Holding

The acquisition notification is invalid for failing to give a brief description of the land (and lacking a plan), making all subsequent vesting and possession steps unlawful, but the notification is not quashed to avoid disruption, and compensation is to be determined as of the date of possession.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined a Central Government notification under Section 3A of the National Highways Act, 1956 that sought to acquire land for a highway. The petitioners argued that the notification failed to give a brief description of the land and lacked a plan, rendering it invalid. The Court held that the notification was indeed void for not meeting the statutory requirement of a clear description, and that the absence of a plan made the right to object under Section 3C nugatory. Consequently, all subsequent steps—including vesting of the land in the Central Government and the taking of possession—were held unlawful. However, because the highway had already been constructed, the Court declined to quash the notification and instead ordered compensation to be assessed as of the date of possession (19‑Feb‑2003). The appeals of the Competent Authority and NHAI were dismissed, while the petitioners' appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

Whether the notification under Section 3A(2) of the National Highways Act, 1956 provides a brief description of the land sought to be acquired
Whether the absence of a plan in the notification invalidates it and renders the right to object under Section 3C ineffective
Whether delay in filing the writ petition bars the challenge to the notification
Whether failure to file objections under Section 3C can non‑suit the petitioners
Whether vesting of the land in the Central Government is lawful when the original notification is invalid
Whether possession of the land was taken in accordance with statutory requirements

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Act, 1894
National Highways Act, 1956s. 30(1), s. 30(2), s. 3A, s. 3C, s. 3D, s. 3E, s. 3G, s. 3H

Subjects

land acquisitionNational Highways Actbrief description requirementnotification validitycompensation assessmentvesting of landpossessiondelay in filingright to objectpublic purpose

Judgment

COMPETENT AUTHORITY A
v.
BARANGORE JUTE FACTORY AND ORS.

NOVEMBER 23, 2005

[K.G. BALAKRISHNAN AND ARUN KUMAR, JJ.] B

Land Acquisition:

National Highways Act, 1956: Sections 3A, 3C and 3D
c
Notification for compulsory acquisition of land-Brief description of
the land sought to be acquired was not given in the notification-Land
owners filed writ petition challenging the not~fication-High Court held
notification as bad in law-High Court also held that no useful purpose
would be served by quashing the notification as possession of the land had D
already been taken-An additional amount calculated at 30% over and
above the compensation already determined was ordered to be paid to the
writ petitioners-Correctness of-Held: The notification fails to meet the
legal requirement of a brief description of the land which renders the
notification invalid-Absence of a plan in the notification renders the right
to file objection sunder S. 3C nugatory-The notification violated the very E'
statute from which it derived its force and, therefore delay in challenging it
would not clothe in with legitimacy-Compensation payable to the writ
petitioners be determined as on the date on which they were deprived of
possession of their /ands-However, the impugned notification is not quashed
in order not to disturb what was already taken place by way of construction F
of the national highway.

The respondents-writ petitioners challenged the compulsory acquisition
of their lands vide a Central Government Notification under Section 3A of
the National Highways Act, 1956. The High Court held that the impugned
Notification regarding compulsory acquisition of land was bad in law. However, G
keeping in view the fact that possession of the acquired land had already taken
by the authorities, the High Court felt that no useful purpose would be served
by quashing the Notification. Accordingly, an additional amount calculated at
300/o over and above the compensation already determined was ordered to be
\laid to the writ petitioners. Hence the appeal.
421 fl
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A The following questions arose before the Court :-

(a) Whether the impugned Notification fulfils the statutory requirement
of a brief description of the land sought to be acquired?
••
(b) Whether delay on the part of the petitioners in challenging the
B Notification under Section 3A(l) of the Natio1aal Highways Act, 1956 rendered
the challenge liable to be rejected?

(c) Whether failure to file objections to the Notification under Section
3C could non-suit the petitioners in this case?

C (d) Whether vesting of the acquired land in the Central Government in
the present case could be said to be lawful?

Dismissing the appeal, the Court (-

HELD: 1. So far as the question whether the impugned Notification
D meets the requirement of Section 3-A(l) of the National Highways Act, 1956
regarding giving brief description of land is concerned that even though plot
numbers of land in respect of each mouza are given, different pieces of land
are acquired either as whole or in part. Wherever the acquisition is of a
portion of a bigger piece of land, there is no description as to which portion
E was being acquired. Unless it is known as to which portion was to be acquired,
the petitioners would be unable to untlerstand the impact of acquisition or to
raise any objection about user of the acquired land for the purposes specified
under the Act or to make a claim for compensation. It is settled law that where
a statue requires a particular act to be done in a particular manner, the act
has to be done in that manner alone. Every word of the statute has to be given
F its due meaning. The impugned notification fails to meet the statutory
mandate. It is vague. The least that is required in such cases is that the
acquisition notification should let the person whose land is sought to be
acquired know what he is going to lose. The impugned notification in this
case is, therefore, not in accordance with the law. (432-C-E)

