Holding

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court order, holding that the presence of an alternative remedy does not bar the court’s writ jurisdiction where the remedy is not efficacious and the impugned order violates principles of natural justice.

Summary

The Committee of Management of Mumtaz Post Graduate College (appellants) challenged the Vice‑Chancellor’s refusal to approve the removal of its principal, Dr. M.N. Khan, arguing that the removal order violated Section 35(2) of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 and that the provision was ultra‑vires Article 30(1) of the Constitution. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the appellants could obtain relief under Section 68 of the Act, an alternative remedy. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in refusing jurisdiction merely because an alternative remedy existed, especially where the remedy was not efficacious and the order was passed without jurisdiction or in violation of natural justice. It also clarified that the Chancellor, as a statutory authority, cannot adjudicate on the constitutionality of the Act. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court order and allowed the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether Section 35(2) of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973, as applied to a minority institution, is ultra‑vires Article 30(1) of the Constitution.
Whether the Vice‑Chancellor validly refused to approve the removal of the principal under the procedural requirements of Section 35(2).
Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the writ petition on the ground of the existence of an alternative remedy under Section 68.
Whether the Chancellor can consider the validity or constitutionality of the statute itself.
Whether an alternative remedy is efficacious enough to bar the exercise of writ jurisdiction.

Legislation cited

U.P. State Universities Act, 1973s. 35(2), s. 68

Subjects

U.P. State Universities ActSection 35(2)Section 68Article 30(1) ConstitutionMinority educational institutionWrit jurisdictionAlternative remedyJudicial reviewNatural justiceRemoval of principal

Judgment

A
[2008) 15 S. C.R. 77 4 -
COMMITTEE OF MANAGEMENT & ANR.
v.'
VICE CHANCELLOR & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 7319 of 2008)
' ,·.~

DECEMBER 16, 2008
8
[S.8. SINHA AND CYRIAC JOSEPH, JJ.]

U.P. State Universities Act, 1973: ss. 68, 35(2) -
Reference' to Chancellor - Proposal regarding removal of
c principal .:. . Non-approval of, by Vice..1Chancellor since
decision of removal not as per s.35(2) - Writ petition -
Dismissal of, on the ground of existence of alternative remedy
uls. 68 - On appeal, held: Chancellor of University has been
conferred a wide power but being a statutory authority, it
cannot consider validity' of a statute - Power of judicial review
0
has been conferred only in superior courts - High C_ourt
should not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction on the ground of
availability of alternative remedy - It may exercise its writ
jurisdiction despite the fact that alternative remedy is
available,, where same would not be an efficacious one .....
E Thus, order of High Court set aside.
Respondent No. 3 is the Principal of the College run
by the appellants. T~ere were allegations of misconduct
against him. Disciplinary enquiry was held and he was
placed under suspension. Respondent no. 1-Vice-
F Chancellor of the University was informed. Respondent -
no. 3 was issued charge sheet but he did not file any reply. ,~
Enquiry, Committee submitted a Report that respondent
no. 3 was prima fac.ie guilty of committing various acts
of misconduct. Thereafter, respondent no. 1 was issued
G notice. He was given fresh opportunity to cross examine
the witness. Respondent No. 1-Vice Chancellor- stayed
the suspension order. Thereafter, resolution was passed
to remove respondent no. 3 from service. Respondent :)..
no. 1 did not approve the proposal of Managing
H 774

,..,.
COMMITTEE OF MANAGEMENT & ANR. v. VICE 775
CHANCELLOR & ORS.

