COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAXversusPRINCE MUFFAKHAM JAH BAHADUR CHAMLIJAN

 A                   COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX
                                 v.
              PRINCE MUFFAKHAM JAH BAHADUR CHAMLIJAN

                                 DECEMBER 12, 2000

B                  [S.P. BHARUCHA, N. SANTOSH HEGDE AND
                             Y.K. SABHARWAL, JJ.]


           Wealth Tax Act, 1957---Sections 2(e), 2(m) and 7-Right of beneficiary
C to live in a house duri'1g his lifetime free of rent--Held, it is a life interest
     and therefore an asset-Wealth Tax Rules, 1957-Rule JB.

            Respondent-assessee was a member of late Nizam's family who
     established several trusts. The assessee was a beneficiary of one of the trusts.
     Uoder the terms of the trust deed, the trustees constructed a house and the
D    assessee had the right to live in the house during his lifetime without payment
     of rent. In his wealth tax returns for the assessment years 1969-70 to 1977-
     78, the assessee did not include the said value of life interest in his wealth.
     The Wealth-Tax Officer added the value of the life interest in the assessee's
     wealth, applying the provisions of Rule 1B of the Wealth Tax Rules. The
     appellate authority held to the contrary with which the Tribunal agreed. On a
E    reference, the High Court held that the said interest was in the nature of a
     licence and that the value of the assessee's life interest could not be included
     in his wealth.

           In appeal to this Court, Revenue contended that the right to live in a
     house free of rent is an asset and its value must be included in assessee's net
F    wealth.

           The assessee contended that the said life interest is not an asset because
     it only conferred a personal, inalienable right to reside on the assessee and
     that it was only a licence and not an asset. The assessee further contended
G    that on application of Rule 1B of the Wealth Tax Rules, the value of the life
     interest is zero.

           Allowing the appeals, the Court

           HELD : 1.1. The assessee has, by reason of the life interest, a right to
H reside in the house in question for the duration of his life. Such a right to
                                           518
  COMMR OF WEALTH TAX v PRINCE MliFFAKHAM JAH BAHADUR CHAMLIJAN [liHARVCHA. J]   5J9

reside, though personal and inalienable, is property, which would have a               A
market in an assumed market place. (523-8)

       1.2. Rule 18 of the Wealth Tax Rules indicates how a life interest is to
be valued. Rule 18 is not workable in the present case as it is applicable only
to an income yielding life interest. Even if Rule 18 is not applicable, the said
life interest, if an asset, had still to be valued and be included in the wealth of    B
the assessee, which is what Section 7 required. In the absence of a rule which
can apply to the valuation of a particular asset, that asset must be valued in
the ordinary way, by determining what it would fetch if it were sold in an
assumed market; the value being what an assumed willing purchaser would
pay for it. This is how the said life interest must be assessed, upon the              C
assumption that the assessee's personal right to reside in the property during
his lifetime is saleable. [523-G, H; 524-A)

      Ahmed G.H. Arif!& Ors. v. Commissionr of Wealth-Tax, Calcutta, (1970)
76 I.T.R. 471 and Purshottam N. Amarsay & Anr. v. Commissioner of Wealth-
Tax, Bombay City II, (1973) 88 ITR 417, relied on.                                     D
      Commissioner of Wealth-tax v. Prince Mujjakkam Jah Bahadur; 186 ITR
421, overruled.

     Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Bombay City II v. Purshottam N. Amersey
and Am:, (1967) 71 l.T.R., 180, referred to.
                                                                                       E
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 2388-2394 of
1994.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 31.1.89 of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court in C.R. No. 84 of 1984.
                                     WITH                                              F
        Civil Appeal No. 3603of1997.

      From the Judgment and Order dated 10.7.95 of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court in S.C.L.P. No. 3/94 in R.C. No. 27of1985.

      S. Ganesh, Ranbir Chandra, S.K. Dwivedi, Ms. Sushma Suri,                        G
P. Murlikrishnan, B.A. Ranganathan and J.B. Dadachanji for JBD & Co. for
the appearing parties.

        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        BHARUCHA, J. These are appeals that relate to the same assessee,               H
     520                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A    Prince Muffakham Jah; they are in respect of the Assessment years 1969-70
     to 1975-76 and 1977-78. They raise the same question. That question was
     referred on the application of the Revenue by the Income Tax Appellate
     Tribunal to the Andhra Pradesh High Court under Section 27(1) of the Wealth
     Tax Act. The question reads thus :

B            "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the
             Appellate Tribunal was right in law in upholding the Commissioner of
             Income-Tax (Appeals) order who directed the Wealth Tax Officer to
             exclude the amount for the assessment year 1977-78 relating to the life
             interest of the assessee added by the Wealth Tax Officer in accordance
             with Rule 18 of the Wealth Tax Rules, 1957."
c
          The principal judgment of the High Court was delivered in the case of
    Commissioner of Wealth-Tax v. Prince Mujjakkam Jah Bahadur, (186) l.T.R.
    421, which is challenged in Civil Appeal Nos. 2388-2394 of 1994, and it was
    followed in the orders which are challenged in Civil Appeal No. 3603 of 1997.