G 2.1. The absence of any reference to a Plan in the impugned Notification
and in fact non-availability of any Plan linked to the Notification, fortifies the
argument that the description of the land under acquisition in the impugned
Notification fails to meet the legal requirement of a brief description of the
land which renders the Notification invalid. [433-FJ

H 2.2. The absence of a plan also renders the right to file objections under
COMPETENT AUTHORITY v. BARANGORE JUTE FACTORY 423

Section 3C(l) nugatory. In the absence of a plan it is impossible to ascertain A·
or know which part of the acquired land was to be used and in what manner.
Without this knowledge no objections regarding use of land could be filed.
Since the objection regarding use of the land had been given up by the writ
petitioners, there is no necessity to go any further into this aspect. Unlike
Section SA of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which confers a general right
to object to acquisition of land under Section 3C(l) of the National Highways B
Act gives a very limited right to object. The objection can be only to the use
of the land under acquisition for purposes other than those under Section
3A(l). The Act confers no right to object to acquisition as such. This answers
the argument advanced by appellant that failure to file objections disentitles
the writ petitioner to object to the acquisition. The Act confers no general C
right to object, therefore, failure to object becomes irrelevant.
(433-G, H; 434-A-B]

Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban, (1999) 7 SCC 44, held
inapplicable.

2.3. Under the National Highways Act, 1956 there is no right to object D
to acquisition of land except on the question of its user. Therefore, the present
objection has to be decided independently of the right to file objections. De
hors the right to file objection, the validity of the Notification has to be
considered. Failure to file objection to the notification under Section 3C,
therefore, cannot non-suit the writ petitioners in this case.1434-D) E
3. It is true that the Notification was challenged only three years after
its i~suance by filing the writ petition. But if the Notification violates the very
statute from which it derives. its force, delay in challenging it would not clothe

- it with legitimacy. The Act requires the Notification to be issued in a
particular manner with brief particulars of land being acquired. The
Notification in this case fails to meet this requirement. The Notification has
F

been held to be had in law. It has no legs to stand. The conduct of the opposite
party cannot be used to make it stand. Moreover, the writ petitioners have
explained the reasons for the delay in filing the writ petition. The Company
which owns the lands had been deregistered. It is a Company registered in
the U.K. It had to be revived. Revival came in mid-2001 whereafter the action
was taken. Thus, there is no merit in the argument about delay in challenging
the Notification rendering the challenge liable to bnejected. [434-E-G]

4. If the initial Notification is bad all steps taken in pursuance thereof
will fail with it. Vesting under Section 30(2) arises on a declaration by the
Central Government under Section 30(1). The declaration is the result of H
424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. S S.C.R.

A disposal of objections under Section JC. Each step is a consequence of an
earlier step and in that sense all the steps are linked to the initial Notification
for acquisition under Section JA(l) and (2). This initial Notification has been
held to be not in accordance with law. When the foundation goes rest of the
edifice falls. The invalid Notificati~n under Section J(A) renders all
B subsequent steps invalid. Therefore, vesting ofland in the Central Government
in the present case cannot be said to be lawful and it does not advance the
case of the Competent Authority or the National Highway Authority of India
(NHAI). Taking possession of the land is yet another step in the same sequence
and is again subject to the initial Notification being held valid. The initial
Notification having been invalidated, there can be no legal or valid vesting of
C land in favour of the Central Government (435-D-FJ

5. The aspect of possession ofland having been taken by the Competent
Authority, is an important issue for consideration in this case. Vesting of
land in the Central Government has been held to be not in accordance with
the law. The other Statutory requirement which needs to be complied with
D before taking possession is deposit of compensation. Under Section 3E(l)
possession can be taken only after the land vests in the Central Government
and the amount determined by the Competent Authority as compensation under
Section JG has been deposited under Section 3H(l). In the present case in
view of an order dated 3.4.2002 passed by the High Court final compensation
E could not be determined by the competent Authority. Therefore, there could
not be a valid deposit of amount finally determined as required under Section
3E(l) of the Act which means the possession could not have been taken. But
the fact is that possession was taken on 19.2.2003 on deposit of the provisional
amount of compensation. The NHAI had in fact applied for permission of court
to take possession of the land under acquisition. But without any order being
F passed on that application, it hastened to take possession after giving only
one day's notice when the Act requires.60 days' notice. Moreover, the
possession is to be taken through the Commissioner of Police or the Collector.
This was not done. Nolie of the three statutory requirements for taking
possession were fulfilled. Thus taking of possession of the lands in the present
G case is in total violation of the statutory provisions. (435-G-H; 436-A-C]