Committee in regard to removal of respondent no. 3 as it A
was not as per the provisions of s. 35(2) of the U.P.
Universities Act, 1973, thus, was liable to be struck down.
Respondent no. 1 also directed that respondent no. 3 be
retired as per law since he has attained the age of
superannuation. Appellant filed Writ Petition. High Court B
dismissed the same on the ground of alternative remedy
available to the appellant. Hence the present appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. The Chancellor of the University has been
conferred a wide power. Howsoever wide the power niay C
be, the Chancellor, in terms of the provisions of the U.P.
State Universities Act, 1973 being a creature of the statute
itself cannot consider the validity thereof.
Constitutionality of a statute, keeping in view the fact that
the power of judicial review has been conferred by the 0
Constitution of India only in superior courts of the
country, cannot be determined by any other authority
howsoever high it may be. The Chancellor, in terms of the
said provision, may consider a matter relating to a
decision of any authority or officer of the University as
to whether the same is in conformity with the Act or the E
Statute or the ordinance made thereunder. Prima facie.
the Chancellor is not supposed to consider an intricate
question of law involving interpretation of the Statute vis-
a-vis the jurisdictional fact of an authority. The matter
might have been different if the Chancellor was required , F
"'-..
to go into only the factual aspect of the matter. [Paras 16
and 17) (784-E-H; 785-A]
Management Committee, Atarra Post Graduate College
v. Vice Chancellor, Bundelkhand University, Jhansi & Anr.
(1990) Supp. SCC 773, Referred to. G
1.2. It is beyond any doubt or dispute that availability
of an alternative remedy by itself may not be a ground for
the High Court to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. It may
exercise its writ jurisdiction despite the fact that an
H
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A alternative remedy is available, inter alia, in a case where
the same would not be an efficacious one. Furthermore,
when an order has been passed by an authority without
jurisdiction or in violation of the principles of natural
justice, the superior courts -shall not refuse to exercise
B their jurisdiction although there exists an alternative
remedy. [Paras' 20 and 21] [786-A-C]
1.3. Whether in a case of this nature such a power
has properly been exercised or not being an intricate
question should ordinarily fall for determination by the
c High Court itself. Keeping in view the legal questions
arising in the matter, it was not a fit case where the High
Court should have refused to exercise its discretionary
jurisdiction to entertain the writ application. Thus, the
impugned order c'annot be sustained and is set aside.
[Paras 24, 25 and 26] [789-E; 790-D-E]
D
Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks,
Mumbai & Ors. (1998) 8 SCC 1; Guruvayoor Devaswom
Managing Committee & Anr. v. C.K. Rajan & Ors. (2003) 7
SCC 546; Manvendra Misra (Dr.) v. Gorakhpur University,
Gorakhpur &. Ors. (2000) 1 UPLBEC 702; Frank Anthony
E Public School Employees' Association v. Union of India & Ors.
(1986) 4 SCC 707; Mrs. Y. Thec/amma v. Union of India &
Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 516; Christian Medical College Hospital
Employees' Union & Anr. etc. v. Christian Medical College
Ve/lore Association & Ors. etc. (1987) 4 SCC 691; Yunus Ali
F Sha v. Mohamed Abdul Ka/am & Ors. (1999) 3 SCC 676; )I
Committee of Management, St. John Inter College v. Girdhari
Singh & Ors. (2001) 4 SCC 296 and Secy., Malankara Syrian
Catholic College v. T. Jose & Ors. (2007) 1 SCC 386 and P.A.
/namdf3r & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2005) 6 SCC
G 537, Referred to.
Case Law Reference:
(1990) Supp. sec 773 Referred to Para 18
(1998) 8 sec 1 Referred to Para 21
(2003) 1 sec 546 Referred to Para 21
H (2000) 1 UPLBEC 702 Referred to Para 22
COMMITTEE OF MANAGEMENT & ANR. v. VICE 777
CHANCELLOR & ORS.

