Holding

Blending or partition is not a 'disposition' within the ordinary meaning of the Estate Duty Act and will not attract sections 9 and 27 unless the explanations to section 2(15) are engaged, which they are not in the present case.

Summary

Natesan Chetty, the Karta of a Hindu Undivided Family, owned five houses in his individual capacity and, in 1970, declared that three of them would become joint family property, a process termed "blending". After a partition in 1971, two of the houses were allotted to him while the remaining three passed to other family members. Upon his death in 1972, the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty treated the blending declarations as "dispositions" (gifts) under the Estate Duty Act, 1953, and included the value of the three houses and a repaid loan in the estate valuation. The High Court held that blending does not constitute a disposition unless the explanations to section 2(15) are attracted, and the Supreme Court affirmed this view, stating that blending alone is not a disposition within the ordinary meaning of the statute. Consequently, the properties were not liable to estate duty, and the appeals filed by the Controller of Estate Duty were dismissed.

Issues considered

The act of "blending" individual property into joint family property constitutes a "disposition" within the meaning of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, thereby attracting sections 9 and 27.
Whether the explanations to section 2(15) of the Estate Duty Act are triggered by the blending act.

Legislation cited

Estate Duty Act, 1953s. 2(15), s. 27, s. 46(2), s. 64(1), s. 9

Subjects

Estate DutyBlendingDispositionHindu Undivided FamilyGiftSection 9Section 27PartitionTax law

Judgment

CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY, MADRAS A
v.
N. SHANKARAN ETC.

NOVEMBER 1, 1991

[S. RANGANATHAN, M. FATHIMA BEEVI B
AND N.D. OJHA, JJ.]

Estate Duty Act, 1953--Sections 21(5); 9, 27--,'Blending'-
'Partition '-Whether 'disposition'.

A common question of l~w that arises for determination in C
these appeals by special leave is whether the act of a member of a
joint family by which he impresses his individual property with the
_character of joint family property or "throws" it into the botch
potch of the joint family or "blends" it with the joint family prop-
erty is a 'disposition' within the meaning of the Estate ·Duty Act,
1953. In Civil Appeal No. 1204 of 1979 the facts are : One Natesan D
Chetty who died on 1.3.1972, was the Karta of a Hindu Undivided
Family, consisting of himself and his four sons. He owned five house
properties in Madras, On 18.6.70 and 16.9.1970, he made declara-
tions by which he impressed the properties with the character of
joint family properties and further declared that they would there-
after belong to HUF of which be was the Karta. Thereafter a parti- E
tion was effected in the family in March 1971 in which two of the
properties came to bis share. Sri Chetty had also borrowed Rs.
46,800 from HUF out of the rental income. from the properties for
his business purposes. These borritwing.s were duly repaid in
April, 1971.
F
In completing the assessment to estate duty of the estate pass-
ing on the death of Natesan Chetty, the Assistant Controller of Es-
tate Duty held that the declaratio~s made by the deceased on 18.6.70
and 16.9.70 were "dispositions" within the meaning of the said ex-
pression as defined in the second explanation to section 2(15) of the
Estate Duty Act. He further held that since the declarations were G
made without consideration, they amounted to gift which had been
made within two years of the date of death and hence 'liable to be
assessed as part of the estate passing on death under section 9 of the
Act. The two properties which had fallen to the _s!aJlre of the de-
ceased passed on the death of the deceased. Be· accordingly in-
cluded Rs. 1,22,SOO the value of the other three properties als9 in H

167
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1991) SUPP.2 S.C.R

A the principal value of the estate. The Asstt. Controller further held
that a sum of Rs. 46,800 being the loan taken and discharged by the
deceased should also be added back in computing the principal value
of the estate by virtue of section 46(2) of the Act.