D          The assessee is a member of the family of the late Nizam of Hyderabad.
    One of the several trusts created by the late Nizam for the benefit of his heirs,
    relations and others was the Prince Mukaram Jah, Prince Muffakkam Jah and
    Princess Dur-Re-Shewar Trust. The trustees thereof, pursuant to the directions
    contained therein, constructed a house on specified land. The assessee was
E   entitled under the terms of the trust to live in that house during his life time
    without being required to pay any rent.

           In his wealth tax return for the assessment years in question the assessee
    did not include the value of the life interest so created in his favour for the
    reason that he had no alienable interest in the house. The Wealth-Tax Officer,
p   however, added the value of the said life interest in the assessee's wealth,
    applying for the purpose the provisions of Rule 1B of the Wealth Tax Rules.
    The appellate authority in first appeal held to the contrary, and the Tribunal
    in further appeal agreed. From out of the order of the Tribunal the question
    aforestated was referred to the High Court.

G          The High Court, in the impugned judgment, took the view that the said
    life interest could not be called an asset for the purposes of the Wealth-Tax
    Act, inasmuch as the assessee's interest was only to live in the house as a
    licensee and he could not dispose of his interest or deal with it in any manner
    for his benefit. He had also no proprietary interest therein.

H          The High Court followed its decision in R.C. No.69 of 1969, disposed
  COMMR OF WEALTH TAX'· PRINCE MUFF AK HAM JAH BAHADCR CHAMLIJAN [BHARCCHA. J J   52 \

of on 5th November, 1971. In that matter, the Shahebzadi Anwar Begum Trust               A
created by the late N izam was in issue. It provided that the trustees thereof
would allow the Shahebzadi to wear and use specified jewels on ceremonial
or festive occasions and other specified jewels for ordinary everyday use.
The trustees were empowered to convert any part of the "jewellery fund" into
an income yielding investment, the income whereof was to be paid to the
Shahebzadi. In the event of the death, divorce or remarriage of the Shahebzadi,          B
the trustees were required to sell the jewels and invest the sale proceeds and
pay out the income to the children and other remote issue of the Shahebzadi
and Prince Muazzam Jab. The question before the High Court was whether
the right to wear the jewellery was an asset and whether its value could be
included in the Shahebzadi's wealth for the purposes of wealth tax. The High             C
Court concluded that the Shahebzadi's interest was of a permissive nature
and could not be called property, however widely the expression was
interpreted. This was for the reason that the Shahebzadi had no proprietary
interest of any sort in the jewellery and she could not lend it. Besides, the
trustees were given the right to withdraw the jewellery from her and sell it
without her consent. Her interest in the jewellery was limited to being allowed          D
to wear it if the trustees did not withdraw it from her.

       It was common ground before the High Court that Rule 1B was not
workable in the circumstances of the present case because the formula therein
could not be applied if income did not accrue to an assessee from his life               E
interest. The High Court agreed, therefore, with the Tribunal that Rule 1B
could not be applied for determining the value of said life interest. It added,
"This of course does not mean that an asset should be excluded altogether
from computation. Even if the said rule does not apply, an asset 'l!Ust still be
valued and must be included in the wealth of the assessee if it satisfies
Section 7(1)."                                                                           F
       Section 2 of the Wealth Tax Act sets out the definitions of the
expressions used therein. Clause (e) thereof defines "assets" to include
property of every description, movable or immovable. Clause (m) thereof
defines "net wealth" to mean the amount by which the aggregate value,
computed in accordance with the provisions of the Wealth Tax Act, of all the G
assets, wherever located, belonging to the assessee on the valuation date,
including assets required to be induded in his net wealth as on that date
under the Wealth Tax Act, is in excess of the aggregate value of all the debts
owed by the assessee. Section 7 sets out how the value of assets is to be
determined. So far as it is relevant here, it says :
                                                                                         H
     522                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A            "S.7. Value of assets how to be detennined- (I) Subject to any rules
             made in this behalf, the value of any asset, other than cash, for the
             purposes of this Act, shall be estimated to be the price which in the
             opinion of the Assessing Officer it would fetch if sold in !he open
             market on the valuation date."

B          Our attention was drawn by learned counsel for the Revenue to several
     judgments of this Court and the High Court at Bombay in support of his
     contention that the said life interest was an asset of the assessee and it had
     to be taken into account in assessing his net wealth.