(1986) 4 sec 101 · Referred to Para 23 A
""""'! ""* (1987) 2 sec 516 Referred to Para 23
(
(1987) 4 sec 691 Referred to Para 23
J (1999) a sec 676 Referred to Para 23
""" (2001) 4 sec 296 Referred to Para 23
B
(2007) 1 sec 386 Referred to Para 23
(2005) s sec 537 Referred to Para 24
I '\ CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
1
7319 of 2008.
From the Judgment and final Order dated 21.08.2006 of c
the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad Lucknow Bench,
Lucknow in Writ Petition No. 1119(S/B) of 2006.
Anoop G. Choudhari, June Choudhari, Shakil Ahmed
Syed, Mohd. Monis Abbasi and Prabhat Kumar Rai for the
Appellants. D
===\
"-),I-
R.G. Padia, C.D. Singh, Sunny Chowdhary, Vairagya
Vardhana Dubey, Aditya Singh, Upasana Nath, Anish Dayal,
Anitha Sheno, B.B. Singh, Siddhartha Vaid and Sanjay Pandey
for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by E
S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted.
<.
2. Appellants run a Muslim Minority Post Graduate
College, commonly known as Mumtaz Post Graduate College
(for short, 'the college') at Lucknow. It is affiliated with the
University of Lucknow (for short, 'the University'). Third F
~
respondent, viz., Dr. Mukhtar Nabi Khan was appointed as
Principal of the said college. On an allegation that a prima facie
case had been made out against the said respondent of having
committed various acts of misconduct, a preliminary enquiry
was held pursuant to a resolution adopted by the Managing G
Committee in a meeting held on ·02nd May 2003. For the said
-4; purpose a Committee of three senior members was
constituted. The said Committee submitted its report on or
about 30th May 2003.
3. Appellants, upon consideration of the said report, by a H
778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R ...
A resolution adopted in a meeting held on 05th June 2003. took
,.....
a decision to hold a proper disciplinary enquiry. He was placed
under suspension. Vice-Chancellor of the University was also
duly informed thereabout.
4. A charge-sheet containing eight charges was issued
B against the respondent no.3. He, however, did not file· any show
cause/reply thereto.
.·t;
5. Upon recording evidence of some witnesses, the
Ef'!quiry Committee submitted its report on 03rd March 2004 rt I

opining that the respondent no.3 was prima facie guilty of
c gross misconduct, dereliction of duty, causing wrongful gain to
himself and causing wrongful loss to the institution. Relevant
portion of the report of the Enquiry Committee is quoted
heretobelow :
"In view of the aforesaid findings of the inquiry
D committee the charged employee can be s.aid to be guilty I

of misconduct, dereliction of duty, acting with malafide ~,,.,
'
intentions to obtain wrongful gain to himself and wrongful
loss to the college and his unbecoming conduct has

E
resulted in great loss of goodwill and reputation to the
college and thus the college was being continuously
mismanaged by him."
...
6. On or about 17th May 2004, a copy of the said Enquiry
Report was sent to the 3rd respondent. He was also informed
that a meeting of the Managing Committee would be held on
F 01 st June 2004 wherein the said report shall be considered.
Respondent no.3, pursuant to the said notice, appeared before ~

the Managing Committee on the said date. He availed the,
opportunity of being personally heard. He also filed his written
submissions.

G 7. By a resolution adopted by the Managing Committee
of the appellant-institution in a meeting held on 05th June 2004,
a decision was taken to iss1:.1e a second show cause notice to
)...
respondent no.3 pursuant whereto a:rrotice was issued to him
on 15th June 2004. He submitted his reply on 23rd June 2004,
inter alia, contending that he had not got an opportunity of
H
COMMITTEE OF MANAGEMENT & ANR. V. VICE 779
CHANCELLOR & ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

cross-examining the witnesses. A fresh opportunity was, A
therefore, granted to him. The Enquiry Officer was also
changed. A senior advocate of Lucknow Bench of Allahabad