Dissatisfied with the conclusion of the· Asstt. Controller, the
B accountable person preferred an appeal to the Appellate Controller
of Estate Duty which was successful. Thereupon the Department
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal which, following the decision of
the Madras High Court in Rajamani Ammal v. Controller of Estate
Duty, (1972) 84 I.T.R. 790 held that the sum of Rs. 1,22,SOO could
not be i~cluded in the value of the estate passing on the death and
c consequently, that the add back of Rs. 46,800 was also not justified.
Thereupon the Controller of Estate Duty applied under Section 64
(1) of the Act for a reference to the Madras High Court for its
opinion on the two questions. The Madras High Court was of the
opinion that the basic question at issue was covered by the earlier
decisions of the Court in Rajamani Ammal v. Controller of Estate
D Duty and Controller of Estate Duty v. Smt. Mookammal, (1978) 110
I.T.R. 581. The High Court declined to call for a reference.and
dismissed the application for reference. Hence the appeals by the
Department.

Dismissing the appeals, this Court,
E
HELD : "Blending" or "partition" will no~ be a 'disposition'
within the ordinary connotation of the expression but will be one if
either of the Explanations to Section 2(1S) are attracted. [179 G]

Unlike an unequal partition, the act of blending will not amount
F to a 'disposition' attracting Ss. 9 and.27 of the Act. [179 H -1.80 A]
Tbe High Court was right in holding that the acts of blending
did not result in the 'gift' of immovable properties within the mean-
ing of the statute. [180 CJ

G Though a declaration 9f blending does not amount to a 'gift'
where the act of blending is followed up by a subsequent partition,
the two transactions taken together do result in the extinguishment,
at the expense :of the deceased, of his rights in the properties which
go to the share of other coparceners at the subsequent partition
and, if the two can be treated as parts of the same transaction the
H Explanation to Section 2 (15) may be attracted. [180 D-E]
CONTROLLER v. N. SHANKARAN[RANGANATHAN, J.] 169

Rajamani Ammal v. Controller of Estate Duty, (1972) 84 ITR 790; A
Controller of Estate Duty v. Smt. Mookammal, (1978) 110 ITR 581;
Rangabayaki Ammal v. CED, (1973) 88 ITR 96; CED v. Kantilal Trikamlal,
(1978) 105 ITR 92; Stremann v. CIT, (1965) 66 ITR 62 SC; Goli Eswariah
v. COT, (1970) 76 ITR 675; C.G.T. v. Getti Chettiar, (1971) 82 ITR 599;
Cherukuru Eswaramma v. C.E.D, (1968) 69 ITR 109; CED v. Jai Gopal
Mehta, (1972) 85 ITR 175FB; C.E.D., v. Laxmi Bai, (1980) 126 ITR 73; B
C.E.D. v. Babubhai T. Panchal, (1982) 133 ITR 455; and CE.D. v.
Satyanarayan Babula/ Chaurasia, (1983) 140 ITR 158, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1204 (NT)
of 1979.
c
From the Judgment and Order dated 3.2.1978 of the Madras High
Court -in Tax Case Petition No. 271 of 1977.

WITH

Civil Appeal No. 4371 (NT) of 1991. D
Ms. A. Subhashini for the Appellant.

Ms. Janaki Ramchandran and A.T.M. Sampath for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was d·elivered by
E
RANGANATHAN, J. Both these matters raise the same question
viz. whether the act of a member of a joint family by which he impresses
his individual property with the character of joint family property or "throws"
it into the botch potch of the joint family or "blends" it with the joint
family property is a, "disposition" within the meaning of the Estate Duty F
Act, 1953 ('the Act', for short).

Civil Appeal no. 1204/79 is an appeal from an order of the High
Court declining to call upon the. Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to refer
the above question for the decision of the High Court in view of certain
earlier decisions of the Court. The ·Madras High Court also declined to
direct a reference on the above issue in T.C.P. No. 478of1977 and that is G
the subject matter ofSLP (C) No. 335of1979. In view of the pendency of
Civil Appeal No. 1204179, we grant special leave in SLP (C) No. 335/79
also.

Before discussing the correctness of the above conclusion, it may be
convenient to set out the background of facts in Civil Appeal No.1204/7J}. H
I .
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] SUPP. l. S.C.R.