6. The High Court rightly observed that the acquisition of land in the
present case was for a project of great national importance, i.e. the
construction of a national highway. The construction of national highway on
the acquired land has already been completed. No useful purpose will be served
H by quashing the impugned notification at this stage. The legal position is that
COMPETENT AUTHORITY v. BARANGORE JUTE FACTORY 425
Jhe acquiring authority can always issue a fresh notification for acquisition A
of the land in the event of the impugned notification being quashed. The
consequence of this will only be that keeping in view the rising trend in prices
of land the amount of compensation payable to the land owners may be more.
Therefore, the ultimate question will be about the quantum of compensation
payable to the land owners. Quashing of the notification at this stage will give B
rise to several difficulties and practical problems. Balancing the rights of
the petitioner as against the problems involved in quashing the impugned
notification, a better course will be to compensate the land owners that is, the
writ petitioners appropriately for what they have been deprived of. This course
is adopted in the interests of justice. [437-A-D)

7. Normally, compensation is determined as per the market price of land
c
on the date of issuance of the notification regarding acquisition of land. In
similar situations instead of quashing the impugned notification, this Court
shifted the date of the notification so that the land owners are adequately
compensated. [437-E)
D
Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v. RajkumarJohri, [1992) 1SCC328, Gauri
Shankar Gaur v. State of UP, (1994) 1SCC92 and Haji Saeed Khan v. State
of UP, (2001) 9 SCC 513, relied on.

8. The relevant date for determining the quantum of compensation in
the present case ought to be the date when possession of the land was taken E
by the appellants from the writ petitioners. This date admittedly is 19.2.2003.
Therefore, it is directed that compensation payable to the writ petitioners be
determined as on 19.2.2003, the date on which they were deprived of possession
of their lands. The impugned notification is not quashed in order not to disturb
what has already taken place by way of use of the acquired land for F
construction of the national highway. (437-G-H; 438-AI

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7015 of2005.

From the Judgment and Order dated 7.4.2004 of the Calcutta High Court
in M.A.T. No. 1598/2003 in W.P. No. 1521 l(W) of2001.
G
WITH
C.A. Nos. 7016-7017, 7018 of2005.

Jayanta Mitra, Tara Chandra Shanna, Sanjeev Sen and Ms. Neelam
Shanna for the Appellant.
H

T
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A Mukul Rohtagi, Ravi Kini, Krishna Kumar, Sumit Dhingra, Sandeep
Tiwari and V.B. Joshi for National Highway Authority of India.

V.P. Singh, K.K. Venugopal, B.K. Jain, Pankaj Jain, S. Kirpal, A.K. Jain
and Prateek Jalan for the Respondents.

B The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

ARUN KUMAR, J. Leave granted.

These appeals arise from a common judgment of the High Court. The
contesting parties before the High Court filed special leave petitions in this
C Court against the judgment of the High Court dated 7th April, 2004. The
special leave petitions filed by the Competent Authority are registered as SLP
(Civil) No. 16820 of2004 while those filed by the National Highways Authority
oflndia are SLP (Civil) Nos.17874-75 of 2004. The Writ Petitioners before the
High Court have also filed a petition which is numbered as SLP (Civil) 18773
of2004. Since all the petitions arise from a common judgment, they were heard
D together and are being disposed of by this judgment. For sake of convenience
the land owners are being referred to as the writ petitioners in this judgment.
The other main parties are the Competent Authority and the National Highways
Authority of India (NHAI) and they will be referred to as such in the judgment.

E The subject matter of these appeals is the compulsory acquisition of
certain lands belonging to the writ petitioners by the Central Government vide
Notification dated I Ith June, 1998 under Section 3A of the National Highways
Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). The writ petitioners challenged
the acquisition of their lands on various grounds. The Division Bench of the
High Court by its impugned judgment dated 7th April, 2004 disposed of the
F writ petition holding the impugned Notification regarding compulsory
acquisition of land to be bad in law. However, keeping in view the fact that
possession of the acquired land had already been taken by the authorities,
the High Court felt that no useful purpose would be served by quashing the
Notification. The High Court also took note of the power of the acquiring
G authority to issue a fresh Notification for acquisition of the land which could
only lead to possible increase in the amount of compensation payable to the
owners. Keeping these aspects in view it ordered that an additional amount
of compensation be awarded to the land owners. Accordingly, an additional
amount calculated at 30% over and above the compensation already determined
was ordered to be paid to the writ petitioners. The Competent authority is·
H aggrieved of the order of the High Court holding the Notification regarding
COMPETENT AUTHORITY v. BARAN GORE JUTE FACTORY [ARUN KUMAR, J.] 427

the acquisition of the land to be illegal, while the NHAI is aggrieved of the A
award of additional 30 per cent amount as compensation to the Writ Petitioners.
The owners/writ petitioners are aggrieved of the Notification not being quashed
in spite of having been declared as illegal.