           In Ahmed G.H. Arif! & Ors. v. Commissioner of Wealth-Tax, Calcutta,
C (1970)76 I. T.R. 471, this Court was concerned with the right of a beneficiary
     to receive an aliquot share of the net income of properties comprised in a
     wakf-alal-aulad created by a Muslim governed by the Hanafi school of
     Mohammedan law. It was held to be property covered by the definition of
     assets in the Wealth-Tax Act, so that the capitalized value of that right was
D    assessable to wealth-tax. This Court said that "property" was a tenn of the
     widest import and signified every possible interest which a person could hold
     or enjoy. It had been held to extend even to a mahantship or shebaitship
     which combined the elements of office and property. This Court referred to
     the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Wealth-tax,
     Bombay City II v. Purshottam N. Amersey and Anr., ( 1969)71 l.T.R. 180 and
E    expressed its concurrence with the view that the charge of wealth-tax under
     Section 3 of the Wealth Tax Act on net wealth included every description of
     property of the assessee, movable and immovable, barring exceptions expressly
     stated. The High Court had rightly observed that when the statute used the
     words "if sold in the open market" it did not contemplate actual sale or the
F    actual state of the market but only enjoined that it should be assumed that
     there was an open market and the property could be sold in such market and,
     on that basis, its value had to be found out. It was an hypothetical case which
     was contemplated.

           The judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Purshottam N.
G Amersey was upheld by this Court in Purshottam N. Amarsay & Anr. v .
    . Commissioner of Wealth-Tax, Bombay City II, ((1973) 88 I.T.R. 417 and
      observations of the kind set out above were repeated. In response to the
      argument on behalf of the assessee that the Court had not considered the
      possibility of an asset not having any value whatsoever, it was said that what
      this Court had ruled in Ariffs case was that even if the property in question
H
  COMMR OF WEALTH TAX'· PRINCE MUFFAKHAM JAH BAHADUR CHAMLIJAN (BHARUCHA, I)   523

was incapable of being sold in the market for the reason that it was a personal      A
asset, the interest of the assessee had to be valued by the Wealth-Tax Officer.

      On behalf of the assessee the view taken by the High Court was
commended, namely, that the said life interest was not an asset because it
only conferred a personal, inalienable right to reside on the assessee. It was
only a licence and, therefore, not an asset.                                         B
      It is difficult, having regard to what has been laid down by this Court
in Ariff's case and Amersey 's case, to uphold the decision of the High Court.
The assessee has, by reason of the said life interest, a right to reside in the
house in question for the duration of his Iife. There can be no question but
that such a right to reside, though it be personal and inalienable, is property      C
which would have a market in an assumed market place; in other words, that
an assumed somebody would acquire this personal right to reside in the
property during the lifetime of the assessee and pay a price for it.

      The alternative contention advanced before this Court on behalf of the         D
assessee was as follows: When a rule provides a method of valuation of an
asset, it is only that rule that can be applied and no further recourse to
Section 7 is permissible. Rule 18 in the instant case indicated how a life
interest was to be valued. It had been applied by the Wealth-Tax Officer. That
application was correct. Because the said life interest yielded no actual income
to the assessee, the value of the said life interest so calculated was zero.         E
      Rule 1B, in so far as it is relevant, reads thus :

        "(!)For the purposes of sub-section (I) of Section 7, the market value
        of the life interest of an assessee shall be arrived at by multiplying
        the average annual income that accrued to the assessee from the life         F
        interest by 1/14141 ~· 1 where 'I' represents the annual premium for
        a whole-life insurance without profits on the life of the life tenant for
        unit sum assured as specified in the Appendix to those rules, and 'd'
        is equal to 111 plus, 'i' being the rate of interest."

      As has been noted, it was agreed by learned counsel appearing on               G
behalf of both the assessee and the Revenue before the High Court that Rule
1B was not workable in the circumstances of the present case, which is clearly
correct for it is applicable only to an income yielding life interest. It is,
therefore, difficult to see how it can now be argued on behalf of the assessee
that Rule I B was correctly applied. In any event, we are in agreement with          H
    524                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20001 SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A the High Court, and indeed, with the Tribunal before it, that even if Rule IB
    did not apply, the said life interest, if an asset, had still to be valued and be
    included in the wealth of the assessee, which is what Section 7 required. In
    the absence of a rule which can apply to the valuation of a particular asset,
    that asset must be valued in the ordinary way, by determining what it would
    fetch if it were sold in an assumed market; the value being what an assumed
B   willing purchaser would pay for it. This is how the said life interest must be
    assessed, upon the assumption that the assessee's personal right to reside
    in the property during his life time is saleable.

           For the reasons aforestated, the judgment and orders under challenge
C are set aside. The question afcirequoted is answered in the negative and in
    favour of the Revenue. The said life interest shall now be valued for each of
    the Assessment Years in question in the manner set out above. No order as
    to costs.

    B.S.                                                          Appeals allowed.




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