A That appeal arises out of the estate duty assessment consequent on the
death of one Natesan Chetty, who died on 1.3. 72. He was the Karta of a
Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) consisting of himself and his four sons.
He was also the owner, in his individual capacity, of five house properties
in Madras. On 18.6.1970 and 16.9.1970 he made declarations by which he
impressed the above mentioned properties with the character of joint fam-
B ily properties and declared that they would thereafter belong to HUF of
which he was the karta. Subsequently, a partition was effected in the
f~~ly in March 1971 in which two of the above mentioned properties
came to the share of the deceased. Sri Natesan Chetty had also borrowed a
swn of Rs. 46,800 from the HUF out of the rental income from the above
mentioned properties for being invested in the business carried on by him.
C These borrowings were made between March 1970 and April 1971 and
they were repaid in April 1971.

In completing the assessment to estate duty of the estate passing on
the death of Natesan Chetty, the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty held
that the declarations made by the deceased on 18.6.1970 and 16.9.1970
D were "dispositions" within the meaning of the said expression as defined
in the second explanation to section 2(15) of the Act. These dispositions
having been made for no consideration within the meaning of s. 27 (l ),
amounted, according to him, to gifts and since the gift had been made
within two years of the date of death, the subject matter of the gift was
liable to be assessed as part of the estate passing on death under section 9
E of the Act.

As already mentioned, two of the properties had been allotted to the
share of the deceased in the partition of 1971 and it is common ground
that they passed on the death of the deceased as they•belonged to him on
the date of his death. The question, however, was whether the other three
·.F properties which went to the other members of the family as a result of
the declarations and partition were also liable to be included as part of the
estate. deemed to pass on the death of the deceased by the application of
section 9 read with S.27 (I) and, section 2(15) of the Act. The Assistant
Controller answered this questi6n in the affirmative and included their
value, taken at Rs. 1,22,500, in the principal value of the estate. As a
G consequence of his conclusion that the properties were liable to be in-
cluded in the estate, the officer a.lso took the view that the sum of Rs.
46,800 being the loan taken by the deceased from the HUF and discharged
within two years prior to the death should be added back in computing the
principal value of the estate by reason of the provisions of section 46 ~2)'
of the Act. It is not in dispute before us that though two points were ilitis
H involved in the assessment-one regarding the inclusion of the value of
CONTROLLER v. N. SHANKARAN [RANGANATHAN, J.] 171

three items of property as part of the estate of the deceased passing on his A
death and the other regarding the addition or disallowance of the debt of
Rs. 46,800 - they are inter-connected and that, if the first question is
answered in favour of the assessees, the second question will also stand
answered likewise.

Dissatisfied with the conclusion of the Assistant Controller, the ac- B
countable person preferred an appeal to the Appellate Controller of Estate
Duty which was successful. Thereupon the Department preferred an ap-
peal to the Tribunal which, following a decision of the Madras High Court
in Rajamani Ammal v. Controller of Estate Duty, (1972) 84 l.T.R. 790
held that the sum of Rs. 1,22,500 could not be included in the value of the
estate passing on the death and, consequentially, that the add back of Rs. C
46,800 was also not justified. Thereupon the Controller of Estate Duty
applied, under S. 64 (1) of the Act, for a reference to the Madras High
Court, for its deCision, of the following two questions :

"l Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the D
transaction by which a Hindu impressed his separate prop-
erties [as] with joint family character could not be consid-
ered as a disposition under the second explanation to sec-
\ tion 2(15) and section 27 ofthe Estate D ... ; Act?
2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumst.allces of the • E
case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the addition
ofRs.1,22,500 made under section 9 and Rs. 46,800 made
under section 46(2) could not be sustained in the case of
the deceased ?"
The Madras High Court was of the opinion that the basic question at
is8'le was covered by the earlier decisions of the Court in Rajamani Ammal F
v. Controller of Estate Duty, (1972) 84 ITR 790 as well as a subsequent
decision in Controller of Estate Duty v. Smt. Mookammal, (1978) 110 ITR
581. The Court found no substance in the attempt, on behalf of the Rev-
enue, to distinguish the above decisions on the strength of a decision of
the Court in Ranganayaki Ammal v. CED, (1973) 88 1.T.R 96 which had
been confirmed by the Supreme Court in CED v. Kantila/ Trikamlal, G
(1978) 105 I.T.R. 92. In this view of the matter the High Court declined to
call for a reference on the two questions above mentioned and dismissed
the application for reference. Hence the present Civil Appeal. It is not
necessary to set out the facts in SLP No. 335 of 1979 where the question
involved is the same except that there was no subsequent partition after
the blending and that no question regarding the deductibility of debts also H
arose in this case.
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1991) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A· It will be seen that both these appeals are directed against the orders
of the High Court declining to call for a reference. It is fairly clear that
the questions whether Rajamani Ammal was rightly decided and whether,
if so, it needed reconsideration in the light of Kantilal Trikamlal are
questions of law. But, in view.of the long lapse of time, we have consid...,
ered the issues on merits and since we are satisfied that the High Court's
B conclusion was correct, we di~se of the appeals straightaway without
going through the formality of asking the Tribunal to make a reference to
the High CoUrt and then awaiting the High Court's decision on the ques-
tion of law referred.

