHNICAL EDUCATION
v.
SHRI PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA BOARDING
HOUSE’S COLLEGE OF ARCHITECTURE & ORS.
B (Civil Appeal No. 364 of 2005)
NOVEMBER 08, 2019
[RANJAN GOGOI, CJI, DEEPAK GUPTA
AND ANIRUDDHA BOSE, JJ.]
Education/Educational Institutions – Architectural course –
C
Institutions running said course – Norms and standards for – Issue
as to the final authority in case of any contradiction in the opinion
of Council of Architecture (CoA) [constituted under the 1972 Act]
and All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) [constituted
under the 1987 Act] , in the matters of grant of approval to
D institutions for conducting the said course and monitoring their
working – Seven matters involving similar controversy – In main
appeal C.A. No.364 of 2005, the dispute pertains to intake capacity
of the respondent-institution – CoA on carrying out inspection of
the institution in 2004 restored the intake capacity of 40 students
per year which was earlier reduced to 30 – However, the Director
E of Technical Education fixed the same at 30 students on the basis
of norms fixed by AICTE – Challenged – High Court inter alia
upheld the power of CoA as the final authority for fixing the norms
and standards of institutions running course on architecture – On
appeal, held: So far as recognition of degrees and diplomas of
architecture education is concerned, the 1972 Act shall prevail –
F
AICTE not entitled to impose any regulatory measure in connection
with the degrees and diplomas in the subject of architecture –
Judgment of the Bombay High Court sustained in the main appeal
– In civil appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.5400 of 2011, the
process of recognition contained in the 1972 Act be implemented
G in respect of the subject institution before any further admission
takes place – But, admissions already undertaken in terms of
interim orders of Supreme Court, not to be disturbed – It is so
directed, as the High Court itself directed compliance of CoA norms
and building requirements set by it was to be effected within one
year – AICTE not to have any regulatory control over the
H concerned institution so far as architecture education is concerned
464
ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. v. PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA 465
BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH.
– Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.8443 of 2011 is dismissed – A
Further, in the appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.20460 of 2011,
decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court issuing directions
contained in the judgment under appeal in absence of CoA being
impleaded is erroneous – However, no independent directions
issued as these appeals were heard together as batch matters and
the grievances of CoA have been addressed in the judgment – Civil B
Appeals arising out of SLP(C) Nos.17005 and 17006 of 2016 are
disposed of in terms of the decision in the main appeal – In appeal
arising out of SLP(C)No.28121 of 2018, the decision of the Kerala
High Court is set aside – Institution involved is entitled to operate
with recognition obtained under the 1972 Act – Interim orders C
passed in these appeals, dissolved – Architects Act, 1972 – ss.2(d),
3, 14-21, 25, 35, 43-45 – All India Council of Technical Education
Act, 1987 – ss. 2(g), 3, 10, 11, 22, 23, 25– All India Council for
Technical Education (Grant of approval for starting new technical
institutions, introduction of courses or programmes and approval
of intake capacity of seats for the courses or programmes) D
Regulations, 1994 – All India Council for Technical Education
(Norms and Guidelines for Fees and guidelines for admission in
Professional Colleges) Regulations, 1994 – Council of Architecture
Regulations, 1982 – Part VIII- Clauses 29, 30 – Minimum
Standards of Architectural Education Regulations 1983 – Clauses
5, 8; Appendix B, C – Minimum Standards of Architectural E
Education Regulation, 2015 – Constitution of India – Art.77 –
Interpretation of Statutes.
Interpretation of Statutes – Former and later Acts – Clashing
provisions – Overlapping provisions in the 1972 Act (under which
the Council of Architecture (CoA) is constituted) and the 1987 Act F
(under which the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE)
is constituted) on the question of grant of approval and subsequent
monitoring of architectural education – Plea on behalf of AICTE
that the 1987 Act being later statute, covering common field, the
provisions of the 1972 Act, to the extent the same deals with G
architectural education, shall be deemed to have been repealed by
implication – Held: It is not an absolute proposition of law that a
later Act would always prevail over the former in the event there
are clashing provisions even if there is no express provision of
repeal – Architects Act, 1972 – All India Council of Technical
Education Act, 1987. H
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.
A Interpretation of Statutes – Special law vis-a-vis general law
– Council of Architecture (CoA) constituted under the 1972 Act and
the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) constituted
under the 1987 Act – Overlapping powers on the aspect of setting
norms for architectural education and for monitoring the
institutions engaged in imparting such education – Held: A special
B law implies a statute covering a particular subject specifically –
Subject of conflict in the present proceedings is architectural
education – 1972 Act however does not solely deal with
architectural education – Further, the 1987 Act has certain features
of a special law being devoted to setting up, supervision and
monitoring of institutions imparting technical education, but it does
C
not cover technical education imparted by all types of institutions
– Having regard to the scheme and provisions of these two statutes,
ex-facie it is difficult to label either of them as special law or general
law – Architects Act, 1972 – All India Council of Technical
Education Act, 1987.
D Interpretation of Statutes – Principle of implied repeal –
Application of – Overlapping of powers between the Council of
Architecture (CoA) constituted under the 1972 Act and the All India
Council for Technical Education (AICTE) constituted under the
1987 Act, on the aspect of setting norms for architectural education
and monitoring the institutions engaged in imparting such
E
education – Dominant purpose of the two legislations – Held:
Principle of implied repeal cannot apply so far as the provisions
relating to architecture education is concerned, on the basis of the
1987 Act having become operational – One of the dominant
purposes of the 1972 Act is recognition of qualifications on
F architecture – Registration of an architect is dependent upon
acquisition of such recognised qualification – Said Act cannot be
held to have been repealed by implication for the sole reason of
inclusion of the word “architecture” in the definition of technical
education– AICTE failed to discharge onus to establish that the
provisions of the 1972 Act was repealed by implication – Architects
G Act, 1972 – All India Council of Technical Education Act, 1987 –
s.2(g).
Architects Act, 1972 – s.17 – Non-obstante clause –
Implication of – Discussed.
All India Council of Technical Education Act, 1987 – s.2(g)
H – Subject of conflict in the instant cases is architectural education
ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. v. PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA 467
BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH.
as under the 1972 Act and the 1987 Act there are overlapping A
areas under which the respective Councils i.e. Council of
Architecture (CoA) and the All India Council for Technical
Education (AICTE) could make Regulations – Plea that the context
of regulating architecture education requires exclusion of the
expression “architecture” from the definition of technical education
– Held: So far as these appeals are concerned, to altogether B
exclude architecture from the purview of AICTE, that expression,
i.e. architecture would have to be dropped from the definition of
technical education – If the issue is examined in the external
context, which in this case would be the provisions of 1972 Act,
such a course would be inevitable – A meaning different to what
C
is ascribed in the definition clause can be given to a word in
different parts of a statute if the context so demands – Subject-
dispute involved in these appeals requires omission of the word
architecture from the definition of technical education – Such
course is also a permissible tool of construction to prevent absurd
or unworkable results flowing from a statute – In respect of the D
provisions of s.2 (g), the definition of “technical education” would
have to be given such a construction and the word “architecture”
should be treated to have been inapplicable in cases where the
AICTE imports its regulatory framework for institutions undertaking
technical education – There would however be no substitution
because the context would not demand it – Architects Act, 1972 – E
Interpretation of Statutes.
Disposing of the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Both the regulatory authorities under the
respective statutes have power to frame regulations for giving F
effect to the provisions of the respective Acts. Both the statutes
have provisions for approval and monitoring of architecture
courses run by institutions. So far as the Architects Act, 1972
is concerned, the expression employed is recognition of
qualification and the ultimate authority for granting or
withdrawing recognition to degree or diploma courses in G
architectural education by different academic institutions is the
Central Government. The CoA under the statutory scheme
however has significant role in such decision making process.
AICTE has also been empowered under the All India Council
of Technical Education Act, 1987 to lay down standards and H
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.
A norms for courses on architecture along with other subjects
coming within the term “technical education”. Under Section
3(3)(b), of the 1972 Act, the CoA is required to have two persons
nominated by the AICTE. On the other hand, Section 3 (4) (m)
of the 1987 Act stipulates that AICTE is to consist of
B representatives of various bodies, including a member to be
appointed by the Central Government to represent the CoA.
Section 10(k) of the 1987 Act requires AICTE to grant approval
in consultation with the agencies concerned. [Paras 19, 25] [492-
B-E]
1.2 Section 20 of the 1972 Act deals with withdrawal of
C
recognition of an authority listed in the Schedule to the Act.
Section 21 of the 1972 Act also empowers the Council to
prescribe minimum standards of architectural education required
for granting recognized qualifications by colleges or institutions
in India. The power of the CoA to examine infrastructural
D facilities at the time of considering the application for recognition
or monitoring the quality of an institution recognized by the
Council stems from Sections 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the 1972 Act.
Further, none of the Regulations produced however specify the
actual norms but refer to standards and norms to be laid down
for approval of technical institutions, which include institutions
E imparting architectural education. [Paras 27, 32] [493-F-H; 494-
A-B; 499-B]
Ajoy Kumar Banerjee and Others v. Union of India and
Others (1984) 3 SCC 127 : [1984] 3 SCR 252 ; State
of Tamil Nadu and Others v. Adhiyaman Educational
F Research Institute and Others (1995) 4 SCC 104 :
[1995] 2 SCR 1075 ; Orissa Lift Irrigation
Corporation Limited v. Rabi Sankar Patro and Others
(2018) 1 SCC 468 : [2017] 13 SCR 921 ; Parshvnath
Charitable Trust and Others v. All India Council for
G Technical Education and Others (2013) 3 SCC 385 :
[2012] 11 SCR 1057 – distinguished.
Varun Saini & Ors. v. Guru Govind Singh Indraprastha
University (2014) 16 SCC 330 – referred to.
2. AICTE has referred to a communication emanating from
H the Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of
ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. v. PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA 469
BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH.
India, bearing No.F.17 11/2003 TS.IV. No case has been made A
out that the memorandum to which reference has been made,
has been published in the official gazette. This memorandum does
not meet the requirement of valid exercise of power under the
aforesaid two provisions by the Central Government so as to
make it binding. This memorandum, at best, can be treated to
be an advisory of the Ministry not having enforceable effect. B
Moreover, the aforesaid memorandum has been issued beyond
the timeframe laid down under the provisions of the statutes
reproduced in the said two sections of the respective Acts. The
memorandum also cannot be treated to be an executive order
under Article 77 of the Constitution of India. [Paras 37, 39] [502- C
B; 503-F-H]
3. As a proposition of law, AICTE’s stand is accepted that
there need not be complete identity in the subject-matters of
the two rival statutes being tested in the yardstick of point of
time of their commencement of operation. It is not an absolute D
proposition of law that a later Act would always prevail over the
former in the event there are clashing provisions even if there
is no express provision of repeal. Further, a special law implies
a statute covering a particular subject specifically. The subject
of conflict in the present proceedings is architectural education.
The 1972 Act however does not solely deal with architectural E
education. The Act intends to control or regulate the profession
of architects. It has two main features, one part dealing with
regulating the profession of architect and the other part
regulating architectural education. Significant portion of the
statute deals with formation of the CoA but the function of that
F
body is essentially to regulate and monitor the other two areas
of this statue. The 1987 Act deals with technical education and
in particular the methodology for approval technical institutions
and their monitoring. The provisions of 1987 Act have not been
immunised by a non-obstante clause like the one employed in
Section 17 of the 1972 Act. Having regard to the scheme and G
provisions of these two statutes, ex-facie it is difficult to label
either of them as special law or general law. The 1987 Act has
certain features of a special law being devoted to setting up,
supervision and monitoring of institutions imparting technical
education. But the said statute does not cover technical
education imparted by all types of institutions. The exceptions H
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.
A have been clearly mentioned in Section 2(h) of the act and
explained in the cases of Bharathidasan University and
Association of Management of private colleges. So far as the
1972 Act is concerned, its application is not confined to
architecture education alone. This enactment contemplates
establishing the Council of Architecture, recognizing degrees
B and diplomas in architecture and regulating the profession of
architects. But there is inter-link between architecture education
and registration of architects. Further, the three regulations
under the 1987 Act do not directly lay down any specific norm
or standard which ought to be followed. Such norms appear to
C have been set by the AICTE in pursuance of the aforesaid
regulations. The two Regulations of 1994 do not lay down
specifically such norms. The 2016 regulations has provision for
Approval Process Hand Book which may be published from time
to time laying down the manner in which approval shall be given.
[Paras 47-51] [511-E-F; 512-B-D-F; 513-A-C, F-G]
D
Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks (1998)
8 SCC 1 : [1998] 2 Suppl. SCR 359 ; K.V. Muthu v.
Angamuthu Ammal (1997) 2 SCC 53 [1996] 10 Suppl.
SCR 188 ; Printers (Mysore) Ltd. v. Asstt. CTO (1994)
2 SCC 434 ; [1994] 1 SCR 682 ; Pushpa Devi v.
E Milkhi Ram (1990) 2 SCC 134 : [1990] 1 SCR 278 –
relied on.
M/s. Mathra Parshad and Sons v. State of Punjab and
Others [1962] Supp 1 SCR 913 ; A.B. Abdulkadir v.
State of Kerala.1962 Supp (2) SCR 741 ; Assn. of
F
Registration Plates v. Union of India (2005) 1 SCC 679
: [2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 496 ; Tika Ramji v. State of
U.P. [1956] 1 SCR 393 ; R.S. Raghunath v. State of
Karnataka (1992) 1 SCC 335 : [1991] 1 Suppl. SCR
387 ; U.P. State Electricity Board v. Hari Shankar Jain
G (1978) 4 SCC 16 : [1979] 2 SCR 355 ; J.K. Cotton
Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P.