-
High Court was appointed as the Enquiry Officer. Respondent
no.3, however, made allegations of bias against him whereupon
another Enquiry Officer, viz., Aftab Ahmad Siddiqui, Advocate B
was appointed. The said Enquiry Officer submitted his report
on 20th November 2005.
' 'i 8. Respondent no.1, however, passe9 an order on 31st
December 2005 staying the operation of the order of
suspension. On or about 04th February 2006, the Managing c
Committee, upon hearing the respondent no.3 in person,
passed.a resolution that he be removed from service. A report
thereabout, as envisaged under the proviso appended to sub-
s~ction (2) of Section 35 of the U.P. Universities Act, 1973 (for
short, 'the Act'), was sent to the 1st respondent. By reason of
an order dated 07th/12th July 2006, the Vice-chancellor refused D
to grant approval to the proposal of the Managing Committee
.
~

•
in regard to the removal of respondent no.3 stating :
~ "It is clear from the decision of management
committee of the College and related records/papers that
removal from service of Dr. M.N. Khan, Principal Mumtaz , E
Post Graduate Degree College, Lucknow is not in
accordance with the procedures established by the
governing/managing body/college. The said decision of
removal from service of managing body of the college .is
( not in accordance to the provisions of 35(2) of 1st Statute F
-.(
of Lucknow University and is therefore, liable to be struck
down.
<

~
Therefore, in exercising of the power conferred
under Seqtion 35(2) of U.P. State University Act 1973, to
Vice Chancellor in this context, the Managing Committee, G
:=t college is directed that Dr. M.N. Khan be allowed to work
as Princtpal with all benefits because decision of th~
-'\
managing body for removal from service is. ex-parte
unsatisfactory and not as per law.
In the matter under reference, since as per his H
780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R. ,,
'

A represen~ation dated 24.4.2006 Dr. M.N .. Khan Principal
has attained the age of superannuation on 3.1.2006 the
Managing Committee of College is directed to consider
and take lsteps for
retirement of Dr. M.N. Khan in
accordance with rules."
B 9. Challenging the lega!ity and/or validity of the said order,
the appellants filed writ petition before the High Court which,
by reason of the impugned order, has been dismissed, stating:
"Against the impugned order dated 7/12.7.2006
,
r·
passed by the Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,
c Lucknow, the petitioner has an alternative and efficacious
remedy before the Chancellor under Section 68 of U.P.
/State Universities Act, 1973. The record reveals that
opposite party No.3, has already attained the age of
superannuation on 3.1.2006 and the academic session
D 2005-06 has also come to an end on 30.6.2006.
I'
We, therefore, dismissJhe instant writ petition on the
ground of alternative remedy available to the petitioner. The
Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, shall not
insist for reinstatement of the opposite party No.3 in
E service as the opposite party No.3, has already attained
the age of superannuation on 3.1.2006 and the academic
session 2005-06 has also come to an end on 30.6.2006."
10. Appellants are thus before us.
11. By an order dated 12th November 2007, in view of the
F contention that the appellants intended to question the
constitutionality of sub-section (2) of Section 35 of the Act as )r

also the applicability of the University Statute in the light of
clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution of India, they ~ere
permitted to raise additional grounds pursuant whereto
additional grounds have been taken. '
G •
)

. 12. Mr. Anoop G. Choudhari, learned senior counsel 1-
appearing on behalf of the appellants would urge :
).-·
(i) Sub-section (2) of Secti6n 35 of the Act as also the
pfoviso thereto is ultra vires clause (1) of Article 30 oMhe
1

H
COMMITIEE OF MANAGEMENT & ANR. v. VICE 781
~'
CHANCELLOR & ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
Constitution of India. A
(ii) The High Court, in a case of this nature, where the
validity and/or interpretation of different provisions of the
Act vis-a-vis the validity of the order of the 1st respondent
dated 07th/12th July 2006 is required to be considered
and/or the manner in which the same had been passed, B
must be held to have committed a serious error \n
dismissing the writ petition on the ground of existence of
alternative remedy.
''-i (iii) In a case of this nature, Section 68 of the Act cannot
be said to provide for any efficacious remedy in the hands c