The acquisition of land in the present case is under the National
Highways Act, 1956. The power to acquire land is contained in Section 3A · B
of the Act. According to sub-section ( 1) where the Central Government is
satisfied that for a public purpose, any land is required for the building,
maintenance, management or operation of a national highway or part thereof,
it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare its intention to acquire
such land. Sub-section (2) provides that every Notification under sub-section C
(l) shall give a brief description of the land. Under sub-section (3) the
Competent Authority is required to cause the substance of the notification
to be published in two local newspapers, one of which will be in a vernacular
language. The impugned notification in this case is challenged on the ground
. that it does not give a brief description of the land sought to be compulsorily
acquired. There has been lot of argument on either side on this aspect. The D
Competent Authority and the NHAI have supported the Notification urging
that brief description of the land contained in the Notification meets the
requirement of the statute while according to the writ petitioners it is not so.
A copy of the impugned Notification dated 11th June, 1993 has been placed ·
on record. As per the Notification, a brief description of the land sought to E
be acquired is given in the Appendix to the Notification. In order to appreciate
the rival contentions it is necessary to reproduce some portions of the
Appendix.

The GAZETTE OF INDIA EXTRAORDINARY
F
[PART II SEC. 3 (iii)

Brief description of land with or without
Structure falling within the proposed Right
of way in terms of Sub-Section (2) of
Section 3A of National Highways Laws G
(Amendment) Act, 1997.

As per Appended-A
I

[No.RW/NH-15013/31194-PL.]
A.D.NARAIN, Director General (Road Development H
& Addi. Secy.
·.
APPENDIX - A to NOTIOFICA TION No.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF PRIVATE LAND WITH/WITHOUT STRUCTURE
FALLING WITHIN PROPOSED RIGHT OF WAY OF SECOND VIVEKANANDA
BRIDGE & ITS APPROACHES IN NATIONAL HIGHWAY - 2, WEST BENGAL.
(Vide Sub-Section (2) of Section 3A of the NH Laws (Amendment) Act, 1997

SI. Dag No. Khaitan No. Full Area Land classification Acquisition/Alienation No.
No. Old New (Acre) as per BL & LR proposed
Ul
Record For Area (Acre) c:
"l:l

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 "
tr:I
~
tr:I
State - West Bengal, District - Howrah, ('"')
0
Police Station - Bally, Mouza - Bally, J.L. - 14, Sheet - 2. c:

1. 1020 1499 0 0.420 DANGA Part 0.0150
"
-i

2 1021 1538 0 0.130 DANGA Part 0.0900
"
tr:I
"l:l
0
3. 1448 7167 0 17.000 SUNA Part 27500 "
-i
Ul
4. 1449 7115 0 10.550 SUNA Part 03800
tJ
0
5. 1659 3446 0 0.1800 DANG A Part 0.1800 0
~
6. 1662 2162 0 O.Q70 BASTU Part 0.0250 Ul
c:
7. 1682 7167 0 6250 SHALi Part 4.0500 "l:l
'.'ti
uo
0.4900 Ul
h
State - West - Bengal, District - Howrah, ~
Police Station - Bally, Mouza - Bally, J.L. - 14, Sheet - 4.

