Holding

Section 59(3)(b) vests the Municipal Commissioner with absolute control to suspend municipal officers pending a departmental inquiry, and such power remains even after an acquittal in a criminal case.

Summary

During the construction of Yeshwant Stadium, two accidents caused seven deaths and eight injuries. The municipal officers responsible for the work were suspended pending a departmental inquiry, first on 23 September 1974 and again after a charge‑sheet under IPC 304A was filed in 1976. The High Court quashed the suspensions, holding that only the Corporation, not the Municipal Commissioner, could order suspension. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Section 59(3)(b) of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 expressly vests the Municipal Commissioner with the power to suspend officers pending a departmental inquiry, and that such power is not lost even if the officer is later acquitted in a criminal trial. The Court also directed speedy disposal of the pending criminal case and clarified that continuation of the departmental inquiry after acquittal is at the discretion of the department. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court order and allowed the appeal.

Issues considered

The Municipal Commissioner’s competence to suspend municipal officers pending a departmental inquiry under Section 59(3)(b) of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948.
Whether a departmental inquiry must continue if the officer is acquitted in the related criminal case.

Legislation cited

City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948s. 59(3)(b)
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 304A

Subjects

municipal lawsuspensiondepartmental inquirycontrolCity of Nagpur Corporation Actcriminal caseacquittaladministrative law

Judgment

22

A CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NAGPUR
CIVIL LINES, NAGPUR & ANR.
v.
RAMCHANDRA S/O GURUNATH MODAK & ORS.
February 26, 1981
B [S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. VARADARAJAN AND
V.B. ERADI, JJ.]
City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948-Section 59{3)(b)-Municipal Com-
missioner is the competent authority to suspend municipal officers and servants,
pending a .departmental inqulry-Words and phrases "control" and "vests'.',
c explained'-Criminal cases to be disposed off to protect. the accused from harass-
ment.:_Departmental inquiry, whether. can be continued after acquittai In 'a
criminal case.

During the construction of a stadium called the Yeshwant Stadium, which
was being looked ;ifter by the respondents, two accidents occurred resulting in the
death of seven persons and i11jur1ies. to eight persons. Pending a departmental
inquiry!fn the said connection, an order of suspension was passed by the
D Municipal Commissioner on the 23rd of September, 1974 which was confirllied
by. the eorporation by its order of the same date. According to the respondents
the later orde.r was not communicated to them. Pursuant.to a criminal complaint
filed before)t, the police filed a charge-sheet under section 304-A Penal Code
against the respondents on the 25th of September, 1976. In view of the charge-
sheet submitted by the police another order of suspension was passed by the
Municipal Commissioner on 13-1-1917 with effect from 8-10-76~ The respondents
E filed an appeal to departmental appellate authority which was dismissed on the
20th of July, 1977. Thereafter the respondents filed a writ petition in the High
Court which allowed the petition taking the view that under the rules and bye-
laws of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948, as amended upto date, the
competent authority to pass orders of suspension against the respondents was the
Corporation itself and not the Chief Executive Officer. The High Court quashed
the orders of suspension and directed the reinstatement of the respondents and
F payment of their full salary to them. Hence the appeal by special leave.
fy_
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD : 1:1. Clause (b) of Section 59(3) of the City of Nagpur Corpora-
tion Act, 194$ in express terms authorises and clothes the Municipal Conunisioner
with the power to exercise supervision and control over the acts of Municipal
G Officers and servants and hence he is fully competent to suspend the Municipal
Officers and servants, pending a departmental inquiry. [24 H-25A; 26 Fl

1 : 2. The term "control" is of a very wide connotation and amplitude
and includes a large variety of powers which are incidental or consequential to
achieve the powers vested in the authority concerned. Clause (b) of the City of
H Nagpur Corporation Act is preceded by the Words "vests in the commissioner".
When the words "control" and "vests" are read together they are strong terms
CORPORATION OF NAGPUR v. RAMCHANDRA (Fazal Ali, J.) 23

which convey an absolute control in the authority in order to effectuate the A
policy underlying the rules and makes the authority concerned the sole custodian
of the servants and officers of the Municipal Corporation. (28 E, 25 A-B]

State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi, (1966] 1 SCR 771 ; High
Court of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v. V. V.S. Krishnamurthy and Ors., [1979]
1 SCR 26, followed.