•
(

of the Chancellor and in that view of the matter, the
I
~ impugned order should be set aside.
13. Dr. R.G. Padia, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the 1st respondent on the other hand would contend
D
(i) The Statute itself having provided for review of an order
..... on the decision taken by the Chancellor of the University
subject of course to the law of limitation, must be held to
be an efficacious alternative remedy and in that view of the
matter, the impugned order should not be interfered with; E
and
(ii) In view of the proviso appended to sub-section (2) of
Section 35 of the Act as only a regulatory power has been
conferred upon the Vice Chancellor and not a power to
grant prior approval as envisaged under the main provision, F
the said Statute cannot be said to be ultra vires the
provisions of the Constitution of India as such regulatory
measures are permissible in law.
14. The U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 was enacted with
a view to toning up the academic and financial administration G
of higher education in State of U.P. A comprehensive Bill
applicable to all the State Universities (except the Roorkee
University and Govind Ballabh Pant Agricultural University), was
prepared in the light of the recommendations made by various
Commissions and Committees appointed by the Government H
782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 17 S.C.R.

A of India and the State Government and also the views of the
Vice-Chancellors and other educationists.
15. Various officers have been named in the Act to perform
their respective functions as conferred upon.them either under
the Act or the Statu·te. Section 35 of the Act, inter alia, regulates
B the conditions of service of an employee in an institution or a
college affiliated to the University; sub-section (2) whereof
reads as under:
"35. Conditions of service of teachers of affiliated or
associated colleges other than those maintained by
C Government or local authority.
(1) ........... .
(2) Every decision of the Management of such college to
dismiss or remove a teacher or to reduce him in rank or
to punish him in any other manner shall before it is
D communicated to him, be reported to the Vice-Chancellor
and shall not take effect unless it has been approved by
the Vice-.Chancellor: ·
.·provided that in the case of colleges established and
admihistered by a minority referred to in clause (1) of
E Article 30 of the Constitution of India, the decision of the
management dismissing removing or reducing in rank or
punishing in any other manner any teacher shall not require
the approval of the Vice-Chancellor, but, shall be reported
to him and unless he is satisfied that th,e procedure
F prescribed in this behalf has been followed, the decision
shall not be given effect to."
Section 68 of the Act reads as under :
"68. Reference to the Chancellor.-lf any question arises
whether any person has· been duly elected or appointed
G as, or is entitled to be, member of any authority or other
body of the University, or whether any decision of any
authority or officer of the University (including any question
as to the validity of a Statute, Ordinance or Regulation, not
being a Statute or Ordinance made or approved by the
H
COMMITTEE OF MANAGEMENT & ANR. v. VICE 783
CHANCELLOR & ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
.
!''
State Government or by the Chancellor) is in conformity A
with this Act or the Statutes or the Ordinance made
thereunder, the matter shall be referred to the Chancellor
and the decision of the Chancellor thereon shall be final:
Provided that no reference under this section shall
be made- B
(a) more than three months after the date when the question
could been raised for the first time;
.,. (b) by any person other than an authority or officer of the
....... University or a person aggrieved :
Provided further that the Chancellor may in
c
exceptional circumstances-
(a) act suo motu or entertain a reference after the
expiry of the period mentioned in the preceding
proviso;
D
(b) where the matter referred relates to a dispute about
the election, and the eligibility of the person so
........ ~ elected is in doubt, pass such orders of stay as he
thinks just and expedient;
(c) * * * * *" E
Statute 17.06, which is relevant for our purpose, is reproduced
below:
"17.06.(1) No order dismissing, removing or terminating
the services of a teacher on any ground mentioned in
clause (1) or clause (2) of Statute 17 .04 (except in the F
case of a conviction for an offence involving moral
--.(
turpitude or of abolition of post) shall be passed unless a
charge has been framed against the teacher and
1 communicated to him with a statement of the grounds on
which it is proposed to take action and he has been given G
adequate opportunity:-
(i) of submitting a written statement of his defence;

~
(ii) of being heard in person, if he so chooses, and
(iii) of calling and examining such witness in his defence
H
)

784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S. C.R.