The Estate Duty Act 1953 has ceased to be enforceable since 16.3.1985.
C In the circumstances we need not elaborately set out the provisions of the
Act and the principles behind them. An outline of the provisions necessary
for the determination of the issue before us·will suffice. The Act levies a
duty on the aggregate market value of the properties passing on the death
of any person (staturorily termed the 'principle value of the e~tate'). It is
manifest that the statute could oe easily circumvented if duty were re-
D stricted only to properties which actually pass on a death, for, various
'<:inds of devices could be thought of by which the property of such person
could ostensibly be transferred to others sometime before the death, al-
though it continues to be really under the domain and control of the
deceased till the time of his death. The statute therefore contains elaborate
• provisions deeming certain properties to pass on death even though their
E beneficial enjoyment may not actually change hands at the time of his
death. One such item of properties which are deemed to pass on the death
of a person are those which formed the subject matter of a gift made by
him within a specified period preceding his death. S.9 of the Act, which
contains this deeming provision reads thus : '

F "9.Gifts within a certain period before death--{)) Prop-
erty taken under a disposition made by the deceased pur-
porting to operate as an immediate gift inter vivos whether
by way of transfer, delivery, declaration of trust, settle-
. ment upon _persons in succession, or otherwise, which
shall not have been bona fide made two years or more
G
before the death of the deceased shall be ~eemed to pass
on the death".

In short, the provision enabled the Revenue to ignore. any gift of property
made by the dec¢ased within two years of his death by creating a statutbry
H fiction that proPerties so gifted passed on the death of the decease'd,
CONfROLLER v. N. SHANKARAN [RANGANATHAN, J.] 173

althot'igh, in fact and in law, they ceased to be his a short time before his A
death. This is the first fiction.

The legis.lature next proceeded to enact a second fiction. This was in
order to bring into the net of taxation transactions which may not be
comprehended within the legal concept of a gift because they are ostensi-
bly made for some consideration. It provided in section 27 that : B
"27. (1) Dispositions in favour of relatives-Any disposition
made by the deceased in favour of a relative of his shall be
treated for the purposes of this Act as a gift unless-

(a) the disposition was made on the part of the deceased for
full consideration in money or money's worth paid to him for C
his own use or benefit; or

(b) .......... ; and references to a gift in this Act shall be con-
strued accordingly: .......... "

Resort to this. provision in the present case is needed for a purpose. Ad- D
mittedly, the deceased received no consideration for impressing the prop-
erty with the character of joint family property. If this amounted to a
transfer, then S.9 alone would be sufficient to bring the properties within
the net of taxation. But it could be argued that a gift involves a 'transfer'
without consideration but the act of blending does not constitute a 'trans-
fer'. [vide: Stremann v. C.lT., (1965) 56 l.T.R. 62 (S.C.) and a host of E
other cases under the Income-tax Act]. Section 27 helps the Department in··
the present case only in that it uses a much wider word, 'disposition', and
treats dispositions in favour of relatives as gifts.

