Supreme Court of India
CORPORATION OF CITY OF BANGALOREversusZULEKHA BL & ORS.
- Citation
- 2008 INSC 388
- Decided
- 24 March 2008
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
Under Section 96 of the CPC, the plaintiff must prove her title, and the Corporation’s documents were insufficient; therefore the High Court’s judgment was set aside.
Summary
The Corporation of Bangalore filed a suit against Zulekha B.I. and others claiming title over a disputed property. Zulekha asserted that she had purchased the land from M.N. Rudrappa and sought a declaration of ownership and an injunction against interference. The trial court dismissed her suit; the Karnataka High Court reversed that decision, holding that the Corporation had failed to prove its title. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure the plaintiff bears the burden of proving title, and the Corporation’s documents—such as an acknowledgment, and the absence of a khata extract or tax receipt—were insufficient to establish ownership. Consequently, the High Court’s judgment was set aside and the matter remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration. The appeals were allowed without any order as to costs.
Issues considered
- Whether, under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the burden of proving title lies on the plaintiff in a suit for declaration of title.
- Whether the documents produced by the Corporation (acknowledgment, lease, etc.) are sufficient to establish its title over the suit property.
- Whether the plaintiff’s failure to produce a khata extract or tax receipt defeats her claim of title.
Legislation cited
Subjects
title suitburden of proofCivil ProcedureSection 96property lawmunicipal corporationacknowledgment documentkhata extracttax receiptremand
Judgment
[2008] 5 S.C.R. 325
CORPORATION OF CITY OF BANGALORE A
v.
ZULEKHA Bl & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 1299 of 2002)
MARCH 24, 2008
.., B
(DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, P. SATHASIVAM AND
~
AFTAB ALAM, JJ.)
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; s.96:
c
Right, title and interest over suit property - Claim of, by
appellant and respondent No. 1 - Onus to prove - Held:
Plaintiff has to prove the title - The conclusion arrived at by
the High Court, that it is for the Corporation to prove the title,
not sustainable - No tax paid receipt produced by respondent
No. 1 to substantiate her claims for title over the property - D
Acknowledgment issued by the authority for having received
.> t
an application from respondent No. 1, by no stretch of
imagination, could be considered to be a document proving
title over the property - Since the first appeal was disposed of
in casual manner, the matter remitted to High Court for E
consideration afresh - Directions issued.
One 'R' allegedly sold his share in the joint family
property to respondent No.1- plaintiff. When she was
raising construction, defendant prevented her from
raising construction and interfered with the peaceful F
,Ii possession of the property by her. Respondent No.1 filed
a title suit, which was dismissed by the trial Court. Appeal
filed thereagainst by respondent No.1 was allowed by
Single Judge of the High Court. Hence the present
appeals. G
Allowing the appeals, the Court
__ _,
HELD: 1.1 There are several infirmities in the High
Court's judgment. The High Court in Para 10 of the
325 H
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.
A judgment concluded that since the appellant was claiming 'f-
title in respect of suit property, it was for the Corporation
to prove the title by production of document in their
possession. This ce>nclusion is not sustainable because
it is the plaintiff wlho has to prove her title. (Para - 7)
B [330-A, BJ
1.2 It has been rightly pointed out by the counsel for
the appellant that there was no Khata extract or tax paid
receipt produced by the plaintiff to substantiate her claim
for title over the property. (Para - 8) [330-B, CJ
c 1.3 The High Court referred to Exh.P6 which was an
acknowledgment purported to have been issued from the
office of the Revenue Officer. The High Court concluded
that the same established that the plaintiff's vendor had
got title over the property. The conclusion is clearly without
D any foundation in law. The Single Judge of the High Court
himself noted that EJ<h. P6 is the acknowledgment issued
for having received application from plaintiff by the
Corpc:>ration on 24.4.1981 and the same was returned on
15.6.1981 requiring the plaintiff to submit further
E information and to show the spot to the Revenue
Inspector and to p1roduce the plan. By no stretch of
imagination same can be considered to be a document
proving title over 1the property. The fallacies in the
conclusions of Single Judge of the High Court are too
F numerous to be referred to in detail. (Paras - 9 & 10)
[330-C, D, E, FJ
. 2. Since the First Appeal has been disposed of in the
most casual manner, the impugned judgment is set aside
and the matter is remitted to the High Court for a fresh
, G consideration in accordance with law. (Para -11) [330-F, GJ
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
1299 of 2002.
From the final Judgment and Order dated 02.12.1999 of the
.H High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in RF.A. No. 430of1994.
I
CORPORATION OF CITY OF BANGALORE v. 327
ZULEKHA Bl & ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
WITH A
Civil Appeal No. 1300 of 2002.
Vikas Rojipura, F.C. Vidya Sagar, A.T.M. Sampath, T.S.
Shanthi, V. Balaji and Legi for the Appellant.
B.V. Deepak (for M/s. T.T.K. Deepak & Co.) for the B
,,
Respondents.
~
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Challenge in these appeals
is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the c
Karnataka High Court allowing the First Appeal filed under
Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short the
'CPC'). The respondent No.1 was the plaintiff and was appellant
beforethe High Court. The case set out in the plaint is as follows:
D
2. The plaintiff is the absolute owner of the suit schedule
property, having purchased it from M.N. Rudrappa under
registered sale deed dated 9-2-1981 and is in possession of it
since that date. The schedule property is the joint family of the
plaintiffs vendor and the suit property fell to the share of the
E
plaintiff's vendor's family who are not alive, plaintiff's vendor
became a co-parcener and in that capacity he sold the suit
property to plaintiff on 9-2-1981, and the khata is not changed
to his name. Now, the plaintiff, with an intention to erect
compound around the suit property has stocked stone slabs,
but defendants 2 and 3 at the instance of the first defendant are F
trying to prevent the plaintiff from entering in to the schedule
~ property and erecting stone slabs and on 20-11-1982,
defendants 2 and 3 with gundas tried to trespass into the suit
schedule property and interfered in the peaceful possession
and enjoyment of the property by plaintiff, trying to remove the G
stone slabs stocked therein and this was resisted by the plaintiff
and well wishers. It is the contention of plaintiff that, he being the
absolute owner and in possession of the suit property has got
----< prima facie case.