.f-
,
A as he may wish; __

Provided that the Management or the officer authorized by
it to conduct the inquiry may, for sufficient reasons to be
'
~\~
"'-~--
.
recorded in writing, refuse to call any witness.
(2) The management may, at any time ordinarily within two
B months from the date of the Inquiry Officer's report pass a \-
resolution dismissing or removing the teacher concerned
from service, or terminating his services mentioning the
grounds of such dismissal, removal or termination. ,.
(3) The resolution shall forthwith be communicated to the V·
c
/

teacher concerned and also be reported to the Vice-
Chancellor for approval and shall not be operative unless
so approved by the Vice-Chancellor. ~-

(4) The Management may, instead of dismissing, removing
or terminating the servic~s of the teacher, pass a resolution
D
inflicting a lesser punishment by reducing the pay of the
teacher for a specified period or by stopping increments
of his salary for a specified period, not exceeding three ~ .........

years and/or may deprive the teacher of his pay during the
period, if any, of his suspension. The resolution by the
E Management inflicting such punishment shall be reported
to the Vice-Chancellor and shall be operative only when
and to the extent approved by the Vice-Chancellor."
16. Chancellor of the University has been conferred a wide
power. Howsoever wide the power may be, the Chancellor, in
>-
F terms of the provisions of the Act being a creature of the statute
itself cannot consider the validity thereof. Constitutionality of a
statute, keeping in view the fact that the power of judicial review ).--
has been conferred by the Constitution of India only in superior
courts of the country,. cannot be determined by any other t"
~
G authority howsoever high it may be. t-
'
17. The Chancellor, in terms of the said provision, may
consider a matter relating to a decision of any authority or ,.
officer of the University as to whether the same is in conformity "r·
with the Act or the Statute or the ordinance made thereunder. .1
H Prima facie, the Chancellor is not supposed to consider an

1
'
COMMITTEE bF MANAGEMENT & ANR. v. VICE 785
CHANCELLOR & ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

intricate question of law involving interpretation of the Statute A
vis-a-vis the jurisdictional fact of an authority. The matter might
have been different if the Chancellor was required to go into
only the factual aspect of the matter. Appellants, apart from
questioning the validity of the Act and/or the Statute also allege
commission of jurisdictional error on the part of the Vice B
Chancellor in implementing the provisions of a Statute.
18. Dr. Padia placed strong reliance upon a decision of
this Court in the case of Management Committee, Atarra Post
Graduate College v. Vice Chancellor, Bundelkhand University,
Jhansi & Anr. 1990 (Supp.) SCC 773 to contend that the power C
of the Chancellor is wide in nature. In that case, the question
; which arose for consideration was as to whether the Vice
Chancellor had properly appreciated the circumstances of the
case or whether his decision was totally perverse and passed
in ignorance of the mass of evidence of the Committee of
0
Management as also several witnesses examined before him
regarding the conduct of the meetings. It was in the
I
aforementioned situation, this Court observed:
' " .... In our opinion it is not for this Court to appraise the
factual circumstances and come to a conclusion whether E
the order of the Vice Chancellor is correct or not,
particularly when it is open to the aggrieved party, under
Section 68 of the U.P. State University Act, to have a
reference made to the Chancellor of the University who has
ample powers to decide whether any decision taken by
any authority or officer is in conformity with the statutes and F
ordinances of the University. In view of this provision it is
open to the Committee of Management to make a
reference to the Chancellor to decide the issue regarding
the validity of the termination of the services of Dr. Gaur
and of the order of the Vice Chancellor. .... " G
19. This Court, therefore, having regard to the factual matrix
obtaining therein, refused to exercise its discretionary
jurisdiction. ·
20. Apart from the fact that a statutory authority cannot
H