The statute had to make provision for a third fiction as well as it
could still be contended that the word 'disposition' would not be sufficient F
to comprehend certain types of transactions. To be on the safe side, there-
fore, the statute proceeded to enact a special definition of the word 'dispo-
sition' in section 2(15) of the Act wide enough to rope in various kinds of
as
acts in respect of property. This provision, insofar it is material for our
present purposes, reads as follows :

"2(15) 'Property' includes any interest in property, movable G
or immovable, the proceeds of sale thereof and any money or
investment for the time being representing the proceeds of sale
and also includes any property converted from one species into
another by any method ;

Explanation /-The creation by a person or with his consent H
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1991) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A of a debt or other right enforceable against him personally or
against property which he was or might become competent to
dispose of, or to charge burden for his own benefit, shall be
deemed to have been a disposition made by that person, and in
relation to such a disposition expression 'property' shall in-
clude the debt or right created.
B
Explanation 2-The extinguishment at the expense of the de-
ceased of a debt or other right shall be deemed to have been a
disposition made by the deceased in favour of the person for
whose benefit the debt or right was extinguished, and in rela-
tion to such a disposition the expression 'property' shall in-
c clude the benefit conferred by the extinguishment of the debt
or right;

The short case of the department now is this; the deceased in these
cases was the full and exclusive owner of the immovable properties in
question; By the act of blending he has converted them into HUF proper-
D ties. The properties no longer belong to him as an individual; they belong
to the family thereafter with certain rights qua them in the other members
of the HUF. In other words, there has been an extinguishment, at the
expense of the deceased, of a part, at least, of his rights in the properties
with a corresponding benefit to the others. There has also been the crea-
tion, by the deceased, of a right in the others enforceable against the
·E deceased and the properties e.g. the right to demand a partition. The
deceased, therefore, has made a disposition in favour of his relatives for
no consideration within two years of his death. The value of the proper-
ties, in respect of which he made the disposition in favour of the family,
are, therefore, liable to be included in the principal value of the estate
passing on his death under section 9 read with section 27 read with the
F Explanations to section 2(15). This is quite apart from the fact that the
value of the two properties, which subsequently fell to the share of the
deceased at the partition in March 1971, are liable to be included as his
own property actually passing on his death. The question that we have to
consider is, therefore, whether the legal incidence of the act of blending
can be brought within the four comers of the two Explanations to section
G 2(15) of the Act. ·

It was precisely this question which had been considered by the
Madras High Court earlier in Rajamani Ammal v. Controller of Estate
Duty, (1972) 84 I.T.R. 790. In deciding the issue, The High Court had the
benefit of two earlier decisions of this Court in Goli Eswariah v. C. G. T.,
H (1970) 76 I.T.R. 675 and C.G.T., v. Getti Chettiar., (1971) 82 I.T.R. 5991,
CONTROLLER v. N. SHANKARAN [RANGANATHAN, J.] 175

where this Court had held, in the context of the Gift Tax Act, that the act A
· of blendmg and the act of a coparcener receiving, on partition of a HUF,
less than the share he was entitled to receive would not constitute gifts.
The details of this decision need to be set ~ut at some length.
Three contentions had been urged in Rajamani : (a) The first was
that the act of blending constituted a 'disposition' within the. general B
meaning of that word. Repelling this contention, the Court observed :
"The learned counsel for the revenue placed strong reliance on
the word "disposition" in section 27 (1) of the Act and con-
tended that even an act of throwing of the self-acquired prop-
erty into the common stock of a joint Hindu family is included
in that expression. In a case arising under the Gift-tax Act, the C
word "disposition" came up for consideration in the decision
in Goli Eswariah v. Commissioner of Gift-tax, (1970) 70 1.T.R
675 (S.C.). The Supreme Court held that the word "disposi-
tion" refers to a bilateral or a multilateral act and it does not
refer to a unilateral act. This decision of the Supreme Court
approves the decision of this court in Commissioner of Gift-tax D
v. P. Rangasami Naidu, (1970) 76 l.T.R. 315 (Mad) (F.B). It is
true that these decisions are under the Gift-tax Act. It is also
true that the word "disposition" was considered in these deci-
sions, with particular reference to the definition of "transfer of
property" under that Act. We are of the view that the word
"disposition" in section 27(1) of the Estate Duty Act also re- E
fers to a bilateral or multilateral act. The section refers to a
disposition by the deceased in favour of a relative and also
speaks of partial failure of consideration. Section 9 also refers
to property "taken under a disposition". Therefore, in our opin-
ion the word "disposition" in section 27(1), however wide its
ambit may be,· would not include the unilateral act of a person F
by which he throws his self-acquired property into the com-
mon stock of the joint family."
(b) It had been next contended, on behalf of the Revenue that, by
throwing the self-acquired properties into the common stock of the joint
family, the deceased had created a right enforceable against him in favour G
of the sons or the other coparceners viz. the right to demand partition of
the properties in question which they could not have exercised earlier.
This contention was rejected by the learned Judges by applying the princi-
ple enunciated in an earlier Full Bench decision of the Court in CIT v.
Rangasami Naidu, (1970) 76 I.T.R. 675, where a similar contention had
been repelled in the context of the Gift Tax Act. The Court had there H
observed:
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