[1961] 3 SCR 185 ; Association of Management of
Private Colleges v. All India Council of Technical
Education and Others (2013) 8 SCC 271 : [2013] 6
H SCR 1054 – referred to.
ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. v. PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA 471
BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH.
4. For the sole reason of there being overlapping subjects, A
Courts straightaway may not get into an exercise to find out if
one statute intends to eclipse the other. The duty of the
regulatory bodies in a situation of this nature would be to come
out with a unified regime, which this Court expected in the case
of Municipal Council, Palia. The two regulatory bodies in the B
field of architectural education however have not taken this
approach and on the other hand have engaged themselves in a
dispute over turf-control. In such a situation, under normal
circumstances attempt should be made first at reconciliation of
the competing statutory instruments. If that exercise fails, then
the aim would be to find out what is the dominant purpose or C
principal subject-matter of a particular statute and then construe
the conflicting provisions of the respective Regulations to match
the dominant statutory purpose. The process of recognition and
effect thereof are more expansive under the 1972 Act. All
“authorities” require recognition by the Central Government to D
conduct any degree or diploma course in architecture education
to qualify for being recognised qualification. The CoA under the
said Act plays a key role in the process of recognition. There is
no exclusion or exemption of any institution from undergoing
such recognition process except the subsisting ones at the time
the Act became operational. The CoA has also wide monitoring E
power under Section 18 and 19 of the Act of every authority
which grants recognized qualification under the said Act.
Moreover, Section 17 of the said Act is armed with a non-
obstante clause. The implication of the said clause in Section 17
of the 1972 Act is that to be on the register of architects in India, F
recognized qualification would be sufficient. There is no
provision under the 1972 Act or in any Rule thereunder which
would entitle a person trained from an AICTE approved technical
institution in architecture to describe himself as an architect or
get himself registered as such without recognised qualification
G
under the 1972 Act. The scheme of the Act thus demonstrates
that lack of recognized qualification under the 1972 Act would
in substance disentitle a person from being registered as an
architect. He would not be able to legally represent himself as
an architect in India. This being the statutory mandate, CoA’s
role in the process of recognition of qualification of an architect H
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.
A cannot be said to have been obliterated by the 1987 Act. It is a
fact that 1987 Act is primarily concerned with setting-up and
running of a technical institution and not with regulating the
professions of individuals qualifying from such institutions. But
under the 1972 Act, conducting a course on architectural
B education and regulating the profession of architect are
statutorily interwoven. Recognition of degrees or diplomas in
architecture cannot be amputated from the said Act and held to
have been replaced by the 1987 Act. That would render the 1972
enactment unworkable. The third distinguishing element of the
1972 Act is that the CoA is not the ultimate decision-making
C authority but it is the Central Government in relation to process
of recognition of degree or diploma in architectural education
or withdrawal thereof. Such decision is required to be taken
after consultation with the CoA. But since CoA has been
conferred with power to make regulations in relation to, inter-
D alia, recognition norms and monitoring of institutions imparting
architectural education, CoA’s role in such process is critical.
The approval power of AICTE is direct. But in the event
AICTE’s norms come into conflict with that of CoA, any report
or representation the CoA may make to the Central
Government would be dependent upon the decision of the
E Central Government. The Central Government’s decision, taken
under the provisions of the 1972 Act in such a case would
obviously prevail, the latter being an authority superior to both
the Councils constituted under the two statutes. [Paras 54, 57-
59] [515-F-H; 516-A; 517-B-E-H; 518-A-E]
F
Municipal Council Palai v. T.J. Joseph [1964] 2 SCR
87 ; LIC v. D.J. Bahadur (1981) 1 SCC 315 : [1981]
1 SCR 1083 – relied on.
“Principles of Statutory Interpretation” by Justice G.P.
G Singh (14th Edition)– referred to.
5.1 AICTE is exercising its power to regulate institutions
imparting architectural education on the strength of definition
of technical education, which has been defined to mean
programmes of education, research and training in architecture.
H The duty of the AICTE to regulate “technical education” is
ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. v. PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA 473
BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH.
derived from the provisions of Section 10 of the 1987 Act. So A
far as these appeals are concerned, to altogether exclude
architecture from the purview of AICTE, that expression, i.e.
architecture would have to be dropped from the definition of
technical education. If the issue is examined in the external
context, which in this case would be the provisions of 1972 Act,
B
such a course would be inevitable. In the event AICTE’s stand
is to be accepted and CoA’s role is eliminated from the
recognition process of architectural qualification, then a person
having a degree or diploma from an AICTE approved institution
only would in effect not be entitled to enrollment in the register
of architects and would not be able to represent himself as an C
architect. Secondly, in view of the decisions of this Court in the
cases of Bharatidasan University and Association of Management
of Private Colleges, there would be two parallel authorities
regulating architectural education. CoA would regulate
universities and affiliated colleges imparting such education
D
while AICTE would supervise rest of the institutions. Moreover,
the authority of Central Government to recognize qualifications
in architecture education would stand obliterated by a body,
AICTE and that too in respect of certain categories of technical
institutions only. The subject-dispute involved in these appeals
requires omission of the word architecture from the definition E
of technical education. Such a course is also a permissible tool
of construction to prevent absurd or unworkable results flowing
from a statute. [Paras 60-62] [518-F-G; 519-D-H; 520-A]
“Bennion on Statutory Interpretation” by F A R
Bennion, Fifth Edition published by Lexis Nexis (at F
page 972) – referred to.
5.2 In respect of the provisions of Section 2 (g) of the 1987
Act, the definition of “technical education” would have to be
given such a construction and the word “architecture” should
be treated to have been inapplicable in cases where the AICTE G
imports its regulatory framework for institutions undertaking
technical education. There would however be no substitution
because the context would not demand it. This construction of
the definition clause is necessary as the external context
requires it to prevent an unworkable outcome in implementation
of the 1987 Act. The principle of implied repeal cannot apply so H
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.
A far as the provisions relating to architecture education is
concerned, on the basis of the 1987 Act having become
operational. One of the dominant purposes of the 1972 Act is
recognition of qualifications on architecture. The registration of
an architect is dependent upon acquisition of such recognised
qualification. The said Act cannot be held to have been repealed
B by implication for the sole reason of inclusion of the word
“architecture” in the definition of technical education. AICTE
has failed to discharge its onus to establish the said provisions
of the 1972 Act was repealed by implication. [Para 63] [520-C-
F]
C 6. So far as recognition of degrees and diplomas of
architecture education is concerned, the 1972 Act shall prevail.
AICTE will not be entitled to impose any regulatory measure
in connection with the degrees and diplomas in the subject of
architecture. Norms and Regulations set by CoA and other
specified authorities under the 1972 Act would have to be
D followed by an institution imparting education for degrees and
diplomas in architecture. Individual appeals – (a) The judgment
of the Bombay High Court forming subject-matter of Appeal
No.364 of 2005 is sustained. The appeal of the All India Council
of Technical Education is dismissed. (b) Three appeals arose
E from the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh,
Gwalior Bench delivered on 2nd February, 2011 in W.P. No. 315
of 2011. Rajeev Gandhi Proudyogiki Vishwavidyalyalay is the
appellant in the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 5400/
2011. The appellant in the second Civil Appeal (arising out of
SLP(C)No.8443/2011) is the institution, Bharatiya Vidya Mandir
F Shiksha Samiti. For the reasons explained earlier in this
judgment, the appeal of Bharatiya Vidya Mandir Shiksha Samiti
is dismissed. The High Court has directed in the judgment under
appeal compliance of the conditions communicated by the CoA.
The academic session involved is 2010-2011. Supreme Court at
G the notice stage in the university’s appeal [SLP(C)No.5400 of
2011] granted interim stay of the order of the High Court.
Subsequently, there were admissions from time to time with
interim directions of this Court. This appeal of the Rajeev Gandhi
Proudyogiki Vishwavidyalaya is accordingly disposed of with
direction that the process of recognition contained in the 1972
H Act ought to be implemented in respect of the subject institution
ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. v. PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA 475
BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH.
before any further admission takes place. But so far as A
admissions already undertaken in terms of interim orders of this
Court, it is directed that such admissions ought not be disturbed.
It is directed so, as it is found the High Court itself had directed
compliance of CoA norms in the judgment under appeal and
compliance of building requirements set by CoA was to be
effected within one year. Thus, CoA norms were substantially B
directed to be complied with. It is also made clear that the
AICTE would not have any regulatory control over the
concerned institution so far as architecture education is
concerned. In the appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.20460 of 2011
that CoA ought to have been impleaded as a party respondent C
in the said writ petition. Decision of the High Court to issue the
directions contained in the judgment under appeal in absence
of CoA being added in the array of respondents was erroneous.
But any independent direction is not issued as these appeals
were heard together as batch matters and the grievances of the
CoA have been addressed to in the judgment. (c) The Civil D
Appeals arising out of SLP(C) No. 17005 of 2016 and
SLP(C)No.17006 of 2016 have been instituted by the AICTE
against a common judgment of the Karnataka High Court in Writ
Appeal No.110 of 2013 and Writ Appeal No. 112 of 2013. The
observation of the Karnataka High Court in a common judgment E
has been that the controversies would be subject to the outcome
of the appeal arising out of the Bench decision of the Bombay
High Court. That is the first appeal we have dealt with in this
judgment. These two appeals are accordingly disposed of in
terms of the decision contained in the preceding sub-paragraph
(a). AICTE would not have any power to impose its regulatory F
measures on the concerned institution so far as architecture
education is concerned. (d) The decision of the Kerala High
Court in the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C)No. 28121 of 2018
is set aside. The appeal is allowed. The institution involved in
this appeal shall be entitled to operate with recognition obtained
under the 1972 Act. All interim orders passed in these appeals G
shall stand dissolved. All connected applications shall stand
disposed of. [Paras 64-66] [520-F-H; 521-A-H; 522-A-H; 523-
A-B]
Bharathidasan University and Another v. All India
Council for Technical Education & Others (2001) 8 H
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.
A SCC 676 : [2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 253 ; Khayti Girish
Purnima Kulkarni v. College of Architecture & Ors.
(2012) 4 AIR BOM R 371; Thejus College of
Architecture v. State of Kerala & Ors. Decision dated.
6th August 2018 of High Court of Kerala in W.P.(C)
No. 23858 of 2018 – referred to.
B
Case Law Reference
[2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 253 referred to Para 10
(2012) 4 AIR BOM R 371 referred to Para 14
[1984] 3 SCR 252 distinguished Para 34
C [1995] 2 SCR 1075 distinguished Para 34
[2017] 13 SCR 921 distinguished Para 34
[2012] 11 SCR 1057 distinguished Para 34
(2014) 16 SCC 330 referred to Para 34
[1962] 1 Supp SCR 913 referred to Para 40
D [1962] 2 Supp SCR 741 referred to Para 40
[2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 496 referred to Para 41
[1998] 2 Suppl. SCR 359 relied on Para 41
[1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 188 relied on Para 41
[1994] 1 SCR 682 relied on Para 41
E
[1990] 1 SCR 278 relied on Para 41
[1964] 2 SCR 87 relied on Para 42
[1956] 1 SCR 393 referred to Para 42
[1991] 1 Suppl. SCR 387 referred to Para 42
F [1981] 1 SCR 1083 relied on Para 42
[1979] 2 SCR 355 referred to Para 42
[1961] 3 SCR 185 referred to Para 42
[2013] 6 SCR 1054 referred to Para 44
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 364
G
of 2005.
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.09.2004 of the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. 5942 of 2004.
With
H Civil Appeal Nos. 8506, 8507, 8511, 8509, 8508, 8510 of 2019.
ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. v. PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA 477
BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH.
Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, Ajit Kr. Sinha, Sr. Advs., Harish Pandey, A
Anil Soni, Ms. Siddhi Padia, Naveen R. Nath, Niraj Sharma, Ashok
Mathur, Ms. Charu Mathur, Shibashish Misra, Rajdipa Bheura, Ms.
Hansika Sahu, A. Venayagam Balan, Ms. V. S. Lakshmi, Vijay Kumar,
Thomas O., Aniruddha P. Mayee, Haris Beeran, Mushtaq Salim, Usman
Ghani Khan, Radha Shyam Jena, V. N. Raghupathy, Md. Apzal Ansari, B
Manendra Pal Gupta, Ms. Binu Tamta, G. S. Makker, Ms. Sushma Suri,
Sudhanshu S. Choudhari, Vijay Kumar, Thomas O., Ms. Bharti Tyagi,
Ms. Asha Gopalan Nair, Naresh Kumar, Vishwajit Singh, T. C. Sharma,
Ms. Neelam Sharma, Rupesh Kumar, Nishant Ramakantrao
Katneshwarkar, Anoop Kandari, Rahul Jain, Milind Kumar, Gautam
Narayan, Arunabh Chowdhury, Rahul Pratap, Abhishek Roy, Ms. Shruti C
Choudhry, Dechen W. Lachungpa, Arun Srikumar, Ms. Pritha Srikumar,
Ms. Mansi Binjrajka, Raghenth Basant, P. V. Dinesh, Sindhu T. P.,
Mukund P. Unny, Raghav Mehrotra, G. Prakash, Jishnu M. L., Mrs.
Priyanka Prakash, Mrs. Beena Prakash, Manoj Ranjan Sinha,
Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Advs. for the appearing parties. D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.
1. Delay condoned in SLP(C)No.17005 of 2016 and
SLP(C)No.17006 of 2016. Leave is granted in all the six petitions for
E
special leave to appeal.