H
328 SUPREME COUFff REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.
A 3. The respondent No. 2 was the defendant No. 2 and his
stand was as follows:
Plaintiff is not the owner of the scheduled property and
that, neither plaintiff nor his vendor Rudrappa had any manner
of right, title and interest over the schedule property. It is denied
B · that'the plaintiff's vendor had the property under the partition
deed dated 26-01-1946 as alleged. Defendant has pleaded
ignorance with regard to the application of plaintiff dated 24-
, 04-1980 to change khata. It is denied that the plaintiff has
stocked stone slabs to erect compound with the schedule
C , property, with the help of goondas. It is contended that, the plaint
schedule is mis-leading and the sale deed produced does not
disclose any number of the property and there is no existence
of such property as described in the plaint. It, is the specific
case of second defendant that the vast vacant land belongs to
D • the Corporation and he had applied to the Corporation for lease
of the land and after obtaining sanction of the Government,
Corporation granted lease of Plot No. 15 measuring 226.6 Sq
, Yards in Siddaiah Road bounded on the East by Corporation
land granted to third defendant, West by land granted to M.A.
E Krishnamurthy, North by Corporation Road and South by
Corporation Plot No. 14 and he has complied with all terms and
conditions of the lease. It is contended that, when he tried to
enclose the property with stone slabs, husband of the plaintiff
Kustaq Ahmed obstructed the work and threatened to remove
F the slabs under imaginary rights, that there is no cause of action
for the suit and she prayed for dismissal of the suit with costs.
4. Similarly the third defendant and the 4th defendant also
' filed written statement contending that plaintiff was not the owner
of the suit land and had no right, title and interest. The following
G issues were framed by the trial court.
1. Whether plaintiff proves that suit property belongs to
M.N. Rudrappa and that she has deprived title to it ·
by the sale deed executed by him?
H 2. Whether plaintiff is in lawful possession of suit
I
CORPORATION OF CITY OF BANGALORE v. 329
ZULEKHA Bl & ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
property? A
3. Whether the suit has been property valued?
4. Whether 4th defendant is not a necessary party to
this suit?
B
..t- 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief of declaration
and injunction prayed?
6. To what reliefs are parties entitled?
5. Ultimately the suit was dismissed by the trial Court and
as noted above First Appeal was filed by the respondent No.1. C
6. It appears that the High Court referred to the various
stands, it was concluded that the documents produced by the
appellant did not prove its title . The ultimate conclusions were
as follows:
D
"The documents referred to above are definitely not prove
the title of the Corporation . Therefore, the above
documents are rejected as not valid for want of clarify and
the property mentioned therein has not been identified at
all. The Corporation as a mighty Public Body after all would E
have produced the register of property or the present plan
· after the Municipal Corporation Act has come into force.
Not aa single attempt has been made by the Corporation
to prove the title if they are really entitled to claim. It is un-
fortunate that by the negligence of the Corporation, the · F
Courts are not able to find out whether the property.claimed
by the plaintiff is a public property or private property of
the other persons under whom, the property is claimed to
be purchased by the plaintiff. Therefore, I have no hesitation
to .reject the evidence of Corporation the 1st respondent G
herein as neither useful for the Corporation nor useful to
the case. The mere facts that the Corporation leased .out
that the property to defendants-2 and 3, it is seen ipso-
facto prove that they are h'aving got the title to the property,
no proof is forthcoming in respect thereof."
H
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.
A 7. There are several infirmities in the High Court's
judgment and a few need to be highlighted. The High Court in
para 10 concluded that since the appellant was claiming title in
respect of suit property, it was for the Corporation to prove the
, title by production of document in their possession. This
B conclusion is not sustainable because it is the plaintiff who has
to prove her title. It is to be noted that the Corporation referred
to various documents i.e. Exh. 01 to 09 to prove that the
Corporation was the owner of the property.
8. It has been rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the
C appellant that there was no Khata extract or tax paid receipt
produced by the plaintiff to substantiate her claim for title over .•
the property.
9. Further the High Court referred to Exh. P6 which was an
acknowledgment purported to have been issued from the office
O of the Assistant Revenue Officer, Bangalore City. The High Court
conCluded that the same established that the plaintiffs- vendor
had got title over the property.
10. The conclusion is clearly without any foundation in law.
It is to be noted that the learned Single Judge himself noted that
E Exh. P6 is the acknowledgment issued for having received
application from p.lainti'ff by the Corporation on 24.4.1981 and
the same was returned on 15.6.1981 requiring the plaintiff to
submit further information and to show the spot to the Revenue
Inspector and to produce the plan. By no stretch of imagination
F same can be considered to be a document proving title over
the property. The fallacies in the conclusions of learned Single
Judge are too numerous to be referred to in detail.
11. Since the First Appeal has been disposed of in the
most casual manner, we deem it appropriate to set aside the
G impugned judgment and remit the matter to the High Court for a
fresh consideration in accordance with law.
12. The appeals are allowed but without any order .as to
costs.
IH S.K.S. · Appeals allowed.
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "title suit"Sign in to search