"With the father having absolute power of disposition inter
A
vivos or testamentary in respect of his self-acquisition and with
no power in the son to interdict any alienation or diJposition or
call for partition, the son's interest is next to nothing. But the
right is real. It lies dormant. It is this dormant right which the .
undivided sons have in their father's property that entitles them
B to take the self-acquired property of the father as coparceners
to the exclusion of a divided son. Juridically, it must be this
dormant birth-right that enables the father at his pleasure, without
formalities, to deny to himself his independent power or pre-
dominant interest and look upon the property as the property
of the family.
c ••• ••• ••• •••
In our view, it is this birth-right imperfect and subordinate to
the special power and predominant interest of the father that
comes into play and makes the interest of the son real and an
interest in praescnti, when the father chooses to waive his
D rights. At his pleasure and without reference to his son, if the
father abandons or determines once for all not to exercise his
independent power over the property, the son's interest therein
becomes a real and full-fledged coparcenary right. There is no
vesting of rights here by the father on the son, but what is
dormant springs to life but irrevocably at the pleasue of the
E. father."

(c) A third contention raised on behalf of the Revenue was that
throwing the self-acquired property into the common stock of the joint
family would amount to "extinguishment at the expense of the deceased
of a debt or other right" within the meaning of Explanation 2 to section 2
F (15). This contention was also repelled by the learned Judges. They ob-
serve:

"We are also of the opinion "that throwing the self-acquired
property into the common stock of the· joint family will not
' amount to "extinguishment at the expense ofthe deceased of a
G debt or other right" within the meaning of Explanation 2 to
section 2 (15). As seen from the judgments cited above, after
the act of throwing into the common stock, it is the joint
family or the coparcenary that owns the property. The person
who converted his individual property into joint family prop-
erty is a member of the Hindu joint family or the coparcenary
H and contines to be a member of the joint family. His interest in
CONTROLLER v: N. SHANKARAN [RANGANATHAN, J.] 177

the erstwhile separate property would extend to the· whole of A
the property even as of the other coparceners, for the interest
of every coparceners extends over the whole of the joint fam-
. ily property. There is community of interest and unity of pos-
session between all the .coparceners. On the death of any one
of the coparceners the others take the property by survivorship.
It may be, the ultimate survivor is the person who threw the B
self-acquired property info the common stock. It, therefore,
follows that there was no extinguishment of the right of the .
deceased and creation of a right in favour of another, in the
case of throwing the self-acquired properties into the common
stock. The decision in Valliammal Achi v. Controller of Estate
Duty, (1969) 73 l.T.R. 806 (Mad) relied on by the learned C
counsel for the revenue, and the decision in Kantilal Trikamlal
v. Controller of Estate Duty, (1969) 74 l.T.R. 353 (Guj.), re-
lied on by the learned counsel for the accountable person,
related to what we may term as "unequal partitions". They do
not deal with cases of throwing the self-acquired properties
into the common stock. We are not concerned with the case as D
to whether an unequal partition would amount to an extin-
guishment of a right and creation of a benefit within the mean-
ing of Explanation 2 to section 2(15), which was the point that
was considered in those cases."
The above decision is clearly against the Revenue. The Revenue, E
however, strongly relies upon a later decision of the same High Court in
Ranganayaki Ammal & Ors. v. Controller of Estate Duty, (1972) 88 l.T.R.
96: It is submitted that Ranganayaki Ammal has been atTmned by this
Court in CED v. Kantilal Trikamlal, (1976) 105 ITR 92 - a common
judgment reversing Kantilal Trikamlal v. CE.D., (1969) 74 I.T.R. 353
(Guj) and affirming Ranganayaki Ammal (Mad) - and, therefore, Rajmani p
is no longer good law. It is therefore, necessary to refer to these cases
though the question involved there was somewhat different.