2. This set of appeals mainly involves the question as to whether
the mandate of the Council of Architecture (CoA) or that of the All
India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) would prevail on the
question of granting approval and related matters to an institution for
F
conducting architectural education course, if there is any contradiction
in the opinions of these two bodies. Both of them are regulatory bodies
constituted by Parliamentary legislations having power to approve or
recognize and thereafter monitor working of such an institution.
3. The CoA owes its origin to the provisions of Section 3 of the
Architects Act, 1972 (the 1972 Act). AICTE has also been constituted G
under the provisions of Section 3 of the All India Council of Technical
Education Act, 1987 (the 1987 Act). As the preambles of these two
statutes suggest, the former has been enacted to provide for registration
of Architects and for matters connected therewith. The object of the
latter statute is to provide for a Council with a view to proper planning H
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.
A and coordinated development of the technical education system
throughout the country, promotion of qualitative improvements of such
education in relation to planned quantitative growth and the regulation
and proper maintenance of norms and standards in the technical
education system and for matters connected therewith. Section 2(g)
of the 1987 Act stipulates:-
B
“technical education” means programmes of education, research
and training in engineering technology, architecture, town planning,
management, pharmacy and applied arts and crafts and such
other programme or areas as the central government may, in
C consultation with the Council, by notification in the official
Gazette, declare;”
4. Though the preamble of the 1972 Act projects the aim of the
legislation to provide for registration of architects, this statute also deals
with educational aspects of a course in architecture. Duties of CoA
D under the 1972 Act includes undertaking steps for recognizing
qualifications for the purposes of the said Act. Such recognition, as,
contemplated by the Act, is at two levels. There is a schedule to the
Act which lists diplomas and degrees awarded by named Indian and
foreign institutes or bodies. Section 14 of the 1972 Act describes them
as authorities. These degrees and diplomas are recognized qualifications
E under the said statute. There is also provision for amendment of the
schedule, so as to incorporate therein architectural qualification granted
by any authority in India. The CoA under the said Act however has
not been conferred with the power to directly recognise the architectural
qualification. The Central government is the authority to undertake that
F exercise. CoA under the 1972 statute is a consulting body. The effect
of recognition by the Central Government is that such recognised
qualification shall be sufficient for enrollment in the register of architects
maintained under the said Act. After such registration, a person can
claim to be an architect under the law. Section 25 of the 1972 Act
prescribes three modes for entry into the register, the main one being
G holding a recognised qualification. Sub-clause (b) of the said provision
preserves the right of practising architects at the time of initial
preparation of the register. The said sub-clause is not relevant so far
the subject-controversy is involved. Section 25 (c) prescribes as a
condition for entering one’s name in the register, possession of such
H other qualifications as may be prescribed by the Rules. But no such
ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. v. PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA 479
BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH. [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]
Rule providing for any additional qualification has been brought to our A
notice by the learned counsel appearing for the parties.
5. On the question of qualification of architects, Section 2 (d) of
the 1972 Act defines “recognised qualification” to mean any qualification
in architecture for the time being included in the Schedule or notified
under Section 15 thereof. The lis in this set of appeals does not relate B
to the provisions of Section 15 of the 1972 Act, which is in respect of
qualification from a foreign educational body.
6. The expression “approval”, however, is not employed in the
1972 Act. This Act deals with recognition of qualification in architecture.
Section 14 of the 1972 Act stipulates: - C
“14. Recognition of qualifications granted by authorities in
India.— (1) The qualifications included in the Schedule or
notified under Section 15 shall be recognised qualifications for
the purposes of this Act.
(2) Any authority in India which grants an architectural D
qualification not included in the Schedule may apply to the Central
Government to have such qualification recognised, and the Central
Government, after consultation with the Council, may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, amend the Schedule so as to
include such qualification therein, and any such notification may
also direct that an entry shall be made in the Schedule against E
such architectural qualification declaring that it shall be a
recognised qualification only when granted after a specified date:
Provided that until the first Council is constituted, the Central
Government shall, before issuing any notification as aforesaid,
consult an Expert Committee consisting of three members to be F
appointed by the Central Government by notification in the
Official Gazette.”
7. The power to amend the schedule is vested with the Central
Government under Section 16 of the 1972 Act. This provision reads:-
G
“16. Power of Central Government to amend Schedule.—
Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) of Section
14, the Central Government, after consultation with the Council,
may, by notification in the Official Gazette, amend the Schedule
by directing that an entry be made therein in respect of any
architectural qualification.” H
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.
A 8. So far as the 1987 Act is concerned, Section 10 thereof, inter-
alia, specifies: -
“POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COUNCIL
10. It shall be the duty of the Council to take all such steps as
it may think fit for ensuring coordinated and integrated
B
development of technical education and maintenance of standards
and for the purposes of performing its functions under this Act,
the Council may:-
xxx xxx xxx
C xxx xxx xxx
(i) lay down norms and standards for courses, curricula,
physical and instructional facilities, staff pattern, staff
qualifications, quality instructions, assessment and
examinations;
D (j) fix norms and guidelines for charging tuition and other fees;
(k) grant approval for starting new technical institutions and
for introduction of new courses or programmes in
consultation with the agencies concerned;
E xxx xxx xxx
(m) lay down norms for granting autonomy to technical
institutions;
xxx xxx xxx
F (o) provide guidelines for admission of students to technical
institutions and Universities imparting technical education;
(p) inspect or cause to inspect any technical institution;
(q) withhold or discontinue grants in respect of courses,
programmes to such technical institutions which fail to
G comply with the directions given by the Council within the
stipulated period of time and take such other steps as may
be necessary for ensuring compliance of the directions of
the Council;”
9. In this judgment, altogether seven appeals shall be dealt with,
H all of which involve the dispute outlined in the first paragraph. The main
ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. v. PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA 481
BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH. [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]
appeal which has been argued before us in detail is Civil Appeal No.364 A
of 2005. The appellant in this proceeding is AICTE and its appeal is
against the judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court
delivered on 8th September 2004 in Writ Petition No.5942 of 2004.
Dispute in this matter pertains to intake capacity of an institution by
the name of Shri Prince Shivaji Maratha Boarding House’s
B
College of Architecture. The CoA, on carrying out inspection of the
college in the year 2004 chose to restore the intake capacity of 40
students per year which was reduced to 30 students for two earlier
academic years, 2003-2004 and 2004-2005. Such reduced intake
capacity was based on a joint inspection undertaken by CoA and AICTE
on 25th April 2003. The CoA had decided to restore the intake capacity C
to 40 students by a communication on 18th May 2004 upon being
satisfied with a compliance report filed by the institution followed by
inspection. For the Academic Year 2004-05 the Director of Technical
Education, however, fixed the intake capacity of 30 students in respect
of same institution on the basis of norms and standards fixed by the
D
AICTE. Questioning legality of such action, the institution and the trust
which ran the latter, brought an action under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India before the High Court. The Bench of the High
Court framed the question for adjudication in the following terms:
“3…..whether the All India Council of Technical Education Act, E
1987 (for short, ‘AICTE Act’ ) overrides the provisions of the
Architects Act, 1972 in the matter of prescribing and regulating
norms and standards of architectural institutions. In other words,
whether the AICTE Act which is a later Act has impliedly
repealed the provisions of the Architects Act…..”
F
10. The Bench of the Bombay High Court found, on examination
of the scheme of both the statutes that the 1972 Act was specially
designed to deal with the architects and maintenance of the standards
of architectural education and profession with recognized qualifications.
The scope of the AICTE Act, in the opinion of the Bench, covered
various programmes of education, research and training in wide range G
of subjects including architecture. The Bench held that the 1972 Act
was not impliedly repealed by the 1987 Act and quashed the order of
the AICTE authorities reducing the intake capacity. Relying, inter alia,
on a decision of a two-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of
Bharathidasan University and Another vs. All India Council for H
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.
A Technical Education & Others,1 the High Court upheld the power
of regulatory body under the 1972 Act as the final authority for the
purpose of fixing the norms and standards of institutions running course
on architecture. In the judgment appealed against, it was observed, after
referring to different authorities: -
B “20…….. It is obvious that the legislature never intended to
confer on the AICTE a super power undermining the status,
authority and autonomous functioning of the existing statutory
bodies in areas and spheres assigned to them under the respective
legislations. There is nothing in the AICTE Act to suggest a
legislative intention to belittle and destroy the authority or
C autonomy of Council of Architecture which is having its own
assigned role to perform. The role of the AICTE vis-à-vis the
Council of Architects is advisory and recommendatory and as a
guiding factor and thereby subserving the cause of maintaining
appropriate standards and qualitative norms. It is impossible to
D conceive that the Parliament intended to abrogate the provisions
of the Architects Act embodying a complete code for
architectural education, including qualifications of the architects
by enacting a general provision like section 10 of the AICTE Act.
It is clear that the Parliament did have before it the Architects
Act when it passed AICTE Act and Parliament never meant that
E the provisions of the Architects Act stand pro tanto repealed by
section 10 of the AICTE Act. We, therefore, hold that the
provisions of the Architects Act are not impliedly repealed by
the enactment of AICTE Act because in so far as the
Architecture Institutions are concerned, the final authority for the
F purposes of fixing the norms and standards would be the Council
of Architecture. Accordingly, we quash and set aside the order
of the Deputy Director reducing the intake capacity of the
petitioner college of architecture from 40 to 30. Rule is
accordingly made absolute in terms of prayer clauses (a) and
(b) with no order as to costs.”
G
11. SLP(C) No.5400 of 2011 also originates from a similar
controversy and the appellant in this proceeding is Rajiv Gandhi
Proudyogiki Vishwavidayalaya. This appeal arises out of a judgment
delivered by a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in a
1
H (2001) 8 SCC 676
ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. v. PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA 483
BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH. [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]
Writ Petition brought by a Society (Bhartiya Vidya Mandir Shiksha A
Samiti) running a college of Architecture. The said writ petition was
registered as W.P. No.315 of 2011 and the judgment was delivered on
2nd February, 2011. In this case, the institution had been granted
permission by the AICTE to conduct B. Arch Degree course with intake
of 80 students for the academic sessions 2010-2011 and it was seeking
B
affiliation from the said University. The Directorate of Technical
Education had allotted 16 students to the institute upon conducting online
counselling. The CoA, however, had mandated that the said institution
ought to have a separate building, independent school or college of
architecture and it should have separate infrastructure facilities for the
aforesaid purpose. The appellant University (respondent No.2 in the C
Writ Petition) informed the institution that it could grant affiliation to
them after approval of the programme B. Arch. by the CoA. This was
contained in clause 2 of a communication issued by the University, dated
6th September 2010. In course of hearing before the High Court, as
recorded in the judgment under appeal, it was submitted on behalf of
D
the institution that it would construct their own building for the purpose
of B. Arch. Degree course within a period of one year. The Bench of
Madhya Pradesh High Court directed the appellant University to
consider the matter with regard to grant of temporary affiliation to the
institution without insisting upon compliance of condition No.2 in the
letter dated 6th September 2010. The Bench, however, directed E
compliance of aforesaid condition of the CoA within a period of one
year for conducting the said course and if no such compliance was
made, and the institution could not get approval from AICTE (respondent
No.3 in that proceeding) within the stipulated period, admission of
students for B. Arch. course in future was made impermissible. In this
F
decision, co-existence of power of both the regulatory bodies was in
substance accepted. One of the questions on which the University wants
decision of this Court in this appeal is whether the various regulations
framed in pursuance of the 1972 Act could be overlooked by the Bench
of the High Court in issuing such directions.
12. SLP(Civil) No. 8443 of 2011 is an appeal by the institution G
concerned, being Bhartiya Vidya Mandir Shiksha Samiti, assailing
the same judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, delivered in
Writ Petition No. 315 of 2011 on 2nd February 2011. In this appeal also,
the question of conflict of powers in deciding admission norms between
CoA and AICTE has been raised. The power of the CoA to direct H
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.
A construction of a separate building is specifically questioned in this
appeal.
13. The same judgment has also been assailed by the CoA in
SLP(Civil) No. 20460 of 2011. One of the grievances of the CoA in
this appeal is that it was not made a party in the Writ Petition in which
B the High Court had directed granting of temporary affiliation to the
institution without insisting on approval of Council of Architecture. On
18th July 2011, a Bench comprising of two Judges of this Court granted
permission to CoA to file this SLP. The direction of the High Court in
the judgment under appeal was conditional in that the respondent-
institution was required to construct and create separate building and
C infrastructure within a period of one year. That was the specific
requirement of CoA so far as Bhartiya Vidya Mandir Shiksha Samiti is
concerned.
14. SLP(Civil) No.17006 of 2016 has been instituted by AICTE
challenging the legality of a common judgment and order passed by a
D Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Writ Appeal No.110 of
2013 and Writ Appeal No.112 of 2013. The dispute in these two appeals,
inter-alia, was over contradictory directives issued by the CoA and
AICTE in relation to admission of two students for the academic session
2011-2012 beyond the intake capacity by an institution operated by one
E BMS Educational Trust. The intake capacity so far as course of
architecture was concerned for the applicable academic session was
80 students. The appellate committee of the AICTE had recommended
that excess admission fee, five times that of total fee collected per
student, ought to have been levied in each case of admission beyond
the intake capacity. On the other hand, CoA had given its approval for
F intake of additional two students during the academic year 2011-2012
on condition that the institution would admit two students less than that
of its intake capacity of 80 for the next academic session i.e. 2012-
2013. In the writ petition, the learned Single Judge, referring to a
decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Khayti Girish
G Purnima Kulkarni Vs. College of Architecture & Ors.2, had held
that approval of CoA was sufficient and it was not necessary that the
petitioners (the aforesaid Trust) had to seek approval from the AICTE.