·'
,. .. ,..,. - -

n
0
:::
"ti
I. 2920 7167 0 17.6500 SUNA Part 0.1000 !!!
rn
2 2904 7167 0 0.4900 DANGA Part 0.0815 z
-I
c>
8.6715 -I
:c
0
State - West - Bengal, District - Howrah, C!
-I
Police Station - Bally, Mouza - Bally, J.L. 14, Sheet - IO. -<
"'
g;J
>
I. 8002 1990 0 02790 BASTU Part 0.0010 '°z>
2 8li03 1991 0 02080 BASTU Part 0.1620 8
3. 8li04 199'2 0 0.0670 UDBASTIJ Part 0.0150 '°rn
4. 8(,()C) 3532 0 0.0310 BASTU Full 0.0310
e
-I
...,
rn
5. 8610 3532 0 0.5100 DANGA Full 0.1400 >
n
-I
6. 8611 3532 0 0.0100 BASTU Full 0.0100 0
7. 8612 5373 0 0.()<)30 UDBASTIJ Full 0.()<)30 '°
-<
8. 8613 5373 0 0.1360 BASTIJ Full 0.1360 >;a
9. 8616 7113 0 0.1560 DANGA Full· 0.1590 ~
10. 8617 3579 0 0.0540 DANGA Full 0.0540 "'c
~
11. 8618 3579 0 0.0240 BASTIJ Full 02040 1"
._
.:....
9.4965
~
N
'°
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A The Appendix contains a long list of various portions of lands sought
to be acquired. The list runs into more than 10 pages in the paper book. We
have chosen to reproduce only a small portion of the Appendix in order to
appreciate the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties. The
learned counsel for the writ petitioners submitted that the purpose of giving
B a brief description of the land sought to be acquired is that the person whose
land is to be taken away, should at least know what he is being deprived of.
This becomes all the more necessary when g,nly a part of the land out of a
bigger chunk of land is sought to' be acquited. A reference to the Tables
forming part of the Appendix, which according to the acquiring Authority
contain brief description of the land, will show that under various heads, only
C part of bigger chunks of land is being acquired. If the entire land falling in
a particular survey is acquired, there cannot be any problem of identification
of land. But when only a part of land out of larger tract of land is sought to
be acquired, the question arises which part is going to be acquired. For
instance in the first Table full area of land in Dag No.1448 at Serial No.3 is
17 acres as per column 5. Column 7 indicates that only a part of the said 17
D acres is being acquired and· as per Column 8, the part which is sought to be
acquired is 2.7800 acres. This means out of 17 acres only 2.7800 acres is being
acquired. The question will arise as to which side this part which is sought
to be acquired is falling, it could be anywhere on the northern, southern,
western, eastern sides or in the centre. How is one to know which part is
E under acquisition? Similar position emerges with reference to other serial
numbers where only part of larger chunks of land is being acquired. Such
cases are several when we look at the entire Appendix and the Tables forming
part of it. According to the learned counsel for the writ petitioners, the
absence of information as to which part of the land is being acquired makes
the description insufficient, rather vague. The owners are not in a position
F to identify the land under acquisition. It also renders it impossible to make
claim regarding compensation for the land under acquisition because it is a
matter of common knowledge that in bigger tracts of land, certain areas on
a particular side are more valuable than the others. The absence of proper
description of land makes it impossible to file objection against acquisition.
G For all these reasons it is argued on behalf of the land owners that the
statutory requirement of a brief description of land is not fulfilled. According
to the Writ Petitioners non-compliance of sub-section (2) of Section 3A
renders the Notification invalid and the same is therefore, liable to be quashed.

The learned counsel appearing for the Competent Authority as also the
H counsel for the NHAl have tried to support the Notification. According to
COMPETENT AUTHORITY v. BARAN GORE JUTE FACTORY (ARUN KUMAR, J.] 431

them, the requirement in sub-Section (2) of Section 3A of the Act is only of A
giving a brief description of the land. Brief description does not mean a
complete description. That would not be the intention of the statute. An
acquisition Notification is only required to convey to the persons claiming
interest in the land about the intention of the Government to acquire a
particular land and the description given in the impugned Notification meets
that requirement. The learned counsel appearing for the Competent Authority
B
had really no answer to the problem demonstrated above about identification
of land where only part of a larger chunk of land was being acquired. Faced
with this difficulty and in an effort to ensure that the impugned Notification
is upheld, the learned counsel appearing for the Competent Authority raised
various subsidiary issues which according to him are sufficient to non-suit c
the Writ Petitioners. They are :

(1) Delay on part of writ petitioners in challenging the Notification
under Section 3A(l);
(2) Failure to file objections under section 3C within twenty one
days as prescribed in sub-section (l); D
•
(3) Applying for compensation for the acquired land giving full
details of the lands sought to be acquired which shows that land
owners knew all the details about the land under acquisition and
the objection regarding absence of proper description of land
sought to be acquired in the impugned Notification is not open E
to them;
(4) On failure of the land owners to file objections under Section 3C
(l ), the Competent Authority submitted a report to the Central
Government and the Central Government issued a declaration
that the land should be acquired for purposes mentioned in sub- F
section (1). On publication of this declaration the land vests
absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances.
As per sub-section (2) of Section 30, therefore, land having
vested in the Central Government the acquisition could not be
challenged;
0
(5) The Competent Authority on vesting of the land in the Central
Government and on compensation amount being deposited by
the Competent Authority, has taken possession of the lands,

-
therefore, the acquisition could not be challenged;

(6) Lastly, it was submitted that these acquisitions were for very H
432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] SUPP. S S.C.R.

A important public purpose, i.e., construction of National Highway
and the court should not interfere with the acquisition on mere
technicalities. The land owners only have a right to compensation.
The quashing of the Notification would only lead to postponment
of the date of Notification thereby possibly resulting in increase
in amount of compensation payable to the land owners. Therefore,
B at best the land owners could be compensated by giving some
additional compensation for their acquired land. The acquisition
need not be disturbed.