.-
786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A consider the validity of a Statute, as has been urged before us
by Mr. Choudhari, it is beyond any doubt or dispute that
availability of an alternative remedy by itself may not be a ..
ground for the High Court to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction.
It may exercise its writ jurisdiction despite the fact that an
B alternative remedy is available, inter alia, in a case where the
same would not be an efficacious one.
21. Furthermore, when an order has been passed by an
authority without jurisdiction or in violation of the principles of
I
natural justice, the superior courts shall not refuse to exercise
c their jurisdiction although there exists an alternative remedy. In
.(
this context, it i_s appropriate to refer to the observations made (

by this Court in the case of Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar .~
of Trade Marks, Mumbai & Ors. ( 1998) 8 SCC 1 :
"15 ..... But the alternative remedy has been consistently
D held by this Court not to ·operate as a bar in at least three
contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been
filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights
or where there has been a violation of the principle of
natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly
without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged ..... "
E
[See also Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee
j
& Anr. v. C.K. Rajan & Ors. (2003) 7 SCC 546]
1
In this case, albeit, before us for the first time, the vires of the
proviso appended to Section 16 of the Act is in question,
F bes.ides other points noUced by us hereinbefore.
22. Dr. Padia relied upon a Division Bench decision of the
Allahabad High Court in the case of Manvendra Misra (Dr.) v.
Gorakhpur University, Gorakhpur & Ors. (2000) 1 UPLBEC
702 wherein Hon'ble Katju, J. (as His Lordship then was),
G speaking for a Division Bench of the said Court, opined that
refusal to entertain ·a writ application on the ground of existence
of an alternative remedy is entirely a matter of discretion though,
of course, the discretion should not be exercised arbitrarily. It
was held:
H
COMMITTEE OF MANAGEMENT & ANR. v. VICE 787
CHANCELLOR & ORS. [S.S. SINHA, J.]

" .... Since writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction hence A
if there is an alternative remedy the petitioner should
ordinarily be relegated to his alternative remedy. This is
specially necessary now because of the heavy arrears in
the High Court and this Court can no longer afford the
luxury of entertaining writ petitions even when there is an B
alternative remedy in existence. No doubt alternative
remedy is not an absolute bar, but ordinarily a writ petition
should not be entertained if there is an alternative
remedy."
[Emphasis supplied] c
23. Thus, even therein no legal principle has been laid
down that in all situations, the High Court would refuse to
exercise its discretionary jurisdiction only on the ground that an
alternative remedy is available. We may notice that Dr. Padia
himself, in his usual fairness, has brought to our notice several o
decisions which upheld the validity of the regulatory power on
the part of the University or affiliating bodies in the matter of
order of dismissal, removal or suspension of an employee, viz.,
Frank Anthony Public School Employees' Association v.
Union of India & Ors. (1986) 4 SCC 707; Mrs. Y. Thec/amma E
v. Union of India & Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 516 and Christian
Medical College Hospital Employees' Union & Anr. etc. v.
Christian Medical College Ve/lore Association & Ors. etc.
(1987) 4 sec 691, on the one hand, and the decisions opining
that such a wide power cannot be conferred on a university,
institution and minority institution being Yunus Ali Sha v. F
Mohamed Abdul Ka/am & Ors. (1999) 3 SCC 676 and
Committee of Management, St. John Inter College v. Girdhari
Singh & Qrs. (2001) 4 SCC 296. Our attention has also been
drawn to a recent decision of this Court in the case of Secy.,
Malankara Syrian Catholic College v. T. Jose & Ors. (2007) G
1 sec 386 wherein it was held :
"19. The general principles relating to establishment ¢ind
administration of educational institution by minorities, may
'y
I be summarized thus :
H

-
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.
""*:-
A (i) ......... lo
(ii) ......... ~
't-
(