In Ranganayaki Ammal, the deceased Bheema Naidu and his widow
and childfen constituted a Hindu undivided family. A little within the
period of two years prior to the death of the deceased, a partition was G
effected of the joint family properties and in that partition he took a
smaller share instead of his legal half benefiting the other to the extent of
the difference. The same thing had happened in the case of Kantilal
Trikamlal also. Trikamlal Vadilal and his son Kantilal constituted a Hindu
undivided family. On 16th November, 1953, and instrument styled a "re-
lease deed" was executed between the two persons. Under this instrument, H
a sum of rupees one lakh out of the joint family properties was taken by
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A the deceased in lieu of his share in the joint family properties and he
relinquished his interest in the remaining properties of the joint family
· which were declared to belong to Kantilal as his sole and absolute proper- -
ties and Kantilal also relinquished his interest in the amount of rupees one
lakh given to the deceased and declared that the deceased was the sole and
absolute owner of the said amount. Trikamlal Vadilal died on 3rd J~e,
B 1955, that is within two years of the release deed. The Assistant Control-
ler found that, as on November 16, 1953, the deceased was entitled to a
one-half share in the joint family properties, the value of which was
Rs. 3,44,058, but had relinquished his interest in the joint fatnily proper-
ties by receiving only a sum of rupees one lakh. The officer, therefore,
held that the difference between Rs.3,44,058 and Rs, 1,06,724 (being the
C amount received by the deceased together with interest) was includible in
the principal value of the estate of the deceased, being the value of a
disposition by the deceased in favour of a relative for partial considera-
tion. This assessment was upheld eventually by the Supreme Court. Both
these decisions, thus, raised the question whether there was "gift" within
the meaning of S.9 read with S.27 read .with the Explanations to S.2(15)
D of the Estate Duty Act where a coparcener in a HUF, at the family parti-
tion, voluntarily agrees to accept properties of a value less than what he is
entitled to claim, as a matter of right, at such partition. This Court--as did
the Madras High Court in Ranganayaki Ammal, the Andhra Pradesh deci-
sion in Cherukuru Eswaramma v. C.E.D., (1968) 69 I.T.R. 109 and tlie
Punjab & Haryana High Court judgment in C.E.D. v. Jai Gopal Mehra,
E (1972) 85 1.T.R. 175 (F.B.) - answered the question in the affirmative.
This Court distinguished Goli Eswariah, (1970) 76 I.T.R. 675, S.C. and
Getti Chettiar, (1971) 821.T.R. 599, S.C. on the ground that the definition
of 'disposition' in Explanation 2 Section 2(15) of the Estate Duty Act is
much wider than the scope of that expression used in the Gift Tax Act.
We do not consider it necessary to se.t out here the full and detailed
F reasoning of this Court in'Kantilal Trikamlal's case.

Before proceeding further, we may refer to a few later decisions of
High Court relevant to the issue before us. The Allahabad High Court, in
C.E.D. _v. Lf!xmi Bai, (1980) J.2,§;J.T.R. 73, a decision rend~red after
G Kantilal1 Trikamlal',thoughtt~:t6e act of blending would not be a 'dispo-
sition' within die meaning ofihe Estate Duty Act. In C.E.D v. Babubhaf
T. Panchal, (1982) 133 I.T.R.455, the Gujarat High Court had occasion to
consider the question whether a transaction of release by a member of a
J;Iindu Undivided family, within a period of two years of his death, of his
~~rest in the family properties would amount to a 'disposition' within
the.meaning of Explanation 2 to Section 2(15) of the Estate Duty Act. The
H
CONTROLLER v. N. SHANKARAN [RANGANATHAN, J.) 179

question was answered in the negative. In C.E.D v. Satyanarayan Babula! A
Chaurqsfp, (1983) 140 I.T.R. 158, the Bombay High Court, without touching
the issue in detail, merely held, applying Goli Eswarian v. C. q. T., (1970)76
I.T.R. 675 S.C, that the act of blending does not involve a transfer.