In the appeal preferred by the AICTE before an Appellate Bench of
the same Court, it was held in substance by the Division Bench that
2
H 2012 (4) AIR BOM R 371
ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. v. PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA 485
BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH. [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]
the decision of the learned Single Judge would be ultimately subject to A
outcome of the pending appeal before this Court on the same point.
That appeal, we are apprised, is the first case in this batch of appeals.
In the case of Khayti Girish Purnima Kulkarni (supra), the judgment
of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Shri Prince Shivaji
Maratha Boarding House’s Council of Architecture, Kolhapur
B
Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. was referred to and followed.
15. SLP(Civil) No.17005 of 2016 is also against same judgment
by the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court by which two writ
appeals stood disposed of. AICTE is the appellant in this appeal. The
origin of this appeal lies in the writ petition instituted by BMS School C
of Architecture. Legality of a circular issued by the Visvesvaraya
University dated 19th September, 2011 mandating all institutions teaching
architecture to secure approval of the AICTE was questioned in that
writ petition. Also assailed in the writ petition was an order issued by
the State Government on 21st September, 2011 in substance directing
compliance of the same requirement. The main point involved in this D
appeal is if AICTE norms can be made applicable in respect of
architecture course or not.
16. SLP(Civil) No.28121 of 2018 (Muslim Educational
Association Vs. The University of Calicut & Ors.) arises out of a
decision of a Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala. In this E
decision, it has been held that approval of AICTE is necessary for
starting a new college of architecture. The petitioner in that case before
the High Court was the said Association, which had obtained approval
of the CoA for starting the college. The affiliating university – the
University of Calicut had declined approval. One of the reasons for F
that was that the Association had not obtained approval from AICTE.
The Association approached the High Court invoking its writ jurisdiction
questioning legality of the decision of the university declining its
affiliation. In the judgment delivered on 29th August 2018 (in W.P.(Civil)
No. 25412 of 2018) the High Court primarily addressed the question
as to whether approval of AICTE was necessary in addition to the G
recognition or approval granted by the CoA. Following an earlier decision
of the same Court in the case of Thejus College of Architecture
Vs. State of Kerala & Ors. in W.P.(C) No.23858 of 2018, decided
on 6th August 2018, the Bench dismissed the Writ Petition, inter-alia,
on the reasoning that it did not have approval of the AICTE. H
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.
A 17. In some of the cases involved in these proceedings appeal,
the CoA has been prescribing certain measures for individual institutions
to undertake to bring them at par with CoA norms. The specific
provision of the 1972 Act or the regulations framed thereunder does
not specifically provide for prescribing such corrective measures. Such
directives, however, in our opinion, are incidental to the regulatory
B powers conferred upon the CoA.
18. There are specific provisions in the 1972 Act dealing with
setting standards and norms for institutions dealing with the education
of architecture. Some of these provisions have been referred to earlier
in this judgment. There are also provisions for monitoring quality of
C education being imparted by the respective institutions. The CoA has
also the power to make representation to the Central government in
the event there are breaches of norms or standards prescribed by the
regulations, which may ultimately result in withdrawal of such
recognition. The decision making hierarchy within the CoA for making
D representations to the Central Government has also been statutorily
prescribed, running up from inspectors to Executive Committee and
ultimately the Council.
19. Both the regulatory authorities under the respective statutes
have power to frame regulations for giving effect to the provisions of
the respective Acts. Power to make rules in respect of certain areas
E
covered by the statutes have been vested in the Central Government
both under the 1972 Act and the 1987 Act. So far as CoA is concerned,
their power to make regulations is derived from Section 45 of the 1972
Act. The said provision stipulates: -
“45. Power of Council to make regulations.
F
(1) The Council may, with the approval of the Central
Government, [by notification in the Official Gazette] make
regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act,
or the rules made thereunder to carry out the purposes
of this Act.
G
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the
foregoing power, such regulations may provide for—
(a) the management of the property of the Council;
(b) the powers and duties of the President and the Vice-
H President of the Council;
ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. v. PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA 487
BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH. [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]
(c) the summoning and holding of meetings of the Council A
and the Executive Committee or any other committee
constituted under Section 10, the times and places at
which such meetings shall be held, the conduct of
business thereat and the number of persons necessary
to constitute a quorum;
B
(d) the functions of the Executive Committee or of any
other committee constituted under Section 10;
(e) the courses and periods of study and of practical
training, if any, to be undertaken, the subjects
of examinations and standards of proficiency
therein to be obtained in any college or C
institution for grant of recognised qualifications;
(f) the appointment, powers and duties of inspector;
(g) the standards of staff, equipment,
accommodation, training and other facilities for
architectural education; D
(h) the conduct of professional examinations,
qualifications of examiners and the conditions of
admission to such examinations;
(i) the standards of professional conduct and etiquette
and code of ethics to be observed by architects; and E
(j) any other matter which is to be or may be provided
by regulations under this Act and in respect of which
no rules have been made.”
(3) Every regulation made under this section shall be laid, as soon
as may be after it is made, before each House of Parliament, F
while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days which may
be comprised in one session or in two or more successive
sessions, and if, before the expiry of the session immediately
following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both
Houses agree in making any modification in the regulation or both
G
Houses agree that the regulation should not be made, the
regulation shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form
or be of no effect, as the case may be; so, however, that any
such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the
validity of anything previously done under that regulation.”
(emphasis supplied). H
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.
A 20. The power to frame regulations by the AICTE originates from
Section 23 of the 1987 Act. This section stipulates:-
“23. Power to make regulations.—(1) The Council may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, make regulations not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, and the rules generally
B to carry out the purposes of this Act.
(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the
foregoing power, such regulations may provide for all or any of
the following matters, namely:—
(a) regulating the meetings of the Council and the procedure
C for conducting business thereat;
(b) the terms and conditions of service of the officers and
employees of the Council;
(c) regulating the meetings of the Executive Committee and
D the procedure for conducting business thereat;
(d) the area of concern, the constitution, and powers and
functions of the Board of Studies;
(e) the region for which the Regional Committee be established
and the constitution and functions of such Committee.”
E
21. Under the 1987 Act, the power of Central Government to
make rules is derived from Section 22 of the Act. The said provision
stipulates:-
“22. Power to make rules.—
F (1) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, make rules to carry out the purposes of this Act.
(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the
foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the
following matters, namely:—
G
(a) the procedure to be followed by the members in the
discharge of their functions;
(b) the inspection of technical institutions and Universities;
(c) the form and manner in which the budget and reports are
H to be prepared by the Council;
ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. v. PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA 489
BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH. [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]
(d) the manner in which the accounts of the Council are to A
be maintained; and
(e) any other matter which has to be, or may be, prescribed”
22. Similar power on the Central Government has been conferred
under Section 44 of the 1972 Act, which lays down:-
B
“44. Power of Central Government to make rules.-(1) The
Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
make rules to carry out the purposes of this Act.
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the
foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the C
following matters, namely—
(a) the manner in which elections under Chapter II shall be
conducted, the terms and conditions of service of the
members of the Tribunal appointed under sub-section (2)
of Section 5 and the procedure to be followed by the D
Tribunal;
(b) the procedure to be followed by the expert committee
constituted under the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section
14 in the transaction of its business and the powers and
duties of the expert committee and the travelling and daily E
allowances payable to the members thereof;
(c) the particulars to be included in the register of architects
under sub-section (3) of Section 23;
(d) the form in which a certificate of registration is to be issued
under sub-section (7) of Section 24, sub-section (4) of F
Section 26 and Section 33;
(e) the fee to be paid under Sections 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 32
and 33;
(f) the conditions on which a name may be restored to the
G
register under the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 27;
(g) the manner of endorsement under sub-section (3) of
Section 27;
(h) the manner in which the Council shall hold an enquiry under
Section 30; H
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.
A (i) the fee for supplying printed copies of the register under
Section 34; and
(j) any other matter which is to be or may be provided by
rules under this Act.
B (3) Every rule made under this Section shall be laid, as soon as
may be after it is made, before each House of Parliament, while
it is in session, for a total period of thirty days which may be
comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions,
and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following the
session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree
C in making any modification to the rule or both Houses agree that
the rule should not be made, the rule shall thereafter have effect
only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may
be; so, however, that any such modification or annulment shall
be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done
D under that rule.”
23. In course of hearing before us, on behalf of AICTE three
Regulations have been brought to our notice by Mr. Pandey, learned
counsel representing this body. The first one carries the title “All India
Council for Technical Education (Grant of approval for starting new
E technical institutions, introduction of courses or programmes and
approval of intake capacity of seats for the courses or programmes)
Regulations, 1994.” This Regulation has been framed by the AICTE in
exercise of power under Section 23(1) of the 1987 Act and became
effective on 31st October, 1994. Another Regulation, framed also in
F exercise of power under Section 23(1) read with Sections 10 and 11
of the 1987 Act of the year 2016 in supersession of earlier regulations
has also been referred to. But so far as the present appeals are
concerned, the respective causes of action predates this regulation of
2016 except in the case of the Muslim Educational Association, i.e.
S.L.P.(Civil) No.28121 of 2018. The other Regulation is titled “All India
G Council for Technical Education (Norms and Guidelines for Fees and
guidelines for admission in Professional Colleges) Regulations, 1994,
framed in exercise of powers conferred under Section 23(1) and
Sections 10 (j) and (o), 1987 Act. This one is dated 20th May, 1994.
No other regulation or rule has been brought to our notice in course of
H hearing on behalf of AICTE.
ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. v. PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA 491
BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH. [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]
24. Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, learned senior counsel representing the A
CoA has referred to Minimum Standard of Architectural Education
Regulations, 1983, framed by CoA in exercise of powers conferred by
clauses (e), (g), (h) and (j) of sub-section (2) of Section 45 read with
Section 21 of the 1972 Act. Another document which was produced
before us by Dr. Dhavan is the annual report of CoA for the year 2017- B
2018. So far as this document is concerned, its relevance for
adjudication of these appeals would be the content recorded under
following two sub-heads therein:-
“14.0 APPROVAL OF NEW INSTITUTIONS IN THE
ACADEMIC SESSION 2017-18:- C
During the year under the report 22 new institutions were granted
approval to impart Bachelor of Architecture Courses and 6
existing institutions were granted approval for imparting PG
Courses.
D
With this, the total number of institutions imparting recognized
courses in architecture in the year 2017-18 with the approval of
Council are 468.
The annual intake of students sanctioned by the Council at
Undergraduate level is approximately 24741, Postgraduate level E
is 1640.
15.0 EXTENSION OF APPROVAL FOR THE
ACADEMIC SESSION 2017-18 ONWARDS:
The Council granted extension of approval or otherwise for UG
and PG Courses for the academic session 2017-18 as under:- F
i) Institutions granted extension of approval for B.Arch.
Course: 408
ii) Institutions granted extension of approval for M. Arch.
Course: 64 G
iii) Institutions put on ‘No Admission’ : 12
iv) Institution put on ‘withdrawal of approval’ : NIL
The Council also initiated the process of inspection for the
academic session 2018-2019 which were due for inspections.” H
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.
A Reporting on these subjects demonstrate CoA’s continued
engagement in the process of recognition of “authorities” granting
architectural qualification.
25. We find that both the statutes have provisions for approval
and monitoring of architecture courses run by institutions. So far as the
B 1972 Act is concerned, the expression employed is recognition of
qualification and the ultimate authority for granting or withdrawing
recognition to degree or diploma courses in architectural education by
different academic institutions is the Central Government. The CoA
under the statutory scheme however has significant role in such decision
making process. AICTE has also been empowered under the 1987 Act
C to lay down standards and norms for courses on architecture along with
other subjects coming within the term “technical education”. We have
extracted relevant parts of Section 10 of the 1987 Act earlier in this
judgment. Both the Councils also appear to have had proceeded with
this understanding. In the decision of the Bombay High Court delivered
D in the case of Shri Prince Shivaji Maratha Boarding House’s
Council of Architecture, (supra), it is recorded in the judgment under
appeal that joint inspection was held in respect of the institution involved
in that proceeding by AICTE and CoA. Moreover, under Section
3(3)(b), of the 1972 Act, the CoA is required to have two persons
nominated by the AICTE. On the other hand, Section 3 (4) (m) of the
E 1987 Act stipulates that AICTE is to consist of representatives of various
bodies, including a member to be appointed by the Central Government
to represent the CoA. Section 10(k) of the 1987 Act requires AICTE
to grant approval in consultation with the agencies concerned.
26. Though both the enactments deal with several aspects of the
F main subject matter of the respective legislations, on the aspect of
setting norms for architectural education and for monitoring the
institutions engaged in imparting architectural education, there are
overlapping powers of these two Councils. Section 14 of the 1972 Act
has been reproduced earlier in this judgment. On the aspect of
G recognising any architectural qualification, Sections 18 and 19 thereof
stipulate:
“18. Power to require information as to courses of study
and examinations.- Every authority in India which grants a
recognised qualification shall furnish such information as the
H Council may, from time to time, require as to the courses of
ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. v. PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA 493
BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH. [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]
study and examinations to be undergone in order to obtain such A
qualification, as to the ages at which such courses of study and
examinations are required to be undergone and such qualification
is conferred and generally as to the requisites for obtaining such
qualification.
19. Inspection of examinations.- B
1. The Executive Committee shall, subject to regulations, if
any, made by the Council, appoint such number of
inspectors as it may deem requisite to inspect any college
or institution where architectural education is given or to
attend any examination held by any college or institution C
for the purpose of recommending to the Central
Government recognition of architectural qualifications
granted by that college or institution.
2. The inspectors shall not interfere with the conduct of any
training or examination, but shall report to the Executive D
Committee on the adequacy of the standards of
architectural education including staff, equipment,
accommodation, training and such other facilities as may
be prescribed by regulations for giving such education or
on the sufficiency of every examination which they attend.