(iii) The right to establish and administer educational
institutions is not absolute. Nor does it include the
right to maladminister. There can be regulatory
B measures for ensuring educational character and
standards and maintaining academic excellence.
There can be checks on administration as are
necessary to ensure that the administration is
r'
efficient and sound. so as to serve the academic
c needs of the institution. Regulations made by the
State concerning g'enerally the welfare of students
~
and teachers, regulations laying down eligibility '
criteria .and qualifications for appointment, as also
conditions of service of employees (both teaching
D and non-teaching), regulations to prevent
exploitation or oppression of employees, and
regulations prescribing syllabus and curriculum of ~...;

study fall under this category. Sucl'l regulations do
not in any manner interfere with the right under
Article 30(1 ).
E
(iv) .........
(v) .........
20. Aided institutions give instruction either in secular
education or professional education. Religious education
F is barred in educational institutions maintained out of the
State funds. These aided educational minority institutions )-
providing secular education or professional education
should necessarily have standards comparable with non-
minority educational institutions. Such standards can be
G attained and maintained only by having well-qualified
professional teachers. An institution can have the services
of good qualified professional teachers only if the
conditions of service ensure security, contentment and r ,
. decent living standards. That is why the State can regulate .....
H the service conditions of the employees of the minority
COMMITTEE OF MANAGEMENT & ANR. v. VICE 789
CHANCELLOR & ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

educational institutions to ensure quality of education. A
Consequently, any law intended to regulate the serviGe
....
conditions of employees of educational institutions will
apply to minority institutions also, provided that such law
does not interfere with the overall administrative control of
the management over the staff. B
21. We may also recapitulate the extent of regulation by
the State, permissible in respect of employees of minority
educational institutions receiving aid from the State, as
~ clarified and crystallized in T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State
of Kamataka (2002) 8 SCC 481. The State can prescribe: c
(i) .........
(ii) the service conditions of employees without interfering
with the overall administrative control by the management
over the staff,
'· (111) .•....... ",..
D
1.1irli~- -
IV ) ..•...•.. It
("

24. Whether in a case of this nature such a power has
properly been exercised or not, in our opinion, being an intricate
question should ordinarily fall for determination by the High E
Court itself. Our attention has also been drawn to a decision
of a Seven-Judge Bench of this court in the case of P.A.
lnamdar & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2005) 6 SCC
537 wherein it has been held :
"126. The observations in para 68 of the majority F
...,- opinion in T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Kamataka
(2002) 8 sec 481 on which the learned counsel for the
parties have been much at variance in their submissions,
according. to us, are not to be read disjointly from other
parts of the main judgment. A few observations contained G
in certain paragraphs of the judgment in Pai Foundation
if read in isolation, appear conflicting or inconsistent with
each other. But if the observations made and the
conclusions derived are read as a whole, the judgment
nowhere lays down that unaided private educational
H
790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A institutions of minorities and non-minorities can be forced
to submit to seat-sharing and reservation policy of the ,,..
State. Reading relevant parts of the judgment on which ...,
learned counsel have made comments and counter-
comments and reading the whole judgment (in the light of
B previous judgments of this Court, which have been
approved in Pai Foundation) in our considered opinion,
observations in para 68 mer:ely permit unaided private
institutions to maintain merit as the criterion of admission
by voluntarily agreeing for seat-sharing with the State or ·r>
adopting selection based on common entrance test of the
c State. There are also observations saying th~t they may
frame their own policy to give freeships and scholarships
to the needy and poor students or adopt a policy in line
with the reservation policy of the State to cater to the
· educational needs of the weaker and poorer sections of ,~
D the society."
25. Keeping in view the legal questions arising in the
matter, we are of the opinion that it was not a fit case where
the High Court should have refused to exercise its discretionary
jurisdiction to entertain the writ application.
E
26. For the aforementioned reasons, the impugned order
·cannot be sustained and is set aside accordingly. The appeal
is allowed accordingly. The High Court is requested to consider
'\
the matter on merits. No costs.
N.J. Appeal allowed.

r