So far as the question whether the impugned Notification meets the requirement
C of Section 3A(l) of the Act regarding giving brief description of land is
concerned, we have already shown that even though plot numbers of land
in respect of each mouza are given, different pieces of land are acquired either
as whole or in part. Wherever the acquisition is of a portion of a bigger piece
of land, there is no description as to which portion was being acquired.
Unless it is known as to which portion was to be acquired, the petitioners
D would be unable to understand the impact of acquisition or to raise any
objection about user of the acquired land for the purposes specified under
the Act or to make a claim for compensation. It is settled law that where a
statute requires a particular act to be done in a particular manner, the act has
to be done in that manner alone. Every word of the statute has to be given
its due meaning. In our view, the impugned notification fails to meet the
E statutory mandate. It is vague. The least that is required in such cases is that
the acquisition notification should let the person whose land is sought to be
acquired know what he is going to lose. The impugned notification in this
case is, therefore, not in accordance with the law.

F While dealing with the question of brief description of land in the
acquisition notifications, reference was made to some judgments of this Court
where acquisition Notifications under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act-
had come up for consideration on account of challenge being leveled on
ground of vagueness of the Notifications. In most of these cases, Plan of the
area under acquisition was made part of the notifications to show that the
G requirement of description of land was met. This lead us to inquire whether
there was any site plan forming part of the impugned Notification.

The availability of a Plan would have made all the difference. If there
is a Plan, the area under acquisition becomes identifiable immediately. The
question whether the impugned Notification meets the requirement of brief
H t
'
COMPETENT AUTHORITY''· BARANGOREJUTE FACTORY [ARUN KUMAR, J.] 433

description of land under Section 3A(2) goes to the root of the matter. The A
High Court rightly observed: " ..... it is just not possible to proceed to determine
the necessity of acquisition of a particular plot of land without preparation
of a proper Plan." The Appendix to the impugned Notification shows that in
many cases small parts of larger chunks of land have been notified for
acquisition. This is not possible without preparing a Plan. But where is the B
Plan? The Notification in question makes no reference to any Plan. Our
attention was drawn to averments in pleadings by Writ Petitioners and replies
thereto of the acquiring authority. The Writ Petitioners have pleaded that
there was no Plan. Replies are vague and by way of rolled up answers. There
is no specific reply. It is obvious that there was no Plan and therefore none
was referred to in pleadings nor any thing was produced before Court at the C
hearing. Learned counsel for the Competent Authority tried to submit before
us that there was a Plan at the time of issue of the notification and the Writ
Petitioners ought to have inspected it if they so desired. He further submitted
that the Plan was produced before the High.Court. We find that both these
submissions are not sustainable as they are not correct. A reference to the
impugned Notification shows that there is no mention of any Plan. Without D
this how can anybody know that there was a Plan which could be inspected
and inspected where? We are inclined to accept that there was no Plan
accompanying the impugned Notification. During the course of hearing we
were shown a Plan which we are unable to link with the impugned Notification.
This was a 1996 P.W.D.Plan. The P.W.D. is a department of the State E
Government. The impugned Notification is by the Central Government. The
NHAI is established under a Central Act. The Competent Authority under
Section 3 of the Act is appointed by the Central Government. Therefore, this
State Government Plan of 1996 (the impugned Notification is of 1998) is of no
assistance. The impugned judgment of the High Court emphasises the need
for a Plan. It is clear from the judgment of the High Court that no Plan was F
produced before it. The absence of any reference to a Plan in the impugned
Notification and in fact non-availability of any Plan linked to the Notification,
fortifies the argument that the description of the land under acquisition in the
impugned Notification fails to meet the legal requirement of a brief description
of the land which renders the Notification invalid. G
The absence of plan also renders the right to file objections under
Section 3C(l) nugatory. In the absence ofa Plan, it is impossible to ascertain
or know which part of acquired land was to be used and in what manner.
Without this knowledge no objections regarding use of land could be filed.
Since the objection regarding use of the land had been given up by the writ H
434 SUPRE~E COURT REPORTS (2005) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A .petitioners, we need not go any further in this aspect. We would, however,
like to add that unlike Section SA of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which
confers a general right to object to acquisition ofland under Section 4 of the
said Act, Section 3C(l) of the National Highways Act gives a very limited
right to object. The objection can be only to the use of the land under
acquisition for purposes other than those under sub-section 3A(l). The Act
B confers no right to object to acquisition as such. This answers the argument
advanced by the learned counsel for the NHAI that failure to file objections
disentitles Writ Petitioners to object to the acquisition. The Act confers no
general right to object, therefore, failure to object becomes irrelevant. The
learned counsel relied on the judgment of this court in Delhi Administration
C v. Gurdip Singh Uban & Ors., [1999] 7 SCC 44. In our view, this judgment
has no application in the facts of the present case where right to object is
a very limited right. The case cited is a case under the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 which confers a general right to object to acquisition of land under
Section SA. Failure to exercise that right could be said to be acquiescence.
The National Highways Act confers no such right. Under this Act there is
D no right to object to acquisition of land except on the question of its user.
Therefore, the present objection has to be decided independently of the right
to file objections. De hors the right to file objection, the validity of the
Notification has to be considered. Failure to file objection to the notification
under Section 3C, therefore, cannot non-suit the Writ Petitioners in this case.
E
The learned counsel supporting the acquisition submitted that the delay
in filing the Writ Petition is fatal to the case of land owners. It is true that
I Ith June, 1998 Notification was challenged only in September, 2001 by filing
the Writ Petition. But if the Notification violates the very statute from which
it derives its force, will delay in challenging it clothe it with legitimacy? The
F Act requires the Notification to be issued in a particular manner with brief
particulars of land being acquired. The Notification in this case fails to meet
this requirement. We have held it to be bad in law. lt has no legs to stand.
The conduct of the opposite party cannot be used to make it stand. Moreover,
the Writ Petitioners have explained the reasons for the delay in filing the Writ
G Petition. The Company which owns the lands had been de-registered. It is a
Company registered in the U.K. It had to be revived. Revival came in mid-2001
whereafter the action was taken. Thus we find no merit in the argument about
delay in challenging the Notification rendering the challenge liable to be
rejected.