E
3. The Executive Committee shall forward a copy of such
report to the college or institution and shall also forward
copies with remarks, if any, of the college or institution
thereon, to the Central Government.”
27. Section 20 of the 1972 Act deals with withdrawal of F
recognition of an authority listed in the Schedule to the Act. The process
involves a report by the Executive Committee of the CoA. On the
basis of such report, if it appears to the Council that the courses of
study and examination held in any college or institution or the staff,
equipment, accommodation, training and other facilities for staff and
training provided in such college or institution do not conform to the G
standards prescribed by the regulations then the CoA is empowered to
make a representation for withdrawal of recognition to the appropriate
Government. Section 21 of the 1972 Act also empowers the Council
to prescribe minimum standards of architectural education required for
granting recognized qualifications by colleges or institutions in India.
H
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.
A 28. From the nature of the dispute giving rise to these seven
appeals, it is apparent that the shortcomings pointed out by the two
regulatory bodies relate primarily to infrastructural facilities of the
respective institutions. The power of the CoA to examine such
infrastructural facilities at the time of considering the application for
recognition or monitoring the quality of an institution recognized by the
B Council stems from Sections 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the 1972 Act.
29. A Regulation has been framed by the CoA with the approval
of the Central Government titled as the Council of Architecture
Regulations, 1982. Part VIII of the 1982 Regulations deals with
inspection of educational institutions of Architecture. Clauses 29 and
C 30 thereof stipulate:
“29. Inspection of educational institutions and their
examinations.- The inspection of architectural institutions and
the attendance at the time of training and examination under
section 19 shall be carried out in accordance with the following
D manner, namely : -
(1) each institution imparting instruction in architecture shall
be inspected by the inspectors once in five years:
(2) the Registrar shall fix the date of inspection in consultation
with the inspector or inspectors and the institution;
E
(3) the Executive Committee shall appoint such number of
inspectors as may be deemed necessary to inspect an
institution or to attend any examinations and to report
thereon:
Provided that the minimum number of inspectors for such
F inspection shall be two.
(4) (a) every inspector shall receive from the Chairman,
Executive Committee, a formal commission in writing
under the seal of the Council;
(b) the instructions of the Chairman shall specify the
G
institution or institutions, courses of studies and
scheme of examination or examinations or training
programme or educational standards including staff,
equipments, accommodation, training and other
facilities which are required to be inspected or
H attended;
ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. v. PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA 495
BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH. [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]
(c) the Chairman shall inform the inspector that he is to A
report to the Executive Committee who shall submit
their final report with recommendations to the Council
in accordance with these regulations;
(d) the Registrar shall provide the inspector with a copy
of the documents and of the recommendations of the B
Council in regard to recognition of the qualifications
or educational standards and improvements to be
made thereon and of the resolutions with regard to
architectural education.”
“30. Powers and duties of Inspectors.- C
(1) It shall be the duty of the inspector: -
(a) to make himself acquainted with such previous reports,
if any, on the institution or institutions which he is
appointed to inspect as the Executive Committee may
direct and with the observations of the University or D
examining body and the report of the Council thereon;
(b) to attend personally institution or examination or training
which he is required to inspect but not to interfere with
the conduct thereof;
E
(c) to inspect the institution which provides a recognized
course of study or has applied for the recognition of its
course of study and scheme of examination and to see
that the course is in conformity with the regulations
relating to education and the standards laid down by the
Council; F
(d) to report to the Executive Committee his opinion as to
the sufficiency or insufficiency of standards of education
or examination or institution inspected by him;
(e) to set forth in his report, in order, all the necessary
particulars as to the question proposed in the written, oral G
or practical parts of each examination attended by him,
the sessional and class work submitted by the candidates
at the time of practical or viva-voce examination, the
arrangements made for invigilation, the method and
scales of making, the standard of knowledge shown by H
496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.
A the successful candidates and generally all such details
as may be required for adjudicating on the scope and
character of the examination;
(f) to set forth in his report necessary particulars in respect
of institutions so as to enable the Executive Committee
B to assess the existing facilities for teaching as well as
the extent to which the recommendations of the Council
regarding professional education have been given effect
to;
(g) to compare, on receipt from the Registrar, proof copy
C of any of his reports, the proof with the original and
correct, sign and return it to the Registrar for
preservation in the records of the Council as the
authentic copy of such report.
(2) Every report of the inspector or inspectors shall be signed
and submitted to the Executive Committee.
D
(3) The reports of inspectors shall be deemed confidential, unless
in any particular case the Executive Committee otherwise
directs.
(4) Copies of the report by inspectors marked confidential shall
E be forwarded to the University or the examining body concerned
as well as the institution with a request that the authority should
furnish to the Executive Committee within six months from the
date of dispatch, such observations thereon as they may think
necessary.
F (5) A confidential copy of report of an inspector or inspectors,
with the observations of the University or the examining body
or the institution thereon, shall be supplied to each member of
the Council and shall be considered together with comments of
the Executive Committee by the Council along with the
observations thereon of the Executive Committee for
G consideration by the Council at their next meeting.
(6) A copy of every report by the inspector or inspectors, with
the observations of the University or the examining body and the
institution concerned and the opinion of the Executive Committee
thereon, shall, after approval by the Council, be forwarded to the
H Central Government and State Government concerned.”
ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. v. PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA 497
BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH. [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]
30. The Minimum Standards of Architectural Education A
Regulations 1983 in particular, deals with the academic and
infrastructural features of architecture courses. Clause (5) of the said
Regulations provides:-
“5 Intake and Migration:-
(1) The sanctioned intake of candidates at the first year level B
shall not exceed a maximum of 40 in a class. If more than 40
candidates are admitted, separate classes shall be organized.
(2) The institutions may permit, at their discretion, migration of
students from one institution to another subject to the maximum
number of students not exceeding the permitted maximum intake C
in a class.”
Clause 8 of the 1983 Regulations further provides:-
“8. Standards of staff, equipment, accommodation, training
and other facilities for technical education D
(1) The institutions shall maintain a teacher/student ratio of 1:8.
(2) The institutions shall have a minimum number of 12 faculty
members for a student strength of 100.
(3) The institution with the maximum intake of 40 in a class
may have the faculty pattern as prescribed in Appendix- E
B.
(4) The institutions shall encourage the faculty members to
involve in professional practice including research.
(5) The institutions shall provide facilities as indicated in F
Appendix-C.
(6) The institutions shall encourage exchange of faculty
members for academic programmes.
Notwithstanding anything contained in these regulations, the
institutions may prescribe minimum standards of Architectural Education G
provided such standards does not, in the opinion of the Council, fall below
the minimum standards prescribed from time to time by the Council to
meet the requirements of the profession and education thereof.”
31. Appendix B to these Regulations deal with designation, pay-
scale and qualification required to be prescribed for faculty positions. H
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.
A The content thereof is not being reproduced in this judgment as for the
purpose of determining the issues involved in these appeals, the
stipulations barring those contained in Appendix C are not of much
significance. Appendix C thereof reads: -
“APPENDIX-C
B Physical Facilities
The Institution of Architecture should be located in a building to
have a floor area of about 15 sq.m.m. per student. The building
should include class rooms and at least 5 studios, adequate space
for faculty members, library, workshop, materials museum,
C laboratories, exhibition/conference room, office accommodation
and common area for students and staff. The space requirements
per student for architectural education whether in the Institution
or in the Hostel are apt to be more than for most other types of
professional courses like engineering and medicine because of
D the large space required for preparation of drawings. This factor
should be borne in mind in the design of Hostels and Studios.
Facilities may also be provided for extra-curricular activities and
sports.
The equipment in the workshop/laboratories has also to be
E provided to meet with the special requirement for architectural
education. It is desirable to provide locker facilities in the studios
for students.
The Library, Workshops, Laboratories and Photography unit
should be managed by professionally qualified staff with adequate
F supporting staff to assist the students and faculty members in
their academic programmes. There should also be administrative
supporting staff to run the Architectural Institutions.
It is desirable to provide hostel accommodation and residential
accommodation for staff and students in close proximity of the
G institution.”
32. So far as the two Regulations of 1994 under the 1987 Act
produced before us on behalf of AICTE, the Regulations dated 20th
May, 1994 contemplates fixing approval norms and intake capacity to
professional colleges. Clause 2 of this Regulation however exempts
H universities, university departments or colleges, government colleges,
ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. v. PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA 499
BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH. [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]
aided colleges and certain other institutions from its application. The A
next one has been made applicable to all new technical institutions
including universities and subsisting technical institutions and lays down
a detailed approval process through multi-tier decision making structure.
The AICTE appears to have made subsequent Regulations time to time
superseding the earlier ones in respect of the approval process, but
B
barring the Regulations made in 2016, no other regulations has been
produced before us. None of the Regulations produced before us
however specify the actual norms but refer to standards and norms to
be laid down for approval of technical institutions, which include
institutions imparting architectural education.
C
33. Clause 6 of the 1994 regulations dated 31st October, 1994
deals with conditions for grant of approval, which stipulates:
“6. Conditions for grant of approval.- Every application under
sub-regulation (1) of regulation 4 shall be considered subject to
the fulfilment of the following conditions, namely:-
D
(i) The financial position of the applicant shall be sound for
investment in developed land and in providing related
infrastructure and instructional facilities as per the norms
and standards laid down by the Council from time to time
and for meeting annual recurring expenditure:
E
(ii) The courses or programmes shall be conducted as per the
assessed technical manpower demands;
(iii) The admissions shall be made according to the regulations
and directions of the Council for such admissions in the
respective technical institution or university; F
(iv) The tuition and other fees shall be charged with the overall
criteria as may be laid down by the Council;
(v) The staff shall be recruited as per the norms and standards
specified by the Council from time to time;
G
(vi) the governing Body in case of private technical institutions
shall be as per the norms as specified by the council;
34. Appearing on behalf of AICTE in Civil Appeal No.364 of
2005, the fact that there are overlapping provisions on the question of
grant of approval and subsequent monitoring of architectural education H
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.
A under both these Acts, has not been seriously disputed by Mr. Pandey.
His main submission is that the 1987 Act being a later statute, covering
common field, the provisions of the 1972 Act, to the extent the same
deals with architectural education, shall be deemed to have been
repealed by implication. The judgment of this Court relied upon on this
point is the case of Ajoy Kumar Banerjee and Others Vs. Union
B
of India and Others3 His further submission is that the power of
AICTE under the 1987 Act has already been upheld by this Court in
the case of State of Tamil Nadu and Others Vs. Adhiyaman
Educational Research Institute and Others4 On the same point,
another judgment of this Court in the case of Orissa Lift Irrigation
C Corporation Limited Vs. Rabi Sankar Patro and Others,5 has also
been relied upon by him. The other authority he has cited in support of
his submission that the Rules and Regulations framed by the AICTE
has the force of law and binding is the case of Parshvnath Charitable
Trust and Others Vs. All India Council for Technical Education
and Others6 In the case of Varun Saini & Ors. Vs. Guru Govind
D
Singh Indraprastha University7 also, the necessity on the part of the
technical institutions for taking prior approval of AICTE has been
highlighted.
35. Primacy of AICTE on the question of giving approval to a
technical institution and subsequent monitoring thereof have been
E discussed in the cases of Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation
Limited (supra) and Parshvanath Charitable Trust and Others
(supra). But in these two cases, the question of inter-se primacy
between the rival regulatory bodies covering the same subject did not
arise. In the case of Parshvanath Charitable Trust (supra), the dispute
F was on the question as to whether shifting of location of college running
courses on technical education could be effected without obtaining a
‘No Objection Certificate’ (NOC) from the AICTE. The Handbook of
Approval Process, 2008 provides for obtaining NOCs from the State
Government, UT administration and affiliating bodies concerned with
the AICTE as per laid down procedure subject to the fulfilment of
G norms and standards of AICTE. The college concerned had changed
3
(1984) 3 SCC 127
4
(1995) 4 SCC 104
5
(2018) 1 SCC 468
6
(2013) 3 SCC 385
7
H (2014) 16 SCC 330
ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. v. PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA 501
BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH. [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]
location without adhering to the aforesaid procedure and it was held A
by this Court in that decision that withdrawal of approval by the AICTE
was valid, there being no compliance with the legal requirements and
binding conditions of recognition, inter-alia, by the AICTE. The lis in
the case of Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Limited (supra) arose
out of a dispute pertaining to service conditions of engineers including
B
junior engineers of the said Corporation. In that case, a diploma holder
in electrical engineering had joined the Corporation as junior engineer
(electrical) and while in service he acquired B.Tech. (Civil) degree from
a deemed university. The said deemed university did not have approval
of the AICTE. That University had started its distance education
programme without taking approval from any of the regulatory C
authorities including University Grants Commission (UGC) and AICTE.
In this decision also, judgment in the case of Bharathidasan University
(supra) was taken note of. It was however held that deemed
universities, whose courses were subject of dispute in the aforesaid
cases were required to abide by the provisions of the AICTE
D
Regulations and could not introduce courses leading to award of degrees
in engineering without the approval of AICTE.
36. In the case of State of Tamil Nadu and Another Vs.
Adhiyaman Educational and Research Institute and Others8, the
controversy arose out of certain overlapping provisions between the E
1987 Act and Madras University Act, 1923. The disputes were mainly
on the aspects of prescribing terms and conditions for affiliation of
different institutions including engineering colleges. It was held that in
respect of the subjects specified under Section 10 of the 1987 Act in
respect of institutions imparting technical education, it would not be the
University Act but the Central Act and the Council created under it F
would have the jurisdiction to that extent. It was held that after coming
into operation of the Central Act, the provisions of the University Act
would be deemed to have become unenforceable. In case of technical
colleges like engineering colleges, this view was taken by this Court,
having regard to the fact that the Central statue had been enacted by
G
the Parliament under Entry 66 of List I as well as Entry 25 of List III.