2. Whether or not the departmental inquiry pending against its servants,
B
if he is acquitted in the criminal case, would have to continue is a matter to be
decided by the department after considering the nature of the findings given by
the criminal court. Normally where the accused is acquitted honourably and
completely exonerated of the charges it would not be expedient to continue a de-
partmental inquiry on the very same charges or grounds or evidence, but the fact
remains that merely because the accused is acquitted, the power of the authority
concerned to continue the departmental inquiry is not taken away nor is its direc- c
tion in any way fettered. However, whether it is really worthwhile to continue the
--f- departmental inquiry in the event of the acquittal after the ;_lapse of number of
years since the departmental inquiry has started is a relevant factor to be
considered. (27 C-E]

Observation : Criminal cases should be disposed off as quickly as possible
so as to protect the accused from unnecessary harassment. (27 A] D
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 396 of 1980.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
3.10. 1979 of the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) in Special
Civil Application No. 1501 of 1977..
G.S. Sanghi, Mrs. Jayashri Wad and Mrs. Urmila Sirur for the E
Appellants.
P.V. Holay, T.G. Narayanan Nair, M.S. Gupta and G.S. Sathe
for Respondent No. 1 & 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F
-{ FAZAL Au, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against
\
an order of the High Court of Bombay of 2/3rd October, 1979 by
which an order passed suspending the two respondents was quashed
on the ground that the order of supension pending a departmental
inquiry was passed by the Municipal Commissioner who was not com-
----..I ' petent to suspend the respondents pending a departmental inquiry. G
The High Court was of the view that under the Rules and Bye-laws
of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948(her einafter referred
to as the 'Act') as amended upto-date, the competent authority to
pass orders of suspension against the respondents was the ~corpora
tion itself and not the Chief Executive Officer. It appears that B
originally the order of suspension was passed by the Municipal Com-
24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 3 S.C.R.
I'
A '
missioner on the 23rd September, 1974 which was confirmed by
the Corporation by its order dated 23rd September, 1974. It is
alleged by the respondents that latter order was not communicated
to them. The suspension was ordered in connection with a
departmental inquiry relating to two accidents which occurred during
the construction of a stadium called the Yeshwant Stadium, which
B was being looked after by the respondents and which resulted in the
death of seven persons and injuries to eight others. A complaint
was also filed before the police as a result of which a charge-sheet
under s. 304~A l.P.C. was filed against the respondents, on the 25th
September, 1976. In view of the charge~sheet submitted by the
police another order of suspension was passed by the Municipal
c Commissioner on 13,1.77 with effect from 8.10.76. The respondents
filed an appeal to departmental appellate authority which was dis-
missed on the 20th July, 1977. Thereafter, the respondents filed a
writJfpetitlon in the High Court which allowed the petition and
quashed the order of suspension and directed the respendents to be
paid theirj_full salary and further directed the re-instatement of the
D respondents. Hence this appeal.
/
The short poirit taken by Mr. Sanghi was that under s. 59 (3)
of the Act, the Municipal Commissioner is the competent authority
to suspend the respondents pending a departmental inquiry. On a
perusal of s. 59 (3) we are of the opinion that the contention is well-
E founded and must prevail. Section 59 (3) may be extracted thus :

"Section 59 (3). : Subject, whenever it is in this Act expres-
sly so directed to the approval or sanction of the Corporation
or of the Standing Committee, and subject also to all other
restrictions, limitations and conditions imposed by this Act,
F the entire executive power for the purpose of carrying out the
provisions of this Act vests in the Commissioner who shall also-
(a) ......
(b) exercise supervision and control over the acts and pro-
c,eedings of all ·municipal officers and servants and subject to
G the rules or bye-laws for the time being in force, dispose of all
questions relating to the services of tne said officers and ser-
vants and their pay, privileges and allowances. "(Emphasis
ours)''

H Thus clause (b)'. of s. 59(3) in express terms authorises and clothes
the Municipal Commissioner with the power to exercise supervision
CORPORATION OF NAGPUR v. RAMCHANDRA (Fazal Ali, J.) 25

and control over the acts of Municipal officers and servants. It may A
be noticed that the said clause (b) is preceded by the words 'vest in
the Commissioner'. When the wotds 'control' and 'vests' are read
together they are strong tenns which convey an absolute control in
the authority in order to effectuate ·the policy underlying the rules
and makes the authority concerned the sole custodian of the control
of the servants and officers of the Municipal Corporation. In the B
case of State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi(1) while
interp~eting a similar language employed in Art. 235 of the Constitu-
tion of India which confers con.trol by the High Court over District
courts, this Coµrt heid that the word 'control' \VOUld include the
power to takedisciplinary action and all
other incidental 'or con-
c
sequential· steps . to effectuate this end · and m·ade · the following
observations : · ···

''The word "control;', as we have seen, was used for the
·, .·-
first time in the Constitution and it is accompanied by the word
''vest" which is a stroi\g wore!. It shows that the High Court
is made the sole cusfodian: <;>f the control overtheju\ficiary. D
Control, therefore, is not merely . ·the p()Wer to arrange the day
to day working ·of the court' but · contemplates disciplinary
jurisdiction over th.e presiding Judge,"

"In our Judgment, the control which is vested in the High E
Court is a complete control subject onlyto the power of the
Governor in the matter of appoiniment ·(illcltiding dismissal
and removal) and ' posting and promotion of District J~dges.
Within the exercise of the control vested in the High Court,
· the High Court can hold enquiries, impose punishments other
than dismissal or removal." F
-l This view was reiterated in High Court of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v.
V. V.S. Krishnamurhty & Ors.(') where this Court Clearly held that.
'control' included the passing of an order of suspension and that the
power of control was comprehensive and effective in opb'ration~ lit
this connection, Sarkaria, J. speaking for th~ Couit,1,observed as G
--.,,' follows:,- .,
' ' ' .1 '' "
"The interpretation and · scope of ,Artic1<1i23~ ,J1as· been
the subject of several decisions of this Court. .. The position
(l) [1966] 1 S.C.R. 771. H
. , (2) [1979] lS.C.R. 26.
: --.·
26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1981] 3 S.C.R.