H Coming to the point regarding filing of claim for compensation on behalf
COMPETENT AUTHORITY,,_ BARANGORE JUTE FACTORY [ARUN KUMAR, J.] 435
of the Company by its General Manager with complete details of the land A
under acquisition, we must note that at the relevant time in 1998 and thereafter
till 2001, the Writ Petitioner Company had no existence. On account of demands
of workers of the factory and to meet other statutory demands, a committee
was appointed by the High Court in the winding up proceedings pending
before it to run the factory. The claim for compensation was filed by somebody B
as the General Manager of the Company. He had no authority to do so. The
committee had to manage only the factory and had nothing to do with
ownership issues. So far as details of land under acquisition contained in the
claim is concerned, it is based on material contained in the impugned
Notification and the Appendix. Filing of such a claim by somebody who had
no authority to do so, cannot deprive the owners of their right to challenge C
the acquisition of the lands owned by the Company. Therefore, neither delay
in filing the Writ Petition nor filing of claim for compensation can stand in the
way of the Writ Petitioners in seeking relief in these proceedings.

About the argument based on vesting of the land in the Central
Government, it is to be seen that if the initial Notification is bad, all steps D
taken in pursuance thereof will fall with it. Vesting under Section 30(2) arises
on a declaration by the Central Government under Section 30(1). The
declaration is the result of disposal of objections under Section 3C. Each step
is a consequence of earlier step and in that sense all the steps are linked to
initial Notification for acquisition under Section 3A(l) and (2). This initial E
Notification has been held to be not in accordance with law. When the
foundation goes rest of the edifice falls. The invalid Notification under Section
3(A) renders all subsequent steps invalid. Therefore, vesting of land in the
Central Government in the present case cannot be said to be lawful and it
does not advance the case of the Competent Authority or the NHAI. Taking
possession of the land is yet another step in the same sequence and is again F
subject to the initial Notification being held valid. The initial Notification
having been invalidated, there can be no legal or valid vesting of land in the
favour of the Central Government.

The aspect of possessior. of land having been taken by the Competent
Authority, is an important issue for consideration in this case. Vesting of land G
in the Central Government has been held to be not in accordance with the
law. The other statutory requirement which needs to be complied before
taking possession is deposit of compensation. Under Section 3E(I) possession
can be taken only after the land vests in the Central Government and the
amount detennined by the Competent Authority as compensation under Section H
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A 3G has been deposited under sub-section (1) of Section 3H. In the present
case in view of an order dated 3rd April, 2002 passed by the High Court final
compensation could not be determined by the competent Authority. Therefore,
there could not be a valid deposit of amount finally determined as required
under Section 3E(l) of the Act, which means the possession could not have
B been taken. But the fact is that possession was taken on 19th February, 2003
on deposit of provisional amount of compensation. The NHAI had in fact
applied for permission of court to take possession of the land under acquisition.
But without any order being passed on that application, it hastened to take
possession after giving only one day's notice when the Act requires 60 days
notice. Moreover, the possession is to be taken through the Commissioner
C of Police or the Collector. This was not done. Neither of the three statutory
requirements for taking possession were fulfilled. Thus taking of possession
of the lands in the present case is in total violation of the statutory provisions.
The learned counsel for the acquiring authority submits that possession was (
taken on basis of oral observations of the court. This is a totally misconceived
plea. Court orders are always in black and white. Oral orders are never passed.
D Moreover, this plea is wrong because the Division Bench observed in its
order dated 27th March, 2003 that it never dealt with question of possession.
The result is that taking possession of the land sought to be acquired cannot
be said to be in accordance with law in this case and does not improve
matters for the NHAI.
E At this stage we would like to note that the learned counsel appearing
for the writ petitioners made reference to a publication in the nature of a
brochure issued by the W!!st Bengal Government wherein it is mentioned that
motels/shops/petrol pumps etc. will also come up in the area where the
acquired land is situate. On this basis it was sought to be argued that such ·•
F use of the acquired land would be contrary to the use mentioned in Section
3A of the Act and, therefore, is not permissible. There was lot of controversy
on this aspect between the parties particularly, on the ground that this plea
was being taken at this belated stage when the respondents had no opportunity
to give a proper reply thereto. We have mentioned this only for the reason
G that the issue has come up during the course of hearing. We do not consider
it necessary to go into this aspect, in view of the fact that we have held in
this judgment that the basic acquisition notification itself is not in accordance
with law.