It was also held in that judgment that the provisions of the University
Act regarding affiliation of technical colleges like the engineering colleges
and the conditions for grant and continuation of such affiliation by the
8
(1995) 4 SCC 104 H
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.
A University was to remain operative but the conditions that are prescribed
by the University for grant and continuance of affiliation will have to
be in conformity with the norms and guidelines prescribed by the
Council in respect of matters entrusted to it under Section 10 of the
Central Act.
B 37. Learned counsel representing the AICTE has referred to a
communication emanating from the Ministry of Human Resource
Development, Government of India, bearing No.F.17 11/2003 TS.IV.
This communication specifically deals with this conflict and specifies:
“The mandate given to the AICTE is to coordinate the
C development of technical education in the country at all levels.
Grants of approval for starting new technical educational
institutions and for introduction of new courses or Programmes
in consultations with the agencies concerned. Although, the
Council of Architecture deals with mainly architect profession
and the Architect Act may be taken as a Special Act dealing
D
with profession of architecture, the overall planning and
coordination of technical education falls within the ambit of
AICTE. For starting new courses, increase in intake, setting up
of new technical institutions, the power is vested with AICTE
under Section 10(k) of the AICTE Act. In that process AICTE
E has to inspect institutions, look into their infrastructure, set up
norms and standards as per the power provided in the AICTE
Act. The Architect Act does not have any power to set up any
institute or grant approval to new courses or increase in intake.
For the benefit of the profession, the Architect Act provides the
F council the authority to prescribe minimum standards of
architectural education for the colleges or institutions in India.
Regulations framed under Architect Act, 1972, also provides for
inspection of institution once in five year and make
recommendation to the central government. The ministry
therefore feels that there is no overlapping of power between
G the two statutory bodies in so far as inspections of institutions
are concerned. The architecture education is to be governed
under AICTE Act and CoA should maintain register for
recognition of architects who have completed full time
Programmes/courses as approved by the AICTE or qualifications
H mentioned in the schedule of CoA Act.
ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. v. PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA 503
BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH. [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]
The matter regarding implementation of various provisions, under A
the Architect Act, 1972 and the AICTE Act, 1987 has been
considered in the ministry and after careful examination the
ministry is of the view that all aspect of architectural education
shall be concern of the AICTE and CoA would look into the
architect profession and ethics for maintaining its professionalism
B
in the field of Architecture.”
38. It is brought to our notice by Mr. Pandey, referring to Section
25 of the 1987 Act, that it is the Central Government which is the
ultimate authority deciding on issues in giving effect to the provisions
of the 1987 Act and hence the aforesaid memorandum ought to be given C
effect to while construing the conflict arising from these two statutes.
Section 25 of the 1987 Act stipulates:-
“25. Power to remove difficulties.—(1) If any
difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of this Act, the
Central Government may, by order, published in the Official D
Gazette, make such provisions not inconsistent with the provisions
of this Act as may appear to be necessary for removing the
difficulty:
Provided that no order shall be made under this section after the
E
expiry of two years from the commencement of this Act.
(2) Every order made under this section shall be laid, as soon as
may be after it is made, before each House of Parliament.”
39. Similar provision is there under Section 43 of the 1972 Act.
F
But no case has been made out that the memorandum to which
reference has been made, has been published in the official gazette.
This memorandum does not meet the requirement of valid exercise of
power under the aforesaid two provisions by the Central Government
so as to make it binding. This memorandum, at best, can be treated to
be an advisory of the Ministry not having enforceable effect. Moreover, G
the aforesaid memorandum has been issued beyond the timeframe laid
down under the provisions of the statutes reproduced in the said two
sections of the respective Acts. The memorandum also cannot be
treated to be an executive order under Article 77 of the Constitution of
India. H
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.
A 40. Main submission of Dr. Dhavan has been that since the 1972
statute specifically deals with architectural education along with certain
other areas pertaining to regulating the profession of architects, the
provisions of the said Act ought to prevail over the provisions of the
1987 Act. This statute, according to him is “architect” and “architectural
education” specific. On the point of implied repeal, his submission is
B
that as a proposition of law, implied repeal of an earlier statute under
the normal circumstances ought not to be presumed merely because a
subsequent legislation having common subjects of legislation comes into
operation unless there is express provision to that effect. The decisions
relied upon in support of this proposition is the case of M/s. Mathra
C Parshad and Sons Vs. State of Punjab and Others9. This judgment
is an authority for the proposition that in absence of express provision
no repeal can be implied unless the two statutes cannot stand together.
He also referred to another authority i.e. A.B. Abdulkadir Vs. State
of Kerala10. Relying on the latter authority, he has argued that in the
event the later Act deals with substantially the same subject as that of
D
a former Act, then the principle of repeal could be applied. In the case
A.B. Abdulkadir (supra), however, the subsequent statute, being
Finance Act, a Central legislation had specific provision for repeal of
the corresponding laws.
41. He has also referred to several authorities to contend that
E the definition clause has to be construed with caution and a particular
definition given in such clause may have to be reversed, if the statutory
context otherwise requires. According to him, the context can be
external and can relate to another existing legislation. CoA’s case on
this point is that though architecture is included in the definition of
F “technical education” in the 1987 Act, coverage of the said subject in
terms of the regulatory framework created thereunder cannot be
automatically inferred. The rationale behind this submission of CoA is
that the 1972 Act covers architecture education specifically in all its
aspects. The authorities cited for this proposition are:-
G Assn. of Registration Plates v. Union of India11; Whirlpool
Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks12; K.V. Muthu v. Angamuthu
9
1962 Supp (1) SCR 913
10
1962 Supp (2) SCR 741
11
(2005) 1 SCC 679
12
H (1998) 8 SCC 1
ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. v. PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA 505
BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH. [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]
Ammal13;Printers (Mysore) Ltd. V. Asstt. CTO; 14Pushpa Devi A
v. Milkhi Ram. 15
42. The distinction or difference between Technical institutions
and Technical education as contained in the 1987 statute has been dealt
with by the two Judge Benches of this Court in the cases of
Bharathidasan University (supra) and Association of Management B
of Private Colleges (supra). On the same point, two other authorities
have been cited on behalf of CoA dealing with the repugnancy between
a State Act and a Central Act under Article 254 of the Constitution of
India. These are Municipal Council Palai Vs. T.J. Joseph16 and
Tika Ramji Vs. State of U.P.17 He has further argued that under
ordinary circumstances, special law ought to override the general law. C
According to him, the 1972 Act is a special law, dealing with, inter alia,
recognition of institutions conducting architectural education. The 1987
Act, in his submission is a general law dealing with technical education
as a whole. It is his case that technical education may include degree
or diploma in architecture. In these appeals, there is specific legislation
D
dealing with architectural education. In the event there is conflict
between the norms and standards set under the general law, which,
according to him is the 1987 Act and law specifically dealing with
architectural education being 1972 Act, he has argued that proper course
would be to proceed on the basis that the intention of the legislature
was to keep out the provisions relating to standards and norms pertaining E
to architectural education from the 1987 Act and Regulations framed
thereunder and mandate following the norms and standards stipulated
in the 1972 Act and connected Regulations. Other authorities relied on
for this proposition are: R.S. Raghunath Vs. State of Karnataka18;
LIC Vs. D.J. Bahadur19 ; U.P. State Electricity Board Vs. Hari
Shankar Jain20; and J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. F
Ltd. Vs. State of U.P.21 These are all authorities in support of the
proposition of law that a general provision should yield to the special
provision, if two statutes are in direct conflict.
13
(1997) 2 SCC 53
14
(1994) 2 SCC 434 G
15
(1990) 2 SCC 134
16
(1964) 2 SCR 87
17
((1956) 1 SCR 393
18
(1992) 1 SCC 335
19
(1981) 1 SCC 315
20
(1978) 4 SCC 16
21
(1961) 3 SCR 185 H
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.
A 43. His main reliance is on the case of Bharathidasan
University (supra), in support of his argument that so far as education
in Architecture is concerned, the 1972 Act ought to survive and not
eclipsed by the 1987 legislation. In the case of Bharathidasan
University, the main point involved was as to whether a university in
order to start a course on technical education was required to obtain
B
prior approval of the AICTE or not. The University in question in that
case was constituted under Bharathidasan University Act 1981 with
its specified area of operation over three districts in the State of Tamil
Nadu. The university commenced courses in technology related subjects
such as Information Technology, Management, Bioengineering and
C Technology, Petrochemical Engineering and Technology, Pharmaceutical
Engineering and Technology etc. The AICTE had objected to running
of such courses without their prior approval. It filed a writ petition before
the Madras High Court to prevent the University authorities from
running/conducting any course or programme in technical education.
The University took a plea that it would not fall within the definition of
D
technical institution contained in Section 2 (h) of the 1987 Act and thus
was outside the purview of Section 10 (k) thereof. Section 2 (h) of the
1987 Act stipulates:-
“(h) “Technical institution” means an institution, not being a
university which offers courses or programmes of technical
E education, and shall include such other institutions as the Central
Government may, in consultation with the Council, by notification
in the Official Gazette, declare as technical institutions.”
It was held in this judgment :-
F “15. To put it in a nutshell, a reading of Section 10 of the AICTE
Act will make it clear that whenever the Act omits to cover a
“university”, the same has been specifically provided in the
provisions of the Act. For example, while under clause (k) of
Section 10 only “technical institutions” are referred to, clause (o)
of Section 10 provides for the guidelines for admission of students
G to “technical institutions” and “universities” imparting technical
education. If we look at the definition of a “technical institution”
under Section 2(h) of the Act, it is clear that a “technical
institution” cannot include a “university”. The clear intention of
the legislature is not that all institutions whether university or
H otherwise ought to be treated as “technical institutions” covered
ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. v. PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA 507
BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH. [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]
by the Act. If that was the intention, there was no difficulty for A
the legislature to have merely provided a definition of “technical
institution” by not excluding “university” from the definition
thereof and thereby avoided the necessity to use alongside both
the words “technical institutions” and university in several
provisions in the Act. The definition of “technical institution”
B
excludes from its purview a “university”. When by definition a
“university” is excluded from a “technical institution”, to interpret
that such a clause or such an expression wherever the expression
“technical institution” occurs will include a “university” will be
reading into the Act what is not provided therein. The power to
grant approval for starting new technical institutions and for C
introduction of new courses or programmes in consultation with
the agencies concerned is covered by Section 10(k) which would
not cover a “university” but only a “technical institution”. If
Section 10(k) does not cover a “university” but only a “technical
institution”, a regulation cannot be framed in such a manner so
D
as to apply the regulation framed in respect of “technical
institution” to apply to universities when the Act maintains a
complete dichotomy between a “university” and a “technical
institution”. Thus, we have to focus our attention mainly to the
Act in question on the language adopted in that enactment. In
that view of the matter, it is, therefore, not even necessary to E
examine the scope of other enactments or whether the Act
prevails over the University Act or effect of competing entries
falling under Entries 63 to 65 of List I vis-à-vis Entry 25 of List
III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
16. The fact that initially the Syndicate of the appellant University F
passed a resolution to seek for approval from AICTE and did
not pursue the matter on those lines thereafter or that other similar
entities were adopting such a course of obtaining the same and
that the Andhra Pradesh High Court in M. Sambasiva Rao
case [(1997) 1 An LT 629 (FB)] had taken a particular view of
the matter are not reasons which can be countenanced in law G
to non-suit the appellant. Nor such reasons could be relevant or
justifying factors to draw any adverse finding against and deny
relief by rejecting the claims of the appellant University. We also
place on record the statement of the learned Senior Counsel for
the appellant, which, in our view, even otherwise is the correct H
508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.
A position of law, that the challenge of the appellant with reference
to the Regulation in question and claim of AICTE that the
appellant University should seek and obtain prior approval of
AICTE to start a department or commence a new course or
programme in technical education does not mean that they have
no obligation or duty to conform to the standards and norms laid
B
down by AICTE for the purpose of ensuring coordinated and
integrated development of technical education and maintenance
of standards.”
44. In the case of Association of Management of Private
Colleges Vs. All India Council of Technical Education and
C Others22, the dispute was between private colleges, including certain
colleges affiliated to Bharathidasan University on one side and AICTE
on the other, broadly on the same question which engaged this Court
in the case of Bhartidasan University. In this decision, referring to
certain portions of the judgment of this Court in the case of
D Parshvanath Charitable Trust (supra), it was held:-
“52. The italicised portions from the said decision in Parshvanath
Charitable Trust case [Parshvanath Charitable Trust v. All
India Council for Technical Education, (2013) 3 SCC 385]
referred to supra would make it clear that the AICTE Act does
E not contain any evidence of an intention to belittle and destroy
the authority or autonomy of other statutory bodies which they
are assigned to perform. Further, the AICTE Act does not intend
to be an authority either superior or to supervise or control the
universities and thereby superimpose itself upon the said
universities merely for the reason that it is laying down certain
F teaching standards in technical education or programmes
formulated in any of the department or units. It is evident that
while enacting the AICTE Act, Parliament was fully alive to the
existence of the provisions of the UGC Act, 1956 particularly,
the said provisions extracted above. Therefore, the definition of
G “technical institution” in Section 2(h) of the AICTE Act which
authorises AICTE to do certain things, special care has
consciously and deliberately been taken to make specific mention
of university, wherever and whenever AICTE alone was
expected to interact with a university and its departments as well
22
H (2013) 8 SCC 271
ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. v. PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA 509
BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH. [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]
as constituent institutions and units. It was held after analysing A
the provision of Sections 10, 11 and 12 of the AICTE Act that
the role of the inspection conferred upon AICTE vis-à-vis
universities is limited to the purpose of ensuring proper
maintenance of norms and standards in the technical education
system so as to conform to the standards laid down by it with
B
no further or direct control over such universities or scope for
any direct action except bringing it to the notice of UGC. In that
background, this Court in Bharathidasan University
case [Bharathidasan University v. All India Council for
Technical Education, (2001) 8 SCC 676] made it very clear by
making the observation that it has examined the scope of the C
enactment as to whether the AICTE Act prevails over the UGC
Act or the fact of competent entries fall in List I Entry 66 vis-à-
vis List III Entry 25 of Schedule VII of the Constitution.