A crystallised by these decisions is that the control over the
subordinate judiciary vested in the High Court under Article
235 is exclusive in nature, comprehensive in extent and effective
in operation. It comprehends a wide variety of matters.
Among others, it includes:

B (a) (i) Disciplinary jurisdiction and a complete control subject
only to the power of the Governor in the matter of appoint-
ment, dismissal, removal, reduction in rank of District Judges,
and intitial posting and promotion to the cadre of District
Judges. In the exercise of this control, the High Court can
hold inquiries against a member of the subordinate judiciary,
c impose punishment other than dismissal or removal.. ....

(ii) In Article 235,. the word 'control' is accompanied by the
word "vest" which shows that the High Court alone is made
the sole custodian of the control over the judiciary. The cont-
rol vested in the High Court, being exclusive, and not dual, an
D inquiry into the conduct of a member of judiciary can be held
by the High Court alone and no other authority ..... .

(iii) Suspension from service of a member of the Judiciary, with
a view to hold a disciplinary inquiry."

E It is thus now settled by this Court that the term 'control' is of
a very wide connotation and amplitude and includes a large variety
of powers which are incidental or consequential to achieve the powers
'vested"in the authority concerned. In the aforesaid case, suspension
from service pending a disciplinary inquiry has clearly been held to
fall within the ambit of the word 'control'. On a parity of reason-
F ing, therefore, the plain language of clause (b) of s. 39 (3), as extrac-
ted above, irresistibly leads to the conclusion that the Municipal 'I
Commissioner was fully competent to suspend the respondents pen·
ding a departmental inquiry and hence the order of suspension
passed against the respondents by the Municipal Commissioner did
not suffer from any legal infirmity. The High Court was, therefore, •
G in error in holding that the order of suspension passed by the '"('
Municipal Commissioner was without jurisdiction. In this view of
the matter the order of the High Court cannot be maintained and
has to be quashed.

H We might, however, mention that although in the criminal case
charge-sheet wa'.l submitted as far back as September, 1976 we
<;ORPORATION OF NAGPUR v. RAMCHANDRA (Fazal Ali, J.) 27

understand that no charges have been framed so far. Criminal A
cases should be disposed of as quickly as possible so as to protect
the accused from unnecessary harassment. We therefore direct the
Judicial Magistrage First Class of Nagpur ·to dispose of the
Criminal Case No. 1902 of 1976 pending in his file with the utmost
expedition and if possible withi~ six months from today. Mr. Sanghi
on behalf of the Municipality, states that he will fully cooperate. B
with the prosecution in producing all the available evidence before
the court and bringing the case to a final conclusion within the period
mentioned above.

The other question that remains is if the respondents are acquit-
ted in the criminal case whether or not the departmental inquiry c
pending against the respondents would have to continue. This is a
matter which is to be decided by the department after considering
the nature of the findings given by the criminal court. Normally
where the accused is acquitted honourably and completely exonerated
of the charges it would not be expedient to continue a departmental
inquiry on the very same charges or grounds or evidence, but the D
fact remains, however, that merely because the accused is acquitted,
the power of the authority concerned to continue the clepartmental
inquiry is not taken away nor is its direction in any way fettered.
However, as quite some time has elapsed since the departmental
inquiry had started the authority concerned will taken into conside-
ration this factor in coming to the conclusion if it is really worth E
while to continue the departmental inquiry in the event of the
acquittal of the respondents. If, h0wever, the authority feels that
there is sufficient evidence and good grounds to proceed with the
inquiry, it can certainly do so. In case the respondents are acquitted.
we direct that the order of suspension shall be revoked and the
respondents will be reinstated and allowed full salary thereafter F
-.( even though the authority chooses to proceed with the inquiry.
Mr. Sanghi states that if it is decided to continue the inquiry, as
only arguments have to be heard and orders to be passed, he will
see that the inquiry is concluded within two months from the date of
the decision of the criminal court. If the respondents are convicted,
--....; ' then the legal consequenses under the rules will automatically follow. G

We might mention that at the time when special leave was
granted by this Court, it was ordered that the respondents should
be paid a lump-sum of Rs. 10,000/- each apart from the 75%
allowance. We think that in the interest of justice the department H
may not insist on the refund of the amout of Rs. 10,000/- until the
28 SUPR,EME COURT REPORTS [1981] 3 S,C.R.
.
A result of .the departmental inquiry and if the departmental inquiry
concludes in their favour, the amount will be either refunded or
adjusted against their dues.

With these observations, the. appeal is accepted and thejudg·
ment of the High Court is quashed'. Parties will bear their own
B costs throughout.
' .

S.R. Appeal allowed,

. ...

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