Having held that the impugned notification regarding acquisition of
,H land is invalid because it fails to meet the statutory requirements and also
COMPETENTAUTHORITYv. BARANGOREJUTEFACTORY[ARUNKUMAR,J.] 437
having found that taking possession of the land of the writ petitioners in the A
present case in pursuance of the said notification was not in accordance with
law, the question arises as to what relief can be granted to the petitioners.
The High Court rightly observed that the acquisition of land in the present
case was for a project of great national importance, i.e. the construction of
a national highway. The construction of national highway on the acquired B
land has already been completed as informed to us during the course of
hearing. No useful purpose will be served by quashing the impugned
notification at this stage. We cannot be unmindful of the legal position that
the acquiring authority can always issue a fresh notification for acquisition
of the land in the. event of the impugned notification being quashed. The
consequence of this will only be that keeping in view the rising trend in prices C
of land, the amount of compensation payable to the land owners may be more.
Therefore, the ultimate question will be about the quantum of compensation
payable to the land owners. Quashing of the notification at this stage will give
rise to several difficulties and practical problems. Balancing the rights of the
petitioners as against the problems involved in quashing the impugned
notification, we are of the view that a better course will be to compensate the D
land owners, that is, writ petitioners appropriately for what they have been
deprived of. Interests of justice persuade us to adopt this course of action.

Nonnally, compensation is detennined as per the market price of land on
the date of issuance of the notification regarding acquisition of land. There E
-t
are precedents by way of judgments of this Court where in similar situations
instead of quashing the impugned notification, this Court shifted the date of
the notification so that the land owners are adequately compensated. Reference
may be made to:

(a) Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v. Rajkumar Johri and Ors., [1992] l F
SCC328
(b) Gauri Shankar Gaur & Ors. v. State of UP & Ors., [1994] l SCC
92
(c) Haji Saeed Khan & Ors. v. State of UP & Ors., [2001] 9 SCC 513
G
In that direction the next step is what should be the crucial date in the facts
of the present case for determining the quantum of compensation. We feel
that the relevant date in the present case ought to be the date when possession
of the land was taken by the respondents from the writ petitioners. This date
admittedly is \9th February, 2003. We, therefore, direct that compensation
payable to the writ petitioners be determined as on 19th February, 2003, the H
438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A date on which they were deprived of possession of their lands. We do not
quash the impugned notification in order not to disturb what has already
taken place by way of use of the acquired land for construction of the
national highway. We direct that the compensation for the acquired land be
detennined as on 19th February, 2003 expeditiously and within ten weeks from
today and the amount of compensation so determined, be paid to the writ
B petitioners after adjusting the amount already paid by way of compensation
within eight weeks thereafter. The claim of interest on the amount of
compensation so determined is to be decided in accordance with law by the
appropriate authority. We express no opinion about other statutory rights, if
any, available to the parties in this behalf and the parties will be free to
C exercise the same, if available. The compensation as determined by us under
this order along with other benefits, which the respondents give to parties
whose lands are acquired under the Act should be given to the Writ Petitioners
along with what has been directed by us in this judgment.

Accordingly appeals filed by the Competent Authority (arising out of
D SLP (C)No.16820 of 2004) and the National Highways Authority of India
(arising out of SLP (C) Nos.17874-17875 of 2004 are hereby dismissed while
the appeal filed by Ridh Karan Rakecha & Anr. (arising out ofSLP(C) No.18773
of 2004) is allowed in terms of the above judgment. There shall be no order
as to costs.
E v.s.s. Appeal dismissed.