53. A cumulative reading of the aforesaid paragraphs
of Bharathidasan University case [Bharathidasan D
University v. All India Council for Technical Education,
(2001) 8 SCC 676] which are extracted above makes it very
clear that this Court has exempted universities, its colleges,
constituent institutions and units from seeking prior approval
from AICTE. Also, from the reading of paras 19 and 20 E
of Parshvanath Charitable Trust case [Parshvanath
Charitable Trust v. All India Council for Technical Education,
(2013) 3 SCC 385] it is made clear after careful scanning of the
provisions of the AICTE Act and the University Grants
Commission Act, 1956 that the role of AICTE vis-à-vis
universities is only advisory, recommendatory and one of providing F
guidance and has no authority empowering it to issue or enforce
any sanctions by itself.
54. It is rightly pointed out from the affidavit filed by UGC as
directed by this Court in these cases on the question of affiliated
colleges to the university, that the affidavit is very mechanical G
and it has simply and gratuitously without foundation, added as
technical institutions including affiliated colleges without any legal
foundation. Paras 13, 14, 15 and 19 of the affidavit filed by UGC
and the assertion made in Para 23 is without any factual
foundation, which reads as under: H
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.
A “That it is further submitted that affiliated colleges are distinct
and different than the constituent colleges. Thus, it cannot be said
that constituent colleges also include affiliated colleges.”
Further, the assertion of UGC as rightly pointed out by Dr
Dhavan in the written submission filed on behalf of the appellant
B in CA No. 1145 of 2004 that the claim that UGC does not have
any provision to grant approval of technical institution, is facile
as it has already been laid down by this Court that the AICTE
norms can be applied to the affiliated colleges through UGC. It
can only advise UGC for formulating the standards of education
and other aspects to UGC. In view of the law laid down in
C Bharathidasan University [Bharathidasan University v. All
India Council for Technical Education, (2001) 8 SCC 676]
and Parshvanath Charitable Trust [Parshvanath Charitable
Trust v. All India Council for Technical Education, (2013) 3
SCC 385] cases, the learned Senior Counsel Dr Dhavan has
D rightly submitted for rejection of the affidavit of UGC, which we
have to accept as the same is without any factual foundation and
also contrary to the intent and object of the Act.”
45. Learned counsel appearing for different institutions in this set
of appeals have broadly supported the arguments advanced on behalf
E of CoA. Learned counsel for the Muslim Educational Association
[the appellant in SLP(C) No.28121 of 2018] has assailed the decision
of the Calicut University refusing to give affiliation to the said institution.
Reference has been made to regulation 15(3) of the Minimum Standards
of Architectural Education Regulation, 2015, which gives 3 years to
provide the building for different infrastructural facilities for a college
F coming within the ambit of the said Act. In fact, it has been argued on
behalf of the said institution that the University could not demand AICTE
approval and within the State of Kerala, there were many institutions
imparting architectural education solely on the basis of recognition
granted under the 1972 Act.
G 46. In the case of Bharathidasan University (supra), this Court
found that in the 1987 Act, there is a distinction made by the legislature
between a technical institution per se and certain other kinds of
institutions over which some other kind of monitoring or supervision is
there by properly constituted universities. That would be apparent from
H the definition of technical institution under the 1987 Act. Sections 10
ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. v. PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA 511
BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH. [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]
(k) and (m) of the 1987 Act also specifically deal with technical A
institution. Thus the 1987 Act recognises the distinguishing feature of
a technical institution not being a university. The Council constituted
under it has supervisory and monitoring power over technical institutions
not being a university imparting courses in technical education. This was
one of the main reasoning as to why it was found by this Court in the
B
case of Bharathidasan University (supra) that the said university
would remain out of the regulatory ambit of the AICTE. Broadly the
same logic was followed in the other authority, Association of
Management of Private Colleges (supra). The case of Adhiyaman
Educational and Research Institute and Others (supra), was
distinguished in this decision and the relevant paragraphs in that regard C
have been referred to earlier in this judgment. None of the authorities
cited on behalf of the AICTE, however, deals with a situation where
there is a pre-existing Central legislation dealing with overlapping power
on the same subject coming within the definition of “technical
education”.
D
47. CoA in these appeals wants to establish its pre-dominance
on the ground that the 1972 Act is a special Act and AICTE’s stand
on the other hand is that the 1987 Act having come to the statue book
on a later date, the provisions thereof ought to prevail when the same
are in conflict with an earlier statute. As a proposition of law, we accept
E
AICTE’s stand that there need not be complete identity in the subject-
matters of the two rival statutes being tested in the yardstick of point
of time of their commencement of operation. Again, as a proposition
of law, the principle of law canvassed by the rival bodies are accepted
tools of construction. But they require application having regard to the
specific circumstances of a given case. It is not an absolute proposition F
of law that a later Act would always prevail over the former in the
event there are clashing provisions even if there is no express provision
of repeal. In the case of Ajoy Kumar Banerjee (supra), it was held,
referring to Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition:-
“39. From the text and the decisions, four tests are deducible G
and these are :(i) the Legislature has the undoubted right to alter
a law already promulgated through subsequent legislation, (ii) A
special law may be altered, abrogated or repealed by a later
general law by an express provision, (iii) A later general law will
override a prior special law if the two are so repugnant to each H
512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.
A other that they cannot co-exist even though no express provision
in that behalf is found in the general law, and (iv) It is only in
the absence of a provision to the contrary and of a clear
inconsistency that a special law will remain wholly unaffected
by a later general law.”
B 48. We shall examine now as to whether the 1972 Act fits the
description of a special legislation so as to prevail over a subsequent
enactment covering its field or area of operation. A special law implies
a statute covering a particular subject specifically. The subject of conflict
in the present proceedings is architectural education. The 1972 Act
C however does not solely deal with architectural education. The Act
intends to control or regulate the profession of architects. It has two
main features, one part dealing with regulating the profession of architect
and the other part regulating architectural education. Significant portion
of the statute deals with formation of the CoA but the function of that
body is essentially to regulate and monitor the other two areas of this
D
statue. So far as effect of recognition is concerned, Section 17 of the
1972 Act stipulates:-
“17. Effect of recognition.- Notwithstanding anything contained
in any other law, but subject to the provisions of this Act, any
recognised qualification shall be a sufficient qualification for
E
enrolment in the register.”
49. The 1987 Act deals with technical education and in particular
the methodology for approval technical institutions and their monitoring.
The dispute has arisen in these proceedings as architecture has been
F included with other subjects in the definition of “technical education”
[Section 2 (g)]. Dr. Dhavan wants us, in effect, to exclude the subject
of architecture from the said definition clause while construing the
applicability of the Regulations for approval of a technical institution
and its subsequent monitoring. He has referred to the opening sentence
of Section 2 of the 1987 Act, which contains the definitions and reads:-
G
“In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires..”
Such context, according to him can be external, outside the
specific statute and includes other subsisting legislations. Before we deal
with this submission, we shall refer to certain other key features of the
H two enactments.
ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. v. PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA 513
BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH. [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]
50. The provisions of 1987 Act have not been immunised by a A
non-obstante clause like the one employed in Section 17 of the 1972
Act. Having regard to the scheme and provisions of these two statutes,
ex-facie it is difficult to label either of them as special law or general
law. The 1987 Act has certain features of a special law being devoted
to setting up, supervision and monitoring of institutions imparting
B
technical education. But the said statute does not cover technical
education imparted by all types of institutions. The exceptions have been
clearly mentioned in Section 2(h) of the act and explained in the cases
of Bharathidasan University (supra) and Association of
Management of private colleges (supra). So far as the 1972 Act is
concerned, its application is not confined to architecture education alone. C
This enactment contemplates establishing the Council of Architecture,
recognizing degrees and diplomas in architecture and regulating the
profession of architects. But there is inter-link between architecture
education and registration of architects, on which aspect we shall dilate
later in this judgment.
D
51. Under both the statutes there are overlapping areas under
which the respective Councils could make Regulations. Though these
Acts, by themselves, do not come into direct conflict the inconsistencies
have surfaced in implementing the power given to the Councils
constituted under the respective enactments. AICTE contends that the E
later statute ought to prevail and as a corollary the regulations framed
under the later statute should prevail. CoA wants its power to eclipse
AICTE’s dominant role as a regulator in relation to architectural
education on the strength of the 1972 Act being a special Act. The
three regulations under the 1987 Act which have been brought to our
notice do not directly lay down any specific norm or standard which F
ought to be followed. Such norms appear to have been set by the
AICTE in pursuance of the aforesaid regulations. The two Regulations
of 1994 do not lay down specifically such norms. The 2016 regulations
has provision for Approval Process Hand Book which may be published
from time to time laying down the manner in which approval shall be G
given.
52. In the case of State of Tamil Nadu and Another (supra),
conflict was between State Legislations, being Tamil Nadu Private
Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976 and Madras University Act 1923 and
the provisions of 1987 Act. In this judgment it was, inter-alia, held :- H
514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.
A “30. A comparison of the Central Act and the University Act
will show that as far as the institutions imparting technical
education are concerned, there is a conflict between and
overlapping of the functions of the Council and the University.
Under Section 10 of the Central Act, it is the Council which is
entrusted with the power, particularly, to allocate and disburse
B
grants, to evolve suitable performance appraisal systems
incorporating norms and mechanisms for maintaining
accountability of the technical institutions, laying down norms and
standards for courses, curricula, staff pattern, staff qualifications,
assessment and examinations, fixing norms and guidelines for
C charging tuition fee and other fees, granting approval for starting
new technical institutions or introducing new courses or
programmes, to lay down norms or granting autonomy to technical
institutions, providing guidelines for admission of students,
inspecting or causing to inspect colleges, for withholding or
D discontinuing of grants in respect of courses and programmes,
declaring institutions at various levels and types fit to receive
grants, advising the Commission constituted under the Act for
declaring technical educational institutions as deemed universities,
setting up of National Board of Accreditation to periodically
conduct evaluation on the basis of guidelines and standards
E specified and to make recommendations to it or to the Council
or the Commission or other bodies under the Act regarding
recognition or de-recognition of the institution or the programme
conducted by it. Thus, so far as these matters are concerned, in
the case of the institutes imparting technical education, it is not
F the University Act and the University but it is the Central Act
and the Council created under it which will have the jurisdiction.
To that extent, after the coming into operation of the Central Act,
the provisions of the University Act will be deemed to have
become unenforceable in case of technical colleges like the
engineering colleges. As has been pointed out earlier, the Central
G Act has been enacted by Parliament under Entry 66 of List I to
coordinate and determine the standards of technical institutions
as well as under Entry 25 of List III. The provisions of the
University Act regarding affiliation of technical colleges like the
engineering colleges and the conditions for grant and continuation
H of such affiliation by the University shall, however, remain
ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. v. PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA 515
BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH. [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]
operative but the conditions that are prescribed by the University A
for grant and continuance of affiliation will have to be in
conformity with the norms and guidelines prescribed by the
Council in respect of matters entrusted to it under Section 10 of
the Central Act.”
53. The case of Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Limited B
(supra) also gives primacy to the AICTE on the question of necessity
for an engineering college to obtain approval from the AICTE. In this
case, question arose on the point as to whether engineering degree
courses operated by colleges could be conducted by open universities
through distance learning mode in absence of approval by the AICTE. C
This case and the case of Parshvnath Charitable Trust and Others
(supra) have been discussed in the preceding paragraphs. These
authorities cited on behalf of the AICTE however do not deal with
conflict arising from two Regulations framed under two Central statutes,
both conferring regulatory powers over a particular subject in the field
of technical education on two different statutory bodies. The ratio of D
the decision in the case of Bharathidasan University (supra),
expanded by the two Judge Bench judgment in the case of Association
of Management of Private Colleges (supra) have been cited in
support of CoA’s contention that the 1972 Act should be treated as a
special statute and Regulations framed thereunder should override those E
framed under the 1987 Act.
54. For the sole reason of there being overlapping subjects, Courts
straightaway may not get into an exercise to find out if one statute
intends to eclipse the other. But in the present set of appeals, intention
of the legislature to override one by the other can be examined by F
analyzing the provisions of the two statutes. The duty of the regulatory
bodies in a situation of this nature would be to come out with a unified
regime, which this Court expected in the case of Municipal Council,
Palia (supra). The two regulatory bodies in the field of architectural
education however have not taken this approach and on the other hand
have engaged themselves in a dispute over turf-control. In such a G
situation, under normal circumstances attempt should be made first at
reconciliation of the competing statutory instruments. If that exercise
fails, then the aim would be to find out what is the dominant purpose
or principal subject-matter of a particular statute and then construe the
conflicting provisions of the respective Regulations to match the H
516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.
A dominant statutory purpose. In the case of L.I.C. Vs. D.J. Bahadur
(supra), it has been observed by a three Judge Bench of this Court: -
“52. In determining whether a statute is a special or a general
one, the focus must be on the principal subject-matter plus the
particular perspective. For certain purposes, an Act may be
B general and for certain other purposes it may be special and we
cannot blur distinctions when dealing with finer points of law. In
law, we have a cosmos of relativity, not absolutes-so too in life.”