The question that falls for our consideration now is whether, despite
the extended definition in S.2(15) of the Act, as explained in Kantilal B
Trikamlal, the act of blending, unlike the voluntary acceptance of an
unequal partition, falls outside the purview of the deeming part of the
definition contained in the explanations. We think the answer to this
question has to be in the affirmative. Reverting once again to the conten-
tions of the Revenue in Rajamani (which are also the contentions reiter-
ated before us for the Revenue), it will be remembered that Rajamani c
specifically dealt with the language of the two explanations to S.2(15) and
that its decision rested on three grounds :

(i) a 'disposition', as held on Go/i Eswariah, (1970) 76
I.T.R. 675 S.C., has to be a 'bilateral' or 'multilateral' act or
D
transaction, not a unilateral act;
(ii) the act of blending does not create any right enforce-
able against the blender or his property but only brings to the
surface rights already latent and inherent in the others; and
(iii) the act of blending does not result in the extinguish- E
ment of any right of the blender with a correlative conferral of
benefit on others.
In our view, Kantilal Trikamlal does not affect the validity of any of
the three grounds set out above. So far as the first ground is concerned, it
does not touch upon the reasoning of Goli Eswariah, not to say doubt or
dissent from it. It refers to C.E.D. v. Kancherla Kesava Rao, (1973) 89 F ·
I.T.R. 261, S.C.-hinting at possible distinction-and to Getti Chettiar
(but without any hint of dissent) and points out that "the conventional
construction of disposition' has to submit to the larger sweep of hypotheti-
cal extension by definition" and that, unlike under the Gift Tax Act,
"there is no limitation, environmental or by the society of words, warrant-
ing the whittling down of the unusually wide range of Explanation 2 to G
S.2 (15)". In other words, the cumulative effect of Goli E:..wariah, Getti
Chettiar and Kantilal Trikamlal is that 'blending' or 'partition' will not be
a 'disposition' within the ordinary connotation of the expression but will
be one if either of the Explanations to S.2(15) are attracted. This takes us
to the other two contentions dealt with in Rajamani as to the scope of the
two explanations. On this aspect, Rajamani has held that, unlike an un- H
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1991) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A equal partition, the act of blending will not amount to a 'disposition'
attracting Ss.9 and 27 of the Act. It distinguishes cases of unequal parti-
tion dealt-with in Valliammai Achi, v. C.E.D., (1969) 73 I.T.R. 806 (Mad)
and the High Court's decision in Kantilal Trikamlal (1969) 74 l.T.R. 353
(Guj.) cited before it which have now received the imprimatur of this
Court in Kantilal Trikamlal. We are inclined to think that the distinction
B has been made on sound lines. We do not consider it necessary to repeat
or elaborate the reasoning in Rajamani on these two points as it succinctly
epitomises well-settled principles of Hindu Law. Suffice it to say that we
endorse this reasoning and think that the High Court was right in holding,
in the present cases, that the acts of blending did not result in the 'gift' of
immovable properties within the meaning of the statute and that Rajamani
C required no reconsideration because of Ranganayaki Ammalffrikamlal.

This disposes of the question sought to be referred in these cases.
We should however like to advert to another aspect which may arise for
consideration at some future date. It may, perhaps, be possible to contend
that, though a declaration of blending does not amount to a 'gift', where
D the act of blending is followed up by a subsequent partition, the two
transactions taken together do result in the extinguishment, at the.expense
'of the deceased, of his rights in the properties which go to the share of
other coparceners at the subsequent partition and that, if the two can be
treated as parts of the same transaction, Explanation 2 to S.2(15) may be
attracted. But this, apart from being a totally new question of law not
E raised at any stage and not debated before us, would also require not only
a closer look from the legal angle but also investigation into facts, particu-
larly as to whether the act of blending and the subsequent partition can be
treated, in law and on facts, as parts of a single transaction. We, therefore,
express no opinion on this issue.

F F'or the reasons discussed above, these appeals fail and are dis-
missed. But we make no order regarding costs.

Y.L. Appeals dismissed.

..c
(