55. On the subject of implied repeal, the course to be followed
by the Court has been explained in the well-known text “Principles of
C Statutory Interpretation”, by Justice G.P. Singh (14th Edition). We give
below the following quotation from page 737 of this text:-
“There is a presumption against a repeal by implication; and the
reason of this rule is based on the theory that the Legislature
while enacting a law has complete knowledge of the existing laws
D on the same subject-matter, and therefore, when it does not
provide a repealing provision, it gives out an intention not to repeal
the existing legislation. When the new Act contains a repealing
section mentioning the Acts which it expressly repeals, the
presumption against implied repeal of other laws is further
strengthened on the principle expressio unius est exclusio
E alterius. Further, the presumption will be comparatively strong
in case of virtually contemporaneous Acts. The continuance of
existing legislation, in the absence of an express provision of
repeal, being presumed, the burden to show that there has been
a repeal by implication lies on the party asserting the same. The
F presumption is, however, rebutted and a repeal is inferred by
necessary implication when the provisions of the later Act are
so inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions of the earlier
Act ‘that the two cannot stand together’. But, if the two may
be read together and some application may be made of the
words in the earlier Act, a repeal will not be inferred.”
G
56. Having regard to the disputes involved in each of these
appeals, proper course for us would be to find out the decision of which
of these two regulatory bodies ought to prevail. For this purpose, it is
necessary to ascertain the dominant purpose of the two legislations
covering the field of architectural education. Section 10 of the 1987
H Act mandates the AICTE to undertake the duties on the subjects
ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. v. PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA 517
BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH. [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]
specified therein. But it has already been held by two Benches of this A
Court comprising of two Judges each in the cases of Bharathidasan
University (supra) and Association of Management of Private
Colleges (supra) that a university or its affiliate colleges could run
courses in technical education without approval of the AICTE.
57. The process of recognition and effect thereof are more B
expansive under the 1972 Act. All “authorities” require recognition by
the Central Government to conduct any degree or diploma course in
architecture education to qualify for being recognised qualification. The
CoA under the said Act plays a key role in the process of recognition.
There is no exclusion or exemption of any institution from undergoing
C
such recognition process except the subsisting ones at the time the Act
became operational. The CoA has also wide monitoring power under
Section 18 and 19 of the Act of every authority which grants recognized
qualification under the said Act.
58. Moreover, Section 17 of the said Act is armed with a non-
D
obstante clause. The implication of the said clause in Section 17 of the
1972 Act is that to be on the register of architects in India, recognized
qualification would be sufficient. There is no provision under the 1972
Act or in any Rule thereunder which would entitle a person trained from
an AICTE approved technical institution in architecture to describe
himself as an architect or get himself registered as such without E
recognised qualification under the 1972 Act. This would be apparent
from the provisions of Section 35 of the Act, which stipulates:-
“35. Effect of registration.—(1) Any reference in any law for
the time being in force to an architect shall be deemed to be a
reference to an architect registered under this Act. F
(2) After the expiry of two years from the date appointed under
sub-section (2) of Section 24, a person who is registered in the
register shall get preference for appointment as an architect under
the Central or State Government or in any other local body or
institution which is supported or aided from the public or local G
funds or in any recognised by the Central or State Government.”
Sub-section (2) of the said provision is not of much relevance
for adjudication of the subject dispute. The scheme of the Act thus
demonstrates that lack of recognized qualification under the 1972 Act
would in substance disentitle a person from being registered as an H
518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.
A architect. He would not be able to legally represent himself as an
architect in India. This being the statutory mandate, CoA’s role in the
process of recognition of qualification of an architect cannot be said to
have been obliterated by the 1987 Act. It is a fact that 1987 Act is
primarily concerned with setting-up and running of a technical institution
and not with regulating the professions of individuals qualifying from
B
such institutions. But under the 1972 Act, conducting a course on
architectural education and regulating the profession of architect are
statutorily interwoven. Recognition of degrees or diplomas in architecture
cannot be amputated from the said Act and held to have been replaced
by the 1987 Act. That would render the 1972 enactment unworkable.
C
59. The third distinguishing element of the 1972 Act is that the
CoA is not the ultimate decision-making authority but it is the Central
Government in relation to process of recognition of degree or diploma
in architectural education or withdrawal thereof. Such decision is
required to be taken after consultation with the CoA. But since CoA
D has been conferred with power to make regulations in relation to, inter-
alia, recognition norms and monitoring of institutions imparting
architectural education, CoA’s role in such process is critical. The
approval power of AICTE is direct. But in the event AICTE’s norms
come into conflict with that of CoA, any report or representation the
E CoA may make to the Central Government would be dependent upon
the decision of the Central Government. The Central Government’s
decision, taken under the provisions of the 1972 Act in such a case
would obviously prevail, the latter being an authority superior to both
the Councils constituted under the two statutes.
F 60. AICTE is exercising its power to regulate institutions imparting
architectural education on the strength of definition of technical
education, which has been defined to mean programmes of education,
research and training in architecture. The duty of the AICTE to regulate
“technical education” is derived from the provisions of Section 10 of
the 1987 Act. It has been contended on behalf of the CoA, referring
G
to the provisions of Section 2 of the 1987 Act, that the context of
regulating architecture education requires exclusion of the expression
“architecture” from the definition of technical education. In the case
of Pushpa Devi and others (supra), it has been held that it is
permissible for the Court to refer to “internal and external context” while
H giving meaning to a definition contained in the interpretation clause of
ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. v. PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA 519
BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH. [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]
a statue. In this decision, it was observed that a word exhaustively A
expressed in the definition can have different meanings in different parts
of a statute. Broadly, the same principle of construction has been
adopted in the cases of Printers (Mysore) Ltd. and Another (supra)
and Whirlpool Corporation (supra).
In the case of K.V. Muthu (supra), it has been held:- B
“12. Where the definition or expression, as in the instant case, is
preceded by the words “unless the context otherwise requires,”
the said definition set out in the section is to be applied and given
effect to but this rule, which is the normal rule may be departed
from if there be something in the context to show that the C
definition could not be applied.”
61. So far as these appeals are concerned, to altogether exclude
architecture from the purview of AICTE, that expression, i.e.
architecture would have to be dropped from the definition of technical
education. In our opinion, if the issue is examined in the external context, D
which in this case would be the provisions of 1972 Act, such a course
would be inevitable. In the event AICTE’s stand is to be accepted and
CoA’s role is eliminated from the recognition process of architectural
qualification, then a person having a degree or diploma from an AICTE
approved institution only would in effect not be entitled to enrollment
in the register of architects and would not be able to represent himself E
as an architect. Secondly, in view of the decisions of this Court in the
cases of Bharatidasan University (supra) and Association of
Management of Private Colleges (supra), there would be two parallel
authorities regulating architectural education. CoA would regulate
universities and affiliated colleges imparting such education while F
AICTE would supervise rest of the institutions. Moreover, the authority
of Central Government to recognize qualifications in architecture
education would stand obliterated by a body, AICTE and that too in
respect of certain categories of technical institutions only.
62. The authorities we have referred to are for the proposition G
that a meaning different to what is ascribed in the definition clause can
be given to a word in different parts of a statute if the context so
demands. The subject-dispute involved in these appeals requires
omission of the word architecture from the definition of technical
education. Such a course, in our opinion, is also a permissible tool of
construction to prevent absurd or unworkable results flowing from a H
520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.
A statute. Here we reproduce the following passage from “Bennion on
Statutory Interpretation” by F A R Bennion, Fifth Edition published by
Lexis Nexis (at page 972).
“ Strained construction We have the authority of Lord Reid for
the statement that, to avoid an unworkable result, a strained
B construction may be justified even where the enactment is not
grammatically ambiguous. Lord Reid said that cases where it has
properly been held that one word can be struck out of a statute
and another substituted include the case where without such
substitution the provision would be unworkable.”
C 63. We are of the opinion that in respect of the provisions of
Section 2 (g) of the 1987 Act, the definition of “technical education”
would have to be given such a construction and the word “architecture”
should be treated to have been inapplicable in cases where the AICTE
imports its regulatory framework for institutions undertaking technical
education. There would however be no substitution because the context
D would not demand it. This construction of the definition clause is
necessary as the external context requires it to prevent an unworkable
outcome in implementation of the 1987 Act. The principle of implied
repeal cannot apply so far as the provisions relating to architecture
education is concerned, on the basis of the 1987 Act having become
operational. One of the dominant purposes of the 1972 Act is recognition
E of qualifications on architecture. The registration of an architect is
dependent upon acquisition of such recognised qualification. The said
Act cannot be held to have been repealed by implication for the sole
reason of inclusion of the word “architecture” in the definition of
technical education. AICTE has failed to discharge its onus to establish
F the said provisions of the 1972 Act was repealed by implication.
64. We accordingly hold that so far as recognition of degrees
and diplomas of architecture education is concerned, the 1972 Act shall
prevail. AICTE will not be entitled to impose any regulatory measure
in connection with the degrees and diplomas in the subject of
architecture. Norms and Regulations set by CoA and other specified
G
authorities under the 1972 Act would have to be followed by an
institution imparting education for degrees and diplomas in architecture.
65. Now we shall turn to the individual appeals –
(a) We sustain the judgment of the Bombay High Court
H forming subject-matter of Appeal No.364 of 2005. The
ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. v. PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA 521
BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH. [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]
appeal of the All India Council of Technical Education A
is dismissed.
(b) Three appeals arose from the judgment of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior Bench delivered on 2nd
February, 2011 in W.P. No. 315 of 2011. These are Civil
Appeal No……./2019 (arising out of SLP(C) No.5400/ B
2011), Civil Appeal No……/2019 (arising out of SLP(C)
No.8443/2011) and Civil Appeal No……/2019 (arising out
of SLP(C) No.20460/2011). Rajeev Gandhi Proudyogiki
Vishwavidyalyalay is the appellant in the Civil Appeal
arising out of SLP(C) No. 5400/2011. It wants
compliance of the CoA norms and invalidation of the C
directive requiring it to grant temporary affiliation by the
High Court without CoA’s approval. The appellant in the
second Civil Appeal (arising out of SLP(C)No.8443/2011)
is the institution, Bharatiya Vidya Mandir Shiksha Samiti.
It has questioned the necessity of obtaining CoA’s D
approval or the requirement of compliance with the
conditions set by them. It wants compliance of AICTE
norms to be treated as adequate. For the reasons
explained earlier in this judgment, we dismiss the appeal
of Bharatiya Vidya Mandir Shiksha Samiti. The High
Court has directed in the judgment under appeal E
compliance of the conditions communicated by the CoA.
The academic session involved is 2010-2011. This Court
at the notice stage in the university’s appeal
[SLP(C)No.5400 of 2011] granted interim stay of the
order of the High Court. Subsequently, there were F
admissions from time to time with interim directions of
this Court. We accordingly dispose of this appeal of the
Rajeev Gandhi Proudyogiki Vishwavidyalaya with
direction that the process of recognition contained in the
1972 Act ought to be implemented in respect of the
subject institution before any further admission takes G
place. But so far as admissions already undertaken in
terms of interim orders of this Court, we direct that such
admissions ought not be disturbed. We direct so, as we
find the High Court itself had directed compliance of CoA
norms in the judgment under appeal and compliance of H
522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R.
A building requirements set by CoA was to be effected
within one year. Thus, in our opinion, CoA norms were
substantially directed to be complied with. We also make
it clear that the AICTE would not have any regulatory
control over the concerned institution so far as
architecture education is concerned. We are of the
B
opinion that in the appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.20460
of 2011 that CoA ought to have been impleaded as a
party respondent in the said writ petition. We are also
of the opinion that decision of the High Court to issue
the directions contained in the judgment under appeal in
C absence of CoA being added in the array of respondents
was erroneous. But we do not issue any independent
direction as these appeals were heard together as batch
matters and the grievances of the CoA have been
addressed to in our judgment. Having held that the 1972
Act shall prevail on the question of recognition of degrees
D
and diplomas in architecture education, we dispose of this
appeal of the CoA in the above terms.
(c) The Civil Appeals arising out of SLP(C) No. 17005 of
2016 and SLP(C)No.17006 of 2016 have been instituted
by the AICTE against a common judgment of the
E Karnataka High Court in Writ Appeal No.110 of 2013
and Writ Appeal No. 112 of 2013. The dispute in these
matters relate to the question of obtaining mandatory
approval from the AICTE for running course on
architecture. The former appeal arose out of
F contradictory directives issued by AICTE and CoA over
admission of two students beyond the intake capacity.
The observation of the Karnataka High Court in a
common judgment has been that the controversies would
be subject to the outcome of the appeal arising out of
G the Bench decision of the Bombay High Court. That is
the first appeal we have dealt with in this judgment. We
accordingly dispose of these two appeals in terms of our
decision contained in the preceding sub-paragraph (a).
AICTE would not have any power to impose its
regulatory measures on the concerned institution so far
H as architecture education is concerned.
ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDU. v. PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA 523
BOARDING HOUSE’S COLLEGE. OF ARCH. [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]
(d) The decision of the Kerala High Court in the Civil Appeal A
arising out of SLP(C)No. 28121 of 2018 is set aside. The
appeal is allowed. The institution involved in this appeal
shall be entitled to operate with recognition obtained under
the 1972 Act.
66. All interim orders passed in these appeals shall stand dissolved. B
All connected applications shall stand disposed of. There shall be no
order as to costs.
Divya Pandey Appeals disposed of.
C
D
E
F